42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 broadly covers prisoners' federal-rights claims, but under Preiser a claim seeking restoration of good time must proceed under the habeas statutes and satisfy § 2254(b)'s exhaustion requirement; that rule was not applied retroactively to these pending actions.

Nelson v. Schmidt · filed 1973-12-14

The motion *707 is based on the holding in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), that prisoners' suits seeking restoration of good time are governed by the more specific habeas corpus statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, even though they come within the broad language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, prisoners' good time suits in federal courts must satisfy the exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). ... It remains to attempt to draw a line between those § 1983 cases now pending in this court to which the new rule in Preiser is to be applied retroactively and those in which it is not to be applied retroactively. I have decided that a practical line of distinction is this: whether a response[10] to the complaint was filed prior to the date of the entry of the decision in Preiser, May 7, 1973. In the present cases, responses had been filed prior to May 7, 1973.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a prisoner's alleged loss of compensatory good time.

Carroll v. Sielaff · filed 1975-03-20

Because these were not such plaintiffs, we hold that a complaint alleging loss of compensatory good time states a cause of action herein under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to restore sentence reduction credits.

Strickland v. McKinney · filed 1988-06-16

Finally, the restoration of sentence reduction credits cannot be accomplished through a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims challenging an improper deprivation of good time credits; those claims must be brought in federal habeas corpus.

Iman Ali Abdullah Akbar v. Richard P. Seiter Dorothy Arn · filed 1988-08-12

Plaintiff brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the named corrections officers seeking injunctive and other relief for alleged constitutional deprivations. ... The claims directed to an improper deprivation of good time credits may only be asserted in an action for federal habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring lost prison good time credits; that relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Taylor v. James Wallace, David Miller, Dolores Ramsey · filed 1991-04-30

While Mr. Taylor commenced this action pursuant to section 1983, he seeks the restoration of his good time credits, an action properly pursued via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide state prisoners a cause of action for unconstitutional deprivation of good time credits.

Best v. Sharon Pratt Kelly, Mayor · filed 1994-10-26

Under Preiser and Heck, state prisoners have no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal courts therefore have no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, with respect to claims of unconstitutional deprivations of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for lost good-time credit unless the disciplinary decision has been invalidated.

Grady v. Aud · filed 1996-07-12

Absent any allegation that Grady has successfully challenged the disciplinary decision, his claim is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the loss of good time credits that affects the duration of confinement; the claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Cardenas v. James Blodgett Tana Wood Frazier, Mrs. · filed 1997-05-21

The district court dismissed Cardenas's § 1983 challenge to his loss of good time credits. The court held that such a claim, which challenges the duration of Cardenas's confinement, must be brought by a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369-70 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90 (1973). We affirm this ruling.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for a claim that would necessarily invalidate the loss of good time credits unless that loss has already been invalidated.

Hampton v. Morton · filed 1998-03-25

A state prisoner may not bring a § 1983 suit for damages if ... the constitutional defect he alleges would, “if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good time credits” unless the plaintiff can show that the deprivation of the good time credits has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim for damages or declaratory relief challenging disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily imply that the loss of good-time credits was invalid.

Huffman v. Braswell · filed 1999-12-15

We conclude the trial court correctly dismissed Huffman’s Second Amended Complaint based on Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) which held a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challenging the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of the inmate’s good-time credits.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for restoration of good time credit.

Walton v. Thayler · filed 2000-09-11

Walton’s request for the restoration of good time credit is not a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims for damages or declaratory relief concerning lost good-time credits are precluded until the disciplinary sanctions are voided; dismissal of those claims is without prejudice.

Smith v. Morgan · filed 2001-07-20

With respect to any loss of good-time credits, we note that any claims for damages or declaratory relief are precluded until the disciplinary sanctions have been voided and we construe dismissal of such claims as without prejudice.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging procedures for awarding discretionary good-time credit when success might only hasten a prisoner’s release.

Willie B. Hadley, Jr. v. Holmes · filed 2003-09-03

In our view, Had-ley’s first claim is not cognizable under § 2254, and should instead have been raised if at all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to the procedures used to revoke good and honor time, but does not permit restoration of the lost time.

Bills v. Henderson · filed 1978-02-24

The Court concludes that, while determination of the constitutional validity of procedures used to revoke good and hon- or time may be made in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the actual restoration of such time in an action brought under Section 1983 is foreclosed by Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).

Section 1983 does not permit monetary or declaratory claims challenging procedures used to deprive a prisoner of good-time credits when the punishment has not been invalidated.

Mallett v. R. Roman · filed 2011-07-26

The district court properly dismissed Mallett’s due process claims because the disciplinary proceeding resulted in the loss of 360 days of good-time credit, and Mallett did not allege that the punishment has been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (a claim for monetary and declaratory relief challenging the validity of procedures used to deprive a prisoner of good-time credits is not cognizable under § 1983).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere; it does not support a claim based only on the statute itself.

Hines v. Town of Vonore · filed 2012-12-05

However, to the extent plaintiff alleges a generic cause of action under § 1983, defendants are entitled to summary- judgment as that statute provides a remedy rather than a right in of itself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the specific constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed.

Román-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2011-08-18

Section 1983 does not provide "any substantive rights independent of those already granted under federal law," Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008), and a plaintiff seeking to recover under that provision must therefore "identify the specific constitutional [or statutory] right allegedly infringed," Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); see also Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). Appellant's complaint lacks any such specificity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law.

Arney v. Simmons · filed 1996-04-08

To allege a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must assert the denial of a right, privilege or immunity that is secured by federal law.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of federal law to support a claim.

Stefanelli v. Silvestri · filed 1981-11-04

Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of federal law which could sustain a claim pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for visitation privileges absent a federal constitutional or statutory right to such privileges.

Henry v. State of Delaware · filed 1973-12-18

Moreover, there is no federal constitutional or statutory right to visitation privileges, Cf. Fear v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (C.A. 3, 1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 278, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969), so this claim is not a right cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for a state-action violation of federal statutory or regulatory rights even without an allegation of constitutional invalidity.

Giguere v. Affleck · filed 1974-01-28

While other courts may differ on this question, see, e. g. Wynn v. Indiana State Department of Public Welfare, 316 F.Supp. 324 (N.D.Ind.1970), I find compelling the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that an action alleging that under color of state law certain federal statutes or regulations are being violated may state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even absent an allegation of constitutional invalidity.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violations of federal statutes or regulations committed under color of state law even without alleging a constitutional violation.

Roselli v. Affleck · filed 1974-02-25

I find compelling the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that an action alleging that under color of state law certain federal statutes or regulations are being violated may state a claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 even absent an allegation of constitutional invalidity.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege the violation of a federal right for relief to be available.

Webster v. Anderson · filed 1975-09-04

While the complaint does charge discrimination, this allegation is based solely on the denial of Webster’s request for an escorted furlough, which he claims other prisoners have received. However, he has alleged no racial or other forms of invidious discrimination for which federal law provides a remedy. No authority has been found suggesting a federal right to an escorted furlough from a state prison.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Whetzler v. Krause · filed 1976-03-31

Thus, there has not been a deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws as required under § 1983; and accordingly we dismiss Count 1 of the complaint.

Section 1983 provides relief only when a person’s federal statutory or constitutional rights have been violated.

Bates v. Sponberg · filed 1976-12-20

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 offers relief only to those persons whose federal statutory or federal constitutional rights have been violated, we conclude that the mere departure from the university regulations, standing alone, did not deprive Bates of any right which can be asserted in this court.

Section 1983 does not convert every defect or denial of a state-law right into a federal right enforceable in federal court.

Davidson v. Lovett · filed 1978-03-24

This Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite the broad language of § 1983, “it was not intended to turn every defect or denial of a claimed state right into a federal right with a federal remedy.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right under color of territorial law.

Sewer v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1980-09-16

In order to assert a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that the offensive conduct occurred under color of territorial law; and that such conduct deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. ... By the plain terms of § 1983, all that Sewer must allege is that Brin deprived him of a federal right while Brin was acting under color of territorial law. ... Thus, the complaint states a cause of action and the motion to dismiss must be denied.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of purely local laws unless the alleged conduct also deprives the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba · filed 1981-06-03

Nothing in section 1983 provides redress if purely local laws are not properly observed.

A § 1983 claim premised on government action being unauthorized by federal law fails when the challenged action does not violate federal law.

Watkins v. Cantrell · filed 1983-08-19

In finding the defendants are not violating federal law, the Court has removed the linchpin holding these theories together. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted also as to plaintiffs’ allegations under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require that the constitutional deprivation have been committed with a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right.

Rustici v. Weidemeyer · filed 1984-07-17

While some confusion existed on this point at one time, it now appears settled that § 1983 does not require that the deprivation complained of have been committed with “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right.”

Section 1983 imposes liability only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, so a claim must be anchored to a specific federal right the defendant is alleged to have violated.

Jackson v. Byrne · filed 1984-08-20

Section 1983 imposes liability only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

A plaintiff cannot base a § 1983 claim on a state agency’s ineffective investigation because Title VII creates no federal right to an effective state investigation.

Holt v. Continental Group, Inc. · filed 1985-05-15

Because Title VII does not create a federal right to an effective state investigation, plaintiff cannot assert a claim under section 1983 based solely upon the state defendants’ failure to provide an effective state investigation.

A § 1983 claim cannot rest solely on a specialized voting right created by a state constitution when the challenged financing scheme violates no federal constitutional right.

Burns v. Egan · filed 1985-07-01

Since plaintiffs’ claims under the US Constitution 14th Amendment and 42 USC § 1983 seem predicated upon the specialized right to vote guaranteed by NY Constitution, article VII, § 11, defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted in its entirety.

A prisoner cannot use a federal criminal statute as the source of rights for a § 1983 claim when that statute secures no private rights.

Dugar v. Coughlin · filed 1985-07-11

The other provisions of Title 18 do not secure rights to plaintiff. He can neither sue directly under them, nor can he use them as a predicate for a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 protects against violations of federally protected rights, not violations of state law alone.

Casines v. Murchek · filed 1985-07-29

Although this issue was not addressed by the Court in Davis, we agree with appellants' contention that section 1983 protects only against violations of federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits challenges to parole procedures only when grounded in federal constitutional rights, not rights created solely by state law.

Kelso v. Armstrong · filed 1985-08-01

Such challenge must be grounded in violation of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, for § 1983 is not available to a plaintiff seeking to vindicate rights created by state law.

A bare reference to the Fourteenth Amendment does not plead Section 1983; the complaint must identify a specific constitutional right and state a cognizable claim on its face.

L.K. v. Gregg · filed 1987-12-23

The residents failed to plead their claim with sufficient specificity. ... Mere references to fourteenth amendment violations do not state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; it affords no claim when the asserted property interest ended before the challenged government action.

de Brindle v. Reoyo · filed 1988-06-10

When defendants decided not to reinstate her, she had no property interest and, therefore, her Fourteenth Amendment due process right was not violated. Without an usurpation of her federal rights, she has no section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits damages for a deprivation of a federal right under color of state law and creates no new substantive right.

Lynch v. North Carolina Department of Justice · filed 1989-02-21

For pertinent to this case, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 subjects to liability in damages only those who, under color of state law, deprive a citizen of the United States of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”; it does not create any new substantive right, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 61 L.Ed. 2d 433, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979); and in the absence of a special relationship between the law enforcement personnel and the victim, such as that heretofore discussed, Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F. 2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 84 L.Ed. 2d 818, 105 S.Ct. 1754 (1985), no one has a “constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F. 2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege or show a violation of the United States Constitution or a federal statute to state a claim.

Patterson v. Carol Stroud, Lenoir County Court · filed 1989-03-21

Appellant does not allege or show a violation of the United States Constitution or a federal statute and, therefore, fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation of the Constitution or federal law; state laws and departmental rules alone cannot support a claim.

Walsh v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-04-20

Walsh cites many Illinois laws and departmental General Orders which he claims provide for Miranda warnings, but these rules are not a part of the Constitution or laws of the United States — a prerequisite for any suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone does not state a claim.

Terry v. Kenny Morgan, Lieutenant Gary Tazelaar, Lieutenant Johnson · filed 1991-04-12

An action under section 1983 requires an allegation of a deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Jones v. Houston Independent School District · filed 1991-09-30

In order to bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a Plaintiff must allege a violation of a federal constitutional right. The statute does not provide a litigant with a substantive right but is a remedial vehicle for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that defendants violated a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Johnson v. Miller · filed 1992-05-13

The trial court held that the section 1983 allegations do not state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief, because plaintiff did not allege that defendants had violated any right or privilege protected by the constitution or any federal law. We agree with the court’s ruling regarding the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal right of which the defendant deprived him; conclusory allegations of a civil-rights violation do not suffice.

Dr. J.T. Garner v. Stephan · filed 1992-06-19

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must point to some federal right of which the defendant has deprived him. Conclusory allegations that the attorney general's failure to investigate violated the appellant's civil rights do not suffice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to articulate a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Coleman v. Wirtz · filed 1993-01-13

Plaintiff has failed repeatedly to articulate any violation of a federal constitutional or federal statutory right as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claim was appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a claim to allege a violation of the U.S. Constitution or federal law.

Williams v. Stephen D. Hale, Willie James Williams v. Kazimierz W. Jankowski, M.D., Willie James Williams v · filed 1993-01-22

A § 1983 claim must allege a violation of the United States Constitution or of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a claim to implicate a federal constitutional or statutory provision.

Reyes v. Koehler · filed 1993-02-09

In order to state a claim in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal constitutional or statutory provision must be implicated.

Section 1983 provides no substantive rights of its own; a plaintiff must show a violation of an independent federal constitutional or statutory right.

Julian v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1994-05-06

Section 1983 does not, in itself, create substantive rights; in order to prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an independent federal constitutional or statutory right.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; state-law allegations alone do not state a claim.

Field v. Kirton · filed 1994-06-21

Put simply, the mere invocation of § 1983, coupled only with state law allegations, cannot succeed.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone cannot support a claim.

McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal · filed 1994-09-02

Therefore, to succeed in its Section 1983 claim, Complainants must point to some federal due process or equal protection right that has been violated by Town’s failure to take provide sewer service as a result of the Complainants’ 1985 application.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a specific federal constitutional or statutory right rather than assert a catch-all constitutional tort claim.

Brown v. Borough of Mahaffrey · filed 1994-09-30

The plaintiffs must assert a specific federal constitutional or statutory right in order to maintain a claim under the civil rights laws. ... The plaintiffs have asserted several constitutional violations; they cannot attach a "catch-all" tort claim as a fallback if those specific constitutional claims fail.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a common-law injury, such as defamation, without deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, even if state-law remedies are inadequate.

Rahman Long v. Holden · filed 1994-12-06

Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, Sec. 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff's common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate.

Section 1983 requires allegations that implicate a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Sales v. City of Conway, Ark. · filed 1995-06-19

We find it unnecessary to determine the application of Heck to this situation, as Sales's allegations do not implicate any right secured by the Constitution or federal law, as required by section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a common law tort unless the tort also violates a federal statutory or constitutional right.

Rodriguez v. Phillips · filed 1995-09-15

A common law tort does not give rise to a Sec. 1983 action unless the commission of the tort also violates a right guaranteed plaintiff under the Constitution or federal statute.

Section 1983 does not support a challenge to the effective date or proper enactment of a state parole policy when those issues do not implicate federally protected rights.

Oglesby v. Ray · filed 1998-06-03

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff failed to assert valid § 1983 claims as to the effective date of the 1995 amended policy or whether it was properly enacted. These issues do not implicate the Plaintiffs federally protected rights.

Section 1983 requires the deprivation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone does not state a claim.

Roche v. Town of Wareham · filed 1998-10-29

Allegations that Defendants have violated state law alone, however, will not state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; a claim without one fails to state a claim.

Fillion v. Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians · filed 1999-06-16

Although the Band’s Motion to Dismiss is premised on the theory that it is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983, in her Motion to Amend the Complaint, Plaintiff has acknowledged what amounts to an alternative basis for dismissal: her failure to link Count I (the Section 1983 claim) to an alleged violation of the Constitution or of federal law. Plaintiffs attempt to remedy this omission was unavailing, and the Court cannot ignore this glaring deficiency in the sole federal claim remaining in the Complaint.

Section 1983 requires a specific allegation that a zoning dispute violated a federal or constitutional right.

Patterson v. Omnipoint Communications, Inc. · filed 2000-11-21

The municipal Defendants correctly point out that zoning disputes do not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983, absent a specific allegation of a violation of a federal or constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a claim based on the violation of an identified federal right.

Workman v. Franklin County, Unpublished Decision (8-28-2001) · filed 2001-08-28

Accordingly, we find appellants do not have a cause of action under Section 1983 because they failed to inform the trial court in their complaint of what federal right appellees violated and we are unable to find a federal right that would support appellants' cause of action against appellees.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of a federal right; violating state law alone is insufficient.

Knight v. City of Miami · filed 2002-08-06

Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong committed under the color of state law, but only for those that deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires a claim based on a federal right; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Sadlowski v. Benoit · filed 2003-04-01

"By the terms of the statute itself, a section 1983 claim must be based upon a federal right."

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of city rules alone does not support a claim.

New York State Federation of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2003-07-03

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and federal law. Thus, a plaintiff must assert a violation of a federal right to invoke a remedy provided by Section 1983. ... Thus, plaintiffs claim that only one person or entity should have to pay under the City’s Rules of joint and several liability raises no issue of federal law.

Section 1983 requires an otherwise valid claim against a state actor; a claim against NASD does not qualify because NASD is not a state agency.

First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen · filed 1979-08-29

Contrary to First Jersey's argument, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973), does not stand for the proposition that an allegation of agency bias renders exhaustion of remedies inapplicable. The complaint in Gibson was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and "state administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 574, 575 n.14, 93 S.Ct. at 1696.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Eastway Construction Corp. v. The City Of New York · filed 1985-05-21

It is axiomatic that a successful Sec. 1983 claim requires more than a showing that one has been wronged at the hands of a state or municipal official. Rather, a plaintiff must allege that he has been deprived of some right secured by federal statute or the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a violation of a right secured by federal law.

Roy v. Stanley · filed 2004-10-06

In order to succeed on his § 1983 claims, Roy must show violation of a right secured by federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed.

Jones v. Montana University System · filed 2007-03-23

The first step in evaluating a § 1983 claim is to identify, therefore, the specific federal constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish a constitutional-right violation as a condition of bringing a claim under the section.

Miller v. Clinton County · filed 2008-10-01

Accordingly, the collective bargaining agreement that Miller relies upon could not confer any property interest in her employment or elevate her to something other than an employee-at-will under Pennsylvania law, and she cannot, therefore, establish the violation of a constitutional right which is a condition precedent to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation of an independently secured federal right; it does not create rights itself.

Berg v. Obama · filed 2008-10-24

A § 1983 claimant must allege violations of “rights independently ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of police policy or state law alone cannot support a claim.

Williams v. Weber Morgan Strike Force · filed 2009-03-02

But a violation of police policies or a state statute, standing alone, cannot form the basis of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil action only when a federal right has been violated.

Pande Cameron & Co. of Seattle, Inc. v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority · filed 2009-03-20

A § 1983 action cannot be maintained unless a federal right has actually been violated.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of a federal right under color of state law.

American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester · filed 1994-09-21

To succeed in its Section 1983 claim, American Woodmark must point to some federal right that has been violated by Sempeles’ failure to take action on American Woodmark’s application for a refund of personal property taxes voluntarily paid by American Woodmark upon its furniture, fixtures and computer equipment located in the City of Winchester.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; violation of a state-law therapist-patient privilege alone does not state a claim.

Madrid v. Mangindin · filed 1996-05-29

Thus, because Mr. Madrid has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (requiring a plaintiff to allege that the defendant deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right in order to state a claim under § 1983), we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of Mr. Mangindin’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Tooma v. David · filed 2010-06-10

To prevail on a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he was ... deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. ... Here, to the extent that Tooma challenges the FPC’s and judge’s acts under Florida law, he states no deprivation of a federal right; violations of state law alone do not establish the denial of a federal right.

Section 1983 generally provides no remedy for a state-law claim without a deprivation of a federal right.

Joseph v. Curtin · filed 2010-11-24

Without a deprivation of some federal right, § 1983 generally provides no redress for claims under state law.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Mason v. Peirce · filed 2014-03-14

As the Court held, Mason did not even attempt to allege that the defendants had violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights, which is a necessary predicate of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish an individual federal right.

Stansel v. City of Atlanta · filed 2014-11-18

A claim under any of the federal civil rights statutes the fifth count cites requires the existence of an individual federal right.

Section 1983 provides no relief unless the plaintiff establishes a federal right.

Maequerita Quire v. Miramar Police Department · filed 2014-12-11

And if there is no federal right supporting the first claim, it cannot be a basis for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the violation of an identifiable federal right; a violation of federal law alone is insufficient.

Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico · filed 2017-02-09

Third, the Defendants’ actions do not violate Pojoaque Pueblo’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because there is no identifiable unambiguous right—pursuant to IGRA or otherwise—that the Defendants violated.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right; it cannot be used to litigate state law claims alone.

Willie Pearl Smith v. Hospital Authority of Cobb County · filed 2017-09-19

As a result, she cannot use § 1983 to litigate state claims in federal court.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a right secured by federal law; a state-law claim for compensation alone does not suffice.

Harvey v. Bexar County Sheriff's Dept, et · filed 2018-11-30

His contention that he is entitled to compensation for his wrongful detention under state law does not allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, as required under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. v. Gwendolyn Givens · filed 2018-12-12

“A successful section 1983 action requires that the plaintiff show she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” ... Even if the ... disciplinary action was frivolous, it would at most amount to a violation of state law, which cannot, without more, provide Holt with a cause of action in federal court.

Section 1983 requires an asserted violation of a federal right; changes to prison grievance policies alone do not support a claim.

JEFFERS v. CARTER · filed 2019-08-22

With respect to the change in the IDOC grievance policies, no action lies under § 1983 unless a plaintiff has asserted the violation of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires an asserted violation of a federal right; a change in prison grievance policy alone does not support a claim.

HARMON v. CARTER · filed 2019-09-04

With respect to the change in the IDOC grievance policies, no action lies under § 1983 unless a plaintiff has asserted the violation of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; failure to follow state protocols alone does not support a claim.

Cadena v. Preston · filed 2019-10-10

In order to seek redress under § 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely the violation of federal law, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989), nor simply the deprivation of statutorily provided benefits or interests, see Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a violated federal right.

Nemcik v. Krippendorf · filed 2019-11-07

Ms. Nemcik has not identified any federal right that has been violated, which is a necessary predicate for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law by someone acting under color of state law; a violation of state regulations alone is insufficient.

Jackson v. Chippewa Valley Correctional Treatment Facility · filed 2019-11-29

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Lewis v. State of Minnesota · filed 2019-12-17

This argument fails, because to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights; violations of state law or prison regulations alone do not suffice.

(PC) Flow-Sunkett v. Diaz · filed 2020-03-11

Any violation of state law, state regulations, or rules and policies of the department of corrections, is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of a federal right; violations of state administrative regulations alone do not state a claim.

Butler v. Laurel County Detention Center · filed 2020-05-14

Because Butler has failed to articulate any violations of a federal constitutional right, he has failed to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a constitutional or federal statutory right of which the defendant deprived them.

UNITED AERIAL ADVERTISING INC. v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-06-11

Since no federal law or constitutionally guaranteed right is identified or thus, implicated, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the violation of a right secured by federal law; an allegedly unfair application of a state prison regulation alone does not state a claim.

Hudson v. Neuschmid · filed 2020-07-10

A § 1983 claim is not stated for the allegedly unfair or incorrect application of a state regulation about family visits because a state regulation does not provide a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the violation of which is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim.

A violation of prison regulations alone does not state a constitutional claim under § 1983.

King v. Rangel · filed 2020-10-01

However, a violation of a prison regulation does not state a claim for a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right; claims arising only under state tort law are not actionable under it.

Counts v. McAddo · filed 2020-10-13

Both false imprisonment and slander are tort claims under Arkansas law and do not arise under the United States Constitution. See King v. Beavers, 148 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1998); Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975). Thus, these claims are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federally guaranteed right; state-law claims alone do not satisfy that requirement.

STEWART v. WEXFORD · filed 2020-11-10

The complaint does reference § 1983, but no violation of a federally guaranteed right has been alleged, instead the complaint specifically focuses on state law claims.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to procedures used to consider a state postconviction application when the requested relief is another opportunity to file the claims.

Spencer v. Bruce · filed 2007-01-12

Spencer’s claims are properly raised under § 1983 because he is challenging the procedures used to consider his state ... application, and the only relief requested is another opportunity to file his claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy to collaterally attack a state-court criminal conviction when habeas corpus is unavailable because the plaintiff is not in custody.

Hanson v. Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Illinois · filed 1979-01-29

We think that Congress intended that habeas corpus provide not only the exclusive federal remedy for those in custody, but also the exclusive federal remedy for all who seek to attack state court judgments of convictions. Thus, convictions not subject to question in habeas are immune from collateral inquiry by the federal courts. The broad, general terms of section 1983 must necessarily yield to the narrower terms of the habeas corpus statute; limitations contained within the more specific statute also limit the availability of remedies under the more general statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to seek post-conviction relief while avoiding the exhaustion requirement applicable to post-conviction remedies.

Bonner v. Marks · filed 1974-01-04

In effect, the plaintiffs are attempting to seek post-conviction relief via the mode of a civil rights action, thereby, escaping the procedural requirement of exhaustion present in post-conviction remedies. This cannot be done.

A state court’s substantial delay in acting on a post-conviction motion may support a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief.

Mcmillan v. Chief Judge, Circuit Court Of Greene County · filed 1983-07-26

A state court's failure to act on a petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief for a substantial period of time may give rise to a cognizable claim for injunctive 4 relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from confinement when habeas corpus is the proper route, and an Eleventh Amendment bar can defeat a claim against a state parole authority.

Alphonso Mills v. Adult Parole Authority · filed 1990-03-15

He filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority in which he sought release from confinement and monetary damages. ... The district court's conclusion, that the complaint lacked merit under the eleventh amendment and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), was sound. Mills and Freeman may, if they so choose, seek habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

Section 1983 provides a basis for equitable relief against a state-affiliated defendant's discriminatory policy that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Scott v. Opelika City Schools · filed 1974-05-06

Given defendants’ failure to offer any rational justification for its policy, this result is equally called for under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits relief for an Equal Protection Clause violation only when the facts establish a significant constitutional violation.

Fant v. Fisher · filed 1976-04-12

Before the Equal Protection Clause can be the basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the facts must show a significant violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a claim when prison officials’ arbitrary abuse of discretion is so severe that it amounts to a denial of due process or equal protection.

United States Ex Rel. Williams v. Cuyler · filed 1977-10-18

Both the statute and regulations impose broad discretion upon the prison officials. Only in the event of an arbitrary abuse of such discretion of such severity as to amount to a lack of due process or equal protection could there arise a valid § 1983 claim. This is not such a case.

Section 1983 protects the right to be free from sex-based discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause, including discrimination in public employment.

Woody v. City of West Miami · filed 1979-09-13

Sex-based discrimination unsupported by a reasonable basis is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the right to be free from such discrimination can be protected under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for purposeful race discrimination by public employers under equal protection even without a property interest in the job; state-law employment protections can create a property interest entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due-process protection.

Poolaw v. City of Anadarko · filed 1981-09-25

Section 1983 provides a remedy for state action that purposefully discriminates on the basis of race in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Thus, the constitutional right to equal protection with regard to public employment does not depend on the existence of a property interest in that employment. ... The allegations of discriminatory employment practices which are sufficient to support Poolaw’s claim for relief under section 1981 are also sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss his equal protection claim under section 1983. ... The touchstone in our analysis is whether Poolaw has a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to his position. ... These procedures are clearly sufficient to give Poolaw a legitimate expectation that his employment will continue absent cause for discharge.

Section 1983 equal-protection employment-discrimination claims fail when the plaintiff cannot sustain the burden of proving a Title VII claim.

Murphy v. Middletown Enlarged City School District · filed 1981-10-29

Plaintiff argues and we agree that caselaw to date makes clear that a plaintiff who fails to sustain her burden on a Title VII claim necessarily fails to sustain the burden of her § 1981 claim (42 U.S.C. § 1981) as well as her § 1983 claim based on equal protection (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 permits damages for substantive due process or equal protection violations by state officials only when their conduct amounts to grave unfairness, such as animus-driven infringement of state law or deliberate disregard of law that impairs significant rights.

Silverman v. Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia · filed 1988-07-15

To succeed in a § 1983 suit for damages for a substantive due process or equal protection violation, a plaintiff must at least show that state officials are guilty of grave unfairness in the discharge of their legal responsibilities. Only a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or a deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights, qualifies for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against municipalities only when an underlying constitutional violation exists.

M.P.T.C. ex rel. C.C. v. Nelson County School District · filed 2016-06-14

Because Plaintiff cannot prevail on his equal protection claim under either a disparate treatment or a deliberate indifference theory, the court grants summary judgment to Defendants Miller, Jaggers, Hendricks, and' Orr on this claim. ... As a result, Plaintiffs substantive due process claim cannot prevail under a state-created danger theory. Summary judgment in favor of the Individual Defendants is granted. ... Furthermore, “a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if there is some underlying constitutional violation for which it could be held responsible.”

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law, permits claims against private persons who conspire with such a state actor, and treats the actions of a state-court-appointed receiver as state action, subject to those limits.

Hohensee v. Grier · filed 1974-04-11

Having grounded their claims on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must show a deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. ... A suit may be brought against private citizens under the Civil Rights Act if it is alleged that a conspiracy existed between the private individuals and one who acted under color of state law Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). ... In my view, this concept of state action would include the actions of a receiver appointed by a state court. Of course, as to those of Plaintiffs’ claims not alleging a conspiracy between Defendant Bradican and other Defendants, and to those claims involving actions prior to the December '3, 1970 appointment of Bradican as temporary receiver of Scientific, the required state action is absent.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private hospital’s receipt of Hill-Burton funds and tax exemptions alone does not establish the state involvement needed to challenge its conduct under the statute.

Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hospital of Pacific Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1974-12-10

The mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds, even coupled with the alleged tax exemptions, is not a sufficient connection between the state and the private activity of which appellant complains to make out state action.

Section 1983 applies to a private hospital's exclusion decision when a state agency's recommendation directly encourages and approves that decision.

Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 1975-05-15

Its recommendation, therefore, directly “encouraged and approved” the hospital’s decision and is state action within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a private attorney's participation in a private state-court action because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Hansen v. John C. Ahlgrimm and Harley Brown · filed 1975-07-08

It is established that a private attorney, while participating in the trial of private state court action, is not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim based on discriminatory conduct by an otherwise private institution; state funding or regulation alone is insufficient without significant state participation in the challenged decision.

Cannon v. University of Chicago · filed 1976-01-15

To be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the discriminatory conduct of an otherwise private institution must be affirmatively supported by state action. ... It is settled, however, that the state must be involved in the conduct that caused the injury, ... and neither the receipt of state or federal financial assistance, nor the existence of a detailed scheme of state regulation, will be sufficient to bring defendants’ actions within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of a showing that the state significantly participated in the decision to deny plaintiff admission to the medical school.

A § 1983 state-action claim against a private hospital requires a state–hospital interdependence making the hospital a joint participant in the challenged activity.

Acosta v. Tyrone Hospital · filed 1976-03-01

To sustain a cause of action the plaintiff must show that the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the hospital that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.

A § 1983 claim fails when the challenged private conduct lacks state action.

Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. · filed 1976-03-11

Because there is definitely a lack of state action in the present case, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss those portions of the complaint dealing with § 1983 is granted.

A private party involved in a conspiracy with state actors can be liable under § 1983 even if not a state official.

1976-03-22 · filed 1976-03-22

Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983.

A private party involved in a conspiracy with state actors can be liable under § 1983 even if not a state official.

Weisman v. LeLandais · filed 1976-03-22

Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983.

A private defendant who is not acting under color of law cannot be liable under § 1983.

Ve-Ri-Tas, Inc. v. Advertising Review Council of Metropolitan Denver, Inc. · filed 1976-04-07

In summary, I conclude that the evidence reveals that the defendants here were not acting under color of law and, accordingly, there is no basis for relief ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 reaches discriminatory conduct by a private entity only when the State is significantly involved in the challenged activity.

Harold S. Golden and David Fincher v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club · filed 1976-04-15

As a matter of law and fact, they fall short of establishing that the City of Miami has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the club that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the internal membership policies of the club.

Section 1983 does not reach a private university's disciplinary action absent state action; public aid or regulation alone is insufficient to establish it.

Berrios v. Inter American University · filed 1976-06-16

The financial assistance provided to the University through tax exemptions and student aid, while indicating that the Commonwealth wishes to foster higher education, does not, without more, render the actions of the University state action for the purposes of § 1983. ... Nor do we think that the Commonwealth’s regulation of the University through the CHE so involves it in University disciplinary procedures as to make those procedures subject to constitutional scrutiny by way of § 1983. ... The University’s actions not having been “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory”, we have no jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 gives a receiver absolute immunity when he faithfully and carefully carries out the appointing judge’s orders, but a private bank or corporation alleged to have conspired with him may still be sued because the conspiracy is action under color of state law.

Kermit Construction Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno · filed 1976-12-29

At the least, a receiver who faithfully and carefully carries out the orders of his appointing judge must share the judge’s absolute immunity. ... The remaining defendants are not so fortunate; they cannot seek the shelter of judicial immunity from liability under § 1983. Although not themselves state officials, the complaint charges that they conspired with the receiver, and this is action “under color” of state law. ... That the receiver is himself immune from damages makes no difference.

Section 1983 does not treat a private association's conduct as state action merely because the State adopts its licensing standards as a prerequisite in a regulatory scheme the association does not administer.

Bailey v. McCann · filed 1977-04-14

Any defect in the USTA system may translate into a defect in the State system for § 1983 purposes, but it does not convert USTA conduct into state action. State adoption of the standards of a private organization as part of a State regulatory scheme which is not administered by that organization, is no more state action by that organization than is the adoption of State regulations by a wholly private organization.

Section 1983 does not apply to a private entity's conduct absent a sufficiently close connection between the government and the challenged action.

Johnson v. Southwest Detroit Community Mental Health Services · filed 1978-11-29

The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of state or federal action in this case. While the Court recognizes that Southwest is subject to pervasive state and federal regulation regarding the services it provides, its structure, organization and staffing, this regulation had no connection with Southwest’s decision to terminate the plaintiff or the manner in which the termination was accomplished. Absent such a connection, the existence of state or federal regulation is insufficient to impose a constitutional standard of conduct upon Southwest. ... In light of these decisions, the Court is of the opinion that the various governmental contacts relied on by the plaintiff are insufficient to establish that Southwest’s actions were under color of state or federal law. Although Southwest’s contacts with the state and federal governments are substantial, there is no showing that the state or federal government had any connection whatsoever with the procedure used in terminating Mr. Johnson’s employment. ... For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims based directly on the constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party whose conduct is sufficiently intertwined with a state institution to constitute willful participation in joint action with the state.

Lyon v. TEMPLE UNIV. OF COM. SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. · filed 1981-01-15

Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to prove, if they can, that AAUP's activity was sufficiently intertwined with Temple's to constitute wilful participation in joint action in concert with an agent of the state to establish liability under § 1983. In denying AAUP's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, we hold only that the requisite state action is present as to AAUP, this being the only issue adequately addressed by the briefs.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, and a private citizen's act of bringing an alleged crime to authorities does not constitute state action absent additional governmental involvement.

Weisman v. Sherry · filed 1981-03-12

The cases, however, clearly hold that state action will not arise through statutes which merely enable citizens to bring alleged crimes to the attention of the authorities. ... In short, Sherry acted as a private individual, not as an agent of Pennsylvania. His conduct may have been tortious, but that fact alone does not activate § 1983. The essential state action is lacking.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a private party only when it willfully participates in joint activity with the State or its agents.

Stern v. Sommerville Communications Corp. · filed 1981-04-23

Private parties such as defendant Sommerville Communications Corp. may only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where they are willful participants in joint activity with the State or its agents.

A private person who conspires with a state official acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 even if the official is immune from liability.

Richardson v. Fleming · filed 1981-07-22

It is now clear that the doctrine of derivative immunity will no longer operate to defeat the state action requirement necessary to hold Appellee Fleming liable for his alleged participation in a conspiracy to deny Richardson of his rights.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Occhino v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company · filed 1982-04-14

As just stated, the first prong of our analysis of a section 1983 claim is to consider whether the action complained of was taken by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. "The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). The proper inquiry is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351, 95 S.Ct. at 453. ... Under the principles elaborated in Jackson, Northwestern did not act under color of state law in disconnecting Occhino's telephone. It merely enforced its own rules and regulations and the record lacks any indication that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state of Minnesota and Northwestern Bell's actions. Accordingly, the steps Northwestern Bell took in terminating Occhino's telephone service cannot be fairly treated as that of Minnesota itself. ... Having concluded that Northwestern Bell's actions in terminating Occhino's telephone service were not effectuated under color of state law, it is clear that section 1983 is inapplicable to this case.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private store's alleged arrangement with police to arrest and detain suspected shoplifters does not by itself make the store's conduct state action.

Newman v. Bloomingdale's · filed 1982-07-26

Given the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the police, by arresting and detaining an individual accused of shoplifting solely on the oral complaint of store personnel and pending the filing of a formal complaint, does not allege facts sufficient to make the store’s conduct the “state action” which is essential to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party that acts in concert with municipal defendants to deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Annunziato v. New Haven Board of Aldermen · filed 1982-08-24

Although wholly private parties are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, The Gan would be liable under Section 1983 if it acted in concert with the municipal defendants to deprive plaintiffs of their rights, privileges or immunities under the constitution.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right under color of state law; state regulation alone does not make a private physician a state actor, and a Section 1983 conspiracy requires a state officer acting under color of state law.

Landry v. Odom · filed 1983-03-22

In order to receive relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show (a) that the defendant deprived him of a right secured to him by the Constitution or federal law, and (b) that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. ... However, the mere fact that an activity may be subject to state regulation does not sufficiently implicate the state in the particular conduct complained of so as to constitute state action. ... The determination of whether there is sufficient state action by non-state persons must be made by weighing circumstances on a case-by-case basis. ... Here, the state of Louisiana is undoubtedly responsible for the statute in question, but Dr. Palotta’s involvement, by his actions pursuant to that statute, without something more, is not sufficient to justify a characterization of him as a state actor. ... The actions of Dr. Palotta do not satisfy either the “public function” or “state compulsion” tests. ... A conspiracy claim under this section requires one or more of the conspirators to be a state officer acting under color of state law. ... Accordingly, the claims brought against this defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires state action; private conduct alone does not support a § 1983 claim.

Farrell v. Onboard, Inc. · filed 1983-03-28

The first four questions reported by the judge we answer in the negative because the defendant Onboard, Inc., and its officers were not engaged in State action. ... Accordingly, there was no basis for maintaining those counts in the complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), We decline to answer the fifth question, which is deficient in stating the factual premises for the question or stating with clarity the issue of law to be resolved.

A private entity may be liable under Section 1983 when acting in concert with state officials, but simple negligence is not cognizable under the statute.

Bostedt v. Festivals, Inc. · filed 1983-08-01

Technically, a private entity such as Festivals, Inc. may be held liable under section 1983 if, for example, it is acting in concert with state officials. ... However, simple negligence generally is not cognizable under section 1983 either.

A private person's conduct is attributable to the state under Section 1983 only when state officials knowingly collude in the wrongful scheme or the private person uses an allegedly unconstitutional state procedure.

Lomax v. Davis · filed 1983-08-25

Thus, it is manifestly clear that either knowing collusion with a private person in a fraudulent, illegal scheme by state officials or the use of an allegedly unconstitutional statute or procedure is necessary for the actions of a private person to fairly be attributable to the state. Without such state action, no claim is stated under § 1983 and the suit must be dismissed.

Private citizens are not liable under § 1983 for non-state-related conduct unless they conspired with state officers.

Carter v. Ingalls · filed 1983-10-06

The law is well settled that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must allege that the defendant was acting under color of state law. Private citizens cannot be sued under § 1983 for non state-related activities unless they conspired with state officers.

Private corporations cannot be sued under Section 1983 absent allegations that their conduct constituted state action.

Evans v. Meadow Steel Products, Inc. · filed 1983-10-12

Defendants are two private corporations and, absent any further allegations by plaintiff, cannot be sued under § 1983.

A private attorney does not act under color of state law merely by using state-authorized subpoena power.

Barnard v. John Mark Young A/K/A John Young, Jr., and Dr. Robert O'toole, Superintendent of Eastern State Hospital · filed 1983-11-15

If an attorney does not become a state actor merely by virtue of instigating state court litigation, ... then the attorney does not become a state actor merely by employing state authorized subpoena power.

Section 1983 does not reach a private hospital's disciplinary action against a doctor merely because the state extensively regulates and supports the hospital.

Hayden v. Bracy · filed 1984-09-27

In Lubin v. Crittenden Hospital Associates, Ltd., 713 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 685 (1982), we held that a private hospital's disciplinary action against one of its doctors did not constitute state action, notwithstanding the state's extensive regulation and support of the hospital. ... Lubin is controlling law in this circuit and, unless overruled by a higher authority, it binds our decision in this case.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private company's compliance with federal law or even extensive state regulation does not by itself satisfy that requirement.

Turner v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. · filed 1984-10-23

Therefore, plaintiff’s contention that adherence to a federal statute, in certain circumstances, could fulfill the state action requirement for a Section 1983 action is totally without merit. ... However, a state regulation, even if quite extensive, does not make a private company’s action state action.

State regulation and quasi-monopoly status do not transform a private telephone company's conduct into state action under Section 1983.

Stoutt v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1984-12-07

The fact that Southern Bell’s operations are subject to state regulation, or that the phone company is granted quasi-monopoly status does not transform the company’s conduct into “state action” for purposes of “color of law” analysis.

A private litigant's abuse of state process does not state a § 1983 claim, but a challenge to the constitutionality of the state procedure itself does.

Duncan v. Mr. & Mrs. Harold Peck, Highlands Coal & Chemical Corp. · filed 1985-01-16

Although under ... Duncan does not state a claim under § 1983 insofar as he is alleging abuse of state process by the defendants, he does state a cause of action under § 1983 in his challenge to the constitutionality of the Ohio procedures authorizing service by publication when the defendant is a non-resident whose property has been attached as a provisional remedy.

A privately employed stenographer who is also a notary public does not act under color of state law when allegedly altering a deposition transcript, because that conduct does not depend on state-conferred authority.

Kaufman v. McCrory Stores Division of McCrory Corp. · filed 1985-07-25

Because plaintiff is alleging, however, only that Bowes altered, and omitted portions of, the depositions, a power Bowes possessed regardless of state law, plaintiff’s section 1983 claim must fail.

Private litigants act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when they act together with and obtain significant aid from state officials.

Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. · filed 1985-08-07

Here, it may fairly be said that the growers were state actors because they acted together with and obtained significant aid from state officials.

Private individuals act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes if they conspire with state actors to deprive a plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Salisbury v. Housing Authority of City of Newport · filed 1985-08-20

Plaintiff has alleged a conspiracy of all defendants, however, to deprive her of her constitutional rights. If these contentions are proved, these defendants would be acting under color of state law for purposes of this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and cannot redress limits imposed solely by a private citizen.

Hershinow v. Bonamarte · filed 1985-09-13

... any limitation on his free exercise of religion came solely from a private citizen, against whom a Section 1983 claim, which requires acts under color of state law, ... cannot be made.

A private person acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes by conspiring with state officials to deprive another of federal rights.

Bey v. Allen · filed 1985-10-01

... an otherwise private person acts 'under color of state law' when he engages in a cnspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights.

Issuing a parade permit or giving a group priority for a particular time and place does not, without more, convert that private group's conduct into state action under § 1983.

Gay Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v. American Legion · filed 1985-11-06

It is not disputed that the mere issuance of a permit does not constitute state action. ... Since society’s interests in order dictate that all groups seeking to parade cannot do so at the same time or place, the granting of a preference as to a particular time and site is not enough to convert the acts of the American Legion into state action.

Private persons and corporations are not liable under § 1983 for nonstate activity unless they conspired with state officials.

Melancon v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 1985-11-07

Private citizens (corporations) cannot be sued under Section 1983 for nonstate related activities unless they have conspired with state officials.

A private person does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by initiating criminal proceedings against another person.

Emswiler v. McCoy · filed 1985-11-21

A private person who institutes proceedings against another does not thereby become a state actor.

A private person acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when the person willfully participates in joint activity or a conspiracy with a state agent.

Della Pietra v. New York State Organized Crime Task Force · filed 1986-03-19

It is well established, however, that a private person who willfully participates in joint activity or in a conspiracy with a state agent may be deemed to have acted under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.