42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim barred by an uninvalidated conviction must be dismissed without prejudice.

Wynter v. Hardt · filed 2003-05-19

The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because Wyn-ter may not bring such an action unless and until his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim attacking a conviction that has not been vacated or otherwise set aside.

James v. O'Brien · filed 2001-08-09

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the complaint be dismissed because it attacks James’s conviction for drug abuse, which conviction has not been vacated or otherwise set aside. ... Upon de novo review, ... we conclude that the district court properly dismissed James’s complaint for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge as adopted by the district court in its order filed November 27, 2000 and entered November 28, 2000 Accordingly, the district court’s order should be affirmed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Palmer v. Kilpatrick · filed 2003-06-12

A favorable ruling on these allegations would necessarily implicate the validity of his convictions. Therefore, Palmer has not raised a cognizable claim, as he has not shown that his convictions were reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s due process claim challenging a disciplinary case unless that case has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Morris v. Moten · filed 2003-06-24

Morris’ claim that her due process rights were violated is without merit given that her disciplinary case has not been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

A prisoner seeking § 1983 damages for a due process challenge to a disciplinary conviction that cost earned credits must first obtain habeas relief or expungement of that conviction.

Walters v. Guilfoyle · filed 2003-06-26

The Plaintiff can only obtain damages based on a claim of this nature if he first obtains a writ of habeas corpus or expungement of his conviction. ... After carefully examining the record on appeal, we agree with the district court’s analysis and disposition of Walters’ claims.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary hearing or administrative sanction without first obtaining favorable termination when the sanction does not affect the overall length of confinement.

Ramirez v. Galaza · filed 2003-06-27

Like these circuits, we hold that the favorable termination rule does not apply to § 1983 suits challenging a disciplinary hearing or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner's confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has first been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Mosley v. Yaletsko · filed 2003-07-17

Here, Plaintiff does not aver and there is no evidence to suggest, that his conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid. Accordingly, to the extent that he is challenging the constitutionality of his arrest and conviction by this lawsuit, this claim also fails and judgment must be entered in favor of the defendant as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit an excessive force claim whose success would necessarily undermine disciplinary assault convictions that have not been invalidated.

Ruiz v. Martin · filed 2003-07-17

Thus, because Plaintiff Ruiz’s excessive force claim, if successful, would necessarily undermine the validity of the disciplinary convictions for criminal assault as well as the veracity of the underlying misconduct reports, Heck bars Ruiz’s § 1983 suit alleging that Defendant Officers Kienert, Mitchell, and Ninnis used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging the basis of civil confinement is barred unless the confinement has first been invalidated through an authorized proceeding.

Young v. Quasim · filed 2003-07-17

Young cannot collaterally attack the constitutionality of his confinement by filing a § 1983 claim without proving that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 requires favorable termination for a damages claim challenging the duration of confinement when the plaintiff filed while incarcerated, even if he was later released.

Mitchell v. Department of Corrections · filed 2003-07-22

Therefore, we dismiss Plaintiffs § 1983 claim because he was incarcerated when he filed the action and he has not satisfied Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Section 1983 plaintiffs challenging the validity of a sentence must satisfy the favorable termination requirement whether or not they are in custody.

Leonard v. Juge · filed 2003-07-31

This court has not overruled Randell and the Supreme Court has not overruled the applicability of the Heck “favorable termination” requirement to custodial and noncustodial plaintiffs alike.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner's procedural challenge to the denial of presentence credit when success would necessarily imply that the denial was invalid.

Beaven v. Roth · filed 2003-08-20

If the nature of the procedural challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation, then the claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Cage v. Tennessee · filed 2003-10-24

Generally, a civil rights claim such as Cage’s is not cognizable if a ruling on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory or injunctive relief that would necessarily imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been overturned or declared invalid by an appropriate tribunal.

McDonald v. Tennessee · filed 2003-10-28

A favorable ruling on McDonald’s petition for declaratory and injunctive relief would necessarily imply that his convictions for the disputed traffic citations were invalid. Thus, the district court also properly dismissed the case because McDonald did not show that his convictions had been overturned or declared invalid by an appropriate tribunal.

Section 1983 damages claims that would invalidate a prison disciplinary finding are premature unless that finding has been set aside.

Wilson v. VanNatta · filed 2003-10-30

To award damages to Mr. Wilson on allegations that some defendants wrote false conduct reports against him and that others violated his due process rights during disciplinary hearings would require a finding that the disciplinary boards’ finding of guilt was invalid. Because the relief Mr. Wilson requests would render the disciplinary boards’ finding of guilt invalid, these portions of his § 1983 complaint are premature.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim challenging a conviction unless a state tribunal or federal habeas court has declared the conviction infirm.

Moore v. Erickson · filed 2003-10-30

However, the court correctly concluded that any civil rights claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because ... plaintiffs conviction has not been declared infirm by a state tribunal or in federal habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would affect the validity of confinement until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Ibrahim v. United States Parole Board Members · filed 2003-10-30

Ibrahim’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 insofar as a ruling on them would affect the validity of his confinement, until he shows that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging an outstanding conviction or sentence requires a prior favorable termination.

Chapman v. Comm of PA · filed 2003-11-04

Chapman’s § 1983 action falls within the purview of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck and the District Court properly dismissed the complaint for failing to satisfy the “favorable termination” requirement.

Section 1983 requires favorable termination before a plaintiff may pursue damages for a claim that would invalidate an outstanding conviction or sentence.

Chapman v. Pennsylvania · filed 2003-11-04

Chapman’s § 1983 action falls within the purview of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck and the District Court properly dismissed the complaint for failing to satisfy the “favorable termination” requirement.

A prisoner whose disciplinary proceeding resulted in the loss of good-time credits cannot seek damages under § 1983 until the disciplinary conviction has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Powell v. Maddox · filed 2003-11-20

A prisoner attacking a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits cannot bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking damages until his "conviction" in that proceeding has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to show that a disciplinary conviction has been invalidated before bringing a claim that would imply its invalidity.

Murray v. Unknown Evert · filed 2003-12-08

Under Edwards, Murray must show that his misconduct conviction has been invalidated before his § 1983 action will be cognizable. Because Murray has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated, his claim is not presently cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to parole revocation unless the prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Smith v. Louisiana State · filed 2003-12-09

Smith’s challenge to the allegedly unconstitutional revocation of his parole is not cognizable in ... the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because he has not demonstrated or alleged “that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 claims that would affect the validity of a conviction cannot be brought until the conviction has been set aside.

Cochran v. Municipal Court · filed 2003-12-11

The district court was also correct to point out that Cochran’s claims of Fourth Amendment and speedy trial violations could not be brought under § 1983 until such time as his convictions had been set aside, as they would affect the validity of his convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been overturned.

Johnson v. Stalder · filed 2003-12-09

The Supreme Court has extended Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings, concluding that claims for damages and declaratory relief that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed in a disciplinary conviction are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding. ... Johnson has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his action under Heck.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Dade v. Entz · filed 2003-12-19

Additionally, the issues Dade raises imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence. Dade’s conviction was not reversed on direct appeal, and there is no indication in the record that it was expunged by an executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Dade has failed to state a claim for a § 1983 constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implicates the validity of a prison disciplinary hearing’s result and the length of confinement unless that result was previously invalidated.

Russell v. Bjork · filed 2003-12-24

Russell’s allegations, if proven, necessarily implicate the validity of the result of the disciplinary hearing and the length of his confinement. Therefore, under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), Russell’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 unless the result of the hearing was previously invalidated.

Section 1983 retaliation claims alleging a retaliatory motive do not require a favorable outcome in the underlying prison disciplinary case to avoid the Heck bar.

Lynn v. Cockrell · filed 2004-01-29

Because an inmate is not required to demonstrate a favorable outcome of a disciplinary case if he is alleging a retaliatory motive, the district court abused its discretion in determining that the retaliation claims against Hassel, Lawson, Boykin, and Alderman were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim that would call a parole revocation into question until the revocation is reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Glover v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2004-02-16

The district court’s determination that Glover may not obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until his parole revocation is reversed or otherwise called into question was not erroneous.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated on appeal, by executive order, by an authorized state tribunal, or through federal habeas relief.

Gooden v. Scott · filed 2004-02-18

Moreover, Gooden’s action is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as he has not shown that his sentences were reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A Section 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction is reversed through direct appeal or habeas corpus.

Conner v. Ramberg · filed 2004-02-24

The district court properly concluded that the gravamen of Conner’s action is that he was prosecuted without probable cause, and a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Conner may not bring such an action unless and until his conviction is reversed through a direct appeal or writ of habeas corpus.

A prisoner has no cause of action under § 1983 for a challenged conviction or sentence unless it has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by a writ of habeas corpus.

Chestra v. State of Kansas · filed 2002-01-08

As to the § 1983 appeal, we agree with the district court that Mr. Chestra has failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court has held that “a prisoner ... has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison discipline do not require favorable termination when the challenge threatens no consequence for the conviction or sentence duration.

Muhammad v. Close · filed 2004-02-25

Heck's requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily implicate the validity of continued confinement unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Grays v. Ramirez · filed 2004-02-26

The district court properly dismissed Grays’ action, because, if successful, it would necessarily implicate the validity of his continued confinement, and he fails to prove that his conviction has been favorably terminated.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner challenging a disciplinary charge to show that the resulting conviction was overturned or otherwise resolved in his favor.

Skinner v. Bolden · filed 2004-03-12

Skinner generally argues that a false disciplinary charge can be the basis of a retaliation claim, but he has not shown that the charges against him were ultimately resolved in his favor as required by Edwards.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Finley v. Densford · filed 2004-03-17

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Finley’s complaint because Finley’s complaint is barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

A § 1983 damages claim challenging denial of eligibility for a prison work camp is not barred by the favorable termination rule when success would not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.

Kritenbrink v. Crawford · filed 2004-04-06

The attenuation between Kritenbrink’s classification and the duration of his sentence is too attenuated under the facts alleged in the complaint. ... Therefore, under this reading of Kritenbrink’s claim, it is not barred under the “favorable termination” rule.

Section 1983 claims challenging parole revocation, including requests for injunctive relief, are subject to Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Santiago v. Martin · filed 2004-04-19

Heck applies to parole revocation proceedings and to Santiago’s request for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose requested relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of prison discipline unless the punishment has been invalidated.

Acevedo v. Stockman · filed 2004-04-26

The district court properly dismissed Acevedo’s action because the operative complaint sought relief that, if granted, would have necessarily implied the invalidation of the punishment imposed by the prison authorities, and Acevedo did not allege that this punishment had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Noel v. Grzesiak · filed 2004-04-27

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Noel’s complaint is, in essence, a challenge to the length of his sentence, and he has not shown that his conviction, sentence, or PSR have been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Accordingly, Noel has no § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims challenging a minor misconduct conviction are not cognizable under the favorable termination doctrine until the conviction is invalidated.

Sarah v. Heidtman · filed 2004-04-29

However, as pointed out by the district court, the rationale to dismiss claims under the favorable termination doctrine applies equally to minor misconduct ticket convictions. ... Because Sarah has not shown that his minor misconduct conviction has been invalidated, his claim regarding this conviction is not presently cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging prison discipline that cost good-time credit when success would necessarily imply the disciplinary conviction is invalid, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

McBride v. Rose Higgins · filed 2004-05-05

The district court properly dismissed McBride’s action after concluding that her claim was foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (to recover damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for harm from actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid, § 1983 plaintiff must prove conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question), because she challenged discipline that included the loss of good-time credit, and a judgment in her favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of her disciplinary conviction.

The favorable termination rule does not bar a § 1983 challenge to a prison disciplinary sanction that does not affect the overall length of confinement.

Benscoter v. Yarborough · filed 2004-05-14

The district court erred in dismissing Benscoter’s action under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997).

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a parole revocation claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the sentence unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Washington v. Killian · filed 2004-05-18

Because Mr. Washington’s claim that his parole revocation was unconstitutional would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, this case falls within the prohibition in Heck .

Section 1983 claims that imply the invalidity of a conviction or parole revocation are barred unless the conviction or revocation has been invalidated.

Sanders v. Johnson · filed 2004-05-24

claims, inasmuch as his allegations implicate the invalidity of his conviction and revocation, and Sanders has not demonstrated that these have been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a civil rights action without first obtaining favorable termination of a disciplinary proceeding when that proceeding does not affect the duration of the sentence.

Johnson v. Johns · filed 2004-06-09

The district court did not have the benefit of Muhammad, which has clarified that Edwards requires a favorable termination of a disciplinary proceeding before a civil rights action may be filed only in cases where the duration of the prisoner’s sentence is affected.

Section 1983 does not require favorable termination of a prison disciplinary proceeding when the sanction does not affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Johnson v. Unknown Coolman · filed 2004-06-15

The Supreme Court has subsequently clarified that Edwards requires the favorable termination of a disciplinary proceeding before a civil rights action may be filed only in cases where the duration of the prisoner’s sentence is affected. ... Here, Johnson received only thirty days’ loss of privileges as a sanction, and the holding of Edwards does not apply.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Goodson v. Tennessee · filed 2004-06-15

Goodson’s complaint is barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” ... As Goodson’s convictions have not been invalidated, any ruling on Goodson’s arguments would call into question the validity of his convictions.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding unless the disciplinary decision has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Robinson v. Blount · filed 2002-02-22

Robinson has not shown that the disciplinary hearing was reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid and, therefore, his claim is barred by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997).

A Section 1983 damages claim for arrest pursuant to a warrant without probable cause requires favorable termination of the criminal proceedings; a prayer for judgment continued after a guilty finding does not satisfy that requirement.

Elkins v. Broome · filed 2004-07-26

As a result, “ § 1983 actions seeking damages for unconstitutional arrest or confinement imposed pursuant to legal process ... must allege and prove a termination of the criminal proceedings favorable to the accused.” ... Though Plaintiff never received a judgment, the proceedings did not terminate in his favor. As a result, Plaintiff fails to meet an essential element of his claim.

Section 1983 damages challenging a parole board decision are unavailable unless that decision has been overturned or invalidated.

Kennedy v. Texas Pardons & Paroles · filed 2004-08-18

Kennedy’s claims for damages against Garrett are unavailing, as he has not shown that the decision of the Board has been overturned or invalidated.

A § 1983 claim that would imply a conviction is invalid is not actionable unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, otherwise invalidated, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Ortiz v. Brown · filed 2004-08-18

Under Heck, Ortiz’s allegations are not actionable because he has not shown that his conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by the executive, invalidated by other state means, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas writ.

Section 1983 excessive force claims are not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily call the plaintiff’s criminal convictions into question.

Watson v. Congemi · filed 2004-09-30

Watson’s excessive force claims are not barred under Heck because a resolution of the claims in Watson’s favor would not necessarily implicate the validity of any of his criminal convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary convictions that cost good-time credits until those convictions have been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Montoya v. Jones · filed 2004-12-15

Montoya cannot attack his disciplinary proceedings resulting in the loss of good time credits in a § 1983 action until his “convictions” in those proceedings have been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction’s invalidity unless the conviction has first been invalidated, even when the plaintiff has been released from custody.

Wilson v. CITY OF PONCHATOULA, LOUISIANA · filed 2004-12-17

It is uncontested that Wilson has not had his conviction reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. As Randell makes clear, Wilson’s claim is barred by Heck.

A prisoner may seek damages under § 1983 for a disciplinary decision revoking good-time credits only after the decision has been overturned.

DeWitt v. Wall · filed 2004-12-30

... and he could only seek damages under § 1983 after overturning such decisions.

Section 1983 claims challenging probation revocation cannot provide relief unless the revocation judgment has been reversed or otherwise called into question.

Adongo v. State of Texas · filed 2005-01-07

The district court did not err when it determined that Adongo may not obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has not shown that the judgment that revoked his probation is reversed or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily implicate the validity of continued probation unless the probation judgment has been terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Taylor v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 2005-02-14

The district court properly dismissed this action without prejudice, because if successful, it would necessarily implicate the validity of Taylor’s continued probation, and he fails to prove that the probation judgment has been terminated in his favor.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil committee to seek damages or injunctive relief that would overturn a civil commitment unless the commitment has been set aside.

Hubbs v. Alamao · filed 2005-02-14

Finally, a civil committee, such as plaintiff, cannot seek to overturn his civil commitment proceedings in a civil rights action for damages and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims challenging past parole denials are barred when Heck v. Humphrey applies.

Dehaven v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2005-02-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to De Haven’s due process claim, because any claim based on past denials of parole is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), see Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir.1997), and any claim for future harm fails because De Haven lacks concrete injury for which he would have standing to sue.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory relief or damages challenging a parole revocation when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the parole violation, unless the revocation recommendation has been reversed or vacated.

Ithna'Asheri v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2005-04-08

In the instant matter, there is no doubt that plaintiff is challenging a New York State parole determination — premature as it may be — and that any success in this matter would necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying parole violation. Therefore, under the circumstances here, plaintiff cannot challenge the determination of Administrative Law Judge Graber’s recommendation to revoke parole and seek declaratory relief and damages unless and until the recommendation has been reversed or vacated.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credit unless the underlying sentence or punishment has been overturned.

Chavis v. Zodlow · filed 2005-04-12

Chavis alleges that he was punished with a loss of credit for good-time served, which is not cognizable as a § 1983 due process claim when the sentence or punishment has not been previously overturned.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary action are barred unless that action is reversed or declared invalid; dismissal is without prejudice to refiling.

Fields v. Pace · filed 2005-04-14

Because Fields’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prison disciplinary action if successful, the district court did not err in determining that the claims were barred by Edwards. ... The district court, however, should have dismissed Fields’s complaint without prejudice to his right to refile the complaint in the future if his disciplinary case is reversed or declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims that call a conviction into question are not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Skipwith v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2005-05-03

Moreover, because his conviction has not been invalidated or otherwise called into question, Skipwith’s § 1983 claims are not cognizable.

Section 1983 claims that implicate the validity of a conviction require the conviction to have been reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

Rotar v. Skaggs · filed 2005-05-13

The district court properly dismissed the Rotars’ action because their claims implicate the validity of their state-court convictions, and they have not proven that their convictions were reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

A § 1983 claim that would undermine a prison disciplinary sanction does not arise until the sanction is reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Phelps v. Tucker · filed 2005-05-26

Mr. Phelps did not have a cause of action until the sanction was reversed.

Section 1983’s prior-invalidation requirement applies only when success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is invalid.

Taylor v. United States Probation Office · filed 2005-06-03

The Heck Court made it clear that this requirement of prior invalidation in § 1983 actions applies only if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. ... Applying these principles, it is abundantly clear that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement is not implicated by Taylor’s complaint.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief when Heck bars claims for damages and declaratory relief that would imply the invalidity of a civil commitment.

Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca · filed 2005-06-09

While Huftile’s claims for damages and declaratory relief are barred by Heck, Huftile’s claim for injunctive relief is not barred.

Section 1983 claims by detainees under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act are subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule when habeas relief is available.

Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca · filed 2005-06-10

We therefore conclude that Heck applies to SVPA detainees with access to habeas relief.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would invalidate an unoverturned community-control revocation, even when habeas relief is unavailable, if the claimant could have appealed the revocation.

Vickers v. Donahue · filed 2005-06-28

He could have appealed the revocation order and, had he prevailed, his § 1983 claims would not be barred by Heck. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the Heck bar applies to Vickers’s claim despite the unavailability of habeas relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would implicitly question the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Dufrene v. Brazoria County District Attorney Office · filed 2005-08-16

Under Heck, Dufrene’s claim is not actionable because he has not shown that his conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, invalidated by other state means, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas writ.

Completion of Pennsylvania’s ARD program is not a favorable termination under Heck, so participation in the program bars a § 1983 claim that would impugn the underlying criminal charge.

Gilles v. Davis · filed 2005-10-25

Viewing these factors together, we hold the ARD program is not a favorable termination under Heck.

A § 1983 claim that would call an underlying criminal charge into question is barred under Heck when the plaintiff resolved that charge through Pennsylvania's ARD program, which is not a favorable termination.

Gilles v. Davis · filed 2005-10-25

Petit's participation in the ARD program bars his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence until it has been invalidated.

Hale v. Riggins · filed 2005-11-15

A claim for damages relating to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner must successfully challenge a disciplinary conviction in habeas before pursuing a § 1983 claim whose success would necessarily imply that conviction’s invalidity.

Miller v. Edminsten · filed 2006-01-06

Because, however, a judgment in Miller’s favor on his retaliation claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary convictions, Miller must first successfully challenge those disciplinary convictions in a habeas proceeding before proceeding on his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence when reversal led to a new trial and a guilty plea rather than a favorable termination.

Stein v. COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, NY · filed 2006-01-17

The Appellate Division decision does not constitute an indication of plaintiffs innocence and therefore cannot amount to a favorable termination. Consequently, plaintiffs § 1983 action cannot stand.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who is legally unable to seek habeas relief to bring a damages claim without first obtaining favorable termination of the challenged conviction or sentence.

Dible v. Scholl · filed 2006-01-24

Therefore, this court concludes that Heck’s favorable termination requirement is not applicable to a § 1983 plaintiff who is unable as a matter of law to bring a habeas petition to challenge a conviction or sentence.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim is not barred by Heck when success would not undermine the plaintiff’s prior conviction.

Ballard v. Burton · filed 2006-03-24

The nature of Ballard’s simple assault conviction and the nature of his excessive force claim are such that a judgment in favor of Ballard on his § 1983 claim would not undermine the validity of his conviction. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in its determination that Heck’s favorable termination rule bars this § 1983 action for use of excessive force.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim challenging the removal of earned time credits is not cognizable unless the removal has been invalidated.

Nutter v. Ward · filed 2006-04-04

Because Nutter has not shown that the defendants’ decision to remove his earned time credits has been invalidated, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims remain subject to Heck’s favorable-termination requirement when habeas relief became unavailable because the plaintiff failed to seek it on time.

Drayer v. State of DE · filed 2006-04-06

Given the particular facts of the instant case (i.e., that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Talley because he failed to seek such relief in a timely manner) and our recent decision in Gilles, we refuse to except appellant’s § 1983 suit from the requirements of Heck.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Cook v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-05-16

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a litigant cannot proceed under § 1983 if success on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of his conviction or sentence. ... The District Court correctly found that Cook’s claims with respect to his first conviction are barred.

Section 1983 damages claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey should be dismissed without prejudice.

Leonard v. Muhm · filed 2006-05-22

The district court did not err by dismissing the claims for damages against defendants Donald L. Crump and Tanya S. Muhm as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), although the dismissal should have been without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims that do not affect the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement are outside the favorable termination rule.

Lindgren v. Curry · filed 2006-06-26

Accordingly, the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), does not apply to this action.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a parole revocation that has not been invalidated when success would necessarily show the revocation was invalid.

Williams v. Consovoy · filed 2006-06-29

Accordingly, because the Parole Board's decision has not been rendered invalid, Williams may not attack it via a § 1983 action, and the District Court's dismissal of Williams's claims against Mahoney and Gomez-Rivera was proper.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on a conviction is not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Kadonsky v. New Jersey · filed 2006-06-30

Kadonsky does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim against the Somerset County and Brown defendants for malicious prosecution where he has failed to show that his convictions on drug charges have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

A prisoner cannot state a § 1983 claim challenging a disciplinary result that implicates a protected interest unless that result has been reversed or expunged.

Rosas v. Rodriguez · filed 2006-07-07

To the extent that the monetary assessment of $28 implicates a protected interest, Rosas has failed to state a claim because he has not shown that the result of his disciplinary proceeding has been reversed or expunged.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit whose success would imply the invalidity of prison disciplinary convictions until those convictions are set aside.

Phelps, Charles v. McCoy, Patrick · filed 2006-07-17

He could not file this civil rights suit until his CAB convictions were set aside because a judgment in his favor would have necessarily implied the convictions’ invalidity.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary sanctions affecting conditions of confinement without first obtaining favorable termination, even when the same proceeding affected the length of confinement, if the prisoner permanently abandons all claims concerning the length of confinement.

Peralta v. Vasquez · filed 2006-10-17

We today hold that a prisoner subject to such mixed sanctions can proceed separately, under § 1983, with a challenge to the sanctions affecting his conditions of confinement without satisfying the favorable termination rule, but that he can only do so if he is willing to forgo once and for all any challenge to any sanctions that affect the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit claims implying the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Gay v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-10-26

We add only that, to the extent that Gay’s claims arising out of his prosecution for murder imply the invalidity of the conviction and sentence, the claims are not cognizable under § 1983 absent a showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily impugn a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Camacho v. Maricopa · filed 2006-12-12

... because a judgment in Camacho’s favor on these claims would necessarily impugn the validity of his guilty plea conviction, and Camacho failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated or called into question.

Barker v. State of Mississippi · filed 2007-01-05

Barker’s argument that the district court erred when it dismissed his complaint with prejudice is unavailing because he has not shown that his 1979 rape conviction has been invalidated or called into ... question.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceedings.

McCulley v. Schwenn · filed 2007-01-26

There has been no favorable termination of McCulley’s criminal conviction enabling McCulley to bring malicious prosecution claims.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Nicholas v. Brooks · filed 2007-03-28

According to the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Heck, when a plaintiff brings a civil rights suit that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. ... However, Nicholas’s conviction has not been invalidated. ... Thus the District Court was correct to dismiss the suit.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim seeking damages requires a showing that the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Nicholas v. Heffner · filed 2007-03-28

To the extent Nicholas seeks damages for malicious prosecution, he has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a showing that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck’s favorable-termination rule does not bar a § 1983 damages suit when the plaintiff is no longer in custody and cannot seek review of the conviction or sentence.

Weiss, Morritz v. Indiana Parole Board · filed 2007-05-03

But Heck presents no obstacle for Weiss now that his parole is over. The rule of Heck prohibits § 1983 suits for damages that might impugn the validity of a conviction or sentence before that conviction or sentence is invalidated on direct appeal or during postconviction proceedings. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. This bar, however, is limited to prisoners who are “in custody” and therefore are able to seek such review.

Section 1983’s favorable termination rule bars a claim that challenges a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed or declared invalid.

Garrett v. Texas Department of Public Safety · filed 2007-05-17

Similarly, Garrett’s section 1983 claim is subject to the “favorable termination” rule and barred because he cannot show that his conviction has been reversed or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding that implies the invalidity of lost good-time credits unless the punishment has been invalidated.

Campbell v. Woodford · filed 2007-05-23

Campbell’s due process claim challenged the propriety of a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of 90 days of good-time credit. The district court properly dismissed the claim because Campbell did not allege that the punishment had been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner challenging mixed disciplinary sanctions to pursue claims about conditions of confinement if the prisoner waives all claims about sanctions affecting the duration of imprisonment.

McEachin v. Selsky · filed 2007-05-31

In this case, McEaehin raises “mixed sanctions” claims, and, therefore, the portion of the district court’s judgment dismissing McEachin’s claims under Heck and Edwards is vacated and remanded. On remand, pursuant to Peralta, the district court must provide McEaehin with the waiver option, and ascertain whether McEaehin is willing to waive all claims relating to,sanctions affecting the duration of his imprisonment in order to proceed with claims challenging the sanctions affecting the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Hunt v. City of Scranton · filed 2007-06-06

Neither Hunt’s amended complaint nor any of his other filings allege that the conviction and sentence about which he now complains was ever reversed, expunged or declared invalid by any court or adjudicative body. Hunt failed to establish, despite numerous opportunities to do so, the existence of a prima facie § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for a prison disciplinary conviction when success would necessarily imply its invalidity and the conviction has not previously been invalidated.

Cardoso v. Calbone · filed 2007-06-18

W e have considered the allegations underlying M r. Cardoso’s due-process claim, and we agree with the district court that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction. Consequently, because M r. Cardoso has not shown that the conviction for individual disruptive behavior has previously been invalidated, his request for damages resulting from his prison disciplinary proceedings was correctly denied based on Heck and Edwards.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would negate an element of an existing conviction, even when the plaintiff is not incarcerated or cannot seek habeas relief.

Ashley v. Sutton · filed 2007-06-26

The explicit indication from the Heck court is that the state defendant cannot prevail in a § 1983 action because the state defendant would have to negate an element of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Supreme Court made no exception in these circumstances for instances in which that state defendant was not incarcerated or otherwise had no involvement with habeas relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a parole violator warrant unless the warrant has been successfully challenged in a state or federal proceeding.

Jackson v. Alt · filed 2007-06-27

We agree with the District Court that Jackson may not proceed under § 1983 because he has not successfully challenged the warrant in any state or federal proceeding.

Section 1983 is unavailable to challenge disciplinary sanctions affecting the fact or length of confinement unless the sanctions have been invalidated through habeas relief or an equivalent state process.

Peterson v. Bussard · filed 2007-06-28

Because these sanctions involved the fact and length of appellant’s confinement, rather than simply the conditions of confinement, § 1983 is unavailable unless the sanctions have been “reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief” or some equivalent state process.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to recover damages when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Washington v. Leonard · filed 2007-07-26

We have considered the allegations underlying Washington’s complaint and agree with the district court that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state conviction and/or sentence. Consequently, because Washington has not shown that either his sentence or conviction has been invalidated, he cannot assert a cognizable claim for damages under § 1983 based on defendant Leonard’s alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of confinement cannot proceed unless the confinement has previously been declared invalid.

Hess v. Chronister · filed 2007-08-27

Accordingly, Appellant’s claims cannot proceed absent a showing that his detention was previously declared invalid, such as through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim without prior invalidation of the conviction or sentence when the plaintiff had no opportunity as a matter of law to obtain habeas review.

Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission · filed 2007-08-29

Under these circumstances, there is no way that Powers could have obtained habeas review of his incarceration. This is precisely the kind of situation that Justice Souter had in mind when he argued in Heck and Spencer that the favorable-termination requirement could not be deployed to foreclose federal review of asserted deprivations of federal rights by habeas-ineligible plaintiffs. Accordingly, we join the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the favorable-termination requirement poses no impediment to Powers’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 plaintiffs who were legally unable to seek habeas relief need not satisfy Heck’s favorable-termination requirement.

Powers v. Cnty · filed 2007-08-29

We are persuaded by the logic of those circuits that have held that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement cannot be imposed against § 1983 plaintiffs who lack a habeas option for the vindication of their federal rights.

Section 1983 does not permit relief challenging a parole revocation unless a state tribunal or federal habeas decision has invalidated the revocation.

Kay v. Bemis · filed 2007-09-11

The district court consolidated these claims and held that no relief challenging a parole revocation is cognizable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can show the revocation was invalidated by either a state tribunal or a federal habeas corpus decision. See Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1987 (10th Cir. 1996). Since Kay failed to demonstrate any attack on his parole revocation by a competent court, the district court dismissed the claim. For substantially the same reasons as the district court’s order, we affirm the dismissal of these claims.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim that would call into question the duration of his sentence requires a prior successful challenge to the underlying disciplinary proceedings.

Ford v. Walker · filed 2007-11-05

Here, plaintiffs success in this action would implicitly question the validity of his disciplinary proceedings and the duration of his sentence. Thus, his section 1983 claim must also fail because he failed to show a previous successful challenge to his disciplinary proceedings.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for violations of federal rights, subject to the favorable termination requirement for claims that would invalidate a conviction or sentence.

Royal v. Durison · filed 2007-11-20

Since Royal has therefore not established the favorable termination requirement, his § 1983 claim cannot go forward.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary decision that would shorten his confinement if reversed unless the decision has already been invalidated.

Miller v. Sanford · filed 2007-12-06

Because Miller’s section 1983 action necessarily implicates the validity of the duration of his confinement, and Miller has not alleged that the disciplinary decision has been invalidated, his action is barred by Heck and Edwards.

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction or sentence is barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Resendez v. City of Houston · filed 2007-12-11

Resendez’s remaining claims are barred by his failure to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a prison disciplinary punishment when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a good-time-credit revocation that has not been invalidated.

Roberts v. Wilson · filed 2007-12-13

Roberts has never had the disciplinary adjudication invalidated. Therefore, his § 1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok. Unlike the claim in Muhammed, Roberts’s claim necessarily would be at odds with the revocation of his good time credits and with the State’s calculation of the time he has left to serve on his sentence.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned on direct appeal or in collateral proceedings.

Sherratt v. Braithwaite · filed 2008-01-23

Thus, Heck barred Sherratt’s civil rights complaint absent a showing Sherratt’s conviction had been overturned on direct appeal or in collateral proceedings. Id. at 483-87. ... That review demonstrates the district court’s resolution of Sherratt’s civil rights complaint is clearly correct. Accordingly, we AFFIRM for substantially those reasons set out in the order of the district court dated July 11, 2007.

Heck’s favorable termination rule applies to a section 1983 claim even when the plaintiff cannot obtain habeas relief.

Rarity Abdullah v. Weinzeirl · filed 2008-02-04

Finally, Abdullah’s inability to obtain habeas relief does not preclude application of Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge disciplinary proceedings that cost good time credits unless the disciplinary results have been invalidated.

Crane v. Wheeler · filed 2008-03-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crane’s claim that his due process rights were violated by disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of good time credits because Crane failed to show that the results of the disciplinary hearings were invalidated.

Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims are barred under Heck when success would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction that has not been invalidated.

Piskanin v. Hammer · filed 2008-03-18

Here, we agree with the District Court’s threshold determination that Piskanin’s Fourth Amendment claims, if successful, would have the effect of rendering his criminal convictions invalid. ... His conviction thus has not been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim challenging a search is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Palmer v. City of Harrisburg · filed 2008-04-25

To the extent that Palmer intended the instant civil rights action to include a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of his pants, said challenge is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on such a claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, which have never been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim to proceed despite a prison assault conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate that conviction.

Lockett v. Suardini · filed 2008-05-14

But such a finding would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Lockett’s misconduct conviction for assault because Lockett could have unlawfully assaulted the officers in the course of the altercation by using force beyond that necessary to defend himself, even if the incident was precipitated by the officers’ own retaliatory conduct. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Lockett’s First Amendment retaliation claim is analytically distinct from whether he was guilty of assault and therefore does not implicate Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Von Schlichten v. County of Northampton · filed 2008-05-30

Moreover, as the district court also determined, to the extent that appellants’ claims imply the invalidity of the conviction and sentence, they are not cognizable under § 1983 absent a showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

A § 1983 action cannot proceed if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Saunders v. Gwendolyn Bright · filed 2008-06-03

We conclude that there is no arguable basis for disagreeing with the District Court’s conclusion that relief could not be granted in his civil rights action without collaterally rendering Saunders’ convictions effectively invalid. Furthermore, his convictions have never been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and he, therefore, has not satisfied Heck’s favorable termination rule.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment that would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Johnson v. Ozmint · filed 2008-06-20

Plaintiff is apparently seeking damages from his alleged unconstitutional imprisonment, but Plaintiff has not shown his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The court accordingly concludes that the rule from Heck v. Humphrey applies in this situation, and applying this rule, Plaintiffs claim cannot proceed.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner seeking damages for past confinement to proceed without satisfying Heck’s favorable termination requirement when habeas relief is unavailable.

Wilson v. Johnson · filed 2008-07-25

We believe that the reasoning employed by the plurality in Spencer must prevail in a case, like Wilson’s, where an individual would be left without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred.

Section 1983’s favorable termination rule bars a claim challenging a parole revocation when success would undermine the revocation’s validity.

Wilson v. McVey · filed 2008-09-08

The rule applies to criminal convictions and parole revocations alike, and inmates may not predicate a civil rights action upon the revocation of their parole if the action would impugn the validity of the revocation.

Section 1983 requires a favorable termination before a person may challenge the duration of confinement; vacating parole revocation decisions without reversing them does not satisfy that requirement.

Connolly v. Arroyo · filed 2008-09-18

The two Appeals Unit decisions vacating the Board’s revocation decisions do not constitute favorable terminations because they were not reversals of the Board’s decisions.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement when the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was ineligible for habeas relief.

S.E. Ex Rel. A.E. v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2008-10-10

Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineli-gible, we hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 claims by a plaintiff who was neither convicted nor sentenced and was ineligible for habeas relief are not barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

S.E. v. Grant County Board of Education · filed 2008-10-10

Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a parole revocation affecting the fact or duration of confinement unless the resulting sentence has been invalidated.

Waller v. Collier · filed 2008-10-20

Waller’s complaint attacked the validity of his parole revocation, thereby calling into question the fact and duration of his confinement. Consequently, the district court was correct that Waller had to show that the sentence imposed as a result of the revocation proceedings had been invalidated by a state or federal court. McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995). No such showing was made. His damages claim therefore is not cognizable under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim challenging the duration of detention must satisfy the favorable termination rule.

Wilson Ex Rel. Estate of Wilson v. Taylor · filed 2009-02-13

In order for a plaintiff to have a valid § 1983 claim based on the duration of his detention, he must meet the “favorable termination rule” established in Heck: the conviction or sentence must have “been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that implies the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Reger v. Walker · filed 2009-02-26

His claim, whether for damages, declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief, is similarly not cognizable in a § 1983 action because it implies the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown his conviction to have been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Buckingham v. State of Texas · filed 1995-05-08

Therefore, Buckingham cannot seek damages under § 1983 as he cannot demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 bars damages claims based on an allegedly unconstitutional sentence unless the sentence has been reversed on appeal or in a postconviction proceeding.

Armant v. Kennedy · filed 2009-04-30

As the district court found, Armant’s claims are barred because he is seeking to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional sentence that has not been reversed on appeal or in a postconviction proceeding.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily challenge prison discipline lengthening a sentence require a favorable termination of the disciplinary result before they can proceed.

Thompson v. Thalacker · filed 1996-12-24

Thompson’s impartial factfinder claims in his § 1983 action are an indirect attack on both the procedure and result of the disciplinary proceedings, thus bringing those claims within the sphere of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for confinement unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Misu v. Department of Justice · filed 2009-06-05

Insofar as plaintiff seeks to recover damages by means of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for time she was ... incarcerated, her claim must fail because she has not shown that her confinement has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, expunge[ment] by executive order, declar[ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or . . . a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); accord White v. Bowz`e, 194 F.3d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (table).

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck’s favorable-termination requirement until the underlying conviction or sentence is favorably resolved.

Domotor v. Wennet · filed 2009-06-30

Although Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and likely unable to bring a habeas action, this Court holds that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement bars Plaintiff from bringing the § 1983 claims alleged in the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed until the claimant obtains a favorable resolution of a challenge to it.

Kuperman v. State of NH, et al. · filed 2009-07-01

Therefore, the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey bars Kuperman's § 1983 claims raised in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Bryant v. Mostert · filed 2009-07-07

The Court concludes that a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. Plaintiff seeks damages directly attributable to his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. However, he has not alleged or otherwise demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated; consequently, the instant claim is not cognizable under section 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction that cost good-time credits until the conviction has been set aside.

Thomas v. Quarterman · filed 2009-07-09

Because a favorable judgment on Thomas’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction for which he was sentenced to the forfeiture of 730 days good-time credits, Thomas’s claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until his conviction in the disciplinary proceeding has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 bars damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated; inability to seek habeas relief alone does not remove that requirement.

Randell v. Johnson · filed 2000-10-13

Because Randell is seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck, he is barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits a person released from custody to challenge the duration of confinement despite Heck when habeas relief is unavailable and the claim does not challenge the conviction's validity.

Huang v. Johnson · filed 2001-05-17

Based on these authorities, we conclude that Heck does not bar Huang's Section 1983 action. While Huang's challenge is aimed at the duration of Yu's confinement, she does not challenge the validity of Yu's conviction. Furthermore, Yu has no habeas remedy because he has long since been released from OCFS custody.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to recover damages on a claim that would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Farrell v. Keys · filed 2001-07-06

Mr. Farrell’s § 1983 claim for compensatory damages is barred as premature at this stage by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”).

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of probation terms are subject to dismissal unless those terms have been invalidated.

Gould v. Patterson · filed 2002-01-16

In the present case, the trial court dismissed Gould’s 42 USC § 1983 suit after consideration of the merits. We conclude, however, that most of the suit was subject to being dismissed because the claims were not ripe for consideration under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (114 SC 2364, 129 LE2d 383) (1994). ... In the present 42 USC § 1983 suit, most of Gould’s claims, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the probationary portion of the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Sanders v. Detroit Police Department · filed 2009-08-28

To recover monetary damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a deferred adjudication cannot proceed until the plaintiff satisfies Heck’s favorable termination requirement.

Kastner v. State of Texas · filed 2009-09-18

If Kastner prevails, he would establish that his deferred adjudication lacks any basis. Accordingly, he may not bring his claims until he satisfies the conditions of Heck.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would imply the invalidity of prison disciplinary proceedings unless those proceedings have been invalidated.

Slack v. Jones · filed 2009-10-05

Heck and Edwards make clear that Mr. Slack does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim unless he can show that the prison proceedings have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the loss of good-time credits while the underlying disciplinary proceedings remain in force.

Randell Orange v. Ellis · filed 2009-10-14

Because the disciplinary proceedings have not been overturned administratively or through habeas proceedings, Orange is barred from asserting a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim challenging disciplinary sanctions that affect only the conditions of confinement, because the favorable termination rule does not bar that claim.

Arango v. Winstead · filed 2009-11-19

Because Arango’s due process claim implicated only the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of her confinement, the District Court erred in ruling that the claim was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The favorable termination rule applies to § 1983 claims concerning parole revocation, but does not bar a claim when the plaintiff has completed the term of imprisonment.

Miner v. Goord · filed 2009-11-25

Although the favorable termination rule applies to § 1983 claims regarding parole revocations, the doctrine is not implicated on these facts. In this case, there is no danger that § 1983 is being utilized in a manner that would allow Plaintiff to engage in an end-run around the requirements for bringing a habeas corpus petition because he has completed his term of imprisonment.

Section 1983 claims challenging pretrial diversions are not barred by Heck when the diversions produced no underlying convictions.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks · filed 2009-12-16

Here, there is no related underlying conviction that could be invalidated by Mr. Vasquez’s § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary convictions and seeking expungement are barred by Heck unless the convictions have been invalidated.

Johnson v. Livingston · filed 2010-01-08

Because Johnson challenged the validity of his ... disciplinary convictions in his § 1983 complaint and sought expungement, his claims were barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim challenging criminal proceedings cannot succeed unless those proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Garey, Jr. v. Romero · filed 2010-01-20

As the district court correctly noted, Mr. Garey’s § 1983 complaint cannot succeed on its merits because there has been no termination of the challenged criminal proceedings in Mr. Garey’s favor.