42 U.S.C. § 1983

Federal privilege law governs a § 1983 action because state law does not supply the rule of decision.

McArthur v. Robinson · filed 1983-07-22

Since a section 1983 action is not an action wherein state law supplies the rule of decision, it would seem that federal law governs. ... The Court holds that federal law applies.

State tort-claim notice requirements do not apply to federal § 1983 actions.

Cain v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-10-02

It already has been determined that the notice provisions of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act are not applicable to federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982), since the Tort Immunity Act was intended to apply to common law tort claims as opposed to quasi-tort actions of a constitutional nature.

Federal common-law tort and damages principles govern recovery under § 1983.

Jeffrey Watts, Cross-Appellee v. James Laurent, Youth Supervisor Ii., Cross · filed 1985-11-01

Federal common law principles of tort and damages govern recovery under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for an arrest made under a warrant valid on its face or for minimal force incident to that arrest.

Bur v. Gilbert · filed 1976-06-23

In contrast, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, the relevant inquiry is not into whether or not there was probable cause to make the arrest, but whether or not the warrant pursuant to which the arrest was made was valid. ... The Court must conclude in the circumstances of this case that the defendants’ arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to the authority of the warrant in question was not violative of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and that the plaintiff can thus not recover under § 1983. ... Granted, a minimal battery and handcuffing incident to arrest might well be offensive to the sensibilities of a responsible and law-abiding citizen. But given that the initial arrest has been determined to have been a deprivation of liberty in accordance with due process, the secondary effects of the use of minimal force incident to that arrest is not violative of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor can it be said that such force amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against a public defender’s investigator acting solely to assist the defense of an accused in the judicial process.

Waits v. Hon. Raymond McGowan A. J. S. C., Monmouth County · filed 1975-04-30

In view of the allegations in this record that Gearity was acting solely in the course of his employment as an investigator for a public defender, working as a member of the bar in representing Waits as defendant in a state criminal prosecution (see first sentence of second paragraph under C below), we have concluded that he is immune from this suit. ... In the same way, an investigator of the public defender has no power to deprive anyone of his or her rights. The only function of such an investigator is to assist in the defense of the accused, a function directly related to the judicial process.

A covenant releasing § 1983 claims against public officials in exchange for dismissal of pending criminal charges is void as against public policy.

Bernard E. Rumery, Jr. v. Town of Newton, Etc. · filed 1985-12-02

We hold that a covenant not to sue public officials for alleged violations of constitutional rights, negotiated in exchange for a decision not to prosecute the claimant on criminal charges, is void as against public policy.

Section 1983 liability for unjustified detention requires knowledge of the sentencing problem and its risk, deliberate indifference, and a causal connection to the detention.

Royal v. Durison · filed 2004-05-26

To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the contention that the sentence the prisoner is serving has been incorrectly calculated and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted.

Section 1983 permits liability for an individual's own actions and, in limited circumstances, for the actions of subordinates.

Holloman Ex Rel. Holloman v. Harland · filed 2004-05-28

There are two ways in which an individual may be held liable under § 1983—he may be sued for his own personal actions (“direct liability”), or, under certain limited circumstances, for the actions of his subordinates (“supervisoral liability”), see, e.g., Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 imposes federal liability on governmental defendants only when their conduct constitutes constitutionally forbidden mistreatment, rather than merely unfair or arbitrary employee treatment.

Cygnar v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-12-30

One last consideration should be identified at the outset: Section 1983 is not a generalized guaranty of fairness in employee relations. Governmental employers may be mistaken and even arbitrary in dealing with their employees. They may (as Mathis was accused of here) break promises that no early (or wholesale) personnel changes will take place. But governmental defendants will not be subject to federal liability unless their conduct masks constitutionally forbidden mistreatment (such as politically- or racially-motivated mistreatment).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federally guaranteed rights under color of state law, including conduct by state officials within or beyond their authority.

Shrader v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. · filed 2005-02-25

It does not follow, however, that § 1983 provides a remedy only if a state official acts outside the scope of his or her employment. On the contrary, § 1983 imposes liability on state officials for conduct taken within, as well as "without[,] the scope of their authority." Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 12, 15 (D.Me.1970).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim based solely on coercive police interrogation that produces an involuntary confession.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2005-02-28

After Chavez, it is clear that the mere act of coercing a confession is not a Fifth Amendment violation upon which a § 1983 claim may be predicated.

Section 1983 imposes liability based on a violation of federal constitutional rights rather than an administrative provision or state law.

McCabe v. Mais · filed 2008-10-02

Defendant Mais is liable to Plaintiff McCabe for the damages that Plaintiff McCabe suffered as a direct result of Defendant Mais’s violation of the Fourth Amendment — not the Policy or any other administrative or state-law provision. Cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-95, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (reiterating that liability in a § 1983 action turns on whether the defendant violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional rights, not whether the defendant ran afoul of some administrative provision or state law).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state for merely knowingly tolerating segregation without affirmative conduct supporting or authorizing it.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1995-03-27

Since we are unable to find, after an exhaustive inquiry, conduct on the part of the State which would satisfactorily distinguish this case from Arthur v. Nyquist, and since this case, rather than the Ohio precedents, is controlling on this Court, we answer in the negative the question of whether the State may be held liable for knowingly tolerating, ie., for not proceeding aggressively against, the de jure segregation that existed in the Yonkers schools.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Cole v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD. · filed 2011-07-26

As it turns out, discovery has not yielded facts sufficient to establish a case for section 1983 liability, so Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and action under color of state law, and permits municipal liability for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom.

McCarthy v. Barrett · filed 2011-07-26

“Liability under section 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.” ... In order to succeed on this claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a person deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the person acted under color of state law when doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when an official policy, practice, or custom causes the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal rights violations and permits liability under specific conditions, including limited failure-to-train claims.

Mohney v. Pennsylvania · filed 2011-08-19

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for the violation of rights created by federal law. ... To state a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged wrongful conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Both elements must be simultaneously present to sustain a claim. ... Generally, in order to establish supervisory liability against government officials in their individual capacities under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officials were personally involved in the commission of the conduct alleged. ... However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a second theory of supervisory liability in that “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of ‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, Defendants are not correct in asserting that personal involvement is a necessary element of a viable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that each defendant, acting with intent, deliberate indifference, or gross negligence, deprived him of meaningful periodic reviews during his confinement in administrative segregation.

Selby v. Caruso · filed 2013-10-31

To prove liability under § 1983 at trial, Selby must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that each defendant, acting with intent, deliberate indifference, or gross negligence, deprived him of meaningful periodic reviews during his confinement in administrative segregation.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, including claims against municipalities when a policy or custom caused the deprivation.

Traylor v. Hammond · filed 2015-03-18

“In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” ... Here, Traylor does not allege that Connecticut College is a state actor or a private party that acted under color of state law. ... Thus, Traylor’s Section 1983 Equal Protection claim is being dismissed as to Connecticut College.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right by a person acting under color of state law.

Griego v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2015-04-11

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law and limits county and supervisory liability to specified policy or personal involvement requirements.

Rojero v. El Paso County · filed 2016-04-28

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under § 1983 for the deprivation of civil rights by demonstrating: (1) a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by an individual acting under the color of state law. ... Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights created under federal law.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity and municipal liability requirements.

Parver v. Jet Blue Airlines Corp. · filed 2016-05-04

We need not determine whether the removal was an unconstitutional arrest because the LVMPD officers’ conduct did not violate any “clearly established” law, and they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. ... The district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the individual officers on Parver’s unlawful arrest claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Parver’s remaining § 1983 claims for excessive force against Officer Rodriguez-Gallar and for municipal liability against the LVMPD under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), fail because there was insufficient evidence to support either claim. ... We also affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of JetBlue on Parver’s § 1983 claims because JetBlue was not a joint state actor with the LVMPD officers.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the Younger abstention doctrine.

Anonymous J. v. Bar Ass'n · filed 1975-04-03

However, it is equally clear that section 1983 is not exempted from the Younger abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must wait until available state proceedings that offer an opportunity to raise the federal issue have concluded before federal courts consider that issue.

Dostert v. Neely · filed 1980-09-10

Thus, once state proceedings have begun which offer, at any stage, an opportunity to raise the federal issue in defense or in any other fashion, the federal courts must abstain from considering that issue in a § 1983 action until the state proceedings are concluded.

When a § 1983 action implicates unsettled state-law issues, Pullman abstention may warrant staying the action rather than dismissing it.

Bryant v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ETC. · filed 1982-01-20

Accordingly, defendants’ motions are denied insofar as they seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims on grounds of abstention, and are granted, insofar as they seek, by their request for “such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper,” to have this action placed on the Suspense Docket of this Court.

Section 1983 claims trigger a particularly weighty federal obligation to exercise jurisdiction, though exceptional circumstances may outweigh that concern and support abstention.

Sisler v. West · filed 1983-02-23

The obligation of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction is particularly weighty when a plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as do plaintiffs in this case.

Including a § 1983 claim does not prevent Burford abstention because abstention is not equivalent to requiring exhaustion of state remedies.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Directors of Wisconsin Ins. SEC. Fund · filed 1983-09-07

The fact that plaintiffs have included in their complaint a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not affect the decision to abstain. Abstention is not the equivalent of exhaustion of state court remedies, a requirement that cannot be imposed upon § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 action raising Fourth Amendment issues also pending on direct state criminal appeal warrants federal abstention until the state appellate court decides those issues.

Doby v. Ronald Strength and T.H. Gray · filed 1985-03-06

Nevertheless, abstention is still appropriate. Apparently, Doby raised the Fourth Amendment violations at his state court trial. That conviction is currently being reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Therefore, we believe that federal abstention is proper until the state appellate court has decided the relevant issues.

Although section 1983 authorizes injunctions against state criminal proceedings, federal courts generally must abstain absent proof of bad-faith harassment or similarly great and immediate irreparable harm.

Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster P.C. v. Dearie · filed 1985-07-17

The court has the power to enjoin state criminal proceedings pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42. ... The court finds that injunctive relief would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding, that plaintiff has not shown the bad faith harassment necessary to warrant such interference, and that plaintiff is unlikely to be able to make such a showing. Since there is not a likelihood of eventual success on the merits, and important public interests would be thwarted were the court to grant a preliminary injunction, the motion is denied.

When Younger abstention bars equitable relief in a § 1983 action, the court must separately address the damages claim rather than dismissing the entire action without explanation.

Rakauskas v. William Gargiulo Morris Becker, Mayor Sabrina Kelley John (Tom) Doe, an Unknown Eastlake Officer · filed 1985-11-06

Next, we find that the district court failed to recognize expressly the request for damages or to explain whether it believed that Younger precluded its adjudication of the damages claim. Consequently, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

A federal court should abstain from a Section 1983 action challenging denial of counsel when the claim can be litigated in an ongoing state criminal prosecution and federal intervention would cause obvious federal-state friction.

Mann v. Rita Jett, Ricki MacEy and County of Pima Arizona · filed 1986-02-10

We conclude that abstention is appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Mann can adequately litigate in the ongoing state criminal proceedings his underlying claim of unconstitutional deprivation of counsel, and “the potential for federal-state friction [resulting from federal intervention] is obvious.”

Section 1983 actions are not exempt from abstention, although abstention should not become a de facto exhaustion requirement for substantial constitutional claims.

Coin Call, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1986-04-11

Where as here, however, a plaintiff advances a tenuous constitutional claim, abstention, if applicable, is lawful notwithstanding that jurisdiction is grounded on section 1983.

A federal court should abstain from a Section 1983 challenge that would interfere with pending state criminal proceedings where the plaintiff can present the constitutional issue in state court.

Wilson v. De Bruyn · filed 1986-04-28

The remainder of Wilson’s complaint is dismissed as premature, without prejudice to its renewal (if necessary) at the conclusion of state criminal proceedings.

A federal court should abstain from a section 1983 suit seeking to enjoin a pending coercive state administrative proceeding that implicates an important state interest and permits later judicial review of constitutional claims.

Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. · filed 1986-06-27

We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the cited authorities. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims.

Younger abstention does not invariably require dismissal of a Section 1983 damages action; the federal court may stay the damages claim while related state proceedings continue.

Suggs v. Brannon · filed 1986-11-03

We now hold that Younger does not invariably require dismissal of Sec. 1983 damage actions.

Younger abstention does not invariably require dismissal of a Section 1983 damages action; the federal court may stay the damages claim while related state proceedings continue.

Suggs v. Brannon · filed 1986-11-03

We now hold that ... Younger ... does not invariably require dismissal of § 1983 damage actions.

A federal court may abstain from a Section 1983 institutional-care action when concurrent review could undercut a comprehensive state consent decree covering the same claims.

Hartshorn Ex Rel. Sade v. Heydinger · filed 1986-11-04

The fact remains that there exists a comprehensive and detailed state scheme which may be undercut by concurrent federal court scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that abstention is appropriate.

A Section 1983 claim is not categorically exempt from abstention when unresolved state-law questions may dispose of the case without a federal constitutional ruling.

Holt v. City of Maumelle, Ark. · filed 1986-11-20

The fact that the plaintiff has asserted a § 1983 claim does not prevent the Court from abstaining. Although federal courts have generally regarded vital questions of civil rights as the least likely candidates for abstention, they have repeatedly held that actions brought under the civil rights statutes are not exempt from the abstention doctrine.

A Section 1983 plaintiff invoking bad-faith prosecution as an exception to Younger abstention must allege specific facts supporting an inference of bad faith.

Collins v. County Of Kendall · filed 1986-12-03

A plaintiff asserting bad faith prosecution as an exception to Younger abstention must allege specific facts to support an inference of bad faith.

A Section 1983 plaintiff invoking the bad-faith exception to Younger abstention must show that the state prosecution was brought to retaliate for or deter constitutionally protected activity.

Collins v. County of Kendall · filed 1986-12-03

This specific evidence must show that state prosecution “was brought in bad faith for the purpose of retaliating for or deterring the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”

Younger abstention does not bar Section 1983 damages claims arising from a private state-court contract action that implicates no vital state interest.

Carras v. Williams · filed 1986-12-15

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in abstaining from Carras’ claims for monetary relief.

Although federal courts may enjoin state proceedings in § 1983 actions, Younger abstention bars an injunction against a pending good-faith criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances.

Kelley v. State of Ohio, Judge Gerry L. Hayes, and Timothy Waterson, Defendants · filed 1987-05-20

Although Congress has authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in SS 1983 actions, ... the present action presents no extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant the drastic measure of enjoining a pending state criminal prosecution.

Younger abstention can require dismissal of a § 1983 action challenging an ongoing coercive state administrative proceeding involving an important state interest and adequate state review of constitutional claims.

Ronwin v. Warren B. Dunham, Gordon A. Sweitzer, and Alton B. Chrystal · filed 1987-06-04

We believe that the ... Younger ... doctrine is fully applicable to the pending state administrative proceeding in this case. ... First, the state’s interest in the safety of its roadways is considerable. ... Ronwin also will have an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding.

A federal court may abstain from a § 1983 action that would interfere with pending state quasi-criminal enforcement proceedings when the state forum can hear all federal claims and no Younger exception applies.

Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Municipal Corporation · filed 1987-08-24

And to the extent that the plaintiff also seeks damages under § 1983 for the alleged harassment, there is every indication that he could have this claim heard as well. ... In any event, there is an adequate state forum for all the plaintiff’s claims to be addressed.

A federal court should abstain from a § 1983 challenge to an ongoing professional-license proceeding when it is judicial in nature, implicates an important state interest, and affords an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.

Damino v. O'NEILL · filed 1987-09-28

First, the state court review proceeding is obviously judicial in nature. Second, the state has a strong interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens and the granting and revocation of physicians’ licenses is clearly an integral part of this state function. ... Finally, plaintiff has had the opportunity to raise all his constitutional claims in the state proceeding.

In a § 1983 action seeking federal intervention in a state election, a court should act only when parallel state procedures would wholly fail to protect the plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights.

Granados-Navedo v. Acevedo · filed 1988-12-29

There is a marked trend in the case law — in fact, it could not be clearer — that in actions brought under section 1983 seeking the drastic remedy of federal intervention in the state electoral process, courts should act only when parallel state procedures would be wholly unprotective of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights.

Pullman abstention is not categorically barred in § 1983 actions.

United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Mario M. Cuomo, Franklin E. White, Horace M. Flowers, Howard L. Sheffey · filed 1989-06-26

Concededly, there is no per se rule barring abstention in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 damages claims are not subject to Younger abstention when deciding them will not interfere with ongoing state proceedings.

Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, Santa Clara County · filed 1989-08-28

Additionally, we do not believe that consideration of the section 1983 damage claims against the private appellees will in any way interfere with the state proceedings. The interests of comity and federalism underlying Younger abstention are therefore inapplicable.

Section 1983 damages suits are barred by Younger abstention when they would substantially disrupt pending state proceedings.

Sendlewski v. Town of Southampton · filed 1990-04-12

Similarly barred is a suit for damages under § 1983 that would have a substantially disruptive effect on the state proceedings.

Section 1983 claims for declaratory or injunctive relief that would interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution are subject to Younger abstention and dismissal without prejudice.

Kramer v. Metro-Dade Corrections & Rehabilitation Department · filed 1993-05-28

All claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants are dismissed without prejudice because of this Court’s invocation of the abstention doctrine.

When relief is sought under § 1983, the federal court’s obligation to exercise jurisdiction is particularly weighty in deciding whether to abstain.

Jones v. Temmer · filed 1993-08-11

The obligation to exercise jurisdiction is particularly ... weighty when relief is sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This case does not involve a federal claim entangled in a complex state regulatory scheme. ... I decline to abstain from hearing plaintiffs’ claims in this ease.

Younger abstention requires a court to withhold injunctive intervention under § 1983 in coercive state administrative enforcement proceedings until available, adequate state judicial review is exhausted.

Nevada Entertainment Industries, Inc. v. City Of Henderson · filed 1993-11-02

It is consistent with both Younger and Patsy for a federal court to abstain from intervening where an administrative proceeding has been initiated by the state to enforce state law even if those proceedings have concluded, where adequate state judicial review was available to the federal plaintiff. The City Council initiated the administrative proceeding in this case to enforce municipal code provisions requiring license applicants to complete applications truthfully. Because the administrative proceeding was coercive and brought by the state to enforce its laws, Younger required the federal court to abstain from intervening unless and until that proceeding, including review by the state court, was complete.

Section 1983 requires an inmate already litigating state-supervised conditions of confinement to present those claims in the state proceeding rather than bring an independent federal suit.

Wayne Nelson and Anthony Manos v. William Murphy, Acting Director of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental D · filed 1995-03-13

But it is to say that an inmate already participating in state litigation must make his stand there rather than attempt the equivalent of federal-defense removal by filing an independent § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 actions are subject to Pullman abstention.

Carrouche v. City of New Orleans · filed 1998-12-09

The Pullman abstention doctrine extends to cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit, Younger abstention limits injunctive relief concerning an ongoing state criminal prosecution, while claims about jail conditions that do not directly involve the prosecution may proceed.

Eyler v. Babcox · filed 1983-12-19

In sum, abstention is appropriate with respect to all of Eyler’s allegations except those involving prison conditions and restrictions.

Section 1983’s lack of a state-remedy exhaustion requirement does not prevent Younger abstention when ongoing state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.

Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Carros · filed 1983-12-20

Plaintiff’s final argument that to dismiss under Younger is tantamount to imposing an exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 misses the mark.

A federal court may abstain in a Section 1983 damages action when unresolved state law questions may moot difficult federal constitutional questions.

West v. Village Of Morrisville · filed 1984-02-14

Though abstention was traditionally considered a function of the court's equity powers, there is authority for using it, as here, in a case asking in part for damages, see Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 4 L.Ed.2d 1170 (1960), and, in particular, in a section 1983 action seeking damages, see Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Association, Inc., 423 U.S. 6, 6, 96 S.Ct. 168, 169, 46 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (per curiam).

Section 1983’s purpose of protecting individuals from unlawful state practices favors a federal forum when a court considers abstention.

Epps v. Lauderdale County · filed 2000-10-03

The foundation of § 1983—protecting an individual from state custom and practice that is contrary to federal law—favors adjudication of such rights in a federal forum, outside state mechanisms.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to Younger abstention when they would interfere with ongoing state civil proceedings.

Cedar Rapids Cellular Telephone, L.P. v. Miller · filed 2002-02-14

We also reject the appellants' suggestion that Younger abstention is inappropriate because their federal lawsuit involves claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A section 1983 action seeking discretionary equitable relief may be evaluated under the Brillhart abstention standard.

Clay Regional Water v. City of Spirit Lake, Iowa · filed 2002-04-04

In this case, while section 1983 is certainly not a discretionary statute, it is remedial, and the relief sought by the District is in the nature of discretionary equitable relief. Therefore, the court will employ the Brill-hart analysis to guide its discretion.

Section 1983 claims for money damages that cannot be redressed in a pending state proceeding must be stayed when the federal court abstains under Younger.

Lee v. Bernard · filed 2003-03-27

When a court abstains under Younger, it must stay, rather than dismiss, § 1983 claims for money damages that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding; otherwise, the plaintiffs claims may be time-barred by the time the state case is resolved.

Section 1983 claims are not categorically exempt from Pullman abstention, including in land use disputes.

C-Y Development Company v. City Of Redlands · filed 1983-03-08

Alternatively, C-Y argues that abstention is inappropriate in this case because several of its claims, based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, allege civil rights violations. We conclude, however, that there is no per se civil rights exception to the abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 damages claims may be subject to Younger abstention when they challenge an ongoing state judicial proceeding, but the federal court should stay the damages claim rather than dismiss it.

Gilbertson v. Albright · filed 2004-09-03

We conclude that Younger principles may apply to claims for damages under § 1983. ... We are confident that Younger principles apply to a claim for damages based on constitutional challenges which can be asserted in pending state proceedings that implicate important state interests, and that the correct disposition is to defer — not to dismiss — when damages are at issue.

A court applying Younger abstention must stay a § 1983 damages claim pending the state proceedings rather than dismiss it.

Castellanos-Bayouth v. Puerto Rico Bar Ass'n · filed 2007-04-06

An action claiming damages under § 1983 must, however, be stayed (rather than dismissed) pending termination of the underlying state proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims may be subject to Younger abstention when deciding them would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.

Rossi v. Gemma · filed 2007-05-31

In light of this, we think that abstention is appropriate on the § 1983 damages claims, in addition to the abstention on the § 1983 equitable claims.

Section 1983 claims seeking to enjoin a pending state proceeding are subject to Younger abstention.

Carr v. Axelrod · filed 1992-07-15

Regardless of Carr’s motive, the principles established in Younger are applicable to his § 1983 claim.

When Younger abstention applies, a court may dismiss requests for injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983 while staying a damages claim pending state proceedings.

Dandar v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. · filed 2013-02-15

Similarly, the Court finds that Younger abstention is appropriate with regard to Dandar’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983. The Court thus grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that Dandar seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under count II. However, to the extent that Dandar’s Second Amended Complaint states a claim for damages against Defendants under Section 1983, Defendants’ motion to Dismiss is denied, and Dandar’s claim for damages under Section 1983 is stayed pending the outcome of the state court proceedings.

A federal court that abstains under Younger from hearing a Section 1983 damages claim should stay the action instead of dismissing it.

Malaer v. Kirkpatrick · filed 2020-04-01

A federal district court that abstains under Younger from hearing a federal plaintiff's § 1983 claim should stay the federal proceedings, not dismiss them. ... Plaintiff seeks only damages (which are not available to Plaintiff in defense of his criminal charges in the state proceeding); therefore, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to stay this action.

Section 1983 permits monetary-damages claims against public officials only for wilful or wanton conduct.

Weiland v. Byrne · filed 1975-04-09

Nor does he have any cause of action against public officials for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of wilful or wanton conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on private persons who follow a statutory scheme assumed to be constitutional absent an indication of improper motive.

Hagopian v. Consolidated Equities Corp. · filed 1975-04-14

The Court holds that, absent some indication of improper motive, private persons acting pursuant to a statutory scheme assumed to be constitutional cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983.

A private party is not liable in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely for having complied in good faith with a facially valid state statute that is later held unconstitutional.

Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown · filed 1984-07-20

We therefore conclude that private entities who regulate their behavior in good faith compliance with a validly enacted law cannot by the fact of their compliance be held legally responsible for constitutional defects in the law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for compensation for time spent confined under a subsequently voided conviction.

Logan v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary · filed 1975-03-05

Compensation for time spent confined pursuant to subsequently voided conviction is unavailable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 racial-discrimination claims may be proved with numerical comparisons, but the statistics must show substantial discrepancies indicating unequal employment practices.

Roche v. Foulger · filed 1975-04-21

With regard to the statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff, it is clear* that actions under § 1983 for racial discrimination contemplate the possibility of proving such discrimination by numerical comparisons. However, the inferences to be drawn from such statistics must result from substantial discrepancies, either from comparing employment totals with population totals or by other statistically demonstrable unequal employment practices, such as promotions or dismissals.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging racially selective enforcement to allege and prove deliberate enforcement based on race or another arbitrary classification; a bare disparity in arrest statistics is insufficient.

Butler v. Cooper · filed 1977-05-16

Before a claim of unlawful discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws can be established, the plaintiff must allege and prove a deliberate selective process of enforcement based upon race (or other arbitrary classification). ... Given these liberal standards in favor of the plaintiff, the record as viewed on appeal is totally devoid of a meritorious claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. ... Nothing in the record supports a theory of conspiracy to racially discriminate in the enforcement of these laws, least of all, not a naked allegation of percentage of black arrests.

Section 1983 reaches intentional racial discrimination by state actors that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Armstrong v. O'CONNELL · filed 1978-06-01

The Court hereby finds, for the reasons stated below, that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs with segregative intent, as further specified below, and in so doing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires intentional racial discrimination for an employee's discrimination claim.

United States v. City of Buffalo · filed 1978-08-01

I do not, however, find sufficient evidence to establish the discriminatory intent required under § 1981 or § 1983.

In a § 1983 racial-discrimination action, the plaintiff normally must prove discriminatory intent, but sufficient evidence may establish a prima facie case that shifts a rebuttable presumption and requires the defendant to show by clear and convincing proof that it did not unlawfully discriminate.

Maudie L. THOMPSON, Appellant v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF OMAHA · filed 1980-05-21

Normally, the burden of proving intent to discriminate rests with the plaintiff in a section 1983 action, Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1288 (8th Cir. 1979); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 1977), and intent will have to be found by "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). In some instances, however, evidence of discriminatory intent may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, triggering a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief. Williams v. Anderson, supra at 1087. The defendant must then show by clear and convincing proof that it did not unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiff.

Statistical proof may be used in Section 1983 actions, with Title VII cases and regulations serving as useful interpretive guides.

44 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1858, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,518 Garrick Black v. City of Akron, Ohio · filed 1987-10-15

In the interest of considering all of the probative evidence, we hold today that statistical proof may be used in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and furthermore, that cases and regulations promulgated under Title VII furnish useful guides to the interpretation of this statute.

A prisoner states a nonfrivolous Section 1983 equal-protection claim by alleging that officials imposed undesirable work based on race while assigning white inmates office work.

Bell v. Robert E. English, Librarian, D. Graham, Assistant Warden of Brunswick Correctional Center · filed 1987-12-23

We find that the dismissal was premature. The complaint states a racial discrimination claim, see Henry v. Van Cleve, 469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.1972), and is not legally frivolous, see Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir.1979).

A plaintiff alleging religious discrimination under § 1983 may prove discriminatory intent directly or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Helland v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 1996-08-15

Helland can prevail on his Title VII and § 1983 claims in one of two ways. He can offer direct proof of discriminatory intent, Sample v. Aldi Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir.1995), or he can rely on the indirect, burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 1983 racial-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Burks v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-01-31

The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to claims alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2377-78, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 n. 1, 113 S.Ct. at 2746 n. 1 (1993); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 825 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994).

Section 1983 race and gender discrimination claims are analyzed under the Title VII proof scheme.

Middlebrooks v. University of MD · filed 1999-01-11

Thus, to evaluate the appropriateness of summary judgment, the Court must evaluate the elements of Appellant's Title IX, Title VI, § 1981, and § 1983 claims. Such claims are appropriately analyzed under the Title VII proof scheme, first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

A § 1983 claim alleging intentional discrimination must satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework when there is no direct evidence.

Mower v. Westfall · filed 2001-12-20

Plaintiffs also sue Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216, et seq. All of these claims involve intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs must therefore be able to make out a claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework for these counts as well.

Section 1983 discrimination claims based on § 1981 use the Title VII circumstantial evidence approach to proving intentional discrimination.

Williams v. Alabama Dep't of Transportation · filed 2007-06-28

The Tille VII circumstantial evidence approach to proving intentional discrimination also applies to discrimination claims brought pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims require proof of intentional discrimination, but courts need not use Title VII’s formal burden shifting framework.

Lily Keyser Maria Sofia Robledo Richard M. Cisneros v. Sacramento City Unified School District, a Public Entity and Jame · filed 2001-02-07

Although courts in the Ninth Circuit are not bound by the formal Title VII disparate treatment burden shifting framework when trying § 1983 claims, id. at 471-72, because both disparate treatment and § 1983 claims require a showing of intentional discrimination, it is unsurprising that summary judgment decisions with regard to § 1983 claims are remarkably similar to their Title VII counterparts.

Section 1983 requires a racial discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, qualification, adverse employment action, discriminatory circumstances, and discriminatory purpose.

Middleton v. Deblasis · filed 2011-12-30

Equal protection discrimination claims under § 1983 are evaluated under the same framework as Title VII claims. ... To state a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII or § 1983, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) that plaintiff belonged to a protected class, (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the position, (3) that plaintiff was subject to an “adverse employment action” despite her qualifications, and (4) that circumstances exist from which a court can infer discriminatory action. ... Further, under § 1983, a plaintiff must show discriminatory purpose on the part of defendants.

Section 1983 race and gender discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Anthony v. Bickley · filed 2014-08-08

Claims of race and gender based discrimination under §§1983 and 1985 claims must be evaluated according to the McDonnell-Douglas 27 framework, which is a ... three-step burden-shifting analysis.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for unconstitutional state arrests, measured by federal constitutional standards rather than state arrest law, and probable cause and good-faith belief defeat liability.

Diamond v. Marland · filed 1975-05-28

Diamond’s action is based on infringement of federally guaranteed rights. The criteria for valid arrest in felony as well as misdemeanor offenses are those recognized by the Constitution of the United States. It does not heed the vagaries and variations of the common law and state statutes involving power to arrest in misdemeanor cases. ... Where an unlawful state arrest is the basis of an action for violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, federal constitutional standards are the appropriate measure of the conduct of the arresting officer. The vindication of federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determinable by federal law. ... Even if a police officer violates a state arrest statute, he would not be liable under the civil rights act unless he also violated federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests. ... An arrest without probable cause to believe that the accused has violated a criminal statute confers a right of action for deprivation of federal constitutional privileges under § 1983. ... Federal constitutional standards as to warrantless arrests control in the instant case. Under them, no distinction exists between felony and misdemeanor in respect to probable cause and good faith belief. Where an arrest is made by an officer for a misdemeanor committed out of his presence, probable cause therefor may be established by the possession of knowledge and facts justifying the belief on the part of one of reasonable prudence that the person arrested was guilty of the crime charged. ... I conclude that the existence of probable cause for warrantless arrest is a question of fact for a jury in a § 1983 action against the arresting officer for unconstitutional restraint of liberty. If the evidence presents, however, no genuine issue as to reasonable grounds for good-faith belief that the defendant had committed the offense for which he was arrested, existence of probable cause becomes a question for the court. ... In either case the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to defendants in actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a retaliatory eviction of a tenant under color of state law actionable.

Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc. · filed 1975-05-30

The law is now clear that a retaliatory eviction of a tenant under color of state law is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Government officials are immune from a § 1983 suit alleging constitutional-rights violations when established facts show they reasonably and in good faith believed their conduct was lawful.

Hamilton v. Edell · filed 1975-05-30

It is well settled that government officials are immune from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights when facts are established which show that the official was acting with a reasonable good faith belief that his conduct was legal.

Section 1983 gives a law enforcement officer a defense to a damages action by proving that the officer acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of the conduct.

Boscarino v. Nelson · filed 1975-07-14

We concluded that it is a defense to an action for damages under Section 1983 or the Fourth Amendment “for a law enforcement officer to prove that he-acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of his conduct.”

A school-board official is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages merely because the official acted without actual malice; the official must also know the basic constitutional rights involved.

Martin v. University of Louisville · filed 1976-08-30

To be entitled to a special exemption from the categorical remedial language of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a student’s constitutional rights, a school board member, who has voluntarily undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school and the activities of the students, must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against municipalities and officials acting in official capacities, but qualified good-faith immunity bars damages when they reasonably implement a policy they believe is constitutional and act without malice.

Ohland v. City of Montpelier · filed 1979-02-26

Nevertheless, in the circumstances presented here, we cannot hold the defendants liable for monetary damages under § 1983 due to their failure to accord plaintiff his due process rights, because they are entitled to a qualified good faith immunity ... This qualified good faith immunity applies to the individual defendants in their personal and representative capacities, and to the City of Montpelier as a corporate “person” subject to § 1983 liability. ... This authority and strong reasons of policy persuade us that the § 1983 liability of local governmental entities should be limited by a qualified good faith immunity parallel to that applicable to individual government employees. ... Consequently, the city as an entity is not liable in damages for deprivation of the plaintiffs due process rights.

Section 1983 gives municipalities a qualified good-faith immunity from damages, even though that immunity is judicially developed rather than stated in the statute.

Huemmer v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL, ETC. · filed 1979-07-09

In finding that a qualified good faith immunity is available to municipalities under section 1983, the Court recognizes that the creation of the immunities structure under section 1983 does not find direct statutory support.

Section 1983 makes good-faith immunity an affirmative defense for individual police officers, which the defendant must prove; whether the defense applies can be a jury question.

Logan v. Shealy · filed 1981-10-07

In this type § 1983 action, the good faith immunity of individual police officers is an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980), under the test of police officer immunity to monetary liability expressed, for example, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218-19, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Therefore verdicts properly could have been directed for these two defendants on that basis only if the evidence established as a matter of law that each acted, the one in promulgating and maintaining, the other in carrying out, a policy that each, at the critical time, "reasonably believed (was) valid, (though it) was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. We hold that the evidence did not conclusively establish this defense as to either Clements or Sachtleben, but that on the evidence adduced the issue of the good faith of each, in the special § 1983 sense, was one of fact for the jury under appropriate instructions as to the burden of proof and the substantive elements of the defense.

Section 1983 allows public officials to claim good-faith immunity unless they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions would violate constitutional rights or acted with malicious intent to deprive such rights or cause other injury.

Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia · filed 1981-12-14

Public officials acting in their official capacity may be immune from liability under section 1983, but not if they “knew or reasonably should have known” that their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the party affected, or if they took the action “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” ... I find that Messrs. Ruetz and Granger are entitled to good faith immunity. ... I also find that given the difficult issues presented by the actions of the town board prior to the election of Messrs. Dandeneau and Horvath, neither reasonably could have known that altering the conditions or refusing to renew the approval would constitute a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ... To summarize, I find that the plaintiffs had no cognizable property interest. I also find that even if an entitlement were present there was no infringement of any due process right. I further find that Cal-Oaks Corp. is not a proper party in interest to this suit, that the defendants did not meet their burden to establish waiver or estoppel, and that all of the individual defendants are entitled to immunity because of their good faith.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against correctional officials subject to qualified immunity: officials are immune when they reasonably and in good faith believe their conduct is lawful, but not when the violated constitutional right is clearly established and they should have known the conduct was illegal.

Martin v. Foti · filed 1983-03-31

The Court must now turn to the question of remedies. As regards damages, it is well-established that correctional officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damage claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if they reasonably believe in good faith that their conduct is lawful, even though it was not. Such immunity is not available, however, where the constitutional right in question is clearly established and the offenders should have known their conduct was illegal.

Private parties sued under § 1983 for invoking a state seizure statute have good faith immunity from damages when their reliance on the statute was reasonable, even if it is later held unconstitutional.

Howard L. Wyatt, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Bill Cole, and Lloyd S. Jones, Wiley Magee & Mike Moore, Defendan · filed 1991-05-30

In sum, the question is close, but on balance we are persuaded that reliance upon the statute by the private actors was not an act of unreasonable ignorance.

Section 1983 shields a public official from liability when the official acts in good faith within the scope of official duties.

Ago · filed 1974-08-29

The conclusion that can be drawn from cases construing s. 1983 is that a public official acting in good faith and within the scope of his or her official duties will be immune from liability under the section.

Section 1983 claims for damages against government officials may be barred by absolute or qualified immunity.

Jerry Young A/K/A Ramadan v. Donald Selsky, P. Orengo, R. Althouse, R.J. Cunningham, D. Schaller, L. Jewett · filed 1994-11-21

In sum, taking into account the presumption against absolute immunity, Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87, 111 S.Ct. at 1939, and a defendant’s corresponding burden in seeking to justify it, Butz, 438 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 2910, we believe that the scale tips against defendant’s claim of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 contains no express immunities, but courts recognize immunities that can shield government officials from personal liability for damages.

Sluman v. State of Washington · filed 2018-05-22

42 U.S.C. § 1983 admits no immunities. The United States Supreme Court, however, has, based on common law and policy grounds, crafted immunities shielding government officials and employees from personal liability for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or an arm of the state because neither is a “person” covered by the statute.

Sebesta v. Davis · filed 2017-12-21

The University is an arm of the state, and states are not among the “persons” ... covered by the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Aholelei v. Hawaii · filed 2007-02-14

Because “[a] state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983,” they cannot be held liable under the statute for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Lewis v. Mikesic · filed 2006-07-25

The district court properly dismissed the claims for monetary damages asserted against the State of Kansas and against Judge M ikesic while acting in his official capacity because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’” against whom a claim for damages can be brought pursuant to § 1983.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to § 1983 claims for retrospective damages.

Hughes v. New Hampshire Division of Aeronautics · filed 2005-03-22

However, in a suit for retrospective relief, i.e., such as money damages for past conduct, as alleged here, neither the State nor its officials when acting in their official capacity are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Weinberger v. State of Wis. · filed 1995-09-28

Moreover, neither the state nor its officials acting in their official capacities can be sued under § 1983 in any court, state or federal, because they are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit in state court against a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Chauncy Wright v. White · filed 1994-02-09

In Will , the United States Supreme Court held as a matter of federal law that a federal Section 1983 suit for damages may not be brought in state court against states, state agencies, and state officials (as opposed to local political subdivisions). Under Will, even if the state civil service statute could be bypassed, a Section 1983 suit against the state defendants in state court could not be brought.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for retrospective monetary relief against a state or its official sued in an official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Williams v. State · filed 1990-11-09

However, § 1983 may not be used to make a claim for relief against a state, as states are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief against the State or Commissioner Conway under § 1983.

A state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Ospina v. Department of Corrections, State of Del. · filed 1990-10-31

The defendant in a § 1983 action must, of course, be a “person” within the meaning of the statute. Unfortunately for the plaintiff in the present case, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

State Ex Rel. Division of Workers' Compensation v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District · filed 1990-10-22

With respect to defendants’ appeal regarding the effect of res judicata on plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and whether this section provides a remedy under the due process clause for gross negligence, we note that it is now settled that states and their agents are not “persons” for the purposes of § 1983: ... The plaintiffs have no § 1983 claim against the defendants in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state or its officers acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rico v. State · filed 1990-10-05

We are also compelled to agree that a state and its officers acting in their official capacity may not be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state court because a state court is not a person under the statute.

Arthur v. Supreme Court of Iowa · filed 1989-03-29

State courts are not persons and, therefore, are not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state agency because it is not a person, and a nominal action against state officials also fails when it is in fact an action against the state.

Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company v. State Of Illinois · filed 1984-09-26

This court has held that "[s]tate agencies are not 'persons' for purposes of the Civil Rights Act." ... This section 1983 action against IDOT, a state agency, fails for lack of federal court jurisdiction. ... A state official acting under color of state authority may be treated as a "person" under section 1983. ... We hold that this action nominally against the IDOT officials but in fact against the state also fails for lack of federal court jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against a state for its agents' acts depriving a person of civil rights; any such remedy must be pursued against the individuals who committed the acts.

Edgar v. State · filed 1979-05-24

Inasmuch as the State is not suable under section 1983 for acts of its agents subjecting the plaintiff to deprivation of his civil rights, the remedy for such deprivation, if such there was, must be pursued against those individuals who committed the acts.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a "person" subject to liability under the statute.

Lynward James Daye, Jr. v. Lee v. Bounds, Commissioner · filed 1975-06-02

We are in agreement with the conclusion of the district court that the State of North Carolina is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to a § 1983 damages claim, including when the claim is brought against an arm of state government.

Arney v. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES · filed 1984-04-11

Florida is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, is not subject to a § 1983 claim for damages by way of a suit against DNR, an arm of state government.

A state is not a "person" subject to suit under Section 1983, so Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity.

St. Louis County, Mo. v. CITY OF TOWN · filed 1984-06-29

Neither does 42 U.S.C. § 1983, another statute under which this suit is brought. ... Only "person[s]" may be sued under § 1983 and a state is not a "person".

A State and its agencies are not persons subject to liability under § 1983.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1985-09-11

It is well settled that a state and its agencies are not “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rosen Ex Rel. Estate of Souza v. Chang · filed 1991-02-15

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), forecloses suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ... for damages against states and state officials acting in their official capacities; both the state itself and its officials are simply not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued.

Patterson v. Webster · filed 1991-04-03

Neither states nor their officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages liability under Section 1983.

Fort Wayne National Corp. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue · filed 1993-09-08

Even if Dennis had overruled Carter, however, Fort Wayne National would still not prevail because the company has brought this action against the Department and its Commissioner acting in his official capacity. "When sued for damages, states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under ... § 1983." Felix, 571 N.E.2d at 295 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58).

Section 1983 does not permit suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity.

Harris v. Terry A. Wallace, Director · filed 1993-10-06

State officials are not subject to suit for monetary damages in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state officials acting in their official capacities.

State Board of Education v. Drury · filed 1993-10-12

Accordingly, the Board is not a “person” against whom a § 1983 claim for damages will lie. ... Such a claim for damages against the individual Board members in their official capacities is not viable under § 1983.

A State and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages suits under § 1983.

Gross v. Capital Electric Line Builders, Inc. · filed 1993-10-29

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that neither a State nor officials of the State while acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... We conclude that relief is not available to the appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fifth Amendment.

A State is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ferrick v. State · filed 1993-11-19

Similarly, the State is not a "person” subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58).

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Levey v. State Developmental Center · filed 1995-06-27

But, a section 1983 action may not he against the State because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a State in state court because a State is not a person under the statute.

People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co. · filed 1995-07-11

Although Brown did not receive immunity for the alleged violations made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, section 1983 actions against the State are not permitted in state court, and section 1981 claims are similarly barred because damages under section 1981 must have been sought through section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Stephenson v. State of Washington Kitsap County Warren Sharpe Danny Clem Leonard W. Costello Leonard W. Kruse G · filed 1995-09-08

Because states are not "persons" for purposes of section 1983, the district court properly dismissed Stephenson's claim against the State of Washington.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Salman v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline · filed 2000-07-05

Therefore, State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983.

A state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for a Rehabilitation Act claim does not make it a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sanders Ex Rel. Rayl v. KANSAS DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND REHABIL. SERVICES · filed 2004-04-29

The state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a § 504 action does not transform it into a "person" under § 1983, because the scope of eleventh amendment immunity and the scope of § 1983 are different issues.

A state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for a Rehabilitation Act claim does not make the state a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sanders ex rel. Rayl v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2004-04-29

The state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in a § 504 action does not transform it into a “person” under § 1983, because the scope of eleventh amendment immunity and the scope of § 1983 are different issues.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a “person” amenable to suit.

Mierzwa v. United States · filed 2008-06-26

Moreover, the State was properly dismissed from the Mierzwas’ suit because New Jersey is not recognized as a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Kinney v. Connecticut · filed 2009-06-05

As the Defendants point out, however, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Thus, the Plaintiffs allegations ... as to the workers’ compensation proceedings also fail for this reason.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

McNiece v. Town of Yankeetown · filed 2020-06-16

McNiece’s complaint also failed to state a claim against the State of Florida, which is not a person under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person, and a state is not a person under the statute.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-06-30

Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the state of Idaho.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Ross v. Shelby Co. Criminal Court · filed 2020-09-09

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires courts to judge local officials' policies and acts against federal constitutional standards, rather than state law alone.

Doe v. Poelker · filed 1975-06-02

The city's policies and acts must be judged against the federal Constitution in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The very purpose of section 1983 would be completely obliterated if local officials were to have their actions judged only in the light of state law and not under constitutional standards.

Section 1983 is not a substitute forum for local administration of a noise ordinance when the city's decision rationally advances legitimate revenue and recreational interests and is not arbitrary or capricious.

Citizen's Association Of Portland v. International Raceways, Inc. · filed 1987-12-01

A Sec. 1983 action is not a substitute forum for the City's administration of the noise ordinance. So long as the City's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, the guarantee of due process has been met.

Section 1983 permits a Brady due process claim against police officers who withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.

Bermudez v. City of New York · filed 2015-06-15

Police officers can be held liable for Brady due process violations under § 1983 if they withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an investigator for failing to disclose evidence to the defense when the prosecutor knew of the evidence and had the duty to disclose it.

Spencer v. Peters · filed 2013-08-21

Finding that Krause could have section 1983 liability for failure to disclose the videotaped interview was manifest error. Based on the facts of this case, she did not have such a duty. Reconsideration is granted as to this issue, and thus Krause’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy when state officials deprive a person of due process by suppressing exculpatory evidence or permitting misleading testimony that causes an unfair criminal trial.

Lilly Mae Onie Lee Whitelaw Hilliard v. John L. Williams and Donn Clark, Appeal of John L. Williams. Appeal of Donn Clar · filed 1975-05-28

It follows that this defendant’s conduct also amounted to an actionable violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold that the conduct of Clark also amounted to an actionable violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a police officer liable for withheld exculpatory evidence to prove the officer acted in bad faith, intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights, or was deliberately indifferent to them.

Reid v. Simmons, et al. · filed 2001-03-30

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that a police officer deprived him of his constitutionally protected right to due process merely by demonstrating that a Brady violation occurred during the course of the plaintiff’s underlying criminal trial. Instead, the plaintiff must also show that the officer acted in bad faith, or with the intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or with deliberate indifference to those rights.

Police officers may face § 1983 liability for concealing material evidence from a prosecutor, but have qualified immunity if that duty was not clearly established at the time.

Gibson v. Superintendent of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety-Division of State Police · filed 2005-06-14

Although Brady places the ultimate duty of disclosure on the prosecutor, it would be anomalous to' say that police officers are not liable when they affirmatively conceal material evidence from the prosecutor. ... We think that Gibson states an actionable § 1983 claim against the Troopers for interference with his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. ... Because such a right was not clearly established in this Circuit at the time of Gibson’s conviction, Troopers Pen-nypacker and Reilly are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to their failure to inform the prosecutor of Brady material.

A constitutional claim against state actors must proceed through Section 1983 rather than as an independent constitutional tort.

Houk v. Village of Oak Lawn · filed 1986-10-31

First, plaintiffs must look only to Section 1983 and not to some misguided notion of constitutional tort. Consequently any "First Amendment" reference in the Complaint cannot be viewed as independently viable.

Section 1983 provides a proper federal vehicle for a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials' use of pre-Gates disciplinary records, rather than immediate or speedier release.

Walter Leonard, Jr. v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board · filed 1975-06-10

At least insofar as Leonard brings this action on behalf of the class, we hold that it is properly brought as a Section 1983 action.

A prisoner's pro se habeas petition alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be treated as a Section 1983 complaint, with leave to amend granted liberally.

Young v. Bill Armontrout, Warden · filed 1986-07-08

We therefore instruct the district court on remand to treat Young’s petition as a complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Leave to amend the complaint shall be granted liberally as justice requires.

Damages under § 1983 cannot be awarded on a motion for a writ of prohibition; that relief requires a plenary action.

Renzulli v. McElrath · filed 2000-05-31

Since there is no finding of bad faith or maliciousness or recklessness on the part of the respondent Family Court Judge, there is no basis for damages or counsel fees under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988. Moreover, such relief can only be granted in a plenary action and not in a motion for a writ of prohibition.

Section 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for challenging how a prison department collects a monetary sanction.

Bout v. Bolden · filed 2001-09-11

The appropriate vehicle for pursuing such claims would be a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of Corrections.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for an equal protection claim, making a parallel claim brought directly under the Equal Protection Clause duplicative.

Priolo v. Town of Kingston · filed 2012-03-20

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, the Priolos assert a claim directly under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As previously noted, this claim is duplicative of the one more properly brought in Count V under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.