42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek compensatory damages for claims that are, in substance, IDEA claims.

Burke v. Brookline · filed 2007-01-29

As is stated above, plaintiffs may not invoke § 1983 to bring claims for compensatory damages that are in essence IDEA claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert claims based on the IDEA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or Pennsylvania Public School Code against a school district or school board.

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District · filed 2008-06-06

Under this court’s February 15, 2008 Memorandum and Order, Griffin and Muse must plead exhaustion to bring claims under the IDEA, ADA, RA and Public School Code and are prohibited from bringing a § 1983 claim based on those statutes against the School District defendants.

Invoking a federal regulation rather than the statute itself does not defeat a colorable § 1983 claim.

Hill v. John F. Richardson, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Human Services · filed 1993-10-18

Defendant’s further argument that plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 because they invoke a regulation rather than § 1437f itself is unavailing. ... Plaintiffs thus had a colorable claim under § 1983 and are entitled to attorneys’ fees — the $16,000 they originally requested, plus full compensation for the time devoted to establishing that entitlement in the district court and this court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a challenge to insurance rates based only on arbitrariness or a violation of state law.

Coors & Birdsong v. Tennessee Temporary Joint Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1977-07-26

Recent decisions by appellate tribunals, moreover, have indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits should be viewed more cautiously; § 1983 is not a “catch-all statute” intended to solve myriads of problems and disputes that may well lie best in state court. ... The claim that the rate charge was arbitrary, capricious and involved violation of the state law should properly be presented to a state court if any cause of action whatever is stated in that claim.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of federal statutes even when those statutes do not provide a private right of action.

Mejia v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1981-06-29

The City defendants also moved to dismiss the counts against them based on four arguments: 1) violation of a federal statute for which a private right of action does not exist cannot constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) plaintiffs have suffered no injury or deprivation of rights; 3) plaintiffs’ claims do not present a constitutional question; and 4) there is no reason for fashioning an independent remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the APA protects plaintiffs’ rights. However, the first, third and fourth arguments are directly contrary to the teaching of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on federal criminal statutes that provide no private right of action.

Jihad v. Fabian · filed 2010-01-21

Therefore, finding that none of the Federal criminal statutes, which are relied upon by the Plaintiff, provide for a private right of action, we conclude that the Plaintiff has no chance of success as to the merits of those claims under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a governor’s alleged failure to follow mandatory parole procedures after the parole board recommends release.

Ellis v. Brown · filed 2010-03-15

Mr. Easterwood also alleged that the Governor of Oklahoma violated mandatory parole procedures in denying him parole after the Parole Board recommended his release. This claim, however, “is not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a consent decree, without more.

Haines v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2010-07-27

The district court considered construing Haines’s petition as a civil-rights complaint but correctly determined that violations of the Ruiz decree, without more, are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of District of Columbia law alone.

Potomac Development Corp. v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-15

District law is not the basis of the cause of action pled in the complaint, which invokes only § 1983, and § 1983, by its explicit terms, creates a cause of action only for a deprivation of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for contractual salary and benefit claims that can be addressed through an ordinary state breach of contract action.

Russo v. School Board · filed 2011-12-15

The Court FINDS that Dr. Russo’s asserted claims to his salary and benefits, stemming from the Salary Deferral Agreement and Transition Agreement, do not give rise to an action under Section 1983, as they properly can be addressed by an ordinary breach of contract action in state court.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim resting entirely on state substantive law.

Simmons v. Gillespie · filed 2013-03-19

The district judge should not have used a §1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the AAIA or ANCA.

Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton · filed 2015-06-26

Nor is a claim available for violations of the AAIA or ANCA Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on an underlying violation of Title IX.

Wilkerson v. University of North Texas ex rel. Board of Regents · filed 2016-11-30

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under § 1983 based on an underlying violation of Title IX.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law, including a state constitution.

Doe v. The University of South Alabama · filed 2020-02-14

Thus, the claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim based on a violation of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law.

Saal v. City of Wooster · filed 2020-02-20

Therefore, to the extent Saal is relying on a violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112 to support his § 1983 claim, it is both redundant of Count I and insufficient to support such a claim; and defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Interstate Corrections Compact because the compact is not federal law.

Archy v. Troxler · filed 2021-01-08

The Interstate Corrections Compact is not a federal law and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert a claim based upon an alleged violation of the Interstate Corrections Compact.

Section 1983 permits a federal action for constitutional injuries arising from juvenile arrest, detention, and trial procedures to proceed before the related state prosecution is complete when the action does not seek to enjoin or disrupt that prosecution.

Cox v. Turley · filed 1974-11-22

Consequently, the action is maintainable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 before the state prosecution has been completed (a) because the action is not intended as one to enjoin or disrupt the state prosecution, and (b) because the relief sought is essentially to redress the alleged violations of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and the class he represents, arising from the procedures alleged to be employed in Madison County, Kentucky, in connection with the arrest, detention and trial of juveniles on criminal charges.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of pending charges until the state proceedings resolve in the claimant’s favor.

Gorenc v. City of Westland · filed 2003-07-31

Plaintiffs claim is therefore not cognizable under § 1983 until the state traffic proceedings are resolved in his favor.

Section 1983 provides no claim against prison officials for an escaped inmate’s assault on nearby residents when the residents have no special relationship with the state or federal right to protection.

Henderson v. Bradford · filed 1988-03-31

Thus, the initial inquiry into a section 1983 action is whether the conduct complained of deprived the plaintiffs of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. We find that plaintiffs were not deprived of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... In the instant case, no such special relationship is created by virtue of plaintiffs’ residence in the same municipality in which the Pontiac Correctional Center is located. ... Hence, plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

The state has no federal constitutional duty to protect the public from a discharged mental patient, so an attack by that person does not itself support a § 1983 claim.

Howard v. Doe · filed 1987-06-17

Although this appeal involves an attack by a discharged mental patient, the principles underlying our decision in Carlson are equally applicable to the circumstances before us and, accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court for the reasons stated in the Carlson opinion.

A state or local government generally is not liable under § 1983’s Due Process Clause merely for failing to provide adequate police protection.

Dudosh v. City of Allentown · filed 1987-05-18

Concomitant with this theme is the general rule of law that a state, or a political subdivision thereof, cannot be held liable under the Due Process Clause, through § 1983, for its failure to provide such protection.

A Section 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires conscious or callous indifference to the prisoner's rights, not merely negligent conduct.

Johnston v. Lucas · filed 1986-04-11

There must be at least a conscious or callous indifference to the prisoner's rights.

A Section 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires at least deliberate indifference, not a lower standard of conduct.

Johnston v. Lucas · filed 1986-04-11

We do not believe that the Court would accept a standard of conduct any lower than deliberate indifference.

A Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim requires deliberate indifference, such as reckless disregard of a substantial danger; negligent failure to protect is insufficient.

El v. O'LEARY · filed 1986-02-19

It is now definitively established that while a correctional official who recklessly disregards a substantial risk of danger to an inmate may be liable under the Eighth Amendment, one who negligently fails to take reasonable steps to protect an inmate is not.

Mere inadvertence or negligence by prison officials in failing to protect a prisoner from assault does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Barnett v. Bell · filed 1985-09-30

Mere inadvertence or negligence on the part of prison officials in failing to protect a prisoner from assault does not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim when jail officials are deliberately indifferent to detainees' constitutional right to be free from attacks by other inmates.

Doe v. McFaul · filed 1984-12-26

With respect to Count 1 of the amended complaints, this Court holds that plaintiffs state a cause of action under § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference to their right to be free from attack by other inmates.

Section 1983 liability for police nonfeasance requires deliberate indifference rather than mere negligence, even when a special relationship creates a duty.

Gilchrist v. City of Livonia · filed 1984-12-11

However, a police officer’s duty resulting from a “special relationship” is not necessarily sufficient to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff must also show that the police acted with “deliberate indifference”; there is no liability for merely negligent nonfeasance.

Section 1983 liability for an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires callous indifference to inmate danger; mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient.

Estate of Clyde Davis, Deceased, William H. Davis, Administrator v. Johnson · filed 1984-09-27

Rather, as the jury was instructed, state officials must act in callous indifference to the dangers faced by a prisoner before they will incur liability under Section 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim when state officials responsible for a confined person’s care and safekeeping knowingly fail to protect him from repeated assaults by fellow inmates.

Pearl Spence, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Jerome W. Spence, Deceased v. Staras · filed 1974-12-16

The present complaint, moreover, contains sufficient allegations regarding the defendant’s knowledge of the beatings of the decedent to make the claim actionable under § 1983. Although the complaint does not allege direct participation by the defendants in the beatings, the complaint does allege more than an “isolated incident” or mere negligent supervision. The complaint here expressly alleges that the defendants knew that the decedent was the target of assaults by fellow inmates, knew that he had been beaten on at least twenty prior occasions, and knew that he was nonverbal and unable to call for help or defend himself when attacked, and yet the defendants failed to protect the deceased. Assuming, as we must on a motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff can prove these allegations, the defendants’ inaction was of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to state a claim against correctional officers who witness and fail to intervene in an assault by fellow inmates.

Gordon v. William D. Leeke, Commissioner Joe Martin, Warden, Wayne Stephen Young v. George H. Collins, Warden · filed 1978-05-02

From the additional pleadings, affidavits and exhibits, it appears that Gordon is asserting that he was brutalized on January 29, 1976 by fellow inmates, that the correctional officers, Ne-ville Riley and another, were present and saw what was transpiring, but, nevertheless, that Riley and the other unknown guard declined to intervene and permitted the assault to continue. In our view, Gordon has thus alleged a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes protective relief requiring transfer outside a state prison system when continued incarceration there exposes a prisoner to an unusually high risk of physical danger.

Walker v. A.L. Lockhart, Superintendent of the Arkansas Department of Corrections · filed 1983-10-04

We hold that Walker’s life is put in danger by his incarceration in the Arkansas general prison population and that Walker has established the right to serve the remainder of his sentence in an institution outside of Arkansas where he will have the same privileges and obligations as other prisoners, but without facing undue risks and fears for his safety. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court denying Walker’s section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for a state actor's own deprivation of a constitutional right, not for a state actor's negligent failure to protect a person from harm inflicted by a private third party outside the official's control.

Ellsworth v. City of Racine · filed 1984-09-12

These cases indicate that state officials are not liable under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations caused by third parties outside their control.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for government inaction that fails to protect a voluntary victim from third-party harm; the state must have placed an involuntary victim in foreseeable peril.

Williams v. City of Boston · filed 1984-12-28

The common thread in all these cases is that the state placed an involuntary victim in peril and that injury by third persons or forces was forseeable. In other words, a civil rights remedy is available only where the injury is caused by government action, and not where it is caused by mere government inaction.

A failure-to-protect claim under § 1983 requires more than negligence; officials must intentionally deprive the inmate of a right or recklessly disregard the inmate’s right to be free from violent attacks.

Porm v. White · filed 1985-05-16

To sustain his claim that White and Tindle failed to take sufficient precautions to protect him from assault, Porm "must show something more than mere inadvertence or negligence. He must show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights, either because they actually intended to deprive him of some right, or because they acted with reckless disregard of his right to be free from violent attacks by fellow inmates."

A prisoner states a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim against a guard by alleging that the guard knew an attack was occurring and did nothing to protect the prisoner.

Serrano v. Jorge L. Collazo Torres · filed 1985-06-14

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellant, we believe that as to this defendant, appellant stated a valid claim for relief. It is alleged that the guard had knowledge of the attack on appellant and that the guard did nothing at the time to protect appellant from harm.

Prison guards may face § 1983 liability when evidence shows that they refused a prisoner's request to escape danger and stood by while other inmates attacked him.

Anderson v. Taylor · filed 1985-06-14

In view, then, of the allegations in plaintiff's affidavit (even if inconsistent in some respects with his statement to Captain Chambliss) wherein he stated that he requested the guards to let him out of the day room 10 to 15 minutes before the attack, that the guards refused and stood idly by while he was attacked by these two inmates with knives and stabbed 11 times, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the guard defendants' liability.

Prison officials may face § 1983 liability for specific acts or omissions that, if committed with gross negligence or deliberate indifference, violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to protection from assault.

Gibralter v. City of New York · filed 1985-06-18

Because plaintiff has alleged specific acts and omissions by Captain Rock, John Doe I and John Doe II which, if committed with gross negligence or deliberate indifference, would constitute a violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, it is respectfully recommended that Captain Rock’s, John Doe Ps and John Doe IPs motion for summary judgment be denied.

Section 1983 supports a due-process failure-to-protect claim when a special relationship gives a specific victim a right to adequate police protection.

Dudosh v. City of Allentown · filed 1985-12-18

For these reasons, based upon the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, we conclude that a special relationship did exist between the deceased and the defendants such that would vest in Ms. Dudosh a right to adequate police protection. We, therefore, also conclude that the plaintiff has set forth causes of action against the defendants pursuant to § 1983 for the deceased’s alleged deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Prison officials’ gross negligence or deliberate indifference can support § 1983 liability for failure to protect an inmate, but ordinary negligence cannot.

Swarts v. Johnson · filed 1987-08-21

This court has held that prison officials' gross negligence or deliberate indifference is sufficient to support a claim against the officials, but ordinary negligence is not.

Government generally has no constitutional duty enforceable under § 1983 to provide protective services to an individual absent a custodial or other special relationship.

Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove · filed 1987-09-08

In the case at bar, the State bore no special relationship to plaintiffs or plaintiff’s decedent and hence had no obligation under the Constitution to provide them with protective services.

A Section 1983 prisoner-safety claim requires evidence beyond conclusory allegations that officials were deliberately indifferent to a specific known risk of harm from another inmate.

Joyner v. Ken McKellar Warden, K.C.I. Gerald S. Gaskin, Chief of Security, Kirkland Correctional Institution · filed 1988-02-10

We affirm its judgment on the ground that Joyner failed to show beyond mere conclusory allegations that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a specific known risk of harm posed by the other inmate.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that officials knew a victim faced special danger from a released prisoner and that their failure to protect or warn causally connected their conduct to the resulting harm for a due process claim based on that harm.

Massey Ex Rel. Yackle v. Grant · filed 1988-02-19

To use the label “special relationship,” without more — without allegations that the relationship created special danger — is insufficient. For only upon the basis of allegations that defendants knew of such special danger could defendants’ failure to protect or warn be construed as grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent or as an arbitrary abuse of power establishing a causal connection between such failure and the ultimate harm actually inflicted by another. Absent such a causal connection, there can be no due process violation, because plaintiffs’ injuries are too remote a consequence of defendants’ actions.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state official’s failure to protect someone from violence absent a special custodial or other relationship created or assumed by the state.

Williams v. Horace M. Kimel, Jr. · filed 1988-07-27

Absent "some special custodial or other relationship[] created or assumed by the state in respect of particular persons," a failure to provide protection from violence is not actionable under Sec. 1983. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir.1983). As Kimel does not stand in a special custodial relationship to plaintiff, his alleged failure to respond to plaintiff's complaints of danger does not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A private contractor acts under color of state law when it carries out a publicly owned and government-funded project with significant municipal involvement and deprives a minority subcontractor of federally protected benefits.

Brant Construction Co. v. Lumen Construction Inc. · filed 1987-11-23

The trial court's finding was ... supported by evidence that the project was built on land owned by the City of Valparaiso and funded by federal, state and city monies. That evidence and the testimony of John Hardwick, the City Engineer for Valparaiso, regarding the involvement of the City and the Board of Public Works and Safety in the project and the MBE requirements for the project set out by the E.P.A. not only supported a § 1983 claim but also supported the trial court's finding that Brant had carried out a governmentally-supported project in such a way as to deprive Lumen of its right to make and enforce contracts and to the benefits of the MBE program set up by the E.P.A.

A private service provider's receipt of public funds and contractual relationship with a city do not alone create the state action required by Section 1983.

Gilmer v. City of Cleveland · filed 1985-09-19

The undisputed facts demonstrate that this relationship is merely that of a contractor providing services for a governmental entity. Therefore, the relationship alone does not create the requisite state action necessary for a claim under 42 U.S.C. sl983.

Section 1983 reaches private institutions whose custodial actions are sufficiently entwined with the State to constitute action under color of state law.

Perez v. Jule M. Sugarman, and New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill · filed 1974-12-03

In this case the appellee institutions, concededly private in nature, contend that their actions in detaining the appellant’s children do not constitute “state action” but rather the action of private parties wholly without the purview of Section 1983. For the reasons developed below, we disagree, and we conclude that under the circumstances here the actions of the institutional defendants did constitute “state action” and therefore the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations of constitutional rights carried out through a custom or usage, and a private organization acting as a municipality’s agent in performing a public function is subject to its obligations.

North Shore Right to Life Committee v. Manhasset American Legion Post No. 304 · filed 1978-06-09

The Civil Rights Act itself prohibits deprivation of constitutional rights by “custom or usage” as well as by statute, ordinance, or regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As the organizer of a public function on public property, the American Legion is acting as the agent or fiduciary of the municipality. It is subject to obligations and responsibilities under the Constitution and Civil Rights Act. ... In organizing this parade, the American Legion stood in the place of the Town of North Hempstead, clothed with its authority. Its denial of plaintiffs’ request constituted state action.

Extensive state regulation of a privately owned public utility does not alone make the utility's credit and service-termination decisions state action under Section 1983.

Moenning v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1985-12-18

Extensive, detailed regulation of a public utility by the State does not, by itself, convert the utility’s action into State action. ... Illinois Bell’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s service was motivated by purely private economic interests. The State receives no direct benefit from enforcement of Illinois Bell’s credit policies. ... We hold that the nexus between the State and Illinois Bell’s conduct was not sufficient to maintain an action under section 1983.

A private athletic association does not act under color of state law merely because public universities fund and belong to it or state law classifies it as a governmental body, absent state involvement in the challenged action.

Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1986-05-16

The Plaintiffs have made no showing that the State of Texas or the state universities which are members of the Defendant associations, acted in any manner which caused the Defendants to deny the Plaintiffs’ request for information. Further, this Court’s ruling that Defendants are governmental bodies under the Act does not compel a finding that Defendants’ action amounted to state action.

A private laboratory does not act under color of state law merely by scientifically testing physical evidence for a government investigation.

Nygren v. Predovich · filed 1986-06-25

I cannot find, however, that scientific testing of physical evidence constitutes a traditional state function.

A private institution acts under color of state law when it assumes the state's delegated responsibility to provide residential care to mentally disabled persons.

Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc. · filed 1987-12-30

Where the state chooses to delegate these responsibilities, and an institution or other private entity chooses to assume them, neither the state nor the private entity may assert that the entity’s acts and omissions do not occur under color of state law.

Under § 1983, whether a private fire company is a state actor under the public-function doctrine requires a fact-intensive inquiry into how the state views firefighting, and disputed facts cannot be resolved through unsupported judicial notice on summary judgment.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Company Of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-10-04

The cases inform the analysis in two ways: first, the determination is a factually intense analysis; and second, its outcome hinges on how a given state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity. ... Haavistola and the Fire Company should be allowed to introduce evidence as to the function of fire protection in Maryland rather than be bound by the district court's own unexplained conclusions. ... A dispute such as this cannot be resolved based on unsubstantiated judicial notice on summary judgment.

Under section 1983, whether a private volunteer fire company performs an exclusively public function requires a fact-specific inquiry into the state's treatment of fire protection, and summary judgment is inappropriate when material facts remain disputed.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun · filed 1993-10-04

Review of the preceding precedents and decisions does little to simplify the issue of when a private entity assumes the role of state actor due to its involvement or provision of an exclusive public function. The cases inform the analysis in two ways: first, the determination is a factually intense analysis; and second, its outcome hinges on how a given state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity. ... The district court’s analysis is flawed in that it draws factual conclusions inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment and that it makes a determination about the status of fire protection as a public function in Maryland without any direct evidence as to how fire protection is conducted throughout the State. ... Without establishing these facts as undisputed in the record, the district court erred by granting summary judgment as there remains a genuine issue of material fact.

Section 1983 does not treat private participants in involuntary commitments in Puerto Rico as state actors under the public function test because involuntary commitment is not exclusively a state function there.

Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hospital San Juan Capestrano · filed 2005-05-31

Because involuntary commitment is a function that is and has been routinely performed by private parties in Puerto Rico, Estades' public function argument as it relates to involuntary commitment fails.

Section 1983 does not treat private participation in involuntary commitment in Puerto Rico as state action under the public function test because involuntary commitment has not been reserved exclusively to the state there.

No. 04-1792 · filed 2005-05-31

There can be no finding of state action under the public function test in connection with Estades' involuntary commitment. This is because involuntary commitment is not a function that is or has been reserved exclusively to the state in Puerto Rico, and therefore, Appellees, in pursuing or otherwise participating in Estades' commitment, could not have performed a public function within the meaning of this test.

Section 1983 does not treat a private animal shelter’s volunteer program as state action under the public function test because operating it is not a function exclusively reserved to the state.

Lynch v. Southampton Animal Shelter Foundation Inc. · filed 2013-09-19

The Court finds that the operation of an animal shelter, including its volunteer program, is not a function exclusively-reserved to the state. ... In sum, the Plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 civil rights claim under the public function test. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants summary judgment with respect to this issue.

Under the public function test, § 1983 liability requires a private adoption agency to perform a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state.

Dahn v. Adoption Alliance · filed 2016-02-17

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that these Defendants acted under color of state law through the public function test.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities when a past disciplinary action has continuing effects.

Gomes v. University of Maine System · filed 2004-02-23

In the Court’s view, taking the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the request for injunctive relief to expunge the adverse actions from their academic records would meet applicable standards for the granting of injunc-tive relief, since the University’s record of discipline, though recorded in the past, has an ongoing and prospective effect.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against a state official who has no immunity from such relief.

Jackson v. Millstone · filed 2002-06-21

Furthermore, regarding Taurus’s action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that the defendant-respondent Director of the Medical Care Financing and Compliance Administration has no immunity from prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state, but allows an official-capacity claim against state officials for declaratory relief while barring a claim for refunds of previously collected fees.

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPEN. DRIVERS v. Anthony · filed 1994-07-05

Dismissal was properly granted as to the State of Oklahoma. Likewise, dismissal was proper as to the remaining Defendants/Appellees to the extent Appellants' § 1983 claims sought anything other than declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for monetary relief.

Buford v. Holladay · filed 1992-02-20

State officials, therefore, may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief under Section 1983, and may be sued in their individual capacities for monetary relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against a state officer seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees without damages.

Lucchesi v. State · filed 1990-09-06

In addition, a state officer may be sued in his official capacity under § 1983 if, as here, a plaintiff seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees and does not seek any damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against a state or its officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 1990-08-02

Monetary compensation is thus not available to the plaintiff because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 is violated when state officials, acting in their official capacities, deprive people of constitutional rights.

Wade v. Kane · filed 1978-03-29

By depriving plaintiffs and others of their constitutional rights by acts done in their official capacity, defendants’ actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement relief against individual state officials sued in their official capacities for proven constitutional employment discrimination.

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District · filed 1977-07-01

Plaintiffs’ case having been proven on the merits, reinstatement under a § 1983 cause of action against the individual defendants in their official capacities is available.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against higher public officials who supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Farber v. Rochford · filed 1975-11-25

Injunctive relief against higher public officials is available in situations where they have been found to supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages from state officials in their individual capacities for unconstitutional deprivations caused by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

West v. Keve · filed 1978-02-15

On February 6, 1976, plaintiff filed a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 alleging that defendants, acting under color of state law, had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in denying him medical treatment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the complaint, as supplemented by docket entry 9, supra, states a claim for damages against the defendants in their individual capacities. ... Therefore, the damage claim was improperly dismissed.

Section 1983 authorizes judgment and a permanent injunction against a state official who enforces an unconstitutional state statute.

General Foods Corp. v. Priddle · filed 1983-08-09

Judgment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, shall therefore be entered for the plaintiff in this case. Defendant Brace Rowley is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the Kansas filled dairy products act.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 damages and retroactive monetary relief against a state agency and state officials in their official capacities, while prospective injunctive claims may proceed.

Elliott v. Hinds · filed 1983-10-24

Accordingly, and based on the above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED as to all claims for damages and retroactive monetary relief. This matter will go forward on the regular court docket on those injunctive claims of a solely prospective nature. SO ORDERED.

Section 1983 permits suits against public officials to vindicate constitutional rights, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar declaratory relief against officials sued in their individual capacities.

Bennett v. Lopeman · filed 1984-12-04

and embraces its theory: without a means to sue public officials, individuals would be denied the very mechanism contemplated under § 1983 to vindicate their rights. (Since the instant action seeks only declaratory relief and the state defendants are named only in their individual capacities, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action.

A section 1983 claim cannot obtain retroactive compensation or equitable restitution from a state's treasury, although a federal court may prospectively enjoin state officials to correct an ongoing constitutional deficiency.

B.H. Papasan, Superintendent of Education v. United States of America · filed 1985-05-21

Such relief was retroactive in character and satisfiable only from the Mississippi treasury. ... A federal court can enjoin state officials to correct a constitutional deficiency or eliminate an unconstitutional status even though expenditures incident to that order will expend themselves on the public treasury.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 suit seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials for enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional law.

Nordgren v. Hafter · filed 1985-08-27

However, because the instant case presents only claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against individual state officials, the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity is unavailable.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 claim against a state official seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief for an alleged ongoing constitutional violation.

Gilbert Central Corp. v. Kemp · filed 1986-06-13

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, and it alleges that defendant’s actions are contrary to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, defendant is stripped of any eleventh amendment immunity.

In a Section 1983 equitable action, state officials may be ordered to take action necessary to remedy an established constitutional violation even if they did not directly cause it.

Libby v. Marshall · filed 1986-11-26

Plaintiffs have certain constitutional rights and state action is necessary to vindicate those rights. A federal court has authority to order the state defendants to take the necessary action even though there is no allegation that the state defendants directly caused the constitutional violation in the first place.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities when they are responsible for the challenged conduct, without requiring that they personally committed it.

Horace Luckey, III v. Joe Frank Harris, Governor · filed 1988-11-23

Personal action by defendants individually is not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged action.

Section 1983 provides no basis for prospective relief against officials in their personal capacities when only actions taken in their official capacities could affect the plaintiff’s asserted property interests.

DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills · filed 1989-06-29

Plaintiffs similarly failed to propose any legal basis for their obtaining injunctive relief against the individual defendants acting in their personal capacities. The plaintiffs have still not explained how prospective relief from this Court against the individual defendants in their personal capacities could protect the plaintiffs’ property interests.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials who have not been sued specifically in their individual capacities.

James Taylor, Jr. v. Ronald G. Shull Melody A.P. Wallace Charles Green Edward Nakfoor · filed 1990-05-02

The defendant state officials are not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983 because they were not sued specifically in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery of monetary damages from state officials in this context.

Tate v. Brown · filed 1990-05-03

The only remaining claim is one for monetary damages, which may not be recovered from state officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against Guam officials in their official capacities to prevent enforcement of an unconstitutional law.

Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada · filed 1990-10-13

Similarly, and relying again on the reasoning of Ex parte Young and its progeny, the Court finds that § 1983 provides an independent ground to permanently enjoin defendants Governor Ada, Attorney General Barrett-Anderson, and Dr. Espal-dón from enforcing any of the provisions of Public Law 20-134.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials who are not sued in their individual capacities.

Holland v. William Seabold, Michael Samberg, Wayne Dunn · filed 1991-02-04

It should also be noted that Holland failed to sue the defendants in their individual capacities; therefore, the defendants are not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 limits relief against a State to injunctions and declarations absent congressional abrogation or the State’s waiver of immunity.

Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton · filed 1991-02-25

Section 1983 limits remedies against the State, in the absence of congressional abrogation or the State’s waiver of immunity, to injunctive and declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits claims for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity.

Trinsey v. COM. OF PA., DEPT. OF STATE · filed 1991-06-10

Moreover, civil rights plaintiffs may pursue Section 1983 claims for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking monetary damages from state officials to plead the capacity in which they are sued; without that pleading, the officials are not subject to suit.

Boswell v. Ray Toombs, Beverly Williams, Dana Hartman · filed 1991-06-14

Boswell failed to plead the capacity in which he sued the defendants as he is affirmatively required to do. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, because Boswell only sought monetary damages from the defendants, they are not subject to suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities, but does not permit retroactive back pay in such suits.

Dachenhausen v. Crosson · filed 1992-03-25

Generally, the State and State agencies are not amenable to suit for deprivation of constitutional rights (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58) and, while State officials acting in their official capacities, such as here, are subject to suits for injunctive relief under said statute, such can only be prospective, not retroactive (see, supra, at 71, n 10). Thus petitioners would not be able to obtain back pay under a 1983 action, but only prospective appointment to Senior Court Clerk or reappointment to Associate Court Clerk.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief directed at future conduct.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1993-03-25

Because the Court’s prohibition of this conduct would constitute prospective in-junctive relief, Plaintiff might be able to amend the complaint to state facts which support a Section 1983 claim against Nuc-kolls in his official capacity.

Under § 1983, an Indiana circuit court clerk is a state official excluded from official-capacity damages liability but subject to prospective injunctive relief, and qualified immunity bars personal damages liability for retaining support-payment interest when the unlawfulness was not clearly established.

Winters v. Mowery · filed 1993-11-04

We find that Parsons controls this case and that Mowery is not a “person” subject to suit in her official capacity under § 1983. ... We find that Mowery has not violated “clearly established” law by her actions and should not be liable in her individual capacity for damages because a reasonable person could have believed that retention of interest income on funds held in the public treasury was lawful. ... With regard to plaintiffs’ suit for injunctive relief, a person can be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief and would be deemed a “person” under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective injunctive relief are not treated as actions against the State.

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Goss v. Sullivan · filed 1993-12-06

Further, because an action against state officials acting in their official capacities is in actuality an action against the State, such individuals are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore are not subject to suit under that statute.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Coeur D'alene Tribe Of Idaho v. State Of Idaho · filed 1994-12-09

Injunctive relief is available against state officials in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state judge, but equity and comity can warrant denying that relief when it would intrude on state judicial proceedings.

Hoover v. Wagner · filed 1995-03-06

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-36, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1974-78, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), held that such relief may be sought against a state judge in a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. But the Court made clear that the power was to be reserved for "really extraordinary causes," id. at 538, 104 S.Ct. at 1979, citing with approval (id. at 539 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 1979 n. 20) O'Shea v. Littleton, supra. ... O'Shea is strong support for affirming the rejection of the relief sought by our plaintiffs against the state court judge.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officers acting in their official capacities.

Remlinger v. State of Nev. · filed 1995-07-31

Injunctive relief is available under § 1983 against state officers acting in their official capacities, and one of the defendants here is Molini, who is the official with authority to hire and fire that Division's employees, including Remlinger.

Section 1983 injunctive relief cannot halt a coercive state administrative proceeding involving an important state interest when the proceeding began before substantial progress in the Section 1983 action and permits litigation of constitutional claims.

Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co. v. Angoff · filed 1995-10-24

Here the proceedings are clearly coercive, the administrative action began before the issues were joined in the § 1983 action, and Missouri has an important interest in preventing unfair discrimination by licensed insurance companies. In addition, the constitutional issues may be preserved before the administrative agency and litigated by way of judicial review. Applying the Younger principle, as reiterated in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the remedy of injunction pursuant to § 1983 may not be relied on to impede the administrative proceeding.

Section 1983 permits an injunction suit against state agency directors even when they are far removed from the actions of agency employees.

Futernick v. Sumpter Township · filed 1996-04-25

The directors also argue that only the officer with immediate control over the challenged act or omission is amenable to § 1983. We find this claim ridiculous. Such a rule would allow a state agency to avoid, or defer, liability merely by transferring the defendant in a particular case, or by changing the scope of the defendant official's authority.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official for prospective injunctive relief, including job reinstatement.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1997-12-15

However, there is one exception to this general rule: When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a "person" for § 1983 purposes. ... Rather, reinstatement is a legitimate request for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits money damages against officials in their personal capacities, but the Eleventh Amendment bars money damages against a state.

Roniger v. McCall · filed 1998-09-15

Money damages are available under § 1983 only in suits brought against officials in their personal capacities, since money damages against a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Harrison v. Coffman · filed 1999-01-25

The claim for injunctive relief (reinstatement) properly remains in the case, despite the Eleventh Amendment rights of the State of Arkansas. ... Another case cited by defendants, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), reaffirms the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment defense to injunctive claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a state official for prospective relief designed to end a constitutional violation.

KHODARA ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. EX REL. EAGLE v. Beckman · filed 1999-03-31

Under the jurisprudential principles that have grown out of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), state officials may be subjected to suit under § 1983 where the relief is prospective only and is designed to end a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a discharged state employee to sue state officials in their personal capacities in state court.

East Mississippi State Hospital v. Callens · filed 1999-10-26

We simply clarify today that when an individual, such as Dr. Callens, is discharged by a state agency, and that individual, as a result of such discharge, asserts a claim actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against one or more state officials in their personal (individual) capacities, that claim may be appropriately asserted via an action commenced in our state courts.

Section 1983 damages claims against state prison officials lie only against them in their personal capacities.

Cruz v. Giovanny Gomez, I/o and Classification Committee · filed 2000-01-26

The claim for damages lies only against the defendants in their personal capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide a detailed remedial scheme that bars prospective relief against state officials under Ex parte Young.

Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas · filed 2000-04-07

Because there is no detailed statutory remedial scheme available for the § 1983 claims asserted 'by Plaintiffs in the case at bar, the limitation is immaterial.

Section 1983 does not allow a state court to grant injunctive relief against state taxes when taxpayers have an adequate remedy at law.

Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors v. Haller · filed 2001-03-02

The United States Supreme Court has held that state courts may not award either declaratory or injunctive relief against state taxes under section 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy. ... Because OCGA § 48-5-311 provides the Glynn County taxpayers with an adequate remedy at law, we hold that the trial court erred in granting them injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits a suit against state officials in their official capacity for injunctive relief despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Nanda, Navreet v. Bd Trustees Univ IL · filed 2002-09-17

We agree with the district court that, under § 1983, a suit against state officials in their official capacity limited to injunctive relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amend- ment.

Section 1983 permits a permanent injunction against a territorial official in his official capacity to remedy a violation of a federal statutory right.

Berne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2003-05-12

The plaintiffs having established their entitlement to injunctive relief, I will issue a permanent injunction against Roy Martin, in his official capacity as the Tax Assessor for the Government of the Virgin Islands, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enjoining Martin from assessing any of the named plaintiffs real properties until he establishes a rehable and credible system that will appraise real property consistently at its actual, market value in compliance with 48 U.S.C. § 1401a.

Section 1983 permits suits against public officials to enjoin violations of constitutional rights.

Bouffier v. Frank · filed 1975-02-19

It has consistently been held, however, since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), that suits may be brought against public officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against local officials to halt unconstitutional jail conditions.

Miller v. Dale Carson, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of Duval County, Florida · filed 1977-11-23

The plaintiffs’ 1983 action was proper: it sought injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions rather than money damages from a nonperson.

State officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Cyrus Ex Rel. McSweeney v. Walker · filed 2005-01-26

However, as indicated by Plaintiffs, Will explicitly recognizes that cases seeking prospective, injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official capacities are permitted. ... Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to Defendant’s contention that she is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacity.

Greenawalt v. Indiana Department of Corrections, William K. Kromann, and Kathy J. Lisby · filed 2005-02-14

But the error is of no consequence because section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual as distinct from their official capacity.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Peter v. Johnson · filed 1997-03-26

Because the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against the State defendants in their official capacities for alleged violations of federal law, the court concludes that the § 1983 claims against the state defendants are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against supervisory officials for a pattern of constitutional violations only when their affirmative involvement is proved.

Lewis v. Hyland · filed 1977-04-19

What we hold here is that in this case, absent proof of affirmative involvement in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations by supervisory officials, injunctive relief may not issue against them.

Section 1983 can support an injunction against a state civil action when the Dombrowski requirements are met; a chilling effect alone is insufficient.

Wallace v. Brewer · filed 1970-06-09

It is also clear that Dombrowski relief is not limited to state criminal prosecutions, but also is applicable to state civil actions. ... In this case these elements are not present; only the action itself is challenged as infringing upon plaintiffs’ first amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not permit an injunction against supervisory police officials based on a pattern of constitutional violations without proof of their affirmative involvement.

Lewis v. Hyland · filed 1977-03-25

What we hold here is that in this case, absent proof of affirmative involvement in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations by supervisory officials, injunctive relief may not issue against them.

Section 1983 permits a governor to be sued for injunctive relief for a federal constitutional violation.

Duncan v. State · filed 2009-06-11

The Governor can thus be sued for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which makes clear that equitable relief is available for a federal constitutional violation and that, if there is any limitation on granting injunctive relief, the limitation pertains only to judicial officers.

Section 1983 does not permit equitable relief against state officers sued in their individual capacities.

Jones v. Buckner · filed 2013-08-09

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 to end continuing violations of his federal rights and prevent future violations of his federal rights. However, state officers may only be sued in their individual capacity for money damages under the statute.

Section 1983 allows prospective injunctive relief against a state official to enforce federal law even when compliance may require spending state funds.

Farrington v. Adjutant General of State of Mich. · filed 1980-07-02

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of back benefits because the State had not waived its sovereign immunity, see, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), and that plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 must be dismissed because the State is not a “person” for purposes of that statute. ... The relief sought by plaintiff is no different than that requested in Barnes. This court is being asked to sever the allegedly unconstitutional portion of a statute from the body of the statute, and to then enjoin the defendant official so that he will comply with the law. This is prospective relief, and it is within this court’s power to grant it, even if it has the ancillary effect of making defendant adjutant general spend more money from the state treasury than he would have under his previous course of conduct. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 permits a claim for injunctive relief compelling state officials to comply with federal law only when they are sued in their official capacities.

Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine · filed 2017-09-29

As a result, we hold that when a plaintiff in a § 1983 action seeks injunctive relief to compel state officials to com- ply with federal law, the claim is available only against a state official sued in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law; allegations of past conduct without an ongoing violation or future harm do not support that relief.

Delgado v. Ocasio · filed 2019-08-27

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that an exception to the Eleventh Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity from suit existed to permit a plaintiff to sue a state official acting in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief for continuing violations of federal law. ... Thus, there are no allegations of an ongoing violation of the plaintiff’s right to medical or mental health treatment for injuries that he suffered as a result of the force used by the defendants in May 2017. Nor are there allegations that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the future if his request for relief is not granted. Accordingly, the request for injunctive relief against defendants Colby, St. John, Thibodeau, and Ocasio is dismissed.

State officers sued for prospective relief under § 1983 must be responsible for the alleged ongoing violation and have authority to remedy it.

Smith v. Demory · filed 2020-03-12

Therefore, the state officer being sued must have both the responsibility for the alleged ongoing violations of federal law and the authority to provide prospective redress for those alleged violations. ... Smith’s allegations do not indicate that either Jacumin or Phyall have authority to provide for relief, as they have no role in setting jail policy.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief against a state official only in an official-capacity suit.

Henderson v. Hannah · filed 2020-07-31

A plaintiff may seek injunctive relief under Section 1983 only by suing a state official in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional-violation finding for a prisoner’s delayed release only when the delay is unreasonable.

Burgess v. Roth · filed 1975-01-09

Only an unreasonable delay in a prisoner’s release will result in the tort of false imprisonment. Only such a delay will justify a finding of a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides damages when established state practices prolong a prisoner’s confinement past the correct release date without a meaningful hearing.

Haygood v. Evelle J. Younger, and Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour · filed 1985-08-27

For these reasons, we hold that Haygood has stated a § 1983 claim for damages for denial of liberty without due process of law.

Section 1983 claims challenging lethal injection protocols may be dismissed for unreasonable delay when the claim was available earlier.

Arthur v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections · filed 2008-07-29

Specifically, we have observed that Arthur was on notice that a § 1983 challenge to Alabama's lethal injection protocol was available as early as June or August 2006.

Section 1983 claims challenging city actions remain subject to Arkansas’s required appeal procedures, even when the city council could not have addressed the alleged constitutional violations.

Talley v. City of North Little Rock · filed 2009-12-03

One additional argument that warrants discussion is appellant’s assertion that his causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not have been addressed by the city council, so District Court Rule 9 does not apply to those claims. ... We also note that whether the city council could have addressed appellant’s alleged constitutional violations is of no moment, as appellant was still required to appeal the City’s actions upon which those allegations were based pursuant to the proper procedures.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for pursuing an available state-court appeal.

Resources for Human Development, Inc. v. Furber · filed 1975-01-22

What we are faced with here is an attempt by plaintiffs to utilize the Civil Rights Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a substitute for the right of appeal in State Court. Having initiated the state judicial process by appealing first from the Board’s denial of the request for a special exception and then from the order of the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, plaintiffs must pursue their claims through the State Courts.

Section 1983 does not permit a litigant to use a federal district-court action to circumvent the obligation to seek direct Supreme Court review of a state court’s disciplinary order.

Rivera v. Monge · filed 1978-12-01

This complaint in essence seeks review of a state court’s disciplinary order, although it is couched in terms of a suit against the individual members of the court. Appellant “cannot invoke the provisions of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act in federal district court so as to circumvent and avoid his obligation to seek direct review in the United States Supreme Court.”

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal from a state-court decision.

Vorbeck v. Whaley · filed 1979-10-18

As to plaintiff’s civil rights claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not designed to be used as a substitute for the right of appeal.

A plaintiff who fails to timely pursue the state-law procedure for obtaining judicial review of an administrative suspension decision is barred from proceeding on a Section 1983 claim raised in the same complaint.

Roark v. City of New Albany · filed 1984-07-26

This is true of Roark's complaint even though, as amended, it included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City had violated his civil rights by suspending him.

Section 1983 confines a federal court to deciding whether federally protected rights were violated and does not authorize it to retry the merits of a fair county employment grievance hearing.

Stermetz v. Harper · filed 1985-07-23

Instead, this court is confined to determining whether any of plaintiff’s “federally protected rights” have been violated. ... After having determined that he was entitled to a hearing and that he got an eminently fair one, the court’s function is complete.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain lower-federal-court review of a final state-court judgment.

Carbonell v. Louisiana Dept. Of Health & Human Resources, Secretary of the Louisiana Dept. Of Health & Human Resou · filed 1985-10-03

A federal district court, as a court of limited original jurisdiction, lacks power to review, modify or nullify a final order of a state court. Nor can a party, aggrieved by a judicial decision of a state’s highest court, invest a lower federal court with such jurisdiction by clothing his or her grievance in the garb of § 1983 and alleging that the decision of the state court deprived him or her of constitutionally protected rights or inter-ests____ A party seeking relief from such an allegedly unconstitutional action by a state court may seek review in only one federal court — the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to relitigate issues decided by a state supreme court; the federal remedy is direct review in the United States Supreme Court.

Fleming v. W. Bedford Moore, Iii, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Amicus Curiae · filed 1985-12-26

Fleming has, on two occasions, attacked the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia by petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. This, of course, was the appropriate, procedure. We detect nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would permit a federal court to relitigate the libel issues under circumstances present here.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district-court review of state divorce rulings; those rulings must be challenged through the state appellate system and ultimately the Supreme Court.

James E.M. Spencer v. Jessie L. Spencer, Mildred Hassell, Nathan T. Everett, Mitchell Norton, Judge Hardison · filed 1987-10-30

The proper method of challenging rulings or actions by the state court is, however, by appeal within the state system, and ultimately by petition to the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to act as an appellate tribunal over state eviction proceedings after the plaintiff has received and used available state procedures.

Goodman v. Shepard Ellenberg Associates · filed 1987-12-02

Here, Goodman has availed herself of the full array of state court procedures in her attempt to establish her right to remain in her apartment. She has not asserted, and her complaint cannot be construed to state, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation has standing to sue under § 1983 for deprivation of its constitutional rights.

Hamilton v. Lokuta · filed 1992-09-30

Because Jo-Bet is suing for a deprivation of its rights under the fourth amendment through the fourteenth amendment and section 1983, it has standing.

Section 1983 permits a union to sue when the union and its members are constitutionally injured by the same conduct.

Elk Grove Firefighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis · filed 1975-01-29

In this case, the unions have had both a First Amendment and pecuniary injury, and those injuries are logically related to the defendants’ conduct. The same is true of the injuries suffered, allegedly, by the union members. Accordingly, where a union and its members are coincidentally constitutionally injured by the same conduct, the union has standing to sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against officials sued individually when each defendant, acting in the performance of official duties, in bad faith deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Muir v. County Council of Sussex County · filed 1975-03-14

In order for plaintiff to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the three Councilmen in their individual capacities, he must have established by a preponderance of the evidence that each defendant in bad faith exercised his discretion in the performance of his official duties to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right.

A political committee lacks standing under Section 1983 to challenge reapportionment when it alleges no injury to its members’ right of association and does not represent their interests.

Suffolk County Democratic Committee v. Gaffney · filed 1993-09-10

Neither does the Committee have standing to assert a civil rights cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 since the Committee does not assert that the reapportionment plan effects an injury to its members right of association ... nor is it representing its members’ interests ... .

Section 1983 does not allow an organization to sue solely for violations of its members’ rights; an associational-rights claim must also involve the organization’s own associational interests.

American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Shiffrin · filed 1999-03-31

American Charities’ articulation of its “right to associate” claim in no way involves the associational interests of the organization itself and thus it lacks standing under § 1983 to sue on behalf of its members under its current description of its association claim.

Section 1983 permits an organization to sue for violations of its own civil rights but generally does not permit it to assert its members’ personal claims.

Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie · filed 2002-04-29

Thus, while NYTWA may bring a § 1983 claim for alleged violations of the organization’s own civil rights, it has no standing to assert the § 1983 claims of its members.

Section 1983 does not give an organization standing based on expenses it incurs processing police misconduct claims.

Calvin v. James B. Conlisk, Jr., Etc. · filed 1976-04-27

The organizations’ other alleged basis for standing, viz., that they will incur expenses in processing claims of police misconduct unless the federal equity court intervenes, assuming this amounts to injury in fact, ... is not within the zone of interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows an organization to sue for its own injury if it independently satisfies Article III standing.

Nnebe Ex Rel. Amin v. Daus · filed 2011-03-25

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

An organization may bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf if it independently satisfies Article III standing requirements.

Nnebe v. Daus · filed 2011-04-07

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

An organization may bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf if it independently satisfies Article III standing requirements.

Nnebe v. Daus · filed 2011-05-31

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

Section 1983 makes the rights it secures personal to the injured person, so an organization lacks standing to assert those rights on behalf of its members.

Steel Institute v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-21

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on behalf of its members.

Section 1983 does not allow organizations to sue in a representative capacity for alleged violations of their members’ rights.

Kwong v. Bloomberg · filed 2012-03-26

However, because this is a § 1983 action, the organizational plaintiffs may not sue in a representative capacity for the alleged violations of rights of their members.

An organization cannot assert § 1983 claims on behalf of its members because the rights the section secures are personal to those injured.

Kiryas Joel Alliance v. Village of Kiryas Joel · filed 2012-09-10

Moreover, because “the rights [§ 1983] secures [are] personal to those purportedly injured,” organizations lack standing to assert § 1983 claims on behalf of their members.

An organization suing under Section 1983 must assert its own rights, rather than the rights of its members.

New York State Citizens' Coalition for Children v. Velez · filed 2015-10-29

When an organization brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, this Circuit has held that it must do so on its own behalf, rather than that of its members.

An organization suing under Section 1983 cannot rely on its members’ standing and must establish its own injury.

Singh v. Joshi · filed 2016-01-26

The Court notes, however, that "an organization does not have standing to assert the rights of its members in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

An organization bringing a Section 1983 claim must establish standing in its own right rather than assert its members’ rights.

Rest. Law Ctr. v. City of N.Y. · filed 2019-02-06

Accordingly, Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing in their own right, and not on a theory that they are acting on behalf of their members.

In the Second Circuit, an organization may sue under § 1983 for its own injury, but not on behalf of its members.

Christa Mcauliffe Intermediate School Pto v. De Blasio · filed 2019-03-04

In the Second Circuit, however, an organization only has standing to sue under § 1983 on its own behalf, not that of its members.

Section 1983 does not allow organizations to assert claims on behalf of their members because the rights it protects are personal to those injured.

Christa McAuliffe Intermediate School PTO, Inc. v. De Blasio · filed 2019-12-20

First, the organizational plaintiffs bringing this appeal do not have standing to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of their members.

Section 1983 claims are governed by federal law rather than being controlled by state law.

Bergstralh v. Gayle Lowe and City of Bend, Oregon · filed 1975-02-18

The vindication of federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be determined by federal law.

The scope of an evidentiary privilege in a § 1983 civil-rights action is governed by federal law.

Breed v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Lionel Taylor and Henry Parker, · filed 1976-09-29

The scope of an evidentiary privilege in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is a question of federal law.