42 U.S.C. § 1983

A private person does not act under color of state law merely by engaging in litigation, even in bad faith, unless compelled by state law or acting under state authority.

Cross-Appellant v. Vivian L. Jenson, Cross-Appellee, Clarence Ehli, Cross-Appellee · filed 1986-04-21

It is the general rule in this circuit that a private individual does not act under color of state law by engaging in litigation, even in bad faith, unless that individual is compelled by state law to bring suit or is acting under the authority ... or pretense of authority of the state.

Section 1983 requires conduct by private hospital defendants to be fairly attributable to the state, a fact-bound inquiry based on all surrounding circumstances.

Davenport v. Saint Mary Hospital · filed 1986-04-28

In order to recover under section 1983, plaintiff must establish that the conduct of the hospital defendants which allegedly deprived her of federal rights is “fairly attributable to the [sjtate.” ... The determination of when the conduct of private parties is converted into state action is ... “necessarily [a] fact-bound inquiry.”

A privately retained attorney does not act under color of state law merely by representing a client, but may do so by conspiring with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Humphrey v. Court of Common Pleas of York County · filed 1986-08-08

We agree with defendant that a private attorney does not act under color of state law while representing a client. ... But an otherwise private person does act under color of state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights.

Section 1983 does not reach private defendants when the complaint does not allege that they acted under color of state law.

McCutcheon v. Foreman · filed 1986-08-12

As a preliminary matter, we dismiss all defendants except Foreman and Wolfson from the § 1983 claims because there is no allegation that any of the other defendants in this suit acted “under color of state law” as required by that statute.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim against private defendants must plead facts showing a meeting of the minds or general conspiratorial objective that jointly engaged them with state officials.

Carras v. Hull & Smith Horse Vans, Inc. · filed 1986-09-12

In addition, the section 1983 claims against the remaining, private defendants were fatally defective because Carras failed to plead facts showing a "meeting of the minds," Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970), or a "general conspiratorial objective," fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983), necessary to demonstrate a colorable claim of state action, see, e.g., Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), by showing that the private defendants were "jointly engaged" with state officials, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980), to deprive Carras of his civil rights.

An attorney appointed by a federal court does not act under color of state law and therefore is not subject to § 1983 liability for alleged ineffective representation.

Smith v. United States of America Mar Karro, Marshall Unknown Agents · filed 1986-09-15

An attorney appointed by a federal court does not act under "color of state law" for purposes of Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 complaint based on an alleged private-public conspiracy must plead specific facts supporting an agreement; conclusory allegations and private invocation of state legal procedures do not establish action under color of law.

Boracci v. Malloy · filed 1986-09-15

In short, it is legally insufficient for a plaintiff in a § 1983 action to merely recite the history of his contacts with the law, and baldly assert, in conclusory terms, that his constitutional rights have been violated. ... Moreover, as has been noted, mere invocations of state legal proceedings by private parties do not constitute “joint participation” or “conspiracy” with state officials satisfying the § 1983 requirement of action under color of law.

A private institution’s receipt of state funding alone does not transform its conduct into state action for purposes of Section 1983.

Jones v. Grunewarld · filed 1986-09-22

However, the fact that Mercy is supported by state funds fails to satisfy the requirement of state action.

Private defendants are not liable under Section 1983 through alleged joint action with a state official when the complaint offers only a conclusory conspiracy label without facts supporting the agreement.

Vitale v. Nuzzo · filed 1986-12-03

To attempt to convert his state court disappointments into a federal civil rights claim, plaintiff simply asserts that there was a “conspiracy” with the state judge, but such bare labeling will not suffice. Plaintiff gives no sufficient description of the nature of or motivation for the judge’s entry into “conspiracy”, or adequate reason actually to suppose a corrupt combination existed.

A private citizen does not act under color of law for Section 1983 merely by giving police information, even false information, or by testifying at a criminal trial.

Holdeman v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1986-12-08

As stated earlier, however, the mere furnishing of information by a private citizen, even if false, is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against a private party. Nor does the fact that they may have testified at the criminal trial provide any basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires the defendant's challenged conduct to constitute action under color of state law.

Chester Dickerson Joseph Handley v. United States Tobacco Company · filed 1986-12-11

The district court noted that Sec. 1983 requires the defendant's action be taken under color of state law. Day v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir.1984). The court then held that the defendant had not engaged in state action. We agree with this conclusion of the district court.

Vague and conclusory allegations that a private employer conspired with federal officials do not establish the governmental action needed for a Section 1983 claim.

Kupcho v. Steele · filed 1986-12-17

Plaintiffs vague, conclusory, and general allegations, set forth in his complaint and subsequent papers, that the Forest defendants conspired with the I.R.S. defendants to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right are clearly insufficient for this purpose.

State licensing and permission to conduct private business, without state coercion, encouragement, or intimate involvement in the challenged conduct, do not establish action under color of state law for § 1983.

Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., Inc. · filed 1987-02-24

That something more than the mere fact of state licensing must be shown in order to support an assertion that a private entity has acted under color of state law is fatal to Kerans’ § 1983 claim. ... In short, there is simply no basis for a finding that the state is “intimately involved in the challenged private conduct,” so as to hold that the conduct was under color of state law, as required by § 1983.

A private employer is not subject to § 1983 merely because it holds federal or state contracts; its challenged conduct must be fairly attributable to the state or jointly undertaken with state officials.

Woods v. Princeton Packaging, Inc. · filed 1987-02-24

Section 1983 does not apply to a private employer unless the private employer’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State or unless he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. ... Even if Princeton Packaging is receiving state contracts however, contracts without more will not satisfy the requirements for state action.

A private party's use of state legal process contrary to state law is not action under color of state law within Section 1983.

Klooster v. North Iowa State Bank · filed 1987-05-08

For purposes of ... however, we believe the Kloosters’ claims against the bank lie outside the ambit of section 1983. Under the ... rationale, any action of the bank on the facts alleged is not under color of state law.

A private party's invocation or misuse of a state self-help lien statute is not attributable to the state and does not support a Section 1983 claim without significant state involvement.

Jenner v. Shepherd · filed 1987-05-20

That the defendants, private citizens, invoked the statute and used it to effect a result not allowable by the statute itself can in no way be attributed to a state decision or a state rule. ... The plaintiffs’ fifth claim does not present an action under section 1983 but rather challenges only the private action of the Shepherds under Indiana law.

A private person is liable under Section 1983 only when jointly engaged with state officials, significantly aided by them, or otherwise chargeable to the state; merely reporting suspected crime to police is insufficient.

Lee v. Town of Estes Park, Colorado, a Municipal Corporation Gregg Filsinger, Robert W. Ault Walter F. Kappely, Od · filed 1987-06-05

However, in order to hold a private individual liable under § 1983, it must be shown that the private person was jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or that the private individual’s conduct is in some other way chargeable to the State. ... the mere furnishing of information to police officers who take action thereon does not constitute joint action under color of state law which renders a private actor liable under § 1983.

A private party's misuse of state civil-contempt procedures ordinarily is not state action under Section 1983 unless the party is adequately alleged to have conspired or jointly acted with a state agent.

Bertucci v. Brown · filed 1987-06-08

Ordinarily, absent a challenge to the procedure itself, a private person who misuses State civil contempt proceedings is not subject to section 1983 liability. ... A private party is, however, subject to liability under section 1983 if he conspires with or willfully engages in joint activity with an agent of the State, ... even if the, State agent is immune from section 1983 liability.

A Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim based on a private person's search requires evidence that the government encouraged or otherwise made the private person its agent.

Hooper v. Sachs · filed 1987-07-02

To establish that Winchell acted as a government agent when she conducted discovery at Deer Park on March 10 and 12, 1980, Hooper had to show, inter alia, that the government encouraged her activity. ... The record is devoid of any direct evidence that the MFCU personnel encouraged Winchell to obtain information for them, and Hooper offered no more than speculation and conjecture to support that position.

A private employer's discharge is not actionable under Section 1983 unless the employer's conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co. · filed 1987-07-08

Plaintiff has thus failed to show that the action of the S.D. Warren Defendants in discharging Plaintiff was state action. It follows that whatever deprivation of property and/or liberty Plaintiff may have suffered as a result of that discharge was not subject to the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Summary judgment for all Defendants on Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 reaches a private person only when the person acts under color of state law, such as through concerted action with police; merely summoning police and signing a complaint is insufficient without evidence of concerted action.

Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc. And Gary C. Gilbert · filed 1987-07-15

The provisions of § 1983 only apply to persons who both deprive others of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and act under color of a state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage. ... Because Carey neither alleged nor offered evidence to support any concerted action between Gilbert and the police, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

A private employer cannot be sued under Section 1983 absent an allegation that it acted under color of state law.

Wood v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1987-11-23

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law. An individual who does not claim that a private employer was acting under color of state law cannot sue the employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private insurer does not become a state actor for Section 1983 purposes merely by considering the claimant's state criminal record when denying an insurance claim.

Galvan v. Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1987-12-09

Further, there is no showing of state action. Galvan’s argument that Cameron’s actions should be attributed to the state is entirely without merit. The mere fact that Cameron considered Galvan’s criminal record when deciding to deny his claim does not establish the nexus necessary for a finding of state action.

A private police officers' association is not subject to Section 1983 when its challenged conduct does not constitute state action.

NAACP, Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n · filed 1988-01-13

The DPOA also seeks summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim not addressed by this Court or the Sixth Circuit. The Court grants this summary judgment because the actions of the DPOA do not constitute state action.

A physician who evaluates and treats a prisoner without acting under color of state law cannot be liable under Section 1983.

Vinson v. Fulton County Sheriff's Department · filed 1988-01-26

Moreover, Dr. Steves cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he did not evaluate and treat plaintiff under color of state law. Thus, this § 1983 complaint would be subject to dismissal against Dr. Steves for lack of jurisdiction.

A private individual cannot be liable in a Section 1983 civil-rights action unless the challenged actions or omissions constitute state action.

Smith Ex Rel. Smith v. Philadelphia School District · filed 1988-02-03

In order for there to be any possible federal civil rights action asserted against him, in the context of this case, Mr. Shohen’s actions or inactions would have to have been taken as a result of “state action.”

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely because the person reports criminal activity and signs a complaint.

Daniel v. Ferguson · filed 1988-03-17

The record supports the conclusion that defendant Jim Judge reported criminal activity and signed a complaint. These actions alone, however, cannot satisfy the state action requirement.

Private attorneys acting within the scope of their clients’ representation are not liable under § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law.

Anderson v. Mackall · filed 1988-03-17

Research would have indicated to the plaintiff that the defendants’ attorneys, acting within the scope of their client’s representation, are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) because they were not acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires state action; a private transit contractor’s personnel decision is not state action when its government contract leaves personnel decisions to the contractor and does not require it to follow city personnel policies.

Mineo v. Transportation Management of Tennessee, Inc. · filed 1988-03-21

Further, state action cannot be found to exist in the instant case because MTA regulated TMT’s activities. The contract between the parties does not require TMT to follow the city’s personnel policies, and it expressly deems TMT to be the employer for all employees necessary for Nashville's transit system. In addition, Executive Order No. 23 was not binding on TMT because the Metropolitan City Charter grants to MTA, not the mayor, the authority to control the transit system.

Section 1983 permits a debtor to sue a private creditor for wrongfully obtaining prejudgment attachment through an invalid state procedure that uses state officials to seize property.

Stensvad v. Towe · filed 1988-06-21

A S 1983 action may be brought by a plaintiff debtor against a defendant creditor who has wrongfully obtained prejudgment attachment of plaintiff Is assets under a defec- tive state prejudgment attachment statute. ... We conclude, based on Lugar, that the S 1983 claim was proper.

Section 1983 reaches a private actor when sufficiently specific allegations link the challenged conduct to state involvement, including joint activity and regulatory encouragement.

Lovell v. One Bancorp · filed 1988-07-14

To demonstrate whether facially private conduct rises to the level of state action within the section 1983, the Court must assess the nature, duration and extent of state-private regulatory intermingling. ... Taken in their entirety, and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs claims allege state action with sufficient specificity to survive Defendant Pape’s motion to dismiss.

Assigned appellate defense counsel does not act under color of state law when representing an indigent defendant, so § 1983 does not cover counsel’s alleged failure to pursue the appeal vigorously.

Mathis v. Bess · filed 1988-08-10

Legal Aid, as assigned counsel, cannot be held to be a state actor or acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a private entity’s rule restricting residence throughout a borough as state action when the rule functions as residential zoning.

Pitt v. Pine Valley Golf Club · filed 1988-09-21

Because residential zoning is a power "exclusively reserved to the state," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352, 95 S.Ct. at 454, this court finds that a private entity's rule, which functions as a residential zoning restriction for an entire Borough, is state action.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a private party’s agreement and concerted action with state officials; a conclusory allegation of conspiracy does not establish action under color of state law.

Studifin v. New York City Police Department-License Division-Firearms Control Section · filed 1990-01-04

Plaintiff’s one-sentence allegation of conspiracy, without supporting facts or specification of time, place, persons, and dates pertaining to the alleged conspiracy, fails to charge a conspiracy with sufficient particularity to make out a section 1983 claim against this private party.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party who uses state courts for litigation without conspiring with a state actor.

Kamasinski v. Rubin · filed 1991-04-05

By failing to demonstrate that the defendant was acting “under color of” state law, plaintiff fails to satisfy the second element of a § 1983 action. Harvey Rubin is a private party, was not acting in a conspiracy with a state actor, and is therefore not liable under a § 1983 action.

Private attorneys do not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 merely by representing adoptive parents in a proceeding to terminate parental rights.

Whittington v. Milby · filed 1991-04-24

Neither can the plaintiff maintain a Sec. 1983 action against Mr. Milby and Ms. Ridings. ... Applying this test here, we find that the representation of the child's adoptive parents by Mr. Milby and Ms. Riding did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 does not make a private hospital a state actor merely because it accepts a prison inmate for emergency care.

McIlwain v. Prince William Hospital · filed 1991-09-24

A hospital’s mere acceptance of a prison inmate for emergency care does not transform the hospital into a state actor.

Private parties who disregard the requirements of a constitutionally valid state statute do not become state actors under § 1983 merely by invoking that statute.

Siefkes v. Nichols · filed 1992-02-28

The facts of this case, viewed most favorably to Siefkes, are that the defendants acted “illegally” by deliberately disregarding the requirements of due process, due process requirements which were present in K.S.A. 60-307. In other words, the defendants, none of whom are state officials, violated a constitutionally-valid statute. Therefore, they cannot be “state actors” and Siefkes cannot prove the second element of the test.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a mutual understanding or conspiracy with state actors to hold private defendants liable for alleged constitutional violations.

Downs v. Red Brick Management, LLC · filed 2019-09-20

Further, Defendants are clearly private actors‘ and Plaintiff has not alleged facts necessary to hold them liable for any alleged constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983. While Plaintiff alleges Defendants “targeted” her, she does not present any facts necessary to establish a mutual understanding or conspiracy between Defendants and law enforcement to do so.

Section 1983’s joint participation doctrine can bring a private actor into a constitutional suit, but it does not expand what the underlying constitutional provision prohibits.

Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, Corp. · filed 2019-07-15

But that is all the exception does. It potentially offers a way to bring nongovernment actors into the case under § 1983. It does not expand what the Contracts Clause prohibits.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private actors who are not acting under color of state law.

Abergel v. Gracie Square Hospital · filed 2019-07-15

The named Defendants are both private actors who are not generally liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private defendant acted in concert with state officials; past conflict and an acquaintance between them do not alone establish joint action.

Farr v. Davis · filed 2018-08-09

Even assuming the Sherriff’s Office lacked probable cause, Farr must show the HOA had some involvement in issuing the arrest warrant. And no reasonable jury could infer the existence of a conspiracy between the Sherriff’s Office and the HOA from the mere facts that Farr experienced conflicts with the HOA in the past and there was some acquaintance between officials from the HOA and the Sheriff’s Office.

A private person’s mere furnishing of information to police does not constitute joint action under color of state law for § 1983 liability.

Chimera v. Lockhart · filed 2013-02-21

But “the mere furnishing of information to police officers who take action thereon does not constitute joint action under color of state law which renders a private actor liable under § 1983.” Lee, 820 F.2d at 1115. The district court properly gave summary judgment to Ms. Sutterfield.

Section 1983 claims against a private defendant may proceed past judgment on the pleadings when the allegations support a joint enterprise with another defendant.

Melton v. Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County · filed 2003-05-07

The Court finds that the only surviving claims at issue in the motions before it are Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims for deprivation of property and for invasion of privacy/violation of right to publicity. Having reviewed such claims, and having heard the arguments of the Parties on April 16, 2003, the Court finds that such claims should not be dismissed in response to Defendant Condon’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. There are sufficient allegations in the Complaint to deny such motion and to support the theory of at least a joint enterprise among Defendants Tobias and Condon.

A § 1983 claim against private defendants must allege their involvement with state officials with enough particularity to survive dismissal.

Bannerjee v. Papadakis · filed 1984-03-22

Absent particularized allegations of state involvement with the private defendants, the complaint cannot stand. Accordingly, so much of plaintiff’s complaint as alleges a claim under § 1983 against defendants Kriegel and Diamond is dismissed, without prejudice to renewal.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private actor whose challenged conduct is jointly undertaken with state officials or otherwise attributable to the state; a conversation with police alone does not establish joint action.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc. · filed 1999-03-10

Moreover, the mere fact that sales agents of Don Stein Buick may have conferred with police officers outside plaintiffs presence upon the officers’ arrival at the dealership is simply not sufficient to show that the sales agents and police officers shared “a specific goal to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights by engaging in a particular course of action” or that a “substantial degree of cooperative action” existed between the sales agents and police officers.

Section 1983 does not make a private person a state actor merely because the person reports conduct to a state licensing board.

Okoye v. Medicalodge North · filed 1999-02-11

Finally, the mere fact that Ms. Frakes reported plaintiffs conduct to the Board is insufficient to constitute the requisite “joint action” for purposes of establishing Ms. Frakes’ liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private citizen only when the plaintiff alleges and proves that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.

Mylett v. L.M. Jeane · filed 1989-09-28

As to the dismissal of defendant Adams, in order to find a private citizen liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.

Section 1983 liability for a private party alleged to conspire with public officials requires evidence of an agreement to deny the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Jetstream Aero Services, Inc. v. New Hanover County · filed 1989-09-08

The potential liability of the corporate defendants is under a different theory and hinges upon whether there was a conspiracy between the private and public parties. ... An agreement is the heart of a conspiracy and the evidence of such an agreement is lacking.

A private security guard acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when a police policy lets the guard substitute private judgment for police investigation in initiating arrests.

Lusby v. Stores, Inc. · filed 1984-11-23

Thus, if we treat Gent as a private party, the local police followed a policy that allowed him to substitute his judgment for that of the police. Such cooperative activity between the police department and a private party is sufficient to make Gent a party acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party who acts in concert or conspires with persons acting under color of state law.

Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg · filed 1974-05-10

We find that the members of the Zoning Board are persons acting under color of state law and that their action or inaction in the involvement of Zoning Ordinances could cause the deprivation of civil rights. ... A great variety of cases have found jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in suits against private parties acting in concert with or in conspiracy with those acting under color of law. ... We find that there is jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to entertain this complaint. ... We find the complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death in favor of the personal representative under federal common law, and private persons who conspire with a state official act under color of state law.

Shaw v. Garrison · filed 1975-03-04

We thus find no impediment to the creation of a federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the personal representative of the deceased. ... Although that statute carries with it the requirement that the prohibited acts be committed under color of state law, it is now clear that private persons may be sued under the statute if they are acting in conspiracy with some state official. ... The same result is required under § 1983, since “under color” of law has an identical meaning under both statutes. ... In the case at bar, plaintiff’s complaint more than adequately alleges a conspiracy between the private defendants and Jim Garrison, who was acting under state law in his capacity as District Attorney of Orleans Parish. ... Plaintiff may or may not be able to prove such allegations at trial, but they are clearly sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 against each of the defendants.

Private persons may fall within § 1983 when they act in concert with a state official who acts under color of state law.

Timo v. Associated Indemnity Corp. · filed 1976-02-20

However, private persons whose actions would not otherwise be deemed to be under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may come within the statute’s purview if they act in concert with a state official who does act under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits liability for private individuals only when they join state or local officials in an effort to violate the plaintiff's protected rights.

Sawmill Products, Inc. v. TOWN OF CICERO, ETC. · filed 1979-09-26

As private individuals, defendants Erlandson and Kovanda can be held liable under § 1983 only if it is shown that they joined with local officials in an effort to violate the protected rights of the plaintiff corporation. ... In the absence of such an allegation, the mere fact that these defendants protested the presence of the sawmill in the community is insufficient to state a claim against them under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private parties to be liable when they are jointly engaged with public officers in denying civil rights.

Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Company · filed 1980-01-02

Private parties may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where they have been jointly engaged with public officers in the denial of civil rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party for merely furnishing information to police who independently make an allegedly unconstitutional arrest; § 1983 requires action under color of state law, such as willful joint activity with state officials.

Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. · filed 1979-03-26

In applying these principles to the instant case, we are again unable to find in the record any significant evidence to suggest that Goldblatt's did anything more than supply information to police officers who then acted on their own initiative in arresting Lewis; and we decline to hold that the mere act of furnishing information to law enforcement officers constitutes "joint (activity) with state officials in the Prohibited action " (that is, the allegedly unconstitutional arrest of Lewis). Accordingly, we must also set aside the jury's verdict against Goldblatt's on Lewis' claim for relief under § 1983.

A private party that violates civil rights through the knowing assistance of a person clothed with state authority may be liable under Section 1983 even when the official's acts were unauthorized or unlawful.

In Re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases · filed 1983-07-13

The policeman’s involvement created state action and rendered the private party liable under § 1983 “whether or not the actions of the police were officially authorized or lawful”. ... Thus a private party who violates another’s civil rights through the knowing assistance of one clothed with state authority is liable under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Private defendants may remain joined in a Section 1983 action when allegations could show they acted in concert with government defendants under color of state law.

G. & A. BOOKS, INC. v. Stern · filed 1985-02-05

If plaintiffs state a cause of action under the first amendment and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, it may be possible for them to demonstrate that all defendants acted in concert under color of state law to deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights.

Private defendants satisfy Section 1983's color-of-state-law requirement when specific allegations show that they acted in concert with state officials in the challenged conduct.

Kufalk v. Hart · filed 1985-03-18

Plaintiff has done far more than merely allege a conspiracy; he has alleged specific instances in which the Hope defendants acquiesced in, or affirmatively repeated, various false, misleading and pretextual statements uttered by the state defendants. Thus, in the view of this court, the plaintiff has alleged concerted action between the state defendants and the Hope defendants sufficient to satisfy the “color of” state law requirement of § 1983.

A private litigant does not act under color of state law merely by obtaining a favorable judicial decision and must be linked to state actors by detailed allegations of joint action or conspiracy.

Perkins v. Penagaricano-Soler · filed 1985-05-14

However, it does not follow that resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit would make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge. The relationship, connection or nature of cooperation between the state and a private individual must be pled in some detail.

Private tenants and their lawyer do not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by appearing in state court.

Tucker v. Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc. · filed 1985-06-04

The appearance of the defendant tenants and their attorney before a state court is insufficient joint action with the state to establish state action for jurisdiction under § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state law; allegations that private parties acted in concert with a state trooper can satisfy the state-action element.

Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream · filed 1985-07-01

To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading that raises a section 1983 claim ... must allege both that someone violated a right that the Constitution or laws of the United States secures and that the offender did so under color of state law. ... As we read the complaint, however, the allegations that appel-lees acted “in concert” with a State Police Trooper and that the microchip operation constituted an unlawful search and seizure sufficed to state a section 1983 claim.

Private people jointly participating with state officials in a civil-rights deprivation act under color of law for § 1983 purposes.

Hooks v. Hooks · filed 1985-08-23

Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in a deprivation of civil rights are acting under color of law for purposes of Sec. 1983.

A private party acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when it solicits and obtains an improper use of state power and thereby becomes a willful participant in joint activity with state officials.

Thomas J. Sims, Cross-Appellant v. Jefferson Downs Racing Association, Inc., Cross- Stewards B.B. Rayburn and Claude Mau · filed 1985-12-18

Because Krantz both solicited and was granted this improper use of state power, we conclude that Krantz was a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

A police officer's presence at a private repossession can constitute state action when it lends the repossession official legitimacy and intimidates the owner from resisting.

Joseph C. Booker, D/B/A Booker Trucking Company v. City of Atlanta, a Municipal Corporation, F. M. Couvillion · filed 1986-01-09

Even if unintended, such an effect could constitute police “intervention and aid” sufficient to establish state action.

A state-appointed guardian with custody of a ward acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when exercising state-created authority jointly with state officials.

Thomas S. v. Morrow · filed 1986-01-09

We conclude that the guardian acted under color of state law and that he is a state actor for purposes of jurisdiction under § 1983.

A private party does not incur Section 1983 liability for police searches and arrests without allegations that the party controlled the investigation or directed the challenged police conduct.

Mann v. City of Tucson · filed 1986-02-10

Mann has failed to allege that these other defendants controlled the investigation or directed that the searches be conducted, and the facts alleged would not support such a claim. For this reason, the section 1983 claims against these private defendants were properly dismissed.

A private person who willfully joins a state official in depriving constitutional rights acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes.

Smith v. William F. Winter, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Mississippi · filed 1986-02-12

A “willful participant in joint action” with a state official to deprive one of his constitutional rights acts under color of state law even though he is not himself an officeholder.

A private judgment creditor acts jointly with the state for Section 1983 when enforcing a judgment necessarily requires coordinated activity with state officials under the challenged state procedures.

Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Company, State of Texas, Intervenor · filed 1986-02-20

Enforcement of the state court judgment therefore necessarily involves a panoply of activities undertaken together by Pennzoil and state officials, which constitutes joint action for the purposes of § 1983.

Federal officials may act under color of state law for Section 1983 when they conspire or act jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights.

Schrader v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare · filed 1986-04-03

Ordinarily, when federal officials conspire or act jointly with state officials to deny constitutional rights, “the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983.”

A private employer does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when its independent refusal to hire rests on an insurer’s bonding decision and the complaint alleges no joint action with city officials.

Crenshaw v. City of Toledo, Department of Public Utilities Taxicab Board of Review Black & White Cab Company · filed 1986-10-07

The cab company based its decision not to hire the plaintiff on its insurance carrier's refusal to provide a bond for the plaintiff. The allegations in the complaint show no joint action between the cab company and the city officials in this case. ... So the case against the cab company was properly dismissed.

A private person's act of calling a complaint into a police department does not by itself support § 1983 liability.

Caplan v. Roseman · filed 1987-08-18

Calling in a complaint to a police department, however, is not, by itself, sufficient to state a claim against private parties under § 1983.

A private adoption agency becomes a state actor for § 1983 purposes when its conduct triggers a self-operative statute implementing the state's predetermined decision to terminate parental rights.

Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services · filed 1987-09-03

The only fair conclusion is that such a private party becomes a “state actor” when his or her actions bring the statute into play so as to effectuate the pre-determined state decision to terminate parental rights.

Private creditors act under color of state law when they jointly participate with state officials in seizing property through a state attachment procedure.

Watertown Equipment Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A. · filed 1987-10-08

It is clear that Norwest and Miller acted under color of state law in instituting an attachment under South Dakota law because they acted in “joint participation” with state officials in seizing Watertown Equipment’s property.

A private corporation acts under color of state law for Section 1983 pleading purposes when it conspires with police officers to procure an unconstitutional arrest and prosecution.

Beckham v. Grand Affair of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1987-10-14

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 because the named Defendant is a private corporation; therefore, Defendant urges, there is no action “under color of state law” involved in this case. But Plaintiff properly alleges, as Defendant concedes, a conspiracy between the named Defendant and certain officers of the City of Charlotte police department, culminating in Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest and unsuccessful prosecution for trespassing. Though perhaps not as clearly as could be wished, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the arrest was unconstitutional because based on neither warrant nor probable cause. These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging that a private defendant conspired with a state official must plead specific facts showing agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Hammond v. Waldo Bales and Roger Hammond · filed 1988-04-08

This court has stated several times that when a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary state action by implicating a state official in a conspiracy with private defendants, the pleadings must specifically present facts showing agreement and concerted action. Conclusory allegations without supporting facts are insufficient.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who jointly participate or conspire with a state actor to violate federal rights.

Doe v. Smith · filed 1988-10-03

The Yassar defendants are concededly private parties and in order to cloak them with state action it must be shown they either jointly participated or conspired with a state actor to violate plaintiffs federal rights.

An attorney may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state actor to deprive someone of civil rights, but a conclusory allegation of conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim.

Campbell v. Ronnie Strong Judge Dominick R. Carnovale John Doe Mary Doe, Defendants · filed 1988-12-21

Although the defendant attorney may be liable under Sec. 1983 if he conspired with a state actor to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919-20 (1984); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980), plaintiff's allegation of such a conspiracy is merely a conclusion and is insufficient to support a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private persons who conspire with public officials to violate federal rights under color of state law.

Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc. · filed 1990-02-27

Conspiracies between public officials and private persons to violate federally-created rights under color of state law are violations of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for private parties only when they jointly engage with public officers in denying civil rights.

Anderson v. Palestine Tp. · filed 1991-02-26

Private parties can be liable under Section 1983 only when they have been jointly engaged with public officers in the denial of civil rights. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144. Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts which suggest that Heyungs and Schultz came to a "meeting of the minds" with public officers to deprive Kenyon and Anderson of their constitutional rights.

A private defendant may face a Section 1983 claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendant jointly engaged with government officials in the prohibited action.

Freedman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. · filed 1991-06-07

We conclude that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action under section 1983. ... We also find that it sufficiently alleges that defendant jointly engaged with government officials in the prohibited action (see, Adickes v Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 152).

A private person may be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest if the person acted in concert with a state actor in pursuing an unconstitutional goal.

Montes v. Gallegos · filed 1992-12-23

In order for Gallegos to be liable, he must be found to have acted in concert with a state actor, namely officer Danny Pacheco, in pursuing an unconstitutional goal. ... I find that there exist genuine issues of material fact concerning Gallegos’ alleged joint participation in securing the illegal arrest of Juan Montes because there are factual disputes about whether Gallegos acted with an improper motive on the night of November 21, 1990 or whether Gallegos’ actions in pursuing the arrest of Juan Montes on November 21, 1990 were completely proper.

Private parties' request that a public recorder perform the ministerial act of recording an abstract of judgment, coupled with conclusory allegations of concerted state action, is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Canatella v. Jamison · filed 1993-10-14

With regard to the claims against Sawaya, Mezzetti, and the Mezzetti law firm based on the recording of the abstract of judgment, Canatella failed to allege just what concerted state action these private defendants engaged in, other than the fact that Jamison, the city/county recorder, recorded the abstract of judgment at the request of Sawaya and her counsel, a purely ministerial act. This is insufficient to allege that Sawaya and her counsel, private parties, acted in some concerted manner with the city/county recorder to deprive Canatella of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations are conclusory at best.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private person who willfully acts with a state official in unlawful conduct.

Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Township · filed 1994-03-30

A private citizen may be held liable under § 1983 for unlawful conduct undertaken willfully together with a state actor.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private citizen who willfully acts with a state actor in unlawful conduct.

Russell v. Steck · filed 1994-05-10

A private citizen may be held liable under § 1983 for unlawful conduct undertaken willfully together with a state actor.

Section 1983 reaches a private participant in a conspiracy with officials acting under color of state law.

Pena v. Edward Mattox, Charles Bretz, Patricia Schneider, and Others Unknown · filed 1996-05-21

Since Bretz certainly and Schneider arguably were acting under color of state law, the conspiracy is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though the third defendant, Amanda’s father, was not.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party for conspiring with state actors when the pleading identifies particular overt acts showing collaboration to deprive someone of protected rights; ordinary dealings with the state are insufficient.

Fox News Network, L.L.C. v. Time Warner Inc. · filed 1997-04-10

Time Warner describes numerous overt acts by Fox and the City in execution of the claimed conspiracy designed to coerce a private entity to give up its rights because of the desire of public officials to reward and ingratiate themselves with a competitor. These cannot be characterized as “normal dealings” with the state. Time Warner alleges with sufficient particularity a collaboration between Fox and the City to deprive Time Warner of its Free Speech, Due Process, and other statutory rights.

Section 1983 permits liability for private parties who conspire with state actors even when the state actors are immune, but the conspiracy must be sufficiently alleged.

Tremblay v. Smith, et al. · filed 1997-07-16

Although non-state actors may be held liable for conspiring with state actors even where the state actors are themselves immune from liability, here the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a conspiracy between Judge Smith, the only state actor named as a party, and the remaining defendants, who are not state actors.

Conclusory allegations that private parties conspired with state officials are insufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim.

Kurschus v. PaineWebber, Inc. · filed 1998-08-12

As Kursehus has submitted only conclusory allegations of the alleged conspiracy between the Sagers and the Nassau County officials, the Sagers are entitled to summary judgment on Kurschus’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims against private individuals who conspire or engage in joint activity with state actors.

Storck v. Suffolk County Department of Social Services · filed 1999-08-11

Private individuals who are not state actors, may nonetheless be liable under Section 1983 if they have conspired with or engaged in joint activity with state actors.

Section 1983 can treat a law firm as a state actor when, through its lawyer, it sets in motion state procedures that lead officials to seize property.

Doyle v. Schultz · filed 2000-03-14

Newman Mathis, through Landry’s actions, may fairly be said to have set in motion the procedures that caused the State to issue and execute the writ of fi fa and therefore may be considered a state actor in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who conspires with a state actor to violate civil rights; evidence of participation in the conspiracy can preclude summary judgment.

Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hospital · filed 2000-03-23

However, an ordinary citizen who conspires with a state agent to violate a plaintiffs civil rights may also be liable. ... Although it is a close call, the Court finds that, considering this evidence and the totality of the circumstances described above in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of fact whether Choi was a participant in the alleged conspiracy. Accordingly, Choi’s motion for summary judgment'on this ground is denied.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a private party to proceed when evidence of substantial cooperation with police creates a factual dispute over joint action.

Pourny v. Maui Police Dept., County of Maui · filed 2000-08-14

The Court cannot say, on the facts now before it, that as a matter of law MCA did not engage in “joint action” sufficient to make its employees’ state actors for purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, MCA’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs constitutional claim is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private citizen who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Brokaw, C.A. v. Mercer County · filed 2000-12-19

While a private citizen cannot ordinarily be held liable under Section 1983 because that statute requires action under color of state law, if a private citizen conspires with a state actor, then the private citizen is subject to Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party who conspires with a state actor, but the plaintiff must show an agreement to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Hessami v. Corporation of Ranson · filed 2001-10-03

A private party involved in a conspiracy with a state actor can be liable under § 1983. However, to sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to show that the party acted in concert with public officials.

Edmond v. Hartford Insurance · filed 2001-11-14

To state a claim under § 1983 against prívate parties, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the party acted in concert with public officials.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Granito v. Tiska · filed 2001-12-12

A § 1983 action may be brought against a purely private party by making a showing “that a person acting under color of state law ... collaborated or conspired with a private person ... to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right....” ... Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient information to entitle him to discovery on his conspiracy claim.

A private person may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state actor to violate constitutional rights, but the plaintiff must show an agreement.

Franklin v. Terr · filed 2003-11-25

“A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered joint action with a state actor.” ... Plaintiff “must show ‘an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights.’ ” ... In other words, Eileen’s liability turns on whether plaintiff can prove that the prosecutor Tipton, or the Detectives, Morse and Cassandro, conspired with Eileen to conceal that Eileen had undergoing hypnotherapy.

Section 1983 reaches private persons who jointly engage with state officials in alleged unconstitutional action.

Smith v. Oakland County Circuit Court · filed 2004-11-10

The Court finds that the allegation of conspiracy against the Cromwell Defendants is sufficient to bring them within the purview of “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires factual support for a claim that private defendants acted in concert with government actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights; speculative and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Scarfone v. Village of Ossining · filed 2005-11-21

The plaintiff’s speculative and conclusory allegations that Civil Service Employees Association (hereinafter CSEA) and Michael J. Duffy acted in concert with the Village and its agents to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights, and that they conspired with the Village to deprive her of her constitutional rights, without factual allegations or other support, were insufficient to state causes of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Adickes v S. H. Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 152 [1970]; Spear v Town of W. Hartford, 954 F2d 63, 68 [1992], cert denied 506 US 819 [1992]; Marrero v City of New York, 2003 WL 1621921, *4 [2003], 2003 US Dist LEXIS 4664, *11 [SD NY, Mar. 28, 2003]), and 42 USC § 1985 (see Griffin v Breckenridge, 403 US 88, 102-103 [1971]; Thomas v Roach, 165 F3d 137, 146 [1999]; Ford v Snashall, 285 AD2d 881, 882 [2001]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 244 AD2d 606, 610 [1997]).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor who conspires with the state to violate someone’s rights, but the plaintiff must show evidence of an agreement.

Adams v. Teamsters Local 115 · filed 2007-01-22

A plaintiff may show such a nexus by establishing that the state and a private actor conspired with one another to violate an individual’s rights.

Section 1983 requires more than conclusory allegations that private defendants conspired or acted jointly with a state officer.

Rowell v. King · filed 2007-04-25

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of a conspiracy or joint action with Officer Evans are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private person depends on a valid underlying claim against the state officer.

Reynolds v. Dawn Jamison and Christopher Darr · filed 2007-06-08

Therefore, the § 1983 claim against Jamison is dependent on the validity of the claim against Darr.

A § 1983 claim against a private attorney based on conspiracy with state actors requires facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds to deprive someone of federal rights.

Ellibee v. Fox · filed 2007-06-21

While Mr. Ellibee’s amended complaint contains extensive allegations, he does not present any facts establishing an agreement or meeting of the minds between Ms. Fox and the state actors to deprive him of any federal rights. Thus, he failed to state a § 1983 claim against Ms. Fox.

Section 1983 permits claims against private persons who act jointly with state officials; a defendant need not be a state officer.

Odom v. Ozmint · filed 2007-07-06

Therefore, under this action, a claim may be raised by an individual against “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents” ... “[p]rivate persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action,” but § 1983 does not “require that the defendant be an officer of the State.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when private persons jointly participate with state officials in the challenged action.

Potenza v. Schoessling · filed 1976-10-04

Plaintiffs’ complaint clearly alleges that the decision to fire them was the product of action by both private and public officials; this is sufficient to meet the standard in Price. Because the test for state action is the same under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as it is under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the decision of the district court must be reversed.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties when they are jointly engaged with public officers in denying civil rights.

Shqeirat v. US AIRWAYS, GROUP INC. · filed 2007-11-20

Under Murray, the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that U.S. Airways and MAC jointly violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in violation of § 1983.

Private defendants may face § 1983 liability when they conspire with state actors to violate civil rights.

Johnson v. Dossey · filed 2008-02-12

The private defendants can be subject to a § 1983 action only if they conspired with the state actors to violate Johnson’s civil rights. The conspiracy allegations are clearly sufficient against McMahon and Rayburn.

Private defendants can be subject to § 1983 only if they conspired with state actors to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Johnson, Mary v. Dossey, John · filed 2008-02-12

The private defendants can be subject to a § 1983 action only if they conspired with the state actors to violate Johnson’s civil rights.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against a private person who willfully joins state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Theodore W. White, Jr. v. Detective McKinley · filed 2008-02-26

Although § 1983 can only be used to remedy deprivation of rights done under the color of law, a private actor can be liable "under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials to violate a private citizen's right[s]. . . . " Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 950 (8th Cir. 2005). The key inquiry is whether the private party was a willful participant in the corrupt conspiracy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private parties who conspire with state actors to violate constitutional rights; the plaintiff must show an agreement between them.

Tebo v. Tebo · filed 2008-11-25

In order to hold them liable on her Section 1983 claim, they must have engaged in a conspiracy with state actors to violate her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits damages against a private person who conspires with state officials acting under color of state law, even if the officials are immune from suit.

Hooshang Kadivar, M.D. v. Stone · filed 1986-11-19

A private person who conspires with state officials acting under color of state law may be held liable for damages in a § 1983 action for participating in the conspiracy regardless of whether the state officials are themselves immune from suit.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 if it conspires with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Hoeft v. Davies · filed 2009-08-20

And though Hoeft does not contend that Derco is a state actor by virtue of employing inmates on work release, a private actor can nonetheless be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if that individual or entity conspires with a state actor to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Private actors may be liable under Section 1983 for conspiring with state officials when the complaint alleges facts showing they acted together to commit an unconstitutional act.

Margaret Zavalidroga and Tomas Zavalidroga v. Joseph S. Cote, Individually · filed 2010-10-06

Although private actors are liable under Section 1983 if they conspired with state officials, to state a claim based on “a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992). The Zavalidrogas’ vague conspiracy allegations do not meet this standard.

A private defendant may face a § 1983 claim when evidence raises a triable issue that the defendant conspired with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Robles v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-20

The plaintiffs submissions additionally raised triable issues of fact as to whether the Allstate defendants “engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive [plaintiff] of federal rights” ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the Allstate defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim against a private person must allege an agreement with a state officer to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection District · filed 2013-10-21

Plaintiffs complaint lacks an allegation of an agreement between Welge and one of the state officers to cause a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Consequently, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to bring Welge within the reach of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy between private individuals and state actors to plead facts showing a specific agreement to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

McQuiston v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2014-03-18

To properly allege a § 1983 conspiracy between private individuals and state actors, a plaintiff must set out facts, which if true, demonstrate at least one private individual reached a specific agreement with at least one state actor to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private actor requires facts sufficiently alleging that the private actor acted jointly with a state actor.

Donell Prince v. Orr · filed 2015-07-13

Prince’s failure to adequately plead a conspiracy also precludes his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Orr conspired with state actors to deprive him of his constitutional rights. This is because he has not sufficiently alleged that Orr, as a private actor, acted jointly with Aiellos or any other state actor.

A private actor may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state actors to violate federal rights, but vague and conclusory conspiracy allegations do not suffice.

Karageorge v. Urlacher · filed 2018-11-27

Miyuskovich is not a state actor, so she can be held liable under § 1983 only if she conspired with state actors to violate Karageorge’s federal rights. ... Yet the complaint’s conspiracy allegations are just that—vague and conclusory—and thus cannot support Karageorge’s § 1983 claims against Miyuskovich.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires facts showing that the party acted with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Badwal v. Badwal · filed 2019-03-12

To the extent the complaint may be construed to raise a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Badwal’s former wife, which might be outside the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, any such claim is inadequately pleaded. “To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor who conspires with state officials when the complaint plausibly alleges an agreement and a deprivation of federal or constitutional rights.

Jones v. Arbuckle · filed 2019-09-11

Private actors may be held liable under § 1983 by proving a civil conspiracy between the private and state actors. ... Considering Jones’ complaint as a whole, he has plausibly alleged facts which suggest, but do not prove, a potential agreement between Dowden and Sheriff officials and employees. At this stage, Jones is only required to plead a plausible cause of action, and he has met this standard.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold private parties liable for conspiring with a state actor to allege facts plausibly suggesting that conspiracy.

Zavalidroga v. Hester · filed 2020-02-11

Third, Plaintiff’s argument regarding his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unpersuasive because, despite his reliance on Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), Plaintiff does not in his Complaint allege facts plausibly suggesting a conspiracy by private parties with a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (nor is any such factual allegation likely given its conspicuous omission from Plaintiff’s otherwise detailed Complaint).

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private actor acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act; conjecture does not establish a conspiracy.

Bonds v. County Of Westchester · filed 2020-07-28

To state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private actor, a complaint “must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” ... Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy is based on conjecture rather than facts.

A private party’s alleged misrepresentations in a contested judicial foreclosure do not establish joint participation with a state judge for a § 1983 claim.

Mitchell v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2020-11-02

In this case, Ms. Mitchell alleged that the Bank abused the judicial-foreclosure process by making misrepresentations to the Mitchell II court about the finality of Mitchell I and urging the Mitchell II court ... to apply Mitchell I as res judicata against her counterclaims. That does not amount to joint participation under Lugar.

Section 1983 requires a state actor to remain a defendant in a First Amendment retaliation conspiracy claim against private parties.

Ferrara v. United Public Service Employees Union · filed 2020-12-29

And the state actor in the alleged conspiracy must be a defendant to sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of law who deprive citizens of rights secured by federal law, including due process and equal protection.

Lopez v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors · filed 1974-05-13

The Court does find that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is applicable to persons who, under color of law, have deprived citizens of the United States of any rights secured by federal law, including the right to due process and equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment. See Mansell v. Saunders, 5 Cir., 372 F.2d 573. Defendants concede that the actions of the Board of Supervisors and the Committee are under color of law. Plaintiffs’ allegations, although not as specific as they might have been, together with plaintiffs’ evidence, do raise questions of due process and equal protection.

Section 1983 provides a claim for constitutional-rights violations committed under color of state or territorial law, not under color of federal law.

Greenya v. George Washington University · filed 1975-05-02

We do not suggest that one is without any remedy if an organization acting under color of federal law is depriving a person of his constitutional rights. We only hold that plaintiff has no claim arising under the Civil Rights Statute and that if a claim for damages against a federal instrumentality exists at all it must be created by the Constitution itself.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action when state officials, acting under color of state law, deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Gonzalez v. Young · filed 1976-08-13

The complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for a deprivation, under color of state law, of any “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law, but not for actions taken under color of federal law.

Askew v. Bloemker · filed 1976-12-30

We hold that the ten DALE-agent defendants named herein were acting solely under color of federal law while engaged in the activities complained of by the Askews. Accordingly, the district court properly ruled that the defendants are not subject to suit under § 1983, and we affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutory rights, including a federal right conferred on a tribal Indian.

Beulah Chase v. Roland McMasters Jack Smith, Jr., Wayne Turner, Arlyn Wadholm and Russel Pederson · filed 1978-04-05

We hold, therefore, that Chase’s claim that she was denied rights under 25 U.S.C. § 465 states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal statutory rights, as well as constitutional rights, when the deprivation is under color of state law.

Reynaldo Tongol, Plaintiffs-Appellees/cross-Appellants v. William J. Usery, Jr., Defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 1979-08-06

Thus, we hold that section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress deprivations of federal statutory rights of the kind alleged by plaintiffs.

Section 1983 provides a legal or equitable cause of action for deprivation of personal or property rights under color of state law.

Cowart v. City of Ocala, Fla. · filed 1979-10-11

It also appears to be settled law that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action, in law or in equity, not only for a deprivation of personal rights under color of state law, but also for deprivation of property rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials for violating rights secured by federal law, including the terms of the Detainer Agreement.

Cuyler v. Adams · filed 1981-01-21

Respondent Adams has therefore stated a claim for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the asserted violation by state officials of the terms of the Detainer Agreement.

Section 1983 reaches claims alleging a deprivation of rights caused by a violation of federal law, and a Department of Public Welfare is a person subject to suit under the statute.

Stanton v. Godfrey · filed 1981-01-27

It is clear the allegations that Stanton et al. violated the Social Security Act causing a deprivation of Godfrey et al.’s rights sufficiently set out a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, the Department of Public Welfare is a person under § 1983 and is a proper defendant. An award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 was not improper.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law; violations of state law alone are insufficient.

Ybarra v. Bastian · filed 1981-02-12

Section 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Only federal rights, privileges, or immunities are protected by the section. Violations of state law alone are insufficient.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts when those breaches do not deprive plaintiffs of federal rights secured by § 13(c).

Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union · filed 1982-06-07

But because we have determined that Congress did not intend that breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts would constitute deprivations of federal rights secured by § 13(c), the union has no cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations of federal rights committed under color of state law, not for actions taken under color of federal law.

Edgar v. Inland Steel Company, a Corporation · filed 1984-09-21

plaintiffs cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a remedy to redress deprivations, under color of state law, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. The statute, by its express terms, is directed only to state wrongdoing. At best, defendant acted under color of federal law when it complied with the IRS instructions; but section 1983 does not protect against such acts.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of law; a claim cannot proceed when the defendants were not alleged or found to have done so.

Blank v. Heineman · filed 1991-01-11

It is clear that to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants must have acted under color of law. As the plaintiffs have failed to allege, and further that the Court fails to find, that defendants acted under color of law, the plaintiffs cannot maintain their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer’s off-duty status alone does not establish that the officer acted outside the color of authority for a § 1983 claim.

Cuellar v. City of San Antonio · filed 1991-10-09

Third, assuming we ignore the forgoing objections, Ortiz’s statement that the log sheets reflect that “[a]t the time of the murder of Adolfo Cuellar Jr. ..., Stephen Smith was off-duty from his patrol shift” does not establish as a matter of law, that at the time of Cuellar’s death, Smith was not acting under “color of authority” as appellee contends.

Section 1983 does not make a private party liable for acting under color of law merely because the party used state or local court procedures.

Hoai v. Van Vo · filed 1991-11-19

It is well established that mere recourse to state or local court procedures does not by itself constitute “joint activity” with the state sufficient to subject a private party to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federally guaranteed rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Gandee v. Glaser · filed 1992-02-24

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create any substantive rights but merely creates a cause of action for the violation of federally guaranteed rights, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), and because this Court has previously concluded that not such violation has occurred, this claim, too, must fail.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for alleged constitutional deprivations committed under color of tribal law.

Sulcer v. Davis · filed 1993-02-18

[N]o action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.... As the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, it follows that actions taken under color of tribal law are beyond the reach of § 1983, and may only be examined in federal court under the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to show that they acted under color of law.

M. Ashley Dickerson, AKA Mahala Ashley Dickerson William F. Bocast William Andrew Mary Andrew v. Duke Williams Jean Will · filed 1994-07-22

The plaintiffs have not asserted a viable federal constitutional claim against the Williamses because they have not shown that the Williamses acted under color of law.

Section 1983 does not govern claims against defendants alleged to act under color of federal law; such claims are properly characterized as Bivens actions.

Dobard v. The United States District Court for Northern California · filed 1994-11-04

Although Dobard designated his action as brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because the defendants all allegedly were acting under color of federal law, Dobard's action is more properly characterized as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law; a cable operator’s franchise agreement with a city alone does not establish that its programming decision was made under color of law.

Templin v. Times Mirror Cable Television, Inc. · filed 1995-05-22

The franchise agreement between Oceanside and Times Mirror, however, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish Times Mirror acted under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when success on judicial review establishes that state action deprived a person of federally protected benefits.

Wimley v. Rudolph · filed 1996-10-07

Upon prevailing upon that claim, plaintiff had, by definition, established a deprivation of rights under color of state law, the very basis for recovery under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a declaratory judgment and nominal damages when defendants deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights under color of law.

Doe v. Porter · filed 2002-02-08

The Court will GRANT the plaintiffs’ a declaratory judgment that the policy and practice of promoting religious education in the Rhea County public schools is unconstitutional, and that defendants have deprived plaintiffs of their civil rights under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs will be AWARDED nominal damages of One Dollar ($1.00) along with reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and their costs of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for actions taken under color of federal law.

Buckley v. Meis · filed 2003-09-23

This argument fails because this court’s case law clearly establishes that a § 1983 action is not available to redress actions taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Howeth Investments, Inc. v. White · filed 2007-02-22

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Howeth Investments Inc. v. the City of Hedwig Village · filed 2007-02-22

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.