42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege a violation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Del Campo v. Community of Hope · filed 2020-07-07

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it does not allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States or that Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 liability for inadequate prison medical care is not avoided by contracting that care to a private provider.

Toombs v. Bell · filed 1990-09-24

Toombs contends that the district court based its ruling in favor of these defendants on the ground that the defendants had absolved themselves from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by contracting the provision of inmate health care to a private organization. We agree with Toombs that such a holding would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (footnote omitted), in which the Court said: ... Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury.

Cummings v. Roberts · filed 1980-08-01

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury.

Hutchings v. Corum · filed 1980-06-27

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to recover for cruel and unusual punishment when prison authorities act with deliberate or callous indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs.

Fielder v. Bosshard · filed 1979-02-21

In order to establish a prima facie § 1983 case of cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must prove that the prison authorities acted with deliberate or callous indifference to his serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits a claim when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' medical needs, and related incidents may establish a pattern sufficient to proceed to trial.

Jere Bishop v. Kent R. Stoneman, Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Vermont, and Julius v. Moeykens, Warden, Ve · filed 1974-12-04

Taking the factual allegations as true, we think that they state a claim for relief under Section 1983. ... A series of incidents closely related in time, within several months as these are, may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. We hold the cumu-lation of incidents alleged in the complaint entitled plaintiffs to a trial of the underlying allegation of deliberate indifference to their medical needs.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner alleging improper medical treatment by prison authorities to plead an abuse of discretion in providing that treatment.

Freddie Bernard Lawrence, Jr. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida · filed 1971-04-07

In similar suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we have held that in order to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the complaint must allege an abuse of discretion by prison authorities in providing medical treatment for prisoners.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for mere negligence in providing or failing to provide medical care to a state prisoner; the alleged conduct must reach a constitutionally actionable level.

Church v. Hegstrom · filed 1969-10-09

Mere negligence in giving or failing to supply medical treatment alone will not suffice, since all rights existing under state law are not also federal rights carrying a federal remedy. ... But the alleged non-action of a prison doctor who was not claimed to have any role in supervising prisoners outside the jail infirmary and whose attention presumably was never called to Church’s illness, for example, while it might conceivably be negligence, could in no way rise to the level of a § 1983 violation of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue prison officials for inadequate medical care when the alleged conduct rises to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and thus cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; mere negligence or poor medical judgment is insufficient.

Martinez v. Vincent R. Mancusi, Warden, Attica Prison, Dr. Williams, Dr. Stamburg, and Nurse Hoffman, Attica Prison · filed 1970-10-08

An action against prison officials for inadequate medical care may be brought under the Civil Rights Act in the federal district courts when the prisoner’s allegations rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ... Martinez’s allegations in this case meet the criteria of Hegstrum and Hyde for an Eighth Amendment violation and thus a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. ... Clearly, then, the defendants’ conduct, as alleged by Martinez, was more than mere negligence or poor medical judgment; it is charged to have been deliberate indifference to, and defiance of, explicit medical instructions, resulting in serious and obvious injuries. Although we express no opinion on whether appellant should ultimately prevail in his suit, we hold that the facts as alleged are sufficient to constitute a violation of his constitutional rights and thus to state a eause of action under the Civil Rights Act; hence they are sufficient to warrant a hearing on the question.

Section 1983 makes the intentional deprivation of essential medical care actionable, but a disagreement between a physician and patient about the adequacy of treatment actually provided does not by itself create a constitutional claim.

Davis v. Schmidt · filed 1972-11-16

It is well-settled that intentional deprivation of essential medical care is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 985, 85 S.Ct. 1355, 14 L.Ed.2d 277 (1965); Schack v. State of Florida, 391 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 392 U.S. 916, 88 S.Ct. 2080, 20 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1968); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2nd Cir. 1970). However, a difference in opinion between physician and patient concerning the adequacy of medical treatment actually provided does not give rise to a constitutional claim under § 1983. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F. 2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968); Henderson v. Pate, 409 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1969); Fear v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 278, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1969); Roy v. Wainwright, 418 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969).

A prisoner's denial-of-medical-care claim under § 1983 requires alleged intent to harm or an injury or illness so severe or obvious as to require medical attention; mere negligence is insufficient absent conscience-shocking conduct.

Page v. Sharpe · filed 1973-10-29

We are impressed with the rule stated in Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (C.A.2 1969), i. e. that a denial of medical care to a prisoner is actionable under § 1983 only if the complaint alleges: (1) either an intent to harm the inmate, or (2) an injury or illness so severe or obvious as to require medical attention. Mere negligence, in the absence of conduct which shocks the conscience, in giving- or failing to supply medical treatment to prisoners will not suffice.

Section 1983 provides an actionable claim when prison officials are alleged to have totally deprived an inmate of needed medical care; a mere disagreement over the adequacy of treatment does not state a constitutional claim.

Pinon v. State of Wisconsin · filed 1973-11-19

While courts generally refuse to second-guess the professional judgment of physicians who actually treat inmates, it is clear that allegations of what amounts to the total deprivation of needed medical care state an actionable claim under § 1983; such allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and require an answer on the merits.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for medical mistreatment only when the challenged treatment amounts to a constitutional deprivation, characterized here as conduct that shocks the conscience.

Blakey v. Sheriff of Albemarle County · filed 1974-01-04

In order to establish a constitutional deprivation cognizable pursuant to § 1983 the treatment complained of must suggest “conduct that shocks the conscience.” ... The circumstances of this controversy indicate that plaintiff has failed to present a constitutional deprivation, and therefore, it is appropriate to order that his complaint be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a potential remedy for state prisoners deprived of essential medical care, depending on the facts and circumstances.

Ross v. Bounds · filed 1974-03-26

Viewing the authority above and taking the plaintiffs’ contention as true, this Court feels they have recourse under § 1983 only if they were deprived of essential medical care by the State, depending on all the facts and circumstances.

Section 1983 requires egregious acts or omissions for a state prisoner to state a claim based on inadequate medical care.

Williams v. Manson · filed 1974-04-29

Assuming his allegations to be true, petitioner has nevertheless failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This is especially so in view of the egregious acts or omissions required to state a claim for relief from inadequate medical care of a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Here where petitioner was ultimately transported to a medical facility without further harm, no abridgement of petitioner’s civil rights occurred.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to state a claim based on major surgery performed without consent when it was not required by a compelling prison interest, or on prolonged denial of necessary analgesics.

Roosevelt Runnels v. David Rosendale, M.D., and Roland P. Young, M.D. · filed 1974-06-21

Allegations that prison medical personnel performed major surgical procedures upon the body of an inmate, without his consent and over his known objections, that were not required to preserve his life or further a compelling interest of imprisonment or prison security, may foreshadow proof of conduct violative of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to justify judgment under the Civil Rights Act. ... Similarly, the allegations that plaintiff-appellant was left in severe pain for an extended period of time without necessary and available analgesic relief were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a state official to allege a clear violation of constitutional or other federally protected rights; inadequate prisoner medical care must involve obvious neglect or intentional misconduct sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment or endanger life.

Freeman v. A. L. Lockhart, Supt., Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1974-10-09

Any suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official must be based upon a claim arising out of a clear violation of the complainant’s constitutional or other federally protected rights. ... Here, the claimed inadequacy of treatment must be predicated on obvious neglect or intentional misconduct by the prison officials, ... and must be so heinous as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment as that term is used in the Eighth Amendment or so endanger the prisoner’s physical well-being that his Fourteenth Amendment right to life is violated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages based solely on negligence; liability requires a knowing failure or refusal to provide urgently needed medical care that causes preventable residual injury, subject to prison officials' discretion in authorized medical procedures.

Scharfenberger v. Holmes · filed 1974-11-13

The common denominator of the authorities and their applicability to the instant ease is clear. There must have been a knowing failure or refusal to provide urgently needed medical care, the consummate effect of which caused a residual injury which could have been prevented with timely attention. To this criteria must be added the wide discretion allowed prison officials in their treatment of prisoners under authorized medical procedures, and the absolute bar to basing any Section 1983 ease on negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for mere negligence in providing medical care to a prisoner.

Goode v. Hartman · filed 1975-02-03

Accordingly, the Court holds that the allegations of the complaint setting forth conclusory allegations of mere negligence on the part of defendant in making medical care available to plaintiff’s decedent are insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983— the sole federal statute involved here.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a prisoner's claim that state officials provided constitutionally inadequate medical care.

J. W. Gamble v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1975-08-04

We can only conclude that Gamble has stated an actionable claim under Section 1983 for inadequate medical care.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a prisoner's mere difference of opinion with physicians about necessary and proper medical treatment.

Ray v. Parrish · filed 1975-08-05

Based upon the prison medical records, which plaintiff has not contested, the Court finds that this apparent difference of opinion between the plaintiff and the physicians as to what treatment is necessary and proper does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits consideration of constitutional claims about inadequate prison medical care even when a prisoner also seeks release, but the alleged care must amount to a constitutional deprivation to support relief.

Henderson v. The Secretary of Corrections · filed 1975-08-25

Determining that immediate or speedy release is not within the scope of a civil rights action does not preclude or eliminate jurisdiction to consider constitutional issues raised by allegations of inadequate medical care. ... We cannot say that the inadequacy of appellant’s normal shoes or the omission to provide the corrective shoes gives rise to a constitutional deprivation sustaining a § 1983 claim nor that appellant could elaborate this set of facts to support a claim which would entitle him to relief.

Section 1983 does not make disputes over proper medical treatment actionable; only exceptional circumstances support a claim for inadequate medical care.

Patterson v. Riddle · filed 1976-01-23

Disputes between physicians and prisoners as to the proper treatment are not actionable of § 1983. ... It is only exceptional circumstances that give rise to a § 1983 claim for failure to provide adequate medical care.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue when officials deny reasonable medical requests despite an obvious need, exposing the prisoner to undue suffering or a threat of tangible residual injury.

Westlake v. William Lucas, Sheriff of Wayne County · filed 1976-07-29

That does not mean that every malpractice claim involving a prisoner may be automatically transformed into a cause of action under the civil rights statutes, but it does mean that prison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to the suffering of prisoners under their care. ... We believe that a prisoner states a proper cause of action when he alleges that prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury. ... We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a prisoner who is needlessly allowed to suffer pain when relief is readily available does have a cause of action against those whose deliberate indifference is the cause of his suffering.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when prison officials' deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.

Estelle v. Gamble · filed 1976-11-30

Regardess of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs.

Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison · filed 1976-12-30

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

A mere difference of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff over diagnosis or treatment, without deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, does not alone state a claim under § 1983.

Smart v. Romeo Villar, Chief Medical Officer, Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas · filed 1976-12-30

We have consistently held that the existence of such a difference cannot alone give rise to a cause of action, and if the complaint indicates that such is the case, it must be dismissed.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs violates § 1983.

Monroe v. Bombard · filed 1976-10-22

It is now well settled in this circuit that deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a prisoner violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s request for necessary medical treatment, not mere negligence or disagreement over medical judgment, for a medical claim.

Phillips v. Keve · filed 1976-11-24

It is well settled that a medical claim under § 1983 arises only when defendants’ conduct “shocks the conscience” by, for example, a deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s request for necessary medical treatment. ... Furthermore, no § 1983 claim arises from the mere allegation of negligence in the treatment of a prisoner’s condition or when the claim is based on differences over matters of medical judgment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue when prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment despite an obvious need, exposing the prisoner to undue suffering or a risk of tangible residual injury.

Campbell v. Buckles · filed 1977-06-01

“* * * [A] prisoner states a proper cause of action [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] when he alleges that prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury. * * *”

Section 1983 does not support a claim based only on a prisoner’s disagreement with doctors about diagnosis or the availability of treatment and medication.

Coleman v. Crisp · filed 1977-09-26

They evidence rather a difference of opinion between plaintiff and the doctors concerning diagnosis and the availability of treatment and medication. It is well established that this does not establish the violation of a constitutional right or sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoner medical-care claims based on Eighth Amendment or due-process violations, and an Eighth Amendment claim requires deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Brown v. McGowan · filed 1978-03-10

A § 1983 complaint concerning improper medical care can be presented on two constitutional grounds: (1) cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and (2) denial of due process of law. ... In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner's claim to proceed when prison officials' deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment, even when the complaint refers only to a state-law medical-examination duty.

United States v. Fayette County, Pennsylvania · filed 1979-06-15

The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because appellant had alleged only a failure to comply with a state statute and not a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law. ... We conclude that because Pennsylvania law provides that all prisoners shall receive a medical examination within 48 hours after admission to the institution, such inaction as is alleged on the part of defendants, under the specific circumstances of this case, would constitute a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," proscribed by the eighth amendment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on a difference of opinion between prison medical personnel and a prisoner regarding treatment.

Jackson v. Moore · filed 1979-06-18

Similarly, a difference of opinion between prison medical personnel and a prisoner regarding treatment cannot serve as a basis for a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not compensate pain caused by a brief lapse in prescribed diet or medication unless the pain was deliberately inflicted in wanton disregard of the prisoner’s rights.

Russell v. Enser · filed 1979-07-06

If it must be conceded that plaintiff experienced some pain that can be attributed to the lapse in his diet and medication, such pain is not compensable under § 1983 unless he can show it was deliberately inflicted in a wanton disregard for his rights.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to recover for denial of medical care when a defendant acting under color of law unreasonably refuses that care.

Holly v. Rapone · filed 1979-08-31

It is well established that a pretrial detainee is entitled to medical attention and a defendant acting under “color of law” who unreasonably refuses to provide medical care is liable under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner claiming medical mistreatment to allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference of serious medical needs.

Smith v. Thomas · filed 1979-09-07

In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference of serious medical needs.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner alleging inadequate medical care to show a constitutional tort caused by official municipal policy and acts demonstrating deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Martin v. New York City Department of Correction · filed 1981-08-14

To come within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner must show that he suffered a constitutional tort as a result of action taken pursuant to official municipal policy. He must also allege acts which evidence a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

A prisoner states a cognizable § 1983 medical-care claim only by alleging acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Lowrence v. Scully · filed 1983-06-13

[i]n order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

An Eighth Amendment medical-care claim under Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference by the defendant.

Miller v. Schacht · filed 1983-08-02

Where medical claims are presented under the Eighth Amendment, there must be a showing of “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendant to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A jailer’s knowing delay of dental care for an inmate suffering severe pain may establish an Eighth Amendment deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Fields v. Gander · filed 1984-05-23

In our view, Fields' allegations could support a finding of an eighth amendment deprivation in violation of section 1983.

A prisoner's deliberate self-injury does not bar a Section 1983 claim for officials' failure to provide adequate medical care.

Ralph Partridge and Betty Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas · filed 1985-02-04

We hold, however, that this distinction is not a bar to a section 1983 cause of action.

Police violate a detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983 by deliberately denying medical assistance they know is needed, but negligence or poor judgment is insufficient.

Brown v. Komidar · filed 1985-05-07

To show deliberate indifference, defendants must deny decedent medical assistance when they know such assistance is needed. Arguably, defendants' conduct in failing to notice the bullet wound in decedent's abdomen was negligent. But since this shows carelessness at worst, there is no element of deliberateness present.

State prison medical personnel are liable under Section 1983 only when their conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs.

Johnson v. Jones · filed 1986-03-19

The trial court was correct in finding that “[m]edical personnel employed in state prisons can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when their actions may be characterized as deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs.”

Negligent medical treatment without deliberate or willful deprivation of serious medical care is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Reeves v. Gary Livesay, Linda Dodson, Virginia Lewis, Willie Grace Angle and Dottie Wyatt · filed 1986-04-09

Even applying these liberal standards, however, plaintiff's claims against defendants are not cognizable under Section 1983. Although defendants' action in dispensing the same allergen to plaintiff twice may be viewed as negligent, there is no evidence of record to show that defendants acted deliberately or willfully to deprive the plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

A private physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under color of state law and may be liable under Section 1983.

Ort v. Dr. Pinchback Correctional Medical Systems Board of Corrections · filed 1986-04-15

Turning to the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Dr. Pinchback, we hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that a physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates does not act under color of state law.

A prisoner states a Section 1983 medical-care claim by showing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs that rises to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Jorden v. Harold Farrier, Paul Loeffelholz and Cripus Nix · filed 1986-04-17

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of medical care, Jorden must establish that defendants’ conduct amounted to “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” ... In order to find an eighth amendment violation, the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need must rise to the level of an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Negligent diagnosis or treatment, without more, does not sustain a section 1983 claim for inadequate prison medical care.

Esnouf v. Matty · filed 1986-05-08

Since the allegations against the defendants sound in negligence only, they fail to meet the standards necessary to sustain a § 1983 action.

A prisoner asserting inadequate medical care under section 1983 must allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; negligence is insufficient.

Jones v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director R. Vanderkolk Pamela Withrow Sam Spade John Wireman Don Wood Mr. Dixon and T · filed 1986-05-09

A prisoner in a section 1983 action claiming that medical treatment violated his civil rights must allege acts or omissions amounting to a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ... An allegation of mere negligence in diagnosis or treatment is not actionable under section 1983.

A detainee need not face a danger of death before a jail official's failure to provide medical treatment may support § 1983 liability for deliberate indifference to a serious illness or injury.

Richards v. Dunbar · filed 1986-06-03

A jail inmate need not be in danger of dying before jail officials must provide or obtain medical treatment for a prisoner.

Prison medical mistreatment is actionable under § 1983 only if it rises to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Smith v. Landon · filed 1986-08-01

Likewise, Smith's claims of --medical mistreatment do not rise to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1977) ,necessary to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner's dissatisfaction that officials did not treat every medical problem is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim when the record shows the prisoner received medical attention.

Hughes v. Paul Smith, Sheriff of Rhea County, Tennessee and Rhea County Sheriff's Department · filed 1986-08-12

The appellant's third contention of lack of adequate medical care fails because the affidavit of Charles O. Swafford, jail administrator and records custodian for the Rhea County Jail, evidences that the appellant did receive medical attention. The failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction is insufficient to support a claim under Sec. 1983.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; mere disagreement over treatment is insufficient.

Crowder v. Correctional Medical Systems · filed 1986-10-31

In order to sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate medical care, a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. ... The allegation of a mere disagreement with prison physicians as to what is necessary and proper treatment fails to state a claim for relief.

A prisoner's § 1983 inadequate-medical-care claim must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Chapman v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, and Odie Jones · filed 1987-05-04

The plaintiff's claims of inadequate medical care do not show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

A § 1983 medical-care claim fails without deliberate indifference; disagreement with trained medical personnel about hospital selection is insufficient.

Sowells v. Robeson County Sheriff Department Hubert Stone · filed 1987-06-04

It is clear that there was no deliberate indifference to Sowells's serious medical needs. ... Sowells's disagreement with medical personnel about where he was taken is of no consequence.

Repeated medical examination and treatment defeat a § 1983 prisoner-care claim when the complaint cannot show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Carpenter v. P v. Tanedo, M.D. · filed 1987-06-17

It is clear from the plaintiff's complaint that he was examined and treated by the defendant, the prison physician, on several occasions. In addition, the prison inspector arranged to have him examined by a different physician. It will be impossible for the plaintiff to show that he was the victim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need as required by Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Negligence does not state a § 1983 claim, and conclusory allegations of inadequate medical care do not establish deliberate indifference.

Dillon v. George W. Wilson, Secretary of the Bureau of Corrections of the State of Kentucky · filed 1987-06-29

The Supreme Court has established that the mere negligent conduct of prison officials is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Furthermore, the mere conclusory allegation of failure to provide medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs' standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), which interpreted the eighth amendment.

A § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs survives summary judgment when circumstantial evidence permits a jury to find that responding officers failed to attend properly to an injured person.

Tagstrom v. Pottebaum · filed 1987-07-08

However, the Court believes that a jury question exists on the issue of whether Defendant Enockson and the other officers at the scene were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.

Prison officials act with more than mere negligence when they deliberately defy a prisoner's doctors' express instructions.

Gill v. Mooney · filed 1987-07-16

Prison officials are more than merely negligent if they deliberately defy the express instructions of a prisoner's doctors.

A prisoner's § 1983 claim based on medical care fails when the allegations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Stanley v. Kurt Fox, Dr. Jim Saladrigas, Nurse · filed 1987-08-06

Because the dispositive issues recently have been decided authoritatively, we dispense with oral argument and affirm the judgment below on the basis that plaintiff's claims do not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

A pretrial detainee seeking § 1983 damages for inadequate medical care must establish deliberate indifference to a serious illness or injury, with expert evidence when seriousness is not apparent to a layperson.

Boring v. Kozakiewicz · filed 1987-11-16

As laymen, the jury would not be in a position to decide whether any of the conditions described by plaintiffs could be classified as "serious." In these circumstances, the district court properly required expert medical opinion, West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir.1978), Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d at 1081, and in its absence properly withdrew the issue from the jury.

Section 1983 does not support a prisoner’s improper-medical-treatment claim based on mere negligence; the conduct must shock the conscience or constitute a barbarous act.

McCloud v. Delaney · filed 1988-01-25

Mere negligence will not support a claim under § 1983; there must be some conduct that “shocks the conscience” or a “barbarous act.”

A prisoner alleging inadequate medical care under Section 1983 must state facts showing deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Ross v. Dr. Schipper, Dermatologist · filed 1988-02-25

Ross alleges that he received inept treatment for his acne condition between November, 1985 and August 15, 1986, and that the failure to cure or improve his condition constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, he does not state facts which demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need on the part of the doctor, as is necessary to succeed on such a claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s medical care claim to survive summary judgment when a prolonged delay in needed surgery raises a factual dispute about deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Hathaway v. Coughlin · filed 1988-03-09

His complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleges that the appellees unconstitutionally deprived him of necessary medical care by denying him treatment for a hip condition for over a year beginning on July 10, 1981. ... We believe this is a sufficient allegation to survive a motion for summary judgment under Archer because it raises a factual dispute as to whether the appellees showed deliberate indifference to Hathaway's serious medical needs in the period after July 10, 1981.

A prisoner claiming denial of medical treatment under § 1983 must present evidence of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Hardy v. Hamilton · filed 1988-04-12

George T. Hardy, a Virginia prisoner, filed this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need and denied him treatment for a broken arm. ... To the contrary, the materials before the Court suggest that the district court correctly found the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite deliberate indifference.

A prisoner states a Section 1983 claim against prison medical personnel for denied care only if the denial involves deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Washington v. Lisa Miller, the P.A. · filed 1988-04-26

However, prison medical personnel only violate the Eighth Amendment if they show deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Washington admits that his medical needs were not serious, he has failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims for inadequate medical care of pretrial detainees use the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference standard.

Thomas v. Town of Davie · filed 1988-06-21

Although the Supreme Court in City of Revere did not define a city’s due process obligations to a pretrial detainee, we have applied the Estelle v. Gamble “deliberate indifference” standard to claims of improper medical care by plaintiffs like Thomas.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue a claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need; alleged refusal of previously scheduled surgery warranted further development before dismissal as frivolous.

Dace v. Solem · filed 1988-07-19

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner who alleges acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Dace alleges not only that his nasal condition causes pain, but that he was scheduled for surgery to treat the condition before being imprisoned and that penitentiary officials, despite being aware of his condition, have refused to provide him with necessary medical treatment. Because Dace's complaint was dismissed before discovery was had, there is no way to assess the seriousness of Dace's condition or the necessity of treatment. ... We therefore conclude that Dace should be given a "chance to develop his case to the point at which the courts can determine whether it has merit."

Section 1983 can cover a civil rights claim arising in a medical setting rather than a claim for medical malpractice alone.

Jones v. Mental Health Services of Orange County · filed 1989-06-15

Because we are of the opinion that the cause of action alleged by appellants was one under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, albeit in a medical setting, we find it error to have applied section 768.49(1).

Section 1983 provides the avenue for a pretrial detainee to seek relief for inadequate medical treatment.

Rodney v. Romano · filed 1993-03-10

Accordingly, his redress, if any, is by way of a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and not the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

A corrections department can remain liable for constitutional deprivations in a § 1983 medical care claim after contracting with a private provider.

Reaves v. Department of Correction · filed 2016-07-15

I agree that the DOC’s duty to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals is not absolved by contracting with an entity such as MPCH.

A shareholder cannot maintain a § 1983 action for an injury suffered by the corporation, even if that injury reduces the value of the shareholder’s stock.

Gregory v. Mitchell · filed 1981-01-12

The district court was correct in holding that “neither officers nor stockholders . .. can maintain an action to redress an injury to the corporation even though the value of their stock is impaired as a result of the injury.” ... These holdings, that the Civil Rights action by all individual stockholders must be dismissed and that the First Bank of Macon is an improper party-plaintiff, are eminently correct.

A shareholder lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim for injury to the corporation in which the shareholder owns shares.

Forest Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Mercy Ambulance of Richmond, Inc. · filed 1997-01-15

Shareholders lack standing to bring a § 1983 action claiming injury to the corporation in which they own shares.

Section 1983 requires a shareholder suing over injury to a corporation to show an individual, direct injury.

Flynn v. Merrick · filed 1989-08-07

Filing suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not diminish the requirement that the shareholder suffer some individual, direct injury.

Section 1983 allows shareholders to sue for injuries to their own rights that are direct and independent of the corporation, but not on the corporation's behalf.

Soranno's Gasco, Incorporated v. Morgan · filed 1989-05-15

The defendants' argument appears to be derived from the well-established doctrine that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a section 1983 action on behalf of the corporation in which he owns shares. Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1969). Similarly, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to assert a personal economic injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation. Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 537, 78 L.Ed.2d 717 (1983). However, a shareholder does have standing where he or she has been injured directly and independently of the corporation. Id. In this case, there are direct and independent injuries to the individual plaintiffs.

A shareholder may bring a section 1983 action for a direct injury independent of injury to the corporation.

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 1989-05-15

However, a shareholder does have standing where he or she has been injured directly and independently of the corporation. ... In this case, there are direct and independent injuries to the individual plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not permit a shareholder to sue solely for an alleged violation of a corporation’s rights when the corporation can sue on its own behalf.

Guys & Dolls Billboards, Inc. v. McHale · filed 1988-04-18

As an initial matter, the district court properly dismissed Mrs. Champion's claim. Mrs. Champion alleges no violation of her individual rights, but claims only in her capacity as a shareholder of Guys & Dolls. It is a settled principle of corporate law that shareholders in Mrs. Champion's position lack standing to sue. Guys & Dolls, as a corporate entity, is entitled to bring suit in this situation, and Mrs. Champion may not herself sue as a shareholder.

A shareholder bringing a Section 1983 action for injury to a corporation must show a direct and independent injury rather than personal economic harm derived from the corporate injury.

Shell Petroleum v. Graves · filed 1983-06-30

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976), SPNV sought to enjoin the California Franchise Tax Board from assessing taxes based on a "unitary" business formula against two companies in which SPNV was the majority stockholder. The district court dismissed SPNV's complaint for lack of standing and because the controversy was not ripe. ... Generally, a shareholder does not have standing to redress an injury to the corporation. ... A shareholder must be injured directly and independently of the corporation.

A shareholder bringing a § 1983 claim must allege a direct, nonderivative injury; injury to the corporation alone does not give the shareholder standing.

Potthoff v. Morin · filed 2001-04-05

We hold that the shareholder standing rule applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by shareholders claiming injury to their corporations.

An Indian tribe cannot sue under § 1983 to vindicate its sovereign immunity from state tax enforcement.

Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Commission · filed 2010-07-09

The district court correctly construed MCN’s § 1983 claim as designed to vindicate MCN’s status as a sovereign immune from Oklahoma’s cigarette tax enforcement scheme, and thus correctly held MCN did not constitute a “person” entitled to bring suit for prospective relief against the Commissioners under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits corporate plaintiffs to bring suit.

California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick · filed 1974-10-25

A corporate plaintiff can assert rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by corporate plaintiffs are permissible, Pierce, supra; Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Los Angeles County, 181 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820, 71 S.Ct. 51, 95 L.Ed. 602 (1950); Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein).

Section 1983 allows a person within United States jurisdiction, including a resident alien, to seek redress for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Jagnandan v. Giles · filed 1974-08-15

Deprivation of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, gives rise to a cause of action in law, equity or other proceeding for redress by any citizen of the United States or other person within its jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Indian tribes are persons entitled to sue under Section 1983.

Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. City of Fallon · filed 2001-08-23

However, Ninth Circuit authority supports the proposition that Tribes are “other persons” entitled to sue under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy to an alien held in Mexico for prosecution there because the person is outside United States jurisdiction.

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-04-21

He correctly eschews a claim under section 1983, because that section does not provide him with a remedy. Section 1983 applies only to United States citizens or aliens within United States jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for a plaintiff's own constitutional rights; it does not permit recovery for a search that violated another person's Fourth Amendment privacy interest.

Lee v. C. M. Gilstrap, Chief of Police, Wayne County Lt. O. N. Weaver Sgt. R. A. Stocks G. W. Bailey Perry Sharp H · filed 1981-11-18

Since Lee had no privacy interest, his claim under § 1983 must be rejected.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to assert the constitutional rights of another.

Graham v. Hutto · filed 1977-09-22

To the extent plaintiff is contending that a ban against passing legal materials infringes the right of other, illiterate inmates to legal assistance, he fails to state a claim cognizable under Section 1983. One may not assert the constitutional rights of another.

Section 1983 does not let an individual shareholder sue in his own name for damages suffered by the corporation.

Erlich v. Glasner · filed 1969-10-28

Simply stated, the claimed damages are those of the corporation, not those of the appellant. We find nothing in the Civil Rights Act which would permit appellant to circumvent the rule of law just stated, completely avoid the corporate entity and thus maintain an action in his own name. Appellant cannot maintain this action.

Section 1983 lets a corporation invoke the statute, like a natural person, to challenge state procedures that allegedly deprive it of due process or equal protection under color of state law.

Mini Cinema 16 Inc. of Fort Dodge v. Habhab · filed 1970-12-22

Thus, a corporate plaintiff has the same right to invoke Section 1983 as a basis for federal jurisdiction to challenge state procedures as does a natural person.

Section 1983 permits claims involving property rights, and corporations are persons entitled to bring suit under the statute.

South Cutler Bay, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla. · filed 1972-10-27

Consequently, It is clear that far from preventing this Court from hearing an action involving property rights, the Civil Rights Act invests us with jurisdiction under § 1343(3) and (4) to hear § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims. ... But defendants object that plaintiff, a corporation, is not a “person” entitled to seek relief under either § 1343(3) or § 1983. If the question was once in doubt, the weight of modern authority favors the view that corporations may bring suit under these sections.

Section 1983 protects corporations as persons and permits them to bring suit for violations of their constitutional rights.

Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Robert A. Miller C. M. Clark Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Robert A. Miller · filed 1973-01-23

At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs are corporations. As such they are deemed to be persons within the meaning of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), ... and persons, as well, whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and who may bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... There is no question, then, of the district court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1983 allows people held in state pretrial detention facilities or penal institutions to seek redress for violations of fundamental constitutional rights.

Poole v. Wolke · filed 1973-01-24

Persons lawfully incarcerated in state pretrial detention facilities or penal institutions are entitled to seek redress for violations of fundamental constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action only for deprivation of the plaintiff's own federally protected right, while a decedent's claim may survive for the estate if state law creates a survival action.

Evain v. Conlisk · filed 1973-07-13

Under the Civil Rights Statutes, this Circuit follows the position that a District Court may not exercise its jurisdiction unless an individual is deprived of a right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution. ... It is quite apparent in Civil Rights litigation that one individual cannot sue for the deprivation of another’s civil rights. ... To this proposition must be added the exception that when the deprivation of an individual’s rights results in his death then a cause of action may survive for the benefit of the estate of the deceased individual under the Civil Rights provisions, if the applicable state law creates such a survival action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to every person whose constitutional or statutory rights are denied under color of state law, without distinguishing between types of civil servants.

Keyer v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York · filed 1975-07-29

Section 1983 by its terms negates any such distinction. It applies to “[ejvery person” whose “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” have been denied him under color of State law.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for individual constitutional-rights violations that may be asserted by individual patients or their guardians, but the United States cannot invoke it to establish authority for executive-branch enforcement absent express statutory authorization.

United States v. Mattson · filed 1979-07-17

The government also asserts that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, which provide a civil remedy for individual constitutional rights violations, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 which allow the executive branch to bring criminal prosecutions for systematic deprivation of constitutional rights, establish the requisite interest. As mentioned later in this opinion, Congress has repeatedly refused to allow executive branch enforcement of the civil provisions. But there appears to be no obstacle to their assertion by individual patients or their guardians.

Section 1983 vindicates individual interests and does not itself protect a state.

Commonwealth v. Porter · filed 1981-07-30

The fourteenth amendment is a limitation upon the states in the interest of individuals, and section 1983 was enacted to facilitate vindication of such individual interests.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege the violation of the plaintiff’s own civil rights under color of state law, not a violation of another person’s rights.

McArthur v. Robinson · filed 1983-07-22

The plaintiff has not attempted to allege that the children’s cause of action arises under the provisions of section 1983, but even if he did, the law clearly is that a plaintiff, in order to fall within the provisions of this statute, must allege that his civil rights have been violated under color of state law, not the civil rights of another person.

Section 1983 does not create a right for a municipality to sue its state for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment deprivation.

City of South Portland v. State · filed 1984-04-30

In the absence of a clearly expressed intent, we do not believe Congress in enacting the forerunner of section 1983 meant to create a new right in favor of a municipality.

An organization generally lacks standing under § 1983 to sue for violations of its members’ personal rights.

The League Of Women Voters Of Nassau County v. Nassau County Board Of Supervisors · filed 1984-05-22

Necessarily, we adhere to our prior decisions and, consequently, hold that the League lacks standing under Sec. 1983, the only jurisdictional basis asserted.

An organization generally lacks standing under § 1983 to sue for violations of its members’ personal rights.

League of Women Voters v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors · filed 1984-05-22

Necessarily, we adhere to our prior decisions and, consequently, hold that the League lacks standing under § 1983, the only jurisdictional basis asserted.

A section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover for constitutional injuries inflicted on a predecessor property owner rather than on the plaintiff itself.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse · filed 1985-07-12

In this action, therefore, plaintiff cannot rely upon the violation of its predecessor’s constitutional rights, and following the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in ... we find that the city’s conduct directed against the plaintiff was insufficient to constitute a taking or a deprivation of property in violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.

Aliens may sue under § 1983.

Jaffe v. Boyles · filed 1985-08-27

Aliens may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation is a person that may assert a claim under Section 1983.

Regency Catering Services, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre · filed 1985-12-06

Although there seems to be some wrangling over the issue whether a corporate entity is a “person” as contemplated by the drafters of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we think it well-settled that a corporation can assert a claim thereunder.

Section 1983 plaintiffs may recover only for deprivations of their own constitutional rights, not another person's rights.

Trejo v. Wattles · filed 1985-12-09

Further, plaintiffs may only recover for deprivations of their own constitutional rights; not the rights of another.

A state university has no standing under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to sue its creating state or enjoin a state education board.

United States v. Alabama · filed 1986-06-06

ASU thus has no standing to sue or to seek to enjoin the Alabama state board of education under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

An individual § 1983 plaintiff must plead an injury to the plaintiff’s own legal rights and interests, rather than seeking recovery solely for injuries to a decedent.

ESTATE OF · filed 1987-05-18

Plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights and interests.

An individual § 1983 plaintiff must plead an injury to the plaintiff’s own legal rights and interests, rather than seeking recovery solely for injuries to a decedent.

Estate of Johnson ex rel. Castle v. Village of Libertyville · filed 1987-05-18

Plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights and interests.

A person may not sue or recover § 1983 damages for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Otero v. Riefkohl · filed 1987-06-17

The law is clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

A corporation is a person entitled to maintain an action under § 1983.

TETON PLUMBING & HEAT., INC. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District Number One · filed 1988-10-24

Similarly, a corporation (such as appellant) is considered to be a “person” possessing due process rights and being entitled to maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not let a person suing in an individual capacity recover damages for a violation of someone else’s civil rights.

Estate of Cooper by and Through Cooper v. Leamer · filed 1989-02-10

In the first three counts of the complaint, Denice Cooper, in her individual capacity, asserts civil rights claims against all three defendants. Far from a model of a well-drafted pleading, each of those counts appears to rest primarily upon alleged violations of David Cooper’s constitutional rights. It is clear that one may not recover damages for the violation of another’s civil rights.

A corporation may sue under Section 1983 for violations of its own federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Erret v. Pennsylvania · filed 1989-03-29

It has been long-settled that a corporation is a “person” entitled to sue under Section 1983 for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights.

A person who merely observes an alleged violation of another person’s rights cannot sue as a plaintiff under § 1983 on that basis.

Ronnie Brock, Ray Bush v. Dwight Lacy McNealy Dr. · filed 1989-08-07

The district court's order dismissing Ray Bush is not in error. There are absolutely no facts alleged that make Bush anything more than a mere observer of the action.

Hospitals may use § 1983 to challenge state Medicaid plans for violations of federal statutory rights under Title XIX.

Temple University v. White · filed 1990-01-24

Before addressing the merits, however, it is necessary to refer briefly to defendants’ threshold argument that plaintiff cannot maintain this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of alleged federal statutory rights, because Title XIX gives rise to no rights which can be asserted by hospitals. This precise argument has been persuasively rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, et al., 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir., 1989), and I am bound by that decision.

Section 1983 does not permit a state’s political subdivisions to assert their own Fourteenth Amendment rights against the state because they have no such rights against it.

Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Department of Social Services · filed 1990-03-05

It has long been settled that a subdivision of a state is not entitled, as against the state, to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Consequently, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to so much of the complaint as attempts to state claims on behalf of the County, the Board, the WBSS and WDSS, or Ann Carbaugh in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of his own civil rights, but not for deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Shepard v. Egan · filed 1990-08-13

Further, it is settled law that a person may generally sue only for deprivation of his own civil rights, and may not sue for deprivation of another’s civil rights.

Section 1983 allows an individual employee to sue a state official for interference with the employee’s rights under the National Labor Relations Act.

Livadas v. Aubry · filed 1990-10-12

Therefore, it is clear that Karen Livadas has a private right of action under § 1983 to bring this case as an individual to vindicate her NLRA rights from interference by the state.

Section 1983 does not let parents or siblings recover personally for a child’s death when government action was not aimed at their family relationship, but the parents may pursue the child’s claim as legal heirs.

Arroyo v. Pla · filed 1990-10-16

Although we find that plaintiffs cannot bring a cause of action in their personal capacity for damages they sustained from Eddie’s death, Eddie’s parents, not the decedent’s siblings, can nevertheless bring an action on behalf of the son’s suffering in their representative capacity as legal heirs to his cause of action.

Section 1983 allows a corporate entity, including a union, to sue for violations of its own First Amendment rights.

Broderick v. City of Boston · filed 1991-01-28

Corporate entities as well as individuals possess standing to sue under section 1983 for violations of their First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits a child born after the alleged unconstitutional killing of a parent to sue for loss of familial companionship because that injury arises at birth, when the child is a person.

John Crumpton, IV v. Daryl Gates Tom Bradley Tom Reddin Ed Davis Herbert Boeckmann Maxwell E. Greenberg Barbara L. Schle · filed 1991-11-04

Because Crumpton’s injury arose at birth, even under the most restrictive view of the scope of section 1983, he is entitled to proceed as a proper party in his federal civil rights suit.

Section 1983 does not allow an Indian tribe itself to sue because a tribe is not a citizen of the United States or other person under the statute.

Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho · filed 1992-07-20

Second, the court finds that the Tribe may not bring a Section 1983 action because it is not a “citizen of the United States or other person” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing in her own right to assert a violation of her own federally protected rights, rather than another person’s rights.

Rose v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1993-01-22

It is well established that the federally protected rights that are enforceable under § 1983 are “personal” to the injured party. Accordingly, a § 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of Plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

A municipality cannot use § 1983 to challenge state action under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment because it is not a person protected by those amendments.

City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court for Twentieth Judicial Circuit · filed 1993-02-25

Because East St. Louis is not a “person,” it cannot invoke the protection of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, ... and therefore cannot bring a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiffs themselves to have been deprived of a constitutional right by defendants acting under color of state law; grandparents who are neither parents nor legal guardians cannot sue solely on a grandchild’s behalf.

Rowland v. Thompson · filed 1993-04-05

To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants acted under color of state law, and that the defendants' conduct deprived the plaintiffs of a constitutional right. ... The Rowlands cannot sue on the minor child's behalf, and they have no cause of action to sue on their own behalf.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to allege a violation of the claimant’s own constitutional rights.

Pacheco v. Y Lebron · filed 1993-05-05

To maintain an action under section 1983, claimants must allege that their personal constitutional rights have been violated in some manner.

Section 1983 allows a partnership to sue for deprivations of its constitutional rights caused by misconduct under color of state law.

Brophy Ahern Dev. v. City of West Haven, No. 33 55 52 (Jun. 15, 1993) · filed 1993-06-15

A partnership has standing to sue under the statute that creates a federal cause of action against persons whose misconduct, under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another.

A corporation is a person who may sue under § 1983.

Corner Construction Corp. v. Rapid City School District No. 51-4 · filed 1994-03-02

A corporation is considered a “person” under both the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co. · filed 1994-04-15

The trial court correctly held that a § 1983 action is personal in nature and cannot be asserted vicariously for the denial of some other person’s civil rights.

Governmental entities are not protected “persons” entitled to invoke § 1983.

City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1994-11-17

Furthermore, governmental entities are not protected “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim only by the person toward whom the state action was directed, not a family member incidentally affected by that person’s injury or death.

Soto v. Carrasquillo · filed 1995-01-20

Only the person towards whom the state action was directed, and not those individuals incidentally affected, may bring a section 1983 action for a violation of due process rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district that is an arm of the state to sue because it is not a person within the meaning of the statute.

School Dist. of Phila. v. PA. MILK MARKETING BD. · filed 1995-02-14

We find that the School District is not a person that can sue within the meaning of § 1983. Accordingly, the School District's claim under Count Three must be dismissed on this ground as well.

A school district that is an arm of the state is not a person that can sue under § 1983.

School District v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board · filed 1995-02-14

We find that the School District is not a person that can sue within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a parent a personal loss-of-companionship claim based on a constitutional deprivation suffered by the child.

Gravely v. Madden · filed 1995-09-08

This Court likewise concludes that a loss of companionship claim by the parent of a child who has suffered a constitutional deprivation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district to sue an agency of its creating state because the district is not an “other person” entitled to sue under the statute.

Barbara Z. Ex Rel. Devin Z. v. Obradovich · filed 1996-07-05

Absent Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent to the contrary, we conclude that the School District is not an “other person” that can sue (as opposed to being sued) within the meaning of section 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit over violations of a decedent’s constitutional rights, state law determines who may bring the action.

Pope v. Ward · filed 1996-08-14

In suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the question of who may bring an action for violations of a decedent’s constitutional rights is answered by looking to state law.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to sue a public employer for infringement of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Jackson v. James · filed 1996-08-16

It is well-established that an employee may sue his or her public employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the violation rests on a claim of infringement of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Individual beneficiaries of the Hawaii Admission Act public land trust may sue state officials in their individual capacities under § 1983 to enforce the trust obligation.

Rice v. Cayetano · filed 1996-09-06

As an initial matter, the court finds that under Ninth Circuit law, individual beneficiaries can bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against state officials in their individual capacities to enforce the trust obligation in the Admission Act.

A foreign consul is a person who may sue under § 1983.

Republic of Paraguay v. Allen · filed 1996-11-27

Only Jose Dos Santos, Consul General of the Republic of Paraguay, has asserted a claim under § 1983. In their motion to ... dismiss, defendants assume that Mr. Dos Santos, a Paraguayan official, is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute. This assumption is erroneous. ... Mr. Dos Santos is a proper plaintiff.

A corporation may sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights.

Auburn Medical Center, Inc. v. Peters · filed 1996-12-12

Accordingly, the plaintiff has standing to sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights.

Section 1983 does not give a school district a cause of action against a parent or guardian to enforce an IDEA administrative decision.

Metropolitan School Dist. of Martinsville v. Buskirk · filed 1997-01-06

While section 1983 gives a private individual a right to bring a cause of 'action against a municipal body (such as a public school) to vindicate substantive federal rights, the statute clearly does not give the municipality any comparable rights in a dispute with a parent or guardian.

Section 1983 does not give inmates a claim based solely on possible misuse of service fees that were properly assessed and collected.

Weinlood v. Simmons · filed 1997-04-18

Possible improper expenditure of service fees properly assessed and collected is not violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims on behalf of unborn children because they are not persons or citizens within its meaning.

Alexander v. Whitman · filed 1997-05-23

Because the unborn are not persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it follows that the unborn are not encompassed within the meaning of the terai "person” or "citizen" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to be a United States citizen; a person within United States jurisdiction may sue.

Colon v. Mack · filed 1997-09-05

THE COURT: To establish a claim under 1983, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence four items. ... First, that he was a citizen of the United States. ... Though I did not discuss further the first prong, ... mere mention of it was' sufficient error to taint the jury instructions.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a deprivation of their own rights, but does not give relatives a claim for that deprivation.

City of Alamo v. Casas · filed 1997-12-04

The rights protected by section 1983 are personal in nature, and the right to bring suit under the statute is vested solely in the person who suffered the deprivation, and does not accrue to a relative.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights action on behalf of an unborn fetus because the fetus is not a person who can bring a deprivation-of-rights claim.

Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic · filed 1997-12-11

Blackburn’s fetus, however, is not a “person” on whose behalf a civil rights action may be commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights.

A state cannot sue under § 1983 because it is neither a citizen of the United States nor a statutory person.

State of Illinois v. City of Chicago, Illinois, and City of Gary, Indiana · filed 1998-02-19

But only a "citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof” may be a plaintiff, and Illinois is neither a "citizen of the United States” nor a statutory "person”.

Section 1983 lets providers sue state officials to enforce Medicaid Act provisions if the providers are among those the provisions are intended to benefit.

Paramount Health Systems, Inc. v. Wright · filed 1998-03-19

But the providers can, as they have done, sue them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they are within the class intended to be benefited by the Medicaid Act.

Citizens and current or former state officials with a legal interest in a state measure’s constitutionality may challenge it under § 1983.

Barker v. Hazeltine · filed 1998-03-31

The three plaintiffs, as citizens, residents, taxpayers, registered voters, and current or former South Dakota elected officials, have a legal interest in the constitutionality of Initiated Measure 1 which they may properly bring before the Court in this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a foreign nation to sue because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Breard v. Greene · filed 1998-04-21

Paraguay is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipality to sue or a state to be sued.

Rockford Board of Education, School District No. 205, and People Who Care, Intervenors-Appellants v. Illinois State Boar · filed 1998-07-17

Apart from the fact that a city or other municipality cannot bring a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and that a state can’t be sued under that statute either, ... the board does not assert an interest that federal law protects, and so the entire suit, not merely the section 1983 claims, fails at the threshold.

A conjugal partnership has no independent claim under § 1983 unless it suffered a direct constitutional deprivation.

Torres v. United States · filed 1998-10-08

Inasmuch as no direct constitutional claim is being asserted on behalf of the conjugal partnership it has no viable claim under § 1983.