42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not treat a public university or its corporate board of regents, as political subdivisions of the state, as persons subject to suit.

Leftwich v. HARRIS-STOWE STATE COLLEGE, ETC. · filed 1982-05-05

However, the law in this circuit is clear that a public university and its corporate board of regents, as political subdivisions of the state, may not be sued under § 1983 because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not provide relief against judges who act purely as adjudicators.

In Re the Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, in Re Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, and Fundacion Colegio · filed 1982-12-08

In short, § 1983 does not provide relief against judges acting purely in their adjudicative capacity, any more than, say, a typical state’s libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier or telephone company for simply conveying a libelous message.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials in their personal capacities for constitutional violations under color of state law, while official-capacity defendants are not persons under the section.

Lumbreras v. Roberts · filed 2004-05-26

The Supreme Court has held that government actors who are sued in their official capacities do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of Section 1983. ... Suits against state officials come within Section 1983’s scope only when they are sued in their “personal capacities.”

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials for constitutional violations and does not apply when federal officials are defendants.

Graves v. John Doe, (B. Relem Unknown), Deputy Clerk, U.S. District Court of Maryland · filed 1987-03-04

While it is true that Sec. 1983 relates to suits against state officials and properly has no application where federal officials are the defendants, a route to recovery against federal officials for constitutional violation may nonetheless exist.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private attorney who is not a state actor absent factual support for a conspiracy with state officials.

Elrod v. Michigan Supreme Court · filed 2004-07-02

As an attorney, Farah was not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983. ... Although private citizens acting in concert with state officials may be subject to § 1983 liability, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), Elrod offered no factual support or evidence upon which a conspiracy could be based.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Taylor v. Dept. of Public Safety · filed 2005-06-23

Here, this case was brought against state agencies, which are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and which enjoy the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as does the State of Georgia.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging deprivation of a federal right by a private citizen to show that the citizen acted under color of law through conspiracy or concert with state actors.

Diaz v. San Antonio Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n—IAFF Local 624 · filed 2005-11-02

To state a cause of action under section 1983 the appellant must allege that the person who deprived him of a federal right was acting under color of law.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights caused by someone acting under color of state law.

Amidon v. STUDENT ASS'N. OF STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK · filed 2005-11-07

Defendants acted under the color of state law, and are therefore subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages actions against persons acting under color of state law who deprive individuals of constitutional or federal rights.

Stotter v. University of Texas at San Antonio · filed 2007-11-27

This court has also recognized that state universities as arms of the state are not “persons” under § 1983. ... Thus, Dr. Stotter’s § 1983 claim, with respect to UTSA, is invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Jude v. Morrison · filed 2008-02-14

The plaintiffs section 1983 claims against the defendants in their official capacity are dismissed because they are not persons within the meaning of section 1983, not because of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Section 1983 does not allow damages or equitable relief against municipalities and their agencies because they are not persons under the section.

Hayes v. City of Wilmington · filed 1978-05-26

It is well settled that a municipality and its agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for pur-. poses of obtaining either damages or equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits claims only against persons, so a state and its department of corrections are not subject to suit under the section.

DeVargas v. STATE EX REL. NM DEPT OF CORR. · filed 1981-10-01

Section 1983 applies to persons. The State and its Department of Corrections are not persons within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a racial discrimination claim against a state’s arm because Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.

Moxley v. Vernot · filed 1982-11-29

This Court concludes that, since the University of California, Irvine, is an “arm of the state” of California, Defendants are correct in their contention that the University is entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity in a suit for racial discrimination under § 1983. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant University is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 permits a local governmental entity such as a county to be treated as a person and sued for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.

Van Ooteghem v. Gray · filed 1984-05-11

Having determined that Harris County is not an agency of the State of Texas, the Court can readily determine that Harris County is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to suits against state actors, not federal actors.

American Civil Liberties Union v. City & County of Denver · filed 2008-08-06

The Amended Complaint (#48) does not clearly state the jurisdictional basis for suit against the Secret Service and Defendant Mark Sullivan, who are federal actors and thus, not subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to a person acting under color of state law and does not impose liability on an entity that is not a person or a private actor lacking state action.

Ludwig v. Meyers · filed 2008-08-12

the Berks County Court of Common Pleas is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pennsylvania, 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005), and is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 673 (3d Cir. 2000).

Section 1983 provides a remedy only against a person, so States and officials acting in their official capacities are outside its scope.

Fairley v. Louisiana State · filed 2008-08-12

We begin an analysis of Fairley’s claim against Stalder in his official capacity for damages under § 1983 by quoting long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on the matter: “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”11 As § 1983 only provides a remedy against a “person,” the dismissal of Fairley’s § 1983 claims was indisputably proper.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against persons or entities who violate constitutional rights under color of state law and does not authorize suits against the federal government, its agencies, or its agents.

Kramer v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Army · filed 1985-12-10

One cannot sue the United States government, its agencies, or its agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against persons, or other entities, who violate one’s constitutional rights “under color of state law.” The federal government does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 generally requires conduct under color of law, so private attorneys, including court-appointed attorneys, are generally not subject to suit unless they conspire with state officials.

Fred Douglas Mills v. Criminal District Court 3, Hon. Gary Stephens, and Lee Ann Breading, District Attorney · filed 1988-02-02

With respect to Stephens, his court appointed attorney, section 1983 claims require that the conduct complained of be done under color of law, and private attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a person acting under color of state law who deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Gale v. Storti · filed 2009-03-19

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), a plaintiff may sue any person acting under color of state law who deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue an individual who, acting under color of law, deprives the person of a federal right.

Ritchie v. Michael Wickstrom, Theodore W. Koehler · filed 1991-09-24

In order for a person to be sued in a section 1983 action, he must be acting under color of law.

Section 1983 permits official capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and individual capacity claims for damages caused by intentional constitutional deprivations.

Housworth v. Glisson · filed 1978-06-14

Injunctive and declaratory relief is properly sought against the defendant in his official capacity. ... In addition, they ask for damages from the defendant individually for alleged intentional acts depriving them of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state officers in their official capacities because they are not deemed persons under the section.

Streater v. Courtright · filed 2009-06-30

The court also correctly ruled that, because Courtright, Harris and Williams are officers of the State of Michigan, they are not deemed “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; thus, they are not subject to suit in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors, but public defenders lack state action and prosecutors are immune from damages claims for prosecutorial conduct.

Thomas v. Doña Ana County District Attorney · filed 2010-01-22

In this case, it is “patently obvious” that Thomas could not prevail on the facts alleged in his complaint. First, as the district court noted, a plaintiff claiming a violation of § 1983 must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Thus neither the Doña Ana County assistant public defender nor Bigelow may be held liable under § 1983. ... Negotiating a plea bargain is included in these activities, and therefore the claims against Pickett and Martinez must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the section.

Owens v. Mallinger · filed 2010-01-29

we conclude dismissal was proper. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (holding that because the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the states from suit, neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 when sued for damages); Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007) (declaring that if a § 1983 complaint is silent as to the capacity in which a defendant is sued, this court interprets the complaint as including only official-capacity claims); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A] prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief to improve prison conditions is moot if he or she is no longer subject to those conditions”); see also Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting this court may affirm a dismissal on any basis supported by the record). We affirm.

Section 1983 permits civil rights liability only when defendants meet its requirements for municipal liability, lack applicable immunity, and act under color of state law.

William Walker, Jr. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2011-07-08

To the extent Walker sought relief under § 1983, dismissal was likewise correct as none of the defendants is liable under that provision. The City of Philadelphia is not subject to liability in a civil rights action absent a showing that unlawful actions were taken as a result of an approved municipal or governmental custom. Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The District Attorney’s Office and the District Attorney himself have absolute immunity from liability for actions related to their official duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976). The Defender Association of Philadelphia and the individual public defenders are not liable under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defenders not liable because they were not acting under color of state law).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law, so private civilians who briefly assist police are not liable under the statute.

Gannaway v. Karetas · filed 2011-07-19

Section 1983 grants a federal cause of action only against ―person[s]‖ acting ―under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, ―a plaintiff seeking to hold an individual liable under § 1983 must establish that []he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.‖ ... As above, however, there is no suggestion that either civilian acted under color of state law. ... Thus, Keller and Dengler are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes suits against persons acting under color of state law for federal rights, requires personal involvement for individual liability, and does not reach immune state institutions.

Baker v. Flagg · filed 2011-07-25

None of the defendants is properly sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that can be marshaled only against “person[s]” acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” ... Flagg, a private party and inmate—and, it appears, a person of limited, if any, involvement in the conduct complained of in the present action—is not clothed with the authority of the state, and is thus not subject to suit under § 1983. Nor has Baker alleged any personal involvement by Warden Perry Phelps in any constitutional violation—a fatal flaw, since “liability [in a § 1983 suit] cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” ... The JTVCC and its institutions are subsidiaries of the DOC, and hence share the State of Delaware’s immunity to suit.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipal units for constitutional deprivations caused by official policies or customs.

Bloom v. Palos Heights Police Department · filed 2012-01-04

As for the Police Department, a non-entity in the legal sense, it is not a “person” capable of being sued under Section 1983, so it is out of the case. But because the Fire District is a municipal unit (70 ILCS 705/1), it requires more discussion. Although the seminal opinion in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) held that municipal units are “persons” capable of being sued under Section 1983, the opinion went on to say (id.) that municipalities are liable only for official policies and customs that cause constitutional torts; see also Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir.2011).

Section 1983 requires state action and does not permit claims against states, their agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Gambaro v. Oregon Department of Justice · filed 2012-01-05

Plaintiffs appropriately do not challenge the decision that they failed to state a section 1983 claim against the nongovernmental defendants, who were not state actors. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 102 S Ct 2744, 73 L Ed 2d 482 (1982) (explaining requirement for state action in a section 1983 claim). Plaintiffs also could not have prevailed on a challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of the claim as against the state defendants on the ground that they were not subject to claims under section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 71, 109 S Ct 2304, 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983). The trial court did not err by dismissing the section 1983 claim as alleged against the state and nongovernmental defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state, requires a municipality’s policy to cause the deprivation, and permits claims against officials subject to suit.

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. The State of Georgia · filed 2012-07-20

The State of Georgia, however, is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. ... Upson County would be subject to § 1983 liability, though, if it caused through the enforcement of County policy the constitutional deprivation Plaintiffs say they would suffer, but the Amended Complaint fails to allege that their prosecution for ... refusing to comply with the Carry Law would be pursuant to County policy. ... The County Manager is amenable to § 1983 liability, but Count 2 contains no allegation of wrongdoing specific to him. ... He is subject to suit under § 1983, and the District Court properly entertained Plaintiffs’ Count 2 allegations against him.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law who deprive others of constitutional or statutory rights.

Smith v. New Jersey · filed 2012-11-07

The Court finds, as a matter of law, that they may not. A state, its agencies, and its actors in their official capacities are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims only against persons and requires supervisory liability to arise from the supervisor’s own reckless or callously indifferent acts or omissions.

Canales v. Gatzunis · filed 2013-10-28

It is well established, however, that neither states nor state officials sued in their official capacities for damages are “persons” for purposes of § 1983. ... State officials sued in their individual capacities may be held liable only “on the basis of their own acts or omissions,” and not “ ‘for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.’ ” ... Instead, the “supervisor’s acts or omissions must amount to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits claims against private entities performing traditional state functions only when their policies or customs cause the injury and requires personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

O'Brien v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2014-10-17

The district court also properly dismissed O’Brien’s claims against Corizon. While “a private entity that contracts to perform traditional state functions may ... be sued pursuant to § 1983,” a § 1983 claim cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. ... O’Brien made no such allegations in his complaint, and, therefore, failed to state a claim against Corizon. Although the district court did not consider whether Garcia, a private entity, could be held liable under § 1983, O’Brien’s claims against Garcia can be dismissed on the same basis.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against a state employee sued in an official capacity.

May v. Strain · filed 2014-10-21

A state employee sued in his official eapacity for monetary damages is not considered a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a person acting under color of state law to deprive someone of a constitutional or federal statutory right and does not apply to federal entities or officials acting under federal law.

Lyles v. Hughes · filed 2015-03-19

In order to state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of a constitutional right, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that “(1) a person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected the plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... By its terms, however, § 1983 does not apply to any federal government entity or to federal officials acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on immune defendants, public defenders who are not state actors, or defendants whose conduct did not cause the alleged injury.

Cheza v. Symons · filed 2015-03-20

Dismissal of Cheza’s claims against the state court judge and the district attorney was proper because these defendants are immune from liability for damages under § 1983. ... Dismissal of Cheza’s claims against the public defender was proper because public defenders are not state actors and thus not subject to liability under § 1983. ... Dismissal of Cheza’s claims against the probation officer was proper because Cheza failed to state facts sufficient to show that the probation officer’s alleged misconduct caused his injuries.

Section 1983 permits suits against officials whose edicts or acts represent official policy and treats interpretation of the section as a matter of federal law.

Sandoval v. County of Sonoma · filed 2015-03-27

We also reject defendants’ argument that they are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 because they do not have “final policymaking authority.” The named defendants are officials “whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person and imposes municipal liability only when a policy or custom caused the constitutional violation, rather than through respondeat superior.

Moody v. City of Delray Beach · filed 2015-04-06

A state is not a person for purposes of § 1983. ... “[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” ... However, a theory of respondeat superior will not establish a municipality’s liability.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons, and official capacity claims are limited to prospective injunctive relief.

Lewis v. Nev. Bd. of Parole Comm'rs. · filed 2015-04-17

First, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint to the extent that appellant raised claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the State and the Board of Parole Commissioners are not persons and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71 (1989). Further, nothing in the complaint indicates that the Executive Secretary of the Board was sued in her individual capacity, and an official acting in her official capacity is not a person and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Id. at 71. ... An official acting in her official capacity could be sued for prospective injunctive relief. See id. at 71.

Section 1983 permits a suit against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office under the circumstances of this case.

Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-05-12

But contrary to these sources, the D.A.’s Office is a proper party under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors acting by virtue of their offices.

Hoskins v. Poelstra · filed 2003-02-28

(Conspiracy matters only with respect to Poelstra; the other defendants are state actors, and thus amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by virtue of their offices.)

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for this constitutional claim against federal public defenders.

Cohen v. Hurson · filed 2015-12-03

Cohen first argues that the district court improperly construed his action as asserting a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). While Cohen’s constitutional claim alleging ineffective assistance by his federal public defenders is more appropriately construed as seeking relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of this claim as frivolous.

Section 1983 permits an action against a person who, under color of law, violates another person's civil rights.

McLean v. McGinnis · filed 2008-12-01

Section 1983 provides for an action against a “person” for a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil rights. As the Supreme Court reminded us, “a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted.” ... Thus, the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment for DSS, an agency or “arm[] of the State,” on the section 1983 claim brought by McLean.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law who deprive others of federal rights, but states and officials sued in their official capacities are not persons.

Triplett v. Washington Dept of Social & Health Services · filed 2016-04-21

[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under§ 1983. ... DSHS, DDD, the Aging and Disability Services Administration, and Lakeland Village should have been granted summary judgment dismissal of the estate's claims against them. Summary judgment dismissal of any "official capacity" claims against Secretary Arnold-Williams and Director Rolfe should have been granted as well. We reverse the trial court's order on those matters.

A county jail is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Robertson v. Sims · filed 2021-01-06

A county jail, however, is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against an officer for transporting a detainee pursuant to a valid court order.

Horton v. Simer · filed 2019-01-31

By the same reasoning, transporting a person from one detention facility to another pursuant to a valid court order does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on officials who carry out a court commitment order, and a jailer is not liable for an error in an order that is patently proper.

United States of America Ex Rel. James "Doc" Bailey v. Reubin O'd. Askew and Louie Wainwright · filed 1973-10-19

Thus it follows that it would be improper if those who are obliged'to carry out those orders of commitment would be subject to such an action. Furthermore, a jailer cannot be held liable for an error in an order of commitment which is patently proper.

An officer executing a facially valid arrest warrant is not liable under § 1983 merely because probable cause was lacking when the officer had no reason to question the warrant.

Theis v. Smith · filed 1988-01-14

He is entitled to rely on the warrant, and is not subject to liability even though probable cause may be lacking.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff, warden, or similar custodian liable for carrying out a judicial order that has not been stayed or reversed.

Carson Combs v. Pedersen · filed 2009-11-10

A sheriff, warden, or similar custodian who carries out a judicial order that has not been stayed or reversed is not liable under §1983.

A Section 1983 claim for willful dissemination of false information requires a policy or agency-wide involvement, or joinder of the responsible individuals, plus reliance on the information that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected interest.

Reyes v. The Supervisor of the Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 1987-12-08

Finally, to assert a § 1983 claim for willful dissemination of false information against the agency, Reyes must either allege that the entire PRPD was involved, ... or join the individuals who generated or communicated that information, as well as demonstrate that it was relied upon to deprive him of some interest protected by the constitution.

Defamation by state officials is actionable under § 1983 only when reputational stigma accompanies loss of a right or government benefit, or a change in legal status, without due process.

Bootz v. Childs · filed 1985-05-22

Under the “stigma plus” test, the stigma caused by the defamation must occur in conjunction with, or “plus,” the loss of some right or governmental benefit, or a change in plaintiff’s legal status, without due process of law.

Defamation by a state official states a Section 1983 claim only when accompanied by tangible harm, such as loss of employment or money.

Jungels v. Pierce · filed 1986-07-21

The traditional test for a claim under § 1983 is the “stigma plus” test. ... In order to satisfy the “stigma plus” test, there must be some tangible harm done to claimant, such as loss of job or money.

Section 1983 provides no claim for allegedly false prison reports when the inmate received due process and the reports did not independently cause a deprivation of liberty.

Dell'Orfano v. Scully · filed 1988-07-29

Accordingly, Freeman is controlling on this issue, and because plaintiff suffered no denial of liberty due solely to Nurse Pendleton’s or Sgt. Bouffard’s allegedly false reports, no action under section 1983 is available to the plaintiff on this basis.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for false prison disciplinary reports or accusations standing alone.

(PC) Sekona v. Perez · filed 2020-09-08

The creation of false evidence, standing alone, is not actionable under § 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for falsely being accused of a Rules Violation or for false reports by any of the Defendants about Plaintiff’s circumstances or conduct.

Section 1983 imposes individual rather than collective liability on government officials.

Houston v. Partee · filed 1991-11-06

But as horrendous as the notion of innocent defendants languishing in prison may be, it cannot be forgotten that Section 1983 establishes a system of individual and not collective liability.

Section 1983 permits deprivation-of-rights claims against individual police officers even when their city has not been served.

Cronan v. Coursey, No. 0395747 (Oct. 4, 1991) · filed 1991-10-04

Both counts 1 and 5 as pleaded, do set out causes of action by a deprivation of rights under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but obviously, since the City has not been served, there can be no relief under the indemnity of G.S. 7-465 as relief under the indemnity of G.S. 7-465 as alleged in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of count 1 that the defendants are being sued in their official capacity.

Merely invoking § 1983 without elaborating an individual-liability theory does not sufficiently raise that issue for trial.

Campana v. Eller · filed 1985-02-27

Although 1983 is predicated on individual liability, the mere invoking of this statute without any further elaboration is not sufficient to raise the issue for trial.

Section 1983 permits damages against individual trustees when the complaint alleges their personal participation in the unconstitutional discharge.

Starke v. Bergles · filed 1978-01-16

Such allegation alleges sufficient individual participation to permit an award of damages under § 1983 against the individual trustees if the plaintiff prevails at trial.

Section 1983 does not permit personal damages recovery against jail officials for negligent failure to protect a prisoner absent proof of the officials’ personal fault; the court left open whether simple negligence is actionable under § 1983.

Levon Brown v. United States of America · filed 1973-10-29

Having stated our misgivings about plaintiff’s theory under § 1983, we find it unnecessary to decide his claim on this point. Even if we assume that mere simple negligence on the part of the sheriff and head jailer is actionable under § 1983, we must agree with the district court that plaintiff failed to prove the essential elements of his case. ... As has already been noted elsewhere, the exercise of reasonable care in the administration of an admittedly inadequate facility is no defense to a § 1983 action for injunc-tive relief against the appropriate officials in their official capacities. Hamilton v. Love, supra,, at 1194. But to render these officials personally liable in damages we feel some personal fault on the part of the individuals must be demonstrated. Plaintiff presented no substantial evidence to show that the individual defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in their personal capacities in providing for plaintiff’s safekeeping. In the absence of such a showing there can be no recovery, even under plaintiff’s theory of negligence, against the sheriff and head jailer personally.

Section 1983 permits a suit against individual school-board members for constitutional injuries caused by excessive corporal punishment that could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Bramlet v. Wilson · filed 1974-04-10

Plaintiffs here have maintained this action against individual school board members. Thus, the defendants are properly sued under the civil rights act. ... In assessing whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle to redress the injuries asserted here, we must determine whether permissible discipline may be implemented through the infliction of excessive and abusive corporal punishment and whether such a practice can be examined under the eighth amendment. ... Thus the facts might demonstrate some basis for relief cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a police supervisor for misconduct by subordinates without direct personal action by the supervisor.

Ford v. Breier · filed 1976-04-27

“Personal involvement is contemplated” in actions brought pursuant to the so-called civil rights statutes. ... It has consistently been held that police supervisory personnel, even those charged with training members of the force, cannot be held liable for damages to one harmed by police misconduct absent direct personal action by the supervising officer. ... Applying this rule to the record presently before the Court, defendant Breier is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law who cause constitutional deprivations, and a state official sharing responsibility for jail operations may face liability under the statute.

Miller v. Dale Carson, Etc., Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, T. Edward Austin, · filed 1977-11-23

Section 1983 provides for actions in law and suits in equity against persons who, acting under color of state law, cause others to be subjected to the deprivation of constitutional rights. ... The fact that Wainwright shares responsibility for the operation of the jail with county officials does not relieve him of liability cognizable under § 1983 because of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a state official who lacked actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Walker v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1978-10-13

However, unless the official has actual knowledge of and acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation, personal liability does not attach.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, and supervisory liability cannot rest solely on an employee’s agency relationship or authority from the department.

Barnes v. Byrd · filed 1981-04-15

Plaintiff proceeds against Defendant Byrd’s supervisors in their official capacity. That is tantamount to asserting a claim for damages against the state, a result which is prohibited by the 11th Amendment and the judicial construction of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. Moreover, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the supervisory Defendants’ liability. She does not assert nor establish that Defendant Byrd acted in accordance with the official policy or customary practice of the department to conspire with one parent against the custodial potential of another. Byrd’s superiors cannot be held responsible under an assertion that Byrd acted under the authority of the department. That is merely an allegation of agency and it is insufficient to support a claim against these Defendants.

An official may be personally liable under § 1983 for authorizing or approving unconstitutional conduct only when an affirmative link connects the misconduct to the official's adoption or approval of a policy.

Heller v. Bushey · filed 1985-05-01

To establish individual liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy ... showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct.”

Personal liability under § 1983 requires that an official acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Anable v. Ford · filed 1985-09-06

To establish personal liability in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is sufficient to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.

School-board members incur individual section 1983 liability when, acting under color of state law, they fire a teacher on an unconstitutional ground.

Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School District No. 17 · filed 1986-05-19

In this case, the Board members violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights by firing her based on the “immorality” of having and raising a child out of wedlock. It is precisely these unconstitutional “under of color of state law” actions which give rise to their Section 1983 “individual” liability.

Individual liability under Section 1983 requires personal participation in the constitutional deprivation and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Robinson v. Moses · filed 1986-10-01

Under § 1983, the potential individual liability of Moses and Rieman is predicated upon personal responsibility. ... Since there is no allegation (and no inference) that either Moses or Rieman participated in the alleged constitutional deprivations in any way, they cannot be held liable. Respondeat superior has been rejected under § 1983 as a basis for individual liability.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must allege each named defendant’s direct and personal responsibility for the allegedly unlawful conduct rather than rely on subordinate liability.

Lee v. Carlson · filed 1986-10-14

the plaintiff must allege the defendants’ direct and personal responsibility for the purportedly unlawful conduct of their subordinates.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an individual official based on a single deprivation of constitutional rights.

Lopez v. Ward · filed 1988-02-26

In contrast, a § 1983 action against an individual official can rest upon a single deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official who sets in motion events that the official knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive a person of constitutional rights, even without direct participation.

Conner v. Reinhard · filed 1988-05-19

For liability under section 1983, direct participation by a defendant is not necessary. ... The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages against a building inspector acting under state authority for unconstitutional zoning and permit actions.

P.L.S. Partners, Women's Medical Center of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Cranston · filed 1988-06-28

As to the issue of specific liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, however, I am somewhat less sure. While I hold that Inspector Crudele, who was acting under authority of state law, is liable for monetary damages caused by his actions, ... I would like both counsel’s learned opinions as to whether the city of Cranston is liable under the teachings of Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Section 1983 makes a building inspector acting under state authority liable for monetary damages caused by his unconstitutional enforcement of a zoning ordinance.

PLS PARTNERS, W. MED. CTR. OF RI v. Cranston · filed 1988-06-28

As to the issue of specific liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, however, I am somewhat less sure. While I hold that Inspector Crudele, who was acting under authority of state law, is liable for monetary damages caused by his actions, see Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 107, 93 L.Ed.2d 56 (1986), I would like both counsel's learned opinions as to whether the city of Cranston is liable under the teachings of Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Section 1983 permits personal liability when an official acting under color of state law causes the deprivation of a federal right.

Haynes v. Marshall · filed 1988-09-09

To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 can impose personal liability on a school superintendent who uses his position in bad faith to induce a school board to violate an employee’s rights, even though the board votes on the action.

Farley v. North Bergen Township Board of Education · filed 1989-01-27

In fact, the record indicates that Heltoski used his position as Superintendent to influence the Board to transfer Farley, and that such influence was used in bad faith and for Heltoski’s personal benefit. This use of improper influence to prompt the Board to transfer Farley, if proven, could subject Heltoski to liability for damages asserted in Farley’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a municipal official for conduct within the scope of official duties on behalf of the municipality.

Vinci v. Town of Carmel (In Re Vinci) · filed 1989-12-19

An official of a municipality who acts within the scope of his official duties may not be held personally liable for conduct on the part of the municipality although the municipality may be liable for such conduct.

Section 1983 imposes damages liability on local tax officials for discretionary tax actions only if they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Lassen v. Caruso · filed 1991-03-28

As stated in Fulton, state or county tax officials will be liable for damages under civil rights statute only if they violate plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. Plaintiff has no clearly established constitutional right which has been violated. ... Plaintiff’s allegations against St. Tammany Parish and its officials and the City of Slidell and its officials define no duty owed to him by the city and parish officials and breached by them; therefore there is no liability for discretionary acts under Section 1983 as found in Fulton, 582 F.2d 1071.

Section 1983 permits an individual suit against a state official for an alleged denial of due process involving a disputed property interest in public employment.

Courtney v. University of Texas System · filed 1991-05-21

Accordingly we hold that the trial court did err in determining that Courtney had no property interest, and further did err in determining that Courtney could not maintain a suit against Dr. Baker individually under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits state officials to be held personally liable for damages caused by their unconstitutional acts.

Arroyo Otero v. Purcell · filed 1992-10-14

In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state officials can be held personally liable for damages caused by their unconstitutional acts.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison official whose alleged deliberate indifference contributes to an inmate’s constitutional injury.

Freitas v. Stone · filed 1993-04-15

Since Freitas has set forth specific facts alleging deliberate indifference on the part of Manuma, his claim against Manuma is actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement by each defendant; a supervisor who learns of a constitutional violation on appeal and fails to remedy it may be liable.

Gilbert v. Selsky · filed 1994-09-29

As a prerequisite to recovery under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate personal involvement by each defendant. ... If a supervisory official learns of a violation through a report or an appeal, but fails to remedy the wrong, that may constitute a sufficient basis for liability. ... By failing to correct these violations, Selsky and Wilhelm were personally involved in the violations of Gilbert’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for state officials for conduct undertaken in their official roles.

Browning v. City of Wedowee · filed 1995-03-06

Accordingly, the court finds that a state official may be held personally liable for conduct ensuing from his or her official capacity.

A student seeking recovery against a teacher or school administrator under § 1983 must show a constitutional deprivation and that the official acted in bad faith or with deliberate indifference to the student’s rights.

BOYETT BY BOYETT v. Tomberlin · filed 1995-12-01

Furthermore, in order to recover against a teacher or a school administrator under § 1983, a student must establish not only that he or she was deprived of a constitutional right, but also that the person who deprived him or her of that right did so in bad faith or with deliberate indifference to his or her rights.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity damages claims against a state corrections commissioner, but personal liability requires involvement in the constitutional violation or an intentional failure to perform statutory duties and is subject to qualified immunity.

Henderson v. Fredericks · filed 1996-02-15

DuBois is subject to suit for damages in his personal capacity, but he is also protected in such a suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. To hold DuBois personally liable for the statutory and constitutional violations that occurred at the Barnstable County Jail, Murphy would need to demonstrate that DuBois “had a[] personal involvement in the constitutional violation” or that he “intentionally failed to fulfil his statutory duties.”

Section 1983 permits a medical treatment claim against nonmedical prison officials only when they personally participate in denying care, deliberately interfere with treatment, or tacitly authorize or are indifferent to medical staff misconduct.

Lewis v. Angelone · filed 1996-05-01

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a medical treatment claim cannot be brought against non-medical personnel unless they were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors’ treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians’ misconduct. ... First, Lewis has failed to refute assertions by Defendants Angelone, Saunders and Lee that they rely on the medical opinions of medical professionals in decisions regarding appropriate medical care for inmates. Accordingly, they cannot be held hable under the Eighth Amendment for any alleged denial or delay of medical care.

Section 1983 does not bar a claim against a school official solely because the official knew of alleged sexual harassment for less than a month before the student left school.

Nicole M. Ex Rel. Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified School District · filed 1997-04-15

The court rejects Guzman's argument that plaintiff fails to state a claim under section 1983 based solely on the length of time that Guzman was aware of the sexual harassment before plaintiff left school.

Section 1983 does not require a supervisory defendant to observe or be present when the plaintiff suffers harm to establish personal involvement.

Hicks v. Armstrong · filed 1999-09-30

The law, however, does not require that a defendant observe or be present at the time of a plaintiffs suffering.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity claims against prison officials whose conduct causes a constitutional violation.

Von Colln v. County of Ventura · filed 1999-11-12

It is clear that prison officials can be liable in their personal capacities under Section 1983 if their conduct causes the violation.

A § 1983 claim against a prison superintendent requires allegations of the superintendent’s personal involvement or knowledge.

Borrelli v. Askey · filed 1984-02-16

On July 29, 1983, I granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Cuyler on ... the grounds that the complaint alleged no personal involvement or knowledge on behalf of Cuyler, and I refused to grant defendant Askey’s motion for summary judgment because he had not filed affidavits in support of his motion.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an officer personally liable to show that the officer caused the deprivation of a federal right.

C.A. Brokaw v. Mercer County, James Brokaw, Weir Brokaw · filed 2000-12-19

However, we cannot stop there because “[t]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that the government officer caused the deprivation of a federal right.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to expedite treatment on officials who lacked authority to do so.

Johnson v. Cherian · filed 2002-09-09

We further find that the unrefuted evidence established that Defendants Rochelle McKinney and Judy Kent were unauthorized to expedite Johnson’s treatment and therefore could not be held liable for a failure to do so.

Section 1983 may permit liability for officials who know a transferred prisoner faces ongoing unconstitutional conditions in another state's prison but refuse to relocate him.

Figueroa v. Dinitto · filed 2002-12-10

If Figueroa is being subjected to unconstitutional conditions in Virginia on a continuing basis and Rhode Island knows of these conditions but refuses to relocate Figueroa, Rhode Island officials might (depending upon the circumstances) be held responsible.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to state a claim against a mayor or police chief, and an unconstitutional city policy to state a claim against the city.

McCloud v. City of Fort Worth · filed 2004-08-18

The district court did not err in concluding that McCloud had stated no cognizable claim against these defendants because he had failed to show personal involvement by either the mayor or police chief, see Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995), and had failed to identify an unconstitutional policy adopted or promulgated by the City.

Section 1983 damages may be awarded against a city, but council members cannot be held liable when no claim against them was pleaded.

Gunter v. City of St. James · filed 2006-04-27

Here, the record is devoid of a showing that Respondents pleadings were either expressly amended or amended by implied consent at trial so as to make specific, substantive claims against members of the City Council, either in their individual or official capacities. ... While we affirm the damage award against the City through its City Council, we reverse the trial court’s award of damages against the members of the City Council in their individual or official capacities.

Section 1983 does not make a county sheriff liable as a county law enforcement official for enforcing a state law.

Doe v. Fowle · filed 2006-11-16

Furthermore, as the section 1983 argument applies to defendant Flannery, the Sheriff cannot be held liable as a county law enforcement official for enforcing a State law.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for a municipal official whose acts, omissions, or condonation cause a constitutional injury if the official had actual or constructive notice of the violation.

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas · filed 2007-07-31

Municipal officials may only be held liable under § 1983 in their personal capacity if the plaintiff can establish that her constitutional injury resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect "conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization." Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). On either theory, the plaintiff must show that the official had actual or constructive notice of the constitutional violation.

A § 1983 claim against a prison official for attacks on an inmate requires allegations showing the extent of the official’s knowledge or participation.

Earnest Lee Thomas v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1979-08-28

In this case appellant seems to allege some foreknowledge on the part of defendant Estelle. The extent or nature of the knowledge communicated via the 1-127 form and the memoranda referred to in paragraph six is unclear. The complaint does not set forth the content of these documents nor are they attached. Without some allegation concerning the extent of defendant’s knowledge or participation, no cause of action can be sustained.

Section 1983 liability for dangerous prison conditions requires a prison official’s responsibility for or control over those conditions.

Crisoptimo v. Nettleship · filed 1986-09-09

In light of the above, summary judgment could only be granted if the defendants “demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding defendants’ responsibility for or control over the conditions complained of.”

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a marshal who should have known that a body cavity search was unlawful.

Figueroa-Flores v. Acevedo-Vila · filed 2009-03-31

As such, Rivera-Reyes, as an experienced marshal, should have known that her conduct was unreasonable and illegal. ... As a result, Rivera-Reyes is personally liable for Plaintiffs damages.

Section 1983 requires a claim against an official in an individual capacity to allege that the official was directly responsible for the constitutional deprivation or authorized or approved the misconduct.

Ekwem v. Fenty · filed 2009-10-29

Under § 1983, plaintiff may bring suit against the Mayor in his individual capacity only if he alleges that the Mayor was directly responsible for the constitutional deprivation or that he gave “ ‘authorization or approval of such misconduct.’ ”

Section 1983 requires a sufficient basis for municipal, individual, and conspiracy liability claims against government actors.

MacK v. Dillon · filed 2010-02-10

Further, there was no basis for section 1983 claims against defendants Timmons and White, who were solely involved in various aspects of the investigation of the shooting, ...; and Mack’s complaint allegations were insufficient to state a section 1983 conspiracy claim, ... .

Section 1983 permits liability for a subordinate official who causes retaliation against an employee, even if the official also has legitimate motives.

Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace · filed 2012-05-08

Finally, it was clearly established at the time of Caw’s conduct that a subordinate officer can be liable under § 1983 for retaliating against an employee even if he also has legiti- mate, non-retaliatory motives.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on government officials; a plaintiff must plead that each official violated the Constitution through individual actions.

Shively v. Green Local School District Board of Education · filed 2014-08-27

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 claims, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an official who, acting under color of state law, causes the deprivation of a federal right; allegations connecting an official to that deprivation can allow the claim to proceed.

Barnard v. Town of Huntington (In re Joe's Friendly Service & Son, Inc.) · filed 2016-06-01

As for the claims against Cline and Vec-chio in their individual capacities, Cline and Vecchio are alleged to have played pivotal roles in the actions complained of by the Trustee. To establish personal liability, “it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” ... The Trustee alleges that Cline and Vecchio abused their authority by ignoring their statutory duties and causing the placement of the Placard on the Building, which deprived the Trustee of .a protected right. To the extent they acted in violation of Town policy, they may be liable to the Trustee. Until there is a clear picture of the respective roles and conduct of these individual defendants, the claims shall not be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their personal, official, or supervisory capacities, with different requirements for each.

Adrian King, Jr. v. Rubenstein · filed 2016-06-07

A state official can be in a § 1983 suit in three ways: in his personal capacity, his official capacity, or in a more ... limited way, his supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for prison officials who are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious dental condition, even when the state contracts with a private provider for dental care.

Williams v. Watson · filed 2018-05-31

And if Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Williams’s serious dental condition, they may be held personally liable, notwithstanding ADC’s contract with Corizon.

Section 1983 claims alleging officials' deprivation of property and denial of access to the courts may require factual development and cannot be dismissed solely because defendants deny knowledge of the property.

Clayton v. Robert T. Wade, Chief of Police, Etc. · filed 1973-11-14

The defendants’ answer denying any knowledge as to the materials or their whereabouts was not a sufficient basis upon which to dismiss his claim. Some fact finding procedures were necessitated.

A court may not grant summary judgment against a pro se prisoner in a § 1983 action by adopting defendants' disputed facts without notice and an opportunity to submit opposing evidence.

Ross v. Gayle Franzen, James Greer, and Judson Childs · filed 1985-12-16

By adopting defendants’ version of the material facts, and at the same time by failing to notify Ross of his opportunity to file an opposing affidavit, the magistrate has not afforded basic fairness to Ross. That fairness to a party is an overriding interest, especially where constitutional rights are concerned. Under such circumstances, the court should be especially cautious in granting summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against individual defendants in their individual capacities when the plaintiff fails to allege that they acted in bad faith.

Schick v. Bronstein · filed 1978-03-10

We find now that Schick is precluded from recovering damages from the individual defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 because he has failed to allege that they acted in bad faith.

Section 1983 treats actions by school committees as under color of state law and does not impose damages liability on officials for discretionary official duties undertaken in good faith.

Wood v. Goodman · filed 1974-09-17

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to redress alleged violation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... The School Committee members and the Superintendent, who necessarily exercise discretion in performing their official duties, are not liable for damages for performance of official duties which are undertaken in good faith. ... The suspension of plaintiff which was voted by the defendant members of the School Committee of Canton on June 4, 1970 was action taken under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F.Supp. 112 (D.Mass., 1969).

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are barred when the officials reasonably relied on procedures that were not contrary to controlling law at the time.

United States Ex Rel. Bracey v. Rundle · filed 1973-11-29

This case, along with other prisoners’ Civil Rights actions brought after the recent landmark decisions expanding inmates’ due process rights before the institution of disciplinary action, raises the question of whether prison wardens acting in reasonable reliance on the validity of procedures not yet held unconstitutional are, unlike police officers, “charged with predicting the future of constitutional law.” ... Any other position is inconceivable. ... We therefore hold that a reasonable reliance on the validity of the procedures used here renders defendant immune to plaintiff’s damage claims.

Section 1983 permits a good-faith defense to damages liability when the prevailing common-law rule for the parallel tort recognizes that defense.

Williams v. Police Officer Gould and City of Los Angeles · filed 1973-12-11

Good faith is a defense to liability for damages in a suit under section 1983 — at least if, and to the extent that, it would be a defense “[u]nder the prevailing view in this country” in common-law actions based on the parallel tort.

In a § 1983 damages claim, defendants may invoke a good-faith defense, which fails when the court finds they acted in bad faith.

Lake Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College · filed 1974-09-27

In regard to the issue of damages, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the ... court finds that the defendants have not established their defense of good faith, Pierson, supra, and that the defendants acted in bad faith in provoking the strike and discharging the teachers with the ultimate aim of breaking the Union.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials, subject to a good-faith defense, with their conduct measured against the constitutional law prevailing when they acted.

Haines v. Otto Kerner, Former Governor, State of Illinois · filed 1974-11-26

Since good faith is a defense to state officials sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed.2d 288, we believe that in a damage action the conduct of the prison officials should be tested against constitutional doctrine as described in prevailing judicial decisions at the time of their action.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are barred when the officials acted on a good-faith belief that their conduct was constitutionally permissible.

Nix v. Paderick · filed 1976-01-13

Plaintiff, James C. Nix, Jr., a Virginia prisoner, and plaintiff, Better Richmond Realty & Investment Company (Better Richmond), primarily owned by Mr. Nix, bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 seeking monetary and injunctive relief to redress an alleged “taking” of their property by defendants, Consolidated Bank & Trust Company (Bank), Bedford C. Thaxton, Jr., an assistant operations officer of the Bank, and E. L. Paderick and Melvin W. Adams, officials of the Virginia Department of Corrections. ... A prison official is immune to damages as a consequence of his action if he acts on the good faith belief that what he was doing is constitutionally permissible, even if it should later be established that he has exceeded his constitutional authority. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims for damages against Mr. Adams and Mr. Paderick must fail.

A defendant acting in good faith can assert a valid defense to a claim under § 1983.

Cale v. Paderick · filed 1976-12-21

Such a finding constitutes a valid defense to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits monetary relief against officials in their individual capacities only upon a showing of conscious or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights; official-capacity relief is limited to declaratory and injunctive remedies, and officials acting in good faith are immune from damages.

Davis v. Nuss · filed 1977-07-25

This Court has jurisdiction of this claim brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants herein are not susceptible to a judgment of restitution in their official capacities that would in effect be a mere conduit to the city treasury; however, they may be susceptible to a monetary judgment in their individual capacities only, and then only upon a showing of action with a conscious or reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. ... The Court also has jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief against these individuals in their official capacities. ... The individual Defendants herein enjoy a “good faith” immunity from suit. ... This Court finds no such impermissible motivation or disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. These individuals are, therefore, immune from damages.

Section 1983 allows a defendant to establish a defense by showing that he lacked a reasonable basis to know his conduct would override another person’s constitutional rights and that he acted in good faith.

Gilker v. Duane Baker, Robert Doom and Albert Marinello · filed 1978-06-07

A defendant can establish a defense by showing that he had no reasonable basis for knowing that his conduct would result in the overriding of another person’s constitutional rights and that he acted in good faith.

Section 1983 damage claims against correctional officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was lawful.

Callahan Ware v. Robert P. Heyne, George W. Phend, Albert Calhoun, Joe Riggs, and Edward Richards · filed 1978-04-05

There is no doubt that correctional officials are entitled to a qualified immunity from damage claims brought under § 1983 if they reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was lawful, even though it was not.

Section 1983 does not impose liability without fault on governmental defendants; if individual officials establish qualified good-faith immunity, the governmental defendants are also shielded from damages.

Milwaukee Mobilization for Survival v. Milwaukee County Park Commission · filed 1979-10-03

In my view, the governmental defendants should be shielded by the qualified good faith immunity if it is successfully asserted by the individual defendants. ... “[W]e do not believe that § 1983, enacted by a Congress accustomed to nearly absolute municipal immunity, should be read to implement a doctrine of liability without fault.” ... Accordingly, if the defendants Mikula and Koplin successfully establish their qualified good faith immunity, this will also bar recovery of damages from the governmental defendants.

Section 1983 allows police officers sued over an arrest to defend the claim by showing that they acted in good faith and reasonably believed they had probable cause.

Morrison v. Fox · filed 1979-12-18

However, in a 1983 action, the defendants may justify the arrest, if made in good faith and if the officers reasonably believe they have probable cause.

Section 1983 does not allow a municipality to defend against liability by showing that its officers or agents acted in good faith.

Owen v. City of Independence · filed 1980-06-02

We hold, therefore, that the municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against officials sued in their official capacity, subject to a good-faith defense that fails when the official knew or should have known the conduct violated a constitutional norm.

Powell v. Ward · filed 1981-03-04

As she was sued in her official capacity, Curry is entitled to a “good faith” defense in a suit for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This defense is unavailing, however, if she knew or should have known that her conduct violated a constitutional norm. ... The 1975 Order and the litigation leading to it put Curry and her predecessors on notice that the Order was designed to require due process in Adjustment Committees and Superintendent’s Proceedings. They knew or should have known, therefore, that the non-compliant procedures used at Bedford Hills violated the constitutional rights of the inmates at the facility. The district court was correct in ruling that Curry is not immune from a judgment for damages.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state or territorial law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; good faith is an affirmative defense that defendants must prove before receiving qualified immunity.

Chavis v. Charles J. Rowe, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 1981-03-11

While defendants, as state prison officials, enjoy a qualified immunity from damages in § 1983 actions, ... this court has not required plaintiffs affirmatively to allege bad faith by the state defendants in order to state a claim under § 1983. ... Rather, this court has treated the question of good faith as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant in a § 1983 action. ... Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently held that, to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff need only allege that some person, acting under color of state or territorial law, deprived him of a federal right. ... Chavis’ complaint met these two requirements and states a valid § 1983 claim. Defendants must therefore prove that they acted in good faith before they are granted qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a good-faith defense when an official acts sincerely believing he is doing right and does not act contrary to settled indisputable law.

Nakao v. Rushen · filed 1982-07-06

Even if the county officials could have foreseen the search of inmate Nakao’s cell, they cannot be held liable under § 1983 if they acted in “good faith.” The “good faith immunity” defense is applicable if the official acts “sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right,” and does not act contrary to “settled indisputable law.”

Section 1983 permits damages actions for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law, but police officers may invoke qualified immunity in wrongful-arrest, false-imprisonment, and excessive-force claims when the violated law was not clearly established or the officer neither knew nor should have known the relevant legal standard.

Heslip v. Lobbs · filed 1982-12-07

Courts have recognized that in section 1983 actions predicated on allegations of wrongful arrest, false imprisonment or excessive use of force, a police officer may be able to claim qualified immunity from liability. ... The remedy envisioned by the Supreme Court is simple. In order to circumvent spurious suits, a court should initiate a threshold inquiry: whether the applicable law that the defendant purportedly violated was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. ... At this stage, if the official seeking to invoke the good faith defense “can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained.”

Section 1983 damages defendants must affirmatively plead qualified immunity, and a proven constitutional violation supports nominal damages when that defense is waived.

Perkins v. Cross · filed 1983-04-29

While the above officers may have been entitled to qualified immunity grounded in good faith and probable cause, they did not plead this affirmative defense. It is therefore waived. This leaves no alternative to the assessment of nominal damages in this case. ... The award of nominal damages is made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge disciplinary procedures without exhausting state remedies when the procedures’ effect on the duration of confinement is speculative and incidental.

Clutchette v. Procunier · filed 1974-07-29

We hold that the speculative and incidental effect of prison disciplinary procedures on the duration of plaintiffs’ sentences is not sufficient to bring any part of this action ... within the “core” of habeas corpus. Therefore, it was proper for the district court to permit plaintiffs to proceed with their civil action under section 1983 without their having exhausted state remedies.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy for a prisoner's challenge to the fairness of parole procedures when the action does not seek immediate release.

Eddy James Candelaria v. Jerry Griffin, Marc Orner, David Garcia, Christine Hodge · filed 1981-03-03

We construe plaintiff’s petition as a challenge to the fairness of parole procedures and not a demand for immediate release pursuant to parole. As such, § 1983 is a proper statutory basis for this action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek relief for unconstitutional parole procedures, but not immediate or speedier release from imprisonment.

Godbolt v. Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services · filed 1981-02-19

To the extent that plaintiff seeks immediate or speedier release from imprisonment, a § 1983 action is not the proper remedy. However, to the extent that plaintiff challenges parole procedures or the lack thereof, he does state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge unconstitutional parole procedures through declaratory or injunctive relief when the requested relief would not itself require release from prison.

Shaw v. Briscoe · filed 1976-02-02

In light of those Supreme Court opinions, it was improper to dismiss the complaint in this case which for the most part could be dealt with by the granting of declaratory relief. ... If the district court reads the ambiguous request in this manner, it is maintainable under § 1983. If it reads the request to be seeking release, it may dismiss as to that particular prayer.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a prisoner’s claims concerning prison conditions and related deprivations when the requested relief is not limited to immediate or speedier release from imprisonment.

Wingard v. State of North Carolina · filed 1973-12-04

It therefore appears, even though Wingard states claims which might well be made the subject of a habeas corpus proceeding, that he also states a valid claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for money damages for a civil-rights violation to continue after the plaintiff is released from confinement.

Cruz v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1974-07-19

Additionally, the complaint sought money damages under Sec. 1983 for plaintiff’s claimed injury, resulting from the deprivation of such rights. ... The claim for money damages for violation of appellant’s civil rights was not rendered moot by Cruz’s release from confinement.

A § 1983 civil-damages claim cannot be based retroactively on constitutional rules established after the challenged surveillance.

Zweibon v. Mitchell · filed 1978-02-09

We believe that a similar disposition of the claim as advanced under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is appropriate. ... For these reasons, we hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought and that defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment should be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a defendant who followed a statutory procedure presumed constitutional when the procedure was later declared unconstitutional.

Oscar Rios, Assignee v. Cessna Finance Corporation · filed 1973-12-06

A statute is presumed to be' constitutional until struck down as unconstitutional. Cessna Finance followed the statutory procedure in bringing its replevin action. We therefore hold that § 1983 is not applicable because damages are not collectible in a civil right action against one who followed a statutory procedure presumed to be constitutional.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against defendants who used a state statute that no court had previously declared unconstitutional.

Pickus v. Vitagliano (In Re Pickus) · filed 1980-12-31

No court having previously found the Connecticut eviction statute unconstitutional, the defendants cannot be liable for damages for exercising their rights pursuant thereto. Whatever constitutional infirmities may exist in Connecticut’s post-judgment remedy of execution upon summary process, such infirmities must await another time or place for their exposure.

Principles of comity bar a federal court from awarding § 1983 damages in a state-tax dispute when an adequate state remedy is available.

Adams v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF HENRY COUNTY, VA. · filed 1983-07-29

the principle of comity relied upon there is equally applicable in ... this case.

Section 1983 does not allow a federal civil-rights action to evade § 1341's bar on enjoining state-tax assessments when adequate state remedies exist.

Charles A. Hickmann and Phyllis C. Hickmann v. Gregory Wujick, as Assessor of the Town of Huntington · filed 1973-12-07

Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S. C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in Section 1341.

Section 1983 actions in federal court are subject to the res judicata rules of the state court that issued the judgment, unless those rules violate due process.

Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1982-10-13

It is settled law that, unless a state’s res judicata rules violate due process, federal courts hearing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions apply the rules of the state court from which the judgment issues.

In a § 1983 damages action challenging a state tax system, comity requires dismissal when the state provides a plain, adequate and complete remedy.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse · filed 1983-05-06

According to the majority, principles of comity bar the award of damages in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged unconstitutional administration of state tax systems. ... If such a state remedy is available, then plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed on the grounds of comity. ... Accordingly, principles of comity as well as the Tax Injunction Act preclude the instant suit for damages in federal district court.

Principles of comity bar federal courts from entertaining suits for damages under § 1983 that challenge a state tax, so long as the state provides an adequate remedy.

Hutcherson v. Board of Supervisors · filed 1984-08-23

The principles of comity bar federal courts from considering suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a state tax, providing adequate state remedies exist.

State courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts to enforce § 1983 unless Congress expressly provides otherwise.

Lloyd v. Page · filed 1985-08-14

We conclude that the majority and better view is that state courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts to enforce federal cases arising under federal law unless Congress has specifically provided to the contrary.

State courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts over § 1983 actions.

Marker v. Talley · filed 1985-11-01

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not provide declaratory, injunctive, or damages relief for an allegedly unlawful local tax when state law supplies an adequate remedy, even if that remedy does not allow attorney fees.

HOWELL LUMBER CO., INC. v. City of Tuscaloosa · filed 1997-03-28

In the counts of its complaint seeking relief for alleged federal constitutional violations, Howell Lumber sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based upon alleged unconstitutional denials of due process and equal protection resulting from the City's unlawful assessment of license taxes upon it. However, the United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that § 1983 may not be used as a vehicle for obtaining such relief. ... Although §§ 40-10-164 and 40-10-165 do not allow for the recovery of attorney fees (as we explain below), we conclude that they are "adequate remedies" within the meaning of McNary and Truck Council. ... Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the trial court's judgment denying relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.

A prisoner challenging a single disciplinary hearing that cost good-time credit must pursue habeas corpus rather than § 1983 relief, even if the prisoner does not seek restoration of the credit.

Choyce v. Sherman · filed 1995-09-11

Likewise, Choyce alleges a due process violation from a single hearing at which he lost his good time. His claim, therefore, must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief other than restoration of good time credits without exhausting state court remedies.

Taylor v. Lloyd Fletcher, Warden, Jerry W. Owens, Lt., Danny Brock, Lt., Tim Powers, Sgt, Eddie Ray Smith, · filed 1991-02-12

Upon review, we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed Taylor's claim for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Since Taylor sought monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief other than the restoration of good time credits, his claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims for declaratory relief concerning improper revocation of good-time credits, but restoration of the credits must be sought through habeas corpus.

Benson M. Russell, III v. Michael P. Buck Louisa Brown George Hampton James L. Harvey Michael Ginn Parker Evatt · filed 1990-02-02

Although the restoration of good-time credits should be sought through a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 rather than a Sec. 1983 complaint, Russell's claims, including declaratory relief for improper revocation of good-time credits, were cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to restore a prisoner’s good time credits; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.

Monteon v. R. Daniels, Lt., Robert Glenn Borg, G.W. Steeves, G.C. Jackson, R.J. Subia, A.L. Bell, R. Briggs · filed 1989-12-14

The district court properly construed Monteon's claim for the restoration of his good time credits as an application for a writ of habeas corpus, and properly dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

A federal court should stay a prisoner's Section 1983 damages or declaratory claim attacking loss of good-time credits until state remedies are exhausted when success would establish entitlement to earlier release.

Offet v. Solem · filed 1987-07-13

Because a prisoner who wins a § 1983 action in federal court for damages or declaratory relief for the unconstitutional deprivation of, good time credits thereby establishes an irrefutable claim for early or immediate release under habeas, we hold that in such a case the federal court should stay the § 1983 claim until the plaintiff has satisfied the exhaustion requirement with respect to the underlying constitutional issue.