42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not treat states or their agencies as persons subject to suit.

White v. West Virginia Department of Transportation · filed 2018-08-06

Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that States and their agencies are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are therefore not subject to federal civil rights claims under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state court office because it is an arm of the state and therefore is not a “person” under the statute.

Haag v. Cook County Adult Probation Department · filed 2018-10-22

The Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County is an office within Illinois’s state court system, established by state statute. ... That means that it is not a person and is not subject to liability under § 1983.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Haddad v. Gregg · filed 2018-12-03

We uphold the district court’s ... judgment for the reasons given by the district court. The opinion and order of the district court is attached as an appendix to this opinion. ... It is well-settled that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Defendant DFIS and Defendants Gregg and Boven, in their official capacities, are entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not allow suits against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Smith v. Crittenden · filed 2019-01-30

State agencies are not persons under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because the agency is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Casey, Jr. v. 3M Company · filed 2019-02-12

Moreover, even if the Probation Department was not immune, it is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state agency is not a “person” under § 1983 and cannot be sued under the section for retrospective monetary relief.

Julio de Lima Silva v. State of Wisconsin, Department · filed 2019-02-22

Defendants also argue that plaintiff may not pursue his equal pro- tection claim against the DOC because it is not a “person” under § 1983. ... We agree this is an alternate basis from which we may affirm the district court’s summary judgment decision as to this claim (Count III).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because it is not a person subject to suit.

RASHEED v. FLOYD COUNTY CPS · filed 2019-07-16

Here, Floyd County CPS is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency.

Williams v. Catt · filed 2019-08-21

Plaintiff’s claim against Robinson Correctional Center, a division of the Illinois Department of Corrections, is barred because it is a state agency not subject to suit under Section 1983.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Uzzell v. Murray · filed 2019-09-17

However, neither the State nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Blake v. The State of New Mexico · filed 2019-09-20

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to suit.

Ray v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections · filed 2019-10-29

However, the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity protects the DOC from suit under § 1983 and, in any event, it is not considered a “person” for the purposes of § 1983.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are persons who may be sued under Section 1983.

Kelly v. Board of Community Health · filed 2019-10-30

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim pursuant to 24 USC § 1983 (“Section 1983”) is also not subject to the defense that the Board Members are not “persons” within the meaning of the Section.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency that is an arm of the state because the agency is not a person under the section.

Texas Medical Board and Scott Freshour, in His Official Capacity as General Counsel of the Texas Medical Board v. Telado · filed 2015-08-04

The Texas Lottery Commission is an “arm of the State” and not a person under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state parole board when a judgment against it would be a judgment against the State.

Davis v. State · filed 2017-10-06

Because any judgment against the Parole Board would be a judgment against the State, it is cloaked with the State’s 11th Amendment immunity and cannot be named as a defendant in an action brought under § 1983.

The Ohio Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 claims against the state or its agencies, which are not persons under the statute.

Young v. Dept. Rehab. & Corr. · filed 2018-06-29

Such conclusion "is consistent with the fact that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the state or its agencies, and that neither the state nor its agencies is a 'person' within the meaning in Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code." Deavors.

State agencies cannot be sued under Section 1983 because they are not persons under the statute.

West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission · filed 2019-11-15

But they cannot assert a § 1983 claim against the commission itself. This is because the commission is a state agency, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 does not allow claims directly against a state.

Section 1983 does not permit money-damages suits against a state department because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Kohn 199940 v. Crompton · filed 2019-11-15

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under §1983 for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state agency because the agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Carter v. Illinois Gaming Board · filed 2019-11-25

Under governing precedent, the appropriate course is to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the IGB on the merits because it is not a “person.”

State agencies that are arms of the state are not suable persons under § 1983.

Novascone v. Danaher · filed 2019-11-25

However, states or governmental entities that are considered arms of the state are not suable “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). Thus, the NDCS must be dismissed from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state corrections department because the department is not a person.

Seeber v. Payton · filed 2019-11-27

However, KDOC cannot be sued under § 1983 because KDOC is not a person.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to liability.

ROMAN v. LITTLE · filed 2019-12-04

Mr. Roman cannot maintain his claims against the Department of Corrections as an arm of the Commonwealth sharing in the Commonwealth’s immunity and is not a “person” liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies, including a state police lab, because they are not persons under the statute.

BAYETTE v. VANAMBURGH · filed 2019-12-17

Therefore, because the State Police Lab is an arm of the State, and not a “person,” Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against it are dismissed.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a state or its agencies because a state is not a person under the statute.

Milligan v. GEO Corrections and Detentions · filed 2019-12-17

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under § 1983. Any claims against the New Mexico Corrections Department and the New Mexico Parole Board fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state agency that is an arm of the state because it is not a person under the statute.

Holder v. Wright · filed 2020-01-14

As an entity that is part of a department within the executive branch of Connecticut’s government, the State Marshal Commission is not a person subject to liability under section 1983.

A state department is not a person who may be sued for money damages under § 1983.

Barnett 981738 v. Fitz · filed 2020-01-14

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under §1983 for money damages.

A state department of corrections is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Miller v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-01-17

The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of SCDC because it is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Plaintiff’s possible state law claims for breach of contract and violation of medical/nursing standards be dismissed because he has failed to state a claim for relief. ... After considering the record in this case, the applicable law, and the Report of the Magistrate Judge, the Court finds no clear error and agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, SCDC and Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because a state agency is not a “person” under the statute.

Rose v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-01-21

Neither a State nor its agencies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action against state agencies because a state is not a “person” suable under the statute.

Narcisse v. Reynolds · filed 2020-01-23

A state is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983 and is not suable under the statute. ... Thus, § 1983 does not create a cause of action against the NRC or the NDHHS.

Section 1983 does not waive state sovereign immunity, and a state is not a person subject to suit under it.

Black v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-01-24

Finally, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute. ... Therefore, the State of Idaho and the IDOC are immune from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are persons under Section 1983.

ROSADO v. DUGAN · filed 2020-01-27

However, state officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

State agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Harvey v. Harry · filed 2020-02-11

Consequently, Harvey’s claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are barred, as it is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Smith v. H.C.F. Medical Unit D.P.S · filed 2020-02-13

To the extent Plaintiff named DPS, HCF, or the HCF Medical Unit as Defendants, he cannot demonstrate likely success or serious questions going to the merits because such entities are not “persons” under § 1983 and, as arms of the State of Hawai‘i, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court absent a showing of waiver—which Plaintiff has not made here.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency as a person subject to a damages suit.

Eng v. State of Hawaii, Dept. of Public Safety · filed 2020-02-28

Thus, DPS, a state agency, is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages suits against a state acting through its corrections department because the state is not a person under the statute.

Walker 747025 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-03-11

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state department of correction because it is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Woolard v. Santiago · filed 2020-04-30

As an entity within the executive branch of the State of Connecticut, the Department of Correction is not a person subject to liability under section 1983.

A state department is not a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Davies v. Heick · filed 2020-05-08

The Department of Public Safety is an agency of the state and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Nor is it a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Public Safety are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a money damages suit against a state agency in federal court.

Bell v. Kenney · filed 2020-05-08

However, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the KDOC is not subject to suit for money damages under § 1983 in federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency exercising state power because the agency is not a person subject to suit.

Brookins v. Precythe · filed 2020-05-11

The complaint fails to state a claim against the MDOC because an agency exercising state power is not a “person” subject to a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state agencies.

Wright v. Oklahoma Department of Transportation · filed 2020-05-19

A state agency cannot be sued under § 1983.

A state agency is not a person that can be sued under Section 1983.

Brown v. Colorado Judicial Department · filed 2020-06-02

With respect to Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims asserted in the third claim, the Court finds Defendant is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, thus, the claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat a New Jersey county prosecutor acting in his official capacity during a prosecution as a person subject to suit.

KIM v. GIODANO · filed 2020-06-03

Therefore, Giordano is not a “person” under § 1983 or the NJCRA, and Plaintiff’s claims against him, based on his actions prosecuting the Superior Court Action, fail.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

D'Agirbaud v. Kam · filed 2020-06-16

Further, because DPS is a state agency and is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, claims against DPS are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for money damages against state governmental agencies.

Dunlap v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-22

The Illinois Department of Corrections is a state governmental agency that is not subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states or state agencies.

Green v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 2020-06-24

Next, Green’s § 1983 claims against the ISBE defendants for damages fail because litigants cannot bring claims for money damages against states or state agencies based on the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state department of corrections because it is not a person subject to suit.

PINSON v. PERERA · filed 2020-06-30

Additionally, the NJDOC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state agency because a state is not a person under the section.

Arrington v. Buff · filed 2020-07-06

Thus, because a state is not a “person” for the purposes of § 1983 and a suit against the state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiff's claim against the Missouri Department of Motor Vehicles will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or a state official in an official capacity because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Parker v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2020-07-29

Turning to the heart of the issue, the Court finds that Plaintiff has no viable § 1983 claim for monetary damages against DPSC and LeBlanc in his official capacity because they are not “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities, but permits such claims against them in their individual capacities.

Jackson v. Doe · filed 2020-08-08

As a result, Mr. Jackson cannot bring claims for monetary damages against Defendant in his official capacity; but the Court will address Mr. Jackson’s claims against Defendant in his individual capacity.

A state, including its corrections department, is not a person subject to a § 1983 suit for money damages.

Brown 367927 v. Totten · filed 2020-08-10

In addition, the State of Michigan (either in its own capacity or acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Merriman v. Mays · filed 2020-08-20

As an agency of the State of Ohio, ODRC is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, and is immune from suit in federal court for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because it is not a person under the statute.

Perez v. Larson · filed 2020-09-09

The Pennsylvania State Police is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons liable for damages.

A. T. v. MARION COUNTY DEPT. OF CHILD SERVICES · filed 2020-09-21

Because MCDCS is considered an arm of the state of Indiana, it is not considered a "person" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a division of a state agency because it is not a person under the statute.

Blaine v. Burnes · filed 2020-09-23

As an initial matter, CMHC is a division of a state agency and not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state department of corrections cannot be sued under Section 1983 in federal court unless its immunity is waived or abrogated.

Johnson 753595 v. Burt · filed 2020-09-23

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC.

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Wilson v. Green · filed 2020-09-25

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state corrections department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Cooper v. Paramo · filed 2020-10-01

The CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983 and is entitled to immunity from suit for monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state agencies because they are not persons under the statute.

Francis v. Meachum · filed 2020-10-19

Regardless, Francis cannot sue the State of Connecticut or any of its agencies pursuant to section 1983.

States and their departments are not persons who may be sued for money damages under § 1983.

Onumonu 303121 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-10-20

In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a constitutional claim against a state department of corrections because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Gomez v. Corrections · filed 2020-11-04

But the DOC is an entity of the State of Connecticut and is, therefore, not a “person” subject to suit for a violation of the Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

States and their agencies are not persons who can be sued under Section 1983.

Mikale v. U.S. Dept. of Labor · filed 2020-12-01

States and their agencies are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

State departments and agencies are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Burton v. Rabish · filed 2020-12-30

It is well-settled that governmental departments and agencies, such as the MDOC, are not persons or legal entities subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state and its agencies are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

Engel v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-22

However, a state is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because plaintiff is missing an essential element of a § 1983 action, the claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against Indiana county departments of public welfare after the 1986 reorganization made them arms of the state.

J.A.W. v. Marion Co. Dept. of Welfare · filed 1998-11-21

We now hold that a 1986 reorganization, Act of Mar. 12, 1986, Pub. L. No. 16-1986, 1986 Ind. Acts 403, rendered the county departments arms of the state for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not treat a state, or a state entity that is essentially the state, as a “person” subject to suit.

Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education · filed 1981-10-09

In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) the Court stated that in enacting § 1983 Congress did not intend to override a state’s traditional 11th Amendment immunity. The effect of this ruling is that the State of Oregon is not a person under § 1983. The question remains then whether or not the Oregon State Board of Higher Education is essentially the State. The Board is a creature that exists by virtue of statutory authority and is charged with administering the State’s entire system of higher education. The Legislature, by statute, has delegated the power and authority to the Board to control higher education within the State. For the purposes of this ruling, the Oregon State Board of Higher Education is the State.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or officials sued in their official capacities as a person subject to suit when the entity is maintained and controlled by the State and exposure to liability would substantially burden the State Treasury or hinder state-controlled operations.

Gann v. Delaware State Hospital · filed 1982-06-29

In determining whether a state agency is a person for the purposes of section 1983, a court must undertake much the same analysis as when it evaluates the scope of eleventh amendment immunity. The principal inquiry in both cases must be “whether the exposure of the particular entity to liability will substantially burden the State Treasury or otherwise substantially hinder those operations over which the State has retained control.” ... As the analysis above indicated, the Hospital is maintained and controlled by the State and has little or no independent existence. The Court therefore concludes that neither the Hospital nor the individual defendants in their official capacities are persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state agency that is an arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone · filed 1989-11-22

Judgment therefore must be entered for the CPUC on an alternative ground: as an arm of the state, see Air Transport Ass'n of America v. PUC, 833 F.2d 200, 203-04 (9th Cir.1987), the CPUC is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983 and therefore cannot be sued under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state agency because an arm of the state is not a person under the statute.

Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1989-11-22

On the merits, we affirm, except as to the CPUC, which as an arm of the state could not be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state-created enterprise that is independent of the state rather than an arm of it.

Hale v. Arizona · filed 1992-06-24

Under these circumstances, we conclude that ARCOR is not an "arm of the state" and is therefore amenable to suit under, section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or an arm of the state as a person subject to suit.

Hale v. Arizona · filed 1993-05-04

For these reasons, we conclude that ARCOR is an arm of the State of Arizona and that it is not a person within § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state transportation department, as an arm of the State exercising eminent domain authority, for losses occasioned by precondemnation publicity.

Thompson v. Department of Transportation · filed 1993-06-18

It follows that DOT is an “arm of the State” for eminent domain purposes, and the trial court correctly held that an action brought against DOT under 42 USC § 1983 could not be maintained for losses occasioned by precondemnation publicity.

An Indiana school corporation is an arm of the state and therefore is not a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Board of Trustees v. Landry · filed 1993-11-02

Applying that test, we hold that under Indiana law, an Indiana school corporation is not a local government unit but is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and is, therefore, not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983.

States and entities considered arms of the state cannot be sued under § 1983.

Kelly v. State of Maryland · filed 2008-01-22

Therefore, because the Center was properly considered an arm of the State of Maryland, it cannot be sued under § 1983 either.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state court that is an arm of the state.

Krug v. Maricopa County Superior Court · filed 2017-01-03

The district court properly dismissed Krug’s claims against Maricopa County Superior Court because in this case it is an “arm of the state,” not subject to § 1983 liability.

State correctional departments and correctional centers are not persons subject to § 1983 liability.

Sittig v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 1985-09-27

Moreover, because state agencies are not persons within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Sittig’s claims against the Illinois Department of Corrections and two of its correctional facilities.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state corrections department that functions as an arm of the state because the department is not a suable person.

Grosz v. State of Ind. · filed 1990-02-21

Similarly, since a cause of action against the department is treated as a cause of action against the state, it is also barred because it is not a suable “person” under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state corrections department that qualifies as an arm of the state because it is not a person under the statute.

Csizmadia v. Fauver · filed 1990-09-17

Will mandates that if an entity qualifies as an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the entity is not a person under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the § 1983 action against the DOC must be dismissed.

A state corrections cabinet is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Reneer v. Dunn · filed 1991-04-15

In addition, the other defendant, the Corrections Cabinet, is an arm of the state and not a "person" within the meaning of who is a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the district court is affirmed for the reasons stated in the district court's December 17, 1990, memorandum opinion.

State prison and state medical institution medical departments are arms of the state and are not persons subject to suit under section 1983.

MacIel v. James K. Rowland, Individually and as Director of the Dept. Of Corrections, State of California Eddie · filed 1993-09-02

Governmental entities which qualify as "arms of the state" under the eleventh amendment are not considered "persons" for purposes of section 1983. Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1989). The medical department of a state prison or medical institution is clearly an "arm of the state." Thus, the district court properly granted judgment for the medical departments at Folsom and CMF.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a state parole board and corrections department as the only defendants, even if some alleged conduct could support a constitutional claim.

Weaver v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole · filed 1997-01-30

While some of Weaver’s allegations may be cognizable under Section 1983, because he has sued only the Board and the Department, such an action will not lie.

A university that receives state funding is a public employer subject to § 1983.

Stiner v. University of Delaware · filed 2003-01-16

The University of Delaware receives state funding and is therefore considered a public employer subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For determining whether a public university is a person under Section 1983, the inquiry considers whether it can satisfy a judgment from funds other than legislative appropriations and whether it is essentially autonomous.

Keller v. University of Michigan · filed 1974-08-02

The inquiry into whether the University of Michigan is a state agency in the context of § 1983 will also turn on whether the University could satisfy a judgment from funds other than those appropriated by the legislature and whether the University is essentially an autonomous entity.

Section 1983 treats state officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, even when the state instrumentality itself is not subject to suit.

GAY STUDENTS ORGANIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE et al. v. BONNER · filed 1974-12-30

They remain defendants only as officials of the University, but we do not read Bruno to hold that officials, as opposed to state instrumentalities, are not § 1983 'persons', at least so far as injunctive or declaratory relief is concerned.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state university that is an instrumentality or branch of state government because it is not a "person" under the statute.

Brown v. Wood · filed 1978-01-27

Thus, because the University is in essence a branch of the state government, it follows that it is not a “person” which may be held liable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The University of Tennessee is not a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Stokes v. University of Tenn. at Martin · filed 1987-06-19

It is well established that the University of Tennessee is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Jonathan Cowan, ph.d. v. University of Louisville School of Medicine Leah Dickstein, M.D. Donald Kmetz, M.D. And Other U · filed 1990-05-24

We note that insofar as plaintiff asserts federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the University of Louisville, his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As noted above, Martin v. University of Louisville, 541 F.2d at 1174-75, held that the University of Louisville is a Kentucky state agency. The Supreme Court has held that such a state agency is not a "person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give rise to a cognizable claim against the State University of New York.

Nawaz v. University Hospital of State University · filed 1990-10-15

Judicial review of a hospital determination pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not available to aggrieved physicians (see, Matter of Cohoes Mem. Hosp. v Department of Health, 48 NY2d 583; Matter of Brindisi v University Hosp., 131 AD2d 667) and 42 USC § 1983 does not give rise to a cognizable claim against the State University of New York (see, Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420; Blanton v State Univ., 489 F2d 377).

Section 1983 does not treat a state university that is an agency of the state as a person subject to suit.

Adatsi v. Dr. Iqbal Mathur, Dr. Thomas Gutteridge, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale · filed 1991-06-17

This fails to state a claim because SIU-C is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983.

State colleges and their officials sued in an official capacity are not persons under Section 1983 when the colleges are alter egos of the state and payment of a judgment would interfere with the state's fiscal autonomy.

Winston v. Maine Technical College System · filed 1993-09-01

Because payment of a judgment would interfere with the state’s fiscal autonomy, and the MTCS is highly dependant on the state, we conclude that the state is a real party in interest. ... Therefore, neither CMTC, MTCS, nor Conrath are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and the judgment was proper as to these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state agency such as the University of Tennessee because the agency is not a person under the statute.

Mirabella v. University of Tennessee · filed 1994-07-11

UT, which is a state agency, is likewise not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

State officials are persons under § 1983 when sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Treleven v. University of MN · filed 1996-01-12

Additionally, state officials are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for injunctive relief because such actions "are not treated as actions against the State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).

Section 1983 does not allow suit against the University of Texas at Dallas because the university is not a person under the statute.

Ntreh v. University of Texas at Dallas · filed 1996-08-12

The University is not a “person” as that term is used in section 1983. As section 1983 is inapplicable to the University, it cannot overcome the University’s sovereign immunity. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed Ntreh’s section 1983 claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, and suing a state university or community college can amount to suing the state.

Sweatt v. University of Kentucky · filed 1996-12-09

In his letter brief submitted at the request of the court following oral argument, plaintiff concedes that dismissal of his claims against the University of Kentucky and Paducah Community College was proper, since the state is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Naming the University of Kentucky and Paducah Community College as defendants was tantamount to naming the State of Kentucky as defendant.

Section 1983 does not support an equal protection challenge to drug-use and drug-testing policies that apply generally to all employees and applicants rather than targeting a discrete class.

Burka v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1988-02-01

The current policies in issue—prohibiting drug use, requiring drug testing, and disciplining or refusing to hire those who test positive—apply to all TA employees or applicants, not just to plaintiffs or some other discrete class.

Section 1983 permits an equal-protection claim challenging a state-created classification to proceed when the complaint alleges no state interest supporting the classification.

Napper v. Wyman · filed 1969-09-24

The court finds that, absent a showing that some State interest is promoted by the classification, plaintiff’s complaint alleging a denial of equal protection states a good claim under 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supports a claim for relief when state action allegedly deprives a student of equal protection and a valuable educational opportunity.

Moran v. School District 7, Yellowstone County · filed 1972-09-11

Violation of the equal protection clause falls within the jurisdiction of § 1983. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 91 (2nd Cir., 1963). ... High school football is no less important an opportunity than college football and therefore the complaint makes out a claim under § 1983 upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 covers Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection rights and requires purposeful discrimination to establish an equal-protection violation.

Moss v. Hornig · filed 1963-01-18

Taking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by itself, there seems to be no reason to limit the scope of the “any rights, privileges, or immunities” clause to that of the “privileges or immunities of citizens” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The immunity from denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws is one secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... We hold that Moss has failed to prove purposeful discrimination which is required in order to establish a denial of equal protection, and that he did not make any offer of proof relevant to that issue. ... He has therefore established no denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches colorable equal-protection claims against state officials who allegedly acted arbitrarily in denying qualified applicants a transfer.

Kurlan v. Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army · filed 1974-12-27

We need not linger long over defendants’ threshold contention that federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims asserted by appellants with respect to their status in the Reserve. Appellants have at least made out a colorable claim of denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction over the state defendants, by asserting that the state defendants, as the persons in command of appellants, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying transfer to those who applied and were qualified for it before July 10, 1974, and that Order 8 attempts to make an illegal distinction among persons who are equal in the eyes of controlling federal law.

State action arising from Hill-Burton funding permits an equal-protection action under § 1983.

Gordon v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc. · filed 1976-01-15

There is no question that the program of Hill-Burton funding of Forsyth has imbued the acts complained of in this suit with state action,...and it is proper for the plaintiffs to bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the grounds that they have been denied equal protection under the law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

A state employer’s sexual harassment is intentional sex discrimination actionable under Section 1983 when the harassment is attributable to the employer’s policy or custom; harassment of the plaintiff alone because of her sex is sufficient.

Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Indiana · filed 1986-08-28

First, the ultimate inquiry is whether the sexual harassment constitutes intentional discrimination. ... To make this showing, it is not necessary to show that all women employees are sexually harassed. Harassment of the plaintiff alone because of her sex is enough. ... In sum, sexual harassment was the general, on-going, and accepted practice at the East Chicago Fire Department, and high-ranking, supervisory, and management officials responsible for working conditions at the department knew of, tolerated, and participated in the harassment. This satisfies § 1983’s requirement that the actions complained of be the policy or custom of the state entity.

A Section 1983 racial-discrimination claim fails when the evidence establishes that performance, rather than race, caused the adverse employment action.

Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corporation and James P. Scamman, Defendants · filed 1986-08-29

The only question is whether Morgan’s race was the cause of his demotion; the finding that it was not is not clearly erroneous. ... The claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — which Morgan complains that the district judge did not address — fares no better than the counts alleging violations of Title VII and § 1981. The theories are fundamentally the same.

A § 1983 equal-protection claim is stated by alleging a deprivation of equal protection carried out by state officials.

Bintz v. Nsu Board Odu Board Governor of Virginia · filed 1987-02-02

We view Bintz's claim that de jure segregation is being maintained at NSU and ODU, as a result of which he is being subjected to discrimination in his employment, as one which meets the requirements for a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. It alleges a deprivation of equal protection which is being carried out by state officials.

A racially motivated zoning conspiracy states a ripe § 1983 equal-protection claim independent of state remedies challenging the zoning decision itself.

East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. MacOn-bibb Planning & Zoning Commission · filed 1987-06-19

Assuming plaintiffs’ allegations to be true, the court finds that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to their equal protection claims. The doctrine of ripeness, as stated in ... is not applicable in this instance because plaintiffs here are not seeking just compensation for the zoning board’s decision, nor are they seeking to have their procedural or substantive due process claims vindicated.

Section 1983 affords protection coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause for a challenge to state contracting preferences, so an equal protection analysis resolves that claim.

Michigan Road Builders Association, Inc. v. Milliken · filed 1988-02-23

Because the protections afforded by these sections are coextensive with the protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... this court need only analyze Public Act 428 under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection standards.

Section 1983 claims challenging state procurement preferences on equal protection grounds are assessed under Equal Protection Clause standards.

Gregory Construction Co. v. Blanchard · filed 1988-08-01

Gregory’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d require the Court to scrutinize the Act under equal protection standards, for the protections afforded by these sections are coextensive with the protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause.

Section 1983 does not authorize a damages claim against the State when a state official is sued in his official capacity without alleged personal involvement in the civil rights violations.

Casillas v. Perales · filed 1989-10-10

The State is therefore the real party in interest and 42 USC § 1983 does not authorize such a claim against the State (see, Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503; Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn. on Regulation of Lobbying, 83 AD2d 723, affd 56 NY2d 656).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District · filed 1991-06-13

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1981 claims against state actors merge into a claim under § 1983.

Malone v. Parker · filed 1996-12-09

Malone also brings a claim under § 1981 for the alleged racial discrimination; his § 1981 claims merge, however, into his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for constitutional claims against state actors; a direct constitutional action against those actors is unavailable.

Universal Outdoor, Inc. v. Elk Grove Village · filed 1997-07-01

Universal’s claimed ticket of entry to this federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) — although Complaint ¶ 3 also refers to provisions of the United States Constitution, no such direct action under the Constitution itself (as contrasted with a Section 1983 lawsuit) exists against state actors in a manner comparable to that provided against federal governmental officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (see, e.g., Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1992); Ellis v. Secretary of State of Ill., 883 F.Supp. 291, 293 (N.D.Ill.1995); and authorities cited in both those decisions).

Section 1983 provides the federal remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors.

Moore v. State of Ala. · filed 1997-08-25

Because the ADOC defendants are state actors, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims merge into their S 1983 claims.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for constitutional claims against government actors, including takings claims.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1999-01-15

Actually, the plaintiffs’ "pure” takings claims against TRPA as to the 1984 Plan have not technically been dismissed from the case, but it is clear by now that all claims against government actors for constitutional violations must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for a due process claim against state actors, so a separately pleaded due process claim merges with the Section 1983 claim.

Stevenson Ex Rel. Stevenson v. Martin County Board of Education · filed 1999-11-15

Plaintiffs’ due process claim is also asserted against state actors and must be brought under § 1983. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ due process claim merges with plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 must be pleaded to pursue a Section 1981 claim against a state actor.

Norris v. City of Anderson · filed 2000-01-20

Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to plead a violation of § 1983 deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over any claims Plaintiff may have under § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of Section 1981, so overlapping race discrimination claims merge into one Section 1983 claim.

MacK v. Alabama Department of Human Resources · filed 2002-01-17

Although the three constitutional claims were brought pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court finds that the claims alleging race discrimination are due to be merged into a single cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of Section 1981 by state actors.

Farmer v. Ramsay · filed 2002-08-05

However, the medical school accurately points out that § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by state actors. ... Accordingly, Farmer has no cause of action based on § 1981 independent of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for enforcing § 1981 rights against a state actor, so a § 1981 claim merges into the § 1983 claim.

Collier v. Clayton County Community Service Board · filed 2002-09-30

Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1981 claim merges into the § 1983 claim and the latter is the operative claim for purposes of this action.

Section 1983 affords a remedy for a class-of-one equal protection claim on appropriate proof.

C&H Company v. Richardson · filed 2003-10-27

That § 1983 affords such a remedy on appropriate proof is clear — the action brought in Olech was itself a claim pursu- ant to § 1983, see Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 1998 WL 196455 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (district court opinion).

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy against a state actor for a violation of Section 1981 rights.

Bolden v. City of Topeka · filed 2004-05-25

It finds that Jett remains good law, and that Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for damages against a state actor for claims which arise under Section 1981.

Section 1983 equal protection claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate disparate treatment.

Gurule v. San Juan County Government · filed 2005-02-28

An equal protection claim brought under § 1983 is evaluated under the analytical framework that the Supreme Court of the United States set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim when the plaintiff proves purposeful discrimination.

Zappan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2005-10-26

To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection, a plaintiff must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.

Section 1983 permits sufficiently specific class-of-one equal protection claims in employment disputes.

Benjamin v. Schuller · filed 2005-12-01

Since Underfer, however, the Sixth Circuit recognizes Section 1983 “class of one” claims as long as they are sufficiently specific.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy against a state actor for a violation of rights secured by § 1981.

Dockery v. Unified School District No. 231 · filed 2006-01-03

Here, then, § 1981 creates the statutory right for Mr. Dockery’s discriminatory discharge claim and § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for the alleged violation of his statutory right.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of Section 1981 rights, subject to a two-year limitations period in Delaware.

Parker v. Gadow · filed 2006-02-24

Accordingly, the only remedy available to Parker was under § 1983. That statute provides for a two-year statute of limitations. Consequently, we hold that the Superior Court correctly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss Parker’s complaint as time-barred.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for a § 1981 racial discrimination claim against a municipal employee in his individual capacity.

Knox v. City of Monroe · filed 2008-03-12

Based on Fifth Circuit persuasive and precedential authority, Knox can only assert a § 1981 claim for racial discrimination against Hopkins in his individual capacity through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides the required cause of action for a federal constitutional or statutory claim against a state actor.

Zimmerman v. Wolff · filed 2008-12-18

However, to bring a federal constitutional or statutory claim against a state actor, a plaintiff must bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action for deprivation of equal protection under color of state law.

Whitfield v. Minter · filed 1973-12-26

The Court holds, therefore, that plaintiffs’ claim of deprivation of equal protection falls squarely within the jurisdictional provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors, but a failure to plead it did not bar the claim when the defendant did not raise the defect and the plaintiff argued the claim under § 1983.

Dunklin v. Montgomery County Board of Education · filed 2009-08-24

Because the Board did not raise the issue on summary judgment, however, and because Dunklin presented his arguments against summary judgment as if he brought his claims under § 1983 (see PL’s Resp. 12), the claim will not be barred for this reason.

Section 1983 is the required means of bringing a § 1981 claim against a state actor.

Y. Daniels v. Jefferson County Sheriff's · filed 2009-10-26

Claims against state actors for violations of § 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for bringing Section 1981 claims against state actors.

Washington v. School Board of Hillsborough County · filed 2010-08-03

Claims against state actors, such as Defendant, for violations of Section 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal cause of action against state actors for violations of rights protected by § 1981.

Ortiz v. City of New York · filed 2010-12-13

I conclude that § 1983 provides the exclusive ... cause of action for § 1981 claims against state actors.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of rights protected by Section 1981.

Bush v. Houston County Commission · filed 2011-02-15

Notably, § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of the rights contained in § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for enforcing § 1981 rights against state actors.

Smiley v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2011-03-30

Consequently, when state actors violate a person’s rights declared in § 1981, that person may only seek a remedy by bringing suit pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to bring an equal protection claim based on unequal treatment in the zoning process.

City National Bank of Florida v. City of Tampa · filed 2011-04-06

Here, the property owners alleged that their proposed project was singled out and treated differently from other similarly situated properties with no rational basis offered by the City, thereby violating their equal protection rights. Such a claim is cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims against state actors alleging deprivation of rights protected by Section 1981.

Zeitoun v. City of New Orleans · filed 2011-12-07

Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and not § 1981 is the proper vehicle to state a cause of action for the deprivation of civil rights claims.

Section 1983 is the exclusive vehicle for bringing Section 1981 discrimination claims against a state actor.

Moore v. Hale · filed 2012-03-19

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive vehicle for the Plaintiffs to bring their claims that a state actor, Hale, discriminated against them in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights asserted against a state actor.

Gill v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-07-03

The Supreme Court has held, however, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) provides the “exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by [Section] 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989). Because the plaintiff has not alleged any claims under Section 1983, the court will regard the plaintiff’s claims as arising under only Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for Section 1981 violations by state actors.

the City of El Paso, Texas v. Marquez · filed 2012-09-25

Because claims alleging Section 1981 violations against state actors must be brought under Section 1983, we conclude that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellee’s Section 1981 claims.

Section 1983 requires an equal protection plaintiff to show purposeful discrimination and different treatment from similarly situated people.

Cypher v. California University of Pennsylvania · filed 2012-11-15

To bring a successful claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection, Plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of purposeful discrimination and that he was treated differently than others similarly situated to him.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against state actors for violations of rights secured by Section 1981.

Bowyer v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-12-20

Therefore, although the plaintiffs have no right of action against the defendants under § 1981 directly, they are permitted to sue the defendants under § 1983 to remedy the alleged deprivation of the rights secured by § 1981.

Section 1983 is the exclusive damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 rights by state actors.

Onyeanusi v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-09-24

Accordingly, because “the defendant here is not a private actor but the District of Columbia,” plaintiff’s claim that his rights under Section 1981 were violated “can be remedied exclusively through the cause of action for damages created by [Section] 1983.”

Section 1983 provides the federal damages remedy for a section 1981 claim against a state actor, but the complaint need not cite section 1983 expressly if its factual allegations state a claim.

Brown v. Sessoms · filed 2014-12-19

We believe Johnson controls our resolution of Brown’s section 1981 claim. The fact that Brown presses a statutory claim, whereas the Johnson plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim, does not appear to us to affect its applicability. Johnson makes clear that once those plaintiffs stated the facts allegedly giving rise to liability, they were not obligated to “invoke section 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.” Id. Because Brown’s section 1981 claim remains viable, we turn to the merits of that claim.

Section 1983 is the required vehicle for bringing § 1981 claims against state actors.

Reginald D. Marable, Sr. v. Marion Military Institute · filed 2014-12-22

Claims against state actors under § 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As Marable filed suit under both § 1981 and § 1983, his § 1981 claim against MMI was properly brought.

Section 1983 provides the remedy for Section 1981 violations committed by state actors.

Grady v. Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University · filed 2015-01-16

Although the Administration Defendants are correct that recovery under Section 1981 is available only pursuant to the general procedural mechanism created by Section 1983, the Complaint states explicitly that Counts III and IV are “brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Am. Compl. at 31-32, ECF No. 6). That is sufficient under federal pleading standards to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim when defendants act with intent or purpose to discriminate against a person based on protected-class membership.

Norsworthy v. Beard · filed 2015-03-31

To state an equal protection claim under § 1983, Norsworthy must allege that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [her] based upon membership in a protected class.”

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for Fourteenth Amendment claims against state actors; a plaintiff cannot bring those claims directly under the Constitution.

Love v. Mike Herron, Daryl Kent, Jerry Jones, and Pen Products Correctional Industries (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-28

Likewise, a plaintiff alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment must bring suit under Section 1983; no direct cause of action exists.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for Section 1981 claims against state actors.

Smith v. Vestavia Hills Board of Education · filed 2016-11-01

Neither party addresses the issue of whether a state actor can be sued under Section 1981. It cannot. As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “Section 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors; instead, claims against state actors or allegations of § 1981 violations must be brought pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” ... The Section 1981 claims in Counts One and Three will be dismissed. The Plaintiff will be given leave to amend to plead those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if she so chooses.

Section 1983 does not permit an official-capacity claim against a state actor because the claim is treated as one against the State.

Greenfield v. Budget of Delaware, Inc · filed 2017-02-22

Second, DFS Defendants cannot be sued in their official capacities because “[a] Section 1983 claim against a government actor in [his or] her official capacity is considered an action against the State, and it is well-settled that the State is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action.”

Section 1983 is the sole remedy for enforcing § 1981 rights against state actors.

Sampson v. City of Fort Smith · filed 2017-06-08

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the sole remedial provision for an action "brought against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981.”

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy for violations of § 1981 rights by state government units.

Ghiles v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 2018-03-19

Instead, § 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy for a violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 by state government units.

Section 1983 is the sole cause of action against state actors for violations of § 1981, and a claim against a municipality requires an alleged policy or custom of misconduct.

Duplan v. City of New York · filed 2018-04-30

With respect to his § 1981 claims, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the sole cause of action against state actors alleged to have violated § 1981. Construing Duplan’s claims as § 1983 claims, he has failed to allege a policy or custom of misconduct, as is necessary to assert liability against a municipality.

Section 1983 is the required remedy for a § 1981 claim against a state actor in her official capacity.

Isbell v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-05-25

Defendants are generally correct and, to the extent that Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim is made against Defendant Le Goff in her official capacity, Plaintiffs' claim must be brought under § 1983.