42 U.S.C. § 1983

Judges are immune from Section 1983 suits for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction.

Collins v. Kansas · filed 2001-11-08

The acts taken by the judges were judicial acts squarely within the bounds of their jurisdiction and the judges, therefore, are immune and dismissed from this lawsuit.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for judicial acts, including orders issued from the bench.

Carley v. Lawrence · filed 2001-11-20

This Court has held that a judge is entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 for actions performed in his judicial capacity, and, in addition, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” ... Plaintiffs claims against Judge Lawrence are based upon orders that he issued from the bench while presiding over a matter in Family Court. Such orders qualify as judicial acts. Therefore, Judge Lawrence is entitled to absolute immunity for those acts.

Judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims when they act with a colorable claim of jurisdiction.

Mehdipour v. Matthews · filed 2001-11-29

It held that defendants Coats and Jackson were entitled to absolute judicial immunity because they had not acted “without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.” ... We AFFIRM for substantially the reasons given by the district court.

Absolute judicial immunity bars Section 1983 claims against a judge for conduct involving a prisoner's state appeal.

Mehdipour v. Bragg · filed 2001-12-12

Ali Mehdipour appeals the district court’s dismissal of his present pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present action, Mehdipour asserts that Oklahoma District Court Judge Susan Bragg violated his constitutional rights by refusing to rule on his motion to proceed pro se with his state appeal, conspiring to deny Mehdipour access to his appellate record, and acting in bad faith by transferring his application to proceed pro se to another county. Each of these claims clearly is barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against judges for actions taken in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction.

Burrows v. Cherokee County Sheriff's Office · filed 2002-03-19

Here, although Burrows alleges the state court judge’s actions in authorizing the “Order of Transport” were improper, it is apparent that those actions were taken in the judge’s judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction (i.e., his jurisdiction over criminal proceedings filed in Cherokee County). Thus, the judge is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred when the challenged acts were performed in the exercise of judicial functions.

Sanders v. US Justice Court · filed 2002-04-10

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a judge for judicial acts unless the judge acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Ely v. Hill · filed 2002-05-08

The district court also correctly dismissed plaintiffs damages claim against Judge Patton in his personal capacity, based on judicial immunity. So long as the judge acted in his judicial capacity and the action was not taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” the judge is immune from a suit seeking damages.

A judge with subject matter jurisdiction is absolutely immune from a § 1983 damages claim for judicial acts, even if the plaintiff was not served.

Rose v. Leaver · filed 2002-05-15

Even assuming that Rose was never served with the petition, the record does establish that Judge Leaver, as a domestic relations judge, had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. Therefore, as Judge Leaver had jurisdiction over the proceedings, he was entitled to absolute immunity.

A judge sued under § 1983 has absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, even if the judge allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Los Angeles County Ass'n of Environmental Health Specialists v. Lewin · filed 2002-05-31

Even if Judge Lewin violated the Association’s constitutional rights by fading to disclose that he received payments from the County, he did not act in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Therefore, Judge Lewin is entitled to absolute immunity from ah of the Association’s claims.

Zoning hearing board members performing a quasi-judicial role are immune from individual-capacity § 1983 claims.

Ryan v. Lower Merion Township · filed 2002-06-12

Defendants Ryan and Morris have been sued in their individual and official capacities for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy, and intentional interference with contractual and business relations. ... Because Defendants Ryan and Morris were performing -a quasi-judicial role as members of the ZHB hearing an appeal of a zoning decision, they will be granted judicial immunity and all of Plaintiffs claims against them in their individual capacities are dismissed with prejudice.

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 claims against judges for protected judicial acts.

Robinson v. Herndon · filed 2002-06-13

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s claims against Damrell, Drozd, Farris, Canby, Pregerson, Fernandez, Wardlaw, and Kozinski as barred by judicial immunity.

Municipal judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for acts performed in their judicial duties.

Starr v. Hattiesburg City of · filed 2002-06-18

The district court did not err in determining that the municipal judge who tried Starr was absolutely immune from suit.

Absolute judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim based on a judge’s acts within her judicial jurisdiction.

Marczeski v. Handy · filed 2002-07-09

This immunity extends to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because all of the allegations against Judge Handy fall squarely within her judicial jurisdiction, they all fall within the scope of absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 requires causation and does not impose liability on a state actor for advising a defendant to plead guilty absent an unconstitutional motive.

Hayden v. NEVADA COUNTY, AR · filed 2012-01-10

The first issue is whether Hayden alleged the violation of a constitutional right by Sheriff Mormon. ... But Hayden cites no case -- and we have found none -- imposing § 1983 liability on a state actor for coercing or inducing a guilty plea that is later determined not to be knowing and voluntary. ... Therefore, absent an unconstitutional motive, jailer Mormon was not liable for advising Hayden to enter a guilty plea subsequently determined to be invalid. ... For these reasons, Sheriff Mormon was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Hayden’s due process claim.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a defendant’s actions and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

O'Dwyer v. State of Louisiana · filed 2009-02-19

Section 1983 jurisprudence requires that a causal connection be shown between the officer’s actions and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Bevan v. Lee County · filed 2007-03-15

Bevan was unable to show the required causal connection between Claudia and Jackie Cowart’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires an adequately alleged causal connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed constitutional deprivation; mere endorsement and encouragement of legislation does not suffice for a conspiracy claim.

Bensch v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1994-04-11

Here, Plaintiffs have yet to adequately allege a causal connection between the actions of SFWMD in relation to the enactment of the ordinances in question and plaintiffs’ alleged suffering of a constitutional deprivation. “Something more ... than simple endorsement and encouragement of legislation that turns out to be unconstitutional is a necessary element of a section 1983 claim based upon a conspiracy theory.”

Section 1983 proximate cause is governed by federal standards that incorporate common law tort principles.

Medeiros v. Town of South Kingstown · filed 1993-05-21

Determinations of proximate cause under § 1983 are governed by federal standards, which incorporate common law tort principles.

Section 1983 requires an adequately alleged causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Bensch v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1992-05-04

Here, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a causal connection between the actions of SFWMD in relation to the enactment of the ordinances in question and their alleged suffering of a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an individual defendant and the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Wright v. Reynolds · filed 1988-08-18

The language of section 1983 requires a degree of causation as an element of individual liability.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s state action to be the legal cause of the deprivation, not merely a but-for cause.

Ingram v. Dunn · filed 1974-10-11

The court believes that a plaintiff must allege harm done in the legal sense of that verb, meaning that the State action must be the legal cause of the wrong. ... The legal cause must be the conduct of those in charge of the corporation. The act of creating or continuing the life of that entity is too remote to support the plaintiffs’ action.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant’s acts proximately caused or contributed to causing the constitutional deprivation to impose liability.

Quinton David Palmer, by Next Friend, Marie Palmer v. Hall · filed 1975-08-15

Obviously, for the Mayor to be liable under this theory it would be necessary for the preponderance of the evidence to show that his utterances proximately caused or contributed to causing the actions of the officer.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and a deprivation of constitutional or federal rights; a statistical pattern of misconduct and supervisory inaction alone is insufficient.

Rizzo v. Goode · filed 1976-01-26

Such reasoning, however, blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress chose in § 1983. We have never subscribed to these amorphous propositions, and we decline to do so now.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and ultimately prove a causal connection between the defendant and the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Craig v. Carson · filed 1978-04-17

A claim under § 1983 must allege, and eventually prove, some causal connection between a defendant and the conduct that deprived a plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when the protected First Amendment motive was not the but-for reason for the challenged refusal to reappoint.

TANNER v. McCALL · filed 1980-09-17

If the first amendment motive is not the "but for" reason for the refusal to reappoint plaintiffs, their section 1983 action fails.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on individuals who subject or cause another person to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Tate v. Alexander · filed 1981-11-30

Apparent from the language of section 1983, however, is the condition that liability will be imposed only upon those individuals who “subject” or “cause to be subjected” another to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed constitutional deprivation.

McClure v. Cywinski · filed 1982-08-12

In order for the jury’s verdict in favor of McClure to stand, the plaintiff had to show a causal relationship between Cywinski’s conduct and McClure’s claimed constitutional deprivation.

General tort-causation principles apply to Section 1983, so liability cannot rest on denial of an administrative hearing that could not have caused the loss of child custody.

Fitzgerald v. Williamson · filed 1984-12-31

The general principles of tort causation apply in § 1983 actions, ... and thus plaintiffs may not hinge § 1983 liability on the failure to grant an administrative hearing.

A section 1983 plaintiff alleging government interference with protected press activity must causally connect the defendants’ conduct to the plaintiff’s abandonment of that activity.

Morgan v. Whitt · filed 1985-06-19

While plaintiff’s newspaper column is thus a protected activity for purposes of section 1983, plaintiff fails to connect defendants’ allegedly slanderous comments and intrusive behavior with his decision to leave the newspaper.

A supervisor's negligent planning does not support § 1983 liability when its relationship to a subordinate's alleged use of excessive force is too attenuated to establish causation.

Martin v. Allen · filed 1985-12-12

The Court finds the relationship between Collins’ allegedly negligent actions and plaintiff’s injury to be too attenuated for Collins to have been a cause of the alleged constitutional injury.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct proximately caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Springer v. Seaman · filed 1986-07-15

It is clearly the law, acknowledged by all parties, that proximate cause must be shown in actions alleging constitutional deprivations.

A Section 1983 claim requires a sufficient causal nexus between the named defendants’ actions and the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Merrow v. Goldberg · filed 1986-10-10

Under the facts contained in his complaint, it would be impossible for ... plaintiff to allege a nexus between the actions of defendants and the alleged deprivation of plaintiffs rights sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief can be granted against these defendants.

Section 1983 requires that the alleged constitutional deprivation be fairly attributable to the defendant’s conduct.

Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company, N.A., Estates of Frank N. Lent and Betty J. Lent v. Dale "Bill" Russell, Sheriff and · filed 1987-08-10

The facts alleged, however, implicate yet another requirement of § 1983, i.e. that the constitutional deprivation alleged be fairly attributable to defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant either to participate personally in the constitutional deprivation or to cause another person to inflict it.

Harrington v. City of Portland · filed 1987-10-23

Therefore, Harrington must establish that Tercek and Karl caused her to be deprived of a federal constitutional right. She can do this by showing that Tercek and Karl personally participated in causing the deprivation, or that they caused another to deprive her of her constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between conduct under color of law and a claimed constitutional deprivation.

Dawson v. City of Kent · filed 1988-03-28

There must, in addition, be a causal connection between action taken under color of law and what is claimed as a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983’s causation requirement is governed by federal law, not state tort law.

Hill Stokes v. Bullins · filed 1988-05-10

We differ with the court’s and the parties’ characterization of the issue of causation as governed by state law. This cannot be, because “cause” is part of the definitional language of § 1983 and has been construed by the Supreme Court without reference to specific state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s action under color of state law to cause a deprivation of federal rights; discretionary authority to enforce county jail standards alone does not establish causation.

Reid v. Johnston County · filed 1988-06-23

In using state law to identify persons responsible for civil rights violations, the court cannot conclude that the discretionary responsibilities set forth in the North Carolina General Statutes make the DHR the cause, as required by § 1983, of any violations.

Section 1983 requires proximate cause; defendants are not liable for a constitutional deprivation caused by officials whose actions they did not instigate or authorize.

Camacho v. Rivera · filed 1988-11-23

At the outset we note that the evidence does not suggest that defendants instigated or in any way authorized the actions of the two Justice Department officials who entered and searched plaintiffs former office. The officials apparently acted independently and merely called defendant Dora López to inform her that they intended to break the lock on plaintiffs former office in order to gain access for some unspecified reason. In light of this, we think plaintiffs case lacks the essential element of proximate cause, which precludes our holding defendants liable for the independent actions of the Justice officials.

Section 1983 liability requires proximate cause, including reasonable foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct would injure the plaintiff.

Hamilton v. Thezan · filed 1989-03-09

In sum, Hamilton has not met his burden of showing a material factual issue that it was foreseeable to defendants that their assumed conduct would result in a tainted grand jury indictment against Hamilton. That being so, Jones as well as Duncan teach that Hamilton has failed on the “proximate cause” element necessary to impose Section 1983 liability on defendants.

Section 1983 liability requires a causal nexus between the defendant’s actions and the challenged deprivation.

Jackson v. Raoul Galan, in His Official Capacity as Clerk, 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jeff · filed 1989-04-14

First, there is an insufficient causal nexus between the actions of Galan’s employees and the challenged garnishment of appellee’s wages to support liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for officials whose unconstitutional employment decision sets a termination in motion, even when another body later makes the final decision.

Jacobs v. Meister · filed 1989-04-21

Relying on this “set in motion” principle, we conclude that the summary judgment granted in favor of the regents did not insulate defendants from liability for the violation of Jacobs’ first amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently close causal relationship between an individual defendant’s actions and the alleged deprivation; a defendant is not liable for harm that is too remote a consequence of those actions.

William J. (Jack) Jones, Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith · filed 1989-06-22

In other words, if the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was “too remote a consequence of the [individual defendants’] action,” those defendants cannot be held liable for that harm.

Section 1983 requires state officials’ conduct to cause the deprivation of a federally protected right; officials with no duty to remedy unconstitutional jail conditions are not liable for failing to correct them.

Reid v. Kayye · filed 1989-07-06

It is well settled that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides a remedy for conduct of state officials only if that conduct causes the deprivation of a federally protected right. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Because, in the case at bar, appellees had no duty to remedy the challenged jail conditions, their inaction cannot be seen as a cause of those conditions and a Sec. 1983 suit cannot be maintained against them.

Section 1983 requires each defendant to have caused the alleged harm before liability can attach.

Houtz v. Deland · filed 1989-08-25

By its own terms section 1983 requires that each defendant cause the harm alleged.

Section 1983 does not require proof of proximate cause when intentional or reckless conduct forms the basis for liability.

Ward v. City of San Jose · filed 1990-01-25

Proximate cause is a requirement for § 1983 liability only under some circumstances and theories of liability. It is not required where, as in this case, intentional or reckless conduct forms the basis for liability.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant to have caused the plaintiff’s loss; acting under color of state law alone is insufficient.

Joseph A. Baucher and Rebecca M. Baucher v. Eastern Indiana Production Credit Association and William Buchanan · filed 1990-07-13

Like all tort liability, however, for liability to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is not enough that an individual merely act under color of state law, but the individual must also have caused the plaintiff’s loss.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging retaliatory termination to show that the exercise of protected rights was a motivating factor in the termination decision.

Romero v. Albert Aguayo, Donald Moser, James Scamman, and School District No. 1, City and County of Denver · filed 1991-05-31

To establish liability under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate his exercise of protected rights was a "motivating factor" in the decision to terminate him.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant caused the alleged detention and that the plaintiff would otherwise have been released.

Canell v. Washington County Sheriff Washington County Jail Nita Skophammer, Sgt. · filed 1991-12-04

He had to show there was some evidence to prove that Washington County caused his continued detention and that Multnomah County would have released him but for the Washington County detainer.

Section 1983 liability for wrongful detention requires a causal connection between a prison official’s act or omission and the duration of detention.

Roa v. City of Bethlehem · filed 1991-12-19

Finally, plaintiff cannot establish the essential causal connection between any act or omission on Pagni’s part and the duration of his detention.

Section 1983’s causation requirement is satisfied when officials threaten criminal prosecution to enforce a requirement that would stop the plaintiff from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct.

Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia · filed 1992-01-22

The Commissioners’ efforts to enforce the certification requirement by threatening criminal prosecution also satisfies the causation requirement of section 1983 inasmuch as it was an affirmative act designed to stop the plaintiffs from engaging in the interstate transportation of infectious medical waste without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity.

Section 1983 liability for denial of access to the courts requires evidence connecting the defendant’s conduct to the alleged intentional deprivation.

Simmons v. Dickhaut · filed 1992-05-20

In order to establish liability under § 1983, appellant has to show an intentional deprivation of his right of access to the courts and that defendants' conduct was causally connected to that deprivation.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts causally linking the defendants’ actions to a cognizable harm, and a pro se plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend to allege that link.

White v. City of Tucson Richard Miranda, Lt. Commander, Tpd Internal Affairs Division Officer Cox, Internal · filed 1992-08-18

In view of our duty to construe pro se complaints liberally, see, e.g., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir.1984), we conclude that Appellant must be given the opportunity to amend his complaint to attempt to allege facts which indicate a causal link between defendants' actions and a cognizable harm.

Section 1983 claims are evaluated for proximate causation under prevailing tort principles.

Dothard v. Dept. of Human Resources · filed 1993-01-29

Furthermore, prevailing tort concepts of proximate causation guide analysis of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal relationship between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation; without it, the defendant is entitled to dismissal.

Latimore v. Widseth · filed 1993-02-25

Section 1983, of course, requires a causal relationship between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation. Absent such a relationship, the defendant is entitled to dismissal.

Section 1983 requires causation between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed deprivation of a civil right.

Purcell v. Miller · filed 1993-04-14

Causation is an essential element in Purcell's civil rights and state tort causes of action.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an official’s own acts or omissions and the constitutional deprivation and does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

LaMarca v. Turner · filed 1993-07-07

Section 1983 thus focuses our inquiry on whether an official’s acts or omissions were the cause — not merely a contributing factor — of the constitutionally infirm condition. ... Because the analysis focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant caused a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights.

Herrold v. Jagels · filed 1993-09-17

To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.1991). Herrold makes no such showing and, therefore, there is no basis for civil liability against the appellees on this allegation.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant’s conduct caused the deprivation of constitutional rights; speculative evidence of causation cannot defeat summary judgment.

Young v. Francis · filed 1993-09-27

Second, plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that defendants’ actions or inactions failed to fulfill their duty of care and that this failure led to the deprivation of the child’s constitutional rights. ... Moreover, even if I were to accept plaintiffs’ increased risk theory of causation, the evidence plaintiffs have proffered is too speculative to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find Dr. Lehmicke’s conduct actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement in conduct causing a federal rights deprivation; initiating a disciplinary charge does not establish liability for a loss of liberty caused by the disciplinary board’s findings and punishment.

Nicholson v. Moran · filed 1993-11-08

The subject of the constitutional inquiry should be the state action(s) which immediately and proximately bring about the alleged deprivation of rights. In this case, the facts establish that the alleged loss of liberty was not caused by Brule’s charge, but by the disciplinary board’s findings and decision to punish Nicholson for “giving false information.” ... Under the stipulated facts, none of the other defendants played a direct role in the conduct which I have found to be unconstitutional.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be both the actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Hernandez v. Eddie Ylst, Warden · filed 1994-02-14

A defendant is liable under section 1983 for depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights only if the defendant is both the proximate and actual cause of the deprivation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the defendants aver, and Hernandez does not dispute, that he was forcibly medicated on the orders of Dr. Lardizibal. Because Hernandez has not met his burden of showing that McFadden's statement was the cause of the involuntary injection, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim.

Section 1983 causation is established when a defendant participates in or is a moving force behind the deprivation of rights.

Jeffries v. Harleton · filed 1994-04-18

A plaintiff may establish causation under section 1983 if he shows that the defendants participated in, or were "moving forces" behind, the deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show causation; a mere allegation of harm does not satisfy that requirement.

Therrien v. Hamilton · filed 1994-04-19

Plaintiffs mere allegation that he was harmed does not satisfy the causation requirement of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant committed an act that caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Thomas William Sinclair Richey v. Riveland · filed 1994-06-09

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants committed an act that deprived him of a constitutional right. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 972 (1992).

Section 1983 requires proof that a defendant caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Cook v. Lehman · filed 1994-07-28

First, in dealing with the jury’s finding that plaintiffs due process rights were violated, I look to the wording of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which premises recovery on a showing that the defendant subjected or “cause[d] to be subjected” the defendant to a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 follows tort causation principles, so an officer’s false statements may cause an arrest and detention despite intervening probable-cause findings by a court and grand jury.

Phelan v. Thompson · filed 1994-12-07

The court disagrees. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to “be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” ... Defendant’s false statements were the catalyst for plaintiffs arrest and subsequent detention.

Section 1983 liability requires a sufficiently close causal connection between wrongful state action and an injury caused by a private person.

Gazette v. City Of Pontiac · filed 1994-12-08

There cannot be Section 1983 liability where the actions of one private individual leading to the injury or death of another individual are too remote from the allegedly wrongful state action.

Section 1983 requires a substantially close relationship between a defendant’s conduct and the claimed deprivation of a federally protected right.

Fields v. Powell · filed 1995-01-30

A defendant's conduct must have a substantially close relationship to the claimed constitutional violation in order to conclude that the defendants subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 requires a malicious-prosecution plaintiff to show that the alleged prosecution caused the claimed deprivation of liberty.

Ford v. City of Rockford, Police and Fire Commissioners Dennis Johnson, Charles Perteete · filed 1995-03-06

Aside from the fact that his challenge to the stop was time-barred, Ford cannot show that but for the alleged malicious prosecution, he would not have suffered the injury of being deprived of his liberty.

Section 1983 requires a substantially close relationship between a defendant’s conduct and the claimed deprivation of a federally protected right.

Hardin v. Fox · filed 1995-03-20

A defendant's conduct must have a substantially close relationship to the claimed constitutional violation in order to conclude that the defendant subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 liability requires a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of federal rights; an intervening decision based on legitimate grounds can break that link.

Jeffries v. Bernstein · filed 1995-04-04

While Harleston and Reynolds were instrumental in putting the one-term issue on the Board's agenda, see id. at 1247, and may indeed have done so to punish Jeffries, the nine votes based on legitimate grounds constitute a superseding cause breaking the causal chain between the tainted motives (of Harleston and Reynolds) and the decision to limit Jeffries' term.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation; an independent decision made on legitimate grounds can break that chain.

Jeffries v. Harleston · filed 1995-04-04

While Harleston and Reynolds were instrumental in putting the one-term issue on the Board’s agenda, see id. at 1247, and may indeed have done so to punish Jeffries, the nine votes based on legitimate grounds constitute a superseding cause breaking the causal chain between the tainted motives (of Harleston and Reynolds) and the decision to limit Jeffries’ term.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts tending to show a constitutional injury proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Bevelhymer v. Clark County, William P. Henry · filed 1995-04-26

To state a claim under section 1983, Bevelhymer must adequately allege facts tending to show that there was a constitutional injury and that Henry's conduct proximately caused it.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently close relationship between a defendant’s conduct and the claimed constitutional violation to treat the defendant as having subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of federal rights.

Riley v. William Overton D. Smith Arum Borton Ruo Foote Erskin Ruo J. Clark · filed 1995-06-13

A defendant's conduct must have a sufficiently close relationship to the claimed constitutional violation in order to conclude that the defendant subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of a federally protected right.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show a causal connection between the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.

Brewer v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc. Dr. Patrick Brady · filed 1995-07-14

Although Brewer places great weight on the fact that Dr. Brady lost his Michigan medical license in November 1992, Brewer has failed to show any connection between Dr. Brady's activities in Michigan and his treatment of Brewer at ISP. See Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (section 1983 plaintiff must prove that defendant's unconstitutional conduct was "cause in fact" of plaintiff's injury), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2395 (1993).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s action caused the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Independent Party of Arkansas v. Secretary of State Priest · filed 1995-11-17

To state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s action caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal connection between an allegedly unconstitutional policy and the constitutional deprivation.

Doe v. Methacton School District · filed 1996-02-12

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there must be a direct causal connection between the allegedly constitutionally defective policy in question and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a defendant and a constitutional injury; when an independent judge orders the challenged act, those who sought the order must have conspired with the judge to be liable for it.

Noyak v. Cobb County Kennestone Hospital Authority · filed 1996-02-14

Thus, in order to have caused Novak to suffer constitutional injury, the defendants had to have conspired with Judge Hines. ... Liability is predicated on the existence of conspiracy, and there is none.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a sheriff’s deliberately indifferent warrant-record procedures and an erroneous arrest; a factual dispute about whether reasonable procedures would have prevented the arrest precludes summary judgment.

Ruehman v. Village of Palos Park · filed 1996-02-14

As previously held, factual disputes remain surrounding whether Miller’s arrest warrant would have been removed from the computer listings in time to prevent his arrest even if the Sheriff had implemented a reasonable warrant validation procedure.

Section 1983 does not impose liability where a police chief’s failure to recommend an officer’s decertification is too remote from the officer’s later misconduct at another agency.

Doe v. Williams · filed 1996-04-29

We believe the action of Williams in failing to recommend decertification of Wright is too remote to create a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police chief for subordinates’ unauthorized recommendations of a former officer when the recommendations are too attenuated from the plaintiffs’ injury.

Doe v. Wright · filed 1996-06-19

The actions of Williams' subordinates in recommending Wright to Pulaski County in violation of the Helena Police Department's policy does not create a cause of action against Williams either individually or in his official capacity. Like the failure to recommend decertification, we believe the recommendation letters are simply too attenuated to state an actionable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a municipality caused the deprivation of a federal right; administering a grant and urging a private employer to comply with wage rules did not make the city liable for the employer’s unpaid wages.

John Jorgensen, Individually, and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. The City of Clarksburg, West Virg · filed 1996-07-02

The question remains therefore whether Jorgensen has alleged any action or inaction by the City of Clarksburg which may be seen as causing that deprivation and thus violating § 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to obtain relief under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that defendant caused a deprivation of plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state law). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jorgensen, United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam), we find no such violation.

Section 1983 requires state action to cause the deprivation of a constitutional right; a plaintiff’s self-inflicted injury does not establish that causation.

Randolph v. Cervantes · filed 1996-12-30

Section 1983 imposes liability only if three things are proven: (1) that there is state action and that (2) such state action causes (3) deprivation of a constitutional right. Assuming, but not deciding that state action is implicated in this case, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact either as to causation or the deprivation of a constitutional right. Plaintiff caused her own injury.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of rights; conduct too remote from the injury does not support liability.

Speed v. Ramsey County · filed 1997-02-12

Mack’s conduct is too remote from the injury to support a claim under Section 1983. Mack is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of fact that his conduct directly caused deprivation of DeJohn’s rights.

Section 1983 requires proximate causation between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Morinaga v. Vue · filed 1997-04-24

Proximate cause is required to establish a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to establish that the defendants’ conduct caused the alleged harm under ordinary tort causation principles.

Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia · filed 1997-06-02

The issue of causation of damages in a section 1983 suit is based on basic notions of tort causation. ... We conclude, therefore, that defendants were properly granted summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate causation under well-established tort principles.

Section 1983 does not impose liability when the challenged government act is too attenuated from the resulting injury.

Raynor v. City of Longview · filed 1997-06-09

Although King used the gun to shoot the victims, we agree with the district court that the act of releasing the gun on April 8, 1991, is too attenuated from the shootings on July 10, 1992, to hold the City and County responsible under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s actions to have actually caused the claimed deprivation of rights.

Hart v. O'Brien · filed 1997-11-06

However, causation is an element of a section 1983 claim; O'Brien's actions must have actually caused the deprivation of liberty of which Hart complains.

Section 1983 allows an official’s proposal of an ordinance to be treated as a proximate cause of an injury even when a council vote is also required.

Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, Janet Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River · filed 1998-03-09

Although both events were necessary, Bogan’s actions could properly be considered a proximate cause of the ultimate harm.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing that the defendants caused the alleged constitutional violations.

Allison v. Connie Beeler, Mail Room Staff S. Frank Thompson, Superintendent Terrance Anderson, Hearings · filed 1998-04-06

Insofar as Allison challenges the propriety of the district court's initial dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint with leave to amend where Allison failed to allege facts showing that defendants caused the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant caused the deprivation of rights.

Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free School District · filed 1998-05-06

To prevail on such a claim, section 1983 requires that the plaintiff prove, inter alia, that the defendant caused the deprivation of his or her rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Ford v. Town of Grafton · filed 1998-05-08

This second prong “requires the plaintiff to prove not only a deprivation of federal right, but also that the defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the alleged deprivation.” Ibid. ... We conclude, after considering the evidence with all reasonable inferences drawn for the plaintiff, that even if the town deprived Ford of her property right during the term of the order, and that deprivation made her more vulnerable to Davidson’s final attack, it was not the actual cause of her January 17, 1986, injuries.

Section 1983 permits liability when a person’s conduct effectively causes another person to inflict a constitutional injury, even if that person does not directly violate the right.

Sales v. Grant · filed 1998-10-14

Critically for this case, the § 1983 causation language, “subject[ ] or cause[ ] to be subjected,” imposes liability not only for conduct that directly violates a right but for conduct that is the effective cause of another’s direct infliction of the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have subjected a person to a deprivation of rights or caused that deprivation.

Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents · filed 1998-10-26

The plain wording of the statute contains an element of causation. In other words, a defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to the deprivation, or caused a citizen to be subjected to the deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation.

Gordon v. Hansen · filed 1999-02-23

These allegations fail to establish a causal link between the alleged wrongful action and deprivation and, therefore, fail to state a section 1983, or Bivens, claim for violation of Gordon's substantive due process rights.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation; a mere possibility that police could have prevented a third party’s violence is insufficient.

Estate of MacIas v. Lopez · filed 1999-03-05

The decisions in Ricketts and Rodriguez-Cirilo make clear that a mere possibility police officers could have prevented a third party’s act of violence does not create the direct causal link that is required to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on attorneys for a deprivation caused by a court’s decision rather than by the attorneys themselves.

Arch v. Papadakos · filed 1984-01-06

In any event defendants can not be viewed as the “persons” who “subjected” Arch to the diminution of his emoluments, when it was a decision by the court which would effectively result in such lessening of the lawyer’s “take.”

Section 1983 requires a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s deprivation of rights.

Gordon v. James A. Hansen Lucinda Glen Kent Plummer Richard Anderson Richard Jarvis · filed 1999-05-17

These allegations fail to establish a causal link between the alleged wrongful action and deprivation and, therefore, fail to state a section 1983, or Bivens, claim for violation of Gordon’s substantive due process rights.

Section 1983 liability can extend to an official who sets in motion events that foreseeably deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Morris v. Dearborne · filed 1999-07-16

We agree with the district court that in order to establish Dearborne's liability, the Plaintiffs must prove that she set in motion events that would foreseeably cause the deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Section 1983 causation is not broken by an intervening judicial decision unless the judge received all the facts and the official presenting them lacked a malicious motive to withhold information.

Morris v. Dearborne · filed 1999-09-27

However, the chain of causation is only broken where all the facts are presented to the intermediary, and where the officer presenting the information does not have a malicious motive to withhold information.

A grand jury’s decision to indict breaks the chain of causation for a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Hale v. Clayton · filed 1999-10-01

The district court properly dismissed Hale’s false arrest claim because the decision of the grand jury to indict him broke the chain of causation.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s actions to cause the deprivation; public defender officials are not liable for failing to remove appointed counsel when only the court could remove him.

Chapman v. Michael H. Musich, Lorri Shurtleff, Joseph W. Downey · filed 1984-02-01

We have carefully studied the record and we fail to see how any liability could follow on behalf of Shurtleff and Downey. The appointment of counsel in this case was made by the state court judge. The court controls the appointment and supervision of counsel. Counsel could not have been relieved in this case unless the court were to so relieve him.

A plaintiff seeking damages under Section 1983 must show that the defendants’ actions proximately caused the constitutional violation.

Antonelli v. Burnham · filed 1984-02-22

To recover damages under Section 1983 a plaintiff must prove not only (1) defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights while acting under color of state law but also (2) their actions proximately caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s action proximately caused the claimed injury.

Hedges v. Musco · filed 2000-02-22

It is axiomatic that "[a] S 1983 action, like its state tort analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation."

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant proximately caused the claimed harm.

Ramos-Biaggi v. Martinez · filed 2000-04-07

In the context of a constitutional tort under § 1983, as with any tort, a plaintiff must show not only that he was harmed but also that the defendant proximately caused his harm.

A §1983 claim requires proof that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the injury.

O'Brien v. Kobrin · filed 2000-04-11

It is well established that a showing of proximate causation is a necessary element of a §1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimed injury.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 2000-06-15

In a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.

Section 1983 permits a claim when an official fabricates evidence during an investigation and foreseeably uses it to cause a deprivation of liberty.

Zahrey v. Coffey · filed 2000-07-20

But we disagree with the further point that no valid section 1983 claim is stated where a deprivation of liberty results from the initial act of obtaining evidence known to be false, at least in a case like Buckley and the pending case where the same person who fabricated the evidence foresee-ably used it.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient causal connection between an official’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation to establish liability.

Neola N. Howard, Etc. v. Ray Fortenberry, Etc. · filed 1984-03-29

We hold, therefore, that the Director’s dereliction, if any, did not have a sufficient causal connection to the constitutional deprivation to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits causation to be shown through an individual defendant’s direct involvement or through acts the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.

Williams v. Pennsylvania State Police-Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement · filed 2001-04-30

Because I can find no controlling law from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on this issue, and because I consider the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Arnold to be persuasive and most consistent with the language of § 1983, I adopt the Arnold analysis today and hold that causation by an individual defendant in a § 1983 action may be established in two ways: (1) with evidence of direct personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation by the defendant, or (2) with evidence that the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an official’s conduct and the claimed injury.

Ransom v. Corona · filed 2001-05-29

Insofar as Ransom appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim relating to his hunger strike, we affirm the district court’s dismissal because prison officials did not cause the injury, if any, suffered by Ransom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s unconstitutional action caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Stalhut v. City of Lincoln · filed 2001-05-30

To establish a violation of § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s unconstitutional action was a “cause in fact” of the plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 requires proof of causation for each defendant's liability for a constitutional violation.

Burleson v. TDCJ · filed 2001-11-14

Burleson is also required to show causation to establish each defendant's section 1983 liability for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s actions to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.

Benner v. McAdory · filed 2002-04-05

As the district court put it, the officials’ actions were not the proximate cause of the harm that befell Benner, and thus they cannot be hable to him under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant directly or indirectly caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Seegars v. Adcox · filed 2002-09-02

A basic element of a successful § 1983 claim is causation. ... Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Whittle participated directly or indirectly in the stop, thereby causing the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging false arrest or malicious prosecution to show that the defendant’s acts proximately caused the deprivation of rights.

Noga v. Potenza · filed 2002-09-04

A plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts of a defendant proximately caused the deprivation of rights to sustain claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under section 1983.

For injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983, causation may be assessed through the combined acts or omissions of responsible officials.

Linderman v. Vail · filed 2003-02-03

But when a prisoner seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against prison officials, his inquiry into causation is “broader and more generalized.” Id. Because Linderman seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the district court should have considered “the combined acts or omissions of the state officials responsible for operating” the WSP. Id.

Section 1983 requires the defendant's conduct to be a legal cause of the alleged deprivation; a police officer who does not significantly influence a bail decision is not liable for that decision.

Briand v. Morin · filed 2003-02-25

After reviewing the undisputed evidence of record in light of the Restatement factors, the court concludes that Morin's actions were not the legal cause of the bail determinations made by Blanchette and Judge Bornstein.

Section 1983 permits liability for a subordinate whose retaliatory conduct causes a termination even if the final decisionmaker lacks a retaliatory motive.

Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences University · filed 2003-04-28

This instruction is completely consistent with the teachings of Gilbrook and Willis that allow imposition of liability even though the decision-maker may be ignorant of its subordinate's retaliatory motive.

A subordinate may be liable under § 1983 when retaliatory conduct influences a termination decision, even if the final decision-maker lacks a retaliatory motive.

Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences University · filed 2003-04-28

On these facts, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that OHSU’s hearing committee did not share Seyfer’s improper motives in terminating Ostad, Gilbrook indicates that Seyfer properly may be held liable. Thus, as to Sey-fer, the district court’s denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law was entirely correct.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant’s conduct legally caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Briand v. Strout · filed 2003-05-29

After reviewing the undisputed evidence of record in light of the Restatement factors, the court concludes that Chief Strout’s and Sergeant Strout’s actions were not the legal cause of the bail determinations made by Blanchette and Judge Bornstein under the circumstances presented in this case.

An independent prosecutorial decision that probable cause exists can insulate an investigator from § 1983 liability for a suspect’s subsequent arrest, conviction, and incarceration.

Sarmiento v. King County · filed 2003-10-01

By independently deciding that probable cause existed to charge Sarmiento, the prosecutor effectively insulated Muller from liability under § 1983 for Sarmiento’s subsequent arrest, conviction, and incarceration.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s action proximately caused the injury.

Davis v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2003-12-12

In order to succeed on a 1983 action, “the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s action was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.” ... Here, there is no such causal link and the building inspector and his agents including Martino, who entered on private property to fulfill emergency inspection orders of a Town Board and rendered a report of what he saw, should not be held liable for an alleged illegal search and seizure, for any violation of due process, for trespass or for violation of anyone’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not impose excessive-bail liability on law enforcement officers when a judicial officer sets bail in its discretion.

Galen v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2004-01-09

Where bail is set at the discretion of a judicial officer, law enforcement has no § 1983 liability for excessive bail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants whose conduct did not cause the rejection of a prisoner’s court petition.

Tyler v. Bett · filed 2004-01-14

As the defendants are not responsible for the rejection of Tyler’s petition, they cannot be liable under § 1983, Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir.2001), and a remand to the district court is unnecessary, Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir.2001).

Section 1983 uses common-law causation principles; a foreseeable intervening act does not break the chain of causation.

Doran v. Eckold · filed 2004-04-06

Issues of causation in § 1983 suits are decided by looking to the common law. ... Foreseeable intervening acts, be they lawful or unlawful, do not break the chain of causation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove that the defendant official’s conduct caused a deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Larson v. Mulcrone · filed 1982-04-01

To establish liability, plaintiff must allege and prove that the official’s conduct “caused” a deprivation of his federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires causation, but a defendant need not be present where the injury occurs to be liable.

Wright v. City of St. Francis · filed 2004-04-20

Absence from the scene at which the injury is inflicted is not necessarily sufficient to exonerate a defendant from a § 1983 claim. Section 1983 does contain a causation requirement.

Section 1983 damages require proof that the defendant’s actions were both an actual and a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

White v. Roper · filed 1990-05-01

To prevail and recover damages on his section 1983 claim under either a deliberate indifference or an intent to punish theory, White must prove that Sergeant Roper’s actions were both the actual and the proximate cause of White’s injuries.

Section 1983 requires factual and proximate causation between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed injury.

Proffitt v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 2004-12-22

To prevail on his § 1983 action, Proffitt must demonstrate that Abel’s conduct both factually and proximately caused his termination.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed constitutional injury.

Johnson v. Hornung · filed 2005-02-17

Common law of torts provides the causation element applicable to civil rights violations.

Section 1983 damages require proof that the alleged federal-right violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Estate of Sowards v. City of Trenton · filed 2005-02-24

The district court appropriately recognized that “proximate causation is an essential element of a § 1983 claim for damages.” Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Doe v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 956 F.2d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 does not require proof that officers’ failure to provide medical care proximately caused a detainee’s death when the need for care was obvious.

Owensby v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2005-07-07

Accordingly, the estate need not prove that the officers' acts or omissions were the proximate cause of Owensby's death in order to hold the officers liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal connection between a defendant’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Dianne Troupe v. Sarasota County, Florida · filed 2005-08-03

A § 1983 claim requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 damages require injuries that would not have occurred but for the constitutional tort and were reasonably foreseeable consequences of it.

Kuzma v. City of Fort Myers · filed 2005-10-03

In addition, the jury instruction on causation accurately reflects the law with respect to the element of causation in § 1983 cases, which requires that “[f]or damages to be proximately caused by a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must show that, except for that constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred and further that such injuries and damages were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in issue.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000).

A § 1983 claimant seeking damages must establish that the unconstitutional provision caused the claimed injury.

Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hopkins · filed 2006-01-05

Because Advantage is not a prevailing party, it must establish that the unconstitutional provisions were the “cause in fact” of its § 1983 injury in order to succeed on summary judgment.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an independent intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation and insulates the initiating officer unless the plaintiff shows that the officer tainted the intermediary’s deliberations.

Fitch v. Morrow · filed 2006-08-30

Under the “break in the causal chain” doctrine, once “facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The causal chain is not broken, however, “if the plaintiff affirmatively shows that ‘the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendants.’” Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456.). ... Therefore, because we continue to recognize the “break in the causal chain” doctrine, we affirm the district court’s decision to apply the qualified immunity doctrine.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that each defendant caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Joseph v. Corradini · filed 2006-12-15

Based on these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that M endez and Zelig w ere the but-for cause of M rs. Joseph’s prolonged stay in Poulsen’s car. This absence of predicate facts establishing but-for causation means that M rs. Joseph has not alleged a constitutional violation attributable to these defendants.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Joseph v. Shepherd · filed 2006-12-15

Based on these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Mendez and Zelig were the but-for cause of Mrs. Joseph’s prolonged stay in Poulsen’s car. This absence of predicate facts establishing but-for causation means that Mrs. Joseph has not alleged a constitutional violation attributable to these defendants.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the defendants responsible for an alleged deprivation and allege a causal connection between their actions and the injury.

Morales v. Chertoff · filed 2006-12-27

Because Morales failed to identify the specific defendants and how their actions amounted to retaliation, he failed to allege a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and his filing of the grievances.

For § 1983 liability based on excessive bail set by a judicial officer, an officer’s deliberate or reckless misrepresentation must have caused the bail to be unconstitutionally excessive.

Galen v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2007-01-18

Thus, to withstand summary judgment, Galen must show that Sergeant Barrier or Deputy Heinrich deliberately or recklessly misled the Commissioner, and that his bail would not have been unconstitutionally excessive but for the officers’ misrepresentations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s actions caused the claimed injury.

Billups v. Hammon · filed 2007-05-23

Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Billups’ claim that Hammon used excessive force against him, because Billups failed to present evidence to counter defendants’ evidence showing his back pain was caused by degenerative disc disease, and not by Hammon’s actions. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir.2000) (a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 claim must show his injury was caused by defendants’ actions).

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct or duties and the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right.

Hamilton v. City of Jackson · filed 2007-06-13

In addition, plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the defendant’s actions, customs, policies, or statutorily imposed duties and the alleged deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional right in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not make an officer liable for a conviction caused by the admission of a suggestive identification when the officer did not mislead or pressure the prosecutor or trial judge.

Wray v. City of New York, Daniel Martorano, William Weller, James McCavera and New York City Police Department, · filed 2007-06-18

In the absence of evidence that Officer Weller misled or pressured the prosecution or trial judge, we cannot conclude that his conduct caused the violation of Wray’s constitutional rights; rather, the violation was caused by the ill-considered acts and decisions of the prosecutor and trial judge.

A § 1983 failure-to-train claim requires evidence that the training failure caused the alleged injury.

Vaughn v. Wallace · filed 2007-08-07

Finally, without addressing the question of whether Ms. Vaughn stated a claim under § 1983 for failure to train, we conclude that she offered no evidence to show how any such failure resulted in Robert’s death.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct factually and proximately caused the alleged injuries.

Hays v. Hallberg · filed 2007-08-07

To prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Hays must demonstrate that Hallberg’s conduct — the purchase of his home — both factually and proximately caused his alleged injuries.

Section 1983 requires evidence that defendants received complaints in time to prevent the alleged harm when a claim rests on their failure to act.

Doe v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2007-08-17

An element of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is causation: some evidence must exist that defendants received the letters at a point at which the complained of harm could have been prevented.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant’s conduct caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Doe v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2007-08-21

An element of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is causation: some evidence must exist that defendants received the letters when the complained of harm could have been prevented.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Rodriguez v. SECRETARY FOR DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2007-11-21

As with any other claim brought under § 1983, to succeed, the inmate must demonstrate a causal connection between the prison official’s conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 requires allegedly unconstitutional conduct to proximately cause the injury for liability.

Garcia v. Santa Clara County · filed 2008-02-29

Finally, because the uncontradicted evidence in the record indicates that Garcia would not have been saved by immediate medical attention, Appellants cannot demonstrate that Garcia’s constitutional rights were violated by the length of time that elapsed between the shooting and Garcia’s examination by medical personnel. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599,109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (allegedly unconstitutional conduct must be the proximate cause of injury to trigger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

A § 1983 plaintiff claiming that deliberate indifference caused a death must prove proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence.

Higgins v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections · filed 2008-06-02

Because Weathers has not demonstrated proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence, we need not consider whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Raynell’s serious medical needs.