42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to dismiss pending state criminal charges.

Brunt v. Busshardt · filed 2020-08-31

Even aside from Younger, Plaintiff’s request that the charges against him be dismissed is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against police officers who, under color of state law, suppress peaceful communication protected by the First Amendment without a reasonable and good-faith justification.

Glasson v. City of Louisville · filed 1975-06-13

Accordingly, we hold that these police officers are required to respond in damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act because they suppressed appellant’s peaceful communication of ideas protected by the First Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against detention facilities because they are not persons subject to suit.

Lucero v. Core Civic C.C.A. · filed 2020-07-31

It is well settled that detention facilities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against individual state-college officials acting under color of law when they deprive a person of federal constitutional rights, regardless of whether their conduct was within the scope of their employment.

Smyth v. Lubbers · filed 1975-06-27

It is elementary that a party stating a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and its implementing statutes, including 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, must allege official or state action, as distinguished from purely private action. Here, the plaintiffs complain of actions taken by the College officers and employees under color of law in their representative capacities. Such allegations are necessary to, and do, state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Sec. 1983. ... The court concludes that the defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and that the pleadings and stipulations establish that they were acting under color of law within the meaning of Sec. 1983 in performing the actions complained of by the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not treat a police department as a suable person.

Britton v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 1975-10-14

A police department is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, thus, is not a suable entity under that statute.

Section 1983 does not treat the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or its Civil Service Division as persons subject to suit.

Anthony v. Com. of Mass. · filed 1976-03-29

neither the Commonwealth of Massachusetts nor the Division of Civil Service are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, are not proper parties to any lawsuit brought under that section.

Section 1983 does not treat a government agency such as the New York Port Authority as a person, but it does treat the responsible individual enforcement official as a person.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New York Port Authority · filed 1977-01-14

The Authority clearly performs an essential governmental function for New York and New Jersey, ... Thus, the New York Port Authority must be deemed a government agency for purposes of the Civil Rights Act and not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. ... Plaintiffs, as indicated, have also sued Walter Lee, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Port Authority Police Force; he is certainly a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize relief against the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners because the Board is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Murphy v. State Bd. of Law Exam. for Com. of Pa. · filed 1977-03-29

The plaintiff has invoked this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, 2281, 2284,1343(3), 1331; also 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although the State Board is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute and no relief could be granted pursuant to it.

Section 1983 does not allow suit against the Pennsylvania Parole Board because the Board is not a statutory person.

Thompson v. Parole Supervisor Burke, Pennsylvania Parole Board Member Jefferson, and Parole Agent Strickler · filed 1977-06-01

The Board, of course, cannot be sued for it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency such as the North Carolina Board of Medical Examiners as a person subject to a damages suit.

Hoke v. Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1978-02-23

Defendants correctly contend, therefore, that the Board is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be subject to a suit for damages.

State agencies are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Atchison v. Nelson · filed 1978-11-17

It would be incongruous, as the Plaintiff suggests, to find that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983 but that state agencies are not, and this Court shall not so hold.

Section 1983 treats a state agency such as Michigan State University and its Board of Trustees as a person subject to suit.

Weisbord v. Michigan State University · filed 1980-08-26

This Court is of the opinion that these defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats state officials acting in their official capacities and state administrative agencies as persons subject to suit.

RI Affiliate Am. Civ. Liberties v. RI LOTTERY · filed 1982-12-16

This Court holds that in light of the acknowledged purpose of § 1983 to provide a broad civil remedy for violations of federally protected rights, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408 n. 17, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), and the plain meaning of the statutory language, state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Once it is accepted that Rhode Island is a "person" under § 1983, it follows that the various agencies of Rhode Island are similarly subject to suit.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives someone of a constitutional or federal right.

Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment · filed 2005-10-28

One consequence of Brown's possession of this authority, the authority to make arrests at one's discretion and for any offenses, is clear: at all times relevant to this case, Brown was a state actor as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who act jointly with the state and qualify as state actors.

Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc. · filed 2007-12-03

Prison Fellowship and InnerChange acted jointly with the DOC and can be classified as state actors under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats states as persons who may be sued for constitutional violations.

Smith v. State · filed 1983-01-10

As such, we conclude that Congress must have intended that states be included as "persons”.

A bounty hunter who attempts to arrest a fugitive on a bondsman’s behalf without law enforcement assistance is not a state actor under § 1983 on these facts.

McCoy v. Johnson · filed 1997-03-31

As a result, under the facts of Plaintiffs complaint, the court believes that Defendant Johnson was not a state actor when he attempted to arrest Plaintiff and applied unnecessary force. Consequently, Plaintiff has not pled a legally sufficient claim for recovery from Defendant Johnson under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations, including the imposition of summary punishment without due process by state officials.

Dillard v. Pitchess · filed 1975-08-26

The plaintiff charges that the detention of unconvieted prisoners in the Hall of Justice jail under the conditions herein-above described constitutes summary punishment without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This court agrees and so holds.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to challenge a deprivation of liberty without due process when the deprivation lacks a legitimate security or substantial administrative justification.

Norris v. Frame · filed 1978-10-31

We conclude that under the circumstances here the refusal to allow Norris to continue to receive methadone operates to deprive him of a liberty interest without due process of law, unless the state can demonstrate that a legitimate security concern, or a genuine fear of substantial administrative disruption, warrants this interference with plaintiff’s medical care.

Section 1983 provides no due-process or equal-protection claim when chaining a pretrial detainee to a hospital bed is reasonably related and not excessive in relation to legitimate jail-security concerns.

Guerrero v. Cain · filed 1983-11-21

I find that his chaining did not constitute punishment because it was reasonably related to jail security and as administered was not excessively restrictive. Plaintiff was not chained because of his race. Defendant’s action violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.

A pretrial detainee need not allege deliberate indifference to state a § 1983 due-process claim for denial of medical care.

Gibson v. Babcox · filed 1984-12-03

Although a pretrial detainee need not allege facts demonstrating deliberate indifference in order to state a claim for denial of medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient even under this more rigorous standard.

A pretrial detainee's brief segregation without a hearing may support a § 1983 due-process claim when the record permits an inference that officers imposed it arbitrarily as intentional punishment.

Hawkins v. Sgt. Frederick T. Poole and Sgt. Donald L. Cleiman · filed 1985-12-16

This record is sufficient, considering all its elements, to raise the issue of whether the segregation, as brief and limited as it was, constituted intentional punishment inflicted by the officers in bad faith. This record is devoid of any suggested justification whatsoever for the segregation. Nor at oral argument was defendants’ counsel able to suggest any justification. It is not enough merely to say that the court should not interfere in the administration of the jail, and that the segregation was not as severe as it might have been.

A pretrial detainee may enforce through § 1983 both the constitutional protections enjoyed by convicted prisoners and the additional right to be free from restrictions imposed as punishment.

Ryan v. Burlington County · filed 1987-11-09

Thus, Ryan enjoyed two tiers of rights on October 4,1983 while detained at the county jail: he was entitled to the rights granted convicted persons as well as the right to be free of any practice or restriction placed on him as punishment.

A prison disciplinary rule violates due process as applied when it fails to give an inmate adequate notice that the conduct is prohibited, and officials lack qualified immunity when that particularized notice right was clearly established.

Rios v. Lane · filed 1987-02-13

We believe that as applied to Rios, Rule 205 failed to approximate the parameters of fairness. ... However, we believe that an inmate’s right to adequate notice of prohibited conduct prior to the imposition of serious disciplinary sanction was sufficiently particularized in 1983 to put the defendants on notice that their conduct was probably unlawful.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek relief for prison disciplinary actions that violate federal constitutional rights, with review focused on whether the actions were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Smith v. Fulton Rabalais, Jr. · filed 1981-10-15

In reviewing administrative- findings under a federal habeas corpus or a section 1983 complaint, the standard to be applied is whether or not actions of the disciplinary committee were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 requires a prison disciplinary claim based on denied witnesses or written statements to allege a denial unrelated to institutional security or correctional goals and a clear abuse of officials’ discretion, supported by facts.

Hurney v. Carver · filed 1979-07-05

To state a valid claim, it must be alleged that the inmate’s requests were denied for reasons not having to do with institutional security or correctional goals, and that the prison officials, in ruling as they did, clearly abused their considerable discretion in such matters.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a federal prisoner’s claim challenging the racial composition of a federal disciplinary committee.

Douglas v. U. S. Attorney General · filed 1975-08-26

The complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and jurisdiction is not established under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 as claimed by the plaintiff.

Prison adjustment-committee members have only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from damages liability under Section 1983.

Redding v. Fairman · filed 1983-09-13

Adjustment Committee members enjoy only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from damages liability.

A prison disciplinary hearing examiner who is not an independent adjudicator receives qualified rather than absolute immunity in a § 1983 action.

Vines v. Howard · filed 1987-10-05

In light of the above, I conclude that Howard, Sr. was not an independent factfinder. ... Howard, Sr. shall be accorded qualified immunity.

A prisoner has no due-process right to learn confidential informants' identities or statements and no unlimited right to call or question witnesses or request documents in a disciplinary proceeding.

Julian v. Rush · filed 1987-10-21

A prisoner does not have a due process right to the identity of confidential informants, a copy of their confidential statements, nor an unlimited right to call or question witnesses and request documents.

A prison disciplinary proceeding satisfies § 1983 due-process requirements when an uninvolved alternate hearing officer presides and the prisoner receives adequate notice and a formal hearing.

Craddock v. Mark Rhodes, Glen Cunningham · filed 1987-11-13

Since Rhodes was a witness in the case and Cunningham signed the findings after the hearing as alternate hearing officer, the record of the proceeding shows no irregularity and no reasonable contention that Rhodes was both the hearing officer and the investigating officer and a witness. ... in this particular case no irregularity has been shown, and the plaintiff received adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged and a formal hearing on the same.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary finding that revoked good conduct credit until the finding is revoked or otherwise voided.

Harris v. Terry Gabel, Thomas P. Roth, Evertt Davis · filed 1996-03-19

Plaintiff was sentenced to two months in segregation, two months of demotion to "C" grade, and two months revocation of good conduct credit. Until the finding of guilty is revoked or otherwise voided, he cannot raise this challenge in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is the proper remedy for a prisoner seeking expungement of a disciplinary charge when expungement would have only a speculative or incidental effect on the length of the sentence.

Lauranzano v. George Ingle, Warden Attorney General of the State of California · filed 1996-04-29

Although the expungement may allegedly affect Lauranzano's chances for parole, it will not automatically shorten his sentence, see Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281 (1995) (parole criteria for life prisoners), thereby having only "a speculative or incidental effect" on Lauranzano's indeterminate sentence. See Sisk, 974 F.2d at 117; Georgevich, 772 F.2d at 1087. Therefore, Lauranzano's proper remedy lies in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for prison disciplinary sanctions when success on the claim would imply that a related loss of good-time credits unlawfully lengthened the prisoner’s confinement.

Jones v. Watkins · filed 1996-11-19

Therefore, under Heck, Jones cannot maintain a lawsuit for damages for either the loss of good-time credits or for the other punishment.

Section 1983 permits damages for time served under a procedurally defective disciplinary sentence even if the hearing is later reversed administratively, but a credit for that time against a new sentence leaves no damages from the initial hearing.

Murray v. Dixon · filed 1997-02-20

A plaintiff may state a claim under section 1983 for damages for the portion of a sentence already served that resulted from a procedurally defective hearing, even if that hearing was reversed administratively. See Mays v. Mahoney, 23 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2608 (1995); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658-59 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2608 (1995). But because Murray's new sentence credited the time he had already served from the original sentence, he did not suffer damage from the initial hearing.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a damages claim that could justify habeas relief before satisfying the procedural prerequisites for habeas relief.

Norton v. Garro · filed 1997-03-20

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a prisoner to recover damages for a constitutional violation and has no requirement of exhausting state remedies, a prisoner cannot bring a claim that could justify habeas corpus relief, unless the prisoner has complied with procedural prerequisites for a habeas case.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 damages claim whose necessary factual findings would invalidate a prison disciplinary decision or punishment until the prerequisites for habeas relief are met.

Austin v. Ellerd · filed 1997-03-21

In other words, if the factual findings necessary for a successful § 1983 claim would, if made by a state court, vacate or reverse the disciplinary decision or punishment, this court may not hear the § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim that calls into question a prison disciplinary decision revoking good-time credits unless that decision has already been set aside.

Diaz v. McBride · filed 1997-05-21

All of these theories call into question the validity of the board's decision, and under Edwards and Heck any line of argument with that effect fails to state a claim--unless the decision of the court or board has already been set aside on direct appeal, on collateral attack, or by executive clemency, which this decision has not.

Section 1983 bars a prison retaliation claim that would undermine a disciplinary finding unless the disciplinary action has been expunged or overturned.

Stewart v. Smith · filed 1997-08-22

He also claims that the disciplinary charge was false, and brought in retaliation for his jailhouse lawyer activities. Proof of false allegations would undermine the validity of the disciplinary finding, much like Edwards ' deceit claims. Thus, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the disciplinary action has been expunged or overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a compensatory claim for a prison disciplinary challenge when Edwards v. Balisok forecloses that claim.

Norman Gotcher, Jr. v. Wood · filed 1997-09-11

We agree with Wood that Edwards forecloses Gotcher’s entire compensatory claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a claim that witnesses were improperly excluded from his disciplinary hearing.

Eaglin v. Clarence Faust, Ronnie Williams, and Karen Schau, 2 · filed 1997-10-15

An improper exclusion of witnesses in the inmate's defense is "an obvious procedural defect, and state and federal courts have reinstated good-time credits (absent a new hearing) when it is established." Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1588 (1997). Such a claim is cognizable under § 1983.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 retaliation claim whose success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding prison disciplinary finding.

Jackson-El v. Winsor · filed 1997-11-18

If a jury were to find that the misconduct ticket had been falsified by Winsor, it would necessarily have to determine that plaintiff did not possess the knife. Such a determination would directly contradict the hearing officer’s determination that plaintiff did in fact possess the knife. Because plaintiffs retaliation claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the hearing officer’s determination, the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary punishment through a claim that would necessarily imply its invalidity unless the underlying determination has been invalidated.

Klein v. Coblentz · filed 1997-11-19

Klein’s disciplinary determination has not been reversed, and he has apparently not pursued a state habeas action to obtain a judgment that the prison ruling was invalid. Klein’s claim, therefore, is similarly noncognizable under § 1983. His claim that he was framed by prison authorities is indistinguishable from Balisok’s and would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim challenging disciplinary hearing procedures when the alleged violations would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary disposition that has not been invalidated.

Shabazz v. Pico · filed 1998-02-11

Because plaintiffs allegations necessarily im-' ply the invalidity of the dispositions of these two disciplinary hearings, plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are precluded by Edwards.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for this challenge to prison disciplinary infractions; dismissal is without prejudice.

Yarborough v. Robinson · filed 1998-12-17

As to Yarborough's challenge to his disciplinary infractions, the district court properly held that the claim is not cognizable under § 1983 and dismissed them without prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of confinement; Heck and Edwards do not bar that claim.

Jenkins v. Haubert · filed 1999-06-11

Accordingly, we hold that a § 1983 suit by a prisoner, such as Jenkins, challenging the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement is not barred by Heck and Edwards.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary hearing that attacks the fact or duration of confinement; the challenge must proceed in habeas corpus.

Moore v. Booker · filed 1999-09-03

Moore’s contention that he was denied due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is a challenge to the fact and duration of his confinement, and it must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit claims whose success would invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction.

Rivera v. Johnson · filed 1999-10-20

Rivera’s arguments concerning the constitutionality of the prison disciplinary proceeding are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because favorable action on his claims would render his disciplinary conviction invalid.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a condition of confinement resulting from prison discipline when federal habeas relief is unavailable.

DeWalt, Anthony v. Carter, Lamark · filed 2000-08-11

To summarize, we hold today that the unavailability of federal habeas relief does not preclude a prisoner from bringing a sec. 1983 action to challenge a condition of his confinement that results from a prison disciplinary action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a prison disciplinary conviction involving lost good-time credits until that conviction is expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Chapman v. Scott · filed 2000-08-21

Even assuming that she lost good time, however, she is not entitled to seek damages under § 1983 until she has shown that her conviction in the disciplinary proceeding has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when a challenge to prison discipline implicates the validity of the punishment imposed.

Burns v. State of Texas · filed 2001-02-14

Because ... Burns's remaining claims, involving disciplinary case numbers 990206487, 990080635, 20000111138, and 20000219322, implicate the validity of the punishment imposed for the disciplinary violations, they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary punishment that has not been overturned.

Bates v. Sullivan · filed 2001-04-24

A finding that the defendants discriminated against Bates in punishing him, however, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his punishment, and therefore Bates’s equal protection claim is barred under Balisok and Heck.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary decision that has not been overturned.

Simmons v. Howard · filed 2001-06-14

A prisoner seeking damages based on a prison disciplinary decision that has not been overturned may not proceed under § 1983 if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim for monetary or equitable relief based solely on procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing when success would imply that the punishment was invalid.

Abdul-Mateen v. Martin · filed 2001-09-17

A claim for monetary and equitable relief complaining only of procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing which, if established, would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Denham v. Shroad · filed 2003-01-28

Since granting Denham his requested relief would call into question the validity of his disciplinary conviction, his Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable under § 1983. A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for challenging prison discipline that affects conditions of custody but not its duration, including segregation and loss of phone privileges.

Smith, Eric D. v. Wilson, Bill · filed 2008-02-06

Other forms of discipline that affect the condition but not the duration of custody—including disciplinary segregation and loss of phone privileges—must be challenged under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a due process claim alleging exclusion from a disciplinary hearing, even when the hearing resulted in lost good-time credits.

Randle v. Pratt · filed 2008-11-19

In alleging his exclusion from the hearing, Randle has stated a cognizable claim under §1983, and the district court’s dismissal of the claim is improper.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of disciplinary actions that deprived him of good-time credits unless those actions have been invalidated.

Richards v. Dickens · filed 2011-01-31

Because Richards’ § 1983 excessive force and conspiracy claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary actions that deprived him of good-time credits, he cannot pursue those claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge punishment imposed for a disciplinary infraction unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated.

Garcia (ID 105180) v. Schnurr · filed 2019-12-23

Furthermore, § 1983 is not applicable to “challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions,” unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims may proceed despite prison disciplinary findings when a judgment for the plaintiff would not necessarily contradict those findings.

Ford v. LeBowitz · filed 2020-07-23

Notably, none of these findings are incompatible with a determination in Ford’s § ... 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge prison disciplinary sanctions that do not affect the duration of custody, such as a temporary loss of privileges.

Cole v. Warden · filed 2021-01-11

The temporary loss of privileges didn’t affect the duration of Mr. Cole’s custody, and if he wants to challenge them, he must do so in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers an off-duty police officer’s conduct when the nature of the act shows he was performing official duties, even if he exceeded his authority.

Stengel v. Raymond L. Belcher, Individually and as a Police Officer of the Policedepartment of the City of Colu · filed 1975-09-16

The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. ... There was other evidence which permitted an inference that Belcher, although he overstepped the bounds, intervened in the dispute pursuant to a duty imposed by police department regulations. ... The plaintiffs-appellees contend that the District Court should have decided, as a matter of law, that Officer Belcher was acting at the time under color of state law, in view of an admission by his counsel in open court to that effect and the undisputed testimony. We agree. ... We see no objection to this procedure and hold that the evidence abundantly supports the jury’s verdict.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal agent acting solely under federal law.

Jeffery Antoine, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., Shanna Ruggenberg, Defendants-Appellees-C · filed 1991-12-13

A federal agent acting under authority of purely federal law cannot he held liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 can reach privately employed special police officers who exercise police powers delegated by the state.

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, Rick Freeman, Anthony Murray and William Blair · filed 1999-07-01

We conclude that for purposes of determining whether Freeman and Murray could be state actors in this case, no legal difference exists between a privately employed special officer with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer.

Section 1983 requires state action; an off-duty police officer acts under color of law when invoking police authority in private conduct or performing an official duty.

Pickard v. City of Girard · filed 1999-09-30

In summary, there appear to be two circumstances where an off-duty police officer’s actions are “state action”: (1) when a police officer undertakes purely private action while invoking his authority as a police officer, or as a result of his role as a police officer; and (2) when an off-duty police officer undertakes an official duty. ... Consequently, when Estes assaulted Pickard, he was not “acting under color of state law.”

An off-duty officer’s lack of uniform does not by itself resolve whether the officer acted under color of state law for a § 1983 claim.

Ott v. City of Mobile · filed 2001-03-28

Thus, the mere fact that an officer is off duty and out of uniform does not resolve the color-of-state-law issue.

A prisoner alleging an inadequate law library under Section 1983 must plead an actual denial of access to the courts, not merely inadequate library resources.

Favors v. Theodore Koehler Joe Mullen and Mr. Britton · filed 1986-02-12

However, to state a claim under section 1983, the prisoner must allege that he was actually denied adequate access to the courts, not to the prison law library.

Section 1983 may provide a claim when negligence by a defendant prevents a plaintiff’s access to the courts.

Welch v. Evans · filed 1975-09-17

Even negligence on the part of the defendant which prevented the plaintiff’s access to the courts may give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for unreasonable interference with a prisoner's outgoing legal correspondence, particularly when the interference limits access to the courts.

Martin v. Wainwright · filed 1976-02-06

This circuit has held that unreasonable interference with a prisoner’s outgoing legal correspondence, particularly when it limits his access to the courts, creates a cause of action cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right, and taking a prisoner’s legal papers is actionable when it interferes with the prisoner’s access to the courts.

Tyler v. "Ron" Deputy Sheriff or Jailor/Custodian of Prisoners, Div. 15 · filed 1978-04-18

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985, one must allege deprivation of a constitutional right. ... The taking of a prisoner’s legal papers states a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 if the taking results in interference with or infringement of the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits an action challenging denial of access to the courts because of an inadequate law library.

Bradenburg v. William C. Beaman, Richard Charles Bradenburg v. Duane Shillinger, Warden · filed 1980-10-16

An action challenging denial of access to the courts because of an inadequate law library may be brought pursuant to this statute.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a constitutional claim that prison officials transferred a prisoner to obstruct access to the courts.

Hilliard v. Scully · filed 1982-04-28

In making this argument, defendants plainly disregard plaintiff’s claim that he was transferred to obstruct his right to petition the courts, a claim which clearly is cognizable in a § 1983 suit for relief.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging denial of prison copying privileges to show that the denial impeded the plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts.

Lacarttle Jones, Fred Lauriano, Paul W. Tedder, Alvin F. Toney-El, Plaintiffs v. Gayle M. Franzen, James W. Fairman, and · filed 1983-01-18

Jones cannot prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without showing that the state has deprived him of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and broad as the constitutional concept of liberty is, it does not include the right to xerox. To make out a claim under section 1983 based on denial of copying privileges Jones has to show that the denial prevented him from exercising his constitutional right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits relief for a prisoner denied access to the courts by threats or intimidation without requiring a particular mental state or that the prisoner succumb to the threats.

Allen L. Lamar, Cross-Appellant v. L.A. Steele, Cross-Appellee · filed 1983-02-28

The interrogatories submitted by the magistrate permitted the jury’s consideration of damages only if it found that the defendant acted both intentionally and wantonly. Since neither mental state is required to establish a violation of the right of judicial access, these interrogatories imposed on Lamar an inappropriate burden. ... The prisoner’s reaction to the threats is likewise immaterial. It is not necessary to show that the prisoner succumbed to the threats as a predicate for securing § 1983 relief.

State interference with adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts gives rise to a claim under Section 1983.

Hardy W. Ryland and Alma Odessa Ryland v. Alfred B. Shapiro, Edwin O. Ware and Edward E. Roberts, Jr. · filed 1983-07-05

A mere formal right of access to the courts does not pass constitutional muster. Courts have required that the access be “adequate, effective, and meaningful." ... Interference with the right of access to the courts gives rise to a claim for relief under section 1983.

A prisoner’s § 1983 access-to-courts claim fails when he received all of his legal materials and access to the law library, and his appointed counsel’s access was unimpaired.

Holloway v. Dobbs · filed 1983-08-12

First, Holloway did receive his legal materials. Holloway’s complaint conceded that all of his legal materials were located and that he was given complete access to them, as well as access to the prison law library. Second, Holloway was represented by court-appointed counsel during the complained-of period, and there is no claim that his counsel was impaired in her access to the courts on his behalf. Therefore, accepting the allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that Holloway’s complaint does not state a claim for infringement of his right of access to the courts.

An isolated negligent delay in mailing a prisoner’s legal letter does not rise to a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Guffey v. Trago · filed 1983-10-07

Here, the court is not confronted with an intentional restriction of a prisoner’s right of access to the courts, but a merely negligent delay in the mailing of a letter. Such an isolated incident cannot rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.

A deliberate impediment to a prisoner's access to court, including delay of legal mail, may support relief under section 1983.

Jackson v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1986-05-09

as well as a potential deprivation of property without due process, and may give rise to a claim for relief under § 1983. ... Any deliberate impediment to access, even a delay of access, may constitute a constitutional deprivation.

A prisoner states a section 1983 access-to-courts claim by alleging total denial of both a prison law library and legally trained assistance.

Privett v. Ernest Pellegrin, Odie Jones Orey Rice, Gary J. Livesay, and Nancy Chewning · filed 1986-06-27

We find that this allegation is not conclusory, ... that it states a cause of action, and that it may not, therefore, be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d).

A prisoner states no § 1983 denial-of-access claim merely by alleging inadequate access to a prison library or free copying; the prisoner must allege denial of access to the courts.

Bell-Bey v. Heather Bur, Lajewski Pearson · filed 1986-08-12

To state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that he was denied access to the courts, not to the prison library. ... Access to the courts is not equated with the adequacy of a prison law library; Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d at 932, quoting with approval Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978); nor is meaningful access equated with free supplies and copying of legal material.

An inmate does not state a Section 1983 access-to-courts claim merely by alleging that officials prevented him from acting as a jailhouse lawyer for other inmates, absent an allegation that he or those inmates were denied access to the courts.

Brooks v. Otie Jones, Warden · filed 1986-08-14

Because the plaintiff did not allege in the district court nor argue in his appellate brief that he or other inmates are being denied access to the courts, as opposed to being denied access to legal advice from this particular plaintiff, it is clear that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

A prisoner alleging a retaliatory transfer under Section 1983 must prove that the transfer would not have occurred but for his litigation activity; at summary judgment, unrebutted legitimate penological reasons defeat the claim.

Hall v. Evans · filed 1986-09-09

Restated simply then, the appropriate standard in a case such as this is that plaintiff must prove that he would not have been transferred “but for” his litigation activities. This standard is not to interfere, however, with the operation of the-proper burdens on summary judgment. ... Under a “but for” standard, this means if defendant has contested plaintiff's allegations with specific facts, plaintiff must rebut these facts with specific facts of his own. ... Thus, there is unrebutted evidence of a valid reason for the transfer, and therefore, no jury question remains as to whether plaintiff’s litigation activity were the “but for” cause of the transfer.

Intentional destruction of a prisoner's property is not actionable under § 1983 when it is not systematic and the state supplies a meaningful postdeprivation remedy; an access-to-courts theory also requires alleging actual interference with litigation.

Hikel v. King · filed 1987-02-13

Unless part of a systematic practice, the intentional deprivation of personal property is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the State provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. ... To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment, when the claim is for destruction of property, plaintiff must allege how defendant’s conduct interfered with his right of access to the courts.

A Section 1983 access-to-courts claim requires injury; receiving requested court documents through appointed counsel defeats the claim.

McCoy v. Marvin I. Lawson, Clerk of Court for Darlington County · filed 1987-07-17

We affirm the judgment below on the grounds that McCoy received the documents from his court-appointed attorney, and that McCoy did not show any injury.

State officials violate Section 1983 when they withhold a principal witness's recantation and thereby deny the affected person meaningful access to judicial relief.

Germany v. Vance · filed 1987-12-01

In light of preexisting law, the contours of the right of access were sufficiently clear in 1980 that a reasonable official would have understood that withholding the evidence of the recantation in this case would have unconstitutionally denied plaintiff her right of access to the courts. Defendants Vance and Paladino, by withholding evidence of the recantation, violated plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, they are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when they allegedly increase rent because plaintiffs exercised their clearly established right of access to the courts.

Craft v. Wipf · filed 1987-12-30

It is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable ..., even if the act when taken for a different reason, would have been proper. ... This principle is so deeply embedded in the legal and social fabric of our society that no government official could fail to know of it. We thus hold that the district court correctly held that the state officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claim.

Section 1983 is the proper framework for an inmate’s claim that denial of in forma pauperis status in a state civil appeal deprived him of access to the courts, but it does not authorize federal review of the state court’s final order.

Tyrone C. Cooper v. James A. Youngblood, Individually and in His Official Capacity Attorney General of South Carolina · filed 1988-03-03

Cooper complained that by denying him in forma pauperis status, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied him access to the courts. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 because Cooper was not attacking the length or constitutionality of his sentence. While we find that Cooper's suit is more properly construed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the necessary jurisdiction for federal court review is still lacking. 2 United States district courts and appellate courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide an access-to-courts claim for a prison mail delay that caused no legal prejudice.

Richardson v. McDonnell · filed 1988-03-31

The isolated incident complained of by Richardson does not give rise to a constitutional violation because the prison’s error was noted in time to permit appellant to re-prepare and timely file his writ application.

Section 1983 does not support a denial-of-access-to-courts claim based on seized legal documents when the plaintiff alleges no actual prejudice and has retained counsel.

Steelman v. Captain John Burns, R.E. Smiley, James Ferrell and Randy Brown, Defendants · filed 1988-05-04

Likewise, plaintiff's allegations that defendants took various legal documents which he needed to prepare a defense to the criminal charges pending against him do not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for denial of access to the courts. In particular, review of the record fails to disclose any allegation by plaintiff that he was ever actually prejudiced in any legal proceeding by the unavailability of the documents in question. More importantly, the record discloses that at all times plaintiff was represented by retained counsel capable of serving his interests. Under such circumstances plaintiff can not maintain a cause of action for denial of access to the courts.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights; a state court order restricting related state court proceedings does not deprive a plaintiff of access to federal court.

Cornett v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1988-06-06

First, Justice McCooe’s order does not encompass proceedings in federal court, but is instead directed to any future state court proceedings plaintiff might bring relating to plaintiff’s allegations against Manufacturers. Accordingly, he has failed to show a deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his claim is dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 permits an inmate to bring a retaliation claim when prison officials bring false disciplinary charges because the inmate exercised the right of access to courts or other legal procedures.

No. 91-1252 · filed 1992-06-25

However, allegations that false charges were brought in retaliation for exercise of an inmate's right of access to the courts or to other legal procedures are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an access-to-courts conspiracy claim for preventing a person from filing suit, but not for merely interfering with discovery in a pending civil action.

Mick v. Brewer · filed 1996-04-24

The Tenth Circuit has clearly indicated in Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1557 (10th Cir.1995), an agreement with the narrower view — that such a conspiracy action is permissible only for preventing ... right of access to the courts. Here, even assuming as true all of Mick’s allegations, the actions of defendants do not represent a denial of her right of access to the courts, but a failure to comply with discovery requirements.

Section 1983 permits recovery for an intentional cover-up that prevents a plaintiff from identifying who committed a proven constitutional violation and thereby deprives the plaintiff of damages.

Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford · filed 1996-08-01

I find, once again, on further study and reflection, that there is a viable claim to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an intentional cover-up if the cover-up caused the jury’s inability to decide who is responsible for the constitutional violations which were proven and, therefore, injured the plaintiff by depriving her of the damage award she would have otherwise received.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim alleging a cover-up intended to impede access to courts without proof that the cover-up succeeded; filing suit does not itself bar the claim.

McGarty v. Town of Carmel · filed 1998-03-10

However, the fact that plaintiff was able to bring this action does not automatically bar her conspiracy claim. ... Thus, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show the effectiveness of the conspiracy in concealing constitutional violations before she can assert a claim for it.

Section 1983 permits an injunction to clear unlawful barriers to state postconviction review, but Heck bars damages for those barriers while the conviction stands and that injunction is available.

Hoard v. Reddy · filed 1999-04-23

He could not argue this, because if the defendants are illegally blocking his access to state post-conviction remedies, he can obtain an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to clear away the blockage. ... As he is not seeking such relief, he has no basis for complaining that no route is open to him other than this damages action for challenging the validity of his conviction. His claim for damages is therefore barred by Heck even if there is the exception we indicated for cases in which there is no way to get the conviction undone.

Section 1983 does not give inmates a cause of action for prison officials’ negligent interference with their access to the courts.

Hill v. Corcoran · filed 1999-06-23

Inmates do not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligent interference by prison officials with their right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for access-to-courts claims that do not challenge the validity of a prisoner’s confinement.

Zamora v. Pierson · filed 2001-03-30

Hence, it is not a claim under habeas corpus; rather, “access to courts” claims are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of constitutional rights, including the right of access to the courts.

Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Commission · filed 1986-01-07

A review of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that the Harrisons have sufficiently stated a cause of action under section 1983 for infringement of their constitutional right of access to the courts, in violation of their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner's denial-of-access-to-courts claim.

Holloway v. Garcia · filed 2002-06-13

We do not reach Holloway’s apparent contention that he was denied access to the courts because it is more appropriately raised in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue for interference with court access only when the interference causes actual injury.

Perry v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2008-04-15

Interference with the right is actionable under § 1983 only where the inmate demonstrates “actual injury stemming from defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.”

Section 1983 does not support a denial-of-access-to-courts claim based on negligence.

Tucker v. I'Jama · filed 2010-01-20

Section 1983 claims also cannot be initiated based on negligent denials of access.

A prisoner’s access-to-the-courts claim is cognizable under § 1983, even if the prisoner labels the pleading as a habeas petition.

Cruitt v. State of Alabama · filed 2016-04-07

The district court erred in dismissing Cruitt’s pleading as a § 2254 petition. As the court found, the pleading appeared to raise an access-to-the-courts claim, which is a cognizable claim under § 1983, and he did not challenge the facts of his underlying conviction, which is required in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 provides a separate action for a prisoner’s claim that limited access to legal materials impedes access to the courts.

Logan v. Haslam · filed 2019-08-30

Rather, this claim concerns access to the Mississippi courts and must be raised, if at all, in a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against purely private defendants.

Slawter v. Morton · filed 1993-02-16

Further, to the extent that Slawter raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the private Defendants are not amenable to action, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and the allegations as to all of the Defendants are frivolous.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private homeowners for petitioning township officials and failing to give personal notice of a road vacation hearing, even when the conduct is alleged to be a conspiracy to deprive a developer of due process.

Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan · filed 1990-09-04

As noted by the court, “Plaintiff’s entire complaint against the defendants [was] based upon nothing more than defendants’ exercise of their right, under the first amendment, to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Order of June 19, 1990. Plaintiff’s allegations of “conspiracy”, even taken as true, fail to show any basis for § 1983 liability against the defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a private entity for alleged civil rights violations.

Poorman v. Quality Inn · filed 1989-08-25

Poorman's allegations are indeed frivolous under this standard as his suit was filed against a private entity which is simply not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, which was the basis of his complaint notwithstanding his argument to the contrary on appeal.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovering from prison inmates absent an allegation that they acted under correctional officers' specific orders or authority enabling them to harm the plaintiff.

Grillo v. Sielaff · filed 1976-05-05

Moreover, without an allegation that defendants Bradshaw, Jackson, Bell and Childress were carrying out specific orders of the correctional officers, or that they had been granted authority that enabled them to harm the plaintiff, Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovery from prison inmates.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for adjudicating claims against a single private individual, and a conspiracy claim under it cannot survive without genuine and material factual support against the other alleged conspirators.

Hahn v. Sargent · filed 1975-09-18

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for the adjudication of claims against a single private individual. Nor can appellant’s complaint under § 1983 that appellees conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights survive the determination that no genuine and material fact persists with respect to the allegations against the appellees other than Berman.

Private persons may be sued under § 1983 when they act in conspiracy or collusion with state officials, and alleged medical mistreatment may amount to an Eighth Amendment deprivation rather than mere malpractice.

Taylor v. M. M. (Hoot) Gibson · filed 1976-04-01

It is now well established that private persons may be sued under Section 1983 when they are acting in conspiracy or collusion with state officials. ... Taylor alleged facts which if true are supportive of a finding of conspiracy authorizing recovery under Section 1983. While characterized by the defense as “mere malpractice”, the acts alleged imply a deprivation of medical care to an extent that sufficiently developed may reach the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

A complaint may state a § 1983 cause of action against individual defendants when its allegations support the required constitutional deprivation.

Lawrence University Bicentennial Commission v. City of Appleton · filed 1976-04-02

For purposes of the motion for a preliminary injunction, it will suffice for the Court to hold that the complaint by the plaintiffs Lawrence University Bicentennial Commission, Weiss, and Moody amply states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the eight named individual defendants ... pursuant to the jurisdictional provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A Section 1983 claim against a private firm requires allegations that it acted under color of state law or agreed to act jointly with state defendants.

Betances v. Quiros · filed 1985-02-19

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Price Waterhouse intended to have its report serve as basis for the alleged conspiracy; that Price Waterhouse entered into any agreement or acted jointly in concert with the other co-defendants to perform the alleged conspiracy; or, that Price Waterhouse acted under color of state law with the other co-defendants in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

Private complainants and witnesses in state criminal proceedings do not act under color of state law merely by invoking those proceedings.

Spencer v. Slone · filed 1986-01-10

Private parties are not acting under color of state law merely by acting as complainants or witnesses in state criminal actions.

Private medical providers are not liable under § 1983 when the complaint alleges no state action.

Griggs v. Lexington Police Department · filed 1987-10-23

Plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the HCHP defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — no state action exists nor is any state action alleged.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a claim against a state seeking a remedy for an alleged deprivation of civil liberties.

Pieri v. Dammasch State Hospital · filed 1996-02-20

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a state for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.

Section 1983 is the avenue for Fourteenth Amendment claims against a municipality; a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle · filed 1980-10-29

Plaintiff’s allegations under Count II against the county defendants are cognizable, if at all, only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A cause of action may not be asserted against a municipality directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A § 1983 claim against a prison health provider based on its policies must allege specific facts showing how those policies were deficient.

Joseph Chester Parzyck, III v. Prison Health · filed 2008-08-21

The district court did not err in dismissing Parzyck’s claims against Dr. Nunez, Dr. Suarez, and Prison Health Services for failure to state a claim. With respect to PHS, Parzyck fails to make any specific factual allegations; he alleges only that their unwritten policies, practices, and protocols were deliberately indifferent without specifying in what manner the policies were deficient.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a former attorney based on allegedly erroneous advice in a previous federal civil action.

Hinton v. Wampler · filed 1996-03-07

Rothen R. Hinton appeals the district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his pro se, in forma pauperis (IFP) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The district court did not err by dismissing Hinton’s action against his former attorney Gregory N. Wampler for alleged erroneous advice in a previous federal civil action.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against the EEOC for its handling of an employment discrimination charge.

Martin v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2014-02-24

Notwithstanding his dissatisfaction with the way the EEOC handled his claim, Martin has failed to identify any viable cause of action against the EEOC. Hence, his claim for declaratory relief, purportedly brought under Section 1983 based on an alleged First Amendment violation, must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not reach conduct by private parties.

Nieves v. City of Cleveland · filed 2005-08-24

We find the filing of two § 1983 claims against a private individual to be particularly egregious. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful”) (internal quotations omitted); Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 590 (“A Plaintiff may not proceed under § 1983 against a private party”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing an official-capacity claim against an employee of a contracted medical provider to show that the provider’s policy, custom, or official action caused the injury.

Lockett v. Smith · filed 2018-12-17

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts or provide evidence of any policy, custom, or practice of Southern Health Partners, Inc. that contributed to the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a Monell claim against a defendant in an individual capacity.

Boykins v. City of Syracuse · filed 2020-03-30

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert a Monell claim against Chief Fowler, in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim against individual defendants for a Takings Clause violation.

JERMC LTD. v. Town of Redington Shores · filed 2020-04-24

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to and cannot state a cognizable claim for relief in Count VII. See Coles v. Board of Park Commr’s, No. 3:08CV2968, 2009 WL 2922036, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that because plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for violation of the Takings Clause against an individual defendant, there is no cognizable cause of action under § 1983 for conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause).

Section 1983 treats official capacity claims against employees of a contracted medical provider as claims against the provider, requiring evidence that its policy or custom caused the injury.

Pritchett v. Griffie · filed 2020-05-07

When a government contracts with a third-party to fulfill a constitutional duty—such as providing medical care—official capacity claims against the third-party’s employees are treated as claims against the third-party itself.

Section 1983 claims, including civil-conspiracy claims, may be resolved on summary judgment when differences in the evidence are not material and the record shows no unlawful act or means.

Vickie Singer v. Robert Wadman, Vickie Singer v. Walter D. Talbot · filed 1984-09-27

But summary judgment is not always inappropriate, even in a § 1983 suit. The Supreme Court has declared that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial. ... Applying the definition of a civil conspiracy to the instant case, the record indicates beyond any doubt that though the defendants, or some of them, were acting in concert, they were not committing an unlawful act.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires proof that the conspirators actually violated the claimant's constitutional rights.

Dells, Inc. v. Mundt · filed 1975-09-04

A claim for conspiracy under the Civil Rights Acts must show that the conspirators did in fact violate the constitutional rights of the claimant. ... If success of the conspiracy is an essential element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), then logic would require the same element for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution, but not for a mere common-law tort committed under color of state law.

Sanchez v. Marquez · filed 1978-09-20

However, Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a mere common law tort even when committed under color of state law. The section provides a remedy for violation of rights secured by the constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide recovery for mere negligence unless the negligence results in a violation of federally protected constitutional rights.

LeBlanc v. Foti · filed 1980-01-31

Without proof of a violation of plaintiff’s federally protected rights, there can be no recovery against Sheriff Foti on the grounds of mere negligence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to show both the conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Landrigan v. City of Warwick · filed 1980-08-27

While conspiracies may be actionable under section 1983, it is necessary that there have been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.

A conspiracy creates no section 1983 liability unless it results in an actual deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.

Joseph Davis Farrar and Dale Lawson Farrar v. Cain · filed 1985-04-08

Without a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege, [the defendant] has no liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no freestanding cause of action for conspiracy or conspiracy to deny due process; the plaintiff must prove deprivation of a specifically protected constitutional right.

Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander · filed 1987-01-13

This cause of action as set forth in the complaint is founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the jurisdictional base upon which the claim stands or falls. There is, however, no cause of action for conspiracy ... per se ... under section 1983. Nor is there a cause of action for "conspiracy to deny due process.” ... Plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a specifically-protected constitutional right to sustain the conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy to violate § 1983 is not itself actionable without an actual deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Collin County v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN) · filed 1987-01-30

A conspiracy to violate § 1983, of course, does not state a claim. It remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Without such a deprivation a defendant has no liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy alone is insufficient.

Gillum v. City of Kerrville · filed 1993-09-16

As we have noted, "it remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive is insufficient."

Section 1983 is the statutory mechanism plaintiffs must invoke for constitutional claims when it is available.

Berger v. City of New Orleans · filed 2001-09-07

When a statutory mechanism is available, § 1983 being a prime example, plaintiffs must invoke its protection.

In a § 1983 suit against state officials, asserting qualified good-faith immunity creates a narrow exception to attorney-client privilege for legal advice relevant to malice or knowledge of constitutional rights.

Hearn v. Rhay · filed 1975-09-26

Based on the holding in that case, this court is compelled to recognize a new and narrowly limited exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies to civil rights suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of good faith immunity.

For a § 1983 qualified-immunity defense, state officials are charged with their litigation attorney's knowledge of a court order affecting the legality of their conduct.

Salahuddin v. Coughlin, III · filed 1986-01-08

Therefore, we hold that defendants are charged with their attorney's knowledge of the state court judge’s oral order converting the state action into a habeas corpus proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy that shortens a prisoner's time in custody.

Curtis v. Perry · filed 2020-07-13

Plaintiffs request to spend less time in custody is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from a criminal judgment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Barcus v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2020-04-13

However, a § 1983 lawsuit is not the vehicle by which an inmate may seek relief from a criminal judgment. Such relief, if granted, must be granted through a habeas action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state prisoner seeking dismissal of state criminal charges.

Hurt v. Kuehnert · filed 2020-04-13

Plaintiff’s claim for dismissal of the state criminal charges is not cognizable under § 1983 and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek accelerated release from prison; that remedy must be pursued through habeas corpus.

VanDyke v. Corrections · filed 2020-04-13

A § 1983 claim challenges the conditions of confinement, rather the execution or duration of a sentence. In this case, VanDyke indeed challenges the general prison conditions, but he seeks an accelerated release from prison, which is properly asserted as a habeas action, not as a civil rights action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the length of a term of custody; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Detlaff v. Boss · filed 2020-03-09

More to the point, a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is not the appropriate way to challenge the length of a term of custody.