42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege the violation of the plaintiff’s own civil rights under color of state law, not a violation of another person’s rights.

McArthur v. Robinson · filed 1983-07-22

The plaintiff has not attempted to allege that the children’s cause of action arises under the provisions of section 1983, but even if he did, the law clearly is that a plaintiff, in order to fall within the provisions of this statute, must allege that his civil rights have been violated under color of state law, not the civil rights of another person.

Section 1983 does not create a right for a municipality to sue its state for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment deprivation.

City of South Portland v. State · filed 1984-04-30

In the absence of a clearly expressed intent, we do not believe Congress in enacting the forerunner of section 1983 meant to create a new right in favor of a municipality.

An organization generally lacks standing under § 1983 to sue for violations of its members’ personal rights.

The League Of Women Voters Of Nassau County v. Nassau County Board Of Supervisors · filed 1984-05-22

Necessarily, we adhere to our prior decisions and, consequently, hold that the League lacks standing under Sec. 1983, the only jurisdictional basis asserted.

An organization generally lacks standing under § 1983 to sue for violations of its members’ personal rights.

League of Women Voters v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors · filed 1984-05-22

Necessarily, we adhere to our prior decisions and, consequently, hold that the League lacks standing under § 1983, the only jurisdictional basis asserted.

A section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover for constitutional injuries inflicted on a predecessor property owner rather than on the plaintiff itself.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse · filed 1985-07-12

In this action, therefore, plaintiff cannot rely upon the violation of its predecessor’s constitutional rights, and following the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in ... we find that the city’s conduct directed against the plaintiff was insufficient to constitute a taking or a deprivation of property in violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.

Aliens may sue under § 1983.

Jaffe v. Boyles · filed 1985-08-27

Aliens may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation is a person that may assert a claim under Section 1983.

Regency Catering Services, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre · filed 1985-12-06

Although there seems to be some wrangling over the issue whether a corporate entity is a “person” as contemplated by the drafters of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we think it well-settled that a corporation can assert a claim thereunder.

Section 1983 plaintiffs may recover only for deprivations of their own constitutional rights, not another person's rights.

Trejo v. Wattles · filed 1985-12-09

Further, plaintiffs may only recover for deprivations of their own constitutional rights; not the rights of another.

A state university has no standing under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to sue its creating state or enjoin a state education board.

United States v. Alabama · filed 1986-06-06

ASU thus has no standing to sue or to seek to enjoin the Alabama state board of education under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

An individual § 1983 plaintiff must plead an injury to the plaintiff’s own legal rights and interests, rather than seeking recovery solely for injuries to a decedent.

ESTATE OF · filed 1987-05-18

Plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights and interests.

An individual § 1983 plaintiff must plead an injury to the plaintiff’s own legal rights and interests, rather than seeking recovery solely for injuries to a decedent.

Estate of Johnson ex rel. Castle v. Village of Libertyville · filed 1987-05-18

Plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights and interests.

A person may not sue or recover § 1983 damages for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Otero v. Riefkohl · filed 1987-06-17

The law is clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

A corporation is a person entitled to maintain an action under § 1983.

TETON PLUMBING & HEAT., INC. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District Number One · filed 1988-10-24

Similarly, a corporation (such as appellant) is considered to be a “person” possessing due process rights and being entitled to maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not let a person suing in an individual capacity recover damages for a violation of someone else’s civil rights.

Estate of Cooper by and Through Cooper v. Leamer · filed 1989-02-10

In the first three counts of the complaint, Denice Cooper, in her individual capacity, asserts civil rights claims against all three defendants. Far from a model of a well-drafted pleading, each of those counts appears to rest primarily upon alleged violations of David Cooper’s constitutional rights. It is clear that one may not recover damages for the violation of another’s civil rights.

A corporation may sue under Section 1983 for violations of its own federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Erret v. Pennsylvania · filed 1989-03-29

It has been long-settled that a corporation is a “person” entitled to sue under Section 1983 for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights.

A person who merely observes an alleged violation of another person’s rights cannot sue as a plaintiff under § 1983 on that basis.

Ronnie Brock, Ray Bush v. Dwight Lacy McNealy Dr. · filed 1989-08-07

The district court's order dismissing Ray Bush is not in error. There are absolutely no facts alleged that make Bush anything more than a mere observer of the action.

Hospitals may use § 1983 to challenge state Medicaid plans for violations of federal statutory rights under Title XIX.

Temple University v. White · filed 1990-01-24

Before addressing the merits, however, it is necessary to refer briefly to defendants’ threshold argument that plaintiff cannot maintain this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of alleged federal statutory rights, because Title XIX gives rise to no rights which can be asserted by hospitals. This precise argument has been persuasively rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, et al., 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir., 1989), and I am bound by that decision.

Section 1983 does not permit a state’s political subdivisions to assert their own Fourteenth Amendment rights against the state because they have no such rights against it.

Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Department of Social Services · filed 1990-03-05

It has long been settled that a subdivision of a state is not entitled, as against the state, to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Consequently, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to so much of the complaint as attempts to state claims on behalf of the County, the Board, the WBSS and WDSS, or Ann Carbaugh in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of his own civil rights, but not for deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Shepard v. Egan · filed 1990-08-13

Further, it is settled law that a person may generally sue only for deprivation of his own civil rights, and may not sue for deprivation of another’s civil rights.

Section 1983 allows an individual employee to sue a state official for interference with the employee’s rights under the National Labor Relations Act.

Livadas v. Aubry · filed 1990-10-12

Therefore, it is clear that Karen Livadas has a private right of action under § 1983 to bring this case as an individual to vindicate her NLRA rights from interference by the state.

Section 1983 does not let parents or siblings recover personally for a child’s death when government action was not aimed at their family relationship, but the parents may pursue the child’s claim as legal heirs.

Arroyo v. Pla · filed 1990-10-16

Although we find that plaintiffs cannot bring a cause of action in their personal capacity for damages they sustained from Eddie’s death, Eddie’s parents, not the decedent’s siblings, can nevertheless bring an action on behalf of the son’s suffering in their representative capacity as legal heirs to his cause of action.

Section 1983 allows a corporate entity, including a union, to sue for violations of its own First Amendment rights.

Broderick v. City of Boston · filed 1991-01-28

Corporate entities as well as individuals possess standing to sue under section 1983 for violations of their First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits a child born after the alleged unconstitutional killing of a parent to sue for loss of familial companionship because that injury arises at birth, when the child is a person.

John Crumpton, IV v. Daryl Gates Tom Bradley Tom Reddin Ed Davis Herbert Boeckmann Maxwell E. Greenberg Barbara L. Schle · filed 1991-11-04

Because Crumpton’s injury arose at birth, even under the most restrictive view of the scope of section 1983, he is entitled to proceed as a proper party in his federal civil rights suit.

Section 1983 does not allow an Indian tribe itself to sue because a tribe is not a citizen of the United States or other person under the statute.

Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho · filed 1992-07-20

Second, the court finds that the Tribe may not bring a Section 1983 action because it is not a “citizen of the United States or other person” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing in her own right to assert a violation of her own federally protected rights, rather than another person’s rights.

Rose v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1993-01-22

It is well established that the federally protected rights that are enforceable under § 1983 are “personal” to the injured party. Accordingly, a § 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of Plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

A municipality cannot use § 1983 to challenge state action under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment because it is not a person protected by those amendments.

City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court for Twentieth Judicial Circuit · filed 1993-02-25

Because East St. Louis is not a “person,” it cannot invoke the protection of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, ... and therefore cannot bring a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiffs themselves to have been deprived of a constitutional right by defendants acting under color of state law; grandparents who are neither parents nor legal guardians cannot sue solely on a grandchild’s behalf.

Rowland v. Thompson · filed 1993-04-05

To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants acted under color of state law, and that the defendants' conduct deprived the plaintiffs of a constitutional right. ... The Rowlands cannot sue on the minor child's behalf, and they have no cause of action to sue on their own behalf.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to allege a violation of the claimant’s own constitutional rights.

Pacheco v. Y Lebron · filed 1993-05-05

To maintain an action under section 1983, claimants must allege that their personal constitutional rights have been violated in some manner.

Section 1983 allows a partnership to sue for deprivations of its constitutional rights caused by misconduct under color of state law.

Brophy Ahern Dev. v. City of West Haven, No. 33 55 52 (Jun. 15, 1993) · filed 1993-06-15

A partnership has standing to sue under the statute that creates a federal cause of action against persons whose misconduct, under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another.

A corporation is a person who may sue under § 1983.

Corner Construction Corp. v. Rapid City School District No. 51-4 · filed 1994-03-02

A corporation is considered a “person” under both the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co. · filed 1994-04-15

The trial court correctly held that a § 1983 action is personal in nature and cannot be asserted vicariously for the denial of some other person’s civil rights.

Governmental entities are not protected “persons” entitled to invoke § 1983.

City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1994-11-17

Furthermore, governmental entities are not protected “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim only by the person toward whom the state action was directed, not a family member incidentally affected by that person’s injury or death.

Soto v. Carrasquillo · filed 1995-01-20

Only the person towards whom the state action was directed, and not those individuals incidentally affected, may bring a section 1983 action for a violation of due process rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district that is an arm of the state to sue because it is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

School Dist. of Phila. v. PA. MILK MARKETING BD. · filed 1995-02-14

We find that the School District is not a person that can sue within the meaning of § 1983. Accordingly, the School District's claim under Count Three must be dismissed on this ground as well.

A school district that is an arm of the state is not a person that can sue under § 1983.

School District v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board · filed 1995-02-14

We find that the School District is not a person that can sue within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a parent a personal loss-of-companionship claim based on a constitutional deprivation suffered by the child.

Gravely v. Madden · filed 1995-09-08

This Court likewise concludes that a loss of companionship claim by the parent of a child who has suffered a constitutional deprivation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district to sue an agency of its creating state because the district is not an “other person” entitled to sue under the statute.

Barbara Z. Ex Rel. Devin Z. v. Obradovich · filed 1996-07-05

Absent Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent to the contrary, we conclude that the School District is not an “other person” that can sue (as opposed to being sued) within the meaning of section 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit over violations of a decedent’s constitutional rights, state law determines who may bring the action.

Pope v. Ward · filed 1996-08-14

In suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the question of who may bring an action for violations of a decedent’s constitutional rights is answered by looking to state law.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to sue a public employer for infringement of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Jackson v. James · filed 1996-08-16

It is well-established that an employee may sue his or her public employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the violation rests on a claim of infringement of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Individual beneficiaries of the Hawaii Admission Act public land trust may sue state officials in their individual capacities under § 1983 to enforce the trust obligation.

Rice v. Cayetano · filed 1996-09-06

As an initial matter, the court finds that under Ninth Circuit law, individual beneficiaries can bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against state officials in their individual capacities to enforce the trust obligation in the Admission Act.

A foreign consul is a person who may sue under § 1983.

Republic of Paraguay v. Allen · filed 1996-11-27

Only Jose Dos Santos, Consul General of the Republic of Paraguay, has asserted a claim under § 1983. In their motion to ... dismiss, defendants assume that Mr. Dos Santos, a Paraguayan official, is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute. This assumption is erroneous. ... Mr. Dos Santos is a proper plaintiff.

A corporation may sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights.

Auburn Medical Center, Inc. v. Peters · filed 1996-12-12

Accordingly, the plaintiff has standing to sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights.

Section 1983 does not give a school district a cause of action against a parent or guardian to enforce an IDEA administrative decision.

Metropolitan School Dist. of Martinsville v. Buskirk · filed 1997-01-06

While section 1983 gives a private individual a right to bring a cause of 'action against a municipal body (such as a public school) to vindicate substantive federal rights, the statute clearly does not give the municipality any comparable rights in a dispute with a parent or guardian.

Section 1983 does not give inmates a claim based solely on possible misuse of service fees that were properly assessed and collected.

Weinlood v. Simmons · filed 1997-04-18

Possible improper expenditure of service fees properly assessed and collected is not violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims on behalf of unborn children because they are not persons or citizens within its meaning.

Alexander v. Whitman · filed 1997-05-23

Because the unborn are not persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it follows that the unborn are not encompassed within the meaning of the terai "person” or "citizen" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to be a United States citizen; a person within United States jurisdiction may sue.

Colon v. Mack · filed 1997-09-05

THE COURT: To establish a claim under 1983, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence four items. ... First, that he was a citizen of the United States. ... Though I did not discuss further the first prong, ... mere mention of it was' sufficient error to taint the jury instructions.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a deprivation of their own rights, but does not give relatives a claim for that deprivation.

City of Alamo v. Casas · filed 1997-12-04

The rights protected by section 1983 are personal in nature, and the right to bring suit under the statute is vested solely in the person who suffered the deprivation, and does not accrue to a relative.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights action on behalf of an unborn fetus because the fetus is not a person who can bring a deprivation-of-rights claim.

Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic · filed 1997-12-11

Blackburn’s fetus, however, is not a “person” on whose behalf a civil rights action may be commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights.

A state cannot sue under § 1983 because it is neither a citizen of the United States nor a statutory person.

State of Illinois v. City of Chicago, Illinois, and City of Gary, Indiana · filed 1998-02-19

But only a "citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof” may be a plaintiff, and Illinois is neither a "citizen of the United States” nor a statutory "person”.

Section 1983 lets providers sue state officials to enforce Medicaid Act provisions if the providers are among those the provisions are intended to benefit.

Paramount Health Systems, Inc. v. Wright · filed 1998-03-19

But the providers can, as they have done, sue them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they are within the class intended to be benefited by the Medicaid Act.

Citizens and current or former state officials with a legal interest in a state measure’s constitutionality may challenge it under § 1983.

Barker v. Hazeltine · filed 1998-03-31

The three plaintiffs, as citizens, residents, taxpayers, registered voters, and current or former South Dakota elected officials, have a legal interest in the constitutionality of Initiated Measure 1 which they may properly bring before the Court in this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a foreign nation to sue because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Breard v. Greene · filed 1998-04-21

Paraguay is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipality to sue or a state to be sued.

Rockford Board of Education, School District No. 205, and People Who Care, Intervenors-Appellants v. Illinois State Boar · filed 1998-07-17

Apart from the fact that a city or other municipality cannot bring a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and that a state can’t be sued under that statute either, ... the board does not assert an interest that federal law protects, and so the entire suit, not merely the section 1983 claims, fails at the threshold.

A conjugal partnership has no independent claim under § 1983 unless it suffered a direct constitutional deprivation.

Torres v. United States · filed 1998-10-08

Inasmuch as no direct constitutional claim is being asserted on behalf of the conjugal partnership it has no viable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a corporate principal to recover individually for a constitutional injury suffered only through searches of the corporation’s businesses.

Mom's, Inc. v. Weber · filed 2000-01-13

With this in mind, the Court is of the opinion that because Plaintiff Bonk’s home was not searched, the only constitutional violation he may have suffered he suffered vicariously as a principal of Mom’s through the searches conducted at the two Jewish Mother locations. Accordingly, he cannot recover individually and summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims brought by Bonk.

A charter school and its association cannot bring a § 1983 equal protection claim because they are not persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Academy of Charter Schools v. Adams County School District No. 12 · filed 2000-03-13

The trial court correctly held that the Academy and the Association, if persons, are not protected persons under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits corporations to sue for violations of their rights because corporations are persons under the statute.

American Fabricare v. Township of Falls · filed 2000-06-13

Corporations are "persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and can bring suit for violations of their rights.

A parent has standing under § 1983 to sue on behalf of a deceased adult child for the deprivation of the child's constitutional rights.

White v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2000-10-27

The Court notes the somewhat unsettled state of the law concerning whether a parent may sue under section 1983 for the constitutional deprivations suffered by the parent's adult child. ... This Court agrees with the foregoing authority and concludes that Marlene White has standing to sue on behalf of her deceased adult child.

Section 1983 does not permit a private college to bring an action against itself.

President and Trustees of Bates College v. Congregation Beth Abraham · filed 2001-02-13

Bates College cannot bring a § 1983 or other action against itself.

Section 1983 allows organizations to sue as persons.

Esperanza Peace and Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio · filed 2001-05-15

Plaintiffs are “persons” entitled to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a state acting as parens patriae to sue to vindicate its citizens’ rights against a defendant acting under color of state authority.

Oregon Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Heavy Vehicle Electronic License Plate, Inc. · filed 2001-08-09

It stands to reason that plaintiff Oregon, ... acting as parens patraie, may bring the suit to vindicate the rights of its citizens.

A deceased person cannot be a plaintiff under § 1983.

Estate of Smith v. Town of West Hartford · filed 2002-02-15

The decedent, however, is not a person under § 1983 or state law and cannot be considered a plaintiff.

Corporations may have standing to bring due process claims under § 1983.

Alexis, Inc. v. Pinellas County, Florida · filed 2002-03-29

Corporations may possess standing to assert due process violations under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits providers and beneficiaries to sue state officials to enforce federal statutory rights.

Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson · filed 2003-04-01

Both beneficiaries and providers (such as LTCPA, on behalf of its members) have standing to assert a Section 1983 private action against state officials for violations of federal statutory rights such as those claimed by LTCPA.

A decedent’s Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983 could be brought only by the decedent’s estate.

Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares · filed 2003-06-23

Admittedly, the distinction was significant on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims because these could only be brought by the estate.

Section 1983 does not allow a tribe to vindicate its sovereign rights by naming its wholly owned corporation or tribal officers with no independent interest in the property at issue.

Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline · filed 2004-01-15

Nor can the ruling in Inyo County be circumvented by the expediency of simply naming HCI or the individuals plaintiffs Blackhawk and Morgan. As plaintiffs conceded, Blackhawk and Morgan have no independent ownership interest in the property seized by the state; they are tribal officers and members attempting to obtain immunity from state laws based upon the sovereign status of the tribe. And HCI is an entity wholly owned by the Tribe. It has no claim, “like other private persons,” for immunity from state revenue and criminal proceedings; its claim for sovereign immunity is wholly derivative from its owner, Ho-Chuck, Inc, its owner in turn, the tribe.

Section 1983 permits the direct victim or the victim’s estate representative to sue, but does not give the victim’s children a claim for their own loss of consortium.

Tallman v. Elizabethtown Police Department · filed 2004-05-24

Accordingly, only the victim him or herself, or the estate’s representative, may bring a § 1983 action, so the victim’s children have no cause of action for loss of consortium for injuries they may have personally suffered.

An estate administratrix may be an injured person entitled to assert a § 1983 claim on the estate’s behalf.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1982-09-13

Barrett in her role as administratrix of the estate should also be considered an injured "person" for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a spouse’s loss of consortium claim when the spouse suffered no deprivation of his own federally protected rights.

Stallworth v. City of Cleveland · filed 1990-03-05

The statute provides redress to a party suffering injuries from a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law. It is Mrs. Stallworth who has allegedly suffered injuries based on such a deprivation. Mr. Stallworth's loss of consortium claim does not represent an injury based on a deprivation of his rights, privileges or immunities. Therefore, the text of the statute does not reach his claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a sovereign tribe to assert communal treaty based fishing rights or its members to bring actions to vindicate those communal rights.

Indian v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-03-08

Recognizing that “[s]ection 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment,” id. at 712, as well as the “long-standing interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign,” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780 (2000), we conclude that the Tribe may not assert its treaty-based fishing rights under section 1983. ... The Tribe’s treaty-based rights do not give rise to individual actions cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights under color of state law.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States · filed 2005-03-09

Recognizing that "[s]ection 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment," id. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, as well as the "long-standing interpretive presumption that `person' does not include the sovereign," Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), we conclude that the Tribe may not assert its treaty-based fishing rights under section 1983. ... Because the Tribe's members seek to vindicate communal, rather than individual rights, they do not have cognizable section 1983 claims against the City or TPU.

Section 1983 does not allow a state or state agency to bring an action as a plaintiff.

Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Reinhard · filed 2005-04-06

For both of these rea- sons, we hold that a state or state agency may not maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a state or state agency to bring an action.

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Dr. · filed 2005-04-06

For both of these reasons, we hold that a state or state agency may not maintain a § 1983 action.

A Section 1983 claim arising directly from a decedent’s death belongs to the estate and may be brought by its administratrix, not by the decedent’s child individually.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1986-12-10

In accordance with this dismissal of the post-death cover-up claims, Elizabeth Barrett in her individual capacity is also dismissed as a plaintiff in this suit. The claims made in this case arising directly out of Harold Blauer’s death, both under the Federal Tort Claims Act and under Section 1983, belong solely to the estate of Harold Blauer. Thus, these remaining claims, the “pre-death claims,” may be asserted by Elizabeth Barrett only in her capacity as administratrix of her father’s estate.

Section 1983 does not allow individual tribal members to sue to vindicate communal treaty fishing rights.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-06-03

Because the Tribe's members seek to vindicate communal, rather than individual rights, they do not have cognizable section 1983 claims against the City or TPU.

A corporation is a person that may sue under § 1983.

Laredo Road Co. v. Maverick County, Texas · filed 2005-07-14

Plaintiff, a corporation, is a “person” as stated by § 1983 and defined by 1 U.S.C. § 1, which explains that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”

Section 1983 allows only the person whose civil rights were violated to bring a claim; family members affected indirectly cannot sue on that person’s behalf.

Zayas v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2005-07-19

In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims arise out of the allegedly discriminatory acts of Defendants directed at Arianna. The First Circuit case law is crystal clear to the effect that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to that Section.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner who alleges only that he witnessed an assault on another prisoner to sue over that assault.

Dennis Calloway, Larry Calloway v. Eric Dahlberg, Beach, Corrections Officer · filed 1989-08-04

Plaintiff Dennis Calloway claimed that he witnessed the alleged attack. The complaint does not set forth any allegations that plaintiff Dennis Calloway was subjected to any assault, battery or racial insults. ... The plaintiffs concede in their reply brief that Dennis Calloway has no standing to bring suit and that he was properly dismissed as a plaintiff. The district court therefore properly dismissed the suit as it pertains to Dennis Calloway.

Corporations, including incorporated religious organizations, are persons who may bring § 1983 claims for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.

Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County · filed 2006-06-01

Accordingly, we hold that Primera, as an incorporated religious organization, stated a section 1983 claim for violation of its equal protection, due process, and free exercise rights.

State law determines who may bring a § 1983 action on a decedent's behalf.

Williams v. Bradshaw · filed 2006-08-16

Federal courts are to apply state law in deciding who may bring a § 1983 action on a decedent's behalf.

Section 1983 does not permit an unincorporated association to sue because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Lippoldt v. Cole · filed 2006-11-07

As such, we reverse the district court’s ruling that OSA is a “person” entitled to bring a claim under Section 1983, and we remand with direction to dismiss OSA’s claims.

Section 1983 permits a private corporation to sue for a constitutional violation, even if the state created it, when the corporation is private in nature.

de Sus v. Flores-Galarza · filed 2007-03-01

A private corporation may allege a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give relatives an independent claim based solely on a civil rights violation directed at someone else.

Perez-Sanchez v. Public Building Authority · filed 2007-03-12

Only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private corporation to sue for a constitutional violation.

Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Juan A. Flores Galarza · filed 2007-04-18

A private corporation may allege a constitutional violation under § 1983.

A limited liability company may bring a § 1983 action to vindicate its own constitutional rights.

Orgain v. City of Salisbury · filed 2007-06-25

Accordingly, M31 Andromeda has standing to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow an Indian tribe to sue to vindicate rights it asserts by virtue of its sovereignty rather than private rights.

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Kleine · filed 2008-03-27

Because § 1983 was designed to vindicate only private rights, the Community is not a “person” under § 1983 for purposes of the rights at issue in the present case. For that reason, the Court will grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the Community’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a Medicaid provider to sue over reimbursement rates if the provider is not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act.

Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz · filed 1985-06-13

Further, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that Arden House is not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act and therefore has no standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of said Act.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of their own federal rights, but not another person’s rights.

Casanas v. De Leon · filed 1986-04-01

The law seems clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Corporations may bring § 1983 claims to vindicate their Fourteenth Amendment rights, including occupational liberty.

SOC, Inc. v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2009-01-22

The district court incorrectly held that corporations do not have the right to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deprivation of occupational liberty.

Section 1983 allows an alien whose presence in the United States is illegal to bring a federal claim against a state officer for violating due process or equal protection.

Bolanos v. Maurice F. Kiley, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York District · filed 1975-01-29

We can likewise agree that...42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) affords such an alien' access to the federal courts to assert a claim of violation of those clauses by a state officer.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to a Medicaid provider deprived of reimbursement by state action that violates federal law.

Yapalater v. Bates · filed 1980-07-30

He claims that wrongful administration of the Medicaid program by the state deprives him of reimbursement to which federal law entitles him. In my judgment, § 1983 as interpreted by the Thiboutot majority furnishes this plaintiff a remedy.

An inmate cannot use § 1983 to bring claims belonging to other inmates.

Smith v. Lund · filed 2009-05-12

Finally, we agree with the district court that Smith may not bring the claims of other inmates, see Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); we reject his argument that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint (a second time), because he did not seek leave to do so, see Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008); and we deny his pending motions.

Section 1983 allows only persons to sue, so one branch of a state cannot use it to sue another.

Indiana Prot. and Adv. v. Ind. Family Soc. Serv. · filed 2009-07-28

Only "persons" can sue under § 1983, and the upshot of this is that § 1983 cannot be used by one branch of a state to sue another.

Section 1983 permits only persons to sue, so one branch of a state cannot use it to sue another.

Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2009-07-28

Only “persons” can sue under §1983, and the upshot of this is that §1983 cannot be used by one branch of a state to sue another.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid providers a right to enforce section 30(A)’s equal access provision.

Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood · filed 2001-01-05

However, we find that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that providers also have a right to bring suit under § 1983 to remedy violations of section 30(A).

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to have suffered the alleged injury personally; a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for an injury suffered by a tenant.

LaCroix v. MARSHALL COUNTY BD. OF SUP'RS · filed 2009-08-18

We find no error in the chancellor's granting partial summary judgment in favor of the County on LaCroix's section 1983 claim regarding violation of section 19-5-22 as it was LaCroix's tenant, and not LaCroix, who sustained any alleged injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show an injury to himself; he cannot sue for an injury suffered only by another person.

LaCroix v. Marshall County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-08-18

The chancellor found that LaCroix did not prove an injury to himself as required to bring a section 1983 claim, and we agree.

A deceased victim’s spouse may state a § 1983 claim as the estate’s legal representative by alleging the marriage and death.

Garrett v. Belmont County Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2010-04-01

Therefore, since Plaintiff did allege that he is her spouse and that Mrs. Garrett is deceased, this Court interprets that allegation as sufficient to state a claim that Plaintiff is the legal representative of Mrs. Garrett’s estate.

A state-created public charter school and its officer acting in an official capacity cannot bring a § 1983 claim against the state.

Nampa Classical Academy v. Goesling · filed 2010-05-17

Accordingly, both NCA and Mr. Moffett in his official capacity cannot, as a matter of law state a claim under § 1983 against the State.

Section 1983 does not let family members sue for a violation of another person’s constitutional rights when their own rights were not violated.

González-Droz v. González-Colón · filed 2010-06-15

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Plaintiffs other than González-Droz lack a viable claim under Section 1983, since they do not claim that their constitutional rights were violated, but only that they have suffered damages for the violation of González-Droz’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows an injured party to seek redress but does not authorize a person to sue for an injury to someone else’s rights.

Johnson v. Miller · filed 2010-07-08

In some instances, Congress grants a statutory right of action for a party who suffers some injury to bring a claim based on another’s rights. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no such right, saying only the government official “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.).

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse or conjugal partnership to sue for another person’s constitutional injury when they were not deprived of their own protected interest.

Abreu v. Oquendo-Rivera · filed 2010-08-09

Because neither plaintiff Reyes nor plaintiffs’ conjugal partnership were deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, they may not bring section 1983 claims on their own behalf.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid transportation providers a private right to enforce Section 30(A) against the State.

Murphy v. Jannis Fisher · filed 2010-08-30

While developments in this area may continue, as suggested by the parties’ various submissions of additional authority, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals holding that Providers do not have a private right to sue the State.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to recover for constitutional injuries inflicted on another person; a familial relationship claim requires conduct directed at the plaintiff and intended to deprive her of that relationship.

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver · filed 2010-09-30

Although there is a recognized constitutional cause of action for deprivation of a familial relationship, the government conduct at issue must be directed at the plaintiff and intended to deprive him or her of that relationship. ... Ulibarri does not assert any such claim and all other alleged constitutional violations involve conduct directed at Vigil. It appears that Vigil is represented here by his Estate, not Plaintiff Ulibarri. Accordingly, I agree with Defendants that summary judgment should enter in their favor on any civil rights claims asserted by Ms. Ulibarri.

A charter school is not barred from suing under § 1983 merely because state law allows it to be sued on the same terms as a political subdivision.

Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School District · filed 2011-08-25

According to the District Court, the language in § 17-1714-A stating that a charter school may “sue and be sued . . . to the same extent and upon the same condition that [a] political subdivision[] . . . can be sued” amounts to an “explicit state[ment]” that charter schools are political subdivisions that cannot bring § 1983 suits. This is simply incorrect. The statute merely states that a charter school can sue and be sued to the same extent that a political subdivision can be sued. The inclusion of “to the same extent and upon the same condition” makes it clear that the statute does not, as the District Court asserts, equate a charter school with a political subdivision.

Section 1983 does not let children sue for a violation of their father’s rights when the alleged conduct was not directed at them.

Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw · filed 2012-01-18

Because plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that defendants’ alleged conduct was directed at them, the Court sustains defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the claims by Bruner’s children.

An LLC member whose financial losses are derivative of the company’s losses cannot bring an individual Section 1983 claim without a direct, independent injury.

Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap County · filed 2012-06-13

Like the district court, we find that Piper’s personal financial losses are derivative of Woods View’s own losses. Piper was not injured directly and independently of the limited liability company and therefore lacks standing to pursue individual claims against Appellees.

Section 1983 allows a charter school to sue as a statutory “person” but bars it from asserting constitutional claims against its school district creator.

Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School District · filed 2012-11-08

Because the relationship between a charter school and a school district is sufficiently analogous, to the relationship between a municipality and its creator, the Charter School’s § 1983 claims will be dismissed.

A plaintiff cannot state a first-party claim under § 1983 based solely on the alleged violation of someone else’s constitutional rights.

Obergefell v. Wymyslo · filed 2013-11-01

The only claim brought in the Second Amended Complaint is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of same-sex couples married in other jurisdictions. Mr. Grunn is not asking for relief that will remedy any alleged unconstitutional treatment that he himself has suffered at the hands of anyone acting under color of state law. Consequently, Mr. Grunn has failed to meet pleading requirements to state a claim on his own behalf, and his attempt to do so must be dismissed.

A child born alive may pursue a Section 1983 claim for injuries allegedly begun in utero and continuing after birth.

Mori v. Allegheny County · filed 2014-09-30

In short, as noted in Crumpton, the proposition that “infants injured in útero and later born alive simply must bear their federally cognizable afflictions without hope of remedy” reflects at best dubious logic and runs counter to the various remedies Congress contemplated in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, from which § 1983 was derived. ... We decline moving defendants’ invitation to endorse that proposition and will deny their motion on this score.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to sue as an “other person” under the statute.

Municipality of San Sebastian v. Rico · filed 2015-03-06

In harmony with Santiago, the Court holds that the Municipality of San Sebastian is an “other person” within section 1983 and is entitled to bring suit pursuant to that statute.

Section 1983 requires a shareholder asserting a civil rights claim to allege an individual, direct injury rather than harm suffered by the corporation.

Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove · filed 2015-04-27

In particular, “a plaintiff-shareholder cannot maintain a civil rights action for damages suffered by the corporation.” ... “Filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not diminish the requirement that the shareholder suffer some individual, direct injury”). ... Nevertheless, because it is self-evident from the amended complaint that the only harms alleged are to Lei-bundguth the corporation, the Village’s motion to dismiss Peterson as a plaintiff is granted.

Section 1983 allows abortion providers to sue state officials to enjoin state laws that violate federal rights.

Planned Parenthood of Wiscons v. Schimel · filed 2015-11-23

The cases are legion that allow an abortion provider, such as Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin or AMS, to sue to enjoin as violations of federal law (hence litigable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) state laws that restrict abortion.

Section 1983 does not bar a union or its members from being plaintiffs.

Huebner v. Ochberg · filed 1980-07-25

The jurisdictional statutes in the case at bar are the same as those in Aldinger, yet there is nothing in those statutes, their legislative history, or their judicial interpretations which indicates a Congressional intent to bar a Union or its members from being plaintiffs.

Section 1983 claims are personal to the injured person and, after that person’s death, may be pursued by the estate through a proper representative.

Akbar v. Calumet City, Illinois · filed 2015-12-14

The only party entitled to raise the claims here is Akbar’s estate, through a proper representative. See Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2011) (“§ 1983 claims are personal to the inured party” and thus may only be prosecuted by the estate’s representative).

Section 1983 permits claims to survive under Alabama wrongful-death law.

Davis v. Riley · filed 2005-10-21

With respect to standing, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been construed by our Supreme Court to permit survivorship, under Alabama law governing wrongful-death claims, of claims brought under that statute. See Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So.2d 373, 380 (Ala.1983). Although Davis has not alleged in his complaint that he is the personal representative of his brother’s estate so as to empower him to bring a wrongful-death action under Alabama law, Davis is not required to prove his capacity to sue in the absence of a defendant’s specific denial, under Rule 9(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., of his capacity to sue. See Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So.2d 930, 934 (Ala.1979). Thus, to the extent that the circuit court’s judgment is based upon Davis’s lack of standing to sue, that judgment is premature.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing on their own behalf to assert a violation of their own rights, not another person’s rights.

A.B. ex rel. Ybarra v. City of Woodland Park · filed 2016-03-29

A civil rights claim must be based on the violation of a plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

Section 1983 allows a victim’s estate representatives to bring the victim’s claim, but family members cannot sue individually for injuries that result from the alleged violation.

Singleton v. Kentucky · filed 2016-03-31

Therefore, the § 1983 claims brought by the Singletons in their individual capacities are properly dismissed for lack of standing. ... However, the Singletons have standing for the § 1983 claims brought in their capacities as co-administrators of their mother’s estate.

Section 1983 permits a surviving parent to seek recovery for personal injuries caused by violations of a child’s rights when § 1988 incorporates the applicable state wrongful-death statute.

Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept, et a · filed 2016-04-07

It follows that a litigant such as Rodgers may sue under §§ 1983 and 1985 for injuries to another, because § 1988 incorporates wrongful-death statutes.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a violation of their own constitutional rights, but not for injuries collateral to a violation of someone else’s rights.

LeFever v. Ferguson · filed 2016-04-15

Claims under § 1983 are personal to the party injured by a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a tribe to sue to protect a sovereign interest because the tribe is not a “person” in that capacity.

Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation · filed 2017-08-25

In our view, the right being asserted here is, at its core, the right of tribal sovereignty. And in seeking to protect that right, the Tribe is proceeding in its sovereign capacity, not as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a charter school to bring a claim against its school district.

First Philadelphia Preparatory Charter School v. Commonwealth of PA, Department of Education · filed 2018-02-22

Therefore, we agree that charter schools cannot assert Section 1983 claims against their school districts, and sustain this preliminary objection.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to sue for an injury that is derivative of a violation of another person's constitutional rights.

Zell v. Ricci · filed 2018-03-30

Try as they might to allege a separate and distinct injury, the remainder of Mark and Beth Zell's allegations are entirely derivative of their daughter's. Yet one person lacks standing to advance the constitutional rights of another. ... Mark and Beth Zell lack standing as to each of their claims (Counts I, II, and III).

Section 1983 allows people alleging unconstitutional state or local government action to seek money damages from the responsible officials.

Benner v. St. Paul Pub. Sch. · filed 2019-05-03

This provision of federal law, commonly called " Section 1983," allows victims of allegedly unconstitutional state or local government actions to sue the offending government official(s) for money damages.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff bring a claim based on a violation of his children’s rights.

Ford v. City Of Rockford · filed 2019-05-07

As the Court explained, a violation of Plaintiff’s children’s rights does not state a claim on behalf of Plaintiff. He cannot represent his children as to any purported violation of their rights.

Section 1983 allows a deceased person’s estate representative to bring the person’s civil rights claims.

Arnold v. Olathe, Kansas, City of · filed 2019-09-11

Plaintiff properly brings § 1983 claims as the representative of the estate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights, rather than another person’s rights.

Gilpatrick v. Harper County, Kansas, Board of Commissioners · filed 2019-09-11

Therefore, the court finds that Gilpatrick and Daren Moon’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed as they have not alleged any violation of their own personal rights.

Section 1983 allows a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for many years to bring an action to protect constitutional rights.

Gonzalez-Cruz v. United States · filed 2020-01-28

As plaintiff is within the territory of the United States and has lived here for many years, he has a right to file an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Three statutes govern immigration detention.

Parents cannot bring individual Section 1983 claims for violations of their child’s constitutional rights.

DOE v. Patrick · filed 2020-02-03

As an initial matter, the claims brought under Section 1983 by Jane and John Doe on their own behalf fail as a matter of law. To the extent that Jane and John Doe’s individual claims stem from alleged violations of their son’s constitutional rights, these claims fail.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to sue on behalf of a friend without a direct, personal injury.

Ferguson v. Alton City Jail · filed 2020-02-04

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a § 1983 claim on behalf of his friend.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to bring a vicarious excessive force claim for witnessing force directed at a dog.

Kailin v. Greer · filed 2020-03-02

But the Kailins cannot pursue an excessive force claim related to the killing of Timber or on behalf of Steven or Taylor.

Section 1983 generally allows a person to sue for violations of their own rights, not solely for violations of another person’s rights.

Huntsman v. Sumner County Jail · filed 2020-03-05

In other words, an individual typically cannot bring suit under § 1983 based on violations of a third person’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to assert claims on behalf of other inmates.

Ackbar v. Monaco · filed 2020-03-11

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff's complaint attempts to assert claims on behalf of other inmates, Plaintiff has no right to do so.

Section 1983 claims are personal to the direct victim of an alleged constitutional violation; a family member's collateral injury does not give that family member standing.

Sorah v. Tipp City Exempted Village School District Board of Education · filed 2020-03-16

The Court has already explained why Brandy Sorah lacks standing to pursue her own claims under the ADA and § 504. For similar reasons, she also lacks standing to pursue claims under § 1983.

A corporation cannot assert § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest or excessive force against individuals; the affected individuals may assert those claims.

Webb v. City of McCrory, Arkansas · filed 2020-07-09

Second, the claims Webb’s Produce raised in the amended complaint cannot be asserted by a corporation. The entity “Webb’s Produce” cannot be the subject of unlawful arrest, excessive force, or racial discrimination. The individual Plaintiffs can.

Only a deceased victim’s estate may bring a § 1983 claim alleging that a constitutional violation caused the victim’s death.

Smart v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2020-07-14

Although it’s true that only the estate of a deceased victim may bring a § 1983 claim alleging death as a result of a constitutional violation, it’s not uncommon for heirs of the deceased (especially when they are also the administrators of the estate) to assert state wrongful-death claims on their own behalf in the same case.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to pursue a constitutional claim on his daughter’s behalf when he lacks standing to do so.

Shabani, Khaled v. Kalka, Kraig · filed 2020-07-28

However, as I explained to plaintiff in orders issued in his previous lawsuit, he lacks standing to pursue a constitutional claim on his daughter’s behalf.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief for violations of the plaintiff’s own rights, not the rights of other inmates.

Knox v. Sharp · filed 2020-08-03

As an initial matter, the Court advises Plaintiff that the Court will only consider claims “based upon the violation of a plaintiff’s personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.” ... Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asking for relief for other inmates, those claims cannot be considered.

A person generally cannot bring a Section 1983 claim for a violation of someone else’s personal rights; a survivor must show authority to pursue the deceased person’s claim under applicable state law.

Marmon v. Barr · filed 2020-08-04

The § 1983 and Bivens claims alleging excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to medical needs while in custody all arise under the Eighth Amendment (if Mr. Mercado was in custody under a criminal conviction) or the Fourteenth Amendment (if he was an immigration detainee). Rights protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are personal rights, and only the person subject to the violation has standing to bring suit. ... Despite these instructions, the FAC contains no facts showing Plaintiff has standing to pursue claims on behalf of Mr. Mercado’s estate.

An unborn fetus cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 because it is not a person within the Amendment’s scope.

Estate of the Unborn Child of Jennifer Jawson v. Armor Correctional Health Services Inc · filed 2020-08-19

In Reed v. Gardner, the Seventh Circuit held that a fetus is not a person within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore cannot bring Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, I will grant the motions to dismiss the § 1983 claims brought on behalf of the Estate and dismiss the claims.

In Colorado, a deceased person’s § 1983 survival claims may be brought only by the estate’s personal representative, not by a child or heir.

Velez v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado · filed 2020-08-31

As such, under Colorado law, these claims can be brought only by the personal representative of the estate of the deceased, i.e., by the personal representative of the estate of Mr. Tirado-Ortiz.

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse who was not seized to bring an excessive force claim for force used against her husband.

Horowitz v. Sherman · filed 2020-09-04

Plaintiffs cite three cases to argue a relative may bring an excessive force claim and each is distinguishable. ... Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend to include an excessive force claim by Cathy Horowitz against Officers Brown and Rosales will be denied.

Section 1983 claims based solely on a child’s rights belong to the child; a nonattorney parent cannot pursue them on the child’s behalf without counsel.

Simmons v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2020-09-09

These counts assert claims for race and disability discrimination pursuant to Section 1983, the ADA, and the No Child Left Behind Act.6 Such claims belong to P.E. and P.E. alone. Because plaintiff does not claim to be an attorney, she cannot bring such claims, on behalf of P.E., without counsel.

Counties cannot bring Section 1983 claims against their parent state for violating constitutional rights they do not possess.

COUNTY OF BUTLER v. THOMAS W. WOLF · filed 2020-09-14

Section 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but rather, merely provides a cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of state law. Counties are creatures of the state. They do not possess rights under the Constitution. They cannot assert a claim against the state—of which they are a creation—for violating rights that they do not possess.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s estate representatives to pursue the decedent’s constitutional claims, but family members cannot pursue those claims in their individual capacities.

White v. Topeka, City of · filed 2020-09-28

Consistent with the parties’ position and Kansas law, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims asserted by plaintiff Kelly White in his individual capacity or on behalf of Dominique White’s minor children because Kelly White, acting in those modes of capacity, lacks standing to sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow surviving family members to recover damages on their own behalf for another person’s wrongful death.

Deloach v. Stevens · filed 2020-10-27

Plaintiffs’ attempt to recover damages on their own behalf under § 1983 for the wrongful death of Decedent is not permissible.

Section 1983 does not let parents bring their own claim based solely on a violation of their child’s rights.

Hoffman v. Tennessee Dept. of Children Services · filed 2020-11-24

Here, the Complaint alleges only that Plaintiffs’ child was assaulted while in an Omni Visions foster home. This is not a sufficient basis for Plaintiffs to bring their own Section 1983 claim against Omni Visions.

Section 1983 does not permit a person to sue for the alleged violation of someone else’s constitutional rights.

Buffalo Valley v. CoreCivic · filed 2021-02-03

Nor may he maintain a Section 1983 claim based on CoreCivic’s alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment rights of those third-parties.

Section 1983 does not allow a parent to bring a Fourth Amendment claim for the seizure of a child when the parent’s personal rights were not violated.

Smith v. Tkach · filed 2021-02-10

Smith lacks standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim based on the seizure of his children because his personal rights were not violated.