42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability for petitioning government agencies about a proposed development when the concerns raised have a rational basis.

Herr v. Pequea Township · filed 2001-12-11

To the extent these claims are based on communications to the LCPC and other responsible state agencies, a straightforward application of the principles already discussed leads to the conclusion that there can be no § 1983 liability. Calling concerns about a proposed development to the attention of the responsible state agencies lies at the core of privileged activity, and this is true without regard to the number of concerns expressed so long as there is some rational basis for those concerns.

Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to Section 1983 claims based on petitioning public authorities.

Empress LLC v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2005-08-18

Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine originally immunized individuals and entities from antitrust liability, Noerr-Pennington immunity now applies to claims under § 1983 that are based on the petitioning of public authorities.

Section 1983 does not create a right to obtain from social services the identity of a child-neglect reporter merely to facilitate a lawsuit against that reporter.

Freed v. Worcester County Department of Social Services · filed 1986-12-08

Nevertheless, no one has the right to obtain the name of the reporter from Social Services for the purpose of initiating litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Removing unconditional work-release privileges that form part of a prisoner’s sentence deprives liberty without due process and supports a Section 1983 claim.

Olynick v. Taylor County · filed 1986-09-23

The conclusion is thus inescapable that because of the denial of her right to exercise Huber Law privileges, plaintiff was denied liberty without Due Process. She certainly did not have a right to serve her sentence in Taylor County, even without reference to the sentencing judge’s comments at her hearing. But there is nothing conditional about the privileges disclosed in either the sentencing hearing or Certificate of Sentencing.

A § 1983 due-process claim may rest on a liberty interest created by an official policy intended to guide discretion, even when the policy is not contained in a statute or administrative code.

Parker v. Corrothers · filed 1985-02-13

We agree with every Circuit that has squarely considered this issue that these particularized standards or criteria which give rise to liberty interests may be found not only in a state's statutes or administrative code but also within official policy pronouncements which are intended to guide the exercise of discretion.

A prisoner may have a liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 when official policies use particularized criteria to govern admission to a treatment program and make parole follow from successful completion unless specified conditions apply.

Green v. Lee Roy Black, Jim Jones, Donald L. Wyrick and Marie Clark · filed 1985-02-27

If Green can show that the prison officials have established particularized standards or criteria under which similarly situated sexual offenders are admitted into Phase II of MOSOP before they have served seven-twelfths of their sentence, and that there is a policy under which inmates receive parole on their seven-twelfths date after successful completion of Phase II unless certain conditions apply, then Green may have a liberty interest in being enrolled and completing Phase II before his seven-twelfths date.

State prison rules requiring notice and a hearing before punitive transfer create a protected liberty interest enforceable through section 1983.

Reese, Frank Ordean v. Sparks, Gary E. Caskey, James E., Sease, Kenneth. Appeal of Frank Reese · filed 1985-04-29

providing for notice and hearing prior to punishment for misconduct, create a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. That interest is entitled to procedural due process protections.

A section 1983 parole due-process claim may rest on a protected liberty interest created by formal regulations, practices, or customs that limit a parole board's discretion even when the statute itself creates no entitlement.

Gale v. Dick Moore, Chairman, Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Bill Duncan, Carolyn v. Atkins · filed 1985-05-31

a protected liberty interest may arise where particular regulations, practices or customs have been formally utilized through such devices as handbooks or inter-office memoranda or other standardized customs which limit the Board’s discretion.

Ohio law creates no constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining shock parole, so its denial does not support § 1983 relief.

Corethers v. Richard P. Seiter Arthur Tate, Jr. John W. Shoemaker · filed 1986-01-20

There is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining shock parole under O.R.C. 2967.31.

A permissive prison regulation that leaves medical-treatment decisions essentially discretionary creates no liberty interest enforceable under Section 1983.

Roberts v. Spalding · filed 1986-02-24

As such, the regulation creates no protected entitlement or liberty interest and the 14th amendment is not implicated.

Section 1983 provides no due-process claim for denial of parole when the governing statute, regulations, policies, and practices leave release discretionary and create no protected liberty interest.

Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole · filed 1986-03-28

For the above-stated reasons, the Court concludes that the statutes, regulations, policies, and practices of the District of Columbia Board of Parole do not create a liberty interest in reparole. Consequently, there is no basis for the plaintiff’s due process claims in this case.

A procedural due process claim under § 1983 cannot be dismissed merely because state law created the property interest at stake.

Ward v. Downtown Development Authority · filed 1986-04-21

Thus, a Sec. 1983 claim of a procedural due process violation cannot be dismissed solely because the interest at stake is state-created.

A parole statute creates a liberty interest actionable under section 1983 when it requires release after the parole board determines that harm is not probable.

Allen v. Board of Pardons · filed 1986-06-26

It states that the Board “shall” release a prisoner on parole when it determines release would not be harmful, unless specified conditions exist which would preclude parole. ... However, the Board may not deny parole under either statute once it determines that harm is not probable.

State statutes requiring prison vocational and educational programs do not support a § 1983 liberty-interest claim when prison officials retain broad discretion unconstrained by substantive limits.

Postlethwaite v. Celeste · filed 1986-08-05

The statutes in question do not create constitutionally protected liberty interests in vocational and educational programs for Ohio state inmates. The programs are required to be developed, but they are to be implemented under the very broad discretion and expertise of the prison officials. Their discretion is not limited by any substantive limitation to which due process could apply. Redress for the alleged denial of the programs cannot, therefore, be sought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A discretionary sentence-reduction law or regulation creates no due-process interest enforceable under Section 1983 when it places no substantive limits on officials’ discretion.

Holley v. Robert Landon, Director Robert Spann, Dep. Dir. William P. Rogers, Warden C.D. Larsen, Acting Warde · filed 1986-11-18

An interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not created by a law or regulation that does not place substantive limits on official discretion. ... Neither Sec. 53.1-191 nor Guideline No. 810 place substantive limits on prison officials' discretion, and thus no protectible interest is created.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 transfer claim requires state law or practice to place substantive restraints on prison officials’ transfer discretion; procedural expectations alone do not create a protected liberty interest.

Mauricio v. Bronnenberg · filed 1986-11-26

Neither inter or intra-institutional transfer cases state a claim unless substantive restraints and restrictions are placed upon the discretion of the decisionmakers.

A state-created liberty interest supporting a Section 1983 due-process claim requires substantive criteria limiting official discretion; procedural prerequisites alone are insufficient.

Okumoto v. Lattin · filed 1986-12-15

In view of the recent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases discussed above, it is clear that the key to a finding of a state created liberty interest is the existence of substantive criteria in the state law which guide the official decisionmakers. Procedural prerequisites are not enough.

A prison regulation creates a protected liberty interest when it uses mandatory language tied to specific substantive predicates.

Wyatt Champ v. Norma Gluckstern, Director · filed 1987-05-11

Because we believe that the regulation uses sufficiently explicit "mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates" to create a liberty interest, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983), we vacate the judgment below. We remand the case for a determination of whether Champ received the process due him under Hewitt.

A state parole statute creates a liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 when mandatory language and substantive predicates require release once designated findings are made.

Board of Pardons v. Allen · filed 1987-06-09

Significantly, the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, uses mandatory language (“shall”) ... to “creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted” when the desig ... nated findings are made. ... Thus, we find in the Montana statute, as in the Nebraska statute, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

State prison rules, policies, or practices may create a liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 in continued participation in a work-detail program.

Hake v. Frank Gunter Charles Black Ronald Bartee Carolos Alvarez Doris Collins and Mary Wiesman · filed 1987-07-15

Under this umbrella, Hake contends that the DCS rules, regulations, policies and practices created a liberty interest in not being removed from work detail without the appropriate procedural due process. In holding to the contrary, we believe the district court erred.

Prison rules mandating continued compensation for inmates medically incapacitated by work injuries create a state-law interest protected by § 1983 procedural due process.

Flowers v. Fauver · filed 1988-01-06

Accordingly, plaintiff’s contention that he was wrongfully deprived of wages after an employment-related accident forced him to go on medical lay-in implicates a state-created liberty interest in compensatory payment for injury incurred during the course of prison labor and therefore states a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A Section 1983 due-process claim sufficiently alleges a special relationship when a state actor places the victim in the situation causing the injury and then fails to protect the victim.

Estate of Tittiger Ex Rel. Tittiger v. Doering · filed 1988-01-27

The Court finds that a “special relationship” between a victim and the state, as required for a due process claim, is alleged sufficiently to withstand a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. where the state actor is alleged to have placed the victim in the situation which caused his or her injury, and then to have failed to protect the victim.

A legislative committee report without the force of law cannot establish the liberty interest needed for a § 1983 claim based on exclusion from a prison release program.

Roland v. Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1988-04-29

That report, however, lacks the force of law so as to establish a liberty interest in plaintiff's favor sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on inaccurate information affecting parole when the plaintiff has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole and has suffered no injury to a state-created interest.

Gregory L. Oakley, Jr. v. Wilson · filed 1988-05-04

Plaintiff appeals the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action for frivolity. ... Upon consideration, we affirm the district court's judgment pursuant to Rule 9(b)(5), Rules of the Sixth Circuit, because plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole and he has not yet been injured by the deprivation of any state-created interest.

Section 1983 allows a federal court to hear a due process claim based on an alleged state-created wage entitlement, with relief against state officials limited to prospective injunctions or declarations.

Young v. Cutter Biological · filed 1988-08-03

The court therefore concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the state defendants based on an alleged deprivation of minimum wages due under the Arizona statutory scheme only in the limited sense that if plaintiffs succeed on this claim the court may grant prospective-injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 cannot directly vindicate a state constitutional right, but it can remedy deprivation of a state-created right without due process of law.

Barcelo v. Agosto · filed 1995-01-25

Therefore, although a 1983 action cannot be used to vindicate the rights established under Section 8, it can be used to insure that such rights were not deprived without due process of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim when officials deprive a person without due process of a liberty interest created by mandatory state law.

Linen v. County of Rensselaer · filed 2000-07-27

Thus, where State law creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on the discretion of governmental officials that are explicitly mandatory, a 42 USC § 1983 cause of action lies when a person is deprived of that protected liberty interest without due process (see, Oviatt v Pearce, 954 F2d 1470, 1474-1475).

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of a federal constitutional right by someone acting under color of state law.

Clouser v. City of Thornton · filed 1987-12-31

I therefore conclude as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 for deprivation of his liberty interest fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

A utility cannot avoid the Johnson Act's jurisdictional bar on federal interference with state utility rates by pleading a § 1983 claim.

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Ackel · filed 1985-08-12

It is well established that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, adds no independent ground for federal district court jurisdiction, ... and it is well established that a utility may not make an “end run” around the Johnson Act by asserting a Civil Rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass the Johnson Act’s bar on federal jurisdiction over a public utility rate challenge when a plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy was available.

Peoples National Utility Company v. The City of Houston, a Texas Municipal Corporation · filed 1988-02-25

The Johnson Act demonstrates Congress’ intent that plaintiffs avail themselves of state remedies. Plaintiffs may not use § 1983 as an “end run” around the Johnson Act.

Section 1983 cannot be used to evade the Johnson Act’s bar on federal jurisdiction over state utility rate challenges.

US West, Inc. v. Nelson · filed 1998-06-16

Although the US West companies also have pleaded a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we agree with the other courts that have held that “[a] plaintiff may not use § 1983 as an 'end run around the Johnson Act.' " J & A Realty, 763 F.Supp. at 88 (quoting Peoples Nat’l Util. Co. v. Houston, 837 F.2d 1366, 1368 (5th Cir.1988)).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; it does not apply to federal employees who are not state actors.

Bozgoz v. James · filed 2020-08-14

Section 1983 creates liability for a person “acting under color of state law” who deprives an individual of his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But there are no state actors named as defendants in the complaint – all defendants are federal employees.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal employees acting under federal law.

Pratt v. Brennan · filed 2020-01-22

Therefore, any § 1983 claims are not cognizable as pled, since both named Defendants are employees of the federal government.

Claims against federal Bureau of Prisons employees are considered under Bivens rather than § 1983.

Perez v. Floyd · filed 2020-01-06

Plaintiff states he brings his case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, as the Defendants are employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and thus federal employees, his claims are considered under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal immigration agencies for alleged constitutional violations.

Endicott v. INS "Perez" · filed 2019-09-30

Whether pursued as a § 1983 claim, or a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), Plaintiff cannot recover against the USCIS and INS for their alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not govern claims against federal employees; those claims are analyzed under Bivens.

Romero-Arrizabal v. Ramos · filed 2019-03-20

Romero-Arrizabal also invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but as all of the defendants in this case are federal employees, this suit is properly analyzed under Bivens rather than § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law, so it does not apply to a federal agency.

Spinale v. U.S. Department of Agriculture · filed 2009-04-02

Second, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for deprivation of inspection rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as that section is limited to persons acting under color of state law, and so does not apply to the USDA, a federal agency.

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for false arrest claims against officers federally deputized for their task force work; those claims are brought under Bivens.

Guerrero v. Scarazzini · filed 2008-02-23

Guerrero framed his false arrest claims against Scarazzini and McAllister as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, because Scarazzini and McAllister were federally deputized for their Task Force work, this claim was properly brought (as the parties agree) as a Bivens action.

A claim against federal employees for their federal conduct is a Bivens action rather than a § 1983 action.

Thibeaux v. Tobias · filed 2003-02-13

Because the defendants are federal employees, this is actually a Bivens action.

Section 1983 is limited to state actors and does not apply to federal employees.

Lehman v. Kornblau · filed 2001-03-08

The plaintiff also seeks damages against Flynn in her individual capacity for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is limited to state actors and does not apply to federal employees.

Section 1983 applies to actions under color of state law and does not cover acts of federal agencies or employees.

Lerma v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. · filed 1981-01-15

The defendant properly asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to actions by state officials “under color of state law.” ... and thus has no bearing on the acts of federal agencies or employees.

Section 1983 applies to state actors; civil rights claims against federal actors are properly treated as Bivens actions.

Badea v. Harvey Cox, Warden Norman Saito Callie Castillo · filed 1994-06-07

Although Badea brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985 & 1986, the action is more properly construed as a Bivens action because the defendants are federal actors.

Section 1983 does not provide the authority for a claim against a federal defendant; Bivens does.

Owens v. J.J. Clark, Warden · filed 1988-03-21

Because Owens' claim was against a federal defendant, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, provides the authority for its consideration...

Section 1983 applies to state officials, not federal officials.

Rodriguez v. United States · filed 1986-02-19

At one point it appears to attempt to sue the United States and Officer Straughn in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which of course applies only to state, not federal, officials.

Claims for federal-rights violations under color of federal law are treated as Bivens claims, while claims against state defendants are properly asserted under § 1983.

Jones v. Hadican · filed 1985-10-10

Plaintiff's suit was properly construed as a Bivens-type action to the extent plaintiff sought relief for deprivation of his federal rights committed by the defendants acting under color of federal and not state law. ... As construed against the state defendants, it was properly asserted under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law and therefore does not provide a cause of action against federal officials.

Ryan v. Bilby · filed 1985-07-03

Ryan erroneously relies on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. That statute applies only to actions taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law and therefore does not provide a cause of action against federal officials.

Ryan v. Bilby · filed 1985-07-03

Ryan erroneously relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute applies only to actions taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal officials acting under federal law because its color-of-law requirement reaches state law, not federal law.

Lieutenant Mary Ogden v. The United States of America · filed 1985-03-29

The district court correctly ruled that plaintiffs’ action does not present a cognizable § 1983 claim since that statute only provides a remedy for deprivations of rights, privileges and immunities which are perpetrated under color of state law.

Federal officials incur no Section 1983 liability for constitutional violations unless they acted under color of state law.

Dr. Bhartur N. Premachandra v. Dr. Murray G. Mitts · filed 1985-04-12

Because Prema-chandra did not allege that the defendants acted under color of state law, no section 1983 liability could be found.

Section 1983 does not provide jurisdiction for constitutional claims against federal employees.

Tripati v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1986-02-20

We note initially that plaintiff’s invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 is incorrect as to the four ... employee defendants before us.

A federal parole officer does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 without probative evidence that the officer acted in concert with state officials.

Rauschenberg v. Williamson · filed 1986-04-02

We agree with the district court’s reasoning that Rauschenberg failed to come forward with probative evidence to controvert Williamson’s evidence that he never acted in concert with state officials to violate Rauschenberg’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials; constitutional claims against them arise, if at all, under federal-question jurisdiction and Bivens.

Hickson v. Burkhart · filed 1986-05-05

An action against federal officials is not maintainable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials; analogous constitutional claims against them must proceed, if at all, under Bivens.

Wellman v. State of W. Va. · filed 1986-06-13

The Court is aware that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for civil actions against federal officials....

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a federal right, and conduct by a Federal Reserve Bank under federal law does not satisfy the state-action element.

Leon v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago · filed 1987-05-29

Two elements are essential to a claim under Sec. 1983--the conduct complained of must be committed under color of state law and the conduct must have deprived the claimant of a right, privilege or immunity protected by the United States Constitution or statutes. ... Thus, the Reserve Bank's conduct in the instant case was taken under color of federal, and not state, law. Under these circumstances, no action under Sec. 1983 can be sustained.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against federal officials acting solely pursuant to their federal authority without state action.

Mooney v. Clerk of Courts · filed 1993-09-24

The Complaint herein sets forth only claims for violation of federal rights based upon allegations of actions taken by several of the Defendants while acting solely in the course of and pursuant to their authority in their various federal capacities. Such claims are- beyond the scope of section 1983. No assertion of “state action” is made. Thus this Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against defendants acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Marin v. Ronald L. Lowe Glynn Mallory · filed 1993-10-18

Because defendants were acting under color of federal law, not state law, we construe this as a claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 2 Marin alleges that he has exhausted his administrative remedies and, alternatively, that he need not exhaust because to do so would be futile.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against federal officers acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Duncan v. Goedeke and Cleasey · filed 1993-11-22

Section 1983 protects persons who were deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities under color of state or local law, not federal law. Therefore, federal officers acting under color of federal law, such as defendants Goedeke, Cleary, Schramm, and Guinn, are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For purposes of Section 1983, state law implementing federal requirements does not transform a federal oversight agency's actions pursuant to federal law into action under color of state law.

Stimac v. William P. Barr John Palomino California Department of Education · filed 1993-11-23

The existence of state law intended to implement federal requirements does not transform the actions of federal oversight agencies into state action.

A civil rights action against a federal actor brought under § 1983 is properly construed as a Bivens action.

Edward E. Allen Toni C. Allen v. Charles L. Gresham, Individually & as Officer of the Internal Revenue Service · filed 1993-12-03

Although the Allens brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the action is more properly construed as a Bivens action because the defendant is a federal actor.

Section 1983 is unavailable when the defendants are federal actors.

Daniel v. United States · filed 1995-05-31

Consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s findings, the Court finds that all Defendants are federal actors, and thus, Section 1983 is unavailable to Plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal actor acting under color of federal law.

Hindman v. Healy · filed 2008-05-16

Moreover, Hindman cannot support a claim under § 1983 because he alleged that Decker was a federal actor, not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not provide for liability against federal agencies acting under color of federal law.

Ponton v. AFSCME, AFL-CIO · filed 2010-09-23

The District Court properly granted the Federal defendants’ motions to dismiss, as Ponton was never an employee of the federal agencies that he named to this suit for purposes of seeking relief under Title VII, and § 1983 does not provide for liability against federal agencies acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 applies to actions of state and local officials, not federal officials.

Norington v. United States · filed 2016-08-23

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to actions of state and local, not federal, officials.

A § 1983 plaintiff who does not identify John Doe defendants within the limitations period has not timely initiated an action against those individuals.

Alabasi v. City of Lyndhurst · filed 2020-09-08

Their failure to ascertain their names within the limitations period means that they failed to initiate a § 1983 action against any qualifying individual within the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims against unnamed defendants require specific factual allegations of their conduct or knowledge of the alleged violation.

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez · filed 2012-03-29

While the First Circuit Court of Appeals has permitted a “suit against a fictitious or unnamed party,” given the plaintiffs’ failure to make specific factual allegations against the unnamed defendants, any claim by the plaintiffs against those defendants cannot survive.

A pro se § 1983 complaint alleging misconduct by unnamed officers must be construed as a claim against those officers.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2006-10-31

By not construing this claim also as one against the unnamed officers, the district court erred.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed against a fictitious defendant when the real defendant cannot be readily identified for service.

Williams v. DeKalb County Jail · filed 2016-02-04

Therefore, as Williams’ excessive force complaint does not name an actionable party, the district court did not err in dismissing it for failure to state a claim.

A § 1983 claim against only Doe defendants fails to state a claim when discovery has closed and the deadline to name defendants has passed.

Morris v. Kernan · filed 2019-09-06

Having denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, it is now clear to the Court that the § 1983 claim fails to state a claim as a matter of law. This is because, as noted supra, the § 1983 claim is not pleaded against any named defendants.

Police force creates Section 1983 substantive-due-process liability only when it is sufficiently egregious and reckless to cross the constitutional line, not whenever an officer commits assault or bodily harm.

Dale v. Janklow · filed 1987-10-28

We also note that the officers' conduct must sufficiently cross a constitutional line so as to create a federal cause of action under section 1983. Not every assault or bodily harm caused by a police officer means that a constitutional claim may be asserted. In order to violate the due process clause, the conduct must be so egregious and reckless that it may be deemed a substantive denial of due process.

A § 1983 substantive-due-process claim may rest directly on the Fourteenth Amendment when state officials acting under color of law deprive a person of liberty through conduct that shocks the conscience, even without violating a specific Bill of Rights guarantee.

Page v. Jay · filed 1988-02-02

One method of asserting a substantive due process violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, is to rely upon the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment itself to ground a claim that the general right of the claimant not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, has been violated, not by infringement upon a guarantee found in a specific command of the Bill of Rights but, rather, by official conduct that offends the community's sense of fair play and decency.

Section 1983 provides a claim for a substantive due process violation when state actors show reckless indifference to a known or obvious, highly dangerous risk.

Nishiyama v. Dickson County · filed 1987-03-18

We hold that such reckless indifference to the risk posed by their actions is sufficient to establish a violation of substantive due process under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing a substantive due process claim to show deprivation of a protected property interest and governmental action wholly without legal justification.

Eagles Landing, LLC v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2010-07-22

Finally, to establish its substantive due process claim under section 1983, plaintiff was required to demonstrate “(1) the deprivation of a protect-able property interest and (2) that ‘the governmental action was wholly without legal justification’ ” (Matter of Ken Mar Dev., Inc. v Department of Pub. Works of City of Saratoga Springs, 53 AD3d 1020, 1024-1025 [2008], quoting Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 627 [2004]). Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to obtain the necessary approval before commencing construction, it failed to demonstrate that it had “a legitimate claim of entitlement to continue construction” (Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 627 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Section 1983 substantive due process claims require conduct that shocks the conscience, and municipal claims require a policy or custom that caused the injury.

Keefe v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2015-05-11

Assuming without deciding that these allegations show a violation of a fundamental right, we hold that Keefe’s § 1983 claim nonetheless fails because the alleged conduct on which Keefe relies does not rise to the level of “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary consciences.” ... Accordingly, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Keefe, we find that he has failed to present a genuine dispute of material fact as to a necessary element of his § 1983 substantive due process claim—that the defendants’ actions were shocking to the conscience. ... But a plaintiff can pursue a Monell claim under § 1983 by identifying a government entity’s policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Leder v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc. · filed 2015-11-18

A substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires plaintiff to show (1) a “fundamental liberty interest,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997), (2) the deprivation of which was “arbitrary in the constitutional sense,” Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994).

Filing a Section 1983 action does not give the plaintiff a federally protected right to be free from compulsory counterclaims by the defendants.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 1985-04-01

Stripped of rhetoric, the essence of plaintiff's claim is that, having elected to commence a section 1983 action against the City and police officers for having assaulted him, he has a federally protected right to be free of counterclaims asserting that he assaulted the officers. To state the claim reveals, its lack of substance; no extended discussion is necessary.

A Section 1983 employee-reputation claim fails when the employee had notice of the allegedly stigmatizing statements and an adequate opportunity to clear his name.

Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1986-10-02

Ewers had notice of the statements which allegedly damaged his name because he was present when they were made. In fact, he immediately responded to them by presenting contrary views. He testified that he had been given an adequate chance to clear up any misconceptions. He was satisfied and no further opportunities to be heard were requested. None were necessary under these facts. Ewers failed to present any evidence that he was denied the opportunity for a hearing at which he could defend himself.

A Section 1983 employee-reputation claim fails when the employee was present for the allegedly stigmatizing public statements and had an adequate opportunity to clear his name.

Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Curry · filed 1986-10-02

Assuming that Ewers was stigmatized under Asbill by the allegations of "padding the books" and "dragging out" of projects made during the February 10, 1981, public meeting, Ewers failed to satisfy the fifth element because he was at the meeting and was afforded the opportunity to clear his name.

A public employee terminated for reasons that would be stigmatizing if false is entitled under Section 1983 to nominal damages and attorney's fees when denied a name-clearing hearing, while consequential damages depend on proof that a hearing would have accomplished something.

Karr v. Townsend · filed 1985-04-01

It appears that if such stigmatizing reasons were given and he was terminated prior to having a name-clearing hearing, he may recover consequential damages if the court believes, from the evidence adduced, that the hearing would have accomplished something for Mr. Karr, but that he is still entitled to nominal damages and attorney’s fees if the court finds that the evidence proves only that he was terminated without a hearing for reasons which would be stigmatizing if false.

A discharged public employee whose termination stigmatizes his reputation and impairs future employment is entitled under Section 1983 to a hearing at which he may refute the charge and clear his name.

Hoffman v. McNamara · filed 1986-03-27

Inasmuch as discharged employees of the state have a liberty interest which is compromised when they are terminated under circumstances which affect their standing in the community and their future job prospects, plaintiff is entitled, even at this late date, to a hearing for the sole purpose of presenting his version of the facts and clearing his name and reputation.

A public employee asserting a Section 1983 liberty-interest claim is not invariably entitled to a formal trial-type name-clearing hearing when less formal procedures provide an adequate opportunity to refute stigmatizing charges.

Baden v. Koch · filed 1986-08-21

Having weighed the competing interests and having considered the procedures actually used in Baden's case and the benefits and burdens entailed by the more formal procedure he requests, we conclude that Baden received all the process that was due him. In all of the circumstances, Baden was afforded an adequate opportunity to refute the charges against him and to clear his name.

Section 1983 does not provide a reputation-based procedural due process remedy to a public employee who was not discharged.

Taylor v. The University of Texas at Dallas · filed 2020-09-29

To determine whether § 1983 affords a government employee a remedy for deprivation of such a liberty interest, the plaintiff must show: (1) he was discharged; ... (7) the employer denied the request. ... Because Plaintiffs were not discharged from employment at UTD, they have failed to state a claim for procedural due process violations based on a liberty interest in their reputations.

A federal court may abstain from a Section 1983 due-process claim when unsettled state-law questions determine whether the plaintiff has a property interest and state resolution could moot the federal claim.

Runyan v. Board of Education of the Covington Exempted Village School District · filed 1985-04-02

Favorable resolution in state court of the unsettled questions of Ohio law presented by Plaintiffs lawsuit may establish Plaintiffs property rights. In addition, such resolution is also likely to give Plaintiff precisely what he seeks, the ability to exhaust his accumulated sick leave as he wishes. ... Having found that abstention is proper in this case, the Court hereby sustains that portion of Defendant’s motion which urged that this Court abstain from considering the instant case.

Section 1983 actions are subject to Pullman abstention when resolving an unsettled state-law question may eliminate the federal constitutional claim.

Brown v. Tidwell · filed 1999-02-17

Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested at oral argument that Pullman abstention is inappropriate in a Section 1983 action. The doctrine has been applied regularly in such actions, however.

Section 1983 claims do not prevent Pullman abstention when abstention is otherwise appropriate.

Eva Kollsman, City National Bank, Tashi Land Corporation, a New York Corporation v. City of Los Angeles, a Municipal Cor · filed 1984-07-17

Nor does the fact that Kollsman also raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alter our conclusion that abstention is appropriate.

A district court may abstain from hearing a § 1983 racial housing discrimination claim when effective state remedies are available.

Rosalyn Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. · filed 1968-06-26

Although plaintiffs argue, however, that the instant action was brought in this court prior to the enactment, on April 11, 1968, of the new Civil Rights Act, it remains the opinion of this Court that even under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, jurisdiction of the instant action should be declined. ... Regarding plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination based on race, this Court adheres to its prior decision.

Section 1983 provides a federal forum for people alleging that their constitutional rights were violated.

NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District · filed 1981-07-16

On the contrary, § 1983 evinces a strong congressional policy of providing a federal forum to those alleging a violation of their rights under the United States Constitution.

A court may decline to hear a § 1983 request to intervene in pending state custody proceedings when state appeals remain pending and no Younger exception is shown.

Dewyse v. Smith · filed 1982-02-25

Similar to the facts of Huffman, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the state court appellate proceedings through the institution of this § 1983 cause of action. In view of Huffman this Court is loathe to entertain this action unless Plaintiff establishes that early intervention is justified under all of the exceptions recognized in Younger. ... It does not appear that the extraordinary circumstances envisioned by Younger are present in this case.

Section 1983 suits remain subject to Pullman abstention despite the rule against mandatory exhaustion of state administrative remedies.

Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. v. Harding · filed 1984-08-23

Application of the Pullman abstention doctrine in a § 1983 suit is not affected by Patsy.

A § 1983 equal-protection claim challenging classifications affecting only economic interests fails when the legislative distinctions are rational and not invidious.

Hess v. St. Joseph Police Pension Fund · filed 1985-04-04

Where purely economic interests are involved, there appears to be neither reason nor authority for the court to conclude that the General Assembly in 1967 engaged in unconstitutional classification when it enacted legislation differing from and inapplicable to existing, reasonable local employee pension plans. Nor was the City of St. Joseph constitutionally required to change the police officers’ pension plan to bring it into conformity with a subsequent plan adopted for the benefit of other city employees.

A regulation challenged through § 1983 satisfies substantive due process when it is not arbitrary or capricious and bears a rational connection to the governmental interest it promotes.

Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, Penrose Van Buskirk, Jr., Max A. Block, John Apple, John Sharman, Euclid C · filed 1987-04-24

The guarantee of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. ... Moreover, when presenting a due process challenge to a regulation, the challenging party must show that there is no rational connection between the regulation and the interest which the regulation promotes.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue state employees for gender discrimination carried out under color of state law.

Wyckoff v. Maryland · filed 2007-10-01

Gender discrimination by employees acting under color of state law is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim for failure to investigate, but inadequate investigations may support municipal liability under Monell.

Curkin v. The City of New York · filed 2020-09-21

Moreover, while the City is right that a failure to investigate is not cognizable as a freestanding claim under § 1983, DePippo, 2019 WL 1004152, at *18, it may still be considered as part of a Monell claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a failure to investigate without another recognizable constitutional right.

SHORT v. WEBB · filed 2019-09-20

To the extent that Short instead attempts to state a claim against Owens for her failure to investigate his PREA claim, the claim is also dismissed. ... Further, “an allegation of a failure to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to investigate or prosecute an offense.

Rolen v. City Brownfield TX · filed 2006-05-30

Failure to investigate or prosecute an offense does not give rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on officials’ failure to investigate an assault or prosecute its perpetrator without deprivation of a federal right.

Roberts v. Murphy · filed 1988-05-10

The essence of plaintiff’s grievance is the failure of the defendants to investigate the assault and prosecute its perpetrator. However, the Court is not aware of, and plaintiff has not directed its attention to, any authority giving plaintiff an enforceable right under federal law to have the matter investigated and prosecuted. Unless the defendants’ conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, the plaintiff cannot sustain an action under § 1983.

An inadequate police investigation does not itself deprive a person of a federally protected right actionable under Section 1983 unless another recognized constitutional right is implicated.

Gomez v. Whitney · filed 1985-04-09

The appellants claim that the right infringed was a due process right to have a full and fair police investigation into violence done against themselves or their children. However, we can find no instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right involved.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for inadvertent errors, honest mistakes, agency confusion, or negligence in a police investigation.

HUTCHINSON v. WHALEY Et Al. · filed 2015-09-21

Moreover, this Court has held that while a police officer’s investigation may be less than perfect, “inadvertent errors, honest mistakes, agency confusion, even negligence in the performance of official duties, do not warrant redress under 42 USC § 1983.”

Section 1983 imposes liability when a prison disciplinary proceeding gives constitutionally deficient advance notice that impairs the inmate's defense and supplies an inadequate written statement of the evidence and reasons for discipline.

Shango v. Jurich · filed 1985-04-10

In sum, the July 25 RDR was constitutionally deficient in the first ... Wolff ... requirement (the advance written notice of violation) and perhaps therefore in the second (because the inadequate notice may well have impaired Shango’s ability to call witnesses and otherwise to present his defense). But to complete the story, the third ... Wolff ... ingredient — the written statement of the AC — was constitutionally flawed as well.

When state law creates a liberty interest in good-time credits, prison officials must assess security concerns in good faith before denying an inmate the opportunity to call witnesses.

McFarland v. Cassady · filed 1986-01-07

To give meaning to an inmate’s right to call witnesses “unless unduly hazardous,” the assessment by prison officials of institutional security must be made in good faith.

A Section 1983 challenge to revocation of good-time credits fails when the disciplinary proceedings satisfy the due-process requirements of Wolff and Hill.

Bradshaw v. Lt. Harlan Edmonson, John Rees, Rebecca Cunningham, Robert Komer Jeanetta Lee, Eldon Cravins, and Lin · filed 1987-03-19

Plaintiff alleges that his procedural due process rights were violated when defendants revoked his good-time credits without sufficient evidence and without providing him with a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the punishment. ... Due process requirements were met as required under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), and King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.1985).

A Section 1983 prison-discipline claim fails when Wolff procedures were followed, some evidence supported guilt, and the resulting segregated confinement was proper.

Jordan v. Manzie · filed 1987-04-28

The disciplinary proceeding and the hearing officer's statement comported with the due process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-568 (1974) and Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Since the Wolff procedures were followed and a determination of guilt was properly made, plaintiff's transfer to segregated confinement was proper.

A § 1983 due-process challenge to prison discipline fails when some evidence in the record supports the disciplinary committee's finding.

Turney v. Gene Scroggy Faye Henry and R.W. Pershing · filed 1987-10-16

In our view the record contains some evidence of sexual assault and is sufficient to support the committee’s finding.

A prison disciplinary statement satisfies due process when it identifies the evidence relied on and finds confidential informants reliable; it need not disclose the confidential statements' contents.

Roberts v. Wilson · filed 1987-10-16

Plaintiff's disciplinary proceeding comported with the requirements of due process; the written statement of the Adjustment Committee sufficiently stated the evidence relied upon, and contained a finding by the committee that the confidential informants were reliable. ... A reference to the content of confidential statements in. the written report is not necessary; Wolff only requires that the fact of omission be noted in the record.

Prison disciplinary due process does not include the full Brady right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence when the inmate knew of the inconsistency, could question the witness, and suffered no prejudice.

Wise v. Carpenter · filed 1988-01-19

Under the principles established in Wolff, we reject Wise's contention that the full panoply of criminal trial rights flowing from Brady and its progeny apply to prisoners in disciplinary settings.

Section 1983 may provide relief to a prisoner disciplined under prison rules if the prisoner lacked notice of those rules.

Frazier v. Coughlin · filed 1988-06-29

While we have no quarrel with this legal principle as a basis for dismissing plaintiff’s October 26th claim, the district judge apparently did not consider Frazier’s claims based on the disciplinary charges brought against him on June 4, 1984, and on October 1, 1984, neither of which involved “criminal activity” such as possession of a controlled substance. As to those charges, therefore, if Frazier can prove that he lacked notice of the rules, he may have a valid claim for relief.

A prisoner does not state a § 1983 due process claim based on denial of a lower risk classification when no protected interest in that reduction exists and the disciplinary hearings provided notice and an opportunity to speak.

Doss v. Frederick, Prison Guard, Badge No. 3, W. Achtabowski, Prison Guard, M. Smith, 4-Block Hearing Officer and · filed 1988-07-27

In a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated his constitutional rights by filing false reports of misconduct and by failing to consider evidence at hearings on the charges. ... Liberally construing the pro se complaint, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and accepting the allegations as true, see Westlake v. Lucas, 538 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976), we agree that plaintiff failed to allege the deprivation of a protected interest. First, a prisoner has no protected interest in the reduction of his risk classification. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1978). Second, because plaintiff received notice of the hearings and was permitted to speak in his own defense, the hearings were adequate.

A federal court abuses its discretion by dismissing a Section 1983 action under Colorado River merely because parallel state litigation exists when no exceptional circumstances justify abstention.

Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land and Walter Wolf · filed 1985-04-10

On this appeal we review the trial court’s dismissal on abstention grounds of a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Holding that the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice was an abuse of discretion, we reverse and remand to the district court so that appellant may present its federal claims for complete resolution before a federal court.

The presence of a Section 1983 claim does not absolutely bar Colorado River abstention in favor of a parallel state proceeding.

Lumen Construction, Inc. v. Brant Construction Co. · filed 1985-12-30

Similarly, in this case, the presence of federal claims under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 2000d is an important factor to be weighed in the balance, but it does not pose an absolute bar.

Colorado River abstention may stay a duplicative § 1983 action when the parallel state case has reached judgment, adequately protects federal rights, and the federal suit risks collateral reexamination.

Oliver v. Fort Wayne Education Ass'n · filed 1987-06-09

We conclude that, in this case, the district court properly abstained because: the state court action has gone to judgment and it can adequately protect the plaintiffs’ federal rights; and the § 1983 suit may have been a method to collaterally attack a final state court judgment.

A city violates procedural due process by towing alleged nuisance vehicles from private property under an ordinance that affords no opportunity for a pre-towing hearing.

Kness v. City of Kenosha, Wis. · filed 1987-10-26

Section 7.126 of the Code of General Ordinances, even in conjunction with Chapter 68, Wis.Stats., does not provide any opportunity for a hearing prior to the towing of nuisance vehicles from private property. Therefore, the ordinance violates due process.

A Section 1983 plaintiff alleging police misconduct and a municipal policy condoning it generally may discover internal-affairs investigations of the incident and similar incidents involving the department or defendant officers.

Tyner v. City of Jackson · filed 1985-04-12

Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that as a general rule a plaintiff alleging unconstitutional misconduct by police officers and a municipal policy condoning such alleged misconduct is entitled to discovery of the internal affairs investigations conducted by the police department regarding the incident of which he complains and regarding other similar incidents involving the police department or the individual police officers about whom plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 excessive force plaintiffs may receive some discovery of police files to support a municipal pattern-and-practice claim when related incidents suggest more than an isolated event, but boilerplate allegations do not justify unlimited discovery.

Mason v. Stock · filed 1994-08-24

Although § 1983 excessive force plaintiffs should not be ahowed to conduct unlimited discovery of police files based on “boilerplate allegations,” Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir.1985), in a ease such as the present one, where there is a related case involving allegations of excessive force and the two cases do not clearly stand in isolation, plaintiff is entitled to some leeway, see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (distinguishing § 1983 cases involving “a single incident” of unconstitutional activity).

In § 1983 suits, police personnel and internal affairs files are discoverable with appropriate protections.

Wolfe v. Green · filed 2009-04-02

Thus, since 2003 it has been the law of this District, in § 1983 cases, that police officers’ personnel files and internal affairs files will be disclosed to plaintiffs’ counsel, with appropriate protections.

In a Section 1983 action brought in state court, federal rules govern discovery of police personnel files.

Zabala v. City of New York · filed 2011-06-06

Where an action is brought in state court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, discovery of police personnel files is governed by federal rules (Mann v Alvarez, 242 AD2d 318, 320 [2d Dept 1997]).

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity; an unspecified capacity is construed as official capacity.

Barrett v. Pat Lane, Mdoc Crp Agent · filed 1996-04-22

Absent a specification of capacity, a state official will be construed to be sued in his official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). A state official, however, is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Therefore, the defendant is not subject to suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages claims against state officials only in their individual capacities.

Woods v. Evatt · filed 1995-01-24

State officials may only be sued in their individual capacities if the plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages.

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Hafner v. Delano · filed 1994-08-10

Again, clear and binding precedent establishes that state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the ambit of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Ruh v. Samerjan · filed 1994-08-01

It is well-established, however, that state officials are not "persons" for the purposes of Sec. 1983 where the relief sought is monetary in nature.

State officials whose capacity is unspecified in the complaint are treated as sued in their official capacities and are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Taylor v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1993-06-16

We also note that Taylor did not state the capacity in which he was suing the defendants. They are, therefore, considered as sued in their official capacities, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989), and are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state corrections officer sued in her official capacity.

Miller-Bey v. Ms. Dorries · filed 1992-08-20

Initially, we note that to the extent Miller-Bey sued Dorries for acts performed in her official capacity, the defendant is not subject to suit for monetary damages in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or a state official sued in an official capacity as a person subject to damages liability.

Livingood v. Meece · filed 1991-11-12

It is now settled that neither a state, an entity with eleventh amendment immunity, nor a state official sued in his or her official capacity, is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and neither is subject to suit under the statute in federal court or state court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Justice v. Brown · filed 1991-02-11

State officers acting in their official capacities are not persons under section 1983 and cannot be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities when the plaintiff fails to plead an individual-capacity suit.

Bantu v. Linda Coleman, R. Finch · filed 1990-11-13

Under these circumstances, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for actions presumably taken in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials in their official capacities when the state has not consented to damages.

Williams v. Shettle · filed 1990-09-21

Therefore, because Indiana has not consented to damages in Sec. 1983 actions, see Ind. Code 34-4-16.7-3 (1982), no damages may be awarded against the defendants acting in their official capacities.

A Section 1983 damages claim against a state prison superintendent in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Jones v. Smith · filed 1986-02-20

We agree with the district court that ... is not apposite here, but hold that Jones’s damage claim against Superintendent Smith is barred by the eleventh amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 monetary damages against a state official in his official capacity because such a claim is effectively against the state entity.

Robinson v. Boyer · filed 1986-09-11

Assuming the violation of a constitutional right by Dr. Boyer, monetary damages against him in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

An official-capacity Section 1983 claim against a public agency requires evidence that an intentional impermissible or corrupt policy caused the constitutional deprivation.

Holloway v. Rogers · filed 1986-11-20

The record is barren of any evidence of “implementation of an intentional policy or a constitutional deprivation resulting from an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy” so as to find a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983.

In an official-capacity Section 1983 challenge to a state policy, the executive officer primarily responsible for implementing or enforcing the policy is a proper person defendant.

Oten v. Colorado Board of Social Services · filed 1987-04-09

The nature of the office held is the decisive factor in determining who is a proper party defendant in an official capacity action under § 1983. When, as here, the complaint attacks the validity of a statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy, the executive officer who is primarily responsible for implementing or enforcing its provisions is the proper party defendant in an official capacity suit.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar personal liability of individual prison officials sued for their own unconstitutional acts under § 1983.

Ross v. Coughlin · filed 1987-07-30

In this case Ross is suing individual prison officials, not the State of New York, and the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to their personal liability for their unconstitutional acts.

The Eleventh Amendment bars official-capacity § 1983 damages claims against state officials but permits prospective declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing violations of federal law.

Brennan v. Stewart · filed 1988-01-07

In this case, for example, the district court should have dismissed the official-capacity damage claims but retained jurisdiction over the official-capacity equitable ones.

Damages claims under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Hendrix v. Evans · filed 1989-03-15

Any and all damage claims against defendants in their official capacities are now DISMISSED under the mandates of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not allow money-damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not state actors for its purposes.

Robert Lee Boles, Jr. v. William Schnarrs v. Sisson Elton Scott Robert Brown · filed 1990-01-19

Finally, it is noted that to the extent the defendants were sued for money damages in their official capacities, the complaint was properly dismissed as the defendants are not state actors for Sec. 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Carson Lynn Brown, I v. Raymond Toombs, Acting Warden Carmen Palmer, R.U.M. Raymond E. Cotton, Rn · filed 1990-03-13

Finally, to the extent Brown sought monetary relief from the state defendants in their official capacity, the suit was properly dismissed. Defendants are not amenable to suit for money damages in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Martinez · filed 1990-03-30

Therefore, if plaintiff can only assert a damage claim, it cannot sue defendants in their official capacities, and insofar as it seeks to do so, summary judgment is granted for defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide money damages against state prison officials for actions taken in their official capacities.

Pearly L. Wilson v. Victor N. Kassicieh, Dr. Jerry Patton · filed 1990-04-04

As an initial matter, we note that Wilson is not entitled to money damages for any actions that the defendants took in their official capacities.

A state official sued in his official capacity is not a person subject to suit for monetary damages under Section 1983.

Latham v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Corrections Cabinet John T. Wigginton, Secretary · filed 1990-04-16

In addition, the suit against defendant Wigginton was correctly dismissed as, in his official capacity, he is not a "person" subject to suit for monetary damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, and a plaintiff must specify an individual-capacity claim to seek damages from them.

Murphy v. Lt. G. Bently Jeanette Rucker Thomas Anderson Al C. Parke · filed 1990-05-15

State officials are not subject to damages when sued in their official capacities. ... Even pro se plaintiffs must specify that they are suing state officials in their individual capacities in order to avoid dismissal on this ground.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against these school officials when sued in their official capacities.

Winokur v. Ann Arbor Public Schools · filed 1991-02-26

Finally, to the extent the defendants are sued in their official capacity, they are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state prison officials acting within the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties.

Scott v. Al C. Parke, Warden, Lt. Alma Overstreet, Lt. Glenn Bentley, Lt. David Hazelwood, C/o Chandra Doyle, Ric · filed 1991-03-28

In actuality, the defendants acted in their official capacity because the alleged wrongdoing fell within the apparent or authorized scope of their official duties. Therefore, defendants are clearly not subject to a suit for money damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Hyundai Motor America v. J.R. Huerta Hyundai, Inc. · filed 1991-04-05

In a section 1983 suit, monetary damages would be not allowed against state officials sued in their official capacities.

A § 1983 claim against a government official in an official capacity must allege that the challenged action was taken pursuant to an official policy; an admitted policy may be treated as pleaded by amendment.

Ziccarelli v. Leake · filed 1991-07-12

Such an allegation is necessary to allege a § 1983 action against a government official in his official capacity. ... Since the Department has already admitted that Ziccarelli was discharged pursuant to the official Department policy, we will not put the parties to that waste of effort and instead construe Count I as being amended to allege the Department’s policy in order to satisfy the Monell pleading requirement.

Section 1983 individual capacity claims need not be expressly pleaded when the complaint and course of proceedings give defendants sufficient notice of potential personal liability.

Yorktown Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Perales · filed 1991-10-28

In place of express pleading, we look to the totality of the complaint as well as the course of proceedings to determine whether the defendants were provided with sufficient notice of potential exposure to personal liability.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against state employees sued only in their official capacities.

Simpson v. M. Veech B. Sewell Mark George David Breeding Leslie Michael · filed 1991-11-26

Moreover, Simpson is not entitled to the monetary relief that he requests because there are no factual allegations in the complaint which might indicate that the defendants had acted in anything other than their official capacity as state employees.

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom causing the alleged constitutional injury for an official-capacity claim against a local government officer.

Harris v. Evans · filed 1992-05-01

To state a claim under section 1983 against Evans in his official capacity, and hence the Overland Park Police Department, plaintiffs must show that a policy or custom of the police department caused the infliction of their alleged constitutional injuries.

For damages claims under § 1983, a state, its agencies, and officials sued in their official capacities are not persons.

Weldon Eugene Wiggins, II v. James Rowland, Director, California Department of Corrections · filed 1993-07-02

A state, its agencies and officials sued in their official capacities are not considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). ... The district court properly dismissed Wiggins' claims against all defendants acting in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or damages claims against a state official in the official's official capacity.

Phillips v. Wiseman · filed 1993-07-20

A claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an official in the official's official capacity is not cognizable. ... A § 1983 suit against the State is likewise not cognizable.

A section 1983 claim against a public official in an official capacity is redundant when the complaint also asserts a section 1983 claim against the municipality.

Amati v. City of Woodstock, Ill. · filed 1993-08-10

Moreover, Beu is correct in noting that a section 1983 claim against a public official in his or her official capacity is redundant and unnecessary when the complaint also includes a section 1983 claim against the municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities.

Boswell v. Lundstrom · filed 1993-10-21

A state official is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official in his official capacity because that is a claim against the state.

Noel v. Paradis, 94-0175 (1994) · filed 1994-12-02

It is well established that a claim against a State official in his official capacity is a claim against the State, itself. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). ... The claim under Federal law is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Rhode Island has no cognate legislation, although claims arising under § 1983 may be litigated in this Court. Will v. Michigan, supra, is dispositive. So far as this is a claim under § 1983, it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state prison officials in their official capacities, but allows injunctive relief on otherwise valid official-capacity claims.

Robinson v. Illinois State Correctional Center · filed 1995-03-29

And although plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages on any valid official capacity claims he may assert — as such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and not cognizable under Section 1983 — he may seek injunctive relief.