42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Florida county is a proper defendant in a § 1983 suit against its sheriff in his official capacity.

Seraphin Ex Rel. Estate of Seraphin v. Parapella · filed 2007-05-16

Significantly, Lucas is the only case that addressed the dismissal of a county defendant in a claim brought against a sheriff and a county pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, these recent cases provide additional support that Lucas should be followed, and no reading of these cases suggests that the county is not a proper party when a sheriff in Florida is sued in his or her official capacity. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Broward County is a proper party to this lawsuit, not a nominal party.

Section 1983 permits claims against a municipal officer in his individual capacity.

Haber v. County of Nassau · filed 1976-04-01

In short, this Court has jurisdiction over the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against defendant Sehlmeyer in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against state officials in their official capacity.

Anderson v. Luther · filed 1981-03-11

Section 1983 does not authorize actions against state officials in their official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against a state officer for prospective relief that ends an ongoing violation of federal law.

Giaquinto v. Commissioner of New York State Department of Health · filed 2008-06-12

In light of Young and its progeny, we agree with petitioner and hold that the relief petitioner sought was prospective in nature; accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar petitioner’s suit against respondent.

A Section 1983 suit against a state official in an official capacity is treated as a suit against the state itself.

King v. St of LA Dept of Pub · filed 2008-09-23

It is well-settled that a section 1981 or 1983 suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself; accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the actions against all defendants sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against municipal employees to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional harm or that the employees were municipal policymakers.

Palmer v. Bartosh · filed 2008-10-23

Here, because the Palmers failed to plead the existence of a District policy or custom establishing a causal nexus between the District and the Defendants' conduct or that the Defendants are policymakers for the District, the Palmers failed to state a cause of action against the Defendants in their official capacities under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit retrospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Robinson v. Allstate · filed 2008-11-06

As such, state officials, such as the moving defendants, cannot be sued in their official capacities for retrospective relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officers sued in their official capacities.

Carter v. Porter · filed 2008-11-12

Consequently, the court will dismiss the plaintiffs § 1983 claim regarding acts done by the defendants in their official capacities as members of the KSP.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against municipal officers may be dismissed as redundant when the plaintiff can obtain the same relief from the municipality.

Trafford v. City of Westbrook · filed 2009-03-06

In short, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any relief that can be granted to him on his official capacity claims that he cannot possibly obtain based on his Section 1983 claims against Westbrook. ... Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to dismiss the official capacity claims against Chu-luda and Littlefield as redundant.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against a state official sued in an official capacity because the official is a person under the statute.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Tristano · filed 1990-04-06

A state official sued for prospective relief in his or her official capacity is a person under § 1983. ... Therefore, the claims for prospective relief survive the motion to dismiss.

State officials sued in their individual capacities may be personally liable under § 1983 even when their acts were official in nature.

Jess White v. Ronald O. Gregory Michael House · filed 1993-08-23

Because White sued Defendants “as individuals,” dismissal under Will was inappropriate.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons for claims that do not seek prospective relief.

Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University, Inc. · filed 1997-07-03

Additionally, in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that state officials sued in their official capacity are not “persons” under Section 1983 and, therefore, they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. ... However, as claims against state actors acting in their official capacities are barred, the claims filed against State and CSS Defendants ... in their official capacities should be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officers sued in their personal capacities despite Eleventh Amendment protection for those officers in their official capacities.

Workman v. MINGO COUNTY SCHOOLS · filed 2009-11-03

Ms. Workman may pursue her claims for damages against the individual defendants only by suing them in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 claims may proceed against officials in their individual capacities when the complaint expressly indicates that capacity.

Bird Ex Rel. Bird v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-01-28

Because the complaint expressly stated that Bird was suing Crews and Groat "Individually" and because Bird's opposition to Crews and Groat's summary judgment motion left no doubt that Bird intended to sue Crews and Groat in their individual capacities, it was error for the court to conclude that Bird sued Crews and Groat in their official capacities only.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their individual capacities and does not make them absolutely immune solely because their acts were official.

Slinger v. New Jersey · filed 2010-02-22

The Supreme Court held in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits brought against state officials in their individual capacities, even if the actions which are the subject of the suit were part of their official duties: “We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature of their acts.” ... We conclude, accordingly, that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims brought by the Slingers against Ap-pellees in their individual capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Section 1983 claims against TDCJ officials in their official capacity are treated as suits against the state and barred by sovereign immunity.

Jim H. Hamilton, Jr. v. Pechacek · filed 2010-03-11

When sued under section 1983 in an official capacity, a suit against a TDCJ official is a suit against the State of Texas and is thus barred by sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are against the state.

Walthour v. CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES · filed 2010-07-14

In other words, a claim against Judicial Defendants in their official capacity is simply a claim against the state, and a state cannot be sued under Section 1983 for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state official when the claim is treated as one against the state, which is not a person under the section.

Chestang v. ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY · filed 2011-05-17

For this reason, Chestang’s claims against Simpson in his official capacity are claims against the state of Mississippi which are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities.

B & B Target Center, Inc. v. Figueroa-Sancha · filed 2012-07-03

Defendants can be sued for damages in their individual capacity, however, and because the plaintiffs’ claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation is moving forward, the defendants may still be liable. This logic is also applicable to the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, a remedy that can be awarded against state officials acting in their official capacity despite the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Santiago v. Keyes · filed 2012-08-21

To begin, Keyes is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against him in his official capacity brought under sections 1983 and 1985. ... Accordingly, the Court held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state official sued in her official capacity because the official is not a “person” subject to liability under the section.

PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele · filed 2012-10-09

Even in the absence of a jurisdictional defect, the claims for money damages would nevertheless fail for the independent reason that the Secretary, when sued in her official capacity, is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Enriquez v. Oliver Bell, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice · filed 2013-12-11

With respect to appellant’s section 1983 claim, the United States Supreme Court has held that neither a state, nor its officials, while acting in their official capacity, are “persons” who may be liable for damages under section 1983. ... Accordingly, we conclude appellant cannot maintain his section 1983 claim against the appellees, who were all sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity suit against a municipal officer as a suit against the municipality, so a claim against both may be dismissed as duplicative.

Kanderskaya v. City of New York · filed 2014-04-09

As an initial matter, I dismiss Kan-derskaya’s claims against Kelly because they are duplicative of her other claims against New York City. Kanderskaya’s claims against Kelly are against him in his (former) official capacity, as an officer of the City. “[A] § 1983 suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity is treated as an action against the municipality itself.”

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit for monetary damages.

Chaney v. Louisiana Work Force Commission · filed 2014-05-14

It is settled law that a suit against state officials in their official capacities does not qualify as a suit against “persons” under § 1983, and Chaney’s claims must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Sherley v. Thompson · filed 2014-11-24

First, state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “person[s]” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are against the state, which is not a person under the statute.

Oliver v. Baity · filed 2016-09-23

Accordingly, because Baity, a North Carolina Highway Trooper, is a state actor, Plaintiffs official capacity claims are, in effect, claims against the State which is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Calzone v. Josh Hawley · filed 2017-08-07

Therefore, it was error for the court to dismiss Calzone’s as-applied claims against the superintendent for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the meaning of “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats claims for money damages against state officials in their official capacities as claims against the state.

Stanko v. South Dakota Highway Patrol · filed 2018-03-28

In so far as Mr. Stanko alleges defendants Moser and Dropper violated his constitutional rights in their official capacities, the court finds the § 1983 claims for money damages in counts 1, 3 and 6 are actually claims against the State of South Dakota.

A sheriff enforcing a state-court eviction order acts for the state and cannot be sued for that action under § 1983 in his official capacity.

Daniels v. Grady · filed 2018-04-02

When enforcing the state-court eviction order Kramer was a state actor, and Daniels cannot allege a § 1983 claim for that action.

Section 1983 suits against state officials in their official capacities are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2018-06-14

A § 1983 suit, however, may be brought only against a state official in his personal capacity. A suit against a state government official in his or her official capacity is the same as a suit against the entity [the state] of which the officer is an agent and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state official in an official capacity when the claim is treated as a suit against the state, which is not a person under the section.

Brown v. Belt · filed 2019-04-15

Further, to the extent that Colonel Smithers is being sued in these counts in his official capacity, those claims are more properly classified as suits against the entity – in this case, the State of West Virginia – which is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief, but not damages.

Kille, Sr. v. Calderin · filed 2019-05-10

However, while a state official may not be sued in an official capacity for damages under § 1983, they may be sued for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Clark v. Jameson · filed 2019-07-31

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officials for actions taken in their official duties, and sovereign immunity does not bar those suits.

Avery v. Difiore · filed 2019-08-06

In fact, individual-capacity lawsuits against government officers for actions taken in the exercise of their official duties represent the rule, not the exception, in Section 1983 litigation. ... Accordingly, although the question is a close one, the Court concludes that Avery seeks relief against Defendants in their individual capacities and, thus, that the Eleventh Amendment does not pose an obstacle to her claims.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a suit against a state official in an official capacity when the plaintiff seeks no prospective injunctive relief.

Curry v. Obaisi · filed 2019-08-12

A Section 1983 suit against a State official in his or her official capacity is an action against the State itself. But such a suit is generally prohibited.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Williamson v. Kenney · filed 2019-08-16

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983.

Redmond v. Birrenkott · filed 2019-08-20

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor for Mr. Redmond’s claim for damages against them in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state official sued in an official capacity because the official is not a “person” under the section.

Stewart v. Mesrobian · filed 2019-09-10

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacity are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... So, damages are not recoverable on the official capacity claim against Steele under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit retrospective money damages against a state official sued in his official capacity.

Blatt v. Touchette · filed 2019-09-17

As Defendant correctly argues, however, a constitutional claim for retrospective money damages against a state official in his official capacity cannot be maintained under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Goff v. Pickens · filed 2019-10-03

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state official sued in his official capacity for damages is not a “person” under § 1983.

Mitchell v. GEO Group Inc · filed 2019-10-04

As a state official, Defendant Honaker is not a “person” under § 1983 insofar as he is sued in his official capacity for damages, and Plaintiff has not stated a claim for any underlying constitutional violation for which he may obtain prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Elliott v. Segal · filed 2019-10-15

Second, state government officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” properly subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Morris v. Dickman · filed 2019-11-04

The district court also correctly dismissed Morris’s official-capacity claim against Fremgen. This is effectively a claim for damages against the state and thus it is not permitted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, though it permits claims for prospective injunctive relief.

WILCOX v. MARTINEZ · filed 2019-11-18

Since a claim against a state official in his or her official capacity is essentially a claim against the state, § 1983 claims are not permitted against state officials in their official capacities, except to the extent that such claims seek prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their individual capacities; sovereign immunity does not bar those claims.

GOODE v. CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2019-11-22

It is beyond a doubt that state officials may be sued under Section 1983 in their individual capacities; the statute would be a dead letter if they could not.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity damages claim against a state official who acts under color of state law.

Isabell v. Trustees of Indiana University The · filed 2020-01-07

Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights “under color of state law” committed by a “person” that the law defines precisely. Dr. Dobrzykowski is just such a person, but not in her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Carr v. Pfaffenberger · filed 2020-01-14

State officials sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Francis v. Boling · filed 2020-02-04

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages from a state officer or employee in his official capacity, he fails to allege a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities because the State is not a person under the section.

Walck v. Bertsch · filed 2020-02-20

A suit for damages against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the State, and the State is not a person under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities, but permits claims for prospective injunctive relief.

Mothe v. Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors · filed 2020-03-09

In this case, Plaintiffs’ improperly seek money damages rather than injunctive relief under § 1983 against Defendants Kim Michel, S.J. Brasseaux, and Dianne Alexander in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against a state or its officials in their official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Marin v. Griffith · filed 2020-03-16

Such claims are barred because a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, and because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials acting in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities when those claims are effectively against the state.

Malone v. Privratsky · filed 2020-01-30

Furthermore, Congress has not abrogated State sovereign immunity against suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant are tantamount to claims against the State of California, which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983 and are immune from damages claims under the Eleventh Amendment.

Adkins v. Chandler · filed 2020-02-24

The magistrate judge found that “to the extent [] David Ballard, or any other defendant, is being sued in an official capacity, they are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under section 1983 and are otherwise immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” ... Instead, the magistrate judge’s finding is correctly based on the above-cited precedent, which extends immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to state officials. ... Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state prison employees sued only in their official capacities.

Gilmer v. Elsinger · filed 2020-04-13

Suits against prison employees in their official capacities are suits against the state itself.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity claims against state correctional officers because they are not persons under the statute.

Ross v. Carver · filed 2020-05-05

“[N]Jeither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Thus, plaintiff's claims against these named defendants in their “official capacities” cannot be sustained.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against municipal officers may be dismissed as duplicative when the municipality is also a defendant.

Frazier v. Trulock · filed 2020-05-06

So, any claims against Trulock and Henry in their official capacities are really suits against the City of Horse Cave. ... As such, Frazier’s Section 1983 claims against Trulock and Henry in their official capacities will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Costello v. Kenney · filed 2020-05-26

In addition, when a state official is sued in his official capacity for monetary damages, he is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity because that official is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Edelen v. Mazza · filed 2020-07-01

In addition, when a state official is sued in his official capacity for monetary damages, he is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims for compensatory damages against state officials are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Coe v. Dysinger · filed 2020-07-07

Plaintiff brings his claims against nineteen of the twenty-one defendants in their official capacities only. These official capacity claims for compensatory damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their personal capacities.

Foster v. State of Washington · filed 2020-07-16

However, neither the Eleventh Amendment nor § 1983 bar claims against state officials in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” subject to suit under the statute.

Thacker v. Graves · filed 2020-07-20

A state official sued in his official capacity for damages is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state official in his official capacity because the claim is against the state.

Kucinsky v. Pfister · filed 2020-07-29

Therefore, a suit against Pfister, in his official capacity as the warden of Pontiac, was a suit against IDOC, a state entity, and thus, a suit against the state. Consequently, the circuit court could not entertain a ... section 1983 action for damages against Pfister in his official capacity.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, so official-capacity claims against its employees fail.

Wright v. Anderson · filed 2020-08-12

Thus, because a state is not a “person” for the purposes of § 1983 and a suit against the state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiff’s claim against defendants Anderson, Bye, and Hacker in their official capacities will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Wright v. Lassiter · filed 2020-08-14

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 official-capacity claim against a successor official requires a basis to conclude that an institutional policy or custom will persist under the successor.

Muslow v. Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College · filed 2020-08-18

Thus, unless “an official’s actions reflect an institutional policy that could be assumed to persist under that official’s successor,” a suit against the official’s successor is moot and must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

State officials sued in their official capacity are not persons under Section 1983.

Krauss v. Mississippi County · filed 2020-09-24

“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... As such, the complaint is legally frivolous as to defendant Jay Holcomb in his official capacity, and plaintiffs claim against him will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, but does not permit damages against the state.

Chuol v. Frankes · filed 2020-11-13

State officials sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief are “persons” under section 1983, because official capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity damages claim against a state judge because the state is not a person subject to suit.

Frisby v. The State of California Department of Justice · filed 2020-11-23

California is not a “person” subject to Section 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are treated as claims against the state.

Coronado v. Paralta · filed 2020-11-30

The rule that state agencies cannot be sued under § 1983 also applies to claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Glenn-El v. Fluharty · filed 2020-12-09

As discussed above, the State of Missouri is not a person for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A state official’s status as a person under § 1983 in an official-capacity suit depends on the relief sought; a claim for injunctive relief may proceed.

Avery v. Benson · filed 2020-12-16

But we have held repeatedly, in reliance on footnote ten in Will, that the “personhood” of official capacity defendants under § 1983 turns on the relief a plaintiff seeks.

Section 1983 provides a right to sue state and local officials for alleged violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Giddens v. Lawson · filed 2020-12-16

Section 1983, on the other hand, specifically provides a right to sue state and local officials for the alleged violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Livingston v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-18

Plaintiff's official capacity claims against defendants Casey, Borton, Baker, and Sachse will be dismissed because they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because a state is not a person under the statute.

Pratt v. Director of Prisons · filed 2020-12-18

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state agency employees in their official capacities cannot proceed because of state sovereign immunity.

Kerr v. McKay · filed 2020-12-29

Specifically, as relevant to Kerr’s subsequent objections, the magistrate judge determined that insofar as the plaintiff asserts §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims against Whaley in his official capacity, she cannot do so inasmuch as the defendant works for the Department of Health and Human Resources, an agency of the sovereign State of West Virginia. ... The magistrate judge’s August 17, 2020 PF&R (ECF No. 18) be, and it hereby is, ADOPTED and INCORPORATED in full except that, ... the defamation claim alleged against the Department of Health and Human Resources will not be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against a state through a claim against a state official in an official capacity.

Coronado v. Paralta · filed 2021-01-06

The Court concluded that any claims against Brewster in his official capacity were claims against the State, and there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983.

Derby v. Wiskus · filed 2021-01-21

However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. As such, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state official because the official is not a person under the statute.

Horton v. Holloway · filed 2021-01-25

Accordingly, Horton's official-capacity claim against Parole Officer Foreman is subject to dismissal, either because Parole Officer Foreman is not considered a person under § 1983 or because the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to know that the defendant was a state actor at the time of the conduct.

Thaje R. Padgett, and Shauna D. Parks v. Thomas A. Wilson, and Paul White James Ruff Mool Sekhawat South Carolina State · filed 1995-10-18

Regarding Wilson's claim that Padgett failed to state a cause of action because she was unaware that Wilson was a state actor at the time of the incident, there is no requirement under Sec. 1983 that the plaintiff be aware that the defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to maintain a separate suit for equitable relief while a class action addressing the same alleged discrimination is pending.

Dayse v. Alford · filed 1995-10-25

A class action lawsuit against T.D.C.J.- I.D involving discrimination against African- American inmates is currently pending in the Southern District of Texas. 3 Dayse cannot maintain a separate suit for equitable relief.

A failure to follow Miranda procedures alone does not state a § 1983 claim because it does not establish a violation of a substantive constitutional right.

Parris v. Officer Hillary Taft · filed 2015-10-27

Under this precedent, we must conclude that Mr. Parris failed to state a claim under § 1983 because his allegation that the officers failed to follow Miranda procedures was insufficient to assert that the officers violated his substantive constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide civil damages for a failure to give Miranda warnings.

Locke v. James Greer, C.T. Caraway, Russell Ticer · filed 1992-05-29

The failure to give Miranda warnings is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Failure to give Miranda warnings cannot form the basis of a civil rights claim under Section 1983.

Termunde v. Mr. Scovell, Head of M.I.S., 1 · filed 1993-08-19

However, Miranda warnings are not a constitutional right, and a failure to issue Miranda warnings cannot form the basis of a civil rights claim.

Failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, create liability under § 1983.

Neighbour v. Patrolman Michael Covert Patrolman Joseph Kenny and the Village of Cooperstown · filed 1995-10-27

However, this seeming inconsistency is of no consequence in this case, since we hold that the failure to give Miranda warnings does not create liability under § 1983.

A failure to give Miranda warnings does not itself support damages under § 1983; the remedy is exclusion of compelled statements.

Veilleux v. Perschau · filed 1995-11-15

"the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a Section 1983 action."

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action for a Miranda violation; the remedy is exclusion of compelled self-incrimination.

Lemons v. Lewis · filed 1997-04-22

Even if the facts could be said to violate plaintiffs Miranda rights, the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an officer failed to give Miranda warnings.

Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir · filed 1998-09-16

The Squad’s failure to inform plaintiffs of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not, without more, result in § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a law enforcement officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Gradisher v. County of Muskegon · filed 2003-02-24

Regardless of whether such warnings were required, which the Court doubts to be the case, Plaintiffs have no claim under § 1983 based solely upon a law enforcement officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Chavez v. Martinez · filed 2003-05-27

Accordingly, Chavez’s failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on custodial questioning without Miranda warnings when the plaintiff’s statements were not used against her at trial.

Renda v. King · filed 2003-10-16

However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chavez, it is clear that Giuffre still is good law following Dickerson, and that the District Court properly ruled that questioning a plaintiff in custody without providing Miranda warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the plaintiff ’s statements are not used against her at trial.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a failure to give Miranda warnings; the remedy is exclusion of evidence obtained through compelled self-incrimination.

Sutherland v. Mizer · filed 2008-05-06

Thus, the remedy for a Miranda violation is to exclude the evidence of any unlawfully compelled self-incrimination tactics. Significantly, it does not constitute a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against law enforcement officials solely for failing to give Miranda warnings.

O'HAGAN v. Soto · filed 1981-04-08

There is no reason or support for subjecting law enforcement officials to civil liability for failure to give Miranda warnings.

Section 1983 does not provide money damages for a failure to give a Miranda warning because that failure does not violate a substantive Fifth Amendment right.

Lloyd v. Marshall · filed 2013-07-29

Even if we were to assume that Lloyd had been entitled to a Miranda warning, “failing to follow Miranda procedures . . . does not violate any substantive Fifth Amendment right such that a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 is created.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer merely for failing to give Miranda warnings.

Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha · filed 2015-06-25

Second, the mere failure to provide Miranda warnings does not subject an officer to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for failure to give Miranda warnings.

Fortson v. Los Angeles City Attorney's Office · filed 2017-04-07

Miranda claims, however, are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officers who obtain unwarned custodial statements used in a criminal case, even if those officers testify to the statements themselves.

Johnson v. Winstead · filed 2019-12-04

To be sure, and as discussed above, the statements had to be used in Johnson’s criminal case to subject Winstead and Las Cola to § 1983 liability, but that it was the interrogating officers who testified does not shield them from liability.

A failure to give Miranda warnings alone does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Cox v. Aversa · filed 2020-02-19

To the extent Plaintiff’s claim is based only on Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Miranda warning, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an alleged failure to give Miranda warnings when the plaintiff does not allege that an unwarned statement was admitted against him at trial.

Baez v. Duggan · filed 2020-04-08

In any event, he has no remedy under Section 1983 for any alleged Miranda violation in this action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings.

Bell v. Drakeford · filed 2020-04-10

However, “[t]he remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any ensuing self-incriminating statements . . . . The remedy is not a § 1983 action.” Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Accordingly, any claim based on an alleged failure to read Bell his Miranda rights is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to give Miranda warnings.

Griffin-Robinson v. Salov · filed 2020-05-06

Plaintiff’s claim premised on the police officers’ failure to provide her with Miranda warnings until several hours after her arrest must be dismissed because such a claim cannot proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no damages action for failure to give Miranda warnings.

(PC) Dixon v. Navarro · filed 2020-08-27

Plaintiff’s claim that prison officials did not provide him with Miranda warnings prior to assessing him a SHU term fails because there is no action for damages under § 1983 for failure to provide such warnings.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204.

Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven · filed 2011-05-04

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's (1) conclusion that 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204 may not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... We adopt the district court's carefully considered and thorough discussion of these issues.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of agency regulations beyond the rights conferred by the governing statute.

Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF NEW HAVEN · filed 2011-05-04

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's (1) conclusion that 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204 may not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... In other words, a right of action "can extend no further than" the personal right conferred by the plain language of the statute. ... We adopt the district court's carefully considered and thorough discussion of these issues.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to enforce a right supplied only by an agency regulation; the right must come from a federal statute.

Guzman v. Shewry · filed 2008-09-22

Thus, whatever the effect of HHS’s decision to retain the implementing regula- tion after the repeal of the statute, Guzman cannot contend that such regulation entitles him to a right enforceable in the § 1983 claim he has brought here.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a right created solely by an agency regulation; the right must come from a statute.

Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit · filed 2003-07-10

But because of controlling Supreme Court precedent, we hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal Medicaid regulations that have the force of law, including the requirement that states ensure transportation for recipients.

Boatman v. Hammons · filed 1998-12-18

This Circuit has held to the contrary that because federal regulations have the force of law, they must be characterized as “law” under § 1983. ... The content of the federal regulation at issue here is clear — states must ensure that Medicaid recipients have transportation to and from medical service providers. It is therefore necessary to provide applicants with written notice of a denial of assistance, including some explanation of the reasons therefor and the availability of review of the decision.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31 when the plaintiff has not shown that the regulation benefits a class including him.

Backlund v. Hessen · filed 1995-11-06

The Court finds no basis to conclude that Plaintiff is a member of the class intended to benefit from the regulation and therefore Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first requirement in Cort. Accordingly the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown he has a claim under § 1983 based upon an alleged violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce rights created by a Medicaid state-plan provision and an accompanying procurement regulation.

Value Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Mental Health · filed 1997-05-30

The Court therefore concludes that the plaintiff has met its burden under Wilder, and that 42 U.S.C. § 1936a(a)(4) and 45 C.F.R. § 74.43 create federal rights upon which the plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action under both § 1983 and Ex parte Young.

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of a requirement that arises only from a regulation rather than a federal statute.

Florida Pharmacy Ass'n v. Cook · filed 1998-09-04

First, the source of this alleged requirement is a regulation, not the statute itself, precluding enforcement of the requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of rights under the Telecommunications Act.

E. Spire Communications, Inc. v. Baca · filed 2003-06-12

Because none of e.spire’s federal Constitutional claims are viable, and the Telecommunications Act cannot support a claim under § 1983, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Cause of Action.

Section 1983 claims cannot be based on violations of state law.

Baker v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-06-01

A Section 1983 claim may not be based on a violation of state law. See Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim fails to extent that it is based on state housing laws.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police officer based on allegations of assault and battery.

Corcoran v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-29

Contrary to defendants' contention, a party may allege assault and battery as the basis for a suit under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie , 90 AD3d 841, 846-847 [2d Dept 2011]).

Section 1983 permits a separate damages action for alleged federal constitutional violations even when the plaintiff did not timely seek state judicial review of the challenged zoning decision.

Sundheim v. Board of Cty. Com'rs of Douglas Cty. · filed 1995-11-14

If, however, monetary damages are sought, because C.R.C.P. 106 does not provide for a remedy in damages, a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon alleged violations of federal constitutional rights may be maintained.

Section 1983 allows a property owner to seek relief for alleged constitutional violations arising from municipal land-use action without being confined to the four-month limitations period for a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

C & D Design, Build, Dev., LLC v. Village of Alexander, N.Y. · filed 2020-08-20

That relief is [*2]appropriately sought via an action based on 42 USC § 1983, and therefore the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings does not apply here ( see Sonne , 67 AD3d at 202-203; see also Matter of Karamalla v Devine , 159 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2018]; Mulcahy v New York City Dept. of Educ ., 99 AD3d 535, 536 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 1983 does not give prison officials qualified immunity for punishing an inmate who puts both his committed name and legal religious name on outgoing mail when that right was clearly established.

Malik v. Brown · filed 1995-11-28

A reasonable officer would not believe that it was proper to punish an inmate for mailing out correspondence with both his committed name and his religious name on it. Consequently, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity regarding the outgoing-mail issue.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a jail superintendent when the pleaded facts adequately support a claim against him as the person responsible for administering the facility.

Picard v. Pennsylvania Institutional · filed 1995-12-06

Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts which give rise to cognizable claims against Mr. O'Mara in his individual capacity, as the person responsible for the administration of the correctional facility (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) .

A sheriff or warden who controls jail policies and conditions may be a proper § 1983 defendant at the pleading stage when personal involvement remains in dispute.

Robinson v. Corriveau · filed 1995-12-07

The sheriff and the warden, who, on the pleadings, are in control of the jail in question, are the obvious defendants in a suit of this kind, and it is premature to dismiss them.

Section 1983 requires evidence that supervisory officials knew of or implemented an allegedly discriminatory practice before they can be held individually liable for it.

Lucien v. Peters III · filed 1997-02-06

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants Welborn and Page on this issue on the basis that these defendants, as wardens, only had "control over prison policy in general, [but] there is no evidence that either of them were personally involved in or aware of any practice of racial discrimination." Also, the court found that Welborn and Page had no "direct responsibility for assigning the plaintiff to particular cells at Menard." We agree that plaintiff failed to show that these officials were aware of or implementing racial criteria for making cell assignments.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only for a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Foote v. Spiegel · filed 1997-07-08

Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that an individual defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct.

Dewick v. Village of Penn Yan · filed 1997-07-14

Further, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating that the individual defendants were personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking personal liability to show that each defendant official caused the deprivation of a right.

Merritt v. M.D. Reed Charles Lanehart, Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1997-07-15

Merritt presented no evidence to establish that either defendant Reed or Lanehart made the reasons for his termination public. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (to establish personal liability in section 1983 action, plaintiff must show that defendant official caused deprivation of right).

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by a defendant in the challenged conduct; a prison superintendent who did not participate in medical treatment decisions is not liable for those decisions.

Beaven v. Daniel R. McBride Teofilo Bautista, and Stephen Kaski · filed 1997-07-15

Finally, Beaven does not establish the personal involvement of McBride in the treatment decisions made by Drs. Bautista and Kaski. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in his favor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing each defendant’s personal participation in an alleged constitutional violation.

Swan v. James Gomez B.J. Bunnell R. Scaggs R.W. Knowles, J. Moor, M.D. L. Murcavitch R. Bird · filed 1997-07-17

With respect to his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims and his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims, Swan failed to allege facts establishing the personal participation of defendant Scaggs or Bird. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on an official for a subordinate’s allegedly improper employment decision when the official did not personally participate in that decision.

Largo v. Vacco · filed 1997-07-18

Defendant Page merely signed a letter, and the only discretionary function which Defendant Vacco performed is that he directed a re-evaluation of the employees to be conducted by his subordinates, and ordered the termination of those whom the subordinates did not find sufficiently well qualified. This is not a civil rights violation on his part, even if it were to be shown that Flynn or Buscaglia, in discharging their mission had allowed allegedly improper political motivations to intrude upon their judgment.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.

Pressley v. Brownfield · filed 1997-07-21

"To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish defendants' personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right."

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between an individual defendant’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.

Bedford v. J.D. Sharp · filed 1997-07-23

Bedford has not alleged an affirmative link between the alleged mail tampering and the actions of defendant Sharp. Therefore, the suit cannot lie against Sharp in his individual capacity, either.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded against that defendant.

White-Ruiz v. City of New York · filed 1997-08-05

In addressing the question of the individual defendants’ responsibility for any constitutional violations, I note first that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged unlawful conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Davis v. Kelly · filed 1997-08-07

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s personal involvement in the purported unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers for failing to prevent another officer’s use of force when they were not in a position to prevent it and did not contribute to the injury.

Macias v. City of Las Vegas · filed 1997-08-13

The plaintiffs' argument that Officers Siwy and Kavon are liable under section 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to protect Macias is unavailing for the same reasons. Although they were present, the evidence shows that they were not in a position to prevent the "shoot situation." At the critical moment, Officers Siwy and Kavon were scurrying for cover. There is no evidence that they took any actions prior to the shooting that unreasonably "escalated the circumstances" or otherwise contributed to Macias's death.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Kalonji Rad Jihad v. Charles E. Wright, Step Huckins, Dawn MacMillan and M. Levenhagen, 1 · filed 1997-08-14

Notably, he did not allege how any of the defendants were personally responsible for making him suffer this alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. Hence, the defendants cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued individually to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Olivieri v. Matt L. Rodriguez · filed 1997-08-15

Even then he had no case against the only defendant whom he has named, the superintendent of the police department, unless the superintendent himself participated in publicizing the grounds of the discharge.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded.

Doyle v. Coombe · filed 1997-08-26

It is well settled that “[p]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Bartlett v. Correctional Medical · filed 1997-09-16

As for these claims, Mr. Bartlett’s complaint fails adequately to show personal participation by most of the defendants, see Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (personal participation is an essential allegation of a § 1983 claim) and Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (conclusory allegations are insufficient); or, the requisite culpable state of mind.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence that the defendant bore responsibility for the harm alleged.

J.R. Ewing Carrell v. James Rowland, Robert E. Borg, C. Hess, Correctional Officer, and Nancy Reid, Correctional Officer · filed 1997-09-24

Because the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Carrell, failed to establish that the defendant bore any responsibility for the attack on Carrell by Fonville, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to connect the defendant personally to the alleged constitutional harm.

Taylor v. Dennis Clark, Clothing Supervisor, Calipatria State Prison · filed 1997-09-24

Taylor, however, did not allege that defendant Clark was responsible for Taylor's discharge despite the fact that the district court specifically notified him of this deficiency in its dismissal of his first amended complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s direct personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Casaburro v. Giuliani · filed 1997-09-29

It is well settled in this Circuit that in a Section 1983 action a plaintiff must allege direct and personal involvement on the part of a defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a damages plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Fischl v. David Armitage, Corrections Sergeant, and S.A. Marshall, Corrections Officer, in Their Individual Capaci · filed 1997-10-09

In order to succeed on a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 liability requires proof that the defendant actually engaged in the conduct alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s federal rights.

DeVaughn v. City of Clanton, Ala. · filed 1997-10-22

Defendants correctly note that, in order to hold a state actor hable under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants actually engaged in the conduct she alleges violated her federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation for individual liability.

Allen v. Brown · filed 1997-10-23

We also conclude that because Allen conceded that defendant Daniels did not personally participate in the alleged violation of Allen's Eighth Amendment rights while he was confined in the Violent Control Unit, the district court did not err by dismissing this claim against defendant Daniels.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence that the defendant personally caused the constitutional deprivation; speculation about responsibility for lost legal mail does not suffice.

Bishop v. Daughtery · filed 1997-10-24

We agree with the district court that Bishop failed to raise a genuine material fact as to whether Daughtery was personally responsible for the loss of his mail. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (stating that to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show defendant's acts or omissions caused a constitutional deprivation); see also Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) ("mere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment").

Section 1983 requires an allegation of the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation to support a claim against that defendant in an individual capacity.

Horton v. Belinda D. Stewart, Superintendent Micc · filed 1997-10-24

Moreover, Horton's contention that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to sue Stewart in her individual capacity is meritless because he failed to allege Stewart's personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires a named defendant to have personally participated in the alleged violation of a right.

Canell v. Ted Ficken, Director of Cornerstone Drug Program Stan Mazur-Hart David Cook, Debbie Rios Rick Hul · filed 1997-10-27

Because Canell did not name the counselor as a defendant, and neither alleged nor submitted evidence that any named defendant monitored these conversations or knew about his counselor's conduct, Canell failed to establish that any of the defendants personally participated in the alleged violation of his right to confer with counsel.

Section 1983 requires a prison official to know of a constitutional deprivation and approve it, turn a blind eye to it, fail to remedy it, or otherwise personally participate in it.

Eddie King v. William O'sullivan, Owen Murray, and Debbie Fuqua · filed 1997-10-31

King must show that O'Sullivan and Fuqua knew of a constitutional deprivation and approved it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way personally participated in it.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials for medical care in which they played no role.

Allison v. Gomez · filed 1997-11-06

First, because Dr. Johnson was the only defendant who played any role in Allison's medical care, there is no basis for liability against the other defendants. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978) (recognizing that respondeat superior theory of liability cannot support claim under section 1983).

Section 1983 requires specific facts linking each defendant to the alleged deprivation of rights.

Maahs v. P.L. Kernan E. Baskerville G. Nakagawa Bonnie Garibay · filed 1997-11-06

We affirm that dismissal, because Maahs failed to allege specific facts to link each defendant to the purported due process violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, including when liability is sought against a supervisor.

Thomas v. Irvin · filed 1997-11-10

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s personal involvement in the purported unlawful conduct. ... In the absence of any proof of unconstitutional conduct on the part of defendants Irvin and Wolff in either a direct or supervisory capacity, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 damages require a defendant to be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Luttrell v. Nickel · filed 1997-11-19

Luttrell did not explain his delay in filing the motion nor did the amended complaint include any allegations of personal responsibility by the proposed additional defendants. ... “To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged rights violation; merely reporting another judge’s failure to report for an assignment to a state court does not state a claim.

Avellino v. Herron · filed 1997-12-16

Merely alleging that Judge Bonavitacola brought Judge Avellino’s failure to report to his assignment of presiding over felony waiver proceedings to the attention of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an arrest on an officer whose role was limited to serving a warrant obtained by another officer.

White v. Town of Marblehead · filed 1997-12-17

The problem is that the Plaintiff has sued the wrong officer. White has sued Hitchcock rather than King or Hazel, the officers who were more directly responsible for the arrest. Hitchcock’s role in this investigation was entirely ministerial. He simply served the arrest warrant obtained by King.