42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy the elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim.

Ienco v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-05-02

To bring a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege that he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the plaintiff shows a deprivation of a federal right, such as an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Price v. Roark · filed 2001-07-18

Thus, to succeed on this § 1983 malicious prosecution suit, Price must show that he was exposed to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Freeman v. Murray · filed 2001-08-31

Under Third Circuit Court of Appeals law, the plaintiff must also establish that he was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for malicious prosecution by itself because it does not allege a constitutional injury.

Berglund v. City of Maplewood, MN · filed 2001-10-25

Moreover, this court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the prosecution to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Brown v. Dillion · filed 2002-01-29

Further, in order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the prosecution ended in his favor.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution alone because malicious prosecution does not itself allege a constitutional injury.

Stagemeyer v. County of Dawson · filed 2002-03-20

“It is well established in this circuit that ‘[a]n action for malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.’ ”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Fulton Jr. v. Robinson · filed 2002-05-09

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115, 118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998), and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law, see, e.g., Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1995); Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.1989).

In the Fifth Circuit, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof of the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.

Gordy v. Burns · filed 2002-06-17

But in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action need establish only the elements of common-law malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim based solely on the prosecution; the plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right.

Penn, David v. Harris, Veronica · filed 2002-07-10

A plaintiff therefore may not state a § 1983 claim simply by alleging that he was maliciously prosecuted. Instead, he must allege the violation of one of his constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Lewis v. Rock · filed 2002-10-03

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), Lewis and Woodman must establish a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to prevail on their malicious prosecution claims under § 1983.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of a state-law cause of action, prosecution by a state actor, and deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills · filed 2002-11-25

A plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution under section 1983 must establish: (1) all of the elements of a state law cause of action; (2) a state actor committed the prosecution; and (3) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim separate from a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.

Collins v. Guinther · filed 2002-12-18

Despite the body of cases that reasonably led the Defendants to believe that their statement of the law was accurate, the Court finds that the Plaintiff may assert, a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution separate and apart from her claim for unreasonable seizure.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a criminal proceeding initiated without probable cause, favorable termination, an improper purpose, and a resulting deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure.

Estate Robert Smith v. Marasco · filed 2003-01-29

To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff ’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a prosecution without probable cause; probable cause bars the claim.

Wood v. Michael Kesler, individually and in his capacity as an Alabama State Trooper, Brian Jones · filed 2003-03-04

While a seizure (i.e., an arrest in fact) occurred in the course of the prosecution, Wood has not shown that Kesler acted without probable cause, which is a required element of Wood’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious-prosecution claim where state-law remedies for wrongful prosecution are available.

Smith, Michael B. v. Lamz, Douglas · filed 2003-03-05

We begin by noting that Smith may not maintain an action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the effective holding of Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), in accordance with its narrowest ground of decision, to be that the opportunity for state-law remedies for wrongful-prosecution claims precludes any constitutional theory of the tort).

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious prosecution action when state law offers a remedy for wrongful prosecution.

Smith v. Douglas Lamz and the Village of Algonquin, a Municipal Corporation · filed 2003-03-05

We begin by noting that Smith may not maintain an action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not recognize malicious prosecution as a claim in itself.

Shultz v. Smith · filed 2003-03-07

A claim for malicious prosecution is not, as such, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim applying New York law requires a final, favorable termination of the criminal proceeding; the mere expiration of the time to bring charges does not satisfy that requirement.

Neal v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2003-03-13

To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiffs favor; (3) there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) the defendant initiated the criminal proceeding out of actual malice.” ... The mere lapsing of the statute of limitations does not establish a formal abandonment of charges and is therefore insufficient to demonstrate a final, favorable termination.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when all elements of the state law tort are present and probable cause was lacking under Fourth Amendment standards.

Akers v. Bishop · filed 2003-05-02

A claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 where all elements of the state law tort are present and probable cause was lacking as defined by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit requires favorable termination; a guilty plea followed by dismissal under Mississippi’s diversion statute does not satisfy that requirement.

Scribner v. Dillard · filed 2003-05-08

“But in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action need establish only the elements of common-law malicious prosecution.” ... In the present case, the only real issue for summary judgment purposes is whether the third element is met; whether the criminal proceeding terminated in Plaintiffs favor. ... Under Mississippi law, the criminal proceeding did not terminate in Plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim alleging malicious prosecution.

Price v. Cochran · filed 2003-05-12

A plaintiff may state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 by alleging that he or she has been subjected to a malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on liability for that tort.

Savino v. the City of New York · filed 2003-05-22

Liability for the tort of malicious prosecution also gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

False arrest and malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 have substantially the same elements as those claims under New York law.

Boyd v. City of New York · filed 2003-07-09

The elements of false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 are “substantially the same” as the elements under New York law.

Section 1983 permits recovery for malicious prosecution only when the prosecution was conducted with intent to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Foster v. Ball · filed 2003-10-20

Dr. Foster cannot recover for malicious prosecution under section 1983 unless the prosecution was conducted with the intent to deprive Dr. Foster of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a malicious prosecution claim based on due process violations alone.

Rybak v. Luxury Motors, Inc. · filed 2003-10-31

However, as the district court observed, § 1983 does not allow an action for “malicious prosecution” based on due process violations alone.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require conduct that is tortious under state law and an injury resulting from a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty.

Weinstock v. Wilk · filed 2003-12-16

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires two inquiries (1) whether a defendant’s conduct was tortious under state law, and (2) whether a plaintiffs injuries resulted from a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution claim to rest on the denial of a federal right; the state law tort alone does not establish a claim.

Castellano v. Fragozo · filed 2003-12-30

We decide that “malicious prosecution” standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and that to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must rest on a denial of rights secured by federal law; malicious prosecution alone does not establish a federal constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Stephen F. Austin State University · filed 2004-02-11

To the extent plaintiff attempted to state a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 upon these facts and the order of the district court allowed the claim of malicious prosecution to proceed, we must reverse. As we recently explained in an opinion filed after the district court’s order: “Malicious prosecution” standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and ... to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not satisfy every requirement of an analogous common law tort to state a constitutional claim.

Pierce v. Gilchrist · filed 2004-03-02

We thus join the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in rejecting the view that a plaintiff does not state a claim actionable under §1983 unless he satisfies the requirements of an analogous common law tort.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution incorporate the elements of those torts under relevant state law.

Tartaglione v. Pugliese · filed 2004-03-11

Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest incorporate the elements of those torts under the relevant state law.

Section 1983 may provide a remedy for conduct underlying a state malicious prosecution claim when that conduct deprives someone of federal constitutional rights.

Somers v. Strader · filed 1977-08-25

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal remedy which protects only federal constitutional rights. While state tort claims do not necessarily constitute § 1983 claims, various federal court decisions have recognized that the facts underlying state tort claims for false arrest, abuse of process and malicious prosecution may also provide the basis for a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim rests on a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure.

Misty Kingsland v. City of Miami · filed 2004-05-11

Thus, in § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, the constitutional right at issue is not the “right to be free from malicious prosecution,” but rather the underlying Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Section 1983 permits malicious prosecution claims based on specific constitutional rights beyond the Fourth Amendment.

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto Scott Burnell Ted Hartz Richard Althouse, Michael Sakamoto, Does I-X, Inclusive · filed 2004-05-20

We hold that the district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment injuries cannot provide a basis for asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not cover malicious prosecution when a state judicial remedy is available, unless the prosecution was intended to deny constitutional rights.

Steve Meyers Keith Meyers v. Gregory Nagel, and City of Circle, Montana McCone County, Montana Mark Speer · filed 1992-04-30

Generally, a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under section 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). An exception to this principle exists, however, "when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights." Id. at 562 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, but the claim cannot proceed when no prosecutorial action followed the arrest.

Robinson v. City of Memphis · filed 2004-06-18

This Court considers itself bound by the decisions in Spurlock and Darrah, which permit a Plaintiff to bring a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. ... Since there was no prosecutorial action taken in this case after Plaintiff was arrested, it is evident that Plaintiff can not maintain an action for malicious prosecution against Officer Berryhill.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim based on a civil or administrative proceeding only when the proceeding violates the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Washington v. County Of Rockland · filed 2004-06-25

As we have noted, our case law does not forbid a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim premised on a civil or administrative proceeding; however, because such claims must, under Albright and Singer, be premised on a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, it is unlikely that a civil proceeding of the kind at issue here would implicate constitutional rights in a manner that would warrant redress under § 1983. Because the circumstances of this case do not constitute a deprivation of liberty sufficient to constitute a violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution in the Fifth Circuit.

Figgs v. Vrazel · filed 2004-07-28

There is no longer a freestanding section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in this circuit.

A plaintiff cannot establish favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim if the prosecutor dropped the charges as part of a compromise with the accused.

Taylor v. Winters · filed 2004-10-14

However, if the prosecutor drops the charges as part of a compromise with the accused, the accused will fail the favorable termination prong necessary to maintain a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

An independent trial court finding of probable cause does not by itself defeat a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, even if it could defeat a claim under state common law.

Becker v. Kroll · filed 2004-10-19

The court agrees that an independent finding of probable cause by a trial court could be fatal to a claim for malicious prosecution under Utah common law, but the Gilchrist decision makes clear that it is not fatal to a § 1983 claim.

A plea agreement dismissing charges does not, by itself, establish the actual innocence required for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Steele v. City of Erie · filed 2004-10-20

Without more, the revelation that a plea agreement has been reached does not demonstrate the actual innocence that is required under Hector.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires a favorable termination; a negotiated dismissal in exchange for concessions generally does not qualify.

Jaisinghani v. Byrne · filed 2005-01-07

“[A] dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings” because such a settlement specifically avoids a determination on the merits. ... Therefore, Jaisinghani cannot establish a favorable termination of the proceedings and the district court correctly granted summary judgment against him.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires an associated Fourth Amendment seizure.

Smith v. McCluskey · filed 2005-03-11

With no associated seizure, there can be no cognizable malicious prosecution claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show that the underlying criminal convictions were overturned.

Wilkins v. Denver Department of Safety · filed 2005-03-28

Fourth, Mr. Wilkins cannot maintain a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 without showing that his criminal convictions were overturned. ... We agree with the district court that Mr. Wilkins’ § 1983 complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that dismissal without prejudice was the appropriate resolution of his case.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution requires a Fourth Amendment seizure; attending trial alone does not qualify.

DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood · filed 2005-05-12

Attending one’s trial is not a government “seizure” in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution action for violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a post-arraignment liberty restraint; restrictions on travel or required court appearances may satisfy that requirement.

Davis v. City of New York · filed 2005-05-31

Restrictions on the right to travel, as well as required court appearances, may satisfy the restraint requirement for § 1983 malicious prosecution actions.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Holman v. Cascio · filed 2005-08-29

It is well settled that in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails the favorable termination requirement when charges are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.

Imbergamo v. Castaldi · filed 2005-10-04

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that, even considering all inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim, (i.e., that the criminal proceeding initiated against him ended in his favor).

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the prior proceedings.

Wilson v. Sullivan · filed 2006-02-22

The district court properly dismissed for failure to state a claim Wilson’s section 1983 claims based on alleged malicious prosecution because Wilson could not allege “favorable termination”; he conceded that his parole was revoked based on the unidentified woman’s complaints.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires tortious conduct under state law and an injury resulting from a deprivation of Fourth Amendment liberty.

Fernandez v. Alexander · filed 2006-03-01

Under section 1983, a malicious prosecution claim has two elements. First, defendant’s conduct must have been tortious under state law. Second, plaintiffs injuries must have resulted from a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful arrest, detention, or prosecution require deprivation of a constitutional right, even when analyzed in light of analogous torts.

Grubbs v. Bailes · filed 2006-04-26

While constitutional claims for wrongful arrest, detention, and prosecution under § 1983 are analyzed in light of analogous torts, such as false arrest and malicious prosecution, the ultimate and indispensable element of such a claim is the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the prosecution implicates Fourth Amendment rights.

Rolon v. Henneman · filed 2006-08-02

Only those malicious prosecution claims that implicate Fourth Amendment rights can be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims do not depend on varying state tort elements; probable cause for the arrest and prosecution defeats a claim based on the Fourth Amendment.

Bielefeld v. Haines · filed 2006-08-22

The existence of probable cause for an arrest and prosecution defeats a Section 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty consistent with seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Laufgas v. Patterson · filed 2006-11-16

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a probable-cause defense to a malicious-prosecution claim, regardless of whether the complainant’s purpose was proper.

Anthony v. White · filed 1974-05-17

Since Mrs. Dickey's showing of probable cause is sufficient to warrant summary judgment in her favor on both the Section 1983 and the state law claims against her, it is unnecessary to consider whether her purpose in initiating criminal proceedings against the Anthonys was proper or improper.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires malice and a lack of probable cause.

Roberson v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2007-01-30

We grant plaintiffs motion to take judicial notice of the state court docket sheet in support of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. ... But to maintain such a claim, “a plaintiff ‘must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause.’ ” ... The uncontested evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that plaintiff was party to a drug transaction. Plaintiff thus failed to meet his pleading burden.

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim based solely on an alleged deprivation of substantive due process rights.

Fiske v. Town of North Attleboro · filed 2007-02-14

Because the law does not recognize §1983 malicious prosecution claims for an alleged deprivation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Fiske cannot assert Counts (l)-(4) on this theory.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show deprivation of a federally protected right.

LaFrenier v. Kinirey · filed 2007-03-20

To transform malicious prosecution into a claim cognizable under § 1983, “the plaintiff also must show a deprivation of a federally-protected right.”

Section 1983 uses common-law tort elements to guide a malicious-prosecution claim, but the plaintiff must establish a constitutional violation.

Boydston v. Isom · filed 2007-04-06

When evaluating a § 1983 claim based on a common law tort, the elements of the tort serve as “an important guidepost for defining the constitutional cause of action,” but “the ultimate question is always whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose malicious prosecution liability on an officer after a prosecutor independently decides to bring charges unless the officer misled the prosecutor.

Little v. City of New York · filed 2007-05-15

Thus, ADA Schwartz broke the chain of causation, and Officers Strong and Blain will not be held liable for malicious prosecution unless there is evidence that either of them misled the prosecutor.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the criminal proceeding to have ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Shipley v. Orndoff · filed 2007-06-07

The claim fails for the simple reason that the Complaint does not allege that the criminal proceeding ended in Plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant’s actions cause an unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Pitt, Christopher v. DC · filed 2007-06-26

We join the large majority of circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably “seized” without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant’s actions cause an unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Christopher G. Pitt, Sr. And Tela Hansom-Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-06-26

We join the large majority of circuits in holding that malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be unreasonably “seized” without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on criminal charges dismissed before trial requires a Fourth Amendment violation.

Becker v. Kroll · filed 2007-07-19

Under the facts of this case, where criminal charges were brought but dismissed before trial, Becker must allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to proceed on a theory of § 1983 malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding malicious prosecution claim, though initiating criminal charges without probable cause may lead to a constitutional violation.

Rodriguez v. Rutter · filed 2007-07-19

Although there is not a freestanding claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983, initiating “criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events” that violate the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim for a Fourth Amendment violation only when the plaintiff establishes the required elements, including a qualifying deprivation of liberty.

Wiltz v. Middlesex County Office of the Prosecutor · filed 2007-09-19

The District Court was correct in holding that absent such allegations, the complaint failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution actionable under §§ 1983 or 1985.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require the elements of common law malicious prosecution and a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Harvey L. Boyd, Jr. v. Peet · filed 2007-09-25

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” ... Boyd’s complaint fails to allege either the existence of any criminal proceedings, or a termination of such proceedings in his favor. Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a proceeding begun or continued without probable cause, terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, and instituted with malice.

Dawkins v. Williams · filed 2007-09-27

In order to prove a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the defendant either commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the proceeding terminated in his favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) that the criminal proceeding was instituted with actual malice.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim starts with common law elements but ultimately requires proof that a constitutional right was deprived.

Cummisky v. Mines · filed 2007-09-28

“In this circuit, when addressing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, we use the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ of our analysis; however, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 does not support a malicious prosecution claim when there is probable cause to prosecute.

Jolley v. Harvell · filed 2007-11-13

Although there is some dispute in this Circuit whether a malicious prosecution claim is valid under the Fourth Amendment, ... it does not matter here because “it nonetheless remains firmly established that where there is probable cause to prosecute, a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution will not lie.”

A federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires the elements of common law malicious prosecution and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure.

McCloud v. Fortune · filed 2008-01-18

“To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Section 1983 requires a federal malicious prosecution plaintiff to prove the common law tort's elements and a violation of a federally protected right.

Orban v. City of Tampa Florida · filed 2008-02-20

To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation [of a federally protected right].

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit.

Bloss v. Moore · filed 2008-03-11

Her claim fails because this court no longer ... recognizes a freestanding § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A plaintiff bringing a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must show that the prosecution was initiated without probable cause.

Cook v. McPherson · filed 2008-04-02

In order to succeed in a malicious prosecution claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cook must show that his prosecution was initiated without probable cause.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of the common law tort, an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure, and a seizure related to the prosecution.

Eloy v. Officer Guillot · filed 2008-07-11

Accordingly, to prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, (2) an unlawful seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and (3) that the unlawful seizure was “in relation to the prosecution.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234-35.

Section 1983 lets plaintiffs pursue federal malicious prosecution claims only if they prove sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint implicating Fourth Amendment rights.

Ellis v. La Vecchia · filed 2008-07-22

To sustain a federal malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must also prove a fifth factor: a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the prosecution was maliciously initiated because of race.

Bouquett v. Clemmer · filed 1985-07-10

Herein, the Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of a malicious prosecution and that he suffered a deprivation of his right to the equal protection of the laws because of his race. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, to the extent that he asserts that the prosecution was maliciously initiated by Defendants because of his race.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff shows an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the elements of the common law tort.

Chaney v. City of Orlando, FL · filed 2008-08-26

Although malicious prosecution is a viable constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prevailing plaintiff must show both a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure and the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires an absence of probable cause and a violation of a federally protected right.

Drudge v. City of Kissimmee · filed 2008-09-25

Because an absence of probable cause is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, the probable cause discussion in the text disposes of this claim as well. Additionally, of course, the Court has found no violation of a federally protected right, which is also necessary for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to succeed.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Olasz v. Welsh · filed 2008-10-14

Thus, our caselaw clearly establishes that the analysis of a malicious prosecution claim arising under § 1983 must begin with a determination of whether a constitutional violation exists.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires an absence of probable cause to arrest.

Titus v. Ahlm · filed 2008-10-28

The absence of probable cause to arrest is an essential element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under §1983.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process.

Holley v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, NY · filed 2009-01-14

To sustain a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the deprivation of liberty — i.e., the seizure— must have been made “pursuant to legal process.”

Section 1983 claims for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution based on probation revocation require a showing that the revocation lacked probable cause.

Heilman v. T.W. Ponessa and Ass · filed 2009-01-14

In order to establish a claim for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, Heilman must show that his probation was revoked without probable cause.

Section 1983 covers malicious prosecution intended to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws.

Usher v. City of Los Angeles, Richard A. Gonzales, Michael E. Melton, Jose E. Ramirez, Joe Rios, and Robert L. · filed 1987-09-21

Read liberally as they must be, Usher’s pleadings fairly bring his common law tort claim of malicious prosecution within the scope of section 1983, under the exception for a malicious prosecution intended to deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim may proceed on evidence of gross negligence or recklessness.

Peterson v. Littlejohn · filed 1989-11-13

The federal law, including that from the Ninth Circuit, is settled that gross negligence or recklessness will suffice to establish a prima facie case under § 1983.

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 is governed by state law when federal common law is absent.

Janetka v. Dabe · filed 1989-12-15

A claim of malicious prosecution brought pursuant to sections 1983 and 1988 is governed by state law in the absence of federal common law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must show that the criminal proceeding as a whole ended in a way indicating innocence of the alleged misconduct; an acquittal on one charge may not suffice when a simultaneous conviction concerns the same conduct.

Kossler v. Crisanti · filed 2009-04-21

The favorable termination element is not categorically satisfied whenever the plaintiff is acquitted of just one of several charges in the same proceeding. When the circumstances — both the offenses as stated in the statute and the underlying facts of the case — indicate that the judgment as a whole does not reflect the plaintiffs innocence, then the plaintiff fails to establish the favorable termination element.

Section 1983 requires a malicious-prosecution plaintiff to show a post-arraignment restraint on liberty that implicates the Fourth Amendment.

Tarantino v. City of Hornell · filed 2009-05-18

In addition, to make out a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must also be a showing of a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment requires a constitutional deprivation; probable cause for the arrest and prosecution defeats the claim.

Darrah v. City of Oak Park, Russell Bragg, a Troy Police Officer · filed 2001-06-22

We need not enunciate a test for malicious prosecution under § 1983 either, however, for Darrah can show no constitutional deprivation in this case. Regardless of the specific elements of the federal malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff is unable to allege an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., that there was no probable cause to justify her arrest and prosecution.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff proves the elements of the relevant state-law tort.

Castellano v. Fragozo · filed 2002-11-20

Thus, by pleading a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff pleads an actionable claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the underlying proceeding to have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Green v. Mattingly · filed 2009-10-21

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under either § 1983 or New York state law, plaintiff must allege, among other things, “termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires both the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Shaarbay v. Palm Beach County Jail · filed 2009-10-23

In order to prove malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish “(1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003)).

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and the elements of the malicious prosecution tort.

ROCKEL v. Watkins · filed 2009-11-24

To establish a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution tort claim.

Section 1983 liability for malicious prosecution is not defeated merely because a prosecutor and judge approved the charges and arrest.

Fletcher v. Burkhalter · filed 2010-05-24

Accordingly, we reject Deputy Burkhalter’s argument that the approvals of the district attorney and the judge absolved him of liability, and we affirm the denial of summary judgment on that issue.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against a state actor requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Manganiello v. City of New York · filed 2010-07-23

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, ... and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law, ... Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.1989).

Section 1983 does not impose malicious prosecution liability on an arresting officer who did not decide whether to prosecute.

DeRosa v. Rambosk · filed 2010-08-11

A police officer who arrests a suspect but does not make the decision of whether or not to prosecute cannot be liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983. ... There is no evidence that Deputy George was involved in the decision of whether or not any of the plaintiffs should be prosecuted. Therefore, he is entitled to summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution component of the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim as a constitutional tort in the Eleventh Circuit.

Brown v. Benefield · filed 2010-09-29

In the Eleventh Circuit, malicious prosecution is a viable constitutional tort recognizable under § 1983.

A court analyzing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may look to state law for the elements of the tort.

Harrington v. Wilber · filed 2010-10-18

When, as here, a district court discusses a § 1983 cause of action by analogizing it to a claim of malicious prosecution, it is appropriate for the court to look to the respective state law for the elements of the tort.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show malice, lack of probable cause, and a purpose to deny a specific constitutional right; probable cause defeats the claim.

Smith v. Almada · filed 2010-10-19

To maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that “the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.” ... For the same reason, probable cause supported Smith’s prosecution. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Sergeant Almada on Smith’s malicious prosecution claim.

A dismissal obtained through a plea agreement does not establish favorable termination for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

White v. Brown · filed 2010-11-04

That the dismissal of those charges resulted from White‟s plea agreement with the prosecution, and not his innocence, means that he cannot establish favorable termination for purposes of a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not require proof of malice for a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim.

Sykes v. Anderson · filed 2010-11-09

In the context of malicious prosecution, the Fourth Amendment violation that generates a § 1983 cause of action obviates the need for demonstrating malice.

Section 1983 does not provide a free-standing malicious prosecution claim; the claimant must allege a violation of a specific constitutional right.

Cuadra v. Houston Independent School District · filed 2010-11-17

Thus, Cuadra’s attempt to assert a free-standing § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim ripens only when the criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Leonard vs FBI · filed 2010-12-14

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint in this case because Leonard’s malicious prosecution claim ripens only if the state-court criminal proceeding is terminated in his favor.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim ripens only when the underlying criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.

Leonard v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2010-12-14

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint in this case because Leonard’s malicious prosecution claim ripens only if the state-court criminal proceeding is terminated in his favor.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must show lack of probable cause; alleged misconduct by the defendant does not excuse that burden.

Mobilio v. NJ Division of Law Pub Safety · filed 2011-02-09

Mobilio cites no case, from this Court or any other, for the proposition that a defendant‟s conduct can relieve a plaintiff of the burden of showing lack of probable cause, one of the required elements of a malicious prosecution claim, and we are aware of no such authority.

Section 1983 does not support a freestanding malicious prosecution claim without a related constitutional violation.

Grimes v. Thomason · filed 2011-03-10

And, because Appellants assert no other viable claims that their constitutional rights were violated in connection with their claim of malicious prosecution, their malicious prosecution claim must also fail. Cuadra v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] freestanding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based solely on malicious prosecution [is] not viable.”).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires malice, lack of probable cause, and a purpose to deny a specific constitutional right; probable cause defeats the claim.

Smith v. Almada · filed 2011-03-21

To maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that “the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution.”).

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim fails if the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a state-law malicious-prosecution claim.

Westwood v. City of Hermiston · filed 2011-04-15

Because Westwood has not established the elements of a state-law claim for malicious prosecution, she also has not established a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of liberty for a federal malicious prosecution claim.

Segreti v. Borough of Wilkinsburg · filed 2011-07-11

The District Court correctly concluded that Segreti did not state a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 because she did not allege the requisite deprivation of liberty.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to prove a constitutional violation and the absence of probable cause, with accrual governed by federal law.

McCarty v. Gilchrist · filed 2011-07-14

This Court has analogized a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to the common law tort of malicious prosecution in articulating its elements: The elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, as applicable in a § 1983 claim, are: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages. Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1258. Although Novitsky holds that lack of probable cause is an element of § 1983 malicious prosecution, McCarty argues that Novitsky does not apply to this case, and relying on Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004), asserts that he is not required to prove lack of probable cause. We disagree with McCarty’s characterization of the Pierce decision. Pierce expressly left open the issue of whether an absence of probable cause is required for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show that the criminal action ended in the plaintiff's favor.

Pittman v. Metuchen Police Department · filed 2011-08-02

To state a claim of malicious prosecution under section 1983 and New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action ended in his favor.

Section 1983 supports a malicious prosecution claim only when the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated.

Kaminski v. Commissioner of Oneida County Department of Social Services · filed 2011-08-05

Only violations of the Fourth Amendment, however, support § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a sufficient post-arraignment restraint on liberty that implicates the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Elek v. Incorporated Village of Monroe · filed 2011-09-27

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fifth element of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983, that she suffered “a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint” that implicated her Fourth Amendment rights.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is actionable only if it results in seizure or confinement.

Miller v. Arbogast · filed 2011-10-25

A malicious prosecution claim is only actionable if it results in seizure or confinement. See Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2009). This court therefore agrees with the district court’s conclusion that the scope of Miller’s claims against Arbogast, Spiers, and Fox is limited to allegations connected with his 2001 arrest and indictment because he was not seized or confined as a result of the 1999 or 2002 indictment attempts.

Section 1983 requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff to show initiation and participation, lack of probable cause, deprivation of liberty, and favorable resolution.

Cheolas v. City of Harper Woods · filed 2012-01-10

A plaintiff must show that: (1) a prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant participated in the decision; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of the legal proceeding; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty through legal process that amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure; the common law tort alone is insufficient.

Moreno-Medina v. Toledo · filed 2012-01-17

In this circuit, a plaintiff seeking to bring a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 must do more than simply satisfy the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution. ... The plaintiff must "show a deprivation of liberty, pursuant to legal process, that is consistent with the concept of a Fourth Amendment seizure."

Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims require an absence of probable cause.

Marshall v. Twp of Penn · filed 2012-01-24

An essential element of both a false arrest and a malicious prosecution claim is the absence of probable cause.

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a prosecutor’s independent decision to file charges presumptively insulates the investigating officer from liability.

Christensen v. Armstrong · filed 2012-05-22

Our decision in Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981), established a rebuttable presumption that the decision to file a criminal complaint results from the independent determination of the prosecutor, insulating the officer that initiated the criminal prosecution from liability.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim only when the prosecution violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Graham v. City of New York · filed 2012-06-14

While New York recognizes the tort of civil malicious prosecution, a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 may only arise where there has been a violation of the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.

A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires proof that a state actor committed the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

Curves, LLC v. Spalding County, Georgia · filed 2012-07-06

A federal malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proving that a state actor committed the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a lack of probable cause and the defendant’s participation in the decision to prosecute.

Burden v. Paul · filed 2012-08-08

Plaintiff fails to satisfy at least two of the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. As we explained, probable cause supported the institution of proceedings against Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendant did not participate in the institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a malicious prosecution claim when state law supplies an adequate remedy.

Gutierrez v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2012-08-13

Because Indiana law recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution, Gutierrez cannot maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a seizure or other intrusion on personal liberty; a prearraignment summons requiring five court appearances without further liberty or travel restrictions does not suffice.

Wilner v. Village of Roslyn · filed 2012-10-03

Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669, *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545, *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 95, 97-98 [2d Cir 2010]; Mangino v Incorporated Vil. of Patchogue, 739 F Supp 2d 205, 228 [ED NY 2010]).

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a criminal proceeding initiated without probable cause, favorable termination, malice or an improper purpose, and a resulting deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure.

Minatee v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2012-11-01

To prove a claim for malicious prosecution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy each of the following five elements: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against a state actor requires a Fourth Amendment violation and the elements of malicious prosecution under state law.

Washington-Herrera v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2012-12-19

“In order to prevail on a [42 USC] § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law”

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding federal claim for malicious prosecution.

Craig v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit Auth, et · filed 2012-12-27

Although a freestanding federal § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law, see Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812-13 (5th Cir. 2010), there remains the possibility that Craig’s claim is actionable under Texas tort law.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on a civil action requires a special injury.

McCaul v. Ardsley Union Free School District · filed 2013-02-26

Indeed, both state and federal malicious prosecution claims based on a civil action require a "special injury," as discussed below.

A § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires both the elements of the common law tort and a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

Kinzy v. Warren · filed 2013-03-02

To establish a federal malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove both (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based on an allegation of malicious prosecution alone.

Joseph v. Allen · filed 2013-04-15

Therefore, under our holding in Kurtz, Joseph’s allegation of malicious prosecution cannot sustain a valid claim under § 1983.

A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a lack of probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff for the charged offense when the proceeding began.

Mott v. Lucas · filed 2013-04-17

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment are as follows: ... Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on the violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require a sufficient post-arraignment restraint on liberty to implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Perez v. Duran · filed 2013-07-03

A claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 requires the additional element of “(5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.”

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural due process malicious prosecution claim when state tort law supplies an adequate remedy.

Damon v. Hukowicz · filed 2013-08-09

In any event, a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim grounded in a procedural due process violation is not viable because, as demonstrated above, state tort law provides an adequate remedy.

Section 1983 does not support a federal malicious prosecution claim when state tort law provides a similar cause of action.

Rivera v. Lake County · filed 2013-09-26

The Seventh Circuit does not recognize federal malicious prosecution claims where, as here, state tort law supplies a similar cause of action.

Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims require a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings; resolution through the ARD program does not qualify.

Boldrini v. Wilson · filed 2013-10-18

The malicious-prosecution claims are therefore not presently cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal malicious prosecution suit against public officers when the state provides no adequate remedy.

Julian v. Hanna · filed 2013-10-21

In holding that Indiana’s failure to provide an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution by public officers opens the door to federal malicious prosecution suits against such officers, we don’t mean to belittle the state’s interest in limiting officers’ liability.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant initiated criminal proceedings without probable cause and acted with malice or an improper purpose.

Pritchett v. Warrender · filed 2013-11-04

In this circuit, a plaintiff seeking to recover for malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983 must show that a defendant initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. ... A plaintiff must also show that the defendant “acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.”

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a post-arraignment liberty restraint implicating the Fourth Amendment; required court appearances can satisfy that element.

Murphy v. City of Rochester · filed 2013-12-05

To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert an additional element: a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate his Fourth Amendment rights. ... Although Plaintiff has not specifically addressed the required elements of a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, the Court finds that the fifth element may be inferred from the undisputed facts, insofar as Plaintiff was required to attend court appearances.

A § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim challenging a seizure after legal process is treated as malicious prosecution and accrues when the criminal proceedings end in the plaintiff’s favor.

Myers v. Koopman · filed 2013-12-20

Here, the district court fixed false imprisonment as the proper analogy for Myers’ § 1983 claim—even though his complaint asserted malicious prosecution. In fact, Myers correctly styled his claim as one for malicious prosecution because he was seized after the institution of legal process. ... A claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Section 1983 does not allow a freestanding malicious prosecution claim.

Farmer v. Louisiana Electronic & Financial Crimes Task Force · filed 2014-01-16

The district court did not err in denying default judgment on the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim. This claim fails as a matter of law because a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution may not be maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a freestanding malicious prosecution claim.

Billy Farmer, III v. LA Elec & Financial Cr · filed 2014-01-20

The district court did not err in denying default judgment on the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim. This claim fails as a matter of law because a freestanding claim for malicious prosecution may not be maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based solely on an allegation of malicious prosecution.

Strei v. Blaine · filed 2014-02-12

The Eighth Circuit has held that "an allegation of malicious prosecution without more cannot sustain a civil rights claim under § 1983,” ... and here Strei has provided nothing beyond this allegation to support this claim.

A section 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a deprivation of liberty resulting from a legal proceeding; receiving a citation by mail and attending a hearing do not establish that deprivation.

Briscoe v. Jackson · filed 2014-02-24

Therefore, we find that no reasonable jury could determine that Plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of a legal proceeding, as required to establish a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim against an officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause, even if the officer plays no further part in the resulting detention.

Carter v. Gore · filed 2014-02-28

Carter’s Amended Complaint therefore alleges a viable § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against Gore, who allegedly secured an arrest warrant without probable cause, causing Carter to be detained for more than sixty days. The fact that Gore played no further part in Carter’s subsequent detention does nothing to undermine this claim.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.

Boans v. Town of Cheektowaga · filed 2014-03-14

In the instant case, although the issue of probable cause supporting Plaintiffs arrest prevents summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because he has failed to establish the underlying criminal action was terminated in his favor as is Plaintiffs burden.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution without a violation of a right secured by the Constitution.

Chisolm v. DeSoto Police Department · filed 2014-03-19

The district court correctly concluded that Chisolm could not raise a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 and that he was required to present a claim based on the rights secured by the Constitution.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires the elements of common law malicious prosecution, including damages, and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure.

Sevostiyanova v. Cobb County of Georgia · filed 2014-06-13

“To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). ... Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages, Ayers was entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 does not recognize malicious prosecution as an independent claim; the plaintiff must allege the denial of a federally secured right.

Boyd v. Farrin · filed 2014-07-22

In any event, we have held that a claim of malicious prosecution, standing alone, is not a violation of the United States Constitution and that to proceed under § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal law.