42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 can reach a private person who conspires with a state official acting under color of law to deprive someone of federal rights, even if the official is immune from damages.

Norton v. Liddel · filed 1980-03-06

However, we believe that the better reasoned view is that where a private individual actively conspires with an immune State official (acting under color of law) with the intent to purposely and knowingly deprive an individual of his rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the fact that the State official is immune from suit in damages should not provide a windfall defense to the private conspirator.

Section 1983 does not impose conspiracy liability on a private person merely for requesting a judge’s ruling or acting on the judge’s approval.

Sparkman v. Mcfarlin · filed 1979-05-02

Our holding is necessarily only that a claim under § 1983 is not made out by the allegations of fact in the complaint with respect to a conspiracy between Judge Stump and the other parties. ... A private person does not conspire with a judge merely by invoking an exercise of the judge's judicial authority or merely by taking action which a judge exercising such authority has purported to "approve."

A § 1983 claim against a private defendant based on a conspiracy with police requires facts supporting an inference of that conspiracy.

Burns v. Walker · filed 2002-09-16

The facts from the complaint, taken to be true and read in the light most favorable to Burns, see id., do not support an inference that Walker conspired with police to violate Burns’ constitutional rights, see United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983 requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights to establish a conspiracy between private parties and government actors.

Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, Etc., Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York and City National Bank, Defendants · filed 1983-06-03

To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights must be shown.

A private actor may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state actor, but a conclusory allegation of conspiracy does not state a claim.

Dunbar v. Lorence · filed 1996-08-22

Here, plaintiff alleged only in a conclusory manner that defendant conspired with a state court judge. Plaintiff's allegation is a mere conclusion which need not be accepted as true. See Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against private citizens when they conspire with state or local officials who acted under color of state law.

Gillibeau v. City of Richmond · filed 1969-10-13

Suit may be brought against private citizens under section 1983 if a conspiracy is established between them and the state or local officials who clearly acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches private persons only when they act under color of state law, including by conspiring with state actors to consummate a constitutional deprivation; unlawful arrest and detention without probable cause can support a claim.

Luker v. Nelson · filed 1972-03-29

In his § 1983 suit, the plaintiff will be required to prove as to the defendant police officers that they deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable arrest and detention without probable cause. As to Clark Oil and Refining Company and its agent, the plaintiff must prove that they conspired with the police officers to achieve this alleged constitutional deprivation and succeeded in consummating the object of their conspiracy. Without this proof of conspiracy, Clark Oil and its agents, no matter what other actions they may have taken (such as procuring plaintiff’s false arrest under a void process), cannot be deemed to have acted under color of state law so as to render them liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 covers private persons who act in concert with state officials.

Undergraduate Student Association v. Peltason · filed 1973-01-10

The motion will be denied in light of the cases which have held private persons acting in concert with state officials to be within the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has been invoked here.

Calling conduct a conspiracy does not move the claim out of § 1983; ordinary agency principles can make persons accountable for others’ acts under the statute.

Abraham v. Beatrice Foods Co. · filed 1976-09-17

It warrants emphasis again that the use of the magic word ‘conspiracy’ does not necessarily take it out of § 1983 and throw it into § 1985. On usual principles of agency persons may be held accountable for the acts of others under § 1983. Most times such a combination, concerted action, etc. would constitute ‘conspiracy’, too.

Section 1983 reaches otherwise private acts when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials, because such acts are performed under color of state law.

Goadby, Albert T. v. Philadelphia Electric Company · filed 1981-03-26

Goadby has alleged a conspiracy between PECO and PUC and it is settled that otherwise private acts are performed under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when they are part of a conspiracy with state officials.

A private creditor acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when it jointly participates with state officials in using state procedures to seize disputed property.

Jordan v. Dorsey · filed 1984-05-14

The conclusion that ACC is a state actor for purposes of this § 1983 action is amply supported by the line of garnishment and prejudgment attachment cases in which the Supreme Court entertained and adjudicated debtor claims that private creditors had violated constitutional standards of due process.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party must plead specific facts linking the private party’s conduct to state officials.

McGillicuddy v. John A. Clements, Etc., Ernst & Whinney, Etc. · filed 1984-10-11

We conclude that the allegations do not reach the level of specificity required to state a § 1983 claim against a private party, and so we reverse. ... Because plaintiff makes virtually no factual showing to support his allegation of a conspiracy, it was improper for the district court to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement may be satisfied when a judge’s official act results from a corrupt conspiracy with private parties.

Dykes v. Hosemann · filed 1984-10-11

The “color of state law” component of § 1983 may be satisfied by showing that an official act of a defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge and other private parties. ... We conclude that Diana has at least stated a § 1983 procedural due process claim.

A bare allegation that private defendants conspired with a state judge, without supporting operative facts, is insufficient to establish the state-action nexus for a § 1983 claim.

Phillips v. Mashburn · filed 1984-11-15

The naked assertion of a conspiracy between a state judge and private defendants without supporting operative facts provides an insufficient state action nexus for a section 1983 action.

Private citizens who conspire with public officials to violate a constitutional right may be liable under Section 1983.

James v. Price · filed 1985-02-21

This allegation states a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. The ability to bring a conspiracy claim under § 1983 against private citizens acting in concert with public officials is well-recognized.

A § 1983 complaint against a private entity must plead specific facts showing how it acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials; a bare assertion of concerted action is insufficient.

Carr v. the Times Picayune Publishing Corp. · filed 1985-03-22

Because plaintiff has failed to allege with any specificity how the newspaper, clearly a private entity, acted under color of state law or conspired with state officials to violate her civil rights, the Complaint fails to state a claim under either § 1983 or § 1985.

A private party who does not independently act under color of state law may be liable under § 1983 only by conspiring and acting jointly with a state actor.

Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine · filed 1985-06-18

However, Dr. Crabtree was employed solely by Horsham, a private clinic, that admittedly received no federal funds, so neither he nor any Horsham employees were acting under color of state law. But if a private party acts in conspiracy with a state actor, he can be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who conspire with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Skepton v. County of Bucks, Pa. · filed 1985-07-18

Although defendants correctly point out that some of the named defendants are not state actors, § 1983 imposes liability upon private parties who conspire with state actors to deprive an individual of constitutional rights.

A private person may be liable under § 1983 as a willing participant in joint action with the state, but a complaint must plead facts supporting the alleged conspiracy.

Reginald R. Brinkmann, Jr. v. Rick Johnston, Don T. Cates, Caroline Berthelot, A/K/A Carolyn B. Brinkmann, and Judge Her · filed 1986-06-30

Although private acts may support an action for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the individual is “a willing participant in a joint action with the state or its agents,” Mr. Brinkmann’s complaint in the present case does not state any factual basis to support his conspiracy charges.

A private bail bondsman acts under color of state law under § 1983 when a police officer significantly assists and jointly participates in the challenged home entry and search.

Betty Jackson, and Frank Ray Jackson v. Nicholas Pantazes Officer Allan Goldberg and Montgomery County, Md · filed 1987-01-30

This participation by a state official suffices to render Pantazes a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Since we hold that Pantazes was a state actor who could be sued under § 1983, we turn to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s proof to withstand the motions for summary judgment.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 through joint participation with police officers, but not merely because it employed the participating manager or off-duty officers.

Barton v. Gulf States Entertainment · filed 1987-02-19

Section 1983 reaches private entities only where they conspire with or act in concert with state officials. ... Such respondeat superior liability is not allowed under § 1983. ... Cooper could be found liable under § 1983 for joint participation with the police officers.

A private party who conspires with a state official may act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Allen v. Trounday · filed 1987-02-23

If Trounday conspired with Goebel, then he may be found to have acted under color of law; that finding is necessary to plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983.

A private party acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it jointly acts with officials whose significant participation places the state’s authority behind the private deprivation.

Fraser v. Schultze · filed 1987-06-11

where a private party acts jointly with a state official who abuses his or her authority, that party also acts “under color of state law” within- the meaning of § 1983. ... Taken as a whole, along with all reasonable inferences from the complaint, these facts indicate that the level of involvement by Morgan and Price was significant enough to convert what would otherwise be a private matter into a federal casé.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private persons fails without evidence that they acted in concert with state officers and intended to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Adams v. Thomas E. Campsey Kim L. Thurston William Eatherly City of Brentwood in Williamson County, Tennessee Ja · filed 1987-07-09

Thus, having concluded that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was the object of any concerted actions on the part of the Saxtons and the officers, that there was no evidence to suggest that she was the object of any conspiracy, and that there was no evidence of any intent on the part of the Saxtons to violate plaintiff's rights under the federal constitution, the district court properly dismissed the Saxtons.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires proof of an agreement involving state officials; shared opposition to a plaintiff’s activities is insufficient.

Montgomery v. Hughes · filed 1988-12-29

However, in the absence of proof that defendants Fisher or Hogue agreed to procure that injury or acquiesced in a plan directed toward that end, there can be no finding of a conspiracy for purposes of section 1983 liability. A common aversion to the plaintiff’s investigation is too weak a strand with which to link the defendants in this case.

A § 1983 claim that private defendants conspired with state officials requires specific factual allegations showing an agreement and concerted action.

Arney v. Davies · filed 1991-03-18

Further, to the extent plaintiff seeks to allege a conspiracy by implicating state legislators and officials with private defendants, he must present specific factual allegations which tend to show an agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 does not provide relief against private individuals absent a showing that they conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Olson v. Anderson · filed 1992-05-20

Olson also failed to show the remaining appellees conspired with state officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and thus, Olson is not entitled to relief against these appellees under sections 1983, 1985, or 1986.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a federal agent for conspiring with city police when evidence supports an inference that they acted together to interfere with constitutional rights.

Wahad v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1993-01-29

Finally, Defendant Lott seeks summary judgment on the issue of his alleged conspiring with members of the NYCPD in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). ... This Court, however, does find evidence sufficient to create an inference of such a conspiracy, and will allow Plaintiff to proceed to trial on this issue.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires factual allegations of concerted action with a state actor causing a constitutional deprivation.

Scheiner v. Wallace · filed 1993-09-13

“To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” ... Here, the Plaintiffs do not state how the District Attorney’s office contacted them or “caused” the Plaintiffs’ attorney to return the alleged photos. A fact-driven causal link is never established between Mr. Wade’s alleged phone call and the Plaintiffs’ alleged civil rights harms. ... As a result, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Under § 1983, private parties who conspire with a state official may be liable without direct contact with that official if each knows the shared plan's essential nature and general scope.

Jackson v. Faber · filed 1993-10-04

It is well established, however, that private parties who conspire with state officials may be sued under section 1983. ... It is not necessary that Plaintiff allege that each coconspirator deal directly with the state actor. ... What Plaintiff must allege is “that there was a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [was] known to each person who [he seeks to hold] responsible for its consequences.”

Section 1983 permits claims against private citizens who conspire with public officers to deprive a person of federally protected rights.

Ferran v. Town Of Nassau · filed 1993-12-01

However, there is also alleged a conspiracy between private citizens and public officers. The allegations are therefore technically sufficient, because that type of joint conduct is actionable under Sec. 1983, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604-1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354-55, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1103-1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), so that plaintiffs' alleged Sec. 1985 claim merely duplicates part of their claim under Sec. 1983.

A private attorney acts under color of state law under § 1983 by conspiring with state officials, but a conspiracy requires an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Tysch v. David Michael Homsy Gary Hal Amsterdam Morton Gantman Gantman & Gantman · filed 1993-12-22

An attorney acts under color of state law if he conspires with state officials such as judges. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). To prove conspiracy under Sec. 1983, an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be shown. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989). ... The district court did not err by finding that Tysch could not show a meeting of the minds among the defendant attorneys in connection with the municipal court case, let alone a conspiracy involving a state court judge.

A private defense provider may satisfy § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement by conspiring with state officials, but a conspiracy claim requires specific allegations of collusion.

Respass v. New York City Police Department · filed 1994-05-19

Pursuant to Tower, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the “under color of state law” requirement of § 1983. However, plaintiff has failed to detail instances of collusion sufficient to support the conspiracy claim, and his claim under § 1983 therefore cannot survive Legal Aid’s motion to dismiss.

A sheriff’s classification under state law does not determine whether the sheriff is a state or local official for Section 1983; the classification depends on the function the sheriff performed.

Penland v. Long · filed 1996-02-26

Although the Defendant contends that a sheriff is a state official under North Carolina law, the state law classification is not dispositive for purposes of Section 1983. ... Instead, a sheriff may sometimes be treated as a state official and sometimes as a local official, depending upon the particular function which the sheriff was performing.

Section 1983 subjects a private citizen to liability only if the citizen willfully collaborates with a state official to deprive someone of a federal right.

Pravda v. City of Albany, NY · filed 1997-02-11

It is well settled that a private citizen may be subject to liability under § 1983 only if he “willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the deprivation of a federal right.”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim can satisfy the color-of-state-law requirement when alleged facts permit an inference that a private person and state officers agreed to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights.

Delew v. Wagner · filed 1998-05-11

The district court additionally erred by holding that the Delews’ conspiracy coverup claim failed to state a plaim for relief. In support of their conspiracy claim, the Delews allege that Janet Kathleen Wagner left the accident scene during the investigation and that the LVMPD and NHP officers permitted Wagner to do so. Construing these facts in a light most favorable to the Delews, it is reasonable to infer an understanding between Wagner and the officers to cover-up the true facts of Erin Rae Delew’s death and thereby deprive the Delews of their right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor who conspires with state actors to deprive someone of civil rights, but the complaint must meaningfully allege the private actor’s participation.

Hanania v. Loren-Maltese · filed 1999-05-12

The parties agree, as they must, that private actors can be liable for violations of § 1983 by participating with state actors in a conspiracy to deprive another of her civil rights. But plaintiffs must allege, in a meaningful way, that the Torshen defendants participated in such a conspiracy, and the complaint does not so allege.

A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under section 1983 must plead specific facts supporting the conspiracy and may be allowed to amend the complaint to do so.

Johnson v. McDonald · filed 1999-12-09

Given our holding precluding immunity, the trial court should allow appellants to amend their civil rights complaint to plead the necessary facts to support the claimed conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private individuals requires allegations that they reached an understanding with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights and willingly participated in joint activity with the state.

Evers v. Reak · filed 2001-09-20

To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Evers needed to allege that 1) state officials and private individuals reached an understanding to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and 2) those individuals were willful participants in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who participates in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the conspiracy requires evidence of an agreement.

Williams v. Seniff · filed 2003-08-20

Moreover, Mr. Lauck and Mr. Toth are alleged to have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; but they were not in a position to fire Mr. Williams, so any liability must be based on the theory that their participation in the alleged conspiracy violated § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires an agreement with government officials to violate constitutional rights.

Ducey v. Meyers · filed 2005-08-04

“To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights must be shown.”

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim alleging a conspiracy between private and public actors.

Daryl A. Schultz and Norita J. Schultz v. Diversified Financial Planners Incorporated · filed 1994-04-01

Such a claim of a violation of the fourth amendment, and implicitly of conspiracy between public and private actors, actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, cannot immediately be lumped with the bankruptcy case--at least, not on the face of the complaint, which, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 allows, is skeletal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private individual to allege a conspiracy with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally protected interests.

McGaney v. Scully · filed 1987-07-15

In order to state a claim for relief against a private individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a conspiracy between a private individual and state officials to deprive plaintiff of his constitutionally protected interests.

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors who conspire with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the conspiracy must be supported by evidence beyond speculation.

Gomez v. Garda CL Great Lakes, Inc. · filed 2014-12-29

In order to hold private actors liable under § 1983, Plaintiffs must produce evidence of a conspiracy that rises above mere speculation. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a conspiracy and, as explained above, Counts I, II, and III cannot survive absent a conspiracy.

A city acts under color of state law when it delegates state-created housing-standard and eminent-domain powers to a private redevelopment corporation.

Williams v. City of St. Louis · filed 1986-03-06

Pursuant to state law, the City delegated its authority to set housing standards for residential properties and its power of eminent domain to MMCRC. This delegation under state law of powers possessed by virtue of state law and traditionally exercised by the City satisfies us that the City's action here is under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives a citizen of constitutional or statutory rights, and pervasive state licensing may supply the required state involvement.

Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc. · filed 1969-12-09

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, provides, in part, that any person who, under color of any state statute or regulation, subjects any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured. ... Our inquiry must thus return to a determination of whether defendant may be found under any state of facts which could be proved to be acting under color of state law in its continued practice of refusing service to women, and whether such practice has denied plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws as prescribed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. ... While considerable question exists as to whether defendant’s activities herein may properly be deemed governmental in nature, when a significantly restricted and regulated license is granted by the State to exercise a privilege of serving the public where that privilege would be impermissible without such license, there may well exist sufficient State involvement to make the acts of the licensee those of the State itself. ... Here, I find a great deal more than a scintilla of State action, but such action which may be considered ubiquitous and pervasive. ... Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is in all respects denied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private utility merely because it is state regulated; the challenged conduct must have a sufficiently close nexus to the State to constitute state action.

McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co. · filed 1976-02-05

A private corporate utility company is not brought within the purview of state action merely because it is state regulated. ... We see no close nexus between the state and the discharge of McLellan from his employment with MPL. Absent state action, there is no cause of action under § 1983.

Federal regulation alone does not create state action under § 1983 when the challenged company conduct has only an attenuated connection to state regulation.

Molinar v. Western Electric Company · filed 1976-03-22

the focus here is rather on federal involvement that is irrelevant under § 1983.

A heavily regulated and subsidized political party is subject to Fourteenth Amendment limits when allocating public funds, supporting a § 1983 claim.

McKenna v. Reilly · filed 1976-09-13

In light of the extensive regulation and subsidization of the Democratic party in the case at bar, the court finds that the party is under the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it allocates public funds directly to certain of its candidates. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is denied.

Detailed regulation or public funding alone does not make private hospital conduct state action under § 1983; the regulatory scheme must encourage, aid, or assist the alleged rights violation.

Hobbins v. Methodist Hospital · filed 1976-09-14

The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that in order for the regulating scheme, adopted by the state and implemented by the defendant, to convert the private action into state action that scheme must somehow encourage, aid, or assist the private entity to violate the rights of the plaintiff.

A private hospital’s restriction on a chiropractor’s laboratory access is not a § 1983 violation when the alleged state involvement and classification do not establish a constitutional deprivation.

Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 1976-09-27

The restriction of the use of its clinical laboratory is therefore not a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A private university’s receipt of public funds and regulation does not establish state action under § 1983 without sufficient state interdependence.

Melanson v. Rantoul · filed 1976-10-19

This Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to show that Rhode Island has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with RISD as to make it a joint participant in RISD’s alleged discrimination.

A private nursing home’s receipt of benefits, financial assistance, and extensive regulation does not by itself establish state action for § 1983.

Mills v. Fox · filed 1976-10-21

If anything, there is even less reason to find state action by a nursing home than by a public utility.

A de facto licensing theory can state a valid Section 1983 claim independently of a stigma-plus claim that requires false defamatory statements.

Phillips v. Vandygriff · filed 1983-08-15

This ruling was correct under a “stigma-plus” section 1983 claim. However, as we have discussed at length, Phillips also put forth a valid de facto licensing section 1983 claim.

A private business does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because state law or agencies regulate it.

Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1984-04-23

However, plaintiffs do suggest that USG, as a regulated business, acted under color of state law so as to make 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applicable to this case. To accept this erroneous assertion would impose virtually limitless liability upon nearly every member of this regulated society.

A person is subject to Section 1983 suit only when the alleged federal-rights infringement is fairly attributable to the state; public funding and regulation alone do not make a private health agency’s employment decisions state action.

Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems Agency · filed 1984-06-18

[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights “fairly attributable to the State?” ... The requisite federal or state action is not shown by the record.

Extensive government regulation of a private hospital, plus its receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and its tax-exempt status, do not transform the hospital into a state actor for purposes of the "under color of state law" requirement of Section 1983.

Dr. Eileen T. MENDEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Dr. Robert BELTON, Presbyterian Hospital, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1984-07-18

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Mendez has failed to prove that the hospital acted “under color of state law” in deciding to suspend her staff privileges. Every circuit that has addressed the issue has decided that extensive government regulation and the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and tax-exempt status do not transform an otherwise private hospital into a governmental actor.

A private hospital's compliance with a general state requirement to adopt bylaws does not make actions under those bylaws state action for Section 1983 purposes when the state neither approves the bylaws nor monitors the actions.

Garst v. Stoco, Inc. · filed 1985-01-09

The state does not approve the bylaws adopted by a hospital, nor does the state monitor any actions taken by a hospital pursuant to its bylaws. Actions taken pursuant to such bylaws cannot then be fairly said to be that of the state. Therefore, plaintiff cannot prevail on a section 1983 claim.

State regulation of a bank does not convert its private lending activity into state action for Section 1983 purposes.

Rynearson v. First Nat. Bank of Rochester · filed 1985-02-20

Even though the bank is an entity subject to regulation by the state, such regulation does not convert the bank’s private loan actions to state action.

A private employer’s notice to the state of a personnel decision, without state participation in or control over that decision, does not satisfy § 1983’s state-action requirement.

Edwards v. Lutheran Senior Services of Dover, Inc. · filed 1985-02-21

Mere notification given to the state of a decision made by a private party, without more, is inadequate to show a nexus between the state and the decision.

Extensive public funding, regulation, certification, and referrals do not by themselves make a private nonprofit drug-treatment provider and its employees state actors subject to § 1983.

Graves v. Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc. · filed 1985-04-04

In view of the facts before the Court, plaintiff has not presented sufficient information to establish that the actions of the above-named defendants were under color of law. ... Therefore, Nasco, along with its employees, Maliaka Horne, Judy Miller and John Washington are dismissed from the action because there are insufficient facts to establish that these defendants acted under color of law.

A utility regulator acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when it applies its own acceptability standard to charitable contributions during ratemaking.

Cahill v. Public Service Commission · filed 1985-05-14

State action is present in each instance where the PSC applies its “relevant civic responsibility” test during the rate-making process.

A privately owned telephone company's termination of service for nonpayment is not state action under section 1983, even when the company is regulated and holds a local monopoly.

Kearson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, a Georgia Corp., and American Telephone and Telegraph Comp · filed 1985-06-12

we hold that there is no state action involved when a privately-owned telephone company ... terminates service to a customer for nonpayment of bills. Kearson therefore fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Private hospitals do not act under color of state law in denying staff privileges merely because they receive public funds, enjoy tax and licensing benefits, or have educational ties to a state university, absent a nexus between the state and the challenged decision.

Kaczanowski v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont · filed 1985-06-19

The record at hand fails to achieve the essential link between the MCHV staff privileges decision and the State of Vermont to meet the demands of state action within the sense and purpose of the Civil Rights Act. This aspect of the plaintiffs’ complaints against MCHV and FAH must be dismissed for lack of state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A private corporation's receipt of substantial public funding does not alone make it a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Wright v. No Skiter Incorporated · filed 1985-10-02

That defendant's receipt of substantial amounts of public funding is not adequate to convert its status to that of a public corporation for purposes of this Section 1983 action. ... We agree. Plaintiff has not established his claim under Sec. 1983.

Extensive state regulation and a state-granted charter do not by themselves convert a private law school’s conduct into state action for § 1983.

Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University · filed 1985-12-23

Also, neither the presence of extensive state regulation, nor the existence of a state-granted charter can show the type of pervasive interdependence required to convert private action to state action.

State authority supporting a private involuntary commitment does not make a private treatment facility's specific conduct state action under § 1983 without a nexus between that authority and the challenged conduct.

William "Billy" Jarrell, Jr. v. Chemical Dependency Unit of Acadiana · filed 1986-06-09

Although the state may have forced Jar-rell’s confinement and treatment, he has not alleged, and the record is barren of evidence to show, that the state’s authority was linked to the specific conduct of CDUA’s private employees complained of here. There is no nexus between the state’s authority and the conduct alleged to be unconstitutional.

A private medical-accreditation body acts under color of state law when the state delegates to it an essential part of the state's physician-licensing function.

St. Agnes Hospital of the City of Baltimore, Inc. v. Riddick · filed 1987-08-31

The nexus between the state’s delegation of authority to the defendant, and the claims of the plaintiff, is direct. ... Taking these factors into account, the court finds that “state action” exists in this case.

A state's threat to prosecute a utility unless it terminates a customer's service converts the utility's termination into state action under § 1983.

Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1987-09-14

The county attorney’s threat of prosecution provided the requisite “nexus” between the state and the challenged action.

A state prosecutor's threat can turn a private company's otherwise private conduct into state action for § 1983 purposes.

Carlin Communications, Inc. v. The Mountain States Telephone And Telegraph Company · filed 1987-12-07

With this threat, Arizona “exercised coercive power” over Mountain Bell and thereby converted its otherwise private conduct into state action for purposes of Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim that a defendant acted under color of state law by conspiring with state actors fails when the conspiracy claim is unsupported.

Godwin v. State of Virginia Child Support Enforcement Division · filed 2003-03-13

Further, as to Plaintiffs’ claim on appeal that Defendant Canella should be considered a state actor because he conspired with state actors, their claim is unsupported and thus must fail.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a sheriff based on a plausibly alleged jail practice that causes constitutional harm, but not on respondeat superior alone.

Wilson v. Cook County Jail · filed 2020-09-22

Although Wilson cannot hold Dart liable in his official capacity based on respondeat superior, Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015), Dart may be held liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). ... But even setting aside the 2008 DOJ report, the Court finds that Wilson has sufficiently alleged a Monell claim.

A local government may be liable for a judgment against an official sued in an official capacity, even if the government was not formally a party, when it received adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.

Barrett v. Thomas · filed 1987-03-10

The Supreme Court has recently held, however, that in suits against local officials, local governments may themselves be made liable to the plaintiffs even when they are not formally parties in the suit, as long as the suits are made against the officials in their official capacities, and as long as the public entities received adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. ... The district court's judgment holding the County jointly liable for the back-pay award is therefore affirmed.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state prison officials sued in their official capacities.

Frederick v. Abramajtys · filed 1995-09-21

In their official capacity, defendants are not "persons" subject to suit for money damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, and a complaint that does not specify capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Adams v. Constance M. Upper, Hearing Officer Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director Margarette T. Ghee, Parole Board Ch · filed 1995-09-27

Initially, we note that because Adams failed to allege in his complaint in what capacity he was suing the defendants, they are considered as being sued in their official capacities. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages under Sec. 1983.

In a § 1983 official-capacity suit, backpay and attorney fees sought from an officer are treated as relief against the governmental entity that would pay them.

Mumford v. Zieba · filed 1995-09-28

Mumford is also seeking backpay and attorneys fees against Judge Basinski in his official capacity. Such relief is really aimed at the County because the County is the true entity which will pay for this type of award.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because they assume the identity of the government that employs them.

Hendren v. Seal · filed 1995-10-20

Furthermore, state officials sued in their official capacity are not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they assume the identity of the government that employs them.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities where the state has not consented to suit.

Joyner v. Barbieri, No. 37 46 26 (Nov. 16, 1995) · filed 1995-11-16

The United States Supreme Court has held "that a state or state official while acting in his official capacity is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983." ... Thus, state officials may not be sued in their official capacities unless the state consents to be sued.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief.

Johnson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 1995-12-01

A plaintiff may only maintain a § 1983 suit against official capacity state officials for prospective, injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials for declaratory or injunctive relief, but not for damages.

Pruitt v. Hess · filed 1996-02-08

While a state official sued in his or her official capacity may be a “person” for purposes of suit under § 1983, this is true only if declaratory or injunctive relief is requested. If damages are requested, such request amounts to a suit against the state itself, and such suit cannot be maintained under § 1983.

An officer sued only in an official capacity may be dismissed from a Section 1983 action when the represented public entity is also a defendant.

Callis v. Sellars · filed 1996-02-27

Since Nuchia has been sued only in his official capacity, and the public entity which he allegedly represents (i.e., the City of Houston) has been joined as a defendant, there is no reason why Nuchia should continue to be a defendant in this action.

An official-capacity suit under § 1983 against a municipal officer is treated as a suit against the municipality.

Phelan v. Thompson · filed 1996-03-12

Such suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though brought against named individuals are in reality suits against the municipality.

Section 1983 does not treat police officers sued in their official capacities as persons subject to money damages.

McAdams v. The University of Cincinnati, Department of Public Safety Police Division Rhonda Herbert Timothy Crawfo · filed 1996-03-15

First, the defendant police officers are not "persons" subject to suit for money damages under § 1983 insofar as they are sued in their official capacities.

State employees sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to monetary damages under § 1983; a complaint that does not specify individual capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Pearly L. Wilson v. Janice Lane, Warden Ronald E. Forrest, Deputy Warden · filed 1996-04-17

The defendants were presumptively sued in their official capacity as state employees because the complaint does not indicate that they were being sued as individuals. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-93 (6th Cir.1989). In that capacity, the defendants are not "persons" who are subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Wells, 891 F.2d at 594.

A state official sued in an official capacity is not a person under § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

Hatcher v. Evans · filed 1996-04-18

A state official acting in his official capacity is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and is immune from suit by operation of the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because the state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

McMurry v. Sheahan · filed 1996-05-15

Pucinski cannot be held liable in her official capacity under section 1983 because the state is not a “person” to whom section 1983 was meant to apply and therefore cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Tate-Bey v. Joseph McCarroll Gary M. Gabry and Michigan Parole Board · filed 1996-05-17

To the extent that Tate-Bey sought monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity, this claim fails because they are not subject to suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state official sued in his official capacity.

Lyle v. Koole · filed 1996-06-10

Initially, we note that because Lyle failed to allege in his complaint in what capacity he was suing the defendant, Koole is considered as being sued in his official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, defendant Koole is not subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 excludes damages claims against state officials in their official capacities but permits official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive relief.

Thomas v. Brown · filed 1996-06-13

As to the first element, when sued for damages, officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” who may be liable under Section 1983. ... However, when sued for injunc-tive relief, officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief against state prison officials sued only in their official capacities.

McManaway v. Sapienza · filed 1996-06-18

Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion because McManaway only sued the defendants in their official capacities for which monetary relief is not available.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against municipal officers are redundant when the municipality is also named as a defendant on the same claims.

Gay v. City of Daleville · filed 1996-07-17

Given that the plaintiff has named the City of Daleville as a defendant in this action and has raised § 1983 claims against it, his claims for § 1983 relief as to the individual defendants in their official capacities are redundant.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Hunter v. Supreme Court of New Jersey · filed 1996-08-27

Because the plaintiff asserts claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities, he has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats state defendants whose sued capacity is unspecified as official-capacity defendants, barring monetary damages while permitting injunctive and declaratory relief.

Mullins v. Rex Zent, Warden · filed 1996-10-09

A state and its officials are not considered persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when sued in their official capacities for monetary damages. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). If a plaintiff does not affirmatively plead the capacity in which he is suing state defendants, they will be considered as sued in their official capacities, and thus not be considered subject to suit for monetary damages. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Nonetheless, such state defendants can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10. Therefore, the appeal may proceed as it relates to these claims for relief.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a municipal officer as a claim against the municipality, making it redundant to name both.

Davoll v. Webb · filed 1996-10-10

I conclude the individual Defendants are sued in their official capacity only and naming both them and the municipality in a § 1983 action is redundant.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity, and a complaint that does not specify capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Harris v. Muchnicki · filed 1996-11-14

Moreover, it is well-settled that a state official sued in his official capacity may not be sued for monetary damages under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). If a plaintiff does not affirmatively plead the capacity in which he is suing a state defendant, the defendant will be considered as sued in his official capacity, and thus not subject to suit for monetary damages.

Under § 1983, a suit against state university police officers in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the university’s Board of Trustees, which is immune from suit in federal court.

Williams v. University of Illinois · filed 1996-11-15

A suit against an individual in his official capacity is a suit against the entity of which he is an agent. ... The entity of which the named officers are agents is, of course, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. And, as noted above, the Board of Trustees is immune from suit in federal court.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under Section 1983 for monetary damages.

Mullins v. Cranston · filed 1996-12-05

State officials are not considered persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when sued in their official capacities for monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity; a suit that does not specify capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Archie Sharp, Jr. v. Ray · filed 1996-12-13

Absent a specification of capacity, a state official will be construed to be sued in his official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). A state official is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Therefore, the defendant is not subject to suit for monetary damages.

A § 1983 damages complaint against a state official must clearly say the official is sued in an individual capacity; otherwise the suit is treated as an official capacity suit.

Harvest v. John Randolph, and State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation · filed 1996-12-18

Under the settled law of this Circuit, where a complaint seeking monetary damages against a state official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not clearly state that the official is sued in his individual or personal capacity, the court must treat the lawsuit as one against the defendant in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages as persons, so they are immune from those claims.

Gholson v. Murry · filed 1997-01-07

To the extent that plaintiffs are suing defendants in their official capacities for money damages in this Complaint, defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

An official-capacity § 1983 suit against a public official is treated as a suit against the governmental entity the official represents.

Simpson v. Michael Sheahan, Sheriff of Cook County, Cross-Appellee · filed 1997-01-17

A suit against an individual acting in his official capacity is effectively a suit against "the polity for which he is an official."

State prison officials sued in their official capacities are not subject to monetary damages under § 1983.

Hughes v. Terry Collins Maria Walters J. Goodman · filed 1997-02-20

Because Hughes did not specify the capacity in which the defendants were being sued, we regard them as having been sued in their official capacities. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir.1989). Accordingly, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

A state official sued in her official capacity for prospective relief is a person who may be sued under § 1983.

Bock Associates v. Chronister · filed 1997-02-25

She is being sued in her official capacity for injunctive and declaratory relief. In such capacity, she is a “person” for purposes of § 1983 when she is sued for prospective relief.

In a § 1983 suit against a local government, the entity is the proper defendant; an officer sued only in an official capacity may be dismissed when both are named.

Luke v. Abbott · filed 1997-03-05

If both are named, it is proper upon request for the Court to dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the local government entity as the correct defendant.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are treated as suits against the state.

Davie v. Wingard · filed 1997-03-06

Any § 1983 claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities are barred, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for these claims.

State officials sued for money damages in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 and are immune from suit.

Alley v. Angelone · filed 1997-04-10

To the extent that plaintiffs are suing defendants in their official capacities for money damages in this Complaint, defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief against territorial officials, but does not permit damages against them in their official capacities.

Everett v. Schneider · filed 1997-04-24

Because in this ease, the Plaintiffs sued territorial officials only in their official capacities the claim for injunctive relief may be maintained under section 1983, but damages are not available.

Section 1983 claims against municipal officers in their official capacities are treated as claims against the municipality itself.

Gustafson v. Jones · filed 1997-06-27

The plaintiffs’ suit against the three defendants in their official capacities must be analyzed as a suit against the City of Milwaukee itself, even though the plaintiffs never attempted to sue the City nor did the defendants seek any substitution of parties.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are persons for that purpose.

Murphy v. State of Arkansas · filed 1997-10-15

State officials acting in their official capacities are § 1983 "persons" when sued for prospective relief, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such relief.

A § 1983 official-capacity claim against a municipal officer requires a municipal custom or policy that caused the violation of rights.

Decker v. Campus · filed 1997-11-07

Additionally, we grant summary judgment to defendant on the issue of official liability, because plaintiff has not stated a custom or policy of Dutchess County which resulted in violation of his rights.

Section 1983 allows prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities but does not allow damages against them in that capacity.

Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College District · filed 1997-12-05

A state official is not a person for purposes of § 1983 and may not be sued under § 1983 in his official capacity for damages, although he may be sued for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against a state agency or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Dollar v. Olmstead · filed 1998-05-11

“Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989) holds that § 1983 claims cannot be asserted against a state agency or state officials acting in their official capacity.” ... Summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities without an Eleventh Amendment bar.

Turker v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections · filed 1998-10-05

A plaintiff however, may sue state officials for monetary damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a municipal officer as a claim against the municipality, so duplicate claims against both are redundant.

Kinsey v. City of Opp, Ala. · filed 1999-05-19

When an officer is sued under § 1983 in his official capacity, the suit is simply “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” ... Thus, the court finds that Counts V and VI against Defendant Kyser in his official capacity are due to be dismissed, as Plaintiffs have also brought these claims against the City of Opp.

A § 1983 plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously plead that a public official is sued in an individual capacity; otherwise, the official is treated as sued only in an official capacity.

Palmer v. Bains · filed 1999-07-06

Having reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs did not state a claim against Bains and Hillman in their individual capacities. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that “in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity”) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Harris v. Curry, No. Cv 99 0088929 (Dec. 16, 1999) · filed 1999-12-16

Accordingly, with respect to counts eight and nine, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to sue the defendants for damages in their official capacities under § 1983, the motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 1983 does not allow claims for money damages against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment or the officials are not “persons” under the section.

Cohen v. Nebraska, Department of Administrative Services, Division of Central Data Processing · filed 2000-02-08

I agree that Cohen’s section 1983 claims for money damages against Hattan, Gillespie, and Unverferth acting in their official capacities are barred, “either by the Eleventh Amendment or because in these capacities they are not ‘persons’ for § 1983 purposes.”

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities when the complaint and course of proceedings show that personal liability is sought.

State v. Nieto · filed 2000-02-14

Under our precedent and considering the complaint as a whole and the course of the proceedings, we hold that the plaintiff stated § 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their “personal” and “individual” capacities.

Section 1983 claims against officers sued only in their official capacities are evaluated under municipal liability standards and require proof of a constitutionally deficient municipal policy.

Hawks v. Jones · filed 2000-06-15

Because Defendants Jones, Reese and Schmidt-Robinson are sued here only in their official capacities and, as such, stand in the shoes of the municipality they represent, the Section 1983 claims against them must be evaluated under the foregoing standards of municipal liability. Therefore, to withstand summary judgment on the federal claims, at a minimum, Plaintiff must present proof of the existence of a constitutionally deficient City of Flint official policy. Plaintiff has not met this burden.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officers for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

O'Hara v. Illinois Department of Mental Health · filed 2000-06-27

Mr. O’Hara can sue the individual officers in their official capacities, at least for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief, but he fails to make his case for a violation.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state corrections employee when the claim is effectively against the state.

Jordan v. Doe · filed 2001-02-15

Mr. Jordan consequently has no § 1983 claim against Mr. Wyle in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief, but sovereign immunity bars claims seeking other relief.

Patricia N. v. Lemahieu · filed 2001-05-29

The court agrees that because Plaintiffs do not appear to request prospective injunctive relief, the § 1983 claims against the individually named state Defendants in their official capacities must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, but allows claims for injunctive relief against them.

Nanda v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2001-08-21

The Supreme Court has held that a lawsuit under § 1983 against state officials constitutes a suit against the State itself, and that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 for purposes of damage awards. ... Defendants are correct that, under this authority, Plaintiffs claim for damages against the individual Defendants must be dismissed. ... Defendants’ motion to dismiss individual damages claims in Count II is granted. Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief in this count will stand.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Hotaling v. LaPlante · filed 2001-08-21

It is well-settled that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983, and thus cannot be liable for deprivations of constitutional rights under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state prison officials in their official capacities because those claims are suits against the state.

Sanville, Martha v. McCaughtry, Gary · filed 2001-09-21

We conclude, therefore, that the official capacity claims seeking money damages from the defendants should have been dismissed on the basis that they may not be sustained under sec. 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against municipal officers are claims against the municipality and are duplicative when the municipality is also named as a defendant.

BGHA, LLC v. City of Universal City, Texas · filed 2002-01-24

Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against defendants Bryant and Becken in their official capacities are actually asserted against the City, which is already a named-defendant in this lawsuit. Consequently, such claims are duplicative and are hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued for damages in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Mejia v. Blanchette · filed 2002-06-11

Although a civil rights action may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a “person” acting under color of state law, state officials sued in their official capacities have Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and hence are not considered “person[s]” within the meaning of § 1983, see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990); Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

Section 1983 claims against county officials in their official capacities require an allegation that a county policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Scott v. Curry · filed 2002-08-12

Scott’s claims against Carpenter and Curry in their official capacity fail because he has not alleged that an official policy or custom of Tarrant County resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against state officials in their individual capacities for actions taken while performing official duties; those claims remain subject to limitations and collateral estoppel.

Simmons v. Gath Baptist Church · filed 2003-01-23

The only theory we can think of that would allow a claimant to sue a state official in his individual capacity for actions undertaken by the official while performing what appears to be his official duty is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But as we indicated above, any action based upon such a theory in this case is barred by collateral estoppel and by the statute of limitations.

District attorneys acting as state officers when deciding whether to prosecute are not persons subject to § 1983 liability in official-capacity damages suits.

Taylor v. Garcetti · filed 2003-02-12

Moreover, as state actors the defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore cannot be held liable under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity suit against state officials seeking only retrospective payment for past conduct, rather than relief for a continuing violation of federal law.

Hebrew Hospital Home, Inc. v. Novello · filed 2003-03-18

The complaint failed to state a cause of action because the named defendants, who are State officials sued in their official capacity for their official conduct in recouping the funds at issue, are not subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983, the relief sought by the plaintiff, i.e., payment of money alleged to have been wrongfully recouped based on the past conduct of defendants, being exclusively retrospective and not directed at remedying any continuing violation of federal law (see Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 [1989]; Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 167 n 14 [1985]).

Section 1983 treats state officers sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief as persons who are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Thompson v. Eason · filed 2003-03-28

State officers sued for prospective injunctive relief in their official capacities, however, have been determined to be “persons” for purposes of a § 1983 suit and they are not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their official capacities cannot proceed when the officials represent the State, because they are not persons under the statute.

Gean v. Hattaway · filed 2003-06-06

Even if Tennessee’s sovereign immunity has been properly waived or abrogated for the purposes of the federal statute the defendants allegedly violated, a § 1983 claim against the defendants in their official capacities cannot proceed because, by definition, those officials are not persons under the terms of § 1983.

A Section 1983 suit against a state official in an official capacity is a suit against the State.

Maximiliano Herrera, Richard Woodcroft, Loretta Tamm, Nina Vaughan and Sandra Moreno v. Spencer · filed 2003-10-16

A suit against an official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official, but is rather a suit against the State.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 against city officials is a claim against the city and requires an alleged city policy or custom.

Hayward v. Health Department & Department of Law · filed 2004-04-08

Hayward’s official-capacity claims against the City defendants thus amounted to claims against only the City, but Hayward did not assert that the City had... a policy or custom of improperly seeking, issuing, and executing administrative search warrants.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against a state official in an individual capacity for acts personally committed under color of state law.

Shockley v. Mary Spinner Jones and Terry McLain · filed 1987-06-26

But a suit for damages against a state official in his or her individual capacity — meaning that the plaintiff seeks to establish personal liability against the defendant for acts he or she personally committed under color of state law — is not a suit against the state, and thus the Eleventh Amendment is not an obstacle to recovery.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officials for acts taken under color of state law, even when those acts are official in nature.

Hafer v. Melo · filed 1991-11-05

We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.

Section 1983 claims against county officials sued only in their official capacities are subject to the requirements for municipal liability under Monell.

Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Richard W. Westlake, Individually and as Sheriff of Shelby County · filed 1986-08-20

Because the plaintiffs sued the defendants solely in their official capacities as agents of the county, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the requirements of Monell.

A § 1983 claim against a municipal officer in his official capacity requires a municipal policy or custom of unconstitutional conduct.

McInnis v. Town of Weston · filed 2005-06-28

Mclnnis has not alleged in his complaint, argued in his opposition brief, or adduced any evidence that the Town of Weston itself had a policy of age discrimination. Therefore his Section 1983 claim against Land in his official capacity must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state officials in their official capacities.

Kelley v. DiPaola · filed 2005-07-13

Thus, the employee defendants are “state officials” and are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim for relief that would require a state to relinquish its interest in property; that relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The John G. And Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Garry Mauro, Commissioner of the General Land Office · filed 1994-06-29

Despite its contention that its § 1983 suit is only for declaratory and prospective in-junctive relief against Mauro in his' official capacity, the relief sought by the Foundation — no matter how its request for relief is phrased — would operate against the State. Hence, the State of Texas, not Mauro, is the real, substantial party in interest. We therefore conclude that the Foundation’s § 1983 claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the district court did not err in determining that the court did not have the power to entertain the claim.

Section 1983 treats a suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity as a suit against the municipality, subject to Monell’s municipal-liability requirements.

Kraemer v. Luttrell · filed 2006-04-27

Suing a municipal officer in his official capacity for a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the same as suing the municipality itself, and thus a successful suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity must meet the requirements for municipal liability stated in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities, but not monetary relief.

Neiberger v. Hawkins · filed 1999-11-12

Therefore, I grant, as confessed, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the DHS, the CMHI-P, and the official capacity Defendants to the extent that monetary relief is requested. Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Toerber are appropriate Defendants in their official capacity under § 1983 for prospective, injunctive relief only.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Lowe v. Sockey · filed 2002-04-02

First , we agree with the district court that, to the extent Mr. Lowe seeks damages from Messrs. Sockey, Amos, and Ward in the official capacities of the respective defendants, the Eleventh Amendment indeed bars such a suit.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity suits against state officials despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Medina-Claudio v. Pereira · filed 2006-07-19

However, as the “Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability’ on state officials under § 1983,” ... the action remains as to all defendants in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

ZBORALSKI v. Monahan · filed 2006-08-14

Second, the definition of § 1983 bars suits against state officials, when sued in their official capacity because the state (and therefore, an official sued as the state) is not a “person” under the definition of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons amenable to such suits under the statute.

Almond v. Tarver · filed 2006-08-15

Therefore, a § 1983 suit seeking damages brought against a state official in his official capacity is foreclosed.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officials, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar those suits.

Hanani v. NJ Dept Env Prot · filed 2006-11-09

State officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under Section 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Scott v. Ozmint · filed 2006-12-14

Defendant Director Ozmint also argues, correctly, that the action against him should be dismissed as a matter of law to the extent he is being sued in his official capacity, because while acting in their official capacity he is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, they are not subject to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state officer in her official capacity when the plaintiff seeks only retrospective relief.

Giaquinto v. Commissioner of New York State Department of Health · filed 2007-04-05

Because petitioner sought only retrospective relief against a state officer acting in her official capacity, he failed to prevail against respondent on a claim under 42 USC § 1983, and is therefore not entitled to an award of counsel fees against respondent under 42 USC § 1988 (compare Hebrew Hosp. Home v Novello, 303 AD2d 255, 255 [2003] [affirming dismissal of 42 USC § 1983 claim because payment of money allegedly wrongfully recouped constituted retrospective relief]; Matter of Gaines v New York State Div. for Youth, supra at 897 [request for back pay sought retrospective relief]).