42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a jailer to be held liable for illegal detention when he unreasonably delays arraignment or release or knows the arrest was illegal; a jailer who acts reasonably and in good faith is not liable for errors beyond his responsibility.

James Wood, Cross v. Allen Worachek, Cross · filed 1980-04-08

Generally, a jailer is liable for the illegal detention of an inmate when he unreasonably detains the inmate for arraignment or release, or possesses an affirmative knowledge of the illegality of the arrest. But if the errors upon which liability is asserted take place beyond the scope of his responsibility, he cannot be found liable where he has acted reasonably and in good faith.

Section 1983 damages must compensate for injuries caused by a constitutional violation; speculative or unforeseeable lost profits are excluded.

Kiswani v. Phoenix Security Agency, Inc. · filed 2008-01-03

Therefore, when a § 1983 plaintiff seeks damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is generally determined in accordance with principles derived from the common law of torts as a matter of federal common law. ... This claim for damages is also barred because it is speculative, there was no legal causation and it was not foreseeable.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for lost gain-time until the loss has been invalidated.

Hale v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections · filed 2009-09-21

In addition, Hale may not seek monetary damages for his loss of gain-time until his loss has been invalidated because the granting of relief would imply that the length of his sentence was invalid.

Section 1983 lost liberty damages for false arrest are not reduced because the plaintiff has previously been arrested or detained.

NIBBS v. Goulart · filed 2011-09-16

Though a plaintiffs frequent arrests and detentions may diminish the emotional toll or embarrassment caused by the arrest and detention at issue, they do nothing to diminish the fundamental loss of freedom implicated in a false arrest. Therefore, Nibbs’s arrest history is irrelevant to the question of lost liberty damages — the only type of damages Nibbs now seeks.

A sitting President is not immune from a § 1983 suit for his unofficial acts.

Jones v. Clinton · filed 1996-01-09

Accordingly, we hold that a sitting President is not immune from suit for his unofficial acts.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an investigator who, because of sexual bias, improperly investigates sexual harassment allegations.

Houck v. City of Prairie Village, Kan. · filed 1996-01-16

While we have no comment upon the underlying strength of plaintiffs claim, we do believe an allegation that an investigator improperly investigated claims of sexual harassment because of sexual bias does state a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment must show that the conviction or imprisonment has been invalidated.

Miller v. Jones · filed 1996-07-29

However, in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), the Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove the conviction or imprisonment had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Because Miller has failed to make any of these showings, his claim for monetary damages must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of sanctions awards that have not been withdrawn or reversed.

Canatella v. City & County of San Francisco Contra Costa County Pamela Wilson Levin Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & F · filed 1996-01-16

The sanctions awards against Canatella have not been either withdrawn or reversed; on the contrary, they have been upheld on appeal. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision holding Canatella's claim not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for damages when the judgment sought would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not already been invalidated.

Kay Elliot Farley, II v. Swayn E. Moore Rand Schuft Wayne Teglia John Slansky · filed 1996-01-25

Because the judgment which Farley seeks "would necessarily imply the invalidation of his conviction" and his conviction has not "already been invalidated," the district court properly determined that Farley failed to state a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages on a claim that would invalidate an outstanding conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Price v. Tulsa County Dist. · filed 1996-04-18

In such situations, Heck dictates that “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. Mr. Price has made no such showing.

Section 1983 bars a claim for denial of exculpatory evidence that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction until the conviction is invalidated.

Henry v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 1996-06-19

To the extent Henry claims a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment right to production of exculpatory evidence, we agree with the district court that a favorable decision on Henry's claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction," Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Therefore, the claim cannot be brought until Henry's conviction is invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies a conviction is invalid when the plaintiff cannot establish its invalidity.

Jones v. Fordice · filed 1996-08-15

This ... claim necessarily raises the invalidity of his conviction, which Jones cannot establish and is, therefore, not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Crooms v. P.O. Mercado, No. 41 · filed 1997-03-03

Because Crooms’ section 1983 claim for damages calls into question the validity of his conviction, which has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, the claim is not cognizable.

A § 1983 claim that necessarily calls into question the validity of a conviction is premature until the conviction has been nullified.

Shea v. State of Ohio · filed 1997-03-27

Shea's complaint about the four points lodged against his driving record with the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles as a consequence of some traffic offense charged in Morrow County necessarily calls into question the validity of his conviction. Shea does not establish that his conviction has been nullified. His § 1983 action is premature.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief for prison disciplinary procedures whose alleged defects necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting punishment.

Edwards v. Balisok · filed 1997-05-19

We conclude, therefore, that respondent’s claim for declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars an excessive-force damages claim that would necessarily invalidate an existing conviction until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Franklin v. County of Riverside · filed 1997-07-18

Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims “necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiffs] convietion[s]” and are barred by Heck until such time as plaintiff can show that his convictions have been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Newman v. (Unknown) Jensen (Unknown) Leslie John G. Bailey (Unknown) Chavez (Unknown) Bottax (Unknown) Washingto · filed 1997-10-24

Heck precludes a section 1983 claim if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," unless the sentence or conviction has previously been invalidated. Id. at 487. Here, Newman failed to allege that his sentence has been reversed, expunged or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See id.

A § 1983 claim about the explanation given in a prison disciplinary proceeding is not barred when success would not necessarily imply that the disciplinary decision is invalid.

Tafoya v. Edwards · filed 1997-11-20

A Lack of explanation does rot necessarily imply that a disciplinary decision is invalid. See Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1589 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Accordingly, Tafoya's claim is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See id. at 487 (court must dismiss action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if judgment for plaintiff would "necessarily imply" invalidity of conviction or sentenced); see also Edwards, 117 S.Ct. at 1588-89 (claim regarding procedures used in prison disciplinary hearing at which sentence credits are deducted may not be brought under § 1983 if claim necessarily implies invalidity of disciplinary decision).

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when they would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner's sentence.

Goldstein v. K.W. Prunty, Warden Arias, Senior Lab Tech · filed 1998-02-23

The district court concluded that Goldstein's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as his Ex Post Facto claim, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence and properly dismissed these claims on that ground.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply that a prison disciplinary conviction is invalid unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Rasheed v. Bender · filed 1998-03-09

Rasheed, however, has failed to show that his disciplinary convictions which resulted from the purportedly improper hearings were invalidated. In fact, the evidence shows only that his direct appeals resulted in two denials by Duval. Consequently, a judgment in Rasheed’s favor would necessarily imply that his disciplinary convictions were unlawful. The Edwards/Heck ruling precludes such a result and in this case requires that judgment enter as a matter of law in favor of defendants.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless that conviction has been independently invalidated.

Moore v. Novak · filed 1998-05-22

We agree with the district court that, because Moore did not prove that his state conviction had been independently invalidated, his § 1983 claim for damages is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 484-87.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Morgan v. Coker · filed 1998-08-20

Because Morgan has not demonstrated that his second conviction has been invalidated, his claims against the defendants are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit an illegal-search claim when success would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Powell v. Weaver · filed 2000-10-19

To argue now in this § 1983 action that he did not consent to the search but that it was illegal would imply the invalidity of his conviction.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when it necessarily implies the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Zihlavsky v. Bossier City Police · filed 2000-12-13

The district court properly dismissed Zihlavsky’s claims, stemming from the events in 1998 and 1999, as frivolous because the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of the claimant’s state conviction.

Shaffmaster v. Clinton · filed 2001-01-26

Plaintiffs claims are not cognizable under § 1983 insofar as a ruling on the claims would imply the invalidity of her state convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Horn v. Ellison · filed 2001-03-15

However, a state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply that his conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 damages claims cannot proceed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Mehdipour v. Chapel · filed 2001-05-03

Clearly, success in this § 1983 action would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,” Heck , 512 U.S. at 487, and it was therefore properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has already been set aside.

Pullen v. Keesling · filed 2001-05-24

In addition, because Pullen’s claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction, he may not assert it under § 1983 without showing that his conviction has already been set aside.

Section 1983 claims that would call a conviction into question are not cognizable until the conviction has been set aside.

Guillory v. Ivory · filed 2001-06-13

If proven, Guillory’s claims would call into question his conviction. See id. These claims are therefore not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or confinement unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Madkins v. City of Memphis · filed 2001-09-18

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a state criminal conviction.

Dispenza v. Orange County Department of Social Services · filed 2002-03-21

The district court properly dismissed Dispenza’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the claim necessarily implied the invalidity of Dispenza’s state criminal conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction; the claim may be pursued through habeas corpus.

Valdez v. Mark A. Rosenbaum Al Terrault Julie Latuska Bill Parker George Gore Debbie Miller Allen Cooper · filed 2002-09-05

The claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Valdez’s subsequent conviction. ... Consequently, the claim is not cognizable in this litigation, but may be asserted in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Sixth Amendment grounds.

Section 1983 claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Bowser v. Lacy · filed 2002-10-24

Nonetheless, because a favorable judgment on Bowser’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and he has not shown that the conviction has been invalidated, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims.

Section 1983 does not provide damages or equitable relief for claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Irvin v. Anderson · filed 2002-12-09

In addition, plaintiffs claims for damages and other equitable relief otherwise are not cognizable under § 1983 to the extent that a ruling on his claims would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary convictions.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action when the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s confinement.

Brooks v. Washington · filed 2005-02-14

The district court properly determined that Brooks failed to assert a cause of action under section 1983 because it would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement, and was therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s confinement unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Banda v. New Jersey Special Treatment Unit Annex · filed 2006-02-03

Further, Banda’s claims are not cognizable under section 1983 because a favorable outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement unless that confinement was previously declared invalid.

Stewart v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2008-03-03

Here, the success of Stewart’s § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement. ... Accordingly, Stewart’s claims may not proceed absent a showing that his detention was previously declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of disciplinary convictions unless those convictions have been invalidated.

Brown v. Cline · filed 2009-03-26

Heck and Edwards make clear that Plaintiff does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim under these circumstances unless he can show that the disciplinary convictions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a claim concerning forfeited good-time credits when success would imply the invalidity of a decision that has not been invalidated.

Arlen Smith v. Washington · filed 2010-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s claims regarding defendants’ refusal to reinstate forfeited good-time credits because Smith did not allege that the decision had been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence are barred unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Arledge v. Ada County · filed 2017-12-20

The district court properly dismissed Arledge’s action as Heck-barred because success on his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, and Arledge failed to show that his sentence has been invalidated.

A Section 1983 claim barred by Heck is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Mendia v. City of Wellington · filed 2011-08-15

We have previously indicated, however, that a dismissal under Heck is for failure to state a claim, which falls under Rule 12(b)(6). ... We also note that a dismissal under Heck is without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the Heck v. Humphrey bar.

Lewis v. Green · filed 2004-06-22

The district court correctly held that Lewis’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), as well as under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

A prisoner’s § 1983 challenge to prison discipline is not barred by Heck or Edwards when it threatens no consequence for the conviction or the duration of the sentence.

Cromer v. Dominguez · filed 2004-06-18

However, while this was the law at the time the district court issued its decision, the Supreme Court has now held that Heck is not “implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.” ... Therefore, Cromer’s due process claims are not barred by Heck and Edwards.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily undermine a conviction are barred until the conviction is overturned.

Minson v. Village of Hopedale · filed 2004-06-17

We do believe, however, that Min-son’s claims of an illegal search and an improper arrest would necessarily undermine the validity of her conviction, and are therefore barred until she succeeds in having that conviction overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a detainee to use a civil rights action to challenge continued confinement when the confinement has not been remedied through the procedures identified in Heck.

Josey v. Texas Department of Public Safety · filed 2004-06-08

Because Josey’s continued confinement has not been remedied by any of the procedures listed in Heck, his speedy-trial claim also is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claims improperly filed in a § 2254 habeas case are dismissed without prejudice.

United States Ex Rel. Rickard v. Sternes · filed 2001-06-07

Because of these differences, the court should dismiss without prejudice a § 1983 claim that has been improperly filed under § 2254. ... For all of these reasons, the court dismisses without prejudice all of Rickard’s claims that are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for an equal protection claim about collateral proceedings when success would not result in immediate release from custody.

Childs v. Herbert · filed 2001-05-07

The equal protection claim he now seeks to add to his habeas petition does not allege any constitutional flaw in the prosecution, trial, or direct appeal of his case. If successful on this equal protection argument, Childs’s petition would not result in his immediate release from custody. Such claims, however, are appropriately brought under § 1983.

A petition filed under § 2254 may be construed as a § 1983 action when § 1983 is the proper basis for the claim.

Songer v. John B. Metzger, Iii, Chairman · filed 1995-11-06

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988) petition, which the court properly construed as a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) action, and denying his motion for reconsideration of that order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).

Section 1983 permits a claim challenging a past arrest and detention when the plaintiff is no longer in custody for that offense and cannot obtain habeas relief.

Parker v. Fort Worth Police Dept. · filed 1993-01-12

Parker is ineligible for habeas corpus relief and properly challenged his May 1990 arrest and detention under § 1983.

A prisoner’s medical-care claim that does not challenge the conviction or seek release from custody must be treated as a claim under § 1983 when raised in a habeas petition.

Grayson v. Attorney General of the State of Arizona Hal Carden, Warden · filed 1992-08-04

Yet the Supreme Court's decision in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), instructs the district court to read this as a claim under § 1983. See Young v. Armontrout, 795 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir.1986); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 729-30 (9th Cir.1974); Galligher v. McCarthy, 470 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir.1972). The district court must therefore treat this portion of Grayson's petition on remand as a claim for relief under § 1983.

A district court may stay a § 1983 claim pending state-court exhaustion of related habeas claims when the circumstances warrant.

Smith v. Macy · filed 1992-02-05

At the same time, we think it is clear that the federal district court had authority, if the circumstances were appropriate, to stay the determination of the § 1983 claim pending the outcome of the state court exhaustion. The decision whether to stay or adjudicate will depend upon the particular facts.

A prisoner's challenge to the computation of good-time credits must proceed in habeas corpus, with exhaustion of state remedies, rather than under Section 1983.

Riley Bradford White v. Larry Meachum Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 1988-02-05

The district court construed the complaint as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed it for failing to exhaust state remedies. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

A challenge to the duration of confinement cannot be maintained under Section 1983 and must instead proceed through habeas corpus with its exhaustion requirements.

Grizzell v. Howard Cook, Penny Bernhardt, Gayle Barber, Robert Moore, Judy Smithson, and One Black Female Clas · filed 1985-09-18

Plaintiff's action has, at its core, a challenge to the duration of his confinement. As such, this cannot be maintained under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for state misconduct allegedly contributing to an illegal conviction or detention, even though habeas corpus is the remedy for release or reduction of confinement.

Fulford v. Frank Klein, Etc., Etc. · filed 1976-05-20

Thus, it seems clear that even though the basis of a § 1983 suit is misconduct that is alleged to have resulted in an illegal conviction, the Court faced this precise problem in Wolff in that the basis of the claim made by the plaintiffs there was the illegal act of the state officials in depriving him of good-time credits, a clear ingredient of the “very fact or duration of confinement.”

A § 1983 damages claim may proceed even though exhaustion of judicial remedies could make habeas corpus available for release from custody.

Wallace v. Hewitt · filed 1976-11-12

Clearly, § 1983 applies to plaintiff’s claim for damages notwithstanding that following exhaustion of judicial remedies, he could be entitled under habeas corpus to release from custody.

A properly brought § 1983 claim may be joined with a habeas claim and proceed even if the habeas claim fails for lack of exhaustion.

Parkhurst v. State Of Wyoming · filed 1981-05-11

Appellant's money damage claim seeks a remedy other than release from confinement and is not cognizable in a habeas action. But the Supreme Court has held that this difference in remedy between a habeas claim and a § 1983 claim does not ipso facto preclude their joinder in a single lawsuit. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2973, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). If the habeas claim happens to fail for lack of exhaustion, a claim properly brought under § 1983 may nevertheless proceed while exhaustion runs its course in state proceedings. Id. See also Henderson v. Secretary of Corrections, 518 F.2d 694, 695 (10th Cir. 1975).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue damages for an unlawful deprivation of good-time credits while seeking restoration or recalculation through habeas corpus or state proceedings.

Partee v. Lane · filed 1981-12-08

Restoration of good time credits of which a prisoner has been deprived in a disciplinary proceeding cannot be sought through section 1983. ... Partee’s request that we order the defendants to recalculate once again his good time credits is essentially a challenge to the duration of his confinement, and may be raised only through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus once available state remedies have been exhausted. ... A claim which seeks monetary damages for an unlawful deprivation of good time credits may, however, proceed under section 1983 while actual restoration (or recalculation) of good time credits is sought in state proceedings.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy for a prisoner's challenge to conditions of confinement without requiring exhaustion of state remedies merely because the challenge might affect the duration of confinement.

Johnson v. Fauver · filed 1983-03-23

Notwithstanding the affidavit of Wiechnik, the court will adhere to its view that the instant complaint states a § 1983 claim not subject to exhaustion.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for obtaining credit that would reduce the duration of a prisoner's confinement; such relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Raso v. Moran · filed 1982-11-08

It is clear that Raso could not have sought credit for blood time denied to him as a result of his transfer in this § 1983 action.

A prisoner’s claim is treated as habeas rather than § 1983 when it challenges the fact or duration of confinement rather than conditions of confinement.

Irving v. Morris Thigpen, Charles J. Jackson, and Eddie Lucas · filed 1984-05-07

Thus, despite its label as a section 1983 action, Irving’s complaint is essentially a habeas corpus petition.

A § 1983 action seeking removal of a parole detainer is cognizable exclusively as habeas corpus and requires exhaustion of state remedies.

Veneri v. State of Missouri and Dick Moore, Chairman Parole Board · filed 1984-05-18

Anthony J. Veneri appeals the dismissal of his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that a preliminary parole revocation hearing violated his rights to due process and equal protection. ... After studying the decisions and records of the district court, as well as the briefs of the parties, we conclude that Veneri’s claim is one cognizable exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and, accordingly, failure to exhaust available state court remedies would require dismissal of his action.

A prior judgment in a § 1983 action does not bar a federal habeas petition raising the same constitutional arguments.

Boyer v. White · filed 1985-06-07

And, in any event, a prior decision in a § 1983 action is not a bar to a petition for federal habeas corpus that seeks to raise the same constitutional arguments.

A § 1983 claim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from a conviction is subsumed in the prisoner’s habeas action.

Spalla v. Foltz · filed 1985-07-15

His petition includes a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for injunctive and declaratory relief; this claim is subsumed in the decision on the habeas action.

A § 1983 claim that calls the validity of a conviction into question requires exhaustion of state remedies.

Albert Charles Burgess, Jr. v. Joseph G. Brown, George Hill, Larry E. Horton, Bob Carter · filed 1987-08-19

We agree with the district court that Burgess' claims regarding his 1985 conviction call into question the validity of his conviction, requiring exhaustion.

Civil actions labeled under § 1983 that attack state convictions and seek release must be treated as habeas petitions and dismissed without prejudice if state remedies are unexhausted.

Hill v. Ward · filed 1987-12-02

Although these cases were brought as civil actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the cause of action alleged in each of them attacked Hill's state criminal convictions and the relief sought in each of them was release from custody. The cases were, therefore, actions seeking habeas corpus relief and exhaustion of state remedies is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b).

A Section 1983 claim dependent on a parallel habeas challenge to a state conviction must be dismissed if habeas relief is denied.

Safford v. H.Q. Evatt, Sheriff, Hamilton County, Tennessee and W.J. Michael Cody, Attorney General, State of · filed 1988-02-23

If a Sec. 1983 claim is dependant upon a parallel habeas challenge to a state conviction, it must be dismissed if habeas relief is not afforded.

A prisoner may refile a § 1983 claim challenging the legality of confinement if a writ of habeas corpus establishes that his constitutional rights were denied.

Hughes v. John R. Southworth Jackson County Sheriff Department · filed 1989-05-31

The dismissal is without prejudice to Hughes' right to refile his claim under Sec. 1983 if and when he can establish through a writ of habeas corpus that he was actually denied his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims by state prisoners are distinguished from habeas claims based on the relief sought rather than the nature of the claim.

Willis v. Bell · filed 1990-02-16

Though Viens there said the Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to resolve the “significant tension between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Preiser and Wolff, on the one hand, and our own decisions in Hanson and Crump, on the other” (id. at 1333), this Court finds that the message plainly given by Viens calls for a turning away from the Hanson-Crump “nature of the claim” approach to one based on the relief sought.

A prisoner’s challenge to discipline must proceed initially in habeas rather than under § 1983 when its core concerns the duration of confinement and any damages claim depends on a favorable resolution of that issue.

Locher v. Plageman · filed 1991-06-19

To determine whether an action is properly considered a § 1983 complaint or a habeas petition (requiring exhaustion of state remedies, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)), a court must consider whether the “core” of a petitioner’s claim concerns the length or duration of his sentence and whether a claim of damages is purely ancillary to and dependent on a favorable resolution of the length or duration of his sentence.

Section 1983 damages claims based on the length of a state prison sentence must be stayed pending habeas proceedings.

Douglas C. Lockrem, v Booth Gardner · filed 1992-06-18

A writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for challenging the length of a state prison sentence; accordingly, a section 1983 action seeking damages based on the length of a sentence must be stayed pending disposition of habeas proceedings.

A § 1983 claim for injunctive relief challenging a single allegedly defective parole hearing must await exhaustion of state habeas remedies and is dismissed without prejudice pending exhaustion.

Cook v. Collins · filed 1993-08-30

COOK’S claim for injunctive relief, being, in effect, an attack on the propriety of a single allegedly defective hearing may not be asserted until state habeas corpus remedies have been exhausted. This Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of COOK’S quiescent § 1983 claim or what relief, if any, would be appropriate. However, his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed without prejudice and with sufficient safeguards within the Court’s judgment to insure that a future complaint is not time barred.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge classification procedures when the requested relief would require use of previous regulations without mandating immediate or speedier release and would leave classification decisions to officials' discretion.

Faruq v. Herndon · filed 1993-09-28

Such a remedy would not mandate immediate or speedier release for any particular plaintiff, but would only mandate that defendants classify the plaintiff pursuant to previous regulations. As plaintiffs note, the ultimate decision in each case would be left to the discretion of government officials.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for an overcrowding claim challenging conditions of confinement rather than a habeas claim under section 2241.

Sule v. Joseph Crabtree, Warden, Fci Sheridan United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 1993-10-01

As a preliminary matter, we note that Sule's claim of overcrowding challenges the conditions of his confinement, and thus, is properly raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991). We therefore construe this claim as a § 1983 claim, rather than as a § 2241 claim.

A claim under § 1983 that challenges the fact of confinement is properly treated as a habeas corpus petition under § 2254.

McLean v. Mallott · filed 1993-11-05

Although McLean brought this action under Sec. 1983, the district court properly treated it as a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988) habeas corpus petition because McLean challenges the fact of his confinement.

Section 1983 claims concerning unconstitutional prison conditions must conform to the general pleading requirements for civil actions and proceed as civil actions rather than habeas petitions.

Mancinone v. Comm'r of Dept. of Correction, No. 345524 (Nov. 17, 1993) · filed 1993-11-17

The motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint, which invokes 1983, is denied. The petitioner is ordered to revise his complaint to conform to the general pleading requirements applicable to civil actions, and this case will proceed as a civil action, not as a habeas petition.

A prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement cannot evade habeas exhaustion requirements by seeking damages under Section 1983.

Tillman v. Richard Conroy, Loretta Thames, James Letsinger, George Woods, and Karen Gibson · filed 1993-11-22

The exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 may not be evaded by seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

In the Ninth Circuit, a prisoner's § 1983 complaint must be construed as habeas to the extent it seeks relief available only through habeas, while remaining § 1983 claims must be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Sims v. Superior Court of State of Cal. · filed 1993-12-03

When a prisoner files a pro se section 1983 complaint seeking relief available only under habeas corpus, the district court should construe the complaint to that extent as a habeas petition and require exhaustion of state remedies. See Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d 963, 967-68 (9th Cir.1992). If the prisoner has not exhausted all available state court remedies, the district court may dismiss the habeas claims. See Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir.1984). However, the district court must stay any remaining section 1983 claims pending exhaustion of state remedies. Young, 907 F.2d at 878.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the duration of confinement by seeking only equitable relief restoring good-time credits; the remedy is habeas corpus.

Barnes v. Lewis · filed 1993-12-10

In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 490, the Court held that if a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks a speedier or immediate release, his sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, if such a claim is asserted in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suit and only equitable relief is sought (as in the immediate case), the suit should be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief available only through habeas corpus must be construed to that extent as habeas petitions.

Agrio v. James Gomez, Director, California Department of Corrections · filed 1994-01-07

When a plaintiff's section 1983 action seeks relief available only under habeas corpus, the district court should construe the complaint to that extent as a habeas corpus petition.

A court must address a prisoner’s habeas request before assessing a Section 1983 claim that implicates the validity of his continued confinement.

Koch v. Moore · filed 1995-04-04

We conclude, however, that Koch's request for habeas relief must be addressed before assessing whether he has stated a section 1983 claim for imposition of the treatment program requirement, because this claim implicates the validity of his continued confinement.

A prisoner seeking to pursue § 1983 claims must file a separate action from a § 2241 petition challenging the execution of a sentence.

Chavez v. Truesdale · filed 2002-02-01

If Chavez wants to pursue these claims, he must file a § 1983 action separate from the present § 2241 petition.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim to proceed when prolonged confinement is only a result of the alleged retaliation and a challenge to confinement is not at the crux of the complaint.

Ferguson v. Nagel · filed 2002-05-01

His complaint focused on the defendants’ pattern of retaliatory conduct; prolonged confinement was merely one result of that conduct. ... Because a challenge to confinement was not at the crux of Johnson’s complaint, we concluded that Edwards was inapplicable. ... Mr. Ferguson’s complaint is similar to Johnson’s in all crucial respects, so we do likewise here.

Section 1983 permits a probationer to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against an amended registration requirement when success would not imply that the conviction or sentence is invalid.

Fritz v. Colorado · filed 2002-09-16

Although Plaintiffs claims focus on a statutorily mandated lifetime reporting requirement, now quarterly, they do not focus on the 20-year term of probation. And, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and in-junctive relief, not monetary damages. Richards supports Plaintiffs use of this § 1983 action seeking such remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek evidence for DNA testing when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Bradley v. Pryor · filed 2002-09-23

On the contrary, Heck explicitly authorizes a § 1983 action that does not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, and it is clear to us that Bradley’s suit does not “necessarily imply” that his conviction is invalid.

Section 1983 does not provide the remedy for a state prisoner attacking the fact of his confinement; that claim must proceed in habeas corpus.

Aldarondo v. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico · filed 1974-01-31

It follows, then, that the only way to construe the instant “Motion” is as a petition for habeas corpus relief, and we agree with the Magistrate that the Supreme Court justices have been improperly included in this proceeding as party-defendants and that the petition as to them should be dismissed for that reason and pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(f).

Section 1983 permits civil actions for deprivation of federal rights, but claims that would imply the invalidity of continued confinement are barred by Heck.

Newsome v. Texas Board of Pardon & Parole · filed 2005-02-23

Because Newsome brought his claims in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and because success in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement, the claims are barred by Heck, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims challenging a conviction until the conviction has been invalidated.

Ruth v. Richard · filed 2005-07-20

With respect to Ruth’s claims for damages, the District Court concluded that they were legally frivolous because, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), until Ruth has had his conviction invalidated, no civil action lies for damages. ... We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Ruth’s claims for the reasons discussed in the District Court’s memorandum and summarized above.

A § 1983 claim barred by Heck may be dismissed with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met.

Clifford v. Stalder · filed 2008-12-15

Therefore, the district court did not err when it dismissed Clifford’s due process claim arising from the disciplinary proceeding in which he lost good time credit with prejudice until the Heck conditions were met.

A Section 1983 damages claim dismissed under Heck must be dismissed without prejudice so the plaintiff may refile if Heck’s requirements are later satisfied.

Blaise v. Smith · filed 2010-01-12

However, to the extent Blaise’s claims for damages were dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 ... (1994), we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice, see Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (dismissal under Heck should be without prejudice so plaintiff can refile if he satisfies Heck requirements).

Section 1983 claims dismissed under Heck are dismissed with prejudice unless or until the Heck conditions are met.

Navas v. JPCC/Correct Health · filed 2019-07-17

Insofar as one or more of the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed based on Heck, dismissal was with prejudice unless or until the Heck conditions have been met.

A Section 1983 claim dismissed under Heck is dismissed without prejudice and may be reasserted when the Heck conditions are met.

Kerry Cook v. City of Tyler, Texas · filed 2020-09-04

That is, a Heck dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim can be brought without proving a conspiracy.

Tollett v. Laman · filed 1974-07-05

Each of Tollett’s claims, however, is also cognizable under § 1983, and conspiracy is not an indispensable element under that section.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional-rights violations even when a conspiracy lacks a class-based discriminatory motive.

Blake v. Town of Delaware City · filed 1977-11-14

This conclusion does not require dismissal of the cdnspiracy claims, however; for the Court considers the allegations in the Complaint sufficient to support a cause of action for conspiracy under Section 1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy for all violations of rights secured by the Constitution, not only those stemming from class-based discrimination.

Section 1983 does not require proof of invidious discrimination or class-based animus.

Upah v. Thornton Development Authority · filed 1986-04-09

There is no similar requirement, however, necessary to maintain a cause of action under § 1983.

A conspiracy is not a necessary element of a § 1983 claim.

Spidle v. Com. of Pa., Office of Budget · filed 1987-05-28

Moreover, considering that a conspiracy charge is not a necessary element of a section 1983 claim, we conclude that Count III survives the motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim still requires proof of an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Dean Tarry Corporation v. Friedlander · filed 1987-08-24

a conspiracy allegation does not obviate the necessity of proving “an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim still requires proof of an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander · filed 1987-08-24

a conspiracy allegation does not obviate the necessity of proving “an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 does not require public employees to face discipline before seeking protection against restrictions on their speech.

Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of Providence · filed 1998-10-27

In that case, there was no holding that public employees must face discipline before they are protected by the Constitution and § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal prisoner temporarily held in a local jail to sue jail officials when they acted under color of state law, even if the confinement was arranged by the federal government.

Henderson v. Warden, Thrower, Etc., Etc. · filed 1974-07-12

Defendants in this action — the warden, associate warden, prison physician, and jailors — supervised and treated all prisoners in the Mobile City Jail by virtue of the positions conferred on them by the city, a creature of the State of Alabama. They cannot now escape liability under § 1983 on the basis of plaintiff’s peculiar status.

Section 1983 reaches only action taken under color of state law, does not impose respondeat superior liability, and permits local-government liability only when the alleged constitutional deprivation results from an official policy or custom.

Dodson v. Polk County · filed 1979-11-20

Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available only if the action of the defendant or defendants was “under color of” state law. This requirement is an essential jurisdictional predicate. ... The doctrine of respondeat superior is not recognized in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Local governments are liable under section 1983 only if the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred pursuant to the execution of its policies or custom.

A state court judgment can preclude a later § 1983 complaint under state res judicata law.

Wash v. Johnson · filed 2001-10-26

Under the Mississippi law of res judicata, the state court judgment had a preclusive effect on Wash’s filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint in federal court.

Section 1983 claims may be raised in state court when the state court has concurrent jurisdiction, and a prior state judgment can bar a later federal action based on the same cause of action.

Davis v. Towe · filed 1974-08-09

Of course, if plaintiff could not present his § 1983 claim in the state court, the state proceeding might not be a bar to a subsequent federal proceeding on the federal claim, semble, Int. Rys. of Central America v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2 Cir. 1967). But the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights claims, Long v. Dist. of Columbia, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 469 F. 2d 927 (1972), Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111 (N.D.Ill.1972), and thus the civil rights claim could have been raised in the state proceeding.

A § 1983 plaintiff may not use a federal civil-rights action to relitigate a federal constitutional issue already raised and decided in a state-court proceeding.

Paddington East Enterprises, Inc. v. Roth · filed 1975-11-03

The cases in this circuit indicate that having once raised and argued the constitutionality of the statute in state court, the party may not thereafter challenge that determination by means of a civil rights action in federal court. ... Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed.

Res judicata bars a § 1983 plaintiff from relitigating both issues actually decided in state court and issues that could have been raised there.

Winslow v. Bauer · filed 1984-04-23

The law is settled in this jurisdiction that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a § 1983 plaintiff from relitigating not only those issues which were actually decided in state court, but also any other issues which might have been raised.

A state court's probable-cause finding may bind the parties in a later Section 1983 action under ordinary claim- and issue-preclusion principles.

Patzner v. Burkett · filed 1985-03-05

The state court’s finding of probable cause is binding for purposes of this civil rights action under section 1983.

A state court's affirmance of a state administrative ruling can preclude a later Section 1983 action when the prior proceedings afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate and satisfied due process.

Gorin v. Elton S. Osborne, Jr., M.D. · filed 1985-03-29

Since the appellant has not questioned the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the prior state proceedings in any other respect, we must conclude that the court below was correct in ruling that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were precluded.

Section 1983 does not permit relitigation of a constitutional claim finally decided in state court when the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it there.

Fellowship of Christ Church v. Thorburn · filed 1985-04-05

Appellants challenge the district court’s holding that res judicata bars relitigation under § 1983 of their claim, which has been finally determined in state court. ... We find these contentions to be without merit, and affirm the district court.

Section 1983 cannot be used to relitigate issues already resolved in a prior state-court action binding on the plaintiff.

Sherman v. Charter Tp. of Delhi · filed 1985-12-16

Hence, appellant's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim cannot serve as a guise for relitigation of the issues in a federal forum.

A final state-court judgment bars a later § 1983 damages action arising from the same cause when the constitutional claims and damages could have been litigated in state court.

Massey v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 1986-02-01

The plaintiff is therefore barred from seeking damages against the defendant in this case under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1982), because the claims for relief under these statutes could have been litigated at the State Court level. It has been widely held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to hear and decide civil rights cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

Section 1983 does not override the Full Faith and Credit Act or guarantee a federal forum after state litigation has claim-preclusive effect.

American National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-06-05

Where Section 1738 is in the picture, Section 1983 does not guarantee a federal forum.

A final state-court judgment after a full hearing on constitutional claims bars a later Section 1983 action asserting the same claims or claims arising from the same facts.

Thomas WHITE, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard J. ELROD and Phillip Hardiman, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1987-04-08

The plaintiffs had a full hearing on their constitutional claims before courts of competent jurisdiction in Illinois, and lost on the merits. That judgment is a bar to their proceeding on the same claims, or claims arising from the same facts, in federal court.

A § 1983 damages action is barred by claim preclusion when the plaintiff could have sought those damages in an earlier state declaratory action arising from the same transaction.

Pasterczyk v. Michael v. Fair · filed 1987-05-29

Notwithstanding that appellant sought damages in the federal case— whereas in the state court action he chose not to — the § 1983 action is barred by res judicata, unless a recognized exception applies.

A final state-court judgment resolving the same due-process pension dispute bars a later § 1983 action under ordinary res judicata principles.

Manfra v. Koch · filed 1987-08-26

The federal courts are required to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment whenever the courts of the state in which the judgment was rendered would do so.

A § 1983 plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating search-and-seizure claims already decided by the state supreme court.

Gray v. William A. Freeman Lieutenant Carl E. Lilly Sergeant Suffolk Police Department · filed 1988-01-22

Coleman Gray appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint. ... The Virginia State Supreme Court has concluded that the search conducted pursuant to the warrant was not a sham and that items not listed in the warrant were properly seized under the plain view doctrine. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 326, 356 S.E.2d 157, 164-65 (1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1987) (No. 86-7114). Thus, Gray is collaterally estopped from relitigating those claims see Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1983), and they were properly dismissed based on collateral estoppel.

A federal court must give a prior state-court judgment the same claim-preclusive effect in a § 1983 action that the judgment would receive in the rendering state’s courts.

Snell v. Mayor And City Council Of Havre De Grace · filed 1988-01-25

The full faith and credit clause of article IV, as implemented by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 (1948), requires federal courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect as those judgments would be accorded by a court in the rendering state. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). This principle applies to federal civil rights actions following state court actions. Migra v. Warren City School District Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (federal action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983).

A prior state-court action seeking both declaratory and coercive relief may claim-preclude a later § 1983 damages action under the rendering state’s preclusion law.

Cimasi v. City of Fenton · filed 1988-02-02

In the original state court suit Barleycorn sought not only declaratory relief but coercive relief as well. We think it clear that Barleycorn’s section 1983 claim is now barred under Missouri law.

A federal court hearing a § 1983 action must give a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect it would receive under the rendering state’s law.

Watson v. Westra · filed 1988-02-05

Moreover, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires us to give a state court judgment "the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." ... The Michigan courts having approved the sentencing judge's finding that the presentence report was properly prepared and accurate, no federal court can now consider a claim premised on a claim that it is inaccurate or otherwise improper.

Section 1983 claims are subject to preclusion when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim in a prior state court proceeding.

Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Craigie · filed 1990-05-10

Where the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its constitutional claim, as Sierra Pacific did here, section 1983 claims are not excepted from the general rule of preclusion.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment under state preclusion law, even though a plaintiff generally need not exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Burks v. County of Miller · filed 1990-10-04

As a general proposition, a party may bring a § 1983 action without exhausting state remedies. However, that does not mean that once a state court action has been brought and adjudicated that the state court judgment will not be given preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Allen and Migra both demonstrate that the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to § 1983 claims brought in federal court if state preclusion law would operate to apply those principles.

Section 1983 claims in federal court are subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel after a prior state court determination.

Ahu Realty Corp. v. Goodwin · filed 1982-02-22

The teaching of the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry is specifically that both res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to Section 1983 cases in the federal courts where there has been a prior state court determination.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an assault based solely on violent words or threats that cause no physical harm.

Simms v. Reiner · filed 1976-08-09

Several courts have concluded, and we agree, that mere words or threats, however violent, do not amount to an actionable assault under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a simple assault actionable when it involves no physical touching and causes no physical injury.

Bolden v. Mandel · filed 1974-12-10

Applying the principles of these cases to the allegations here, this Court concludes that the pending complaint does not state a claim which would entitle plaintiff to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court concludes that a simple assault which does not result in a physical touching and which produces no physical injury is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a person assaulted and battered by someone acting under color of state law.

Gregory v. Thompson · filed 1974-08-14

It is well established that § 1983 provides a remedy for one who has been the victim of an assault and battery at the hands of a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for intentional conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional or federal rights, not every state-law tort.

Sheffey v. Greer · filed 1975-03-25

Not every action that constitutes a state law tort of assault, even when it is committed under the color of state law, is sufficient in and of itself to show a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406, 407 (3rd Cir. 1967); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F.Supp. 482, 487 (D.Del.1974). ... This Court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s complaint does not meet the test, enunciated above, which would raise the degree of wrong-doing involved up to a deprivation of a federally guaranteed right, i. e.,-the act challenged is not one which involves shocking or brutal conduct.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner's claim that his custodian assaulted him.

Collins v. D. B. Hladky, Sheriff of Campbell County · filed 1979-08-17

A claim of assault on a prisoner by his custodian is cognizable under § 1983.

A deliberate and intentional assault by a police officer invades a substantive constitutional right and is actionable under § 1983.

Gant v. Aliquippa Borough · filed 1985-07-10

As such she has a right of action against the officer under Section 1983. This complaint does not allege a simple tort action against a state officer, but a deliberate and intentional invasion of a substantive constitutional right.

Dismissal of a Section 1983 excessive-force claim is harmless when a jury rejects an assault and battery claim involving the same factual issues and liability elements.

Whitney v. Officer Ronald Pfeifer and City of Ypsilanti · filed 1985-01-03

The summary dismissal of Whitney's Sec. 1983 claim was also harmless error. The factual issues and elements of liability--excessive force and assault and battery--in both the tort action and the Sec. 1983 action are identical. If there is any difference between these causes of action, it is that the Sec. 1983 claim imposes a standard of liability more difficult for the plaintiff to meet than the assault and battery charge. In that event, liability for assault and battery is a necessary element in establishing the Sec. 1983 claim. Since the jury believed that Pfeifer was not liable for assault and battery, it could not have concluded that Pfeifer violated Whitney's rights under Sec. 1983. Hence, if the District Judge erred in dismissing the Sec. 1983 claim, his error, in light of the jury's verdict, was harmless.

Section 1983 does not require proof of physical assault or battery for every constitutional claim, including a claim that officers executed a search warrant unreasonably.

Fred Tarpley, Sr. v. Greene · filed 1982-07-02

Contrary to the District Court’s reading, Johnson v. Glick does not stand for the general proposition that physical assault and battery is an essential element of any constitutional claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide separate assault and battery claims for alleged force during an arrest; those allegations are treated as excessive force claims.

Boyler v. City of Lackawanna · filed 2018-02-27

The Court has not found any case that recognizes either an assault or a battery claim grounded in § 1983, and Plaintiff's counsel failed to provide a satisfactory reason during oral argument for recognizing federal assault and battery claims in this context. ... Instead, it is the Court's view that Plaintiff's fifth and sixth causes of action, alleging an assault and battery under § 1983, respectively, are properly formulated as excessive force claims.

A prisoner's Section 1983 retaliation claim survives dismissal when the complaint pleads a chronology from which retaliatory motive can be inferred, rather than merely alleging retaliation as an ultimate fact.

Murphy v. Lane · filed 1987-11-06

Our review of the record persuades us that, for purposes of overcoming dismissal, Murphy's complaint does in fact set forth a chronology of events from which retaliatory animus on the part of defendants could arguably be inferred. ... We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of the retaliatory transfer component of Murphy's complaint and remand that one issue for further proceedings.

A newspaper may pursue a section 1983 claim that county officials withdrew advertising and threatened advertisers in retaliation for critical reporting.

North Mississippi Communications, Inc. v. Jones · filed 1986-06-27

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the Section 1 and 2 antitrust claims against all defendants, but we VACATE that part of the judgment dismissing the § 1983 claim and REMAND the case for findings of fact concerning that claim.

A school board may be liable under section 1983 when retaliatory charges prompted it not to renew a teacher for protected speech.

Cox v. Dardanelle Public School District Glenn Fugatt, Superintendent of Schools and Johnny Dillard, Principal · filed 1986-06-11

We also reject appellants’ argument that because the School Board members were unaware of Cox’s grievance and other criticisms of Dillard’s policies, their decision not to renew Cox’s contract was not tainted by any impermissible motive. The district court could reasonably conclude that the Board would not have considered an adverse action against Cox had Dillard and Fugatt not advanced these retaliatory charges.

An inmate may state a § 1983 retaliation claim by showing that prison officials reclassified or disciplined him because he filed grievances.

Price-Bey v. Murphy · filed 1985-10-10

Prisoners have a right to petition prison authorities for redress, and a violation of this right occurs when prison officials engage in intimidation, harassment, including retaliation or deprivation of privileges in response to a prisoner's assertion of that right. ... If the appellant can show that the reclassification and misconduct ticket were issued in retaliation to his filing the grievances, he might state a cause of action under the aforementioned authorities.

Section 1983 does not provide relief where a plaintiff fails to substantiate that her non-retention was caused by her complaints about program management.

Olmstead v. Community Action Services of Morgan County, Inc. · filed 1980-06-24

The plaintiff has completely failed to substantiate her claim that she was not rehired because of her complaints against the management of the Headstart program. Other persons who had been outspoken in their complaints were rehired. There was no violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a temporary jail transfer actionable as retaliation without injury or a deterrent effect on filing complaints.

Green v. Ballou · filed 1975-01-30

Although this court takes an extremely dim view of any efforts by state officials to obstruct a prisoner’s access to the courts, it cannot say that such a transfer from one jail to another, both temporary, until transfer to the penitentiary, was retaliatory; or if such a transfer was in fact motivated by Green’s filing of writs, such action did not inure to the injury of Green or have such a deterrent effect upon filing complaints as to be cognizable as a claim in this court.

Section 1983 permits a public school principal to sue for discharge or demotion based on exercising free speech, but does not recognize a federal constitutional right to encourage illegal acts.

R. Brooks Bates, Individually and as Superintendent of the Russell County Board of Education v. Leslie Dause and Robert · filed 1974-09-12

Although these two school principals would have a right of action under § 1983 if discharged or demoted for the exercise of freedom of speech, we decline to recognize any federal constitutional right on the part of the principal of a public school to urge and encourage teachers under his jurisdiction to commit illegal acts, or as in the present case to engage in an illegal school strike.

Section 1983 provides a jury trial upon demand for legal issues when both legal and equitable relief are sought, and permits damages and equitable relief for a nontenured public-school teacher retaliated against for First Amendment activity.

Amburgey v. Clifford R. Cassady, Superintendent of Rowan County Board of Education · filed 1974-11-26

A complainant alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeking both equitable and legal relief is entitled to have a jury determine the merits of the legal issues in the case. ... Section 1983 meets these prerequisites, and plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial upon her demand. ... Furthermore, a nontenured teacher in a public school system may be awarded damages and may be accorded equitable relief, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if he is discharged or refused tenure or reemployment in retaliation for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a state university's retaliation against an employee for exercising First Amendment free-speech rights.

Decker-Gregg v. Scarlett · filed 1975-02-12

If it were true that MTSU did not renew DeekerGregg’s employment contract in reprisal for her exercise of the First Amendment right to free speech, this would be an impermissible infringement and a valid cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a government benefit is denied or revoked in retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.

Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton · filed 1978-02-24

Where the plaintiff has alleged that he was denied a governmental benefit such as a gun license in retaliation for testimony before a grand jury, he has made out a cause of action under § 1983, based on the First Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to bring a constitutional claim for retaliation by public officials based on exercising protected First Amendment speech rights.

Lemons v. Morgan · filed 1980-09-19

We conclude that a claim is stated under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore reverse the order of the district court dismissing the complaint.

Section 1983 provides a claim for retaliation against protected speech when the plaintiff proves that the speech substantially motivated termination, the parties would otherwise have contracted, the contract terms, and resulting damages.

Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority · filed 1981-02-09

Plaintiff has a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if she can show: (1) that plaintiff’s remarks were a substantial factor in DURA’s decision to terminate negotiations; (2) that but for such remarks, she and DURA would have entered into a redevelopment contract; (3) what the terms of such contract would have been; and (4) that she was damaged because the contract was not entered into.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a claim against state actors who retaliate against a person for exercising First Amendment association and assistance rights, even absent a property or contractual right to public employment.

Owens v. Rush · filed 1981-06-29

The First Amendment clearly affords protection against actions penalizing or inhibiting the exercise of such constitutional rights, even absent a contractual or tenure right to continued public employment. ... Lack of any property interest or contractual right in his public employment does not defeat the plaintiff's First Amendment claim alleging retaliation against him for exercise of his own First Amendment right of association and assistance to aid his wife's preparation of her charge. ... Accordingly, the summary judgment rejecting plaintiff-appellant's Title VII claim on the basis of the personal staff exception is affirmed; the order dismissing his constitutional claim asserted through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(c) is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the latter claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment employment-retaliation claim to prove that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Neal v. Crawford A. Howell and the City of Rock Hill, S. C. · filed 1982-09-10

In order to prevail in the present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Neal had the burden of proving to the jury that his participation in the litigation against the city was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the decision not to promote him to the position of Captain.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs bringing a retaliatory-transfer claim to show that the transfer would not have occurred but for their exercise of First Amendment rights.

Association for Reduction of Violence v. Hall · filed 1983-03-08

In order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiffs ultimately must establish that they would not have been transferred “but for” the exercise of their First Amendment rights.

A § 1983 complaint states a First Amendment claim when it alleges that state licensing agencies harassed physicians willing to provide care consistent with the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.

Graham v. George Deukmejian, Attorney General of the State of California · filed 1983-08-18

Nevertheless, we conclude that it can be read to state a claim cognizable under § 1983. The Witnesses allege that their religion forbids blood transfusions, that only a limited number of physicians in California will perform certain operations without transfusions, and that California, through its licensing and discipline agencies, has a policy of harassing the physicians who agree to perform such surgery. We conclude that plaintiffs should have the opportunity to attempt to establish their claims, and that they state a cause of action.

Section 1983 supports a First Amendment claim when a person acting under color of state law physically assaults someone in retaliation for protected expression.

Turner v. Cooper · filed 1983-11-01

To the extent that Blakely, complains of an assault by a person acting under color of state law in retaliation for expression protected by the first amendment, it cannot seriously be contended that she fails to state a claim.

A § 1983 retaliation claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence permitting an inference that the protected activity caused the challenged action.

Munson v. Wendell R. Friske, John Rybak, Jr., Kenneth Todd, and Ashland County · filed 1985-01-29

Since we find that no inferences are permissible in this case which might suggest that Munson’s submission of an overtime claim was the cause for his termination or for the institution of the John Doe proceeding, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Munson’s section 1983 cause of action.

A prisoner may state a § 1983 retaliation claim when officials deny a transfer because of protected legal activity, even though the prisoner has no independent due-process entitlement to the transfer.

McCalvin v. Fairman · filed 1985-02-25

It is impermissible to deny a transfer request in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of a protected right even if the denial, when done for another reason, would have been proper.