42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 conspiracy claim may proceed when the alleged facts plausibly support an inference that defendants agreed to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Davis v. Curran · filed 2019-03-12

The inference that the individual defendants communicated about Davis’s condition and either participated or acquiesced in the decisions regarding Davis’s care is sufficient to plausibly allege agreement, and hence a conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement involving state actors, concerted action to cause an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Barnes v. Harling · filed 2019-03-18

To state a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages." ... The record before the Court viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff sets forth no specific facts that support the conspiracy allegations.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an unconstitutional objective.

Holliman v. Thompson · filed 2019-03-26

Conspiracy liability under section 1983 cannot lie unless the conspiracy has an unconstitutional objective.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for a conspiracy claim; proof of a conspiracy alone is insufficient.

Karnecki v. City of Sisters · filed 2019-05-31

Moreover, even if the argument is not waived, “[c]onspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983” and the “‘[m]ere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.’” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980)). Instead, “there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutional right; it fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Wood v. City of Farmington · filed 2019-07-16

In order to succeed on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must prove both the existence of a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutional right.” ... Because an essential element of the conspiracy claim is absent, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim when defendants agree to violate constitutional rights and the conspiracy results in an actual violation.

Worthy v. The City of Phenix City, Alabama · filed 2019-07-18

“A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” ... Appellants did not plead facts showing that Phenix City and Redflex reached an understanding to violate their constitutional rights. They also did not sufficiently allege a violation of their constitutional rights. Accordingly, Appellants fail to state a conspiracy claim.

A conclusory allegation of conspiracy does not state a claim under § 1983.

Hollins v. City of Columbia, Mississippi · filed 2019-07-23

She only made a conclusory allegation of conspiracy. That is not enough to state a conspiracy claim under Section 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific allegations of an agreement to deprive someone of a federally protected right; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Singleton v. Shearer · filed 2019-07-25

Such conclusory allegations do not meet the stringent specificity requirements of a plan or agreement among all or between any of the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the challenged conduct of deterring him from pursing his PREA complaint.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an alleged conspiracy among defendants; a bare allegation of conspiracy does not state a claim.

(PC) Walker v. Kernan · filed 2019-08-09

Plaintiff has concluded that various groupings of defendants conspired to violate his rights. However, plaintiff has not included any facts to support his allegation. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is not sufficient to state a claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the defendants; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Pendergraft v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges · filed 2019-08-13

In order to state a claim of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a “plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants.” Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). ... The allegations of the Amended complaint provide no specific facts from which to infer that Misak and Thurman formed an agreement or what that agreement entailed.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 fails when the alleged underlying constitutional violation fails.

Wilson v. Rundle · filed 2019-08-19

A conspiracy under § 1983 rises and falls with the alleged constitutional violation.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement to cause a constitutional injury; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Kendrick v. Troche · filed 2019-08-29

Kendrick’s allegations also fail to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. ... Kendrick has not alleged, except in the most conclusory fashion, that a meeting of the minds occurred among the three state actor Defendants.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private defendants fails when the alleged conspiracy is conclusory and implausible on its face.

Wakley v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2019-09-05

Wakley first generally contests the dismissal of his conspiracy claim against the non-City defendants, but the district court properly dismissed them because Wakley has not alleged a plausible basis for relief against them.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement, an overt act, a resulting injury, and deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Robinson v. Hawkins · filed 2019-09-05

In order to prove a conspiracy under § 1983, the plaintiff must show for a particular defendant: (1) a conspiracy between the defendant and at least one other person; (2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (3) a resulting injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege. ... Nonetheless, they do not establish the existence of an agreement between Officers Hawkins and Swinton. ... We find the district court erred in denying Officers Hawkins and Swinton summary judgment on the conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 supervisory liability and conspiracy claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Talley v. Varner · filed 2019-09-05

Finally, Talley’s claims of supervisory liability and conspiracy fail because, as noted by the District Court, there is no underlying constitutional violation. ... Consequently, the supervisory liability and con- spiracy claims cannot be maintained by themselves under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting a plausible agreement to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Patton v. Flores · filed 2019-09-09

But the allegations of conspiracy in Patton’s FAC remain “unadorned,” and thus still fail to provide any factual enhancement to show that any of the named Defendants entered into an express or implied agreement to violate his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right and an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of that right.

POPE v. WILKINSBURG BOROUGH SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2019-09-16

Because Pope cannot establish either a violation of her constitutional rights or an agreement among Defendants to deprive her of a constitutional right, summary judgment will be granted with respect to her conspiracy claim at Count II of her Amended Complaint.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right; an alleged intention to conspire is insufficient.

William v. Tenhaken · filed 2019-09-24

This statement does not show that the defendants reached an agreement as required in Burton, and William has not stated any other facts to show that defendants made an agreement to conspire against William.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of an agreement and an actual deprivation of a federally secured right; conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient.

Diaz v. Devlin · filed 2019-09-30

“In order to make out an actionable conspiracy under section 1983, a plaintiff has to prove not only a conspiratorial agreement but also an actual abridgment of some federally-secured right.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). ... Here, Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations without factual support on the record of the conspiracy, which are insufficient to establish any genuine issues of material facts. I grant the Defendant’s Motion as to Count IV.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive someone of constitutional rights, an act in furtherance of that agreement, and resulting injury.

Pirtle v. Brooks · filed 2019-10-08

In order to establish a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff “must show that an actual conspiracy existed (in other words, that people agreed to injure him), that its purpose was to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional rights, that an act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that he was injured.” ... The amended complaint does not contain any factual allegations from which it could be plausibly inferred that a conspiracy existed to hide Brooks’ retaliatory acts.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual violation of a protected right and concerted action with specific intent to violate that right.

McKinney v. Sr. Warden C. Mcduffie · filed 2019-10-14

To establish a conspiracy, a prisoner must allege an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and that the defendants acted in concert with specific intent to violate that right.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to violate the plaintiff’s rights and an actual violation of those rights.

Bailer v. Jackson County Board of Education · filed 2019-10-17

Thus, in order to prevail at trial Bailer would be required to prove (1) that there was an agreement or understanding between Reeves and Hancock to violate his rights, and (2) that there was an actual violation of those rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an express or implied agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and an actual deprivation resulting from that agreement.

(PC) Turner v. Munoz · filed 2019-10-24

To establish a cognizable claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement involving a state actor, concerted action to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Mir v. Zucker · filed 2019-11-01

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to suggest, for the purpose of any § 1983 conspiracy claims that he asserts, that there was “(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages,” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 provides no independent conspiracy claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

Edward Novotny, III v. City of Wauwatosa · filed 2019-11-04

But absent any underlying constitutional violation, “there is no independent cause of action for § 1983 conspiracy.” Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000)). Since Novotny is unable to establish any constitutional violation, his claim for conspiracy fails as well.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against deputies acting within the scope of their employment are barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine unless an exception applies.

Harris v. Wingo · filed 2019-11-05

Count XII is a civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983 which alleges that Deputy Wingo conspired with other deputies to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights on April 4, 2014. ... Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim in Count XII is barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing that the defendants agreed to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Logan v. Clemmons · filed 2019-11-06

Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest Defendant Spreadly reached an agreement with any other Defendant to allow the attack to occur or to conceal evidence of the attack. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is due to be dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation and an agreement among the defendants to cause it.

Jade Green v. Howser · filed 2019-11-07

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires both (1) an underlying constitutional violation and (2) an agreement among the de- fendants to inflict the unconstitutional harm.

Section 1983 does not provide an independent basis for conspiracy liability when the underlying claims fail.

Young v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-11-27

As Young’s other § 1983 claims fail, so does his § 1983 conspiracy claim because “conspiracy is not an independent basis of liability in § 1983 actions.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008).

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual constitutional violation.

Ferran v. City of Albany · filed 2019-12-05

And without a constitutional violation claim, plaintiffs are unable to maintain their Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying violation of a federal right.

Peters v. Huttel · filed 2019-12-05

A conspiracy claim, however, only will stand “insofar as the plaintiff can prove the sine qua non of a § 1983 action: the violation of a federal right.” ... Here, Plaintiff failed on summary judgment to establish a constitutional violation related to his excessive force and retaliation claims against Defendant Benford.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive constitutional rights and an actual deprivation resulting from that agreement.

(PC) Gao v. Marroquin · filed 2019-12-09

To establish a cognizable claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable conspiracy claim against Defendants Marroquin, Bernal, and Heifner.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must allege specific facts tending to show a meeting of minds among the alleged conspirators.

Snelling v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2019-12-09

In order to successfully plead a conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege specific facts “tending to show a ‘meeting of minds’ among the alleged conspirators.” Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails without an underlying § 1983 violation.

Grafton v. FoBelk · filed 2019-12-10

Without an underlying § 1983 violation, Mr. Grafton’s conspiracy claim also fails.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Pendergraft v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges · filed 2019-12-30

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts showing both (1) the existence of a conspiracy and (2) an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying deprivation of rights.

Gonzalez v. City of New York · filed 2020-01-13

Therefore, Gonzalez will be unable to show an underlying deprivation of his rights under Section 1983 sufficient to sustain a conspiracy claim against the Union.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence that the defendants agreed to deny the plaintiff’s rights.

Powell v. Alabama Credit Union Administration · filed 2020-01-16

At the summary judgment stage, when discovery has been completed and plaintiffs have had the opportunity to present evidence of a conspiracy, the district court did not err in finding that they had not met their burden of showing that the parties reached an agreement to deny them their rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires concerted action and an overt act that deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Nutter v. Mellinger · filed 2020-01-23

Under § 1983, “there must be a showing that the defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, which resulted in plaintiff being deprived of the constitutional right.”

Section 1983 does not make conspiracy an independent basis for liability.

Gosier v. Thompson · filed 2020-01-23

First, conspiracy is not an independent basis of liability in Section 1983 actions.

A §1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and overt acts that actually do so.

Steinke v. Krueger · filed 2020-01-29

To state a conspiracy claim under §1983, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of those rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Williams v. Wetzel · filed 2020-02-06

It follows, therefore, that in the absence of an actual violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim necessarily fails.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement between people acting under color of state law to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

MCINTYRE v. LICIARDELLO · filed 2020-02-07

To prevail on his § 1983 conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants, “acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation resulting from that agreement.

Cheesman v. Ellensburg School District · filed 2020-02-18

The elements to establish a claim for conspiracy under § 1983 are: (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendants to deprive her of her constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement. ... While they relied on statements made by the school officials, these statements alone do not provide evidence of an agreement to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. A reasonable jury would not find that school officials conspired to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not support a municipal conspiracy claim based on an alleged agreement among officers of the same police department when the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars the alleged conspiracy.

Villegas v. City of El Paso · filed 2020-02-28

In this case, all defendant officers are employees of the same governmental entity: the El Paso Police Department. Therefore, under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, they are incapable of conspiring with one another in violation of Section 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and a deprivation caused by overt acts furthering that agreement.

Esparza v. Verstraete · filed 2020-02-28

To succeed in a § 1983 claim based on a theory of conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants reached an express or implied agreement to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights by defendants’ overt actions in furtherance of the agreement.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against one named defendant and unnamed co-conspirators when the complaint sufficiently alleges a concerted cover-up that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Minifield v. City of Winchester · filed 2020-03-03

The Complaint, taken as a whole, sufficiently pleads a claim under § 1983 that Sills and unnamed co-conspirators conspired to engage in a cover-up.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights; a bare allegation of conspiracy is insufficient.

(PC) Ardds v. Martin · filed 2020-03-04

As such, a bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under § 1983. Here, plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a grievance process, and he alleges no facts demonstrating an agreement or meeting of the minds.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation of those rights.

(PC) Choyce v. Oliveria · filed 2020-03-04

To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, plaintiff must show the existence of an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights. ... Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for conspiracy.

Section 1983 does not make conspiracy an independent constitutional tort; a conspiracy can establish a defendant’s causal connection to an underlying violation.

King v. Davis · filed 2020-03-05

A conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but may “enlarge the pool of responsible defendants by demonstrating their causal connections to the violation.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing how each defendant participated in the alleged plan to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Koch v. State of Ohio · filed 2020-03-09

Koch’s § 1983 conspiracy claim fails because he does not allege any facts to show how each of the defendants participated in the various plans that he alleges were concocted to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actionable violation of a federal right.

Burks v. Huntsville City Board of Education · filed 2020-03-13

Because Ms. Burks has not established a violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments, she cannot “prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to inflict a constitutional injury; an agreement to cause some other injury is insufficient.

Marshall v. Garcia · filed 2020-03-16

A requirement of a § 1983 conspiracy is that the defendants conspired to “inflict an unconstitutional injury,” not simply any injury at all.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing a meeting of the minds and a common objective to violate constitutional rights.

(PC) Smith v. Siskiyou County Jail · filed 2020-03-23

In other words, plaintiff cannot simply state that all of the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights; rather, he must allege facts demonstrating a meeting of the minds as well as a common objective of such an alleged conspiracy and such objective must rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s amended complaint includes no such factual allegations.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires evidence that they agreed with a state actor to violate constitutional rights.

DeSantis v. Town · filed 2020-03-31

Here, DeSantis’s claim fails because there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Culps and Officer DeVincentis agreed to violate his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an overt act causing damages.

Stathatos v. Gottlieb · filed 2020-04-06

The facts as alleged, and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, cannot support any agreement between Liebhauser and WGM, and certainly no agreement to act in concert to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and Liebhauser’s leaving her business card at plaintiff’s door does not rise to an overt act causing damages. Plaintiff’s allegations fail each prong of his conspiracy claim, and as such the claim is dismissed with prejudice.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the underlying civil rights claims are dismissed.

JACOBS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-04-09

Because we are dismissing Jacobs’ Section 1983 claims for deprivation of rights, malicious prosecution, defamation, racial discrimination, and First Amendment retaliation, no underlying claim remains to support his claim for conspiracy.

A §1983 conspiracy claim cannot stand without an adequately pleaded underlying §1983 violation.

Stemler v. Borough of Parryville · filed 2020-04-13

In this case, the court has found that plaintiffs have failed to successfully plead an underlying §1983 violation and thus a §1983 conspiracy claim cannot stand.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Bowen v. Methodist Fremont Health · filed 2020-04-16

“The plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.” Id. ... As discussed above, she has not stated a valid First Amendment claim in her Second Amended Complaint or proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. Thus, her request to amend is denied as futile and her conspiracy claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not recognize conspiracy allegations alone as a claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

(PC) Hayes v. Spencer · filed 2020-04-22

With respect to plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy, they do not, alone state a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific facts showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights and a resulting deprivation.

(PC) Kendrid v. Osman · filed 2020-04-24

To state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must plead specific facts showing an agreement or meeting of minds between the defendants to violate his constitutional rights. ... Accordingly, the court finds that the allegations in the complaint fail to state a cognizable claim against defendants based on a conspiracy to have plaintiff transferred out of the CTC.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations showing an agreement to violate civil rights.

Gross-Quatrone v. Mizdol · filed 2020-04-27

Gross-Quatrone asserted two other conspiracy-based claims: one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and another under § 1985. Both fail for the same reason. These claims also require Gross-Quatrone to allege the existence of a conspiracy. ... Because Gross-Quatrone’s complaint lacks factual allegations showing an agreement to violate her civil rights, her § 1983 conspiracy and § 1985 claims were properly dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual constitutional violation and cannot proceed when the underlying claims fail on qualified immunity.

Walker v. Stroman · filed 2020-05-04

A claim of conspiracy is not actionable without an actual violation of § 1983. ... Because the Court has already found that the Plaintiff failed to overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity, the conspiracy claim is not actionable.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting a plausible inference that the defendants agreed to inflict constitutional harm.

Lindell v. Greff · filed 2020-05-04

To plead a plausible conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege facts showing an agreement among the defendants to inflict constitutional harm.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations of an agreement; vague and conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Eldars v. State University of New York at Albany · filed 2020-05-19

Because Plaintiff has offered nothing but vague and conclusory allegations that a conspiracy existed between the Defendants, she has failed to state a claim of conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation of those rights.

Presti v. Warden of Waiawa Correctional Facility · filed 2020-05-20

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff must show the existence of an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to do an illegal act and an actual constitutional deprivation; it cannot proceed when the underlying claims fail on qualified immunity grounds.

Yager v. Stroman · filed 2020-05-22

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) an agreement to do an illegal act; and (2) an actual constitutional deprivation. ... Because the Court has already found that the Plaintiff failed to overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity, the conspiracy claim is not actionable.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails without an underlying § 1983 violation.

Ortiz v. Annucci · filed 2020-05-22

Moreover, a § 1983 conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law without an underlying § 1983 violation, see Mitchell v. County of Nassau, 786 F. Supp. 2d 545, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), and the underlying § 1983 claims here have been dismissed.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence that defendants acted together with specific intent to violate constitutional rights.

Magee v. Reed · filed 2020-05-29

Without any evidence of “action taken in concert by the defendants with the specific intent to violate” constitutional rights, this Court finds that there is no disputed issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims, and they are appropriately dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific, nonconclusory facts showing an agreement to violate civil rights.

Pertee v. Dart Area Rapid Transit · filed 2020-05-29

First, she determined that his conspiracy claims fail because he “fails to allege specific, nonconclusory facts that if prove[d], would establish there was an agreement among the defendants to violate his civil ... rights.” ... the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and accepts them as those of the court.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing concerted action and an agreement or shared conspiratorial objective.

Mirll v. University of Central Oklahoma · filed 2020-06-04

To adequately allege a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege specific facts that show “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert” and “an allegation of a meeting of the minds, an agreement among the defendants, or a general conspiratorial objective.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation resulting from that agreement.

Hammler v. Alvarez · filed 2020-06-16

A conspiracy claim under section 1983 must contain sufficient “factual matter,” and not simply offer “naked” and conclusory assertions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to plausibly show: “(1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendant officers to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.” ... Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to provide any factual enhancement to show that any of the named Defendants entered into an express or implied agreement to violate his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

Hinkle v. Beckham County Board of County · filed 2020-06-22

For a valid § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiffs “must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.” ... As we have concluded, Hinkle has not shown a false arrest; therefore, the conspiracy claim was properly dismissed.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy do not state a claim under § 1983.

(PC) Barnes v. Van Ness · filed 2020-07-14

While Plaintiff attempts to connect the claim(s) in his supplement to the claims in his complaint by alleging a conspiracy, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are not enough to state a conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails without a plausible underlying constitutional violation.

Gray v. King · filed 2020-07-27

Thus, where a plaintiff’s substantive claims alleging a constitutional violation are dismissed, any claim for a § 1983 conspiracy must also be dismissed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the plaintiff cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Guziewicz v. Gomez · filed 2020-07-31

Thus, because the Probation Defendants are entitled to judgment as to the constitutional claims, they are ipso facto entitled to judgment on the conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts supporting an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Stanko v. State of South Dakota · filed 2020-07-31

Stanko fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding any element of a civil conspiracy under § 1983 or a private conspiracy based on class or race under § 1985(3). Stanko’s pleadings fail to allege specific facts that would give rise to an inference of the existence of a conspiracy or meeting of the minds between Chaffin or any other named defendants.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights.

Olguin v. Gastelo · filed 2020-08-03

Here, the Complaint fails to state a conspiracy claim because it does not allege specific facts of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive someone of constitutional rights and overt acts that cause the deprivation.

Golatte v. Chicago · filed 2020-08-03

To establish a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show “an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive a plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights,” and the “actual deprivation of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.” Id. at 442. ... In short, the plaintiff has not adduced specific facts sufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor on his conspiracy theory. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for the defendants on Golatte’s conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement to do an illegal act and an actual constitutional deprivation.

Redding v. Swanton · filed 2020-08-07

To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) an agreement to do an illegal act; and (2) an actual constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires evidence that defendants agreed to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Nordholm v. Barkell · filed 2020-08-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nordholm’s conspiracy claim because Nordholm failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing a conspiracy and an underlying constitutional violation.

Robinson v. San Bernardino County · filed 2020-08-10

The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s § 1983 conspiracy claim because Robinson failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy or an underlying constitutional violation.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

C1.G. v. Siegfried · filed 2020-08-10

C.G. fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim because, as described above, he failed to establish a constitutional violation.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a plausible underlying civil rights violation.

Brockman v. City of Monterey · filed 2020-08-19

Brockman’s fourth claim is for conspiracy to violate his civil rights. In order to plausibly state this claim, Brockman must first plausibly allege that his civil rights were violated. The conspiracy claim is predicated on the underlying civil rights claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an underlying deprivation of those rights.

Hernandez v. Holt · filed 2020-08-24

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy between Defendants. ... Further, in order to state a cognizable claim for relief for conspiracy, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants conspired to violate an underlying constitutional right. Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s second cause of action for conspiracy fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not recognize conspiracy as a constitutional tort by itself; a conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Smith v. Fu · filed 2020-08-28

Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement among people acting under color of state law to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Harvard v. Cesnalis · filed 2020-09-01

“To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law reached an understanding to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” ... Although we conclude that a jury could determine that Harvard’s constitutional rights were violated, Harvard has not demonstrated that Cesnalis and Beatty agreed to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

The intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine does not bar a § 1983 conspiracy claim against members of the same entity.

Holzhauer v. Town of Normal · filed 2020-09-02

Plaintiff’s claim is not barred by the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine because the doctrine does not extend to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require evidence of an agreement to deprive someone of constitutional rights and an underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. Wetzel · filed 2020-09-10

Moreover, Williams’ conspiracy claims failed both because of the lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of a conspiracy and because his constitutional claims failed, as detailed above.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Vontress v. State of Nevada · filed 2020-09-18

“Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” ... For a conspiracy claim to survive, “there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.” ... Because this Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's Eight Amendment claim against Defendant Hininger, it should also have dismissed the conspiracy claim against him.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim when specific allegations plausibly show an officer’s personal involvement in an agreement to violate constitutional rights.

Nicomedez v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-28

Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in her favor, Nicomedez sufficiently pled facts to plausibly state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Wroblewski: namely, that Wroblewski conspired with the NYPD to unlawfully arrest Nicomedez as either retribution for her complaints against him or to intimidate her to stop complaining about him.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement among the alleged conspirators to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Freed v. Herndon · filed 2020-09-29

An essential element for a claim of conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right is an agreement to do so among the alleged co-conspirators. ... He has therefore failed to state a claim of civil conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must be pleaded with specificity.

Davis v. CoreCivic · filed 2020-09-30

A plaintiff may plead a conspiracy claim under § 1983, but he must do so with specificity.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Metcalf v. Flamburis · filed 2020-10-05

To support a claim of conspiracy under §1983 a plaintiff must prove that defendants, acting under color of law, reached an agreement with one another for the purposes of depriving the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires defendants acting under state law to conspire to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and to carry out that deprivation.

Walker v. Lynch · filed 2020-10-13

To state a claim of conspiracy in violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acting under state law conspired to, and did in fact, deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

Dix v. Edelman Financial Services · filed 2020-10-19

Moreover, “a plaintiff must allege and prove both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights; mere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.” ... As we have seen, Dix did not allege an actual deprivation of rights because there was no Fourth Amendment seizure.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require factual allegations supporting an agreement to cause a constitutional injury; vague, unsupported allegations do not suffice.

Ates v. United States · filed 2020-10-22

Here, the Court finds that the Complaint asserts “vague and unsupported” allegations regarding a conspiracy that are devoid any facts. (See generally Compl.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation of those rights.

(PC) Hearns v. Whisnand · filed 2020-10-30

To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, plaintiff must show the existence of an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation of those constitutional rights. ... Hearns fails to state a cognizable claim for conspiracy. He fails to demonstrate that any individual defendant conspired, how such defendant conspired, and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and acts that caused constitutional harm.

Cheek v. Lundquist · filed 2020-11-09

Plaintiff alleges no facts supporting his vague assertion that Hockfort and Baumruk agreed to attempt to cover-up Lundquist’s actions. Nor does he explain what actions they took in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy or whether he suffered any constitutional harm. Plaintiff may not proceed on his conspiracy claim against Hockfort and Baumruk.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

ROBINSON v. MCNEESE · filed 2020-11-09

The second problem with Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claims is that Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that Defendants reached an agreement or understanding to violate his constitutional rights—a requisite element in any § 1983 claim for conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific allegations of an agreement to violate civil rights.

JONES v. NAJERA · filed 2020-11-12

Specific allegations of an agreement to carry out the unlawful actions are necessary to state a conspiracy claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations showing an agreement to deprive someone of a federal right; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Bryant 215761 v. Threlfall · filed 2020-11-13

A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” ... Plaintiff has provided no allegations establishing a link between the alleged conspirators or any agreement between them.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Dickerson v. Samson · filed 2020-11-30

To state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights. ... Further, the alleged conspiracy must result in an actual deprivation of a constitutional right. ... In sum, the Court finds these allegations, as pleaded, sufficiently establish a meeting of the minds to support Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 permits conspiracy liability when an agreement to violate constitutional rights results in an underlying constitutional violation; conspiracy is not an independent basis for liability.

Harris v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-12-02

In a § 1983 action, a police officer who agrees to violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff is liable only if the underlying constitutional violation comes to fruition.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require a plausible agreement to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act that causes damages.

Harden v. Doe · filed 2020-12-07

To state a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) an agreement between [two or more state actors or] a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Section 1983 permits a civil conspiracy claim when the alleged facts support an inference that defendants agreed to violate a constitutional right.

Page-Jones v. Berfield · filed 2020-12-18

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff had adequately pled a cause of action for conspiracy under § 1983 at this time.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation and facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights.

(PC) Johnson v. Lozano · filed 2021-01-05

Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under Section 1983, and it does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional violation. ... Without minimal circumstantial evidence from which a conspiracy could be inferred and more clarity as to the damage plaintiff experienced as a result of defendants’ alleged conspiracy, the conspiracy claim fails.

Section 1983 does not make conspiracy independently actionable without an underlying constitutional violation.

Guzman v. Jones · filed 2021-01-11

Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing a conspiracy before defendants can be held collectively responsible for it.

Sekerke v. City of National City · filed 2021-01-20

Sekerke also seeks to hold every Defendant responsible as part of a conspiracy, without alleging facts plausibly suggesting they all conspired together or explaining why the acts and omissions the SAC complains of were the product of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation to support a conspiracy claim.

Files v. Dunn(INMATE 1)(CONSENT) · filed 2021-01-26

Applicable federal law directs that in order to state a conspiracy claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff “must show an underlying actual denial of [his] constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 provides a claim for a prisoner alleging intentional confiscation or destruction of property without justification or explanation.

Bayron v. Correctional Officer Trudeau and Correctional Counselor G. Petrushun, Individually and in Their Officia · filed 1983-02-25

The magistrate and the district judge gave much too technical a reading to a pro se prisoner’s complaint, particularly when the “nonoperative” allegations do make out a claim under § 1983. There are numerous cases holding that similar allegations regarding intentional confiscation or destruction of a prisoner’s property without justification or explanation state a § 1983 claim.

A prisoner states a section 1983 property claim by alleging that prison officials withdrew permission to possess property for no security-related reason.

Holloway v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1986-06-11

Thus, we are compelled to conclude that the complaint states a claim and should not have been dismissed since in the present procedural posture of this case the District Court was not in a position to weigh any security considerations that the ADC might offer to justify its actions.

Section 1983 does not entitle a convicted prisoner to the return, before release, of a pistol confiscated upon arrest.

Cook v. Watson · filed 1976-07-14

To conclude from these cases, however, that Section 1983 entitles a legally convicted prisoner to have his pistol, which was confiscated upon arrest, returned to him before his release, is untenable.

Section 1983 permits compensation for emotional distress caused by a substantive-due-process violation, including reckless harm to a child after police create a special custodial relationship by arresting the child's guardian.

Mendez Through Mendez v. Rutherford · filed 1987-02-13

In sum, then, because the Seventh Circuit recognizes that a substantive due process violation may occur by way of the defendants’ gross negligence or reckless disregard of a custodial plaintiff’s interests, because such actions are alleged to have occurred here, and because emotional injuries from such violations are eompensa-ble, Elizabeth’s substantive due process claim must not be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a jury trial on a refusal-to-hire plaintiff's back-pay claim and recognizes mental and emotional distress as a cognizable remedy.

Powell v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency · filed 1983-03-04

Powell, the plaintiff in the instant case, has the right to a jury trial on the issue of his claim for back pay under §§ 1981 and 1983. ... A claim for mental and emotional distress is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Emotional-distress damages for a First Amendment violation are not presumed in a Section 1983 action and must be supported by proof of actual injury and causation.

Spence v. Board of Education of Christina School District · filed 1986-12-05

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleged a First Amendment violation that resulted in emotional distress. Her claim does not fall within the narrow category of cases in which damages may be presumed.

Section 1983 back pay awards must be reduced by the plaintiff’s interim earnings.

Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Jorge L. Aquino, Etc. · filed 1988-12-09

Even if it is determined after remand that the CDC is not immune from the back pay award, we hold that the award of back pay must be reduced by Figueroa’s interim earnings. ... However, the measure of damages in section 1983 actions is a matter of federal common law.

In a § 1983 political firing case, when a jury decides liability and compensatory damages, it must consider back pay as an item of compensatory damages.

Santiago-Negron v. Modesto Castro-Davila, Etc. · filed 1989-02-03

Applying the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court, we hold that in a § 1983 case based upon an alleged unconstitutional political firing where the issues of liability and compensatory damages will be determined by a jury, back pay shall be considered by the jury as one of the items of compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not create a federal cause of action for a spouse’s emotional distress.

Rodriguez v. Comas · filed 1989-11-07

The district court properly held that Section 1983 does not create a federal cause of action for the emotional distress of a spouse.

Section 1983 emotional distress damages require demonstrable injury; the circumstances of a constitutional violation alone do not establish that injury.

Biggs v. Village Of Dupo · filed 1990-01-09

While Mr. Biggs emphasizes that, unlike the plaintiffs in Nekolny, he was told wrongly that he had acted in a way "unbecoming a police officer," and that the Mayor reportedly said Mr. Biggs was unworthy to represent the Village of Dupo, we require that a plaintiff show "demonstrable emotional distress," not just point to circumstances of the constitutional violation which might support an inference of such injury.

Section 1983 permits a claim for compensatory damages for emotional distress arising from a First Amendment violation even after a request for injunctive relief becomes moot.

Lueth v. St. Clair County Community College · filed 1990-02-05

The Sixth Circuit recognizes the availability of money damages for emotional distress arising from first amendment violations. ... Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiff possesses standing to proceed with her claim for money damages against the defendants, but dismisses her requests for injunctive relief as moot.

Section 1983 allows damages for emotional distress after a violation of a federal right is established, but an emotional-distress claim alone does not establish liability.

Naliielua v. State of Hawaii · filed 1990-05-29

Similarly, plaintiffs’ claim for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress does not assert the violation of a federal right and fails to state a claim under § 1983. While damages for emotional distress may be available under § 1983 once a violation has been established, the claim itself cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a court to order a hearing and back pay as equitable relief for a public employee denied procedural due process without first deciding whether the employee would have been fired after a hearing.

Bennie Brewer v. Dave Parkman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of St. Francis County · filed 1990-11-15

Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in ordering that Brewer be granted a hearing and awarding Brewer back pay without first determining that Brewer would not have been fired had a hearing been held.

Section 1983 allows emotional distress damages after a violation is established, but emotional distress alone cannot form the basis of a claim.

Naliielua v. Hawaii · filed 1991-04-16

As this court noted in its May 29 order, damages for emotional distress may be available under section 1983 once a violation of that section has been established. However, such damages cannot in themselves form the basis for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows full back pay for a public employee denied procedural due process only if the employee would not have been discharged had proper procedures been followed.

Brewer v. Chauvin · filed 1991-07-10

This will include a full award of back pay only when there is a finding that the discharge would not have occurred if the employee's procedural due process rights had been observed.

Section 1983 permits recovery for emotional distress caused by a constitutional violation when the injury is supported by sufficient evidence.

Town of Upton v. Whisler · filed 1992-01-10

More than ten years ago, this court recognized the proposition that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation once a constitutional violation is established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold, however, that it was sufficient to justify the jury in reaching a proper inference that the emotional distress was, at least in part, attributable to the discharge of Whisler from the office of municipal judge without notice or hearing with respect to the asserted cause for discharge.

Section 1983 permits damages for emotional distress caused by a violation of rights when evidence supports the injury.

Bloom v. City of Scottsdale · filed 1992-10-02

However, a plaintiff may recover for mental and emotional distress caused by a violation of her rights. ... There was thus evidence to support an award of damages to Stacy Bloom for emotional distress.

Section 1983 back pay damages for wrongful termination are calculated using a quarterly earnings formula.

Kendrick v. Jefferson County Board of Education · filed 1994-02-11

Applied to the facts of this case, our holding that § 1983 damages are to be calculated using a quarterly earnings formula means that Kendrick is due some damages.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages for actual injury without requiring expert medical evidence.

Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1994-04-07

We hold that expert medical evidence- is not required to prove emotional distress in section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages for employment discrimination without proof of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct.

Davis v. City of Waterloo · filed 1996-07-24

It is clear that under both Iowa Code section 216.6 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress for employment discrimination without a showing of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct.

Section 1983 permits damages for emotional injury without requiring severe distress or outrageous conduct.

Chatman v. James Slagle, Richard Unger · filed 1997-02-19

There is no requirement that the defendant’s conduct be outrageous or that plaintiffs injury be extreme. To the contrary, we have often upheld damages under § 1983 without requiring any such showing.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages based on a plaintiff’s testimony alone when that testimony establishes mental distress.

Burks v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-08-26

A plaintiffs testimony regarding evidence .of his or her mental distress, without more, is sufficient to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no damages for emotional distress from asbestos exposure without proof of physical injury when Pennsylvania law governs the claim.

Fontroy v. Owens · filed 1998-06-01

In conclusion, we hold that the district court did not err by applying Pennsylvania law to Fontroy's section 1983 claim and, consequently, that Fontroy has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for damages for emotion distress allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos without proof of physical injury.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for emotional distress from asbestos exposure without proof of physical injury in this conditions-of-confinement claim.

Fontroy v. David S. Owens and Irene J. Pernsley and Gaetano Curione and Harry Moore, Derrick Dale Fontroy, I · filed 1998-07-28

In conclusion, we hold that the district court did not err by applying Pennsylvania law to Fontroy’s section 1983 claim and, consequently, that Fontroy has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for emotional distress allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos without proof of physical injury.

Section 1983 permits damages for proven mental and emotional distress without requiring physical injury.

Orr v. Crowder · filed 1984-01-25

In Carey, the United States Supreme Court recognized in a section 1983 action involving a violation of procedural due process rights that a claim for mental distress would be allowed if proven: ... In the present case, the plaintiff did produce psychiatric as well as lay testimony that she suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of her termination.

Section 1983 permits compensation for emotional distress only when the constitutional violation proximately caused it; the distress need not be severe.

Smith v. City of Dayton, Ohio · filed 1999-09-07

Of course, emotional distress need not be severe to be compensable under § 1983. ... However, the distress must have been proximately caused by the constitutional violation. There is simply no proof offered by Plaintiff of any causal connection between the release of personal information and any heightened threat from Mr. Bacher.

Section 1983 requires competent, sufficient evidence to support compensatory damages for emotional distress.

Saleh v. VA State University · filed 2001-05-31

Compensatory damages for emotional distress must be proven by competent, sufficient evidence.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages without expert witness evidence.

Sabir v. Jowett · filed 2002-07-10

Contrary to defendants’ arguments, expert witness evidence is not required to sustain an award of emotional distress damages in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages without proof of physical symptoms.

Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York · filed 2002-10-17

We agree that Annis should not be read to require physical symptoms of emotional distress in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require physical symptoms to recover emotional distress damages.

Patrolmen's Benevolent Association Of The City Of New York v. The City Of New York · filed 2002-10-17

We agree that Annis should not be read to require physical symptoms of emotional distress in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages, but the claimant must provide evidence of emotional distress.

Zeltser v. City of Oakland · filed 2003-04-08

Although emotional distress damages are available in a § 1983 action, ... Zeltser offered no evidence in support of her claim that she suffered emotional distress.

Section 1983 does not provide reinstatement with back pay for the alleged wrongful discharge of employees by a private hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds.

Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses · filed 1965-07-19

While we express serious doubts as to the scope and breadth of the Simkins holding, and specifically whether it permits an action for wrongful discharge against a hospital privately owned and operated but which is also the recipient of Hill-Burton funds, we reserve this question for other courts. Assuming arguendo that such an action is maintainable, we do not believe that it permits an action for reinstatement with back pay as contrasted with the customary action for breach of contract seeking damages for wrongful discharge.

Back pay on a § 1983 procedural due process claim depends on whether a proper hearing would have prevented discharge; the defendants bear the burden of proving the employee would have been discharged anyway.

Cotton v. Reynolds · filed 1992-12-04

Whether plaintiff Cotton would have been terminated even if an appropriate pre-termination hearing had been held. The defendants will be required to carry this burden by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 1983 permits back pay and reinstatement when a public employee is discharged for exercising a constitutional right.

Jannetta v. E. W. Cole, Chief, Rock Hill Fire Department, Anthony L. Jannetta v. E. W. Cole, Chief, Rock Hill · filed 1974-04-03

Thus the remedy for constitutionally impermissible discharge from public employment is back pay and reinstatement.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages when objective circumstances substantiate the plaintiff’s injury.

Lynch v. Town of Southampton · filed 2007-06-27

In this case, reviewing the record, there is sufficient evidence of the plaintiffs emotional distress by objective circumstances, namely, the unexpected arrival of three uniformed officers who forced her to leave the Animal Shelter forthwith. In addition, the publicity of her forced termination as a volunteer in the newspapers and on the radio, furnish additional objective substantiation of humiliation and emotional distress on the part of the plaintiff. In sum, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support an. award- of emotional distress to the plaintiff Patricia Lynch.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking emotional distress damages must prove a specific discernable emotional injury resulting from a constitutional violation, with evidence of the harm’s nature and extent.

Baughman v. LEE COUNTY, MS · filed 2008-05-20

Moreover, each plaintiff alleges that he or she suffered emotional distress damages as a result of being strip searched, and federal law requires that, to recover emotional distress damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate a “specific discernable injury to [his] emotional state” resulting from a constitutional violation, proven with evidence regarding the “nature and extent” of the harm.

Section 1983 does not permit backpay, including retroactive retirement and Social Security contributions, against a defendant sued only in an individual capacity.

Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago · filed 2008-06-05

This makes perfect sense; a suit for backpay, even one brought under a tort-like cause of action such as that supplied by section 1983, necessarily stems from the contract of hire — a contract to which the individual-capacity defendant was never a party. ... One common denominator, however, is that all species of backpay are improper forms of relief when imposed upon a defendant who is sued only in his or her individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits recovery for emotional distress without expert testimony.

Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 2009-02-24

A plaintiff does not need to present expert testimony to recover damages for emotional distress caused by the violation of his civil rights.

Section 1983 damages for emotional distress follow common law tort principles, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails when the underlying tort requirements are unmet.

Faison v. Parker · filed 1993-01-19

The level of damages awarded under section 1983 is “ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” ... Thus, Ms. Faison cannot maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under section 1983 for the same reasons, discussed above, that she can not maintain such an action under state law.

Section 1983 does not require expert medical evidence to prove emotional distress damages.

Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1994-05-09

We hold that expert medical evidence is not required to prove emotional distress in section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits compensation for mental and emotional distress when the plaintiff proves the injury was actually caused.

Niederhuber v. Camden County Vocational & Technical School District Board of Education · filed 1980-08-21

While the Court recognizes that he may be compensated for mental and emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1052, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), he must first prove that “such injury actually was caused,” Id. In reviewing the record, we find that plaintiff has failed to present any credible evidence to support his allegation of mental and emotional distress. Accordingly, his claim for such damages must be denied.