42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages for procedural defects in a disciplinary hearing when success would not imply the invalidity of his confinement.

Armstrong v. McGinnis · filed 1996-04-30

Consequently, because the success of Armstrong's claim did not impugn the validity of his confinement, his claim remains cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations in prison disciplinary hearings when success would not necessarily invalidate the disciplinary outcome.

Umar v. Johnson · filed 1997-06-09

In sum, this Court finds in light of Heck and Edwards that Umar’s damages action for procedural due process errors in the Adjustment Committee hearing is cognizable under Section 1983. Both of those decisions carry forward the Wolff recognition that due process deprivations that do not necessarily connote the invalidity of the prison’s disciplinary outcome are independently actionable.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily imply that a loss of good-time credits was invalid.

Gary v. Jernigan v. Jack Regan D.W. Nelson E.S. Alamedia, Jr. B.L. Jackson B.O. Daniels Ray Brown M.H. Tristan R. Mejia · filed 1997-09-24

The determination whether a cause of action based on allegedly unconstitutional prison hearing procedures may be cognizable under § 1983 must be based upon whether "the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards, 117 S.Ct. at 1587.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of revoked good-time credits.

Lusz v. Scott · filed 1997-10-07

These two contentions, like Lusz’s drug test contention, cannot go forward because, if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of Lusz’s conviction, i.e., his revocation of good-time credit.

Section 1983 does not permit review of a prison disciplinary board’s credibility determinations when no procedural due process violation is implicated.

Reed v. Jago · filed 1986-02-25

Although issues of credibility are not normally resolvable on summary judgment motions, the district court here never had to reach that issue, since where no procedural due process violations are implicated, the credibility determinations made by a prison disciplinary review board are not reviewable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for pendent-party jurisdiction over a municipal corporation joined only for a related state-law claim when federal diversity jurisdiction is absent.

Aldinger v. Howard · filed 1976-06-24

As we have indicated, we think a fair reading of the language used in § 1343, together with the scope of § 1983, requires a holding that the joinder of a municipal corporation, like the county here, for purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction, is without the statutory jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to people deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law, but does not extend a federal forum to another plaintiff asserting only a related state tort claim.

Washco v. Darby Borough Police Department · filed 1988-04-14

Despite these differences in posture, however, it is fair to conclude that Congress did not authorize the federal courts to hear claims like Mrs. Washco’s. The remedy provided by § 1983 is available to a specific class of plaintiffs — those who have suffered deprivations of their constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support pendent party jurisdiction over private defendants facing only related state-law claims.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1988-04-19

Here, as in the cases cited immediately above, plaintiffs with section 1983 claims against various state actors, seek to have the court exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ purely state-law claims against different parties who are merely private individuals or entities. I will follow the clearly established trend of case law in this circuit and in others. “[Ujnder § 1983, Congress intended the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only when the defendants have acted under color of law_ The inference is clear: Congress intended to negate the exercise of jurisdiction over all parties who have not acted under color of law.”

Section 1983’s municipal policy or custom requirement precludes pendent party jurisdiction over a municipality when that requirement is unmet.

Phipps v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-08-14

The court finds that this custom or policy requirement implicitly negates the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over municipalities in § 1983 cases where the requirement is not met.

Section 1983 does not grant pendent-party jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a party with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners ex rel. Avery · filed 1991-08-28

However, our task is an easy one because the Aldinger court resolved for us in the negative the issue of whether section 1983 grants pendent-party jurisdiction.

Section 1983 itself does not authorize pendent party jurisdiction over defendants against whom no federal claims are asserted.

Gibson v. City of Glendale Police Department · filed 1992-03-10

It has long been settled that no such jurisdictional authorization exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not affirmatively grant pendent party jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties.

Meyers v. Trinity Medical Center · filed 1993-01-14

We agree with the district court that neither the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contains an affirmative grant of pendent party jurisdiction as required by Finley.

A state university sufficiently distinct from the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, along with its governing board, is a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Kovats v. Rutgers · filed 1986-04-24

Both the University and the Board of Governors are “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipal departments are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Landon v. County of Daviess · filed 2020-06-03

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants must be dismissed because municipal departments are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on the wrongful disposition of personal property.

Kircheis v. Long · filed 1976-12-06

Initially, the claim of a wrongful disposition of personal property can be heard under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims arising in the Trust Territory because the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within the statute.

Thompson v. Kleppe · filed 1976-12-15

However, the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within § 1983 and, therefore, this action may not be brought under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 applies in American Samoa and does not require filing an administrative claim under territorial tort law before suit.

Tuivai v. Pele · filed 1984-06-05

Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 et seq. apply in the Territory of American Samoa. In order to proceed under those statutes it is not necessary to file administrative claims under the government tort liability act.

A civil rights damages claim can survive a prisoner’s transfer even when the transfer moots requests for prospective relief.

Boatman v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2006-03-23

The order under review is affirmed as to the disposition of those claims for which the appellant sought only declaratory or injunctive relief. But because the trial court erred in concluding that the claims for which the appellant sought money damages were inappropriately raised in a civil rights complaint and also erred in failing to address these claims, the order is otherwise reversed and this case is remanded.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for injuries caused by an unconstitutional ordinance even after the ordinance is amended, so the amendment does not moot the claim.

George Phillips Philip Vitale v. Borough of Keyport Victor Rhodes Board of Adjustment · filed 1997-02-21

Contrary to the defendants' suggestion, the issue of the constitutionality of this version of the Ordinance is not moot. Phillips and Vitale have a § 1983 damage claim based on the 500 foot version of the Ordinance. They seek damages for defendants' refusal to permit them to operate an adult bookstore on Lot 61 from July 28, 1992, when Ordinance 31-92 was first adopted, to the date in the fall of 1993 on which the 300 foot version of the Ordinance was adopted. If the 500 foot Ordinance is unconstitutional, Phillips and Vitale are entitled to any damages they can establish to have been occasioned by it.

Section 1983 personal-liability claims against individual defendants are not mooted by a plaintiff's graduation, while individual injunctive-relief claims under it are.

Zentgraf v. TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY · filed 1981-03-02

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s individual claim under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and her individual claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court will not dismiss as moot Plaintiff's claim for personal liability against the individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A Section 1983 claim seeking to undo a state-court child-custody judgment is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel after the constitutional issues were fully litigated in state court.

Yow v. Crater · filed 1981-11-18

Were the Court able to overcome its reluctance to rule on domestic relations matters, it would still be unable to grant the requested relief, since plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for the alleged denial of law-library access, work assignments to a state prisoner held at a county jail, or minor property loss where state remedies exist.

Falzerano v. Collier · filed 1982-01-08

The facts alleged on this count, taken in their most favorable and lenient reading, fall far short of a § 1983 claim. ... This claim raises no federal claim under § 1983. ... But whatever the imperfections may be, they do not rise to § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 damages request remains a live controversy after the challenged disciplinary proceedings have ended, even if injunctive relief becomes moot.

Henson v. The Honor Committee of U. Va., the Rector and Visitors of U. Va. · filed 1983-12-05

Henson sought both injunctive and monetary relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the University. Thus, his request for damages remained a live controversy even after the disciplinary proceedings were dropped.

Ordinary tort-law principles of causation, including the rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, govern claims for constitutional torts brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parrett v. City of Connersville, Indiana · filed 1984-08-22

These are general principles of causation in tort law but they are applicable to constitutional torts litigated under section 1983.

A section 1983 claim for damages is not mooted merely because the defendant later remedies the underlying deprivation, since the damages claim survives independent of any request for injunctive relief.

Delancy v. Terry Caldwell, Official Court Reporter, Tulsa, Ok · filed 1984-08-29

The district court’s holding that plaintiff’s action is moot is correct to the extent that plaintiff sought injunctive relief. However, plaintiff also sought damages for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights flowing from the delay in receiving the transcript. If plaintiff can establish a deprivation of his rights and damages as a result thereof, his claim is not mooted merely because he is supplied a copy of the requested transcript.

A reviewing court may sever a Section 1983 claim into a separate proceeding when resolving it requires evidence beyond the limited record permitted in administrative review.

Jahn v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1986-03-11

To the extent that a resolution of Jahn’s § 1983 claim would require the judge to hear further evidence, the judge properly concluded that this cause of action should be maintained in a separate proceeding.

A defendant's promise not to repeat challenged conduct does not moot a viable Section 1983 claim for damages already sustained.

Stokes v. Village of Wurtsboro · filed 1987-05-08

The Village’s stipulation, that it would not apply Local Law 5-1983 to the Sullivan Street property in the future, did not address and therefore does not preclude an action for damages allegedly sustained by the Stokes when water service was terminated. Thus, the section 1983 cause of action was not mooted when the Village entered into the stipulation.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging how prison officials handled a furlough decision.

Jackson v. Walters · filed 1989-10-25

Plaintiff’s claim is, as the Magistrate held, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 may provide a claim for conversion of property by municipal employees when the underlying conversion claim is maintainable.

Hahn v. City of Rensselaer · filed 1990-10-18

While plaintiffs arguments on this point are not entirely clear, it appears that, insofar as plaintiffs cause of action for conversion is maintainable, it is also a claim cognizable under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Gomez v Toledo, 446 US 635, 640).

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a claim seeking to remedy denial of access to state courts.

Stephens v. Muncy · filed 1991-02-20

However, because Stephens seeks to remedy a denial of access to state courts, we consider his filing as a complaint filed more appropriately pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against state officials, but declaratory and injunctive claims become moot when repeal of the challenged law leaves no prospective relief available.

Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Felix · filed 1991-05-16

The stockholders still seek declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983. Will recognizes that state officials can be sued for prospective relief under § 1983. 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2811 n. 10. No prospective relief is attainable in this case, however. The intangibles tax was repealed retroactively to November 10, 1988, by Pub.L. No. 80-1989, §§ 18-19, 1989 Ind.Acts 912, 919 (April 26, 1989). Any claim for declaratory or injunctive relief is moot.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims that a sheriff assaulted a person or that the person was improperly placed in segregation.

United States v. Horton · filed 1991-05-28

We note that Horton's claims that he was assaulted by a sheriff and that he was inappropriately placed in segregation should be asserted in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 is the required cause of action for a litigant alleging a violation of a constitutional right.

Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1992-07-23

Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution. We have previously held that a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a pendent state law fraud claim.

Harris v. Welch · filed 1992-11-13

More importantly, the district court correctly determined that once Count One had been dismissed, the district court could dismiss Count Two because it was a pendent state claim not covered under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to state court judgment preclusion for issues previously litigated and claims that could have been raised in the earlier state court proceeding.

Hardin v. Harshbarger · filed 1993-01-14

This rule is applicable to actions brought under § 1983 respecting both issues actually litigated (issue preclusion), ... and issues which could have been raised in the earlier state-court proceeding but were not (claim preclusion).

A claim for money damages under Section 1983 is not mooted by an inmate’s release from confinement.

Curtis Leon Taylor, Sr. v. P. L. Huffman Stateof Georgia · filed 1994-09-28

Claims for money damages under Sec. 1983 are not mooted by an inmate's release from confinement.

A Section 1983 claim for monetary damages remains live even when the claim for injunctive relief is moot.

Allen v. Deland · filed 1994-10-26

A section 1983 claim for monetary damages, however, cannot be dismissed on mootness grounds.

Section 1983 allows a damages claim challenging the procedures used to obtain a conviction when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Evans v. City of Columbia · filed 1996-03-27

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck Court explicitly stated that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result," are cognizable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of the Supremacy Clause based on federal preemption.

Gustafson v. City Of Lake Angelus · filed 1996-04-03

In regard to attorneys fees, a claim premised on a violation of the Supremacy Clause through preemption is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claimant who seeks damages from an Ohio state agency in the Ohio Court of Claims waives a § 1983 claim against state employees based on the same acts.

Gibson v. The University of Cincinnati Nancy Talbott Tina Whalen · filed 1996-05-13

This court has twice held that foreclosure of a claimant's right to sue in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has sought damages from a state agency or institution in the Ohio Court of Claims does not deny the claimant any right guaranteed by a federal statute or the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 permits a claim for denial of equal protection of the laws.

Henry v. Milonas · filed 1996-07-12

Because plaintiffs have successfully contended that they have been denied their rights to equal protection of the laws, a claim cognizable under 42 USC § 1983, the action is remitted to Supreme Court to determine the amount of counsel fees, if any, to be awarded pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 (see, Wilson v Crosson, supra; Davis v Rosenblatt, supra, at 173).

Constitutional claims against local governments must be brought under § 1983 and satisfy its requirements.

Orozco v. County of Monterey · filed 1996-09-20

Thus, the second and third causes of action must be and hereby are deemed to be asserted under § 1983 and subject to the requirements of that statute.

A claim for compensatory damages under Section 1983 for a past deprivation of federal rights under color of state law is not moot merely because the challenged conduct has ended.

Spencer v. Gonzalez · filed 1999-04-16

If, as Mr. Spencer alleges, Mr. Gonzalez deprived him of visitation with his children for over a year under color of state law in violation of federal constitutional rights, the question of entitlement to compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not moot.

Section 1983 permits a claim alongside an ADA claim when the Section 1983 claim rests on an independent federally protected right.

Kruger v. Jenne · filed 2000-06-19

The Court in Holbrook did not hold that a plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain causes of action under § 1983 and the ADA, but rather that the litigant may do so as long as the § 1983 claims are based on independent causes of action, i.e. claims based on violation of federally protected rights, whether constitutional or statutory. In this case, the plaintiff alleges independent claims that the defendant, under color of state law, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 is not limited to tortious actions.

South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. South Dakota · filed 2000-09-15

There is nothing in the text or the legislative history of § 1983 that supports a limitation of § 1983 only to “tortious actions.”

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a prisoner’s claims challenging forced, uncompensated prison labor.

Valderas v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-14

The district court correctly treated the former claims as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the latter claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. ... § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's due process challenge to a classification hearing when success would not necessarily result in release or create an entitlement to early release.

Reyna v. Johnson · filed 2001-03-14

Because Reyna’s assertions that he was denied due process at his classification hearing would not necessarily win his release from custody and would not create an entitlement of early release, these claims should have been construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for seeking money damages for constitutional violations, and a court may construe constitutional claims as Section 1983 claims even when they are not expressly labeled that way.

T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead · filed 2002-03-26

Indeed, for the plaintiff to recover money damages for the violations he alleges, Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle by which he must assert his claims. Accordingly, the Court views the plaintiffs first three claims as: (1) a Section 1983 equal protection claim; (2) a Section 1983 substantive due process claim; and (3) a Section 1983 procedural due process claim.

Section 1983 provides the statutory mechanism for bringing First Amendment political patronage claims and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims.

Coffey v. Cox · filed 2002-08-20

On the other hand, in order to bring a Rutan patronage claim under the First Amendment, a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, or an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a would-be plaintiff must use the statutory mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, the Heck bar depends on both the civil claim and the specific offense of conviction.

Hughes v. Lott · filed 2003-11-14

Thus, the court must look both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest under color of state law, including a government employee's stigma-plus claim when defamation accompanies dismissal.

Patterson v. City of Utica · filed 2004-06-02

For a government employee, a cause of action under § 1983 for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law may arise when an alleged government defamation occurs in the course of dismissal from government employment.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action in which a claim for inadequate medical care may properly be brought.

Baez v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement · filed 2004-06-03

Baez’s claim is not cognizable is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition; rather, it is properly brought in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not govern a claim seeking a state tort remedy rather than relief for a constitutional violation.

Barrett v. Miller · filed 1992-04-22

The judge erred by characterizing this as a § 1983 action. The Barretts filed an excessive-force action seeking a state remedy provided within the ambit of traditional tort law. The Barretts did not allege a constitutional violation of their civil rights; they did not seek a remedy under federal or state constitutional law.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply an invalid conviction are barred until the conviction has been invalidated.

Higgins v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma · filed 2004-06-29

When a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of plaintiff necessarily would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate the conviction or sentence already has been invalidated.

An unpleaded § 1983 claim cannot support a judgment on an alternative ground when the failure to plead it deprived the defendant of the opportunity to raise defenses available under the statute.

Graham v. Springfield Vermont School District · filed 2005-03-15

By failing to plead § 1983, Graham prevented the District from raising any defenses that may have been available because of § 1983’s limitations. Thus, whatever potential defenses the District may have had were not considered at trial.- We will not presume that Graham could have overcome those defenses in the event he had pled the statutory remedy.

A § 1983 claim may fail when a defendant is immune or the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim.

Cooper v. Finley · filed 2007-02-20

With respect to all appellees, either the appellees are immune, Cooper has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, or the Younger doctrine applies.

A preprinted § 1983 complaint form does not make a complaint a § 1983 action when the pleaded claims arise under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

O'GUINN v. Lovelock Correctional Center · filed 2007-09-05

The district court mischaracterized O’Guinn’s complaint as arising under § 1983. O’Guinn’s complaint clearly-pleaded ADA and Rehabilitation Act statutory violations.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would invalidate an unrevoked conviction.

Bessent v. Clark · filed 2007-09-25

Bessent's conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Accordingly, Bessent cannot sue the various named governmental officials based on the constitutionality of his arrest pursuant to section 1983. See Ott v. Mitchell, 792 So.2d 332, 334(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2001). As in Ott, this Court affirmed Bessent's conviction on direct appeal. As such, Bessent's claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s current sentence; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus or a criminal appeal.

Thigpen v. McDonnell · filed 2008-04-11

We agree that Thigpen’s double jeopardy claim is barred by Heck. ... If Thigpen were successful on this challenge, the invalidation of his current sentence would necessarily result. Therefore, the appropriate vehicle for relief on Thigpen’s double jeopardy claim is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a criminal appeal.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for violating constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law.

Blaylock v. Borden · filed 2008-04-16

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 covers claims against local officers for excessive force during arrest and deliberate indifference to medical needs during incarceration.

Goodman v. Lewis · filed 2009-01-12

The complaint also alleges facts in support of a claim that individual officers employed by the Waycross Police Department and the Ware County Sheriffs Department used excessive force in arresting plaintiff and then showed deliberate indifference to plaintiff s medical needs upon incarceration. These claims will be construed as ones brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law who deprives the person of a federal right.

Harris v. CITY OF VALDOSTA, GA. · filed 2009-04-15

To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a person, (2) acting under color of state law, (3) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including claims based on equal protection and substantive due process.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-02-19

To state a defamation-plus claim, Buckey must join a defamation claim to a recognizable section 1983 wrong such as the denial of equal protection and substantive due process here hypothesized.

Section 1983 provides damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies that act under color of law to deprive a person of protected rights.

Peterson v. Ward · filed 2002-08-16

His action is best characterized as a claim typically brought in federal court under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates an action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies that act under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage to deprive a person of any rights, privileges or immunities secure by the Constitution and law.

Section 1983 claims must be pleaded in the complaint.

Aviles v. Department of the Army · filed 2009-09-08

All plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are also dismissed as they are nowhere pled in the complaint.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations caused by state actors and requires more than a de minimis use of force for an excessive-force claim.

PARLIN v. Cumberland County · filed 2009-09-11

Thus, to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for excessive force by prison officials, a plaintiff must allege wrongdoing amounting to more than a de minimis use of force.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.

Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free School District · filed 2009-09-30

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.

Section 1983 concerns constitutional violations rather than violations of local laws or regulations.

Christmas v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-02-11

The defendants correctly argue that violations under local laws and regulations have no bearing on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which involve violations under the constitution.

Title VI does not preclude a claim under Section 1983.

TC v. Valley Central School District · filed 2011-03-30

In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Fitzgerald and its citations to Alvarado, Nashville I-k0 and Bossier Parish, the Court now concludes that Title VI does not preclude a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials.

Myers v. Simpson · filed 2011-12-09

Section 1983, which prohibits a person acting “under color of’ state law from depriving individuals of their federal rights, provides a cause of action to a plaintiff who must show that a government official actually violated the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of ADA Title I because Title I has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Okwu v. McKim · filed 2012-06-12

Accordingly, we must affirm the district court’s conclusion that Okwu cannot state a § 1983 claim predicated on violations of Title I of the ADA.

A complaint can state a § 1983 claim without naming the statute if its allegations give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its grounds.

Deron King v. Butts County Georgia · filed 2014-08-13

Thus, because King gave Butts County fair and sufficient notice of the nature of and grounds for his § 1983 claims of discrimination and retaliation such that he may proceed under § 1983, the district court’s granting of Butts County’s motion for summary judgment was error.

Section 1983 provides a private action for deprivation of federal rights and requires state action plus deprivation of constitutional or federal rights.

Montañez v. State Insurance Fund · filed 2015-03-17

Section 1983 “creates a private right of action for redressing abridgments or deprivations of federally assured rights.” ... A claim pursuant to section 1983 must satisfy two essential elements: “the defendant must have acted under color of state law, and his or her conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law.” ... Finally, “while plaintiffs are not held to higher pleading standards in § 1983 actions, they must plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for the alleged taking of unidentified property.

Sanchez v. Allen · filed 2015-04-23

In addition, Sanchez’s claim that certain (unidentified) property was taken from him does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge a city ordinance that allegedly deprives a person of federal constitutional rights.

ATM Exp., Inc. v. City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 2005-07-08

Section 1983 authorizes the court to redress “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” committed by any “person” who acts “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”.

Section 1983 does not provide greater remedies for an IDEA claim whose essence is denial of FAPE when the claim is recast under that section.

David T. Ex Rel. Kaitlyn T. v. City of Chicopee · filed 2007-02-15

While the complaint asserts, as noted above, a claim pursuant to § 1983 and offers in its six counts other causes of action with a constitutional or common law flavor, the First Circuit has recently determined that “[w]here the essence of the claim is one stated under the IDEA for denial of FAPE, no greater remedies than those authorized under the IDEA are made available by recasting the claim as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights and requires personal involvement by the defendant.

Schwarm v. Craighead · filed 2008-05-05

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights that are conferred elsewhere. ... Section 1983 imposes personal liability and requires that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily may be amended unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

Beckerman v. Weber · filed 2008-08-12

A plaintiff who has a § 1983 claim dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily given an opportunity to amend the claim, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. ... Here, amending the claim would have been futile. Beckerman has clearly provided the facts underlying his First Amendment claim but an essential element of a viable claim, an official act, is lacking. This deficiency is a legal inadequacy that amending the complaint cannot cure.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Vierria v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2009-06-23

Thus, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. ... Thus, SCIF’s and Devereux’s motion to dismiss this claim on the basis that SCIF and Devereux were not acting under color of law is DENIED.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action subject to substantive due process causation and danger creation rules.

Rhoten v. Dickson · filed 2010-01-29

But the Tenth Circuit employs distinct tests to determine causation for acts or omissions in a § 1983 substantive due process claim, so Rhoten’s two negligence theories must be examined separately. ... Generally, federal liability does not attach if state actors do nothing when suspicious circumstances require action unless the state actor recklessly created the danger through some affirmative conduct on the state’s part that placed plaintiff in danger. This is called the “danger creation” theory. ... The federal district court relied upon Rhoten’s failure to establish that Pase created the danger when granting summary judgment under the omission theory of liability. It held there was no § 1983 liability, reasoning that Pase did not change the status quo or place Rhoten in a worse position by following Dickson. But this additional showing is not required under Kansas negligence law, and the issue decided by the federal district is not identical to the causation analysis in Kansas.

A court must resolve a §1983 refund claim rather than deny it and direct the defendant to provide administrative review.

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., R. Blount and D. Bell v. PPA · filed 2018-04-13

By simply denying all refund claims and directing an administrative review, the trial court abdicated its duty to resolve Licensees’ claims under §1983 and sought to transfer that responsibility to the Authority. In so doing, the trial court committed an error of law.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed on absolute prosecutorial immunity and Heck v. Humphrey grounds.

Davis v. Daniel · filed 2018-10-12

Arkansas inmate Larry Davis appeals the district court’s1 dismissal without prejudice of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Upon de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we conclude that dismissal was proper.

A plaintiff asserting a constitutional claim under § 1983 need not expressly cite the section in the complaint.

Domineque Hakim Marcelle Ray v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2019-02-06

Although Ray did not mention Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the method by which he was asserting his Establishment Clause claim, the Supreme Court has made it clear that he need not expressly invoke that provision.

Section 1983 does not govern a due process challenge to a tax sale raised as a jurisdictional defect in a quiet title action.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Trust · filed 2019-12-18

At the outset, we reject the Game Commission’s contentions that the Proctor Trusts’ due process claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or is barred by the statute of limitations in the Act of 1815.

Section 1983 covers claims alleging deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Thorne v. Hammer · filed 2020-07-09

As stated by Judge Arbuckle, Plaintiff’s claims are properly construed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 as Plaintiff: ... person acting under color of state law (see id. at 2-8).

Section 1983 claims are subject to the Heck bar and to defendants’ immunity.

Gober v. Niman · filed 2020-12-28

However, she recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s case because his claims are Heck-barred, and the named Defendants are otherwise entitled to immunity. ... The Court agrees with Judge Baldwin. Having reviewed the R&R and the record in this case, the Court will adopt the R&R in full.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for an allegedly illegal search even when the related parole revocation was lawful.

Bodeker v. Frank Dyson, Chief of Police of the City of Dallas · filed 1977-01-03

Although Bodeker’s parole revocation was lawful, his complaint for damages as a result of the allegedly illegal May 14, 1974 search states a cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages resulting from an unconstitutional search and seizure.

Keller v. Hilgendorf · filed 1978-09-18

A claim for damages which resulted from an unconstitutional search and seizure falls squarely within the cause of action provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim can fall within an exception to the Heck bar on § 1983 claims.

Sellers v. Waring · filed 2005-08-03

Although we find that Sellers’s excessive force claim falls under the Fourth Amendment exception to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), we nonetheless affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim on the ground that Sellers fails to allege that he suffered more than de minimis injury.

Section 1983 does not permit an illegal-search damages claim when success would necessarily undermine an element of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Chester Weaver, Sr. v. Geiger · filed 2008-09-24

His allegation of an invalid basis for the search warrant thus amounts to the kind of attack on the factual basis for a conviction that we have deemed impermissible under Heck.

Section 1983 provides the proper civil action for a constitutional claim seeking to compel a state court to process an appeal when the claim does not necessarily imply the conviction's invalidity.

Blair v. Martel · filed 2011-07-20

We therefore conclude that a request for an order directing a state court to hasten its consideration of an appeal belongs in a § 1983 complaint, not a habeas petition.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Howard Mosby, Jr. v. O'Brie · filed 2013-07-29

Because success in his § 1983 action would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction, Heck bars his suit, absent favorable determination.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Gause v. Conway Police Department, City of · filed 2020-10-21

Thus, while Younger abstention is no longer warranted, Heck v. Humphrey6 bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims because he “plead[s] facts inconsistent with guilt.”

A § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence that challenges a prosecution requires favorable termination; an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not qualify.

Corso v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-26

In short, the Court concludes that in light of McDonough, Corso’s acceptance of an ACD bars his fair trial claim.

For a § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence, dismissal in the interest of justice satisfies any favorable termination requirement when a civil judgment would not conflict with the criminal disposition.

Simon v. Cruz · filed 2020-03-19

Therefore, Plaintiff’s dismissal in the interest of justice is a favorable termination for the purposes of his § 1983 fair trial claim.

A plaintiff who accepts an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal cannot bring a § 1983 fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence underlying that charge.

Daniels v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-11

Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff's acceptance of an ACD bars his fair trial claim.

Section 1983 fair trial claims alleging that fabricated evidence founded a prosecution require favorable termination; accepting an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not satisfy that requirement.

Miller v. Terrillion · filed 2020-02-04

Just the same, a comparison of those two claims through the lens of McDonough leads to the inevitable conclusion that Miller’s fair trial claim is barred by his acceptance of an ACD.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages based on a mandatory-supervision eligibility determination that has not been invalidated.

Mendenhall v. Valdez · filed 2010-04-22

Because Mendenhall cannot show that the TDCJ’s determination regarding his eligibility for release on mandatory supervision has been invalidated, under the principles of Heck he ... cannot maintain a suit for damages under § 1983 based on those determinations.

Section 1983 bars a civil rights claim that would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Sanders v. Carnley · filed 2004-05-24

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his civil rights challenges to these actions as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). His allegations implicate the invalidity of his parole revocation, and Sanders has not demonstrated that his revocation has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims challenging a federal conviction may be barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Finnell v. Virginia · filed 2002-10-21

Insofar as Finnell is attempting to challenge his federal conviction, we find it barred by the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 claim challenging a federal conviction is barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Finnell v. Commonwealth of VA · filed 2002-10-21

Insofar as Finnell is attempting to challenge his federal conviction, we find it barred by the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A § 1983 damages claim cannot proceed when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Brown v. City of Detroit · filed 2002-09-23

A ruling in Brown’s favor on his excessive use of force claim would undermine the validity of his conviction for assault with intent to murder Allen. Since Brown did not contend that his state court conviction for assault with intent to murder Allen has been reversed, overturned, or otherwise invalidated, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, his § 1983 excessive use of force claim seeking monetary damages cannot be maintained.

A § 1983 detention claim is not barred by Heck when success on the claim would not affect the plaintiff’s conviction.

Fritz v. City of Corrigan · filed 2001-06-25

That claim is not proscribed by Heck. Whether his detention was constitutionally reasonable will not affect his conviction for speeding.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge removal from work release without first invalidating the sanction when the removal does not affect the length of confinement.

Weller v. Grant County Sheriff · filed 1999-11-22

Given the lack of any clear authority to the contrary, this Court is of the view that the weight of authority supports the proposition that Heck and Edwards do not bar plaintiffs present claim.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment are barred unless the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

Hinton v. Moritz · filed 1998-07-31

In any event, § 1983 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment are barred unless the underlying criminal proceedings, in this case the revocation of parole, was terminated in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to seek damages for alleged deprivations arising from a prison disciplinary hearing unless the hearing result has already been invalidated.

Burnell v. Coughlin · filed 1997-09-03

As I read these decisions, the Supreme Court is sending a loud message: an inmate cannot seek money damages for alleged deprivations arising out of a prison disciplinary hearing by commencing an action under § 1983 unless the results of that hearing already have been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Mendenhall v. State of Idaho County of Lewis City of Kamiah, Transportation Department John Does, 1-10 · filed 1997-08-28

Heck precludes a claim under § 1983 if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," unless the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims based on police interrogation when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Anderson v. Magno, No. Cv 88-0351446-S (Nov. 20, 1995) · filed 1995-11-20

Any allegations the defendant now makes about the impropriety of interrogation would necessarily "imply the invalidity" of his conviction; on the basis of this record I cannot come to the same conclusion as to the allegations concerning the search and seizure conducted by the defendants. ... I conclude as to this count and as to the claims in any counts alleging the impropriety of the interrogation or interrogation procedures or training a § 1983 claim does not lie.

Section 1983 claims that implicate the validity of a plaintiff’s incarceration are premature until that incarceration has been invalidated.

Morris v. City of Suffolk, Va. · filed 1995-11-20

Morris's complaint raised Sec. 1983 claims that implicated the validity of his incarceration, which has not yet been invalidated. The claims are not yet ripe for a Sec. 1983 action.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Billy Worth Fausset v. Masters · filed 1995-08-22

A prisoner civil rights claim for damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid does not accrue until his sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated.

Section 1983’s Heck favorable-termination requirement does not apply to a plaintiff who was neither convicted nor sentenced.

Reed v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-10-27

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Since the Plaintiff in the present case has been neither convicted nor sentenced, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heck is inapplicable.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply a conviction’s invalidity require the conviction to have been invalidated.

Harris v. William Henry Donald Dibble · filed 1994-12-09

Because Harris' allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because Harris did not show that his conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court, the district court properly dismissed his claim for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for conduct that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Bowmane v. Vince G. Swinney Justice Court Dorothy Nash Holmes Jo Ann Wilson Judicial District Court · filed 1995-01-19

Thus, Bowmane is seeking to recover damages for conduct which if proven true, would invalidate his conviction. His conviction has not been invalidated. Therefore, he cannot state a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim for damages based on the challenged conduct of the district attorney, public defender, and state court judges.

Section 1983 damages claims that would call an outstanding conviction into question are not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Foti v. Graham · filed 1995-02-22

First, Foti's claims for malicious prosecution and denial of due process are not cognizable because Foti has failed to demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim questioning the validity of current incarceration unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Cooper v. Murray · filed 1995-02-28

Because Cooper's claim questions the validity of his current incarceration, he cannot proceed under Sec. 1983 unless his conviction has been overturned. Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S.1994). Because Cooper's conviction has not been found invalid, dismissal of this Sec. 1983 action was proper.

A prisoner may recover damages under § 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Ricky Bell v. Hoskins · filed 1995-03-03

However, during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, a prisoner must establish that the conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. ... A vacated conviction is the obvious consequence of a court's finding that Bell's conviction was unconstitutional. This case therefore attacks the fact of Bell's confinement and falls squarely within Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply a conviction is invalid do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa · filed 1995-03-09

Because Trimble’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment allegations necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because he did not show that his conviction has been invalidated, Trimble’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims have not accrued at this time.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a parole revocation or resulting sentence does not state a cause of action unless the sentence has been invalidated.

McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 1995-03-13

McGrew remains in custody and he has not alleged that the sentence imposed as a result of the revocation proceedings has been invalidated by a state or federal court. Therefore, McGrew's complaint does not state a § 1983 cause of action.

A Section 1983 claim for denial of a fair trial through withheld exculpatory evidence cannot proceed until the charges are dismissed and the accused is discharged.

Smith v. Holtz · filed 1995-03-24

We therefore hold that there can be no civil action under § 1983 for denial of due process during trial for withholding exculpatory evidence unless and until the charges have been dismissed and the defendant discharged.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages based on an allegedly invalid conviction must plead and prove that the conviction has been set aside.

Moore v. Knotts · filed 1995-03-29

In the alternative, we affirm the district court's summary judgment on the grounds that, in order to prevail on the claims for damages, Mr. Moore and Mr. Kirby would be required to plead and prove that their convictions have been set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that exculpatory evidence was withheld at trial until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor or the conviction is reversed or set aside.

Hale v. Fee · filed 1995-04-07

Hale cannot maintain a Sec. 1983 action alleging that exculpatory evidence was withheld at his trial unless and until he can show that the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor, or that his conviction has been reversed or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily calls a conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Stuart v. Whitter · filed 1995-04-19

Under Heck, Stuart cannot assert a claim for section 1983 relief based on this allegation unless and until the duration of the imprisonment about which he complains is "reversed . . . expunged . . . declared invalid . . . or called into question by a federal . . . writ of habeas corpus." 114 S.Ct. at 2372.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for harm that would imply an invalid conviction to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Oliver v. San Francisco Police Department Charles Siani Geoffrey Williams and Marty Lalor · filed 1995-05-19

"In order to recover damages under section 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove the conviction has been invalidated." ... Because Oliver's allegations against the defendants necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and because Oliver failed to show that his conviction has been invalidated, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Oliver's complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on misconduct that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Lombard v. Salisbury Police Department · filed 1995-06-14

The holding of Heck v. Humphrey bars the present Section 1983 in Massachusetts Civil Rights claims. The entire focus of the plaintiffs complaint is indeed to “call into question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement.” ... In these circumstances, the Supreme Court has determined that there is no cognizable claim under Section 1983.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is not cognizable while the underlying conviction remains valid.

Goddard v. Larsen · filed 1995-08-04

Goddard's claim of malicious prosecution fails both on the ground of prosecutorial immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and because such a claim is not cognizable where his conviction has not been reversed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Zankich v. Trebesch · filed 1995-08-07

Because Zankich's allegations of inadequate funding for appropriate representation necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction has been overturned, or otherwise invalidated, Zankich has no damages claim at this time.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Williams v. Lange · filed 1995-08-09

As to the first claim, we conclude the district court's dismissal was proper because success on this claim would have implied the invalidity of Williams's conviction, and Williams failed to show his conviction had been reversed, expunged, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Hamilton v. Vance · filed 1995-08-22

Therefore, Hamilton cannot seek damages under § 1983 because he cannot demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for civil rights allegations intertwined with a challenge to confinement when the conviction and sentence have not been invalidated.

Gardner v. Scott · filed 1995-08-22

Assuming arguendo that he did raise civil rights claims below, any such claims are intertwined with the habeas claims and necessarily implicate the legality of his confinement. It is undisputed that neither Gardner's conviction nor sentence has been invalidated. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), Gardner does not have a claim that is cognizable under 42 U.S.C § 1983 at this time.

A § 1983 damages action that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction must be dismissed with prejudice unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Crowley v. Brown · filed 1995-08-25

If the prisoner cannot make such a showing, his § 1983 action should be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the procedures used to deny good conduct time credits when the claim does not call into question the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Norman GOTCHER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1995-10-04

Wolff, like this case, involved a claim for using the wrong procedure, not for reaching the wrong result (i.e., the denial of good time credits). ... Likewise, Goteher’s case does not call into question the lawfulness of his continuing confinement and is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 permits damages for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment only if the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Alexander v. State of Texas · filed 1995-10-17

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims require favorable termination of the underlying charges; dismissal in the interest of justice does not qualify.

Nowosad v. English · filed 1995-10-17

The Court finds nothing in the amended complaint that would alter its view that the menacing charges, which were dismissed in the interest of justice under New York Crim.Proc.Law § 170.40, do not form the basis for a Section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.

A prisoner challenging the computation of a sentence under § 1983 must show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Roberts v. Woods · filed 1995-10-18

To proceed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). Heck applies to suits challenging the computation of a prisoner's sentence.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment must first show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bussell v. Mary Martins John Atkins Terry Sanders · filed 1995-10-26

In order to state a cognizable claim for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a Sec. 1983 plaintiff must first show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 plaintiff satisfies the Heck favorable-termination requirement when the challenged conviction was reversed on direct appeal.

Fondren v. Klickitat County · filed 1995-11-21

Second, Mr. Fondren’s criminal conviction was reversed on direct appeal, and he has satisfied the Heck requirement even if it applied to him.

Section 1983 claims for damages caused by an allegedly unconstitutional prosecution and conviction are not cognizable until the conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court.

Joe Bone-Club v. Whatcom Public Defender's Office Lynden Police Dept. · filed 1995-11-24

Because Bone-Club has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated by a state or federal court, his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims for damages caused by the allegedly unconstitutional prosecution and conviction are not yet cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Courtney v. Havard · filed 1995-11-28

A judgment in favor of Courtney would imply that his parole revocation and his subsequent confinement are invalid. Courtney asserts that his state habeas corpus application was denied, but he has not alleged that his parole revocation has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, this claim is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would directly implicate the validity of a conviction or sentence until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated on that ground.

Robert Lee Brock, A/K/A Two Souls Walker v. Raymond Robertson, District Attorney for Staunton Circuit Court · filed 1995-11-30

Because Appellant's claim would directly implicate invalidity in Appellant's conviction and sentence, it may not be the subject of a Sec. 1983 claim until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated on that ground.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim related to criminal charges on which the plaintiff stands convicted unless those charges have been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.

Brown v. United States · filed 1995-12-06

Plaintiff stands convicted of the charges placed against him by the individual Louisville police officers, and plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim related to those offenses absent a resolution of the charges in plaintiff's favor.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner challenging a disciplinary conviction whose invalidity is necessary to the claim to have that conviction set aside first, including when the discipline cost good-time credits.

Richmond v. Duke · filed 1995-12-19

So, it seems clear that, in so far as plaintiff is seeking relief under § 1983 for these alleged due process violations, he must first succeed in having his disciplinary conviction set aside, either in a § 2254 proceeding, or in some other appropriate forum.

A § 1983 damages claim that calls a conviction into question is dismissed without prejudice and may be refiled if the conviction is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court.

Haburn v. Brewer · filed 1996-01-02

We agree that, with respect to Appellant's damages claim, the district court properly dismissed that claim. ... Because Appellant may refile his action if his conviction ever is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court or upon the exhaustion of state remedies, we modify the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim that can be read as challenging acts outside the judicial process is not subject to Heck dismissal merely because the plaintiff also has a conviction or sentence.

William J. Evers and Anita E. Evers v. Outagamie County, John R. Schreiter, George H. Schroeder · filed 1996-01-09

Alternatively, if the Evers were challenging "actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," the district court would instead be required to dismiss these two claims under Heck v. Humphrey, given that the Evers did not allege that their convictions or sentences had been invalidated. Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. However, it is clear that one may interpret each cause of action as challenging not sentences, but actions outside the judicial process.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages cause of action for injuries arising from a conviction or confinement that has not been invalidated when recovery would require proving its invalidity.

Horton v. Marovich · filed 1996-01-19

Therefore, because Horton’s conviction and confinement have not been and will not be invalidated in a manner prescribed by Heck, Horton has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3).

Section 1983 damages claims that would invalidate a parole revocation or the imposition of a suspended sentence require that the revocation or sentence first be invalidated.

Nelson v. State of MS · filed 1996-01-22

Claims alleging "harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" cannot be brought under § 1983 unless that "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." ... This rule clearly applies to the imposition of a suspended sentence, and we have held that it also applies to the revocation of parole.

A Section 1983 claim falls under Heck only if a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid.

Hamilton v. Lyons · filed 1996-02-07

A § 1983 claim falls under the rule in Heck only when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a subsequent conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages for claims concerning an arrest and prosecution until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor or are reversed.

Cole v. Mark Matthews Jim Fracks Lindsay Stewart Gentry E. McCauley Bourbon County Prosecuting Attorney Jim · filed 1996-03-12

To the extent Cole seeks monetary damages, her complaints regarding her arrest and prosecution are simply not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until such time as she can demonstrate that the criminal proceedings terminated in her favor or were reversed.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action challenging the loss of good-time credits until the disciplinary deprivation has been invalidated by the state or through habeas corpus.

Jones v. William Dobie, Officer Peterson and W.M. Lockhart · filed 1996-03-12

Jones challenges the validity of his confinement for the additional 360 days of lost good-time credit. A judgment in favor of Jones would necessarily imply the invalidity of his imprisonment. It follows that Jones has no cause of action under § 1983 until he first proves that the alleged deprivation has been invalidated by the state or by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 requires dismissal of a claim that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless that conviction has first been invalidated.

Cordova v. City of Reno · filed 1996-03-15

Therefore Heck applies: Because Cordova’s conviction has not yet been invalidated, this court must dismiss Cordova’s Section 1983 claim.