42 U.S.C. § 1983

Retaliation under color of state law for protected political activity supports Section 1983 liability even when the resulting injury takes the form of reputational harm.

Rakovich v. Wade · filed 1985-03-04

The fact that Rakovich’s injury took the form of damage to his reputation does not shield the defendants from liability under § 1983.

A public employee is entitled to § 1983 relief for a politically motivated discharge only when protected party affiliation caused the termination.

Grossart v. Dinaso · filed 1985-04-03

If Grossart was terminated because she was not a Republican, she was entitled to section 1983 relief. The district judge, however, found no causal connection between the Republican party's unsuccessful solicitation of Grossart and her subsequent termination. We do not believe this finding was clearly erroneous.

A public employer violates § 1983 by discharging an employee in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern.

Brasslett v. Raymond J. Cota, Jr. · filed 1985-05-16

We reverse the district court’s decision on the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and hold that the defendants, in discharging Brasslett from his position as fire chief, unlawfully retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights to free speech.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when prison officials transfer an inmate to punish the exercise of First Amendment rights.

Murphy v. Missouri Department of Correction · filed 1985-08-02

We express no opinion on the merits of Murphy’s claim but hold only that his complaint states a valid cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits general damages for First Amendment violations even without proof of consequential injury.

Walje v. City Of Winchester · filed 1985-09-30

... so too must Section 1983 permit the recovery of general damages for First Amendment violations, which by their very nature weaken and damage the guarantee of free speech.

A government employee may recover under § 1983 for retaliation against protected speech even without a protected liberty or property interest in the job.

Edgardo A. Gonzalez, Jr. v. C.Y. Benavides, Jr., Webb County Judge · filed 1985-10-24

Employees may recover for actions taken by government employers in retaliation for protected speech even if the employee has no protected liberty or property interest in his job.

A prison guard may not retaliate against an inmate for complaining to supervisors about the guard’s conduct.

Gibbs v. John T. King, Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 1986-01-02

A guard thus may not harass an inmate in retaliation for the inmate complaining to supervisors about the guard’s conduct.

A § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim fails without a causal connection between the plaintiff’s protected speech and the adverse employment action.

O'COnnOr v. Peru State College · filed 1986-01-02

Because we affirm the trial court’s finding of lack of causal connection between O’Connor’s speech and her termination, we need not consider the court’s additional suggestion that O’Connor failed to show that she engaged in any protected speech.

A Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim may rest on a punitive transfer even when the public employee has no right to remain in the position.

Bob Thomas v. Harris County · filed 1986-03-10

In addition, retaliation need not take the form of actual dismissal but may also be manifested by certain transfers. This is so even though the public employee does not have the right not to be transferred.

A Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation plaintiff must show that protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action.

Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1 · filed 1986-11-13

Next, we must inquire into causation. Lewis must show that his speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his firing. Without this showing, the protected nature of his speech will not alone support a decision for the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Government action taken in retaliation for exercising a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even without proof of consequential or actual damages.

Rakovich v. Gregory Wade and Darryl Drake, George Rakovich v. Chester Kass · filed 1987-05-27

As this circuit recognized under different circumstances in ... “[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983_” ... Mr. Rakovich was not required, as a predicate to his first amendment action, to prove actual damages. ... Accordingly, by alleging government conduct taken in retaliation for the exercise of protected first amendment rights, Mr. Ra-kovich stated a claim which is actionable under section 1983.

A § 1983 retaliation claim fails when the plaintiff cannot show that the alleged retaliatory motive was at least a substantial factor in the defendant's conduct.

Rockland County Sheriff's Deputies Ass'n v. Grant · filed 1987-10-08

Having failed to show that such a motive was at least a substantial factor behind the defendants’ negotiations, the plaintiffs do not state a cause of action under section 1983.

Reinstatement is an available § 1983 remedy when a public employer's decision not to rehire was based on the employee's exercise of protected First Amendment rights.

Hale v. Walsh · filed 1987-11-03

A claim for reinstatement is established if the decision not to rehire an employee was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected first amendment freedoms.

A public employee's § 1983 speech-retaliation claim fails without a causal relationship showing that protected speech substantially or materially motivated the adverse employment action.

Hamer v. Brown · filed 1987-10-27

We hold that the district court did not clearly err in holding that Hamer’s speech was not a substantial and motivating factor in the termination of his contract. ... Because we hold that Hamer failed to establish a causal relationship between his protected speech and the termination of PATSD and his contract of employment, Hamer’s claim that his First Amendment rights were violated must fail.

A prisoner's § 1983 retaliation claim survives dismissal when a pleaded chronology permits an inference that an adverse transfer followed protected litigation activity.

Murphy v. Lane · filed 1987-11-06

Murphy’s transfer immediately followed his filing of these lawsuits, thus permitting the inference that the transfer was in retaliation for the lawsuits.

A § 1983 First Amendment retaliation plaintiff must show protected conduct and that the defendant's harassment was motivated by or substantially caused by the protected speech.

Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, John R. Colli, Jr., Russell C. Gabrielson, and John R. Col · filed 1987-11-25

To recover on a first amendment claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his conduct is deserving of first amendment protection and that the defendants’ conduct of harassment was motivated by or substantially caused by his exercise of free speech.

A prisoner may pursue a § 1983 claim when officials retaliate against protected communications with government officials or the news media, because retaliation can itself abridge First Amendment rights.

Johnnie F. Flournoy, Jr. v. Richard P. Seiter, Tropper Teets, B.G. Seth, Ronald C. Marshall, S.T. Dillon, Wayne Chamblis · filed 1987-12-07

Plaintiff retains the right to engage in such activity without fear of retaliation. ... Indeed, retaliation can be an abridgement of plaintiff's rights in and of itself.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging discharge solely in retaliation for exercising the constitutional right to free speech.

Cruz v. Quichocho · filed 1988-02-23

The instant case is not identical to Attao in that, here, plaintiff has alleged that he was fired solely as reta/iation for exercising his constitutional right of freedom of speech. As alleged, it is not, as in Attao, merely a garden-variety breach of contract disguised as a legitimate §1983 claim.

Section 1983 covers a public board’s retaliation against a newspaper for protected criticism by withholding public advertising, but the plaintiff must prove the retaliatory motive by a preponderance of the evidence.

North Mississippi Communications, Inc. v. DeSoto County Board of Supervisors · filed 1988-03-08

Clearly, the Board cannot legally punish a newspaper by withholding public advertising from it in retaliation for the newspaper’s expressing its constitutional right of free speech under the First amendment. ... If the claims of the Times against the Board are proven by the preponderance of the evidence, then the Board is guilty of violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which prohibits any person, under color of state law, to subject “any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution. ...”

Section 1983 allows a claim when officials conduct an investigation in retaliation for comments protected by the First Amendment.

Rakovich v. Gregory Wade and Darryl Drake, George Rakovich v. Chester Kass · filed 1988-07-14

The district court correctly found that an investigation conducted in retaliation for comments protected by the first amendment could be actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief when prison officials file false disciplinary charges and punish an inmate in retaliation for cooperating with a state investigation of inmate abuse.

Franco v. Walter Kelly, Lt. Moscicki and Officer Higley · filed 1988-07-25

If Franco can prove his allegation that he was subjected to false disciplinary charges and subsequent punishment for his cooperation with the Inspector General’s inquiry, he is entitled to relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment retaliation claim when an adverse employment action is likely to chill constitutionally protected speech.

Carlisle v. Lopresti · filed 1999-04-30

When an adverse employment action is likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally protected speech, it is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to bring a First Amendment retaliatory harassment claim when the alleged harassment, viewed as a whole, would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights.

Rodriguez v. Torres · filed 1999-06-30

Accordingly, we find that a plaintiff may state a cause of action for retaliatory harassment under § 1983 if the court determines that the alleged acts of harassment, when viewed in their totality, are likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a public school teacher loses employment for speaking about a matter of public interest.

Bracey v. Board Of Education Of City Of Bridgeport · filed 2004-05-11

Bracey asserts that he lost his employment as a public-school teacher because of his exercise of his right to speak to the DCF, the hospital, and the police department about a matter of public interest: the physical treatment of public-school students. Congress, through enactment of what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created a cause of action applicable to, among many other things, just such circumstances.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming First Amendment retaliation to show protected activity, adverse action, and that the speech motivated the action.

Farhat v. Jopke · filed 2004-05-28

To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse action or deprived of some benefit; and (3) the protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" in the adverse action.

In a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, an employee must show protected conduct and a substantial or motivating role in the punishment, after which the government may avoid liability by proving it would have acted the same way.

Settlegoode v. Portland Public Schools, Multnomah School District No.1 Susan Winthrop Robert Crebo Larry Whit · filed 2004-06-09

When a government employee alleges that he has been punished in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, we engage in a three-part inquiry: To prevail, an employee must prove (1) that the conduct at issue is constitutionally protected, and (2) that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the punishment. Even if the employee discharges that burden, (3) the government can escape liability by showing that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Spiegla, Nancy v. Hull, Eddie · filed 2004-06-14

In evaluating a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of First Amendment rights in the public employment context, we apply a three-step analysis premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). ... we follow the approach delineated in the majority of our cases, adopted in our sister circuits, and compelled by Mt. Healthy itself, i.e., a plaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her protected activity was a motivating factor in the defendant’s retaliatory action.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue state officials for First Amendment retaliation without proving an adverse employment action as defined by Title VII.

Spiegla v. Hull · filed 2004-06-14

However, a § 1983 case does not require an adverse employment action within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim to show protected activity, adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness, and a causal connection.

Revels v. Wimp · filed 2004-08-27

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of First Amendment rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Cohen v. Cook County, Ill. · filed 1988-01-08

The merits of plaintiff’s claim are governed by the substantive law of § 1983 which prohibits color-of-law retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment activity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim to prove protected activity, a chilling injury, and retaliatory motivation.

Anderson v. Ravenna Township Fire Department · filed 2005-11-03

A prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 requires that a plaintiff demonstrate (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) defendant’s adverse action caused him to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, as a response to his exercise of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim only when the alleged act would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights.

Bell v. Wathen · filed 2008-04-14

Even assuming that the district court and the defendants were notified of Bell’s First Amendment claim against Wathen, this claim must fail because Wathen’s comment did not deter Bell from prosecuting this lawsuit or filing subsequent grievances.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging retaliation for protected speech to show constitutionally protected speech, adverse action by a public employer, and motivation by that speech.

John Miller, Jr. v. City of Canton, Ohio · filed 2009-04-03

Consequently, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) the public employer subjected the plaintiff to adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected speech.

Section 1983 retaliation claims require a deprivation likely to deter free speech, rather than an adverse employment action.

Matrisciano v. Randle · filed 2009-06-26

A case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation does not require a plaintiff to show an “adverse employment action.”

Section 1983 permits claims of retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.

Rectrix Aerodome Centers, Inc. v. Barnstable Municipal Airport Commission · filed 2009-07-10

Claims of retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

First Amendment retaliation is actionable under § 1983, and that rule was clearly established by 1997.

Glenview Construction, Inc. v. Bucci · filed 2001-09-19

It is well settled both that First Amendment retaliation is actionable under § 1983 and that this was clearly established in 1997 and 1998.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to pursue a First Amendment retaliation claim against a governmental employer.

Shanks v. VILLAGE OF CATSKILL BOARD OF TRUSTEES · filed 2009-09-02

Accordingly, a public employee may establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against his governmental employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon proof “that: (1) his or her speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the speech and the adverse employment action.”

Section 1983 retaliation claims require protected conduct, an adverse action that would deter an ordinarily firm person, and retaliatory motivation.

Fritz v. Charter Township of Com-Stock · filed 2010-01-28

Therefore, Plaintiffs complaint is sufficient to show that she was engaging in protected conduct, that the Comstock Defendants took adverse action against her that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct, and that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by her protected conduct.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for First Amendment retaliation claims, but Title VII’s retaliation provision cannot itself support a § 1983 claim.

Tyler v. University of Arkansas Board of Trustees · filed 2011-01-06

Although section 704(a) of Title VII “may not be the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim in a § 1983 action,” Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 455 (8th Cir. 1985), § 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing claims of retaliation on the basis of the First Amendment.

A § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim asks whether the defendant's actions would deter a reasonably hardy person from exercising constitutional rights.

Barton v. Clancy · filed 2011-01-14

Thus, the pertinent question in a § 1983 retaliation case based on the First Amendment is whether the defendant's actions would deter "a reasonably hardy individual[]" from exercising his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim does not require an adverse employment action as defined by employment discrimination statutes.

Hutchins v. Clarke · filed 2011-10-24

A § 1983 retaliation claim does not require an adverse employment action within the same meaning as other anti-discrimination statutes.

Section 1983 provides a claim for First Amendment retaliation when protected conduct prompted or substantially caused the defendant's action.

Reardon v. Keating · filed 2013-10-29

Such a claim lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To establish a retaliation claim under § 1983 in this case, Dougherty must show that (1) his conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and (2) such conduct prompted or substantially caused defendant’s action.”

Section 1983 requires a First Amendment retaliation plaintiff to show protected speech, adverse deterrent retaliation, and a causal connection.

The Indigo Room, Inc. v. City of Fort Myers · filed 2014-10-16

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) his speech or conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) the retaliatory conduct of the defendant adversely affected the protected speech, in that the retaliation “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in the protected speech; and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory conduct and the protected speech.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming First Amendment retaliation to prove protected speech, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Schwartz v. Anderson · filed 2015-03-29

To prove his First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, plaintiff must show “(1) that the speech at issue was protected, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse employment action.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation to plead a protected right, retaliatory motivation or causation, and injury.

Norton v. Town of Islip · filed 2015-03-31

To properly plead a claim for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Norton must adequately allege: (1) that he has a right protected by the First Amendment; (2) that Defendants’ actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) that Defendants’ actions caused him some injury.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations, including retaliation and purposeful unequal treatment.

Mercer v. SEPTA · filed 2015-04-01

To bring a successful § 1983 claim for a denial of Equal Protection, a plaintiff must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that the plaintiff was treated differently from other, similarly situated individuals because of his status. Blunt v. Lower Merion School District, 767 F.3d 247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014). Mercer failed to identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently. The District Court therefore correctly dismissed Mercer’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming retaliation for protected speech to prove protected speech, adverse action, and a causal relationship.

Raub v. Campbell · filed 2015-04-29

A plaintiff seeking to assert a § 1983 claim on the ground that he experienced government retaliation for his First Amendment-protected speech must establish three elements: (1) his speech was protected, (2) the “alleged retaliatory action adversely affected” his protected speech, and (3) a causal relationship between the protected speech and the retaliation.

Section 1983 retaliation claims require proof that the defendant's desire to chill speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's action.

Nichols v. City of Portland · filed 2015-11-13

The court’s instruction correctly reflected our case law concerning the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim brought by a private ... plaintiff under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a First Amendment retaliation claim to allege protected speech, adverse retaliatory conduct, and a causal connection.

Hoever v. Andrews · filed 2015-11-16

As to the remaining three defendants, to state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the third amended complaint must adequately allege: (1) that Hoever’s speech or act was constitutionally protected; (2) that the defendants’ retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and (3) ... that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on the speech.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to pursue a First Amendment retaliation claim when protected speech plausibly caused an adverse employment action.

Hill v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2015-11-24

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court of course must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Where, as here, the protected activity and the initial adverse employment action appear to be separated only by a matter of weeks, the court can plausibly infer that Plaintiff’s speech and termination were linked. Furthermore, whether a plaintiff’s speech was a substantially motivating factor giving rise to the adverse employment action is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. See Tao, 27 F.3d at 639. Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim at this juncture would be inappropriate.

Section 1983 provides the framework for a public contractor’s First Amendment retaliation claim, requiring protected expressive conduct, adverse action, and causation.

Alpha Energy Savers, Inc., an Oregon Corporation Robert Obrist v. Diane Hansen Multnomah County Judy Swendsen · filed 2004-08-27

When a business vendor operates under a contract with a public agency, we analyze its First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 using the same basic approach that we would use if the claim had been raised by an employee of the agency. ... Accordingly, the contractor must establish that (1) it engaged in expressive conduct that addressed a matter of public concern; (2) the government officials took an adverse action against it; and (3) its expressive conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.

Section 1983 requires a First Amendment retaliation plaintiff to allege protected activity, a likely deterrent adverse action, and retaliatory motive.

Soderlund v. Zibolski · filed 2015-12-08

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Soderlund must allege (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) he suffered an adverse action that would likely deter fixture First Amendment activity, and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to retaliate.

Section 1983 requires a First Amendment retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor.

Wilson v. Jayne Miller · filed 2016-04-25

To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege and show that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take the adverse employment action.” ... Accordingly, Miller is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits an individual who is not the final decisionmaker to be liable for First Amendment retaliation if that individual’s retaliatory conduct caused the employee’s firing.

Sims v. City of Madisonville · filed 2018-06-28

If an individual defendant’s animus against a coworker’s exercise of First Amendment rights is a link in the causal chain that leads to a plaintiff’s firing, the individual may be liable even if she is not the final decisionmaker.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment retaliation claim without an employment relationship or an adverse impact on employment terms.

Dowgiewicz v. Webster, Town of · filed 2019-11-07

On the other hand, a section 1983 retaliation case based on the First Amendment does not require a showing of an employment relationship or an adverse impact on the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment.

Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims based on a civil lawsuit generally fail when there was probable cause to file that lawsuit.

DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream · filed 2019-11-21

Therefore, the presence of probable cause will generally defeat a plaintiff’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim predicated on an underlying civil lawsuit, or counterclaim for that matter.

Section 1983 protects alien residents who allege injury from a state action that violates a constitutional right covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Jackson v. Sargent · filed 1975-02-04

Taking, therefore, a broad reading of § 1983, it seems evident that, when state action is alleged, the zone of interests protected by this statute is coextensive with the zone of interests protected by the Constitutional right allegedly violated — in this case, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies to citizens and alien residents alike, ... this Court holds that the plaintiffs, including the alien resident Parra, each of whom has alleged injury from a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the defendants’ state agencies, come within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit relatives to sue for another person’s constitutional injury, but an estate may pursue the decedent’s claim after collateral consequences keep it live, and state judges in this circuit are not immune from suits seeking injunctive relief.

Javits v. Stevens · filed 1974-09-24

We begin with the proposition that one may not sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of another’s constitutional rights. ... We hold, therefore, that the action is not mooted by the expiration of the suspension order and that the decedent could assert a § 1983 claim if he were living. ... the § 1983 action survives the decedent’s death and may be asserted by his estate. ... Thus, in this circuit, at least, state judges are not immune from suits for injunctive relief under § 1983, and since plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, we reject defendants’ immunity argument.

Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their child’s companionship and society whose deprivation by state actors is actionable under § 1983.

Kelson v. City Of Springfield · filed 1985-08-02

This appeal requires us to resolve the narrow question whether parents possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of their child, deprivation of which is actionable under section 1983. Because we conclude that a cognizable liberty interest does exist in the circumstances of this case, we reverse.

Whether a § 1983 claim survives the plaintiff's death is determined by the forum state's law governing survival of personal-injury claims, unless inconsistent with federal law.

Bennett v. Tucker · filed 1987-09-30

Accordingly, we conclude that, in order to determine whether a Sec. 1983 claim survives, we must look to the state law governing whether a personal injury claim survives. ... Because this provision is not inconsistent with federal law, we adopt its rule of survivorship and conclude, as a matter of federal law, that Hattie Cunningham's Sec. 1983 claim survives.

A judge acting in a judicial capacity within the court’s jurisdiction is immune from damages liability under § 1983.

Simmons v. Conger · filed 1996-07-03

The district court clearly erred in awarding damages against Judge Conger in his individual capacity because he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages in this section 1983 case.

Judicial immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a judge for stalking or sexual assault because those are not judicial acts.

Vivian Ann Archie, Lisa Darlene Golden, Lisa G. Couch, Anthony Wayne Couch v. David W. Lanier, Reed Riley · filed 1996-09-11

We hold that stalking and sexually assaulting a person, no matter the circumstances, do not constitute “judicial acts.”

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages suits for judicial acts unless the acts are nonjudicial or taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Cornforth v. Howard · filed 1996-10-04

Generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. Immunity can be overcome only where the challenged actions are nonjudicial, or are "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction."

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity for judicial acts performed by a liquor commissioner when suspending a liquor license and imposing a fine.

R & V Pine Tree, Inc. v. Village of Forest Park · filed 1996-10-11

These actions, however, were judicial and, therefore, subject to absolute immunity under § 1983.

Judicial defendants are absolutely immune from damages claims under Section 1983 for their judicial acts.

Ortman v. Thomas · filed 1996-11-07

The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Ortman’s claims against several of-the defendants were frivolous and without any basis in law or fact, that the judicial defendants were absolutely immune, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims challenging the constitutionality of the Michigan attorney discipline system, and that the claim against Comerica was an impermissible attempt to attack a valid state court judgment.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judge for acts within the judge’s jurisdiction and judicial capacity because absolute judicial immunity applies.

Bearce v. Kennedy · filed 1996-11-19

Thus, because the act about which the plaintiff complains was one arising directly out of Judge Kennedy’s judicial capacity, and within the scope of his jurisdiction, Judge Kennedy is absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against a state judge in an official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and damages claims against the judge in a personal capacity are barred by absolute judicial immunity.

David A. Nowicki and Robert B. Laird v. Voss · filed 1996-11-20

The plaintiffs' claims for damages under § 1983 against Judge Voss in his official and personal capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and absolute judicial immunity respectively.

A judge who acts after alleged disqualification for partiality remains absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages claim because that conduct is not action in clear absence of jurisdiction.

MacFarlane v. Smith · filed 1996-11-27

Accordingly, this court holds that any actions taken by Judge Smith after his alleged disgualification for partiality were not taken in "clear absence of jurisdiction" and that he is absolutely immune from the section 1983 claim against him.

Absolute judicial immunity protects members of the United States Supreme Court from a § 1983 claim.

Okoren v. Symington · filed 1997-01-29

Appellants' argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the members of the United States Supreme Court are not entitled to absolute immunity is frivolous.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages suits for actions taken in a judicial capacity.

Barnes v. Winchell · filed 1997-02-03

Immunity from a § 1983 suit for money damages is no exception. ... Absolute judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity.

Judges have absolute immunity from damages suits under § 1983 for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

White v. O'Connor · filed 1997-02-27

Defendants, Magistrate Judge O’Connor and Judge Prado, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages in § 1983 actions arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

A municipal judge is immune from a damages suit under § 1983 for judicial acts.

Jasper Vick v. Martin · filed 1997-03-17

Jasper Vick appeals the district court’s order dismissing Vick’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Brinkley Municipal Judge John Martin. Having reviewed Vick’s complaint, we agree with the district court that Judge Martin was immune from this damages suit.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 suit against a judge for conduct while presiding over a matter.

Burt v. Barry · filed 1997-04-14

In the immediate case, Judge Wolf is protected from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim based on a judge’s ex parte communications in a case within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Shuster v. Oppelman · filed 1997-04-18

If any alleged ex parte communications between Judge Spatt and other named defendants occurred, Judge Spatt still remains absolutely immune from suit.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Noiel v. McKee · filed 1997-04-24

Judicial officers such as Magistrate Judge McKee are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Judges acting in a judicial capacity have absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983.

William W. Roche Steven J. Henry v. City of Hamilton Martha Bethel, Judge · filed 1997-05-09

Roche and Henry were on notice that judges acting in a judicial capacity have absolute immunity from liability for damages in a section 1983 action.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a judge.

Hall v. Branyan · filed 1997-06-06

Missouri inmate Donald Hall filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against two attorneys who were appointed to represent Hall in his state postconviction proceeding, and the judge who initially presided over the proceeding. The district court dismissed Hall's claim against the judge on the basis of judicial immunity, and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys because the evidence did not support Hall's allegation that they conspired with state officials to deprive Hall of a federal right. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court's ruling is clearly correct.

Judicial immunity can bar § 1983 claims against state judges for their conduct in state proceedings.

Vild v. Rose · filed 1997-06-20

Elmer P. Vild appeals pro se the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Arizona Superior Court judges Rose and Kamin, the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona Supreme Court, alleging he was denied due process during state proceedings. We conclude the district court's dismissal was proper because Vild's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and because Vild cannot use the federal courts to collaterally attack prior state proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts unless the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Bowling v. McVay · filed 1997-07-03

Judges who are sued for monetary relief are absolutely immune from individual liability for their “judicial acts” so long as they do not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Judges with subject matter jurisdiction remain immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts even if they commit grave procedural errors or exceed their jurisdiction.

Tucker v. Marilyn Outwater, and the County of Jefferson · filed 1997-07-07

By asserting jurisdiction without complying with the formal requirements of sections 120.90(3) and 120.70(2), Justice Outwater may well have acted in excess of her jurisdiction. But her mistakes are precisely the kind of “procedural errors,” albeit “grave,” that do not deprive a judge of subject matter jurisdiction—or judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars damages claims against judges under § 1983 for their judicial acts.

Mickelsen v. Smith · filed 1997-07-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Smith based on Smith's absolute judicial immunity against Mickelsen's claims for damages.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against appellate court clerk/staff attorneys and commissioners who are protected by judicial immunity.

Mutch v. Anne Noris Mary Ellen Hudgins · filed 1997-08-28

The appellees are immune from suit for damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not shield judges with absolute judicial immunity for administrative decisions to terminate court employees.

Meek v. County of Riverside · filed 1997-09-02

In short, Judge Walker and Judge Wojcik are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because their alleged actions in voting to terminate plaintiff, thereby allegedly forcing plaintiff to retire, were administrative rather than judicial in nature.

A judge acting in a judicial capacity is absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim based on those acts.

Martinez v. Newport Beach City · filed 1997-09-10

In denying Martinez’s Petition to Expunge his Record, Judge Robison was acting in his judicial capacity and is therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity for those acts. ... The district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s § 1983 cause of action against Judge Robison on the ground that his actions are protected by judicial immunity is affirmed.

Section 1983 claims against a court commissioner are barred by judicial immunity when the commissioner acts in a judicial capacity while presiding over a trial and sentencing.

Shong-Ching Tong v. Jack P. Hunt, Individually Jennifer Wenger, Individually Martin L. Goetsch, Individually County of L · filed 1997-09-29

We agree with the district court that Tong's claims against the court commissioner are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity because the commissioner was acting in a judicial capacity in presiding at Tong's trial and sentencing.

A court clerk is immune from damages under Section 1983 for issuing a bench warrant unless the clerk acts in the absence of all jurisdiction.

Newton v. Buckley · filed 1997-10-17

Unless she acted in the absence of all jurisdiction, Serassio is immune from damage liability for issuing the bench warrant.

Judges have judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts within the scope of their judicial duties.

Robinson v. Emerson · filed 1997-10-27

These allegations involve acts committed by Judge Emerson within the scope of his judicial duties. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Judge Emerson was entitled to judicial immunity.

Judges are absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages suit for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction.

McGreal v. San Bernardino County · filed 1997-11-07

Our review of the record indicates the district court properly concluded the judicial defendants were absolutely immune from suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 328, 830-31 (9th Cir.1995). We reject as unsupported by the record McGreal's contention that Judges Carroll and Wade acted in absence of jurisdiction.

State court judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983.

MacNeil v. Woodford · filed 1997-12-19

Second, state court judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983.

State court judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from liability under Section 1983.

D. James Perrott MacNeil v. The Honorable Tom Woodford, District Court, Jefferson County Court, Jefferson County, Golden · filed 1997-12-19

Second, state court judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against a state court judge for judicial conduct are subject to dismissal on immunity grounds.

Wriston v. Friedel · filed 1998-01-06

In addition, Wriston’s action is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) as it seeks compensatory and punitive damages against a state court judge.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity for judicial acts taken in excess of jurisdiction, unless the judge acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Cetenich v. Alden · filed 1998-01-09

Thus, even accepting as true the Plaintiffs allegation that Judge Smith ruled on his appeal before it was properly before her, she is still entitled to judicial immunity because, at worst, she was merely acting in excess of her authority. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs claim against Judge Smith.

Absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity can bar § 1983 damages claims against a judge and a court clerk.

Fischer v. Layton · filed 1998-01-14

After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the district court that the judge and the clerk are entitled to absolute judicial and quasi- judicial immunity from Fischer’s damages claims.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims arising from judicial acts unless they act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Krajicek v. Justin · filed 1998-01-27

All the aforementioned alleged acts of defendant Templin are undeniably “judicial acts.” Moreover, defendant Templin did not take these alleged actions in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 600.8342(1) allows circuit judges for the county in which the judgment is rendered to hear appeals from the district court. Plaintiffs claims against defendant Templin must be dismissed since defendant Templin is entitled to immunity for them.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against judges for judicial acts unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Puchner v. Waukesha County Circuit Court · filed 1998-02-03

Moreover, judges are absolutely immune in their personal capacity from suits for money damages which relate to their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

A state judge may be dismissed from a § 1983 action on grounds of absolute immunity.

Shramek v. Ball · filed 1998-02-20

We affirm the district court's dismissal of state judge H. John Hall on grounds of absolute immunity.

A state judge has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for judicial acts within the judge’s jurisdiction.

St. Clair v. Hodges · filed 1998-03-13

Additionally, we note that Judge Hodges “as a state court judge . . . is entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial acts.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state judge for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

St. Clair v. Norman Hodges, District Judge and County of Luna, N.M. · filed 1998-03-13

Additionally, we note that Judge Hodges "as a state court judge ... is entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial acts." ... In sentencing defendant in accordance with state statutory authority, Judge Hodges was acting well within his judicial capacity.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against a court clerk who has judicial immunity.

McGee v. Eaton · filed 1998-04-23

Eaton is immune from suit for damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against judges for judicial actions in matters within their jurisdiction, including a failure to recuse.

Shepherdson v. Nigro · filed 1998-05-13

Justice Nigro is immune from suit for damages under § 1983 on any claim predicated on his failure to recuse himself in plaintiffs state court case when serving as a Common Pleas Judge.

A judge is immune from a § 1983 damages claim based on refusing or failing to recuse from a case within the judge’s jurisdiction, regardless of motive.

Shepherdson v. Nigro · filed 1998-05-13

Moreover, a judge is immune from suit on a claim predicated on his refusal or failure to recuse himself in a case which he otherwise has jurisdiction to adjudicate, whatever his motive.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages claims for judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction.

Calderon v. State of Kansas · filed 1998-05-22

A judge is generally immune from a suit for money damages, except where the challenged actions are non-judicial or are “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” ... Under the circumstances, Judge Bacon is immune from any claim for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges and guardians ad litem may be barred by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively.

Brown v. Delmuro · filed 1998-08-28

We agree with the district court that Brown&s damages claims against the judges and the guardian ad litem were barred by absolute judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively.

Judges are immune from § 1983 suits for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Figueroa v. Kapelman · filed 1981-01-13

Moreover, plaintiff’s own complaint and affidavit make clear that the alleged acts of Justice Kapelman, assuming they occurred, were of a judicial nature and were performed in the justice’s judicial capacity, and thus were insulated from suit by his cloak of judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 damages claims for a judge’s judicial acts, including issuing an arrest warrant and requiring payment of court costs.

Ammons v. Baldwin · filed 1983-05-31

The record clearly demonstrates that Judge Baldwin’s actions in issuing the arrest warrant and requiring Ammons to pay court costs were protected by judicial immunity.

Section 1983 judicial immunity protects a district justice adjudicating summary offenses even when alleged procedural defects affect personal jurisdiction.

Martin v. Bicking · filed 1998-12-10

Any procedural defect in the offenses charged, even if the defect was sufficient to deprive Bicking of personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, does not constitute a clear absence of jurisdiction sufficient to deprive Bicking of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against judges protected by absolute judicial immunity.

Williams v. Birzon · filed 1983-12-28

Just as clearly, these [judicial] defendants are cloaked with absolute immunity from any damage awarded in a Section 1983 action.

A state judge with at least colorable jurisdiction over the challenged act is immune from § 1983 liability.

Vento v. Colorado National · filed 1999-05-19

We need not decide whether the Denver Probate Court had jurisdiction over the interpleader action because we find that under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-103(5), granting jurisdiction to the Denver Probate Court over “every legal and equitable question arising out of or in connection with express trusts,” Judge Stewart had at least colorable jurisdiction sufficient to invoke judicial immunity. Therefore, Judge Stewart cannot be held liable under § 1983.

A judge is immune from a § 1983 claim for acts within her judicial capacity and jurisdiction, even if those acts were inappropriate.

Calderon v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 1999-07-06

Even assuming arguendo that some of Judge Bacon’s questions were inappropriate, she clearly acted in her judicial capacity pursuant to the code’s jurisdictional grant. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Ms. Calderon’s action against Judge Bacon under the doctrine of judicial immunity.

A judge has absolute judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim challenging the judge’s issuance of a search warrant.

Richardson v. Scholz · filed 1999-09-13

Judge Thaxton is entitled to absolute judicial immunity; the district court did not err in granting a summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 shields a local liquor commissioner from damages for revoking a liquor license, but permits claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Cathy's Tap, Inc. v. Village of Mapleton · filed 1999-09-24

Similarly, Odewalt is entitled to judicial immunity for his act as Liquor Commissioner in revoking Cathy’s Tap’s liquor license. ... Accordingly, to the extent that Cathy’s Tap is suing Odewalt in his individual capacity for the action he took as Liquor Commissioner in revoking Cathy’s Tap’s license, he may not be sued for damages. However, he may be sued in his individual capacity as Liquor Commissioner for in-junctive and declaratory relief.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Badillo-Santiago v. Andreu-Garcia · filed 1999-10-05

The Court finds that plaintiffs claims against co-defendant Judge Berrios Jiménez are barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. ... Thus, all claims against Judge Berrios Jiménez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be DISMISSED.

State court judges acting in their judicial capacity have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims.

Wight v. State of Utah · filed 1999-10-14

The district court correctly applied the well-established doctrines of Eleventh Amendment immunity in dismissing the complaint against the State, comity in dismissing Murray City and Orem City, and absolute immunity in dismissing the state district courts and judges acting in their judicial capacity.

Absolute judicial immunity can bar a § 1983 suit against a judge.

Clay v. Sanders · filed 1999-10-21

The district court properly concluded that Judge Sanders is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.

Judicial immunity bars a Section 1983 claim based on an act normally performed by a judge in a judicial capacity.

Davis v. Weatherford · filed 1999-10-26

This is an act normally performed by a judge, and immunity is attached to it. Davis’ Section 1983 claim against Judge Weatherford, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity can bar a Section 1983 claim against a judge.

Moore v. King · filed 2000-02-16

Moore’s remaining claims lack arguable merit because they are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity or fail to allege a violation of Moore’s federal constitutional rights.

A trial judge has judicial immunity from a damages claim under Section 1983.

Henderson v. Criminal Dist Court · filed 2000-02-16

Further, the trial judge has judicial immunity from Henderson’s damage claim.

Section 1983 claims against a judge for issuing an arrest warrant are barred by judicial immunity.

DeNoyer v. Dobberpuhl · filed 2000-02-18

His claim against a judge for issuing an arrest warrant was barred by judicial immunity.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts performed in their judicial functions.

Brown v. Francis · filed 2000-02-22

Judicial officers such as Judge Francis are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Judges acting within their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983.

Zuranski v. Anderson · filed 1984-03-05

Turning next to the issue of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an award of attorneys’ fees therefor, the case of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1979), controls. Judges acting within their judicial capacity, as in the case at bar, are absolutely immune from liability.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges of courts of limited jurisdiction are subject to the same judicial immunity as claims against judges of courts of general jurisdiction.

Figueroa v. Blackburn · filed 2000-03-27

In sum, we hold that, with respect to the doctrine of judicial immunity, there is no distinction between judges of courts of limited jurisdiction and judges of courts of general jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims against a judge for acts performed in her judicial capacity are barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Hill v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2000-04-07

Judge Casswell is entitled to absolute immunity for all acts performed in her judicial capacity, see Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994), and is therefore immune from claims arising from her denial of Hill’s motion to enforce his plea agreement.

A trial judge has judicial immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Henderson v. County Criminal Ct · filed 2000-04-12

Further, the trial judge has judicial immunity from Henderson’s damage claim.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims arising from acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Johnson v. Fanguy · filed 2000-04-12

Judicial officers such as Judge Fanguy are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Judicial immunity can shield a judge from a § 1983 suit for money damages.

Johnson v. Esry · filed 2000-04-13

Judicial immunity shielded Judge Blaeuer from a suit for money damages.

Section 1983 affords judicial immunity to a prison disciplinary hearing officer performing judicial functions.

Garrett v. Sawyer · filed 2000-06-02

Sawyer is entitled to immunity under the KTCA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the performance of these judicial functions.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state court judge for judicial acts because the judge has absolute immunity.

Maynard v. Casebolt · filed 2000-07-20

As a state court judge, he is entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial acts and cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 preserves a judge’s immunity from suit for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Davis v. Crush · filed 1986-08-13

This Court notes in passing that the Supreme Court of the United States specifically held in Pierson that this principle was not abolished by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... E. A Judge in the exercise of his judicial function is immune from suit.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a judge for judicial acts taken within the court’s jurisdiction.

Daddona v. Gaudio · filed 2000-09-08

The claims against Judge Thompson in his individual capacity are barred by judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on judges for judicial acts within their jurisdiction, even when they fail to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Cappello v. New York · filed 2000-12-19

In view of these authorities, imposition of § 1983 on Justice Lefkowitz would be impossible in this case. Hon. Joan B. Lefkowitz is a New York State Supreme Court Justice in a court of general jurisdiction. She was acting in her judicial capacity when she held Plaintiff in contempt without affording him notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Judicial officers are immune from damages under § 1983 when acting in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction.

Sundwall v. Leuba · filed 2001-01-03

For immunity to attach, judicial officers must be acting in their judicial capacity and must be acting within their jurisdiction. ... The district court correctly determined the Defendants were each acting in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims against state administrative law judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts performed in their judicial duties.

Smith v. Shook · filed 2001-01-10

Considering these facts, we conclude that Foster's role as a state ALJ was functionally comparable to that of a trial judge or a federal ALJ. Further, as is the case with trial judges and federal ALJ's, absolute immunity is necessary for state ALJ's to ensure that they can perform their functions without harassment or intimidation. Therefore, we affirm the district court's holding that Foster was immune from suit for Smith's claims concerning Foster's performance of his judicial duties.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Edmonson v. Contra Costa Superior Court-Richmond · filed 2001-01-24

Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute immunity unless the judge acts in a non-judicial capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Fields v. Lapeer County Circuit Court · filed 2001-02-02

Moreover, Judge Holowka and Bruns are entitled to immunity. A judge has absolute immunity from civil suits for monetary damages unless the judge has acted in a non-judicial capacity or has performed judicial acts in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity.

English v. Meacham · filed 2001-02-07

We agree with the district court that Judge LeBaron was acting in his judicial capacity and is therefore immune from suit.

Judges acting in a judicial capacity within their jurisdiction are immune from damages under § 1983.

Bodell v. McDonald · filed 2001-02-07

Cunningham acted only in a judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction over the termination and adoption case, as did Stephens when he responded to Bodell’s attempt to seek Cunningham’s recusal. Thus, neither defendant falls within the exceptions to judicial immunity.

Court-appointed custody evaluators and those who assist their court-ordered evaluations have judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for work integral to the court's custody decision.

Hughes v. Long · filed 2001-02-27

We disagree and hold that Long and McHugh enjoy judicial immunity because they acted as "arms of the court," similar to a guar dian ad litem or a court-appointed doctor or psychologist, a non-judicial person who fulfills a quasi-judicial role at the court's request.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages claims for actions taken in their official capacity.

Martin v. Heffelfinger · filed 2001-03-15

It is well settled that a judicial defendant is immune from a suit seeking monetary damages for actions completed in the judge's official capacity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim for actions that are functions normally performed by a judge.

Mottahedeh v. Leininger · filed 2001-04-18

Because Commissioner Leininger’s actions constituted “functions normally performed by a judge,” judicial immunity bars appellant’s contentions.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a judge for judicial acts performed within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Irvin v. Walton · filed 2001-06-07

Nothing in Irvin’s complaint or his brief on appeal suggests that Walton acted in a non-judicial capacity or without jurisdiction. Accordingly, he is absolutely immune from Irvin’s suit seeking monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a judge for acts undertaken within the judge’s judicial capacity and jurisdiction.

Carr v. Spencer · filed 2001-06-12

We further conclude that the magistrate judge properly dismissed Carr’s claim against Gounaris for monetary damages because it is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Generally, judges have absolute immunity from civil suits for monetary damages with regard to acts undertaken within their judicial capacity.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts performed in their judicial functions.

Hinkle v. Johnston · filed 2001-06-13

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damage claims under § 1983 arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a judge for rulings made in a judicial capacity within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Clay v. Wilkinson Cty Bd Sup · filed 2001-06-13

Clay does not allege that Judge Lillie B. Sanders acted in the absence of jurisdiction or in a non-judicial capacity, and she is absolutely immune in this action for damages because her rulings were undertaken in her judicial role.

Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 claims when the plaintiff does not allege facts showing they acted outside their official capacity or in the absence of all jurisdiction.

George v. Ross · filed 2001-07-25

Because George has not alleged facts sufficient to support his claims that Thomas, Mask, and Ross were not acting in their official capacity or were acting in the absence of all jurisdiction, he has not shown that the district court erred in holding that they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 damages claims for judicial acts when the judge’s court has subject-matter jurisdiction, even if the judge exceeds their authority.

Stephen M. Stern and Christopher D. Becker v. Mascio · filed 2001-08-24

This immunity applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights. ... Since Judge Mascio’s court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the ease, he did not act “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction” for purposes of the judicial immunity determination.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred by absolute judicial immunity when the challenged conduct consists of judicial decisions made within the judge’s jurisdiction.

Springs v. Clement · filed 2001-09-25

Here, all of Springs claims against Pessala are barred because they stem from judicial decisions made while Pessala was presiding over the various visitation petitions brought regarding the custody of Dean.

A judge with jurisdiction over a case is immune from monetary damages under § 1983 for acts within the scope of judicial duties.

Forbush v. Zaleski · filed 2001-09-26

Judge ZalesM is entitled to judicial immunity from suit for monetary damages because, when dismissing Forbush’ counterclaim, staying a claim, denying Forbush’s demand for a jury trial, and scheduling her case for arbitration, he acted within the scope of his official duty as judge and clearly had jurisdictional authority to preside over Forbush’s suit.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity when the challenged acts were performed in a judicial capacity.

Burg v. Velasco · filed 2001-10-24

Because Burg complained only of Judge Velasco’s judicial acts, the district court properly concluded that Burg’s claims were barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Judicial defendants may be protected by absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 claims.

Hinkle v. Parsons · filed 2001-10-26

The district court concluded that the judicial defendants were entitled to absolute judicial immunity and that, to the extent that Hinkle sought injunctive relief, he was seeking review of adverse state-court decisions, a remedy barred by the “Rooker/Feldman” doctrine. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, based on these grounds, Hinkle’s complaint was frivolous.

Judicial officers are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts unless they act in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Jones v. Harris · filed 2001-11-06

In the instant case, Jones was appearing before defendant, expecting to deal with her in her judicial capacity, and she was performing a normal judicial function of determining probable cause for his arrest. Because this case is not materially distinguishable from the above authority, defendant was properly found to be entitled to absolute immunity.