42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a causal connection or affirmative link between an official and the alleged violation; awareness alone is insufficient when the official lacks power to change the challenged conditions.

Lewis v. Washington · filed 2003-06-02

The fact that Mr. Currie and Mr. Gaetz may have been aware of how Category IV protective custody was run is not sufficient to impose liability on them. Absent the power to change the way in which Category IV is administered, Mr. Currie and Mr. Gaetz have no causal connection or affirmative link to the alleged violations.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s personal involvement in, or causal connection to, the alleged violation.

Durrell v. Torrey · filed 2003-06-18

The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim because Durrell did not raise a triable issue as to Henning’s personal involvement in, or causal connection to, the alleged use of excessive force.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to establish the named defendants’ actual involvement in the challenged action.

United States Ex Rel. Golden v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission · filed 2003-06-25

He must also establish a causal connection and actual involvement by the named parties.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that the defendants were personally involved in the deprivation of federal rights.

Raines v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-07-09

A complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege the defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights.

Garcia-Sanchez v. Roman Abreu · filed 2003-07-10

As a prerequisite to § 1983 liability, plaintiffs would have to allege Norat’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of their rights, which they have failed to do.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; signing earlier disciplinary charges alone is insufficient.

Toran v. Bzdawka · filed 2003-07-11

He has not explained how either of the individual defendants was involved in his termination, other than to note that Bzdawka signed the 1997 charges prompting the settlement agreement, which is not enough on its own. Thus, the individual defendants before us have no liability under § 1983.

Individual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Doran v. Robinson · filed 2003-07-25

Furthermore, Mr. Doran fails to allege facts establishing Dr. Robinson personally caused a constitutional violation. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish the named defendants’ actual involvement in the alleged violation.

Golden v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission · filed 2003-08-01

He must also establish a causal connection and actual involvement by the named parties. He has failed to submit any evidence connecting Appellees with the decision to terminate him, any evidence connecting the termination to his alleged protected speech, any evidence that Appellees knew of his alleged protected speech or any evidence that the proferred non-discriminatory reason was in any manner false.

Section 1983 permits a claim against prison officials whose involvement in implementing and enforcing the challenged policy is shown by attachments to the complaint.

R. Sterling/Sayyed v. James Banks · filed 2003-08-06

However, the attachments to Sayyed’s complaint--which he pointed to in his objections to the magistrate judge’s report--...show that defendants Rick Toney and Ray Hobbs were involved in implementing and enforcing the newspaper policy. We therefore conclude that Sayyed stated a First Amendment claim against Toney and Hobbs.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in or causation of the alleged deprivation.

St. Pierre v. Angelone · filed 2003-08-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on St. Pierre’s claim against various defendants alleging denial of adequate tier exercise time. Angelone, as Director of the Nevada Department of Prisons, was not personally involved in and did not cause St. Pierre’s lack of tier exercise time.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; officers are not liable for denied medical treatment after a prisoner leaves their control.

Perkins v. Brown · filed 2003-08-26

To be liable under Section 1983, a defendant must have been personally involved in the alleged violation. ... Although plaintiff also alleges that he asked for, and was denied, medical attention upon being returned to prison, defendants named in this action were not responsible for ensuring that plaintiff received medical treatment while he was outside of their control.

Section 1983 requires sufficient evidence of an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation to sustain a claim against that defendant.

Todd M. Johnson, Sr. v. Joseph Ganim, Ron Rapice, and City of Bridgeport · filed 2003-08-27

Although we find that Johnson waived his right to appeal the grant of summary judgment to the City, and agree that Johnson failed to produce enough evidence of Ganim’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation, summary judgment was inappropriate as to Rapice.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials whose sole involvement is denying a prisoner’s grievance.

Alder v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2003-08-27

Furthermore, defendants DeBruyn, King, and Naylor were involved solely by virtue of their denial of Alder’s grievances. The mere denial of a prisoner’s grievance states no claim of constitutional dimension.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable merely because they failed to remedy a prisoner’s grievance.

Pounds v. Myers · filed 2003-09-11

The district court properly concluded that the named defendants — the warden, associate warden, hospital administrator, and commissioner — could not be held liable merely on the basis that they failed to remedy a grievance presented by Pounds.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Auer v. Donat · filed 2003-09-15

With respect to Auer’s excessive force claim, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment to defendants Vanacore, Smith, Lopez, Neven, Donat, Endel, McDaniel and Slansky because Auer failed to show that these defendants were personally involved in the alleged use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not make an official responsible for later harms beyond the official’s own actions.

Frazier v. Mitchell · filed 2003-09-19

Frazier attempts to blame Nicewander for every adverse occurrence that he has experienced since his removal from protective custody. However, because this was the only action taken by Nicewander, he cannot be held responsible for Frazier’s subsequent problems.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Wolf v. Coffey · filed 2003-09-22

The district court properly dismissed Wolfs claim agamst defendant Coffey because Wolf provided no evidence that she personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting the defendant’s acts or omissions to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Wright v. Santopietro · filed 2003-09-29

Based on the summary judgment record here, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show a tangible connection between Santopietro’s acts or omissions and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.

A Section 1983 damages claim requires the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Jones v. Nassau County Sheriff Department · filed 2003-10-07

A complaint based on a violation under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal involvement of the defendant is “fatally defective on its face.” ... The plaintiff fails to allege or indicate any personal involvement in his slip and fall by any Nassau County official or representative. ... Accordingly, the Section 1983 claim against Reilly is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits recovery against named officers only for actions they caused.

Townsend v. Benya · filed 2003-10-14

Limiting instructions, if necessary, will be permitted to make it clear Plaintiffs will only be allowed to recover for actions caused by the named defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation; a supervisory role alone does not establish liability.

James Galdikas, Catherine Hansen, Carol D. Hedgspeth v. Stuart I. Fagan, Paula Wolff, Harry Klein · filed 2003-10-16

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based upon personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 requires a complaint to affirmatively link a named defendant’s actions to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Andrews v. Carey · filed 2003-10-17

Dismissal was proper because Andrews’ amended complaint failed to affirmatively link any actions of the named defendant to the alleged constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged retaliation for relief against that defendant.

Westbrook v. Treon · filed 2003-10-27

As Westbrook does not allege personal involvement by the other defendants as to this claim, he is not entitled to relief against them.

Section 1983 claims against an individual require allegations of that person’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Thomas v. Nassau County Correctional Center · filed 2003-10-28

In this case, the plaintiff neither alleges personal involvement by the director nor does he make any viable allegations against the non-moving director. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses all of the claims against the director.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation for an award of damages; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Govan v. Campbell · filed 2003-10-29

He further fails to name the defendants who allegedly destroyed his property. “It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 can impose liability on a defendant who sets in motion events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Garrett v. Hibler · filed 2003-10-30

Additionally, contrary to his contention on appeal, Dr. Kermis may be liable for the wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment just by getting the process underway. “[D]irect participation is not necessary. . . . The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have participated directly in the constitutional violation.

Hildebrandt, Reinee v. IL Dept Natural · filed 2003-10-30

For a defendant to be liable under § 1983, he or she must have participated directly in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to participate directly in the constitutional violation to be personally liable.

Hildebrandt v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources and Richard Little · filed 2003-10-30

For a defendant to be hable under § 1983, he or she must have participated directly in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires an allegation of personal involvement to maintain a damages claim against a state official in an individual capacity.

Terio v. Wing · filed 2003-10-31

Further, a claim for damages under § 1983 may not be maintained against a State official in his individual capacity absent an allegation that the individual was personally involved in the challenged conduct or decision.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s direct, personal wrongdoing; an officer cannot be held derivatively liable for another officer’s alleged excessive force.

Willis v. Freeman · filed 2003-11-20

But viable it is not. An individual defendant is liable only for his direct, personal wrongdoing.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Srivastava v. Cottey · filed 2003-11-21

Srivastava’s amended complaint, however, fails to allege any actions by Newman himself, and § 1983 requires some personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; a position of authority alone does not establish personal liability.

Sanchez v. University of Connecticut Health Care · filed 2003-12-01

Courts in this Circuit hold that personal involvement of a defendant in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983. ... The fact that Dr. Cutler was in a high position of authority is an insufficient basis for the imposition of personal liability.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; a position of authority alone is insufficient.

Delrio v. University of Connecticut Health Care · filed 2003-12-01

Courts in this Circuit hold that personal involvement of a defendant in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Oliver v. University of Connecticut Health Care · filed 2003-12-01

Courts in this Circuit hold that personal involvement of a defendant in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation for an award of damages; a high-ranking position alone is insufficient.

Ozenne v. University of Connecticut Health Care · filed 2003-12-01

Courts in this Circuit hold that personal involvement of a defendant in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983. ... The fact that Dr. Cutler was in a high position of authority is an insufficient basis for the imposition of personal liability.

Section 1983 does not make officials liable for errors in a disciplinary hearing merely because a prisoner notified them of those errors.

Jones v. Brown · filed 2003-12-10

Once Mr. Jones was provided with a hearing, others do not become liable to him for errors which may have occurred during that hearing merely because he notified them of the alleged errors.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against an individual-capacity defendant to allege facts showing that defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Esnault v. Burnett · filed 2003-12-11

Under § 1983, when a defendant is sued in his individual capacity, the complaint must allege facts that show the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; merely naming someone as a defendant does not state a claim.

Krych v. Hvass · filed 2003-12-12

Further, we agree with the District Court that Krych failed to state any claim whatsoever against Stender and Fitzloff-Meyer because he merely listed these individuals as defendants in his complaint and did not allege they were personally involved in the constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; direct participation or certain supervisory conduct can satisfy that requirement.

Tekula v. Bayport-Blue Point School District · filed 2003-12-15

A defendant may be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of section 1983 if he “directly participated in the infraction,” or if he is a supervisory official, and he (1) failed to remedy the wrong after learning of the violation through a report or appeal; (2) created or continued a custom or policy under which unconstitutional practices occurred; or (3) was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. ... Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 against the individual defendants is denied.

Section 1983 does not make defendants liable for alleged misconduct in which they were not personally involved.

Lynn v. Maryland · filed 2003-12-17

Although the dog sniff that gave rise to the search and arrest of plaintiff provided relevant background information at trial, there was absolutely no legal basis for holding any of the defendants liable for any errors committed in connection with the dog sniff since they were not responsible for conducting it.

Section 1983 liability for a public official requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Whalen v. Allers · filed 2003-12-24

There is no liability imposed upon a public official who had no personal involvement in the alleged Constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant contributed to the plaintiff's injury.

Armstrong v. Town of Cheshire, No. 413481 (Aug. 22, 2001) · filed 2001-08-22

Count 5 alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . While the claim is facially directed against all defendants, Armstrong did not press her claim against the Town at the hearing. For reasons already discussed (with respect to Count 3), there is no evidence on the record submitted to the court that either Merriam or Irving have contributed to any injury suffered by Armstrong.

Section 1983 requires each defendant to be personally and directly involved in the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Rivera v. Fagundo · filed 2004-01-29

A plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant was personally and directly involved in the violation of his federally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not make a defendant liable for a hearing officer’s independent decision to end a hearing.

Krenzel v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2004-01-30

It is perfectly clear that Judge Goldman and not SEPTA terminated the hearing as he held that the proceedings were moot. While Krenzel may believe that the judge erred in taking that action, even if we ignored the fact that the Commonwealth Court held that the judge did not err, we could not hold that SEPTA could have been liable on the basis of his determination. After all, Judge Goldman’s very function was to reach his own conclusions with respect to the relief, if any, to which Krenzel might be entitled.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting each defendant to a violation; listing names in the complaint’s caption is insufficient.

Gilmore v. Corrections Corp. · filed 2004-02-06

Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to sustain recovery under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against an individual official for delayed medical treatment fails when the official lacked knowledge of the injury, treatment requests, and delay.

Dittmeyer v. Whetsel · filed 2004-02-11

After a thorough review of the record, it is clear no evidence shows Sheriff Whetsel knew of Mr. Dittmeyer’s injuries; Mr. Dittmeyer’s or his mother’s requests for treatment; or the delays or omissions in providing him treatment. As a result, Mr. Dittmeyer fails to show Sheriff Whetsel possessed the requisite personal knowledge or acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health and safety, as required, to succeed on his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; mere presence at the scene is insufficient.

Smith v. Barber · filed 2004-02-13

However, Barber cannot be found liable for his mere presence at their home; rather, they must show that he personally participated in the search that allegedly violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation for individual liability.

Lewis v. City of Topeka, Kansas · filed 2004-02-18

Plaintiffs have failed to show that the other officers personally participated in the alleged unlawful stop and detention. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials who lacked authority over, and responsibility for, the challenged dismissal or failure to reinstate.

Pavlov v. Martin · filed 1974-09-06

The theory on which the plaintiff seeks to establish liability on the part of the Mayor of Newark and its City Councilmen, either in their official or personal capacities, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is not clear. ... Under these provisions the Mayor and City Councilmen were without power to discharge or reinstate the plaintiff, and were not responsible for his dismissal or for the failure of the City to reinstate him. Nothing in the record suggests that any of these defendants acted maliciously or in bad faith in any of their relationships with the plaintiff. No basis exists for imposing liability on them for having violated plaintiff’s substantive due process rights.

An official cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 without evidence of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional injury.

Green v. Baca · filed 2004-02-20

Here, by contrast, plaintiff has offered no evidence regarding Baca’s personal involvement in the alleged overdetention. The court therefore grants defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s individual capacity claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged wrongdoing; vicarious liability alone is insufficient.

Mishler v. Avery · filed 2004-02-20

To succeed on his § 1983 claim, Mishler could not rest on a theory of vicarious liability but needed to show that the Nevada Board Members performed illegal acts themselves.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant was responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

Esslinger v. Worrall · filed 2004-02-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Esslinger’s procedural due process claim against the doctors because Esslinger presented no evidence showing that the doctors placed him in administrative segregation or a mental hospital facility, or were responsible for procuring a classification hearing for him.

A § 1983 plaintiff must give fair notice of each defendant’s alleged personal involvement; a suspicion that some defendants participated does not state a viable claim against them.

Bright v. Gillis · filed 2004-02-26

Bright gave no fair notice that any defendant other than Kessling, Cerelli, and Fujimoto participated in the alleged beating. His suspicion that “some or all” of the remaining defendants might have participated failed to articulate a viable claim and certainly was insufficient to warrant a jury trial on the excessive force issue as to any other defendant.

Section 1983 limits an officer’s liability to his own actions; other guards’ failure to intervene cannot be attributed to him.

Riccardo, Anthony v. Rausch, Larry · filed 2004-02-27

Circumstances brought out at trial suggest that other guards should have recognized on May 30 that problems had developed between Riccardo and Garcia; their failure to intervene may be culpable but cannot be attributed to Rausch, whose liability depends exclusively on his actions the evening of May 28.

Individual liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Phillips v. Grady County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2004-03-02

Concerning the individual defendants, Sheriff Florence and Deputy Pettit, we must determine whether any factual issues exist as to their personal participation in the alleged wrongdoing. See Foote v. Spiegel , 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”). We discern no evidence showing that either Sheriff Florence or Deputy Pettit participated in Ms. Phillips’ arrest and detention.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Page v. Kirby · filed 2004-03-10

In order to establish personal liability against a defendant in a § 1983 action, the defendant must be personally involved in the alleged wrong(s); liability cannot be predicated solely under respondeat superior.

A § 1983 complaint must connect named defendants to the alleged constitutional deprivation through authorization, participation, or a relevant policy.

Salinas v. Brown · filed 2004-03-10

Salinas did not allege that the defendants had authorized or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivations or had established policies on the matters.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal participation in the violation or an affirmative link through a failure to act or supervise.

Gadlin v. Watkins · filed 2004-03-12

As stated by the district court, personal participation is an essential allegation in a civil rights action, Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976), and there must be an affirmative link between the alleged violation and each defendant’s participation, or failure to act or supervise.

A § 1983 claim against an individual defendant requires sufficient allegations of personal involvement.

McGibboney v. New York · filed 2004-03-15

The district court held, inter alia: (1) the claim against the Division of Parole was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) McGibboney had failed to state a claim against Persaud and Goord because his claim did not allege sufficient personal involvement; and (3) the extension of his release date was proper under the pertinent New York State regulations and thus McGibboney failed to state a claim against any of the appellees. ... Having reviewed the record below, we find no error with the district court’s judgment and affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation.

Ramsey v. USA · filed 2004-03-17

Further, Ramsey has failed to show how defendants Wignall, Varner, Bowles, or Knowles were personally involved in any alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant and the constitutional injury, established through direct personal participation or conduct that sets the injury in motion.

Revelles v. Stout · filed 2004-03-22

The requisite causal connection for a § 1983 claim may be established “by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation” or by conduct that “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the unlawful activity; generalized allegations against multiple defendants do not suffice.

The Schatz Family v. Gierer · filed 2004-03-24

Because a defendant's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is founded only on a particular defendant's, personal involvement in unlawful activity, see Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990), this Court ruled, in both its September 27, 2002, and May 9, 2003 orders, that the plaintiffs may not rely on the allegations in paragraphs 72 through 123 (excluding paragraph 99) of the Third Amended Complaint to support their claims for relief. That conclusion applies equally here, and as a consequence, no defendant is liable for the allegations in those paragraphs.

Section 1983 claims against a defendant cannot proceed without allegations or evidence that the defendant was involved in the alleged wrongs.

Tilghman v. Waterbury Board of Education · filed 2004-03-25

Defendants argue correctly that plaintiffs have provided no allegations or evidence that Giordano was involved in the alleged wrongs. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges only that Giorda-no was an ex officio member of the Board. The complaint does not allege that he took any action related to their claims. Nor do plaintiffs' later pleadings and affidavits contain any such allegation. Accordingly, the claims against him must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation for an award of damages.

Gill v. Tuttle · filed 2004-03-29

With respect to the Free Exercise aspects of Gill’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action against defendantsappellees Lieutenant Ashby, Edward Dann, R. Nelson, and G. Greene, respectively, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate because Gill does not allege that any of these defendants were personally involved in the violations of his rights. “[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the defendants personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Brewer v. Village of Old Field · filed 2004-03-31

Here, the plaintiffs failed, among other things, to indicate the specific people who allegedly violated the plaintiffs’ rights, how due process was allegedly denied, and the specific injury that was allegedly suffered. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in causing the claimed deprivation of rights.

Lippoldt v. Cole · filed 2004-03-31

They correctly point out that the causation element of § 1983 requires that the particular defendants sued must have subjected a citizen to the claimed deprivation. ... The court thus finds that defendants Cole and Har-lenske personally participated in the denial of the parade permits.

A Section 1983 complaint must identify the defendant personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Wood v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE OF NY · filed 2004-03-31

Here, the plaintiff failed, among other things, to indicate the specific person who allegedly violated the plaintiff's rights, how due process was allegedly denied, and the specific injury that was allegedly suffered. Accordingly, the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a supervisor’s direction of retaliation can satisfy that requirement.

Hernandez v. Goord · filed 2004-03-31

Thus, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of Greiner for purposes of this motion; accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of personal involvement by Greiner is denied and motion is granted as to Goord.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a defendant’s acts; merely naming a state official states no claim for relief against that official.

Schuman v. The State of California · filed 1978-10-30

Since that portion of the amended complaint based on § 1983 alleges no acts on the part of the state defendants (besides the DMV employees), but merely lists their names, no claim for relief is stated as to them.

Section 1983 liability requires more than an officer’s mere presence at the scene of an inmate attack.

Ruiz v. Price · filed 2004-04-07

He merely avers that Officer Castillo was present at the unit at the time of the attack. This is insufficient to establish relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant officer caused the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Wiggins v. Gulley · filed 2004-04-07

However, after a careful review of the record, we must conclude that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Officer Gulley “caused” this ticket to be issued to Roy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against defendants alleged to have known of and condoned the deprivation of rights.

Cobbs v. Sheahan · filed 2004-04-14

Again, defendants’ arguments that plaintiff fails to allege requisite personal involvement are better left for the summary judgment stage. While plaintiff will bear a heavy burden in proving that defendants were motivated by her race or gender when demoting her, she alleges a violation of her rights. At the very least, she alleges that each defendant knew of the improper conduct and condoned it.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a defendant’s personal involvement in the events giving rise to the claim.

Proctor v. Mobley · filed 2004-04-16

Initially, we conclude the district court properly granted Mobley judgment as a matter of law because Proctor did not present evidence of Mobley’s personal involvement in the events at issue.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Everett v. Gould · filed 2004-04-20

Furthermore, Everett’s allegation that Bosner’s absence from the meeting was engineered is unsubstantiated in the record and is insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact as the evidence does not indicate Bosner had personal involvement in the decision not to retain Everett.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal involvement in the unlawful conduct; naming officials solely because of their positions is insufficient.

DePonceau v. Pataki · filed 2004-04-27

In order for a plaintiff to establish a claim against a defendant in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had some personal involvement in the allegedly unlawful conduct. ... Since plaintiffs have made no specific allegations whatsoever about the involvement of the vast majority of their twenty-nine named defendants in the complained-of events, who appear to have been named solely because of their official position in New York State government or agency, the claims against them must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Limbert v. Umar · filed 1983-08-19

There is no allegation of any personal involvement by Mr. McMonagle in the refusal to provide an arthroscopy. Summary judgment will be granted.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded.

Feingold v. New York · filed 2004-04-30

A finding of “personal involvement of [the individual] defendants” in an alleged constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983. ... He has also, therefore, presented sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that they were personally involved in behavior that violates Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by each defendant for individual liability.

Brown v. Illinois Department of Public Aid · filed 2004-05-21

First, his allegations of unequal treatment are made generally against all defendants, failing to alleged the “element of personal involvement necessary for individual liability under § 1983.”

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the individual defendant committed the act causing the constitutional deprivation.

Smith v. Swanson, Unpublished Decision (5-24-2004) · filed 2004-05-24

Moreover, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that an individual defendant committed the act that caused the constitutional deprivation. ... Appellant's complaint fails to allege any individual acts committed by Sheriff Swanson himself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish the defendant's personal participation in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Bennett v. Schroeder · filed 2004-05-27

Having failed to come forward with any substantive evidence to establish that Defendant Schroeder personally participated in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights, we find that Plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of his Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant was personally involved in depriving the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Cook v. James · filed 2004-06-09

It is well-settled that Cook also must establish that Defendant James was personally involved in the deprivation of his constitutional rights in order to sustain a claim under § 1983. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985).

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed constitutional violation.

Paradise v. DeRobertis · filed 1984-10-29

Furthermore, in order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed violation of a constitutional right must be established.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer alleged to have directly participated in a seizure under an unconstitutional statute.

Holladay v. Roberts · filed 1977-01-06

The direct participation of Roberts in the seizure pursuant to the unconstitutional statute obviously is sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against him.

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants require allegations of specific, personal wrongdoing by those defendants.

Williams v. Duckworth · filed 1983-12-08

One final note in conclusion: even a liberal reading of plaintiffs complaint and other pleadings demonstrates plaintiffs failure to allege any specific, personal wrongdoing on the part of any of the individual named defendants. Even under the mandate of Haines v. Kerner, supra, such constitutes grounds for dismissal of § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Green v. Coughlin · filed 1986-04-25

It is clear that Thomas A. Coughlin, III, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, had no personal involvement in the proceeding at issue and must, therefore, be dismissed as a defendant.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege a defendant's direct and personal responsibility for the alleged unlawful conduct.

Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward · filed 1987-03-25

Having failed to allege, as they must, that these defendants were directly and personally responsible for the purported unlawful conduct, their complaint is "fatally defective" on its face.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each individual defendant was personally involved, directly or as a supervisor, in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Davis v. Department of Social Services of Baltimore County · filed 1991-08-19

In order to maintain a cognizable claim under section 1983 against any of the officials or employees of the various agencies in their individual capacities, Davis had to allege facts that would demonstrate that the officials and employees were personally involved, directly or in a supervisory capacity, in the deprivation of her federally protected rights.

Section 1983 holds defendants liable for their own acts; an incident involving someone who is not a defendant does not establish their liability.

Baxter v. Everett · filed 2004-06-17

As to the delay in taking Baxter to the hospital on one particular evening, we note the “night shift lady” involved in that incident is not a defendant. See Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandall, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "[d]efendants are liable for their personal acts only").

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an individual merely for denying an administrative grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Lee v. Michigan Parole Board · filed 2004-06-23

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 liability requires a showing that the defendants were responsible for the challenged conduct.

Hayes v. Knodel · filed 2004-06-24

To the extent Hayes alleges that defendants denied him due process during the course of his disciplinary hearing, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Hayes failed to demonstrate that defendants were responsible for the disciplinary procedure or sanction.

Section 1983 makes a prison guard’s liability depend on his own actions; other guards’ failures to intervene cannot be attributed to him.

Riccardo, Anthony v. Rausch, Larry · filed 2004-07-12

Circumstances brought out at trial suggest that other guards should have recognized on May 30 that problems had developed between Riccardo and Garcia; their failure to intervene may be culpable but cannot be attrib- uted to Rausch, whose liability depends exclusively on his actions the evening of May 28.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Thomas v. Ragland · filed 2004-07-14

Because she has not set forth any specific facts showing that defendant Ragland was personally involved in the investigation, this claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violation for individual-capacity liability.

Patterson v. County of Oneida, New York · filed 2004-07-15

Likewise, a plaintiff must establish a given defendant's personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim against an official requires factual allegations of that official’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Bloom v. New York State Commissioner of Health · filed 2004-07-28

Because the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any personal involvement of Novello to support a claim based on Section 1983, the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to have participated in or been responsible for the challenged employment decisions to be liable for First Amendment retaliation.

Thomas v. City of Beaverton Linda Adlard Sandra Miller · filed 2004-08-16

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Adlard, however, because the record does not indicate that Adlard participated in or was responsible for the decisions to extend Thomas’ probation or to terminate her. After the verdict in Perry’s suit, Adlard was relieved of her supervisory duties over Beaverton municipal court’s personnel matters. Thus, summary judgment on all claims against Adlard, including the First Amendment retaliation claim, was appropriate.

Section 1983 requires evidence of an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Golub v. City of New York · filed 2004-08-18

At the outset, defendant Markman is entitled to summary judgment as to Golub’s First Amendment retaliation claim because there is no evidence of involvement by him.

Section 1983 requires each individual defendant’s act or omission to cause the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Wesley v. Davis · filed 2004-08-24

In order to impose liability under section 1983 on an individual defendant, the defendant’s act or omission must cause the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 defendants cannot be held liable under respondeat superior; they must have participated in the alleged misconduct.

Miller v. Wertanen · filed 2004-08-25

As for the defendants who were listed in the caption but not mentioned in the complaint, the district court properly noted that they could not be held hable under respondeat superior, but must have participated in the alleged offensive conduct.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be personally involved in or to cause the alleged deprivation of rights.

Eichelberger v. Cunningham · filed 2004-08-27

Moreover, they have failed to show how Cunningham, who allegedly only filed the private defendants’ amended complaint and issued a summons to plaintiff Eichelberger, was personally involved in any deprivation of due process or caused any such deprivation.

Section 1983 damages liability requires the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.

Smith v. Carrasco · filed 2004-09-03

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for damages based on personal liability. A person cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the person was .personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not make police officers liable for medical decisions made exclusively by an emergency room physician.

Sullivan, Jeffrey J. v. Bornemann, Jon · filed 2004-09-14

Police officers like Bornemann and Whealon should not be at risk of liability under § 1983 for medical decisions made exclusively by the emergency room physi- cian.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant personally participated in depriving the plaintiff of a federally protected right while acting under color of state law.

Allison v. Utah County Corp. · filed 2004-09-14

In order to maintain a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant deprived him of a federally protected right while acting under color of state law. The defendant must have personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.

Jackson v. Kronberg · filed 2004-09-17

However, Nurse James is not a defendant in this case and Kronberg appears to have no personal involvement with this incident. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that each defendant was personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional conduct that caused the injury.

Colvin v. Schaublin · filed 2004-09-21

In order to establish liability pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants are personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional actions that caused his injury.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; participating in discussions leading to a decision is insufficient.

Zdziebloski v. Town of East Greenbush, NY · filed 2004-09-23

Involvement in discussions that lead to a decision is not personal involvement under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation for individual liability.

Sharif v. Buck · filed 2004-09-30

In the absence of any proof that Buck was personally involved in the violation of plaintiffs procedural due process rights, he cannot be individually liable under § 1983, Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir.2004); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir.2004).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a complaint that alleges no personal action by that defendant fails to state a claim.

Creekmore v. Attorney General of Texas · filed 2004-09-30

Thus, when a plaintiff does not allege personal action by the person sued, a complaint submitted under section 1983 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to that defendant.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Veloz v. New York · filed 2004-09-30

With respondeat superior being the only theory attaching liability to Koenigsmann, claims against this defendant are dismissed for lack of personal involvement.

A § 1983 complaint must identify conduct by the named defendants that constituted a constitutional deprivation.

Marks v. Sebelius · filed 2004-10-05

Applying these standards, and after careful review of the record on appeal and all of Marks’ filings with the court, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Marks failed to identify conduct by the named defendants that constituted a constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts showing each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Suarez v. Keiser · filed 2004-10-05

As stated above, I will allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading to address these two deficiencies: l)failure to allege specific allegations concerning each defendant which show that he or she was personally involved in the deprivation alleged, and 2)failure to state specific allegations as to each defendant that show he or she was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs condition, rather than just negligent.

A § 1983 claim against an individual officer cannot be rejected for lack of personal involvement when summary judgment on that issue is premature.

Allen v. Thomas · filed 2004-10-07

Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Allen’s claim against Dickey on grounds of lack of personal involvement was premature, we VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Allen’s due process claim against Dickey and REMAND for further proceedings.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Borzych v. Frank · filed 2004-10-14

It is well established that liability under § 1983 must be based on a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that each defendant was involved in or responsible for the alleged violation.

Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 1985-07-11

Because he fails to show that any of the four defendants was involved in or responsible for this action, they were entitled to summary judgment on the matter.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Starr v. City of Tulsa · filed 2004-11-17

“ ‘[PJersonal participation is an essential allegation’” that must be proven before a Plaintiff can recover on a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an official’s personal involvement in an eviction; active participation or concerted action with private actors may suffice, but merely failing to protect the owner does not.

Hansen v. Cannon · filed 2004-11-29

Officials who simply fail to protect citizens from private actors cannot be liable under § 1983. ... Nevertheless, allegations of concerted action between government officials and private actors may be enough to establish the state actors’ personal involvement, as will active participation in the seizure.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged use of force; a claim against an officer cannot rest solely on force attributed to other officers.

Murry v. Barnes · filed 2004-11-29

That error was harmless as to Lonnie Murry, because his only contention is that he was assaulted by the two officers who are not defendants.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims require an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Bafford v. Simmons · filed 2004-12-03

The district court granted the motion, concluding that: ... (2) the claims asserted against defendants Simmons and Nelson in their individual capacities failed because Bafford had not asserted that either defendant personally participated in the alleged use of force; ... We have reviewed the record, the appellate briefs, and the applicable law and conclude that the district court’s resolution of Bafford’s claims was proper.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation; a supervisor’s position alone does not establish liability.

Wilson v. Watters · filed 2004-12-10

Respondent Watters cannot be held liable for the acts of any of the team members simply because he is the warden of the facility. Liability under § 1983 must be based on a respondent’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor in an individual capacity to show the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Murphy v. Goord · filed 2006-08-08

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must show that the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 jail-suicide claim when the deliberate-indifference standard was clearly established and factual disputes remain over whether officials reasonably would have known their conduct violated it.

Bult v. Beadle County, SD · filed 1995-12-05

The district court concluded that the constitutional standard for deliberate indifference regarding liability for jail suicides was clearly established at the time of the suicide and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the officials reasonably would have known that their actions and omissions would have violated that standard. ... Its order denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is affirmed.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on omitted warrant facts when pre-existing law did not clearly establish that the omissions would negate probable cause.

Haygood v. Johnson · filed 1995-12-04

We, looking at the pre-existing law, hold that the facts omitted here were not so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that their omission would lead to a search in violation of federal law.

Officials have qualified immunity from a § 1983 patronage dismissal suit when the employee’s asserted right was not clearly established.

Billingsley v. St. Louis County · filed 1995-11-14

Under existing law, a county council administrative assistant does not have a clearly established right to be free from patronage dismissals. As a result, defendants could have reasonably believed that Billings-ley’s termination for political reasons was proper. Therefore, they are immune from suit.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against a state executive director who administers and enforces the challenged law, even when the statute assigns formal enforcement authority to the agency.

Emison v. Catalano · filed 1996-01-12

Nevertheless, the court does not find in the plaintiffs’ naming of Ms. Catalano as the defendant a ground for dismissal of this civil action. The plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief, not money damages. There can be no doubt that the day-today business of the Registry of Election Finance, both in the administration and in the enforcement of the Campaign Contribution Limits Act, will be conducted by its paid executive director, not by its uncompensated members.

Section 1983 permits recovery of post-indictment defense costs, incarceration losses, and emotional distress when an unlawful search proximately causes those injuries.

Train v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2009-05-11

After examining the existing case law and the relevant legal principles, the Court finds that a plaintiff who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations. The recovery should be guided by common-law tort principles— including principles of causation — and tailored to the interests that the Tenth Circuit has stated the Fourth Amendment protects. Those interests include liberty, property, and privacy interests — a person’s sense of security and individual dignity. In appropriate circumstances, such damages may include damages flowing from post-indictment legal process, such as costs incurred in defending against charges brought as a result of an unlawful search, losses incurred because of incarceration while defending against the charges, and appropriate emotional distress damages.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery of criminal defense expenses resulting from the discovery of incriminating evidence during an unlawful search.

Hector v. Watt · filed 2000-12-13

When we reflect on the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, we believe that it follows that a plaintiff cannot recover the litigation expenses incurr ed because police officers discovered criminal conduct during an unconstitutional search.

Section 1983 damages for illegal entry and excessive force are limited to the harm each wrong proximately causes, even when that harm overlaps.

Bodine v. Warwick · filed 1995-12-26

Thus, if the troopers are found to have entered the Bodine residence illegally, they should be held liable for the harm proximately caused by the illegal entry. Similarly, if the troopers are found to have used unlawful force, they should be held liable for the harm proximately caused by this use of force. The harm proximately caused by these two torts may overlap, but the two claims should not be conflated.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove proximate cause.

Blue v. Bigos · filed 1996-06-07

However, proximate cause is part of a § 1983 plaintiff's burden.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s constitutional violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Earl Hickerson, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Unit Officer John Koepp, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1997-02-10

The plaintiff must establish that the defendant's constitutional violation was the proximate cause of his injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s retaliatory action proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Gierlinger v. Gleason · filed 1998-11-05

Further, in a retaliation ease, as in all § 1983 cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s action was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 requires proximate causation between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed injury.

Hailey v. Kaiser · filed 1999-11-08

We have therefore recognized that proximate cause is one of the requirements of a §1983 claim. ... We therefore find the defendants are not liable for these injuries under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires expert medical evidence to prove causation when a miscarriage’s cause is beyond a lay jury’s common knowledge.

Barnes v. Anderson · filed 1999-12-17

Applying this principle in the context of plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ conduct caused Mrs. Barnes’ miscarriage, we conclude as did the district court that, particularly in the circumstances of the present case, a miscarriage is the sort of complex injury for which expert medical evidence of causation is required.

A plaintiff seeking to establish liability under § 1983 must prove proximate cause.

Tallman v. Barnegat Board of Education · filed 2002-08-21

Proximate cause is an essential element of a claim seeking to establish liability under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.

Loria v. Gorman · filed 2002-09-26

Since Carey, this Court has held that "in all § 1983 cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 872 (2d Cir.1998). Gorman's entry into Loria's home was a proximate cause of the arrest, particularly because it is clear on these facts that Loria did not intend to submit to arrest outside of the house.

Section 1983 damages require proof that the defendant’s actions proximately caused the claimed injuries.

Turner v. White · filed 2005-02-07

Thus, in order to establish his claim for damages under Section 1983, plaintiff must establish that defendants’ actions were a proximate cause of plaintiffs alleged injuries.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a constitutional violation proximately caused the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery.

Betty Cameron, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Cameron v. City of Pontiac, Michigan, Michael McBrid · filed 1987-03-13

Even if Cameron had been seized by unreasonable means, his estate could not recover unless the constitutional violation was a proximate cause of his death.

Section 1983 liability requires proximate causation; a superseding act can relieve a defendant of liability for later injuries.

Bliss v. Franco · filed 2006-04-25

The probation officers’ conduct was not the proximate cause of Mr. Trask’s alleged injuries if another act intervened and superseded the officer’s liability for subsequent events.

Section 1983 requires defendants to proximately cause the deprivation; a judge’s independent decision to devise an order can break that causal chain.

Peace v. Kerlikowske · filed 2007-05-30

On this record, Peace cannot meet the independent requirement that the defendants “proximately caused” any deprivation of Peace’s due process rights. We agree with the defendants that under the unusual circumstances of this case, the fact that the September 28 order “was issued not by appellees, but by a neutral and detached King County District Court [judge] with the power — and obligation— to review the petition and deny relief ... if the standard of the statute was not met” precludes relief under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim's proximate cause is determined under federal law.

Jackson v. Weatherby · filed 1981-05-20

Technically, the existence of proximate cause is a question of federal law in the § 1983 claim, but of Michigan law in the tort claim.

Section 1983 liability for a third party’s misconduct requires more than but-for causation.

DESKOVIC v. City of Peekskill · filed 2009-09-22

Even if the non-Tweed Defendants set in motion events that led to Plaintiffs imprisonment, without which Tweed allegedly could not have assaulted Plaintiff, more than mere “but for” causation is required to impose Section 1983 liability on the non-Tweed Defendants for Tweed’s misconduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendants’ actions proximately caused the claimed injury.

Buonanotte v. New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Services · filed 2010-09-22

In the absence of proximate cause (herein established as a matter of law), no prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be made.

Section 1983 permits recovery for harm directly and proximately caused by a constitutional violation, even if later use of force was not itself unconstitutional.

Rush v. City of Mansfield · filed 2011-02-11

The rule is simple: when a constitutional violation occurs, liability attaches for harm that is the direct and proximate result of that constitutional violation, but only for such harms.

A § 1983 claim requires proximate causation; a judge’s independent legal decision can sever the causal chain between a probation officer’s communication and an alleged due process injury.

Barr v. County of Clarion · filed 2011-03-14

In evaluating causation, “[i]t is axiomatic that „[a] § 1983 action, like its state tort analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation.‟” ... Thus, we hold that Graham‟s ex parte communication with Judge Arner cannot be considered the proximate cause of any due process deprivation Barr may have suffered as a result of Judge Arner‟s order.

Section 1983 damages require proof that the defendant’s actions proximately caused the claimed injury.

Phillips v. City of New York · filed 2012-07-03

Still, a plaintiff cannot recover under Section 1983 unless he has proven that the defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of his injuries.

Section 1983 permits liability for harm proximately caused by an official’s conduct, including a foreseeable continuation of an unlawful detention after custody is transferred to other officers.

Martinez v. Carson · filed 2012-10-17

Section 1983 imposes liability on a government official who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . . to the deprivation of any rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We conclude that a reasonable jury could find Defendants’ conduct to be the proximate cause of at least some portion of Plaintiffs’ prolonged detention following Defendants’ transfer of custody to the Rio Rancho officers.

Section 1983 applies common-law tort principles to determine whether an officer caused a constitutional injury.

Morales v. Chadbourne · filed 2017-01-24

Causation under § 1983 is evaluated according to common-law tort principles. ... Agent Donaghy’s actions were a proximate cause of Ms. Morales’ unconstitutional detention.

Section 1983 permits recovery for injuries proximately caused by a Fourth Amendment violation, subject to qualified immunity.

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez · filed 2017-05-30

For example, if the plaintiffs in this case cannot recover on their excessive force claim, that will not fore- close recovery for injuries proximately caused by the war- rantless entry.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff who merely holds a detainee under a judge’s order and played no instrumental role in the arrest.

Smith v. Sheriff of Cook County · filed 1995-12-29

It is thus clear that plaintiff could only survive defendant’s motion to dismiss if an issue of fact exists as to whether the sheriff of Cook County served not only as plaintiff’s jailer and custodian, but also played an instrumental role in plaintiff’s arrest.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for detaining an arrestee under a judge’s remand order when the judge fails to make a probable cause determination at arraignment.

Bowlin v. Mease · filed 1996-01-25

Furthermore, Mease cannot be liable for any constitutional violation resulting from Judge Kirsch's failure to ... make a probable cause determination at Bowlin's arraignment, because Judge Kirsch's order remanding Bowlin into Mease's custody until Bowlin had posted bond legally obligated Mease to hold Bowlin.