42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow a corporate principal to recover individually for a constitutional injury suffered only through searches of the corporation’s businesses.

Mom's, Inc. v. Weber · filed 2000-01-13

With this in mind, the Court is of the opinion that because Plaintiff Bonk’s home was not searched, the only constitutional violation he may have suffered he suffered vicariously as a principal of Mom’s through the searches conducted at the two Jewish Mother locations. Accordingly, he cannot recover individually and summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims brought by Bonk.

A charter school and its association cannot bring a § 1983 equal protection claim because they are not persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Academy of Charter Schools v. Adams County School District No. 12 · filed 2000-03-13

The trial court correctly held that the Academy and the Association, if persons, are not protected persons under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits corporations to sue for violations of their rights because corporations are persons under the statute.

American Fabricare v. Township of Falls · filed 2000-06-13

Corporations are "persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and can bring suit for violations of their rights.

A parent has standing under § 1983 to sue on behalf of a deceased adult child for the deprivation of the child's constitutional rights.

White v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2000-10-27

The Court notes the somewhat unsettled state of the law concerning whether a parent may sue under section 1983 for the constitutional deprivations suffered by the parent's adult child. ... This Court agrees with the foregoing authority and concludes that Marlene White has standing to sue on behalf of her deceased adult child.

Section 1983 does not permit a private college to bring an action against itself.

President and Trustees of Bates College v. Congregation Beth Abraham · filed 2001-02-13

Bates College cannot bring a § 1983 or other action against itself.

Section 1983 allows organizations to sue as persons.

Esperanza Peace and Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio · filed 2001-05-15

Plaintiffs are “persons” entitled to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a state acting as parens patriae to sue to vindicate its citizens’ rights against a defendant acting under color of state authority.

Oregon Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Heavy Vehicle Electronic License Plate, Inc. · filed 2001-08-09

It stands to reason that plaintiff Oregon, ... acting as parens patraie, may bring the suit to vindicate the rights of its citizens.

A deceased person cannot be a plaintiff under § 1983.

Estate of Smith v. Town of West Hartford · filed 2002-02-15

The decedent, however, is not a person under § 1983 or state law and cannot be considered a plaintiff.

Corporations may have standing to bring due process claims under § 1983.

Alexis, Inc. v. Pinellas County, Florida · filed 2002-03-29

Corporations may possess standing to assert due process violations under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits providers and beneficiaries to sue state officials to enforce federal statutory rights.

Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson · filed 2003-04-01

Both beneficiaries and providers (such as LTCPA, on behalf of its members) have standing to assert a Section 1983 private action against state officials for violations of federal statutory rights such as those claimed by LTCPA.

A decedent’s Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983 could be brought only by the decedent’s estate.

Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares · filed 2003-06-23

Admittedly, the distinction was significant on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims because these could only be brought by the estate.

Section 1983 does not allow a tribe to vindicate its sovereign rights by naming its wholly owned corporation or tribal officers with no independent interest in the property at issue.

Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline · filed 2004-01-15

Nor can the ruling in Inyo County be circumvented by the expediency of simply naming HCI or the individuals plaintiffs Blackhawk and Morgan. As plaintiffs conceded, Blackhawk and Morgan have no independent ownership interest in the property seized by the state; they are tribal officers and members attempting to obtain immunity from state laws based upon the sovereign status of the tribe. And HCI is an entity wholly owned by the Tribe. It has no claim, “like other private persons,” for immunity from state revenue and criminal proceedings; its claim for sovereign immunity is wholly derivative from its owner, Ho-Chuck, Inc, its owner in turn, the tribe.

Section 1983 permits the direct victim or the victim’s estate representative to sue, but does not give the victim’s children a claim for their own loss of consortium.

Tallman v. Elizabethtown Police Department · filed 2004-05-24

Accordingly, only the victim him or herself, or the estate’s representative, may bring a § 1983 action, so the victim’s children have no cause of action for loss of consortium for injuries they may have personally suffered.

An estate administratrix may be an injured person entitled to assert a § 1983 claim on the estate’s behalf.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1982-09-13

Barrett in her role as administratrix of the estate should also be considered an injured "person" for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a spouse’s loss of consortium claim when the spouse suffered no deprivation of his own federally protected rights.

Stallworth v. City of Cleveland · filed 1990-03-05

The statute provides redress to a party suffering injuries from a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law. It is Mrs. Stallworth who has allegedly suffered injuries based on such a deprivation. Mr. Stallworth's loss of consortium claim does not represent an injury based on a deprivation of his rights, privileges or immunities. Therefore, the text of the statute does not reach his claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a sovereign tribe to assert communal treaty based fishing rights or its members to bring actions to vindicate those communal rights.

Indian v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-03-08

Recognizing that “[s]ection 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment,” id. at 712, as well as the “long-standing interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign,” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780 (2000), we conclude that the Tribe may not assert its treaty-based fishing rights under section 1983. ... The Tribe’s treaty-based rights do not give rise to individual actions cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights under color of state law.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States · filed 2005-03-09

Recognizing that "[s]ection 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment," id. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, as well as the "long-standing interpretive presumption that `person' does not include the sovereign," Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), we conclude that the Tribe may not assert its treaty-based fishing rights under section 1983. ... Because the Tribe's members seek to vindicate communal, rather than individual rights, they do not have cognizable section 1983 claims against the City or TPU.

Section 1983 does not allow a state or state agency to bring an action as a plaintiff.

Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Reinhard · filed 2005-04-06

For both of these rea- sons, we hold that a state or state agency may not maintain a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a state or state agency to bring an action.

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Dr. · filed 2005-04-06

For both of these reasons, we hold that a state or state agency may not maintain a § 1983 action.

A Section 1983 claim arising directly from a decedent’s death belongs to the estate and may be brought by its administratrix, not by the decedent’s child individually.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1986-12-10

In accordance with this dismissal of the post-death cover-up claims, Elizabeth Barrett in her individual capacity is also dismissed as a plaintiff in this suit. The claims made in this case arising directly out of Harold Blauer’s death, both under the Federal Tort Claims Act and under Section 1983, belong solely to the estate of Harold Blauer. Thus, these remaining claims, the “pre-death claims,” may be asserted by Elizabeth Barrett only in her capacity as administratrix of her father’s estate.

Section 1983 does not allow individual tribal members to sue to vindicate communal treaty fishing rights.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-06-03

Because the Tribe's members seek to vindicate communal, rather than individual rights, they do not have cognizable section 1983 claims against the City or TPU.

A corporation is a person that may sue under § 1983.

Laredo Road Co. v. Maverick County, Texas · filed 2005-07-14

Plaintiff, a corporation, is a “person” as stated by § 1983 and defined by 1 U.S.C. § 1, which explains that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”

Section 1983 allows only the person whose civil rights were violated to bring a claim; family members affected indirectly cannot sue on that person’s behalf.

Zayas v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2005-07-19

In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims arise out of the allegedly discriminatory acts of Defendants directed at Arianna. The First Circuit case law is crystal clear to the effect that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to that Section.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner who alleges only that he witnessed an assault on another prisoner to sue over that assault.

Dennis Calloway, Larry Calloway v. Eric Dahlberg, Beach, Corrections Officer · filed 1989-08-04

Plaintiff Dennis Calloway claimed that he witnessed the alleged attack. The complaint does not set forth any allegations that plaintiff Dennis Calloway was subjected to any assault, battery or racial insults. ... The plaintiffs concede in their reply brief that Dennis Calloway has no standing to bring suit and that he was properly dismissed as a plaintiff. The district court therefore properly dismissed the suit as it pertains to Dennis Calloway.

Corporations, including incorporated religious organizations, are persons who may bring § 1983 claims for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.

Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County · filed 2006-06-01

Accordingly, we hold that Primera, as an incorporated religious organization, stated a section 1983 claim for violation of its equal protection, due process, and free exercise rights.

State law determines who may bring a § 1983 action on a decedent's behalf.

Williams v. Bradshaw · filed 2006-08-16

Federal courts are to apply state law in deciding who may bring a § 1983 action on a decedent's behalf.

Section 1983 does not permit an unincorporated association to sue because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Lippoldt v. Cole · filed 2006-11-07

As such, we reverse the district court’s ruling that OSA is a “person” entitled to bring a claim under Section 1983, and we remand with direction to dismiss OSA’s claims.

Section 1983 permits a private corporation to sue for a constitutional violation, even if the state created it, when the corporation is private in nature.

de Sus v. Flores-Galarza · filed 2007-03-01

A private corporation may allege a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give relatives an independent claim based solely on a civil rights violation directed at someone else.

Perez-Sanchez v. Public Building Authority · filed 2007-03-12

Only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private corporation to sue for a constitutional violation.

Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Juan A. Flores Galarza · filed 2007-04-18

A private corporation may allege a constitutional violation under § 1983.

A limited liability company may bring a § 1983 action to vindicate its own constitutional rights.

Orgain v. City of Salisbury · filed 2007-06-25

Accordingly, M31 Andromeda has standing to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow an Indian tribe to sue to vindicate rights it asserts by virtue of its sovereignty rather than private rights.

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Kleine · filed 2008-03-27

Because § 1983 was designed to vindicate only private rights, the Community is not a “person” under § 1983 for purposes of the rights at issue in the present case. For that reason, the Court will grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the Community’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a Medicaid provider to sue over reimbursement rates if the provider is not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act.

Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz · filed 1985-06-13

Further, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that Arden House is not an intended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act and therefore has no standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of said Act.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of their own federal rights, but not another person’s rights.

Casanas v. De Leon · filed 1986-04-01

The law seems clear that one person may not sue, nor recover damages, for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Corporations may bring § 1983 claims to vindicate their Fourteenth Amendment rights, including occupational liberty.

SOC, Inc. v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2009-01-22

The district court incorrectly held that corporations do not have the right to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deprivation of occupational liberty.

Section 1983 allows an alien whose presence in the United States is illegal to bring a federal claim against a state officer for violating due process or equal protection.

Bolanos v. Maurice F. Kiley, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York District · filed 1975-01-29

We can likewise agree that...42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) affords such an alien' access to the federal courts to assert a claim of violation of those clauses by a state officer.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to a Medicaid provider deprived of reimbursement by state action that violates federal law.

Yapalater v. Bates · filed 1980-07-30

He claims that wrongful administration of the Medicaid program by the state deprives him of reimbursement to which federal law entitles him. In my judgment, § 1983 as interpreted by the Thiboutot majority furnishes this plaintiff a remedy.

An inmate cannot use § 1983 to bring claims belonging to other inmates.

Smith v. Lund · filed 2009-05-12

Finally, we agree with the district court that Smith may not bring the claims of other inmates, see Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); we reject his argument that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint (a second time), because he did not seek leave to do so, see Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008); and we deny his pending motions.

Section 1983 allows only persons to sue, so one branch of a state cannot use it to sue another.

Indiana Prot. and Adv. v. Ind. Family Soc. Serv. · filed 2009-07-28

Only "persons" can sue under § 1983, and the upshot of this is that § 1983 cannot be used by one branch of a state to sue another.

Section 1983 permits only persons to sue, so one branch of a state cannot use it to sue another.

Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2009-07-28

Only “persons” can sue under §1983, and the upshot of this is that §1983 cannot be used by one branch of a state to sue another.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid providers a right to enforce section 30(A)’s equal access provision.

Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood · filed 2001-01-05

However, we find that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that providers also have a right to bring suit under § 1983 to remedy violations of section 30(A).

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to have suffered the alleged injury personally; a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for an injury suffered by a tenant.

LaCroix v. MARSHALL COUNTY BD. OF SUP'RS · filed 2009-08-18

We find no error in the chancellor's granting partial summary judgment in favor of the County on LaCroix's section 1983 claim regarding violation of section 19-5-22 as it was LaCroix's tenant, and not LaCroix, who sustained any alleged injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show an injury to himself; he cannot sue for an injury suffered only by another person.

LaCroix v. Marshall County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-08-18

The chancellor found that LaCroix did not prove an injury to himself as required to bring a section 1983 claim, and we agree.

A deceased victim’s spouse may state a § 1983 claim as the estate’s legal representative by alleging the marriage and death.

Garrett v. Belmont County Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2010-04-01

Therefore, since Plaintiff did allege that he is her spouse and that Mrs. Garrett is deceased, this Court interprets that allegation as sufficient to state a claim that Plaintiff is the legal representative of Mrs. Garrett’s estate.

A state-created public charter school and its officer acting in an official capacity cannot bring a § 1983 claim against the state.

Nampa Classical Academy v. Goesling · filed 2010-05-17

Accordingly, both NCA and Mr. Moffett in his official capacity cannot, as a matter of law state a claim under § 1983 against the State.

Section 1983 does not let family members sue for a violation of another person’s constitutional rights when their own rights were not violated.

González-Droz v. González-Colón · filed 2010-06-15

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Plaintiffs other than González-Droz lack a viable claim under Section 1983, since they do not claim that their constitutional rights were violated, but only that they have suffered damages for the violation of González-Droz’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows an injured party to seek redress but does not authorize a person to sue for an injury to someone else’s rights.

Johnson v. Miller · filed 2010-07-08

In some instances, Congress grants a statutory right of action for a party who suffers some injury to bring a claim based on another’s rights. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no such right, saying only the government official “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.).

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse or conjugal partnership to sue for another person’s constitutional injury when they were not deprived of their own protected interest.

Abreu v. Oquendo-Rivera · filed 2010-08-09

Because neither plaintiff Reyes nor plaintiffs’ conjugal partnership were deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, they may not bring section 1983 claims on their own behalf.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid transportation providers a private right to enforce Section 30(A) against the State.

Murphy v. Jannis Fisher · filed 2010-08-30

While developments in this area may continue, as suggested by the parties’ various submissions of additional authority, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals holding that Providers do not have a private right to sue the State.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to recover for constitutional injuries inflicted on another person; a familial relationship claim requires conduct directed at the plaintiff and intended to deprive her of that relationship.

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver · filed 2010-09-30

Although there is a recognized constitutional cause of action for deprivation of a familial relationship, the government conduct at issue must be directed at the plaintiff and intended to deprive him or her of that relationship. ... Ulibarri does not assert any such claim and all other alleged constitutional violations involve conduct directed at Vigil. It appears that Vigil is represented here by his Estate, not Plaintiff Ulibarri. Accordingly, I agree with Defendants that summary judgment should enter in their favor on any civil rights claims asserted by Ms. Ulibarri.

A charter school is not barred from suing under § 1983 merely because state law allows it to be sued on the same terms as a political subdivision.

Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School District · filed 2011-08-25

According to the District Court, the language in § 17-1714-A stating that a charter school may “sue and be sued . . . to the same extent and upon the same condition that [a] political subdivision[] . . . can be sued” amounts to an “explicit state[ment]” that charter schools are political subdivisions that cannot bring § 1983 suits. This is simply incorrect. The statute merely states that a charter school can sue and be sued to the same extent that a political subdivision can be sued. The inclusion of “to the same extent and upon the same condition” makes it clear that the statute does not, as the District Court asserts, equate a charter school with a political subdivision.

Section 1983 does not let children sue for a violation of their father’s rights when the alleged conduct was not directed at them.

Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw · filed 2012-01-18

Because plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that defendants’ alleged conduct was directed at them, the Court sustains defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the claims by Bruner’s children.

An LLC member whose financial losses are derivative of the company’s losses cannot bring an individual Section 1983 claim without a direct, independent injury.

Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap County · filed 2012-06-13

Like the district court, we find that Piper’s personal financial losses are derivative of Woods View’s own losses. Piper was not injured directly and independently of the limited liability company and therefore lacks standing to pursue individual claims against Appellees.

Section 1983 allows a charter school to sue as a statutory “person” but bars it from asserting constitutional claims against its school district creator.

Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School District · filed 2012-11-08

Because the relationship between a charter school and a school district is sufficiently analogous, to the relationship between a municipality and its creator, the Charter School’s § 1983 claims will be dismissed.

A plaintiff cannot state a first-party claim under § 1983 based solely on the alleged violation of someone else’s constitutional rights.

Obergefell v. Wymyslo · filed 2013-11-01

The only claim brought in the Second Amended Complaint is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of same-sex couples married in other jurisdictions. Mr. Grunn is not asking for relief that will remedy any alleged unconstitutional treatment that he himself has suffered at the hands of anyone acting under color of state law. Consequently, Mr. Grunn has failed to meet pleading requirements to state a claim on his own behalf, and his attempt to do so must be dismissed.

A child born alive may pursue a Section 1983 claim for injuries allegedly begun in utero and continuing after birth.

Mori v. Allegheny County · filed 2014-09-30

In short, as noted in Crumpton, the proposition that “infants injured in útero and later born alive simply must bear their federally cognizable afflictions without hope of remedy” reflects at best dubious logic and runs counter to the various remedies Congress contemplated in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, from which § 1983 was derived. ... We decline moving defendants’ invitation to endorse that proposition and will deny their motion on this score.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to sue as an “other person” under the statute.

Municipality of San Sebastian v. Rico · filed 2015-03-06

In harmony with Santiago, the Court holds that the Municipality of San Sebastian is an “other person” within section 1983 and is entitled to bring suit pursuant to that statute.

Section 1983 requires a shareholder asserting a civil rights claim to allege an individual, direct injury rather than harm suffered by the corporation.

Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove · filed 2015-04-27

In particular, “a plaintiff-shareholder cannot maintain a civil rights action for damages suffered by the corporation.” ... “Filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not diminish the requirement that the shareholder suffer some individual, direct injury”). ... Nevertheless, because it is self-evident from the amended complaint that the only harms alleged are to Lei-bundguth the corporation, the Village’s motion to dismiss Peterson as a plaintiff is granted.

Section 1983 allows abortion providers to sue state officials to enjoin state laws that violate federal rights.

Planned Parenthood of Wiscons v. Schimel · filed 2015-11-23

The cases are legion that allow an abortion provider, such as Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin or AMS, to sue to enjoin as violations of federal law (hence litigable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) state laws that restrict abortion.

Section 1983 does not bar a union or its members from being plaintiffs.

Huebner v. Ochberg · filed 1980-07-25

The jurisdictional statutes in the case at bar are the same as those in Aldinger, yet there is nothing in those statutes, their legislative history, or their judicial interpretations which indicates a Congressional intent to bar a Union or its members from being plaintiffs.

Section 1983 claims are personal to the injured person and, after that person’s death, may be pursued by the estate through a proper representative.

Akbar v. Calumet City, Illinois · filed 2015-12-14

The only party entitled to raise the claims here is Akbar’s estate, through a proper representative. See Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2011) (“§ 1983 claims are personal to the inured party” and thus may only be prosecuted by the estate’s representative).

Section 1983 permits claims to survive under Alabama wrongful-death law.

Davis v. Riley · filed 2005-10-21

With respect to standing, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been construed by our Supreme Court to permit survivorship, under Alabama law governing wrongful-death claims, of claims brought under that statute. See Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So.2d 373, 380 (Ala.1983). Although Davis has not alleged in his complaint that he is the personal representative of his brother’s estate so as to empower him to bring a wrongful-death action under Alabama law, Davis is not required to prove his capacity to sue in the absence of a defendant’s specific denial, under Rule 9(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., of his capacity to sue. See Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So.2d 930, 934 (Ala.1979). Thus, to the extent that the circuit court’s judgment is based upon Davis’s lack of standing to sue, that judgment is premature.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing on their own behalf to assert a violation of their own rights, not another person’s rights.

A.B. ex rel. Ybarra v. City of Woodland Park · filed 2016-03-29

A civil rights claim must be based on the violation of a plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

Section 1983 allows a victim’s estate representatives to bring the victim’s claim, but family members cannot sue individually for injuries that result from the alleged violation.

Singleton v. Kentucky · filed 2016-03-31

Therefore, the § 1983 claims brought by the Singletons in their individual capacities are properly dismissed for lack of standing. ... However, the Singletons have standing for the § 1983 claims brought in their capacities as co-administrators of their mother’s estate.

Section 1983 permits a surviving parent to seek recovery for personal injuries caused by violations of a child’s rights when § 1988 incorporates the applicable state wrongful-death statute.

Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept, et a · filed 2016-04-07

It follows that a litigant such as Rodgers may sue under §§ 1983 and 1985 for injuries to another, because § 1988 incorporates wrongful-death statutes.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a violation of their own constitutional rights, but not for injuries collateral to a violation of someone else’s rights.

LeFever v. Ferguson · filed 2016-04-15

Claims under § 1983 are personal to the party injured by a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a tribe to sue to protect a sovereign interest because the tribe is not a “person” in that capacity.

Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation · filed 2017-08-25

In our view, the right being asserted here is, at its core, the right of tribal sovereignty. And in seeking to protect that right, the Tribe is proceeding in its sovereign capacity, not as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a charter school to bring a claim against its school district.

First Philadelphia Preparatory Charter School v. Commonwealth of PA, Department of Education · filed 2018-02-22

Therefore, we agree that charter schools cannot assert Section 1983 claims against their school districts, and sustain this preliminary objection.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to sue for an injury that is derivative of a violation of another person's constitutional rights.

Zell v. Ricci · filed 2018-03-30

Try as they might to allege a separate and distinct injury, the remainder of Mark and Beth Zell's allegations are entirely derivative of their daughter's. Yet one person lacks standing to advance the constitutional rights of another. ... Mark and Beth Zell lack standing as to each of their claims (Counts I, II, and III).

Section 1983 allows people alleging unconstitutional state or local government action to seek money damages from the responsible officials.

Benner v. St. Paul Pub. Sch. · filed 2019-05-03

This provision of federal law, commonly called " Section 1983," allows victims of allegedly unconstitutional state or local government actions to sue the offending government official(s) for money damages.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff bring a claim based on a violation of his children’s rights.

Ford v. City Of Rockford · filed 2019-05-07

As the Court explained, a violation of Plaintiff’s children’s rights does not state a claim on behalf of Plaintiff. He cannot represent his children as to any purported violation of their rights.

Section 1983 allows a deceased person’s estate representative to bring the person’s civil rights claims.

Arnold v. Olathe, Kansas, City of · filed 2019-09-11

Plaintiff properly brings § 1983 claims as the representative of the estate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights, rather than another person’s rights.

Gilpatrick v. Harper County, Kansas, Board of Commissioners · filed 2019-09-11

Therefore, the court finds that Gilpatrick and Daren Moon’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed as they have not alleged any violation of their own personal rights.

Section 1983 allows a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for many years to bring an action to protect constitutional rights.

Gonzalez-Cruz v. United States · filed 2020-01-28

As plaintiff is within the territory of the United States and has lived here for many years, he has a right to file an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Three statutes govern immigration detention.

Parents cannot bring individual Section 1983 claims for violations of their child’s constitutional rights.

DOE v. Patrick · filed 2020-02-03

As an initial matter, the claims brought under Section 1983 by Jane and John Doe on their own behalf fail as a matter of law. To the extent that Jane and John Doe’s individual claims stem from alleged violations of their son’s constitutional rights, these claims fail.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to sue on behalf of a friend without a direct, personal injury.

Ferguson v. Alton City Jail · filed 2020-02-04

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a § 1983 claim on behalf of his friend.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to bring a vicarious excessive force claim for witnessing force directed at a dog.

Kailin v. Greer · filed 2020-03-02

But the Kailins cannot pursue an excessive force claim related to the killing of Timber or on behalf of Steven or Taylor.

Section 1983 generally allows a person to sue for violations of their own rights, not solely for violations of another person’s rights.

Huntsman v. Sumner County Jail · filed 2020-03-05

In other words, an individual typically cannot bring suit under § 1983 based on violations of a third person’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to assert claims on behalf of other inmates.

Ackbar v. Monaco · filed 2020-03-11

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff's complaint attempts to assert claims on behalf of other inmates, Plaintiff has no right to do so.

Section 1983 claims are personal to the direct victim of an alleged constitutional violation; a family member's collateral injury does not give that family member standing.

Sorah v. Tipp City Exempted Village School District Board of Education · filed 2020-03-16

The Court has already explained why Brandy Sorah lacks standing to pursue her own claims under the ADA and § 504. For similar reasons, she also lacks standing to pursue claims under § 1983.

A corporation cannot assert § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest or excessive force against individuals; the affected individuals may assert those claims.

Webb v. City of McCrory, Arkansas · filed 2020-07-09

Second, the claims Webb’s Produce raised in the amended complaint cannot be asserted by a corporation. The entity “Webb’s Produce” cannot be the subject of unlawful arrest, excessive force, or racial discrimination. The individual Plaintiffs can.

Only a deceased victim’s estate may bring a § 1983 claim alleging that a constitutional violation caused the victim’s death.

Smart v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2020-07-14

Although it’s true that only the estate of a deceased victim may bring a § 1983 claim alleging death as a result of a constitutional violation, it’s not uncommon for heirs of the deceased (especially when they are also the administrators of the estate) to assert state wrongful-death claims on their own behalf in the same case.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to pursue a constitutional claim on his daughter’s behalf when he lacks standing to do so.

Shabani, Khaled v. Kalka, Kraig · filed 2020-07-28

However, as I explained to plaintiff in orders issued in his previous lawsuit, he lacks standing to pursue a constitutional claim on his daughter’s behalf.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief for violations of the plaintiff’s own rights, not the rights of other inmates.

Knox v. Sharp · filed 2020-08-03

As an initial matter, the Court advises Plaintiff that the Court will only consider claims “based upon the violation of a plaintiff’s personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.” ... Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asking for relief for other inmates, those claims cannot be considered.

A person generally cannot bring a Section 1983 claim for a violation of someone else’s personal rights; a survivor must show authority to pursue the deceased person’s claim under applicable state law.

Marmon v. Barr · filed 2020-08-04

The § 1983 and Bivens claims alleging excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to medical needs while in custody all arise under the Eighth Amendment (if Mr. Mercado was in custody under a criminal conviction) or the Fourteenth Amendment (if he was an immigration detainee). Rights protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are personal rights, and only the person subject to the violation has standing to bring suit. ... Despite these instructions, the FAC contains no facts showing Plaintiff has standing to pursue claims on behalf of Mr. Mercado’s estate.

An unborn fetus cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 because it is not a person within the Amendment’s scope.

Estate of the Unborn Child of Jennifer Jawson v. Armor Correctional Health Services Inc · filed 2020-08-19

In Reed v. Gardner, the Seventh Circuit held that a fetus is not a person within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore cannot bring Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, I will grant the motions to dismiss the § 1983 claims brought on behalf of the Estate and dismiss the claims.

In Colorado, a deceased person’s § 1983 survival claims may be brought only by the estate’s personal representative, not by a child or heir.

Velez v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado · filed 2020-08-31

As such, under Colorado law, these claims can be brought only by the personal representative of the estate of the deceased, i.e., by the personal representative of the estate of Mr. Tirado-Ortiz.

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse who was not seized to bring an excessive force claim for force used against her husband.

Horowitz v. Sherman · filed 2020-09-04

Plaintiffs cite three cases to argue a relative may bring an excessive force claim and each is distinguishable. ... Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend to include an excessive force claim by Cathy Horowitz against Officers Brown and Rosales will be denied.

Section 1983 claims based solely on a child’s rights belong to the child; a nonattorney parent cannot pursue them on the child’s behalf without counsel.

Simmons v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2020-09-09

These counts assert claims for race and disability discrimination pursuant to Section 1983, the ADA, and the No Child Left Behind Act.6 Such claims belong to P.E. and P.E. alone. Because plaintiff does not claim to be an attorney, she cannot bring such claims, on behalf of P.E., without counsel.

Counties cannot bring Section 1983 claims against their parent state for violating constitutional rights they do not possess.

COUNTY OF BUTLER v. THOMAS W. WOLF · filed 2020-09-14

Section 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but rather, merely provides a cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of state law. Counties are creatures of the state. They do not possess rights under the Constitution. They cannot assert a claim against the state—of which they are a creation—for violating rights that they do not possess.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s estate representatives to pursue the decedent’s constitutional claims, but family members cannot pursue those claims in their individual capacities.

White v. Topeka, City of · filed 2020-09-28

Consistent with the parties’ position and Kansas law, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims asserted by plaintiff Kelly White in his individual capacity or on behalf of Dominique White’s minor children because Kelly White, acting in those modes of capacity, lacks standing to sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow surviving family members to recover damages on their own behalf for another person’s wrongful death.

Deloach v. Stevens · filed 2020-10-27

Plaintiffs’ attempt to recover damages on their own behalf under § 1983 for the wrongful death of Decedent is not permissible.

Section 1983 does not let parents bring their own claim based solely on a violation of their child’s rights.

Hoffman v. Tennessee Dept. of Children Services · filed 2020-11-24

Here, the Complaint alleges only that Plaintiffs’ child was assaulted while in an Omni Visions foster home. This is not a sufficient basis for Plaintiffs to bring their own Section 1983 claim against Omni Visions.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for deprivation of a benefit when the plaintiff lacks a legitimate property entitlement to it.

Smith v. Cooper · filed 1978-04-27

Plaintiffs assert a property interest in the federal funds withheld by the Board. ... To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. ... Since we find that plaintiffs' alleged interest in the federal funds withheld by the Board is non-existent, it follows necessarily that no cause of action has been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a property deprivation only when the deprivation is without due process of law, and the claim must plead the constitutional deprivation with specificity.

Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n · filed 1978-01-11

Although the complaint only states in broad, conclusory language that Miller had been deprived “rights, privileges and immunities under law", the gravamen of the § 1983 claim is apparently that plaintiff has a property interest in its quarry operation and that the defendants have deprived Miller of the full use of that property. Because the property interest is protected by the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff asserts that the complaint states a cause of action under § 1983. The fallacy of this argument is that not every deprivation of property is a constitutional violation. Only when an individual has been deprived of property without due process of law has he been injured in a constitutional sense. U.S.Const. Amend. XIV. The complaint does not specify what due process rights Miller has been denied or even that there was a denial of due process. The complaint is, therefore, defective since Civil Rights actions in this circuit must be pled with specificity.

Section 1983 protects personal civil rights, not natural rights arising from ownership of personal property; enforcing a valid ordinance in strict compliance with its abatement provision falls outside the statute's scope.

Martin v. George J. King, Marshal of the Town of Buena Vista · filed 1969-11-05

The ordinance is valid, and the execution thereof by King in strict compliance with its abatement provision is not within the ambit of the Civil Rights Acts. Such acts protect personal civil rights and not natural rights stemming from the ownership of personal property.

Section 1983 does not support a claim whose gist is damage or injury to property or independent impairment of a business venture, although a properly proven political vendetta that burdens constitutional rights may state a claim.

National Land & Investment Company v. Arlen Specter · filed 1970-07-20

Without professing absolute certainty about the matter, we, too, are inclined toward the Stone view that the Civil Rights Act was not designed to support a cause of action, the "gist" of which is damage or injury to property. Hague v. C.I.O., supra, 307 U.S. at 531, 59 S.Ct. 954 (Stone, J.). We doubt that Congress ever intended that a corporation and its stockholders should be able to invoke § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart to enjoin state investigative and criminal proceedings, based on the independent and separate allegation that the success of a business venture is being threatened or impaired. Of course, this is not to say that an allegation of a personal vendetta by an elected public official to stifle his political opponents by injuring their business enterprises would not, under proper proof, state a claim under the Civil Rights Act. But even viewing appellants' apparently separate claim of injury to property as part of a wider charge that this injury was intended to, and did, burden them in the exercise of their constitutional rights, such claim as not been substantiated. See the discussion and disposition of appellants' First Amendment allegations, supra.

Section 1983 is available for a civil-rights action alleging deprivation of property rights; the court rejected a personal-liberty/property-right distinction as a basis for dismissing the action.

Monell v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF CITY OF NY · filed 1972-04-12

In Eisen v. Eastman, the Second Circuit had held that jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Acts, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), could not be predicated on a claim of infringement of property rights. However, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1115, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) ruled that it “has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietory rights as a guide to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction” and expressly rejected the distinction. The complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not support a civil-rights action whose gist is the deprivation of a property right rather than a personal right.

Grissom v. Branch & Associates, Inc. · filed 1972-03-27

This action cannot be sustained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) 1, for reasons which shall become apparent. ... Blume notwithstanding, it is the opinion of this court that upon the facts of this case the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), as alleged, since the gist of the suit is an alleged deprivation of a property *897right. ... For these purposes, the interpretation of the “right, privilege or immunity” language of § 1343(3) shall also apply to the identical words (in the plural) in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations of property rights under color of state law and does not limit that remedy to personal liberties.

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. · filed 1972-04-24

The “cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored," Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503; Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U. S., at 437, thus counsels a refusal to pare down § 1343 (3) jurisdiction— and the substantive scope of § 1983 — by means of the distinction between personal liberties and property rights, or in any other way.

Section 1983 permits federal civil-rights suits seeking redress for deprivation of property rights; jurisdiction is not limited to claims involving personal rights.

Rosen v. Hursh · filed 1972-07-26

The jurisdictional issue is controlled, of course, by Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., supra. Whether the questions sought by Mrs. Rosen to be resolved involved rights properly characterized as "personal" or as "property," they are subject to federal adjudication.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a claim seeking redress for an infringement of property rights.

Picking v. STATE FINANCE CORPORATION · filed 1971-05-06

Because plaintiff’s complaint seeks redress for an “infringement of property rights,” Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1940), no cause of action is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 protects property rights, and applies when government action adversely affects the property right or its peaceful enjoyment even without completely destroying the property.

Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon · filed 1974-01-30

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, does not only protect personal liberties but property rights as well. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). It is not necessary, however, that the property involved be completely destroyed in order for the law to apply; it is only necessary that the property right or its peaceful enjoyment be affected adversely.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional claims involving property rights as well as personal rights.

Miranda v. Hicks · filed 1974-09-30

The Supreme Court has expressly held that a federal court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not diminished by any distinction between personal and property rights. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972).

A § 1983 claim belongs to the claimant asserting a personal right, not to the deceased person's estate.

Smialek v. Begay · filed 1986-07-25

The Wrongful Death Act (NMSA 1978, §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl.Pamp.1982)) and Section 45-3-902 of the Probate Code (NMSA 1978, §§ 45-1-101 through 45-7-401), discuss the order of priorities of those claiming benefits for or assets of a deceased’s estate, but a Section 1983 claim deals with the claimant’s personal right, not the right of the deceased’s estate.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for violations of that person’s own rights, not another person’s rights.

Brumfield v. Don Jones, Mayor, in His Official Capacity · filed 1988-06-24

The right to sue under the Civil Rights Act is personal in nature.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of property without due process as well as deprivations of personal liberties.

Gillihan v. Duane Shillinger Tom Shanyfelt and John Bunch · filed 1989-04-12

Section 1983 does not distinguish between personal liberties and property rights, and a deprivation of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 protects property rights, including riparian rights, as well as personal rights.

Bentley v. Ellam · filed 1991-05-15

We also reject the defendant’s reliance upon Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140 (N.D.Ala.1971), for the proposition that riparian rights, being “property” rights rather than “personal” ones, are not protectible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of property without due process as well as deprivations of personal liberty.

ABBOTT v. McCOTTER · filed 1994-01-18

Turning from plaintiff's transfer to the confiscation of his property, we note that "[s]ection 1983 does not distinguish between personal liberties and property rights, and a deprivation of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under Sec. 1983." Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 1120, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972)).

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of personal property without due process regardless of the property's value.

Ferranti v. Moran · filed 1980-04-18

It is well-established that a civil rights action under .section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), will lie for a claimed deprivation of personal property without due process, ... irrespective of the value of such property.

Section 1983 claims must rest on violations of the plaintiff’s own rights, not a relative’s rights.

Van Deelen v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District 512 · filed 2004-02-18

As such, the court must keep firmly in mind the well-settled principle that a § 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.

Section 1983 protects property rights as well as personal liberties.

Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co. · filed 1975-02-04

Cameron-Brown also argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deals only with a deprivation of personal liberties rather than a protection of property rights. However, this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972).

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that a sheriff, acting under color of state law, deprived a person of property in violation of constitutional rights.

Cruz v. Lyman Cardwell, Sheriff of Taney County, Missouri · filed 1973-10-31

We conclude from our examination of the complaint in this case that it states a claim for relief under 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating federal rights, but liability requires personal involvement in the violation.

Brannum v. Overton Cnty Sch Bd · filed 2008-02-20

The decision as to the location of the cameras and how and when they would be used was beyond their personal involvement and their role in the matters giving rise to this suit are too indirect to subject them to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits claims for deprivations of constitutionally protected property rights; it is not limited to personal liberties.

Hofferber v. First Nat. Bank of Guymon, Oklahoma · filed 1977-08-04

Therefore, Defendants’ argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deals only with personal liberties is without merit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to claim a violation of their own rights, rather than someone else’s.

Jones v. Rainey · filed 2019-06-28

It is well settled that “a section 1983 claim must be based upon the violation of plaintiff’s personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.” Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1990). ... Jones’s claims based on wrongs done allegedly to anyone other than himself are dismissed with prejudice—as to him—as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 claims alleging police harassment that implicates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are substantial enough to confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and overlapping state-law claims do not justify abandoning that federal jurisdiction.

Estella Brown v. Commander Knox · filed 1977-03-23

First, the federal § 1983 claim is substantial. The allegations of police harassment certainly suffice to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. ... No abstention doctrine requires federal courts to relinquish their jurisdiction over federal claims simply because the same facts would state a claim under state law. Indeed, in the § 1983 context such “abstention” would be peculiarly inappropriate.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for specific relief but does not itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Conover v. Montemuro · filed 1969-09-24

Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is a jurisdictional statute: these enactments merely create forms of action for specific relief, available in the federal courts only when subject-matter jurisdiction is properly grounded on a jurisdictional statute.

Section 1983 gives federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief alongside state-court jurisdiction over the same subject.

Carothers v. Follette · filed 1970-07-15

Our jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supplements, and is concurrent with, such jurisdiction as has been granted by New York State to its courts in the same area.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil-rights action without a jurisdictional amount in controversy or exhaustion of available state remedies.

Anderson v. Solomon · filed 1970-08-11

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No jurisdictional amount in controversy is required. ... Plaintiffs do not lack standing because they have not exhausted available state remedies, including Sections 1 and 21 of old Article 59 and new Sections 14 and 15 of Article 59 as now in effect.

Section 1983 creates a federal claim when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, and an action within its terms may be heard in federal court.

Jerald Gere, a Minor by His Father and Next Friend, Paul Gere v. Emory R. Stanley, as Superintendent of Blue Ridge School District · filed 1971-12-27

Thus, without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case. ... Section § 1983 gives rise to a federal claim when any “person [acting under color of State law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ” ... We cannot say that these allegations are so “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” that we are thereby divested of jurisdiction. ... Although it might be tempting to disclaim jurisdiction in controversies such as this one, a careful consideration of the statutes and cases impels the conclusion that we have the power to adjudicate the issues presented here.

Section 1983 gives a federal court jurisdiction to hear an action brought within the statute's terms, regardless of the case's ultimate merits.

Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver Junior-Senior High School · filed 1972-04-13

Part of the controversy surrounding long hair cases is the threshold question whether the federal courts even have the power to adjudicate the issue. ... This Court has addressed this question and had decided that federal courts do have jurisdiction. ... without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

An action that falls within § 1983's terms may be heard by a federal court.

Stull v. School Board of the Western Beaver Junior-Senior High School · filed 1972-04-13

This Court lias addressed this question and had decided that federal courts do have jurisdiction. In Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971), the Court said: “ . without regard to the ultimate disposition on the merits, if an action is brought within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it follows that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case.”

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction where the court finds no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Portner v. Franck · filed 1972-10-11

The Order and the manner in which the special counsel and his staff have conducted the investigation have not violated any of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... Since there is no violation of Mr. Portner’s constitutional rights, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 supports a federal civil-rights action for claimed constitutional discrimination and related injunctive relief.

Morris v. Michigan State Board of Education · filed 1973-01-25

On the basis of the pleadings and such record as has been developed thus far in this proceeding in the District Court, we believe that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to consider the claimed discrimination involved in the exclusion of girls from interscholastic competition in noncontact sports and to enter a temporary injunction in relation thereto.

Section 1983 permits federal jurisdiction over claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants involved in allegedly peaceable repossessions.

Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp. · filed 1971-03-17

Insofar as the complaints seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants Wolke and Krause, we believe there is jurisdiction in this court under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). This is true notwithstanding the contention that the repossessions were peaceable in the case at bar. The motions for dismissal by Wolke and Krause must be denied.

Section 1983 actions may be brought in state courts because the statute does not make federal-court jurisdiction exclusive.

Brown v. Pitchess · filed 1975-02-19

The majority of courts considering the question concur in our conclusion that state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in federal court under the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Husbands v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1975-03-31

1. We have jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 covers Puerto Rico as a Territory or State, allowing redress for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of Puerto Rican law.

Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. De Otero · filed 1976-06-17

Finally, § 1983, by its terms, applies to Territories; Puerto Rico, but not the District of Columbia, obviously was one of these. Whether Puerto Rico is now considered a Territory or a State, for purposes of the specific question before us, makes little difference because each is included within § 1983 and, therefore, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).

Section 1983 protects personal statutory rights concerning food and shelter and qualifies as an Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights for purposes of § 1343(4) jurisdiction.

Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Inc. v. Raymond W. Vowell, Etc. · filed 1977-07-13

In analogous contexts we have held that statutory rights concerning food and shelter are “rights of an essentially personal nature” and that plaintiffs may invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to protect those rights. ... we have held that § 1983 is an “Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights”, sufficient to invoke § 1343(4) jurisdiction.

Section 1983 supports a federal civil-rights action alleging that defendants acting under color of state law violated federal rights, and the court found jurisdiction proper under that provision.

Sovereign News Co. v. Falke · filed 1977-10-31

The complaint alleges an excess of 10,000 dollars in controversy, and charges that the defendants violated Sovereign’s federal civil rights while acting under color of state law. Thus paragraphs two and three of Sovereign’s complaint allege original federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(1), 1343(3), 1343(4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sovereign also seeks a declaratory judgment and therefore alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The court finds that jurisdiction is proper under each statutory provision cited in Sovereign’s complaint.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of the Constitution, not for violations of state law or regulations alone.

Durkin v. Taylor · filed 1977-11-10

This Court’s function under Section 1983 is to determine not whether defendants violated State law or regulation, but whether they violated the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a remedial cause of action but does not itself confer federal-court jurisdiction.

Margarette CURTIS et al. v. TAYLOR · filed 1980-09-11

While the plaintiffs predicate their cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is only remedial; it recognizes a cause of action but it does not of itself bestow jurisdiction of the action on federal courts.

Section 1983 permits constitutional challenges to generally applicable state bar-admission rules.

Bailey v. Board of Law Examiners of State of Tex. · filed 1980-12-22

This Court does have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to determine whether generally applicable rules and procedures for admission to the Bar impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to forgo federal relief merely because a state judicial remedy exists.

Moton v. Lambert · filed 1981-03-06

The existence of a state judicial remedy is, of course, totally irrelevant to federal court § 1983 jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not itself confer federal jurisdiction when a complaint alleges no tortious violation of a federally protected right.

Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Division · filed 1981-12-07

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these complaints because none alleges the tortious violation of any federally protected rights. The denomination of these complaints as § 1983 actions does not alone give the district court jurisdiction to hear them.

When a Section 1983 cause of action and federal-question jurisdiction are intertwined, the court must take jurisdiction and decide the merits unless the federal claim is immaterial, jurisdictionally contrived, wholly insubstantial, or frivolous.

Eubanks v. O.L. McCotter Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Defendants · filed 1986-10-17

Because the federal causes of action in appellants’ complaint were neither immaterial nor frivolous, the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by a federal regulation when the regulation is sufficiently specific for judicial enforcement.

Ermler v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 1992-01-16

However, Howard, is distinguishable from the instant case because, unlike 47 C.F.R. § 97.111, the regulation here at issue is sufficiently specific for easy judicial enforcement.

Section 1983 is a remedial statute and does not independently confer federal jurisdiction.

Ernst & Young v. Depositors Economic Protection Corp. · filed 1994-06-03

Similarly, 42 U,S,C. § 1983, as a remedial statute, does not confer federal jurisdiction independently.

A § 1983 claim supports federal jurisdiction if its underlying federal claim is neither frivolous nor insubstantial.

Henn v. City of Highland Heights · filed 2001-02-08

The standard for jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, however, requires only that the underlying federal claim not be “either frivolous or ... insubstantial.”

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action but does not itself give federal district courts jurisdiction over the claim.

Goldsmith v. Mayor of Baltimore · filed 1988-01-19

Section 1983 does embrace Goldsmith’s claims that Ordinance Number 625 enacted by the City Council and Mayor of Baltimore deprives her of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws,” to wit, due process protection before discharge from employment. However, the federal cause of action created by this section does not itself confer jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to adjudicate these claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a catch-all route to federal court for matters within state courts' exclusive jurisdiction.

Tonti v. James C. Petropoulous and Richard B. Metcalf · filed 1981-07-27

This litigation represents yet another misuse of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an attempt to obtain federal jurisdiction. This civil rights statute was never intended as a catch-all under which a myriad of suits, traditionally within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, can be brought in the federal courts.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations of joint action with a state actor to support a conspiracy claim against private attorneys.

Walker v. Family Court Judge Catherine Cholakis · filed 2020-06-29

Therefore, the allegation should be dismissed under 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff fails to state a claim under §1983 against Drescher and Foley.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an agreement and overt, concerted acts to hold a private party liable for conspiring with state actors.

Markham v. Rosenbaum · filed 2020-06-18

Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory and he fails to set forth any agreement or any overt, concerted acts to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

A private actor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory without evidence of a conspiracy with state actors.

Warne Young v. County of Hawaii · filed 2014-06-16

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Ostendorp on Young’s § 1983 claim. Ostendorp, a private actor, told HIHS that Roberta Young had legal authority to transfer the dogs. The agency verified these representations by speaking to Roberta Young and obtaining a copy of the notarized POA. Even assuming that Ostendorp and Roberta Young conspired to obtain the POA fraudulently, Young presented no evidence of a conspiracy between the HIHS defendants and Ostendorp.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires an agreement with a state actor to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act causing damages.

Pacicca v. Stead · filed 2011-11-14

To support a claim against a private party on a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must show “(1) an agreement between a state actor ... and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002). Pacicca presents no evidence that Stead entered a conspiracy with White Plains police.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires evidence of an agreement with a government actor to violate constitutional rights.

Mertens v. Shensky · filed 2009-12-08

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against defendant Barker because Mertens did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barker entered into a conspiracy with any government actor.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who conspires with arresting officers only if a preconceived plan prevents the officers from independently determining whether there is cause to arrest; merely reporting alleged misconduct is insufficient.

Gonzales v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. · filed 2007-03-14

To hold a private party liable for a conspiracy with arresting officers to violate a plaintiff’s civil rights, the plaintiff must show “that the arresting officer did not make an independent determination whether there was cause to arrest” because of a “preconceived plan” between the private party and the arresting officers; it is insufficient to merely show that the defendant informed the police of alleged misconduct.