42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit back pay for a procedurally defective discharge when the discharge was justified.

Laje v. R. E. Thomason General Hospital · filed 1982-01-14

Examining the results in these cases, and noting that none came to grips with Carey, the Wilson panel concluded that under the authority of Carey the plaintiff could not recover back pay or other benefits that would have accrued during the period following the procedurally improper discharge. This is the clearest and most direct statement on the issue in this circuit and we are bound to follow it. ... Accordingly, recovery of lost salary for the period August 18, 1972 to July 14, 1973, the balance of Dr. Laje’s contract, was inappropriate and must be eliminated from the award.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery for emotional distress absent a violation of constitutional rights.

Gonzalez v. Cortez · filed 2009-10-02

Although he alleged that he suffered mental anguish from the incident, he may not recover under § 1983 for emotional distress absent a violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven emotional distress, and a plaintiff’s own testimony may provide the required proof.

Winstead v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-02

In order for a plaintiff to recover such compensatory damages, he or she must have proof of the injury. ... While it is true, as the District notes, that plaintiffs offer nothing more than their own testimony as to the effect that the deprivation of their due process rights has had on their emotional state that is all that plaintiffs are required to offer in this circuit: ... It is therefore not appropriate to preclude plaintiffs from offering such testimony at trial.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress, even without proof of economic loss.

C.B. v. Sonora School District · filed 2011-09-30

The Supreme Court has stated that Section 1983 damages may include “impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” ... “[C]ompensatory damages may be awarded for humiliation and emotional distress established by testimony or inferred from the circumstances, whether or not plaintiffs submit evidence of economic loss or mental or physical symptoms.”

Section 1983 permits damages for emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself, but not for distress caused by a justified deprivation.

Contract Design Group, Inc. v. Wayne State University · filed 2015-12-16

“[M]ental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983,” although “the injury caused by a justified deprivation, including distress, is not properly compensable under § 1983.” ... The record does not establish that the jury found Murray’s deprivation to be justified, and trial testimony provides the requisite causation linking the deficient debarment procedure and Murray’s emotional distress.

Section 1983 permits emotional distress damages for the unconstitutional seizure of a pet.

Moreno v. Hughes · filed 2016-01-19

Thus, this Court must apply the federal common law and award emotional distress damages arising from Defendant’s unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs’ dog.

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act does not preclude a § 1983 action when plaintiffs accept the administrative educational placement and challenge a school board's separate residence determination that prevents implementation of it.

Catlin v. Ambach · filed 1986-09-04

Plaintiffs are not circumventing the administrative remedies that must be exhausted under EHA. The court is convinced by plaintiffs’ argument that they are perfectly satisfied with the COH’s determination as to placement and classification and that their “harm” comes only from the failure by the Board of Education to implement the decision of the COH, by a determination of non-residence made outside the COH. This case is properly before this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights.

Although the Education for All Handicapped Children Act precludes a § 1983 claim for violation of the Act itself, an independent § 1983 due-process challenge to state or local EHA procedures may be maintained.

Miener v. State Of Missouri · filed 1986-09-04

While the Supreme Court held in Smith that it was impermissible to bring a Sec. 1983 claim for violations of the EHA, it expressly did not resolve the question whether the EHA precludes a due-process challenge under Sec. 1983 to the procedures local and state agencies employ in the EHA context. ... This Court has since held that such claims may be maintained.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce procedural safeguards guaranteed only by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act when that Act's detailed remedial provisions show that such a remedy is inconsistent with congressional intent.

Hurry Ex Rel. Hurry v. Jones · filed 1983-03-24

This Court declines to do so, however, because of its view that under the circumstances in the present case, § 1983 is being used to enforce procedural safeguards guaranteed Plaintiffs only by virtue of the EAHCA, and the present weight of authority holds that the detailed remedial provisions of the Act indicate that a § 1983 action to enforce rights under the EAHCA would be wholly inconsistent with congressional intent.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain § 1988 attorneys’ fees when the EAHCA itself supplies the necessary relief.

Jane Doe, on Behalf of Her Minor Son, Dennis Doe, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Kennet · filed 1983-06-16

Since section 1983 was superfluous to plaintiff’s relief, it cannot be utilized for attorneys’ fees under section 1988.

The EAHCA’s comprehensive remedial scheme shows congressional intent to preclude enforcement of its rights through Section 1983.

Rollison v. Biggs · filed 1983-06-29

As a law of the United States, the EAHCA comes within the ambit of section 1983. ... Where, however, the statute itself sets forth sufficiently comprehensive remedial devices, such a legislative scheme indicates a congressional intent to preclude enforcement suits pursuant to section 1983. ... As such, the congressional intent to enforce EAHCA provisions through these organic measures rather than section 1983 is evident.

A claim that can be decided under the Education of the Handicapped Act cannot also support a separate § 1983 action merely by being labeled a due-process claim.

Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board Of Education · filed 1986-05-29

This claim simply invoked the Act. As stated by the Second Circuit in Bonar v. Ambach, "Where a claim may be decided under the terms of the [EAHCA], then no separate action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 may be obtained."

Preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause, when based on federal occupation of the field or conflict with federal goals, does not itself support a Section 1983 action or Section 1988 attorney’s fees.

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams · filed 1986-08-20

We thus come down on the side of the weight of authority that preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause--at least if based on federal occupation of the field or conflict with federal goals--will not support an action under Sec. 1983, and will not, therefore, support a claim of attorney's fees under Sec. 1988.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for a state actor's deprivation of a federal statutory right unless Congress expressly or through specific statutory evidence foreclosed private enforcement.

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1987-01-14

Under these cases, if there is a state deprivation of a “right” secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. ... In sum, we conclude that nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners’ § 1983 claim against respondent.

Parents may use § 1983 to enforce rights under the Education of the Handicapped Act or the federal Constitution because the EHA does not provide the exclusive remedy.

Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi · filed 1987-11-04

In light of this clear legislative history, we hold that parents are entitled to bring a Sec. 1983 action based on alleged violations of the EHA or the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the federal Constitution. Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that no private right of action could be maintained other than by way of an EHA suit. Plaintiffs may therefore pursue their Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for improper federal tax withholding under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3402 and 3403 because those statutes give employees no enforceable rights.

DiGiovanni v. City of Rochester · filed 1988-02-26

That aspect of DiGiovanni’s § 1983 claim which is premised on his “rights” under the federal tax withholding statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3402 and 3403, is dismissed. As previously discussed, those statutes simply do not vest DiGiovanni with any rights. They merely detail the obligations owed by the employer with respect to withholding, and provide that the employer may be liable to the Government for unpaid taxes if the withholding was improperly performed. The statutes do not vest in employees a right to have the withholding conducted properly.

Section 1983 enforces rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws, but does not provide a way to enforce a Section 1985(3) claim that creates no separate right.

Thillens, Inc. v. Fryzel · filed 1989-04-07

In turn that means such a claim is not enforceable via Section 1983 (which is also available only to enforce other rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for infringement of tribal self-government because that interest protects sovereign powers rather than individual rights.

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins · filed 1989-07-28

Because the right to tribal government protects the powers conferred upon the tribe, and not individual rights, it falls outside the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a violation of rights created by Title VII.

Trautvetter v. Quick · filed 1990-10-12

Ms. Trautvetter's § 1983 allegation cannot be referring to her Title VII right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace. "Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights. It supplies no remedy for violations of rights created by Title VII."

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created by Title VII.

Trautvetter v. Quick · filed 1990-11-01

Ms. Trautvetter's Sec. 1983 allegation cannot be referring to her Title VII right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act.

Mauricio and Dina Scokin, Individually and as Next Friend of Davina Scokin, a Minor v. The State of Texas · filed 1984-01-27

The Scokins also sought relief under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the district court’s denial of relief under both of these statutes. ... The court in Marvin H. also held that § 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle to enforce a violation of the EAHCA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to recover for violations of rights under the ADA.

Svendgard v. State · filed 2004-07-26

But Svendgard cannot recover for violations of ADA rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself create a property interest in a job promotion.

Shirokey v. Marth · filed 1992-02-26

The key issue in this case is whether Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code affords Shirokey a property interest in being promoted to the position of Fire Lieutenant in the city of Cleveland Heights. For the reasons that follow, we answer such query in the negative.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that officers obtained compelled statements and used them against the claimant at trial.

Bellamy v. Wells · filed 2008-02-29

Thus, § 1983 casts a wide net, and the undeniably Constitutional foundation of Miranda brings Bellamy’s allegations within that net. If Miranda alone were not enough, Bellamy has also made clear that he challenges the “extraction and use” in a criminal case of testimony that may have been compelled. This court finds that the fairest reading of the plain language at issue and the relevant Supreme Court precedent constrains this court to find that Bellamy’s pleadings state a cognizable claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights protected by federal statutes.

Casillas v. Daines · filed 2008-08-05

Since 1980, it has been settled that section 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of rights protected by a federal statute.

Section 1983 lets a person seek relief against someone acting under color of state law who deprives them of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Grammer v. John J Kane Regional · filed 2009-06-30

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a vehicle for imposing liability against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” ... If a plaintiff alleges a violation of a federal right as the basis of a § 1983 action, we must determine whether the applicable federal statute confers an individual right.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim for alleged IDEA violations when the parents received a due process hearing and the asserted rights are subject to review in the IDEA appeal.

School Board v. L.H. ex rel. D.H. · filed 2009-09-30

Similarly, L.H’s parents have alleged only violations of the IDEA as the basis for their § 1983 claim. Moreover, the violation of L.H.’s or the parents’ rights for which they seek redress pursuant to § 1983 are subsumed by the School Board’s appeal and will be determined after the Court makes a ruling on the merits of the School Board’s claims. Accordingly, the parents have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for disability-discrimination rights supplied solely by the ADA.

Lener v. Hempstead Public Schools · filed 2014-09-23

Therefore, to the extent Lener’s claim of disability discrimination is premised upon the substantive rights provided by the ADA, the claim is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to sue to enforce their rights to EPSDT services.

J.E. ex rel. Egan v. Wong · filed 2015-08-27

The only question before the Court, at this stage, is whether Medicaid recipients have a private cause of action to enforce their rights to EPSDT services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Court holds that Plaintiffs have a private cause of action under the Medicaid Act pursuant to which they may make these allegations.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for enforcing rights created by the IDEA.

J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area School District · filed 2008-02-22

On July 11, 2007, this Court, pursuant to the recent Third Circuit decision in A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., holding that the IDEA cannot be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dismissed counts IV and V of the Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce federal rights conferred elsewhere; it does not itself confer rights.

Brady v. School Board, Somersworth, et al. · filed 2016-11-03

Section 1983 does not confer rights but instead provides a statutory means to assert a violation of a federal right conferred elsewhere.

Section 1983 provides a way to bring claims against state actors for violations of § 1981.

Boxill v. O'Grady · filed 2019-08-16

Even though the district court erred in finding that Boxill could not use § 1983 as a vehicle to vindicate her rights under § 1981, her claim still fails.

For liability in affirmative-action cases, Section 1983 is analyzed identically to the Fourteenth Amendment.

31 Fair empl.prac.cas. 465, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,497 Hanson Bratton v. City of Detroit, and Guardians of Michigan, I · filed 1983-03-29

Because we find that, with regard to liability in affirmative action cases, the analysis under § 1983 is identical to that under the Fourteenth Amendment, we simply omit any discussion of § 1983 until we reach a consideration of the appellants’ claim for damages.

A race- and sex-conscious public-procurement program that is constitutionally permissible does not create liability under Section 1983.

Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken · filed 1983-08-12

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that P.A. 428 is constitutionally permissible and is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also determines that the Act does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981,42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ attack upon P.A. 428 is without merit.

Section 1983 may support a civil-rights claim when a state court fails to act on a post-conviction motion for a substantial period of time.

Pool v. Wyrick · filed 1983-04-06

The court below properly recognized that a failure to act on a Rule 27.26 motion for a substantial period of time may give rise to a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state court’s substantial delay in acting on a post-conviction motion may support a Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief.

McMillan v. Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Greene County · filed 1983-07-07

A state court’s failure to act on a petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief for a substantial period of time may give rise to a cognizable claim for injunctive... relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an offensive cause of action based solely on Supremacy Clause field-preemption principles.

Air Transport Association of America v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Defendants · filed 1987-11-30

Nor does the law of this circuit permit an offensive challenge to the state regulation as violative of supremacy clause principles via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because ATA’s claim, to the extent it is not based on 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a), must be considered as being based on federal preoccupation of the field.

Section 1983 does not encompass claims based strictly on federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause.

Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations · filed 1984-12-13

Nonetheless, the variance between the role of the Supremacy Clause and that of Section 1983 in the federal governmental scheme convinces us that Section 1983 does not encompass claims based strictly on preemption.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a claim based solely on the Supremacy Clause.

United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon · filed 1983-04-29

Constrained both by logic and by precedent, this Court must conclude that the assertion of a Supremacy Clause claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Preemption under the Supremacy Clause alone does not support a Section 1983 damages remedy.

Pirolo v. City of Clearwater · filed 1983-08-12

The sole cause of the unconstitutionality was the supremacy clause. Therefore Pirolo is not entitled to a § 1983 remedy for enforcement of the ordinances.

Federal preemption grounded in the Supremacy Clause concerns governmental power rather than individual rights and therefore does not support a Section 1983 claim.

Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, a Municipal Corporation, Jean Chormicle Kapp v. City of Cathedral City, Californi · filed 1987-04-02

There we held that preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause — being grounded not on individual rights but instead on considerations of power — will not support an action under section 1983, and will not, therefore, support a claim for attorneys’ fees under section 1988. ... We find this case substantially indistinguishable from ... Williams, ... and therefore hold that appellants have not stated a claim for relief under section 1983 and may not recover attorneys’ fees under section 1988.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an alleged violation of the Supremacy Clause.

Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner · filed 1989-04-19

The court, however, in its independent research has determined that a claim under the supremacy clause is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on federal preemption of local ordinances under the Supremacy Clause.

Maryland Pest Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County · filed 1989-09-08

We hold that federal preemption of local ordinances pursuant to the Supremacy Clause is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for violations of the Commerce Clause.

Dennis v. State · filed 1990-02-16

Despite the broad language of § 1983 and the fact that there appears to be a division of authority on the question as to whether there is a cause of action under § 1983 for violations of the commerce clause, we believe the better reasoned cases hold that there is no cause of action under § 1983 for violations of the commerce clause.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a Commerce Clause violation.

Georgia Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Alabama Real Estate Commission · filed 1990-08-16

As the Court finds that plaintiffs are the prevailing party only on their claim asserted under the Commerce Clause, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 1988 as a Commerce Clause violation is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits to redress violations of the Commerce Clause.

Dennis v. Higgins · filed 1991-02-20

We conclude that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred in holding that petitioner’s Commerce Clause claim could not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff alleging a Commerce Clause violation to proceed with a civil rights claim.

Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn. · filed 1992-02-14

The Court has found that the Counties’ Designation Ordinances violate the Commerce Clause. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that Commerce Clause plaintiffs could proceed under § 1983. Dennis v. Higgins, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 865, 872, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991). Therefore, the court believes it is inappropriate to grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits Commerce Clause claims, including in cases pending on direct review when that rule was announced.

Bfi Medical Waste Systems v. Whatcom County · filed 1993-01-15

In Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), the Supreme Court held that Commerce Clause violations are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). ... Dennis did apply the new rule retroactively. See Dennis, 498 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 873. We must therefore do the same.

Section 1983 permits Commerce Clause plaintiffs to pursue claims for violations of their Commerce Clause rights.

Waste Systems Corp. v. County Of Martin · filed 1993-02-18

The Supreme Court has held that Commerce Clause plaintiffs can proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991). We have found that the Counties' Ordinances violate the Commerce Clause. Therefore, we affirm the district court's holding that granting the Counties' motion for summary judgment is inappropriate. We remand for further proceedings on Waste Systems' § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits suits for violations of the Commerce Clause because it confers rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the section.

Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Louisiana State Tax Commission · filed 1993-07-02

Further, the Supreme Court has recently held that since the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution confers “rights, privileges or immunities” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, suits for violation of the commerce clause may be brought under § 1983. ... We conclude, therefore, that Rowan’s petition factually stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and since it prevailed on the merits of that cause of action, § 1988 is applicable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim premised on a violation of the Supremacy Clause through preemption.

Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus · filed 1993-10-22

The court also notes that a section 1983 claim premised on a violation of the supremacy clause through preemption is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of the Supremacy Clause.

Washington Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Public Utility District No. 3 · filed 1994-08-25

A violation of the supremacy clause does not give rise to a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims for Commerce Clause violations.

Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis · filed 1995-02-01

Commerce Clause violations are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of the Commerce Clause.

National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer · filed 1995-08-23

The district court erred in dismissing NSWM's § 1983 claim as it related to the "effective siting” and "formal rulemaking” provisions of the Wisconsin statute; its decision that these provisions violated the Commerce Clause entitled NSWM to § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a Supremacy Clause violation premised on federal preemption.

Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus · filed 1996-02-27

In regard to attorneys fees, a claim premised on a violation of the Supremacy Clause through preemption is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim against a county for violating the dormant Commerce Clause.

Poor Richard's Inc. v. Ramsey County, Minn. · filed 1996-03-20

Plaintiffs’ claim for damages arising from the revocation of their hauler’s license is cognizable under section 1983, Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451, 111 S.Ct. 865, 873, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), and plaintiffs have established the County’s liability.

Section 1983 supports claims based on violations of the Commerce Clause.

Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County · filed 1996-03-28

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451, 111 5.Ct. 865, 872-73, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), it is clear that § 1983 supports such claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of the Contract Clause.

Andrews v. Anne Arundel County, Md. · filed 1996-05-31

I decline, however, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and despite the cogency of plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, to rule on the basis of a forecast that the Supreme Court will at its first opportunity expressly overrule Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322, 5 S.Ct. 928, 930-31, 29 L.Ed. 202, 204 (1885) (no § 1983 claim lies for a Contract Clause violation). Accordingly, judgment shall be entered in favor of the County on this issue.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on Supremacy Clause preemption.

Baskin v. Bath Township Board of Zoning Appeals · filed 1996-11-21

The fact that the district court found that the height/location requirement was, on the hearing board's record, not a reasonable accommodation and therefore preempted, does not create a basis for a section 1983 action. A claim premised solely on Supremacy Clause preemption "is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of the Contract Clause.

Andrews v. Anne Arundel County · filed 1997-06-13

... found that the plaintiffs could not receive attorneys fees because there is no cause of action available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Contract Clause. ... Our review of the record and the appropriate legal standards in this case persuades us that the decision of the district court was correct. We therefore affirm the judgment on the reasoning set forth in the dis- trict court's extensive and careful memorandum opinion.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for federal preemption premised on a violation of the Supremacy Clause.

Soo Line Railroad v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1998-05-21

Because the Court does not reach the merits of CPR’s Commerce Clause claim, and a federal preemption claim premised upon a violation of the Supremacy Clause is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, CPR’s request for damages and attorney’s fees is denied.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts Clause.

Kilbourn v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n · filed 1998-05-28

However, a violation of the Contracts Clause does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging violations of the Contract Clause.

TM Park Avenue Associates v. Pataki · filed 1999-03-25

The Court, therefore, finds that alleged violations of the Contract Clause can be brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on Supremacy Clause preemption when preemption rests on federal occupation of a field or conflict with federal goals.

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams · filed 1984-02-07

We thus come down on the side of the weight of authority that preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause — at least if based on federal occupation of the field or conflict with federal goals — will not support an action under § 1983, and will not, therefore, support a claim of attorney’s fees under § 1988.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a dormant Commerce Clause claim.

Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Kassel · filed 1984-03-27

We therefore hold that Sec. 1983 does not provide a remedy for a dormant Commerce Clause claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a dormant Commerce Clause claim.

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel · filed 1984-03-27

We therefore hold that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for a dormant Commerce Clause claim.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by the Contracts Clause.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana · filed 2003-07-14

The right of a party not to have a State, or a political subdivision thereof, impair its obligations of contract is a right secured by the first article of the United States Constitution. A deprivation of that right may therefore give rise to a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a Supremacy Clause claim only when the plaintiff identifies a statute that creates an enforceable federal right.

Planned Parenthood of Central Texas v. Sanchez · filed 2003-08-04

To raise a Supremacy Clause argument under section 1983, a plaintiff must first assert a statute that creates an enforceable right under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on federal preemption of a local ordinance under the Supremacy Clause.

Maryland Pest Control Association v. Montgomery County, Maryland · filed 1989-09-08

We hold that federal preemption of local ordinances pursuant to the Supremacy Clause is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 gives market participants a cause of action for violations of their Commerce Clause rights.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez · filed 2002-12-26

Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that plaintiffs as market participants indeed have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the Commerce Clause.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to bring dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state laws.

Brooks v. Vassar · filed 2006-09-11

In sum, we affirm the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs may bring their Commerce Clause challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; we reverse the district court’s judgment holding unconstitutional the Per- sonal Import Exception and the ABC Stores Restriction; and we dis- miss as moot the appeal and cross-appeal insofar as these appeals relate to provisions of the ABC laws amended by the Virginia legisla- ture effective July 1, 2006, vacate the relevant judgment of the district court, and remand with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenges to these provisions.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to bring dormant Commerce Clause challenges.

Brooks v. Vassar · filed 2006-09-11

Finally, with respect to the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs in this case are entitled to maintain their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore qualify for an award of attorneys fees if they are the prevailing party, as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we affirm.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for Supremacy Clause violations.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Tolson · filed 2007-02-20

Defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to make a Supremacy Clause claim, because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for Supremacy Clause violations. Defendant is correct as to the scope of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a Supremacy Clause preemption claim.

Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez · filed 2007-03-01

In this case, the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs’ Supremacy Clause claim was not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to assert a Commerce Clause claim when they allege that officials acting under color of state law deprived them of a federal right.

Colorado Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Pueblo County · filed 1993-03-11

To assert a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law and that the defendant’s action deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the federal constitution or federal laws. ... Because plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for asserting a § 1983 claim, we conclude they have standing.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging Establishment Clause violations; its scope is not limited to civil rights or equal protection laws.

Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners · filed 2009-06-08

The Establishment Clause protects religious liberty no less than the Free Exercise Clause does. ... And the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that § 1983’s scope is limited to civil rights or equal protection laws.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging Establishment Clause violations.

Green v. Haskell County · filed 2009-06-08

And the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that § 1983’s scope is limited to civil rights or equal protection laws. ... In that light, it is unsurprising that both the Supreme Court and this court repeatedly have, without comment, decided § 1983 actions alleging Establishment Clause violations.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for bringing a dormant Commerce Clause claim.

LIBERTY DISPOSAL, INC. v. Scott · filed 2009-08-26

As a preliminary matter, although Plaintiffs attempt to erroneously bring this action directly under the Constitution, the proper procedural vehicle for asserting this dormant Commerce Clause claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 can be used to bring Establishment Clause claims in federal court.

American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport · filed 2010-12-20

UHPA asserts that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Establishment Clause claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court, however, has previously rejected that argument.

Section 1983 permits a Contracts Clause claim when a state denies access to adjudication or an adequate remedy, but not for an alleged contract impairment in the first instance.

Crosby v. City of Gastonia · filed 2011-03-10

As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Carter, then, recourse to § 1983 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Contracts Clause is limited to the discrete instances where a ... state has denied a citizen the opportunity to seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a constitutional impairment of a contract has occurred, or has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an established impairment. Section 1983 provides no basis to complain of an alleged impairment in the first instance.

Section 1983 permits a Contracts Clause claim when a state official changes contract terms rather than merely breaches the contract.

Welch v. Brown · filed 2013-03-29

Defendants next argue, based on a Fourth Circuit case, that “§ 1983 actions are limited to the discrete instances where a state has denied a citizen the opportunity to seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a constitutional impairment of a contract has occurred.” ... Because the terms of the contracts have been altered by Defendant Brown, Plaintiffs are foreclosed from bringing a breach of contract claim. The instant case is thus precisely the sort of case in which a claim for impairment of contract is appropriate. ... Accordingly, the Court does not find Defendants’ argument persuasive.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on the Supremacy Clause because that clause does not create substantive individual rights.

PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian · filed 2013-09-30

To the extent that Plaintiffs have not abandoned that claim, the Court finds it merit-less because the Fourth Circuit has “held that the Supremacy Clause is not a source of substantive individual rights that could support an action brought pursuant to Section 1983.” Md. Pest Control Ass’n v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 884 F.2d 160, 162-63 (4th Cir.1989) (per curiam).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an alleged Contracts Clause violation.

Kaminski v. Coulter · filed 2017-07-25

We join the Fourth Circuit and hold that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for Supremacy Clause violations.

St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Lindley-Myers · filed 2017-12-18

But preemption claims—the sole prevailing legal theory—are not fee-generating, because § 1983 does not provide a remedy for Supremacy Clause violations.

Section 1983 permits a private action for a Contracts Clause violation.

Watters v. Board of School Directors of the City of Scranton · filed 2019-08-22

Finding on this basis that Plaintiffs have a private right of action to bring a Contracts Clause violation under § 1983, the Court will now turn to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot identify a “contractual right” protected by the Contracts Clause (Doc. 11 at 21).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an alleged Contracts Clause violation.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UAW) and UAW L · filed 2020-10-01

Plaintiffs’ recourse for an alleged contractual impairment is to seek enforcement of the collective bargaining agreements, not a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a settlement credit against compensatory damages for an indivisible injury, but not against punitive damages.

Goad v. MacOn County, Tenn. · filed 1989-09-28

First, however, the court concludes at step three of the analysis that applying Tennessee created set-offs to compensatory damage awards does not create any inconsistency with 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, the court will not apply a settlement set-off against the punitive damage awards against defendants Bilbrey and Mercer.

Section 1983 allows a settlement credit against a nonsettling joint tortfeasor's damages in proportion to the injury caused by the settling tortfeasor, rather than as a dollar-for-dollar reduction.

Dobson v. D.R. Camden · filed 1983-05-26

We hold that the dual policies of section 1983, compensation and deterrence, allow credit for a settlement by a joint tortfeasor in proportion to the amount of the injury caused by that tortfeasor; thus, if a settling tortfeasor is found to have caused one-third of the plaintiff’s damage, a nonsettling tortfeasor is entitled a credit of one-third of the amount of damages found by the jury, regardless the amount of the settlement.

Section 1983 permits a settlement setoff under applicable state law for the same indivisible injury because its damages remedy compensates actual loss without allowing double recovery.

Hoffman v. McNamara · filed 1988-07-06

Allowing double recovery would conflict with § 1983’s basic purpose — to provide compensation, not a windfall. Thus allowing a set-off here is consistent with both purposes of § 1983. A set-off will, therefore, be allowed in this case consistent with Connecticut law.

A state custodial institution's special relationship with a former juvenile inmate who remains a day student can support Section 1983 liability when deliberate indifference or gross negligence exposes the student to known private violence and causes injury.

Riddle by and Through Brewster v. Innskeep · filed 1987-12-23

As a former inmate at the Rehabilitation Center and as a day student, Riddle had a special relationship with the Center. If, in failing to follow their own policies regarding preplacement interviews, and in failing to transfer Jeff Joseph after discovering his violent propensities, it can be said (viewing the totality of the circumstances) that the defendants’ failures to act amounted to deliberate indifference or gross negligence, then they will be liable to the plaintiffs under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a right to state protection against private criminals, although an affirmative-protection right may arise from a special custodial or other relationship created or assumed by the state.

Fox v. Custis · filed 1983-07-13

The qualification--an important one actually acknowledged by the Bowers court, id.--is that such a right and corollary duty may arise out of special custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state in respect of particular persons. ... Without attempting a general definition of the special relationship required to give rise to a right, vindicable under § 1983, to affirmative protection by the state, it suffices to observe that none is claimed or appears here.

Protective-service caseworkers are not liable under Section 1983 for negligent or inadvertent failure to protect a child in a special state relationship; the plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference.

Jensen v. Conrad · filed 1983-08-24

It is important to realize, however, the mere failure of protective service caseworkers to follow these procedures and offer appropriate protection due to negligence or inadvertence, even in light of this special relationship, does not state a claim under § 1983. To establish liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress violations of the constitutionally protected right to bodily privacy, including an unreasonable strip search.

Creamer v. Raffety · filed 1984-12-27

The right to bodily privacy is constitutionally protected, and violations of that right may be redressed in a § 1983 cause of action.

Unemployment compensation is a collateral source that may not be offset against a Section 1983 back-pay award when tort damages principles apply.

Collins v. Robinson · filed 1983-08-03

Unemployment compensation payments clearly constitute a collateral source. ... They may not be offset in favor of a tort-feasor.

Section 1983 damages follow the common law collateral source rule, so insurance payments do not reduce the defendant’s liability.

Gill v. MacIejewski · filed 2008-11-04

We first note “[t]he collateral source rule applies to § 1983 actions.”

Section 1983 damages are subject to the common law collateral source rule, so insurance payments do not reduce a defendant’s liability.

Gill v. Geoff Maciejewski, etc. · filed 2008-11-04

We first note "[t]he collateral source rule applies to § 1983 actions." ... Thus, the district court correctly applied the common law collateral source rule.

Section 1983 claims against state National Guard officers challenging personnel decisions incident to military service are barred by the Feres doctrine.

Nyberg v. State Military Department · filed 2003-03-31

To the extent Feres protects federal military personnel from Bivens claims, it should also shield state military officers from constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a National Guard member to challenge a discharge incident to military service when the Feres doctrine makes the claim non-justiciable.

Uhl v. Swanstrom · filed 1996-04-04

Upon de novo review, we find ourselves equally reluctant, yet legally bound, to hold that plaintiff's claims in the present case are non-justiciable under the Feres doctrine.

Section 1983 does not provide a justiciable damages claim for a National Guard member’s injuries arising from activity incident to military service.

Towne v. North Dakota National Guard · filed 1995-04-25

Towne's claim against the National Guard, whether properly construed as arising under section 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 2 or Bivens, 3 is nonjusticiable because his allegations involve injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."

Military immunity bars damages under § 1983 for a service member’s constitutional claims against superior officers arising from military discipline or discharge, but a claim for reinstatement may proceed.

United States Ex Rel. Karr v. Castle · filed 1990-08-31

It follows plaintiff’s claims based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 for money damages are barred. ... Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims for money damages against all defendants will be granted, but will be denied as to plaintiff’s claim for reinstatement.

Intramilitary immunity bars a § 1983 civil-rights conspiracy claim based on a National Guard personnel decision.

Watson v. Clark · filed 1990-08-02

This court has held open the possibility that there still may be a case in which a serviceman may bring suit because their constitutional or statutory rights have been violated by their superiors. Christofferson v. Washington, 855 F.2d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1988). Watson's fifth cause of action is not one that would fit the possible exception. The essential conspiracy charged in violation of Watson's civil rights is the termination of his employment in the National Guard. A personnel decision of this kind is peculiarly within the competence of the military. It is not a decision to be reviewed by this court. Id. at 1441-45.

Section 1983 does not create liability by military superiors for alleged transgressions against the rights of other military personnel.

Martelon v. Temple · filed 1984-11-08

Before the passage of Sec. 1983, there was no liability on the part of military superiors for transgressions against the rights of other military personnel. By the passage of Sec. 1983, Congress never intended to create such rights. ... The plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim has no merit.

A Section 1983 claim challenging an Army National Guard personnel assignment is nonjusticiable when adjudication would require a civilian court to review military assignment decisions.

Martelon v. Walker · filed 1983-08-05

I find and conclude that Martelon’s claim seeking relief for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raises issues not appropriate for determination in this court. A federal trial judge is not competent to review decisions of Army National Guard officers in assigning personnel, at least in the circumstances here presented.

Section 1983 money-damages claims by National Guard members against superior officers for alleged constitutional violations are barred when they would invite judicial review of intraservice military decisions.

Crawford v. Texas Army National Guard, Bruce A. Olson v. Texas Army National Guard · filed 1986-07-23

Consequently, appellants’ requests for money damages, to the extent they are based upon alleged constitutional violations and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are precluded by ... Chappell.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against National Guard superiors for an allegedly unconstitutional denial of reenlistment, but does not allow damages against those superiors for the military personnel dispute.

Spence v. Holesinger · filed 1988-07-29

This Court agrees with the Jorden majority that the implication of the citations by the Chappell Court is that, although some non-damage constitutional claims involving the military may remain viable, damage claims do not. ... For this reason, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against the individual Defendants is GRANTED. ... Therefore, although the answer is not crystal clear, this Court believes that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be allowed to stand, and that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground should be DENIED.

Section 1983 claims by National Guard personnel challenging military retention decisions may be nonreviewable under the Mindes military reviewability test.

Christoffersen v. Washington State Air National Guard · filed 1988-08-31

Even assuming that Chappell does not bar section 1983 actions by military personnel, we find the particular claims raised by appellants are nonreviewable.

Section 1983 claims for injuries incident to military service fall within the Feres doctrine and are barred.

Watson v. Clark · filed 1989-06-23

Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are properly within the scope of the Feres doctrine.

Section 1983 does not provide damages or injunctive relief to National Guard personnel challenging military personnel decisions by their superiors when those claims are nonjusticiable under Chappell.

Lovell v. Heng · filed 1989-11-17

Therefore, we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Chappell bars not only appellant's claim for damages but also his claim for injunctive relief. Appellant's claims are thereby dismissed as nonjusticiable.

Section 1983 claims for injuries arising from activity incident to military service are nonjusticiable under the Feres doctrine.

Wood v. United States · filed 1992-07-06

Under the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S.Ct. 153, 159, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, negligence claims, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Bivens 2 claims are nonjusticiable if they involve injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Watson v. Arkansas Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1005-08 (8th Cir.1989) (discussing cases that apply the Feres doctrine).

In the Eighth Circuit, § 1983 claims challenging discharge from the National Guard and related mandatory termination of civilian technician employment are nonjusticiable.

Becker v. Rice · filed 1993-07-07

With respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim for termination of her civilian status, the court finds that it is also nonjusticiable. ... As the court may not hear plaintiffs claim that she was wrongfully discharged from her military duty with the National Guard, and discharge from her federal technician position is mandatory upon termination from the Guard with an appeal only to the Adjunct General, the court finds that it may afford the plaintiff no judicial relief on her § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit National Guard members to recover damages from their military superiors for alleged constitutional deprivations.

Introini v. South Carolina National Guard · filed 1993-07-29

In accord with what appears to be the unanimous view of the courts that have considered the issue, this court holds that Introini cannot sue his military superiors for damages under § 1983 for alleged constitutional deprivations. Chappell’s logic and rationale plainly foreclose any such claim.

Section 1983 actions seeking equitable relief against military defendants are governed by the Mindes reviewability test rather than the Chappell and Stanley bar applicable to Bivens damages actions.

Scott v. Rice · filed 1993-09-23

With respect to the application of the intramilitary immunity doctrine to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.s 1983, we reject the district court's conclusion that Chappell and Stanley compel dismissal in this case. ... Having endorsed the Mindes test, we must apply it-not Chappell or Stanley-to determine the reviewability of non-Bivens actions against military defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a justiciable claim against National Guard personnel for service-connected actions taken by military superiors.

Hunt v. TX Army Natl Guard · filed 1995-08-03

As noted above, Hunt's claims attack the service-connected conduct of her military supervisors. Accordingly, we find that Hunt's § 1983 claims are not justiciable.

Section 1983 affords no civil-rights damages remedy to a dismissed National Guard technician whose dual military and civilian position is essentially martial.

Quiñones-Cruz v. Diaz-Colon · filed 1997-03-26

In the Wright case, 5 F.3d at 589-90, the First Circuit found a fired National Guard technician without a Bivens or § 1983 remedy in a suit for civil rights damages. There are no relevant facts that distinguish the instant ease from the Wright ease, so our duty here is clearly defined, invalidating the plaintiffs section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a National Guard officer to seek monetary or injunctive relief against former military superiors for alleged constitutional violations arising from an internal personnel decision.

Bradley v. Stump · filed 1997-03-28

For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims for monetary and injunctive relief against his former military superiors for alleged constitutional violations are nonjusticiable and therefore plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not permit state National Guard members to recover damages from superior officers for conduct arising from their Guard service.

Grant v. Shubuck · filed 1997-10-03

That evolution of cases stands for the proposition that § 1983 damages actions by members of a state National Guard arising out of their activities in that capacity are not renewable by the courts.

Section 1983 permits a National Guard member to seek reinstatement for an alleged constitutional violation arising from military service.

Wigginton v. Centracchio · filed 2000-03-13

We are satisfied, nonetheless, that in ruling — contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s assessment — that Major Wigginton’s suit was justiciable, the District Court was correct in concluding that Wright v. Park is not a bar to a guardsman’s reinstatement suit, whether brought against federal actors or, as in the case at bar, against state actors pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 claims by enlisted personnel against the military for injuries incident to service are nonjusticiable, whether they seek damages or injunctive relief.

Marvin K. Speigner, Jr. v. Alexander · filed 2001-04-24

Therefore, we now hold that cases brought by enlisted personnel against the military for injuries incident to service are nonjusticiable, whether the claims request monetary damages or injunctive relief.

Section 1983 plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must plead and prove that the underlying criminal charges lacked probable cause.

Hartman v. Moore · filed 2006-04-26

The Courts of Appeals have divided on the issue of requiring evidence of a lack of probable cause in 42 U. S. C. §1983 and Bivens retaliatory-prosecution suits. ... Because showing an absence of probable cause will have high probative force, and can be made mandatory with little or no added cost, it makes sense to require such a showing as an element of a plaintiff’s case, and we hold that it must be pleaded and proven.

A § 1983 plaintiff claiming retaliatory prosecution must allege and prove a lack of probable cause, even when the defendant officers initiated the grand jury proceedings themselves.

Barnes v. Wright · filed 2006-06-02

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Moore to resolve this split amongst the circuits, and while this case was pending on appeal the Court recently held that “want of probable cause must be alleged and proven” by a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 or Bivens suit for retaliatory prosecution. ... The concerns regarding the intervening actions of a prosecutor do not apply in this case, because the officers themselves initiated the grand jury proceedings against Barnes. ... Regardless of the reasoning, it is clear that the Hartman rule modifies our holdings in McCurdy and Greene and applies in this case.

In a § 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest or prosecution claim, an official’s retaliatory motive and the absence of probable cause suffice to overcome the presumption that the prosecutor’s decision broke the causal chain.

Beck v. City of Upland · filed 2008-05-28

We hold, first, that to the degree Smiddy I could be understood under our case law to apply to a First Amendment-based retaliatory arrest or prosecution cause of action, Smiddy I is inconsistent with Hartman and cannot stand. In such cases, we will not separately inquire, through application of a presumption or otherwise, into the prosecutor’s actual state of mind. Instead, a showing of a “retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor’s decision” will suffice to rebut the presumption of regularity and settle the causation issue.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 retaliatory prosecution claim must allege that probable cause did not support the underlying charge; a conviction is irrelevant to that requirement.

Williams v. Davis · filed 2015-07-23

Whether a person is convicted of a crime is irrelevant to the inquiry; to state a retaliatory prosecution claim, a plaintiff must allege that probable cause did not support the underlying charge.

A Section 1983 retaliatory prosecution claim accrues when the criminal charge is filed, rather than when it is dismissed or a conviction is overturned.

Ajster v. Towne · filed 2018-07-19

The Seventh Circuit has squarely held that a claim for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment accrues when the charge is instituted, not when it is dismissed or a resulting conviction is overturned. See Gekas v. Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court dismisses Count 2 for this reason and thus need not address the defendants' other arguments for dismissal.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a subjective chill of speech caused by a threat of embarrassment without a threat of tangible action affecting employment status.

Samad v. Donald M. Jenkins the University of Akron, School of Law John Doe I John Doe II Board of Trustees of · filed 1988-05-06

We affirm, therefore, the decision of the district court that a mere threat of embarrassment, absent a threat to take action tangibly affecting employment status, is not actionable under § 1983.

Public officials sued under § 1983 lacked qualified immunity for retaliating against a public employee's protected speech outside the workplace, but retained immunity for internal office communications before that protection was clearly established.

Greenberg v. Kmetko · filed 1987-02-05

In the case at bar, therefore, it should have been clear to defendants Kmetko and Weflen that Greenberg could not be penalized for statements made outside the office. ... Thus, qualified immunity does shield the defendants in the present case from liability for penalizing the plaintiff for first amendment communications made within the office.

A prisoner meets the initial burden for a religious-exercise claim by proving that the asserted beliefs are sincerely held and religious in nature.

Anthony W. Martinelli, Cross-Appellant v. Richard L. Dugger, Mrs. Ana Gispert, Cross-Appellees, Lt. T. Mowery, Sgt. E. S · filed 1987-06-01

A claimant meets this initial burden, therefore, if he or she proves that the beliefs are truly held and religious in nature.

Prisoners retain free-exercise rights, including a right to food that sustains health while satisfying sincere religious dietary laws, subject to legitimate security and correctional interests.

McElyea Jr. v. Governor Bruce Babbitt · filed 1987-11-30

Inmates also have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.

A prison policy restricting religious exercise is valid in a § 1983 action if reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest; it need not be the least restrictive alternative.

Lane v. J.H. Griffin, and Muhammad Nubee, Chaplain, Rae McNamara Director of Prisons, James Woodard, Secret · filed 1987-12-03

This instruction is erroneous because, by requiring that any prison restriction be no “broader than is necessary,” the court articulated a least-restrictive alternative standard of review rather than the appropriate “reasonably related” standard.

The rule of necessity bars Section 1983 damages liability based solely on decisionmakers' failure to disqualify themselves when they are the only body authorized to decide the matter.

Malone v. City of Poway · filed 1984-11-06

Since the Poway City Council is the only body that could issue the permit here and defendants comprised a majority of the city council at that time, defendants had a duty to consider Malone’s application and therefore cannot be subject to a civil rights damages action for failure to disqualify themselves. ... While the Rule of Necessity can be a complete defense in an action for money damages based solely on a failure to disqualify, it would not immunize the merits of the Council’s ruling from judicial consideration.

Section 1983 does not provide a right of contribution.

TCI Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Jefferson, Mo. · filed 1984-12-17

Nor is there a right of contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies no right of indemnification when the statute and its legislative history provide no basis for one.

Banks v. City of Emeryville · filed 1985-08-27

Defendants have pointed to no provision of § 1983, nor any legislative history, to support their assertion that § 1983 provides for a right of contribution or indemnity. Therefore, any claims for indemnification against the third party defendants based directly upon § 1983 are impermissible.

State law governs a third-party indemnity or contribution claim arising from a Section 1983 action when the alleged third-party duties originate solely in state law.

Holman v. Walls · filed 1986-11-26

In light of the decided cases and the policies underlying adjudication of § 1983 claims, however, I hold that state law controls the third-party action.

Section 1983 does not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors because contribution would weaken its deterrent purpose.

Mason v. City of New York · filed 1996-12-17

Accordingly, contribution among joint tortfeasors in Section 1983 cases would conflict impermissibly with the statutory goal of deterrence and is impermissible under the third prong of the Section 1988 test.

Contribution is available among defendants in § 1983 actions.

Fishman v. De Meo · filed 1985-01-08

In my view, the Third Circuit’s analysis in Miller therefore compels the finding that contribution is available in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not create a right to contribution or indemnity for defendants.

Hepburn Ex Rel. Hepburn v. Athelas Institute, Inc. · filed 2004-07-01

Accordingly, § 1983 does not create a right to contribution.

Section 1983 provides no express or implied right to contribution for defendants accused of constitutional torts, and federal common law supplies no such right.

Katka v. Mills · filed 2006-03-23

In sum, the court finds that § 1983 does not expressly create a right to contribution. Because Defendants here are alleged to have committed a constitutional tort and not to have been victim to such a tort, the court also finds that there is no implied right to contribution under § 1983. The court concludes that there is no right to contribution under § 1983 through federal common law.

Section 1983 does not give defendants a claim for contribution for their liability under the statute.

Crews v. County of Nassau · filed 2009-03-23

Accordingly, because as a matter of law there is no contribution claim for Section 1983 liability, the Court denies defendants’ motion to implead Majid and his firm to add such a third-party claim.

Section 1983 provides no right to contribution among defendants.

Castro v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-09-13

No right to contribution exists under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no basis for contribution among defendants liable under it.

Thomas v. City of Troy · filed 2018-03-22

Federal law does not provide a basis for contribution for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal right to contribution.

Colavito v. The City of New York · filed 2019-10-30

As for Colavito’s claim for contribution, the Court first notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a federal right to contribution.

Section 1983 provides no right to contribution for liability on a Section 1983 claim.

Mosca v. The City of New York · filed 2019-10-30

Initially, no right to contribution lies with respect to the Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not expressly give a defendant a right to contribution for damages arising from a civil rights violation.

Dudley v. City of Kinston · filed 2020-11-23

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff can hold a defendant liable for a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. And while the statute provides for the liability of a constitutional tortfeasor, it is silent on whether that tortfeasor can seek contribution (or indemnification) from others. ... So the court will deny the original defendants’ request to bring a third-party claim for contribution under § 1988 against the proposed third-party defendants.

Before dismissing a Section 1983 action sua sponte outside the frivolous-complaint procedure, a district court must serve and notify the parties, allow amendment or response, and state its reasons.

Newson v. Les Harrison Charles McKinney · filed 1986-03-10

In this case, the district court did not follow these procedures or dismiss the case as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d).

Before dismissing a § 1983 complaint sua sponte, a district court must allow service, give notice and opportunities to respond or amend, and state its reasons if it dismisses.

Watson v. Westra · filed 1985-01-18

In Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984), this Court held that before a district court may dismiss a civil rights case sua sponte, it must '(1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or motions; and (5) if the complaint is dismissed, state its reasons for the dismissal.' Id. at 1112. In this case, the district court did not follow these procedures.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for petitioning government officials to act, regardless of the petitioners’ motives, except in limited circumstances such as sham petitioning.

Eaton v. Newport Board of Education, Kentucky Education Association and William Gist · filed 1992-11-09

Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, liability may not be assessed under § 1983 or the antitrust laws except in very limited circumstances, for actions taken when petitioning authorities to take official action, regardless of the motives of the petitioners, even where the petitioning activity has the intent or effect of depriving another of property interests.

Noerr-Pennington immunity for petitioning the government extends to claims brought under § 1983.

Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County · filed 1985-01-31

This Court agrees with the Association Defendants that ... immunity for petitioning activities extends to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private citizens for petitioning government officials to take lawful action.

Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan · filed 1990-06-19

This court holds that the defendants in this action are immune from § 1983 liability for actions taken in petitioning Wayne Township officials to vacate Woodcreek Lane North as a public roadway.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for activity protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Boulware v. Nevada, Department of Human Resources · filed 1992-03-27

Thus, activity protected by Noerr-Pennington cannot form the basis of section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private citizens or civic associations based on their protected petitioning of government bodies.

Gibson v. City of Alexandria · filed 1994-06-13

The Court finds that plaintiffs sued defendants Kuckro and the Association for expressing their viewpoints before governmental bodies and lobbying for governmental action. These First Amendment activities are at the heart of our representative form of government, and are subject to broad protection. To permit lawsuits of this kind to go forward would strike a devastating blow to citizens’ willingness to express their views publicly or to lobby their government.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for traditional political advocacy that petitions public officials to hire someone.

Tarpley v. Frank Keistler, Jr. And Union County Republican Central Committee · filed 1999-08-13

Section 1983 claims, as much as the antitrust laws, are not appropriate vehicles for proscribing traditional political activity such as attempts to persuade public officials.