42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Urbina v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause his alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from his exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Halstead v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Norman Halstead and Aquilla Frederick failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether their alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Nick Panchev v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause his alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from his exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Garza v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.

Martinez v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a toxic tort case, plaintiff must demonstrate general causation, “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged,” and specific causation, “whether a particular individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Ken Nitao v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause his alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from his exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Hawes v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause his alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from his exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a toxic tort case, plaintiff must demonstrate general causation, “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged,” and specific causation, “whether a particular individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Ornelas v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Ramirez v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a toxic tort case, plaintiff must demonstrate general causation, “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged,” and specific causation, “whether a particular individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Christison v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause his alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from his exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a toxic tort case, plaintiff must demonstrate general causation, “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged,” and specific causation, “whether a particular individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Matthiesen v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Jenkins v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

Darlene Herring Jenkins appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth Amendment claims stemming from alleged exposure to elevated levels of arsenic and uranium. ... The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause her alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from her exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Williams v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

A § 1983 plaintiff claiming injury from toxic exposure must show that the substance could cause the alleged injury and that the exposure caused it.

Downing v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

Cindy Sue Downing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth Amendment claims stemming from alleged exposure to elevated levels of arsenic and uranium. ... The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause her alleged injuries, and whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from her exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Bolin v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Aurang Khan v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Carrera v. Pg&e · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic or uranium.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Spaulding v. Sawyer · filed 2020-09-14

Thus, the Court further finds the Amended Complaint fails to allege an affirmative causal connection between the conduct of the named FCCC officials and any alleged Constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to link each defendant’s actions to the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Knirnschild v. Ada County Jail · filed 2020-10-13

An essential element of a § 1983 case is that the plaintiff show that the defendants’ actions caused the deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Plaintiff has not clearly linked any act of any defendant to his injury. Therefore, he must file a Third Amended Complaint if he desires to proceed.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged deprivation of rights.

Gouveia v. M. · filed 2020-10-22

Without a causal connection between Jackie M.’s statements and a threat to Gouveia’s safety, he cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to prove causation through circumstantial evidence.

Moore v. LaSalle Corrections Inc · filed 2020-10-30

Plaintiffs in a Section 1983 case are permitted to show causation through circumstantial evidence.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between an official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Venneau v. Woodard · filed 2020-11-17

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit requires “‘an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation’ in § 1983 cases.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Oudshoff had any further involvement in his housing assignments after he transferred from Sumter C.I.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a defendant’s conduct to the alleged constitutional violation; an accusation later used to justify the violation is insufficient by itself.

Hawthorne v. Kernan · filed 2020-11-24

The claim that Defendant Bensimon’s accusation was used by Defendants to justify the alleged constitutional violations is insufficient, by itself, to allege § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 liability does not require a constitutional violation to be the sole cause of injury; ineffective assistance of counsel does not defeat liability when it does not supersede the violation.

Jones v. Cannizzaro · filed 2021-01-21

Accordingly, Defendant cannot as a matter of law show that Atkins’s ineffective assistance was a superseding cause of his conviction.

An independent judicial decision can break the chain of causation and insulate police officers and a municipality from Section 1983 damages attributable to the resulting constitutional harm.

Bullen v. Derego · filed 1986-08-22

Under these circumstances we would have to say the police officers and the City and County of Honolulu were insulated from tort liability because the chain of causation of the harm occasioned by the constitutional violation was broken by the independent judgment of a judicial officer.

A damages action under § 1983 is treated as a tort action, so the plaintiff must prove actual injury and a causal connection between the constitutional violation and the injury.

Lossman v. Pekarske · filed 1983-05-16

Section 1983 plaintiffs sometimes forget that a damage suit under that statute is a tort damage action even though the duty the defendant is charged with having violated is created by the Constitution rather than by common law or a safety statute or regulation. ... So plaintiffs have failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged denial of due process and any injury resulting from the removal of the children from Loss-man’s custody; and the principles of tort causation apply to constitutional as to other tort suits.

Section 1983 liability follows tort-law causation principles, while federal courts should develop federal prejudgment-interest rules and treat common-law tort rules only as a nonbinding starting point for damages.

Furtado v. Harold Bishop, John Furtado v. Harold Bishop · filed 1979-07-26

Section 1983 is to be “read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” ... When a person’s conduct is a “substantial factor and a material element” in bringing about a foreseeable injury, he can be held liable for that injury. ... We think that the issue of prejudgment interest is closely allied with that of damages, and that a federal rule should, therefore, be developed for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Nevertheless, the traditional common law view has been criticized, ... and common law tort rules, although a useful starting point for fashioning remedies for section 1983 violations, are not binding.

Section 1983 damages require a causal link between the constitutional violation and the claimed injury.

John H. Baer, Individually and D/B/A Liberty Guns v. The City of Wauwatosa · filed 1983-08-22

A plaintiff must prove a causal link between the violation and the injury for which he is seeking damages; and, by itself, the revocation of Baer’s license did not cause any injury to him, because (ignoring the question of the federal license) he could and did continue, without a city license, to sell all the guns he wanted to sell, thanks to section 6.84.020(B).

A § 1983 damages claim requires that the unconstitutional policy or conduct be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, not merely that a constitutional violation occurred somewhere in the background.

J.C. Sims v. Donald Wyrick, Warden, Ewing D. Gourley, and Joseph R. Keene · filed 1984-09-10

It does not follow, however, that plaintiff is entitled to damages. Only if the unconstitutional policy, now deemed established by the stipulation, was the proximate cause of the loss of the transcript, would the claim for damages be good.

Section 1983 liability requires proximate causation, and an official whose conduct played too remote a part in an assault cannot be held liable for the resulting injury.

Linda Hayes and John Hayes, Cross-Appellants v. Harry Vessey, Cross-Appellee · filed 1985-11-29

The “part” which defendant Vessey played in the tragic attack on plaintiff by the rapist is not actionable under section 1983. Vessey was not present at the time the rapist gained entrance to the school through the actions of Sheridan; therefore, Vessey cannot be held to have proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries as a result of any acts or omissions he may have been guilty of on that fateful day.

To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, the defendant's legal responsibility, and proximate causation of injury.

Kremhelmer v. Powers · filed 1986-04-22

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that the undisputed facts prove that the search deprived her of a constitutionally protected right, that defendant is legally responsible for that deprivation, and that such deprivation was the proximate cause of that injury.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege that the defendant's deprivation of a constitutional right caused an injury and that a causal connection exists between the injury and deprivation.

Amelunxen v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1986-04-22

Similar to an action in tort, a section 1983 plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of a constitutional right by defendant caused an injury and that a causal connection exists between the injury and the deprivation.

Unconstitutional prison overcrowding can proximately cause injuries from a fire when the overcrowding caused a foreseeable riot and the fire was an integral part of that riot.

Donyell A. Marsh v. Marion S. Barry, Individually/as Mayor of D.C. Ricky Brogsdale v. Marion S. Barry, Individually/as M · filed 1987-07-28

If overcrowding led to rioting by the inmates, and the setting of the fire was an integral part of that riot, then the overcrowding could be said to be the proximate cause of the fire.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging denial of a fair trial must prove that the defendant's conduct proximately caused the conviction and resulting damages.

Venegas v. Wagner · filed 1987-11-09

In asserting denial of a fair trial, plaintiff has the burden of alleging (and proving) defendant's conduct proximately caused the conviction and damages which flow therefrom.

Section 1983 liability for deficient police supervision requires proximate causation between the supervisory omission and the injury.

Gulledge v. Smart · filed 1988-07-29

The Court agrees with the defendants, however, that the essential element of causation is lacking. The defendants’ failure to require that Jackson submit to treatment cannot be found to have proximately caused Gulledge’s death in the absence of evidence that Jackson would have affirmatively responded to such treatment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to show that the defendant’s alleged unconstitutional conduct caused the injury; the claim fails if the injury would have occurred anyway.

Williams v. Thezan · filed 1989-01-05

A plaintiff cannot recover damages in a constitutional tort case where his injury would have occurred even if the defendant had not engaged in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. ... Thus, to prevail on his § 1983 claim, Williams must demonstrate that the State could not have procured an indictment against him without proffering the allegedly coerced Benjamin statement to the grand jury.

Section 1983 claims require proximate causation; officers who pursue a suspect without direct involvement in the collision are not a proximate cause of injuries from that collision.

Travis v. City of Mesquite · filed 1989-01-09

Following Dent, we hold that the officers’ conduct in electing to pursue the lawbreaker was, without their direct involvement in the collision, as a matter of law, not a proximate cause of appellants’ damages. Accordingly, the City of Mesquite and the Mesquite Police Officers were properly granted a summary judgment on appellants’ causes of action for common law negligence and for appellants’ claims under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to show that a constitutional violation caused the claimed injury.

Cochenour v. Josephine Kay Cochenour J. William Holliday Verlin Waide · filed 1989-11-03

The constitutional issue in this case is presented under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and causation is a necessary element of such a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead a sufficient causal link between defendants’ own actions and the alleged injury.

Morales v. De Ramos · filed 1989-11-08

Thus, we dismiss the section 1983 claim because plaintiff has failed to plead a sufficient causal nexus between defendants’ actions and decedent’s death.

Section 1983 liability requires a showing that the state agent’s actions proximately caused the damages.

Ritter v. Johnson · filed 1991-01-23

More broadly, there is no § 1983 liability when there is no showing that the actions of the state agent proximately caused the damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the claimed injury.

Johnson v. Summers · filed 1991-09-04

Accordingly, a showing of proximate causation is a necessary element in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 uses traditional common-law causation principles to determine whether a defendant is liable for a constitutional injury.

Alber v. Illinois Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1992-03-03

Section 1983 embodies traditional common-law concepts of causation and injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury.

Butler v. Dowd · filed 1992-11-11

In order to establish a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s unconstitutional action was the “cause in fact” of the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that government action proximately caused the injury.

Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge · filed 1993-05-10

Moreover, as with all other § 1983 actions, plaintiff must demonstrate that the government action proximately caused his or her injury.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between the defendants’ alleged constitutional violations and the plaintiff’s injury; an intervening judgment does not defeat causation when the defendants’ deliberate indifference may have caused incarceration beyond the release date.

Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections · filed 1993-06-01

We also find sufficient evidence was presented to establish causation between the defendants' alleged constitutional violations and Mr. Mitchell's injury. Reliance upon the "clarifying" judgment does not alter this finding as the question remains whether the defendants' alleged deliberate indifference resulted in Mr. Mitchell being incarcerated beyond his release date.

Section 1983 permits recovery for later injuries, including those arising during subsequent constitutional conduct, when they are reasonably foreseeable consequences of an earlier constitutional deprivation under ordinary proximate-cause principles.

Reich v. Minnicus · filed 1993-07-22

However, a plaintiff who suffers a constitutional deprivation early-on may, under § 1983, recover for his later injuries, even during later constitutional stages in the process, if the injuries are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the earlier deprivation of rights.

A section 1983 claim based on denial of a building permit is premature when the claimant never applied for the permit and therefore cannot establish causation or nonspeculative damages.

Beneficial Development Corp. v. City of Highland Park · filed 1994-07-28

Beneficial stipulated at trial that it had not applied for a building permit. In the absence of such an application, Beneficial’s section 1983 claim is premature (see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985), 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108), and we decline to consider it. Highland Park did not deny Beneficial a building permit, and therefore, Beneficial cannot establish causation. Further, because Beneficial did not apply for a building permit, any damages awarded for the denial of a building permit would be purely speculative.

Section 1983 damages require both factual and proximate causation linking the defendant to the denial of constitutional rights.

Corder v. Kansas Board of Healing Arts · filed 1994-10-28

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based both on proximate cause and cause in fact of the denial of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 damages claims require an alleged compensable injury attributable to the defendant.

Lem Williams, Jr. v. Nelson · filed 1998-02-20

To the extent Williams’s claims were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Williams did not allege a compensable injury attributable to Nelson.

Section 1983 requires expert medical evidence to establish that defendants’ conduct caused a miscarriage when the circumstances make causation too complex for a jury to determine unaided.

Arthur Barnes and Michelle Barnes v. Laura Anderson, Bernardo Aviles, Arnold Thomas, Alan Kaplan, and Randal Meierdierks · filed 1999-08-25

Applying this principle in the context of plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ conduct caused Mrs. Barnes’ miscarriage, we conclude as did the district court that, particularly in the circumstances of the present case, a miscarriage is the sort of complex injury for which expert medical evidence of causation is required.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to show an injury and a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Maus v. Murphy · filed 2002-01-04

To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must show both injury and “a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused injury.

Jackson v. Steinberg · filed 2003-04-16

The district court properly granted defendants summary judgment because Jackson failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that prison officials’ withholding of his therapeutic diets caused him any injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging an altered trial transcript to identify an injury the alteration could have caused.

Forte v. Sullivan · filed 1992-06-18

Where, on the other hand, the complaint fails to identify an injury which could have been caused by the alleged alteration, it does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a state actor’s violation of constitutional rights caused injury or damages.

Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-06-17

In order to succeed in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must “es- tablish not only that a state actor violated his constitutional rights, but also that the violation caused the plaintiff injury or damages.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a state actor violated a constitutional right and that the violation caused injury or damages.

Flemming v. Breen · filed 2020-08-13

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, to succeed under § 1983 a plaintiff must establish both that a state actor violated his constitutional rights and that the violation caused the plaintiff injury or damages.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for constitutional violations under color of state law, and federal law governs the immunities of state officials sued under it.

Briggs v. Goodwin · filed 1977-09-21

However, § 1983 is a federal statute, creating a federal cause of action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law. The immunities enjoyed by state officials sued under § 1983 are governed by federal law.

In a § 1983 action, executive immunity and good faith ordinarily present defenses for the jury, and determining immunity may require evidence about defendants’ roles and authority.

Beightol v. Kunowski · filed 1974-10-08

The question presented by Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint is whether under the Civil Rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the issue of executive immunity is one for the court or the jury. ... Under the developing case law it is quite apparent that absent highly unusual circumstances the defenses of executive immunity and good faith should be submitted to the jury. ... In order to determine whether the Defendants in the instant case exercised a “policy-making or judgmental element” and to decide whether their allegedly wrongful acts were “within the outer perimeter” of their authority, to use the Johnson v. Alldredge executive immunity language, it is necessary to know the role of each Defendant as delineated by the evidence received in the case. For this a jury is necessary. ... Of course, whether a conspiracy existed at all is a question for the jury as well.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are barred when the constitutional violation was reasonably made in good faith.

Collins v. Sullivan · filed 1975-04-23

Even though the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by not providing the Plaintiff with a hearing within a reasonable time after he was placed in a one-man cell, it does not follow that the Defendants are necessarily liable for damages to the Plaintiff. It is well established that prison officials and other government officials who violate the constitutional rights of persons under their official authority are immune from claims for damages where the violations are reasonably made in good faith. ... The Plaintiff’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants on summary judgment must, therefore, be denied.

School officials cannot invoke § 1983 immunity when they violate students’ settled constitutional rights.

Picha v. Wielgos · filed 1976-03-04

School officials cannot claim immunity when they violate the well settled rights of their students.

Section 1983 damages actions may be barred by qualified or absolute immunity for public officials acting in their official capacity.

Morales v. Vega · filed 1979-12-21

It is now firmly settled in civil rights jurisprudence that public officials acting in their official capacity enjoy either a qualified or an absolute immunity from suits on damages.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state gaming commissioners and control-board members who are absolutely immune for their adjudicative and prosecutorial functions.

Rosenthal v. State of Nev. · filed 1981-05-06

Therefore, this Court holds that the members and former members of the State Gaming Control Board and the Nevada Gaming Commission are absolutely immune from claims for damages brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials acting within their statutory authority and in good faith may be immune from § 1983 claims.

Givens v. King · filed 1990-03-07

Givens concedes, however, in brief — and we agree — that if we determine that the board acted within its statutory authority and did so in good faith, then the board should be protected by the appropriate immunity doctrines. ... We find that the board acted within its statutory authority and did so in good faith. The trial court’s determination concerning the applicability of the immunity doctrines to the facts at hand is affirmed.

A district court may require a prisoner bringing a § 1983 action to exhaust inmate grievance procedures under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and may dismiss without prejudice when the prisoner fails to establish exhaustion as ordered.

Cash v. M.C. Samberg, Warden, Sgt. Brown, Investigator, J.E. Green, Lieutenant, Lt. Parker · filed 1987-02-17

The district court could properly require exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997. Its dismissal of Cash's action, without prejudice, when Cash failed to comply with its order that he establish exhaustion, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to pursue damages without exhausting state remedies when the action does not seek release from custody, and federal qualified-immunity principles protect parole officials acting discretionarily and in good faith.

Joyce v. Gilligan · filed 1974-10-07

The plaintiff here employs § 1983 to redress an alleged wrong done to him, not to effectuate his release from custody. ... Since habeas corpus is not the remedy sought, there is no requirement that the plaintiff exhaust state remedies. ... In determining whether a state official is immune from liability under the Civil Rights Act, specifically § 1983, the test to be applied is one of general rather than state law. ... In applying this test to the facts at hand, this Court finds that the parole board meets the test for immunity.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, permits suit against a public housing authority that is not a state agency, and treats good-faith immunity as an affirmative defense that officials must plead.

Skomorucha v. Wilmington Housing Authority · filed 1980-10-30

With regard to the § 1983 claim, it is settled law in this Circuit that a plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court. ... These considerations compel the conclusion that, for purposes of suit under § 1983, the Housing Authority is not a state agency. ... The motion fails because the good faith immunity available to officials in § 1983 actions must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. ... Plaintiff thus was not required to make any allegations as to Phillips’ motives or knowledge.

Pro se prisoners may use the Federal Rules' discovery devices in § 1983 suits on the same terms as other civil litigants.

Holloway v. Lockhart · filed 1987-03-05

We have previously stated, and now reiterate, that the discovery devices of the Rules of Civil Procedure are available to pro se prisoners in Sec. 1983 suits on the same terms as other civil litigants.

A court may require a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing Section 1983 only under Section 1997e and only if the grievance procedure is certified or substantially complies with the Attorney General’s minimum standards.

Lewis v. Meyer · filed 1987-03-26

Exhaustion of administrative remedies usually is not a condition precedent to suit under § 1983. ... Section 1997e(a)(2) provides that exhaustion may not be required “unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section.”

A court requiring prisoner exhaustion under Section 1997e may not dismiss a Section 1983 action with prejudice without considering whether the prisoner reasonably and in good faith attempted to exhaust.

Rocky v. Vittorie · filed 1987-04-07

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Rocky’s suit without considering whether Rocky had reasonably and in good faith pursued his administrative remedies. ... Accordingly, if Rocky did, in fact, mail his grievance letter within the thirty-day limit for doing so, we conclude dismissal with prejudice would be inappropriate, even though the prison itself may consider the claim procedurally barred.

A court may require a prisoner pursuing a Section 1983 claim to demonstrate administrative exhaustion under Section 1997e and may dismiss the claim without prejudice for failure to comply.

Dewveall v. Dr. Mendez, Virginia State Penitentiary · filed 1987-05-07

Gregory Wayne Dewveall, a Virginia inmate, appeals the district court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ... The district court could properly require Dewveall to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. The court's dismissal of Dewveall's complaint, without prejudice, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 claims may require exhaustion when they directly challenge a conviction or confinement, while immunity depends on the defendant and requested relief.

Tarter v. Hury · filed 1981-06-01

Relying on Preiser, this Court has held that even where a state prisoner seeks only damages and disclaims any interest in obtaining release from prison, he must still exhaust state remedies before bringing a § 1983 action if the action would raise issues that go directly to the constitutionality of his conviction or confinement. ... The district court’s conclusion that absolute immunity protected the defendants against Tarter’s claims is only partially correct. ... The plaintiffs’ claims for damages against the judges and the prosecutors were therefore properly dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity. ... The claims for damages against the court clerks therefore are not now dismissable on the basis of immunity. Furthermore, since clerks enjoy no immunity whatsoever from claims for equitable relief, those claims are also not dismissable on that ground.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for a state prisoner’s request for injunctive relief requiring production of a free state-court transcript.

Lucas v. Virginia · filed 1974-10-31

This court has therefore properly treated plaintiff’s petition under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both deprivation of a federally secured right and action under color of state law.

Baldwin v. Appalachian Power Company, a Corporation · filed 1977-06-01

Where a complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two elements must be established before there can be recovery. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under color of state law.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a state prisoner’s trial-transcript request rather than habeas corpus, but the prisoner must show a particularized need for the transcript.

Ham v. Leeke · filed 1978-03-30

Treating the petition as a complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ... A request by a state prisoner for a trial transcript represents a § 1983 case, not a habeas petition. ... However, even then, a prisoner must show a particularized need for a transcript.

Section 1983 is the appropriate civil-rights vehicle, rather than habeas corpus, for a state prisoner seeking injunctive relief and damages over confinement conditions without challenging the fact or duration of confinement, and no prior exhaustion of state remedies is required.

Perkins v. Wagner · filed 1981-05-04

Here, plaintiff, a former pre-trial detainee, complained that his inability to visit his incarcerated co-defendant deprived him of his right to prepare a defense against pending criminal charges. ... Moreover, the caption which the plaintiff selected for his complaint — “Form to be used by prisoners for filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” —further buttresses this conclusion. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint will be construed as a civil rights action rather than as a habeas corpus petition and, therefore, plaintiff did not need to exhaust state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights cause of action for this challenge to a denial of food stamp benefits.

Ehrman v. Perales · filed 1990-06-18

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly denied his request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 inasmuch as his cause of action is not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Cruz v Perales, 158 AD2d 597; Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692).

Allegations filed in a habeas petition must be treated as a Section 1983 claim to the extent they state a claim for civil rights relief.

Milligan v. State of Oregon · filed 1994-12-27

Even though a petitioner files his action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner is "entitled" to have his allegations treated as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (the Civil Rights Acts) to the extent that his allegations state a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Acts. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam); Galligher v. McCarthy, 470 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir.1972).

Section 1983 is the civil rights vehicle for a prisoner’s claim of unconstitutional treatment during confinement, while challenges to the fact or duration of confinement belong in habeas corpus.

Moore v. Bowles · filed 1997-09-24

Habeas corpus applies when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement based on allegedly unconstitutional state administrative action, whereas civil rights cases relate to a state’s alleged unconstitutional treatment of a prisoner while in confinement. ... Accordingly, we conclude the argument is without merit.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a prisoner challenging unconstitutional treatment during confinement; habeas corpus addresses challenges to the fact or duration of confinement.

JORDAN v. BOWLES · filed 1997-09-24

Before addressing the correctness of the New Mexico district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action, we first consider their challenge to the Texas district court's conversion of the action from habeas corpus to civil rights. Habeas corpus applies when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement based on allegedly unconstitutional state administrative action, whereas civil rights cases relate to a state's alleged unconstitutional treatment of a prisoner while in confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 498-99 (1973). Although plaintiffs contended the transfers made their sentences illegal and New Mexico therefore forfeited its authority to require imprisonment for their New Mexico convictions, they did not raise issues suitable for decision under the laws of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims in a pleading that also raises habeas claims must be identified and separated according to their substance, regardless of the pleading’s title.

Odom v. West · filed 1999-03-01

The district court should have reviewed the essence of Odom’s claims regardless of the title affixed to the suit and should have separated the habeas claims from the § 1983 claims.

When a habeas petition also contains a § 1983 claim, the district court should separate and address the civil rights claim.

Galland v. MS Dept of Corr · filed 1999-09-16

With respect to Galland’s civil rights claim, the district court should have separated out the § 1983 claim and addressed it.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a prisoner’s inadequate medical treatment claim when the prisoner does not challenge his conviction or sentence.

West v. Grubbs · filed 2000-05-24

Therein, Petitioner stated he was not attacking his conviction or sentence, but rather a purported violation of his constitutional rights as a consequence of inadequate medical treatment. ... We conclude that the district court properly construed Petitioner’s § 2254 petition as arising under § 1983, and properly dismissed it for failure to comply with a court order.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring good-conduct time lost as a disciplinary sanction or restoring a prisoner’s time-earning status; those claims must proceed under habeas corpus.

Franklin v. Johnson · filed 2001-03-23

To the extent that Franklin sought the restoration of good conduct time lost as a sanction for misconduct, or the restoration of the earning status he believes he should have held, his remedy was under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a suit whose principal objective is something other than redressing federal rights, even when constitutional deprivations are asserted as a means to that objective.

Pierre v. Frank M. Jordan, Secretary of State of California · filed 1964-08-05

Where there is some other principal objective of the litigation, and the deprivation of constitutional rights is asserted only as a means of achieving that objective, the subject matter is not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act, and district court jurisdiction thereunder is lacking.

Section 1983 provides the proper civil rights action for a prisoner challenging conditions of confinement.

Jauregui v. J. Martinez, Warden Grant Woods, Attorney General · filed 1994-07-20

In contrast, when a prisoner challenges the conditions of his or her confinement, the proper mechanism is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a claim to recover lottery winnings a civil rights action merely because the plaintiff labels it one.

Lewis v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2012-01-20

Notwithstanding plaintiff s characterization of this case, see z'a’. at 4, either as a civil rights action against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or as claim over which this Court has diversity jurisdiction, see Compl. at 2, it actually is a tort claim for the recovery of lottery winnings to which the plaintiff claims an entitlement.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a prisoner's claim concerning property allegedly taken at arrest; the claim cannot be litigated in a habeas petition.

Sloane v. Anderson · filed 2019-08-20

Further, the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s assertions concerning his property in this action because such claims cannot be considered in a habeas corpus petition, but must be brought in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff must choose between a Section 1983 civil rights complaint and a habeas petition; the two cannot be pursued in one action.

(PC) Easley v. Strain/Hall · filed 2020-01-28

Habeas petitions and civil rights complaints provide exclusive vehicles for relief and may not be pursued concurrently in a single action.

Section 1983 does not cover a prisoner's request for home confinement when the prisoner does not challenge conditions of confinement.

Brady v. Warden · filed 2020-04-14

Brady does not challenge the conditions of her confinement at DFPC and thus her motion is not a §1983 civil rights action as alternatively intimated by the government.

Section 1983 permits challenges to prison conditions, but a prisoner seeking earlier release must proceed through habeas corpus.

Riggs v. Louisiana · filed 2020-04-22

A § 1983 claim challenges the conditions of confinement, rather the execution or duration of a sentence.

Section 1983 does not cover a prisoner's request to serve her sentence in home confinement when she does not challenge the conditions of her confinement.

Berry v. Reherman · filed 2020-04-27

Berry does not challenge the conditions of her confinement at AFPC and thus her motion is not a §1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not govern a prisoner's request to change how her sentence is served when she does not challenge her conditions of confinement.

Berry v. Warden Federal Prison Camp Alderson WV · filed 2020-04-27

Berry does not challenge the conditions of her confinement at AFPC and thus her motion is not a §1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 civil rights claims challenging conditions of confinement must be brought in a separate civil action, not in a § 2241 habeas petition.

Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2020-10-06

In addition, Williams’ civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not be pursued in a § 2241 proceeding but must be pursued in a separate civil action.

Section 1983 permits claims about prison conditions, but a challenge to the fact or duration of custody seeking release must proceed through habeas corpus.

Gates 957047 v. Horton · filed 2020-10-30

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a confined person to seek relief for beatings, physical torture, and maltreatment by custodial officials and employees.

Thompson v. Montemuro · filed 1974-10-23

While prison officials have wide discretionary authority to exercise disciplinary control over inmates, Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F.Supp. 9, 12 (W.D.Pa. 1971), affirmed 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972), it is well-settled that persons in jails, penitentiaries, and other places of confinement have a federal Constitutional right to be free from beatings, physical torture, and maltreatment by custodial officials and employees, and that this right can be vindicated in an action under Section 1983, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966).

A prisoner states a facial § 1983 substantive-due-process claim by alleging an unjustified beating by prison officials.

Mahammad v. Fay Barnes Josephine Bobo Phyliss Jellison Lynda Cutlip Cathy Lawson Vickie Douglas and Debbie Lan · filed 1987-08-24

He also alleged he was a victim of an unjustified beating by prison officials which states a facial violation of his substantive due process rights cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Allegations of beatings, extreme cold, denial of medical care or food, and grossly unsanitary confinement state potential § 1983 claims when supported by evidence.

Gee v. Estes · filed 1987-09-28

These allegations, or some of them, state a claim for Sec. 1983 relief, if they are supported by evidence.

Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action for egregious physical abuse by state officials that constitutes a constitutional deprivation.

Cole Ex Rel. Cole v. Newton Special Municipal Separate School District · filed 1987-06-10

In short, the defendants’ purported acts simply do not shock the conscience and do not give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed.

A Section 1983 claimant suing a municipality must name a municipal entity capable of being sued.

Fultz v. Whittaker · filed 2001-05-08

A section 1983 claimant suing a municipality must name as a defendant a municipal entity that is capable of being sued.

Municipal departments are not proper defendants in a § 1983 action when the city itself is the suable entity; the city remains answerable for their actions or omissions.

Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1990-11-15

That being the case, this Court will follow the cases discussed above and grant the motion to dismiss. ... The Fort Lauderdale Police Department and the Fort Lauderdale Building and Zoning Department are DISMISSED as defendants to this action. The City of Fort Lauderdale shall remain as a party defendant to answer for the actions or omissions of the now dismissed departments.

City pension officials and boards are amenable to suit under § 1983 for actions taken under color of state law.

Mcdarby v. Dinkins · filed 1990-07-02

Further, these defendants are amenable to suit under section 1983, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889, 109 S.Ct. 220, 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988); Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 986 (2d Cir.1983), and acted under color of state law, see Campo, 843 F.2d at 99; Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir.1983); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 22 n. 8 (2d Cir.1979).

Section 1983 does not treat a governmental instrumentality of Puerto Rico as a person, and it does not protect a union’s derivative interest in dues when employees have no enforceable right to continued employment.

Union Insular de Trabajadores Industriales y Construcciones Electricas v. Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales de Puerto R · filed 1975-08-18

First of all it is clear that the Authority, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, in view of our disposition of this case, we need not discuss this issue further. ... Lastly, we must deal with the contention of Plaintiff Unions to the effect that they have a property interest, separate and apart from Individual Plaintiffs, which is protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Considering that we have already ruled that Individual Plaintiffs’ are subject to layoffs, and that Plaintiff Unions’ “rights” are dependent upon such individuals being employed, this far-fetched contention falls of its own weight.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county board of ethics that is merely a subunit of the county and lacks a separate legal identity.

Umhey v. County of Orange, NY · filed 1997-03-27

However, to the extent that the County requests that the Orange County Board of Ethics be dismissed, we grant their motion, finding that they are not a separate legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983, but are merely a subunit of the County of Orange.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not a suable entity.

Tatum v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-26

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the HRA because an agency of the City of New York, like the HRA, is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a suable entity.

Washington-Steele v. Perez · filed 2019-05-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Corrections/Mental Health and Hygiene must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency must be brought against the City because the agency cannot be sued.

Williams v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Corrections · filed 2019-07-24

Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Corrections must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A § 1983 claim against the New York City Department of Correction must be brought against the City of New York because the department cannot be sued in its own name.

Lucas v. Brann · filed 2019-11-22

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because claims against the DOC must be brought against the City of New York.

Section 1983 claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because the department cannot be sued as a separate entity.

McDaniel v. Department of Correction · filed 2019-11-22

Plaintiff's claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

The NYPD cannot be sued under Section 1983 because it is a New York City agency that lacks capacity to be sued.

Martinez v. New York Police Department · filed 2019-11-26

The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. ... The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD because an agency of the City of New York, like the NYPD, is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency such as the NYPD cannot be sued under § 1983; the City of New York is the proper defendant.

Staboleski v. New York Police Department · filed 2019-12-04

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD because an agency of the City of New York, like the NYPD, is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Syville v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-05

Plaintiff’s claims are also construed as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. ... Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Services (DHS) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is a non-suable entity.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-20

But DOC cannot be sued because an agency of the City of New York is a non-suable entity.

City agencies without a separate legal existence cannot be sued under § 1983.

GRACE v. JUDGE IDEE C. FOX · filed 2020-01-02

City agencies like the Tax Revenue Bureau are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

A New York City agency cannot be sued in its own name under § 1983.

Paloma v. New York City Department Of Corrections · filed 2020-03-23

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under Section 1983; claims against it must be brought against the City.

Genao v. City Of New York · filed 2020-04-08

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against New York City’s Department of Correction must be brought against the City because the department cannot be sued.

Trail v. New York City Dept. of Corrections · filed 2020-05-18

As an agency of the City of New York, the DOC is not an entity that can be sued. ... Claims against the DOC must be brought against the City of New York.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a city agency that has no legal existence separate from the city.

GRACE v. JUDGE IDEE C. FOX · filed 2020-05-27

As I determined previously, City agencies like the Tax Revenue Bureau are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a New York City agency that lacks capacity to be sued.

Paloma v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against a New York City agency such as the Department of Correction must be brought against the City, because the agency cannot be sued.

Massey v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 2020-08-13

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against New York City agencies because those agencies cannot be sued.

McDaniel v. NYC Fire Department · filed 2020-09-03

Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD and the FDNYmust be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because the department lacks capacity to be sued in its own name.

Massey v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-21

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because as an agency of the City of New York, DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

A New York City agency cannot be sued in its own name on a Section 1983 claim because it lacks capacity to be sued.

Massey v. Michele · filed 2020-10-08

Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because as an agency of the City of New York, DOC is not an entity that can be sued in its own name.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency that lacks capacity to be sued separately from the City.

Massey v. City of New York · filed 2020-10-19

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) because an agency of the City of New York, such as the DOC, is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Karelefsky v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-17

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a New York City agency because the agency is not an entity that can be sued.

Gil-Cabrera v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-21

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. ... The Court dismisses the “Department of Corrections” from the action for failure to state a claim.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Espinal v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-07

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

A New York City agency cannot be sued as a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Miata v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-08

Whether Plaintiff Miata intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 treats a municipal agency that is merely an administrative arm of a municipality as the same entity, so the agency cannot be sued separately alongside the municipality.

GAJAROV v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES · filed 2021-01-15

For purposes of § 1983 liability, a municipality and a municipal agency are a single entity. ... Because the Allegheny County CYF is an administrative arm of Allegheny County, the Court will dismiss CYF as a defendant from this action.

A New York City agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a suable entity.

Henley v. Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-18

Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.

Section 1983 reaches informal, behind-the-scenes use of state authority that interferes with an established private employment relationship and deprives a person of federal rights.

Stokes v. Lecce · filed 1974-11-11

Here there was no flagrant open threat, but there was, as discussed above, sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that by veiled threat, “for the sake of harmony,” Lecce had used the power of his office to cause the Association to remove plaintiff’s name, that he had used the power of his office to terminate an employer-employee relationship which had already been established between plaintiff and the Association, notwithstanding that the time for performance was not to commence until sometime in the future. “This informal, behind the scenes exertion of state authority is as much within the scope of § 1983 as the more usual examples of formal and open action leading to the denial of federal rights.” Kletscha v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 1969).

Section 1983 permits a private person to be held liable when he willfully participates in joint activity with state officials, even if the officials are exonerated from liability.

Vance v. Billingsly · filed 1980-03-20

The precise issue before the Court is whether, where the under-color-of-law prong is based solely on concert of action between the private defendant and the public defendants, and the public defendants are exonerated from liability by a jury, the private defendant can nevertheless be held liable under § 1983. ... We hold that he can.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for conduct under color of state law, and a private hospital's employment decision is not covered without a sufficient state nexus.

Thompson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1982-05-27

Accordingly, because the particular acts complained of were not performed at the state’s specific behest and because CAMC does not act either in an exclusively state capacity or for the state’s direct benefit, the court finds that CAMC’s actions were not committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging state action through a conspiracy between state officials and private defendants to plead specific facts showing agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Sooner Products Co. v. McBride · filed 1983-05-16

When a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary “state action” by implicating state officials or judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere eonclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 requires prison officials who are put on notice of a life endangering situation by an inmate's repeated requests for help to take reasonable measures to ensure the inmate's safety.

West v. Rowe · filed 1978-02-23

Accordingly, we hold that when an inmate’s repeated requests for help place the appropriate officials on notice of a life endangering situation, a constitutional duty of care arises, binding such officials to take reasonable measures to ensure that inmate’s safety.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an injury inflicted by another inmate after the plaintiff provoked the incident.

Herring v. Superintendent, Danville City Jail · filed 1974-11-19

The fact that plaintiff was hit by another inmate after provocation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the remainder of plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to constitutional proportions.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for abuse of extradition power caused by officials' noncompliance with applicable law.

Sanders v. H. J. Conine, Sheriff, Laramie County, Wyoming, 1968 · filed 1974-12-02

A complaint which charges abuse of the extradition power by noncompliance with applicable law states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may not be dismissed summarily as frivolous.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on an allegedly unlawful, arbitrary traffic stop; a brief stop is not too trivial to support the claim.

Richardson v. City of Newark · filed 1978-03-29

In the interim, the Court cannot conclude that the stop of plaintiff is so incidental to his constitutional rights as to fail to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a bona fide civil rights claim for a controversy concerning only the administrative application of state statutes and regulations.

Rozier v. Perales · filed 1989-04-24

Such a controversy concerns the administrative application of State statutes and regulations (see, Social Services Law § 22 [9] [a]; § 34 [3] [e]; 18 NYCRR 358.18 [a]; 358.22). Accordingly, there is no bona fide civil rights claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Williams v D’Elia, 119 AD2d 678; Matter of Patterson v Blum, 86 AD2d 893).

Section 1983 does not allow an individual to claim an indirect civil rights injury from the termination of a contract held by his corporation.

Diaz v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. · filed 1989-11-01

In the case at bar, plaintiff claims that defendants deprived him of his civil rights when they allegedly terminated the contract that plaintiff's corporation had with PRTC. Even assuming the allegations to be true, however, this type of indirect claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

A claim concerning the administrative application of state statutes and regulations may fail to qualify as a bona fide civil rights claim under § 1983.

Kross v. Perales · filed 1989-12-11

We find that under the facts of this case, the petitioner has not established that his claim, which concerns the administrative application of State statutes and regulations (see, Social Services Law §§ 363, 22 [9] [a]; § 106-b; 18 NYCRR 358.22), is a bona fide civil rights claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 so as to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710; see also, Matter of Zellweger v New York State Dept, of Social Servs., 74 NY2d 404).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of the Ruiz decree without more.

Neal v. Williams · filed 1996-11-13

Violations of the Ruiz decree, without more, are not cognizable in a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Jacob Todd, etc. v. Smith · filed 1997-01-10

We find that they stated a sufficient section 1983 claim based on the substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 is a derivative cause of action; a claim for compensatory or punitive damages based on violations of the IDEA or Rehabilitation Act § 504 must state a claim under the underlying statute.

Sellers v. School Bd. of the City of Manassas, Virginia · filed 1997-04-30

In other words, to state a claim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA and § 504, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, state such a claim under the IDEA and § 504.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations even when the same conduct violates the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII, but it cannot be used to enforce rights based solely on those statutes.

Bryant v. City of Blackfoot · filed 2002-05-31

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Bryant’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act, and we reverse the dismissal of her § 1983 claims insofar as they are based upon rights secured by the United States Constitution. We uphold the dismissal of the § 1983 claims insofar as they sought to enforce rights based solely upon the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim based solely on a State statute.

Jiles v. Department of Correction · filed 2002-08-26

files’s remaining § 1983 claim, pleaded in count IX, is defective because the claim is based on a State statute, G. L. c. 127, 36A.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.

Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. McCoy · filed 1997-09-17

However, as conceded by the environmental defendants, _ dormant commerce clause claims are viable under § 1983.

Section 1983 redresses claims based on federal law, including the Constitution, but does not provide a claim for violations of state laws or regulations.

Lilly, Warren G. v. Jess, Cathy · filed 2006-07-21

None of the argu- ments concerning state laws and regulations states a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which is limited to redressing claims based on federal law (including the Constitu- tion).