42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability for actions taken under color of federal law.

GANT v. MARLER · filed 2020-09-29

For federal officials, “[i]t is well established that liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under color of federal law.” Brown, 250 F.3d at 800.

A prior New York Article 78 proceeding does not preclude a subsequent § 1983 damages action arising from the same events.

Clow v. Deily · filed 1997-02-10

It is well settled that New York courts would not bar an action seeking damages for a violation of civil rights based on a prior action brought pursuant to Article 78.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the same preclusive effect for prior state court judgments that the rendering state would give those judgments.

Giakoumelos v. Coughlin · filed 1996-06-20

Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give a prior state court judgment the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). This rule applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be precluded by issues resolved in an unreviewed state administrative hearing.

Scott v. Mattingly · filed 1992-08-21

Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the issues before us have already been litigated at least once, and this action is precluded. Any issues which were not litigated and resolved before us or before the district court were litigated and resolved before the Department of Health. An unreviewed administrative hearing can preclude later litigation of the same issues.

A federal court adjudicating a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim must give a prior state judgment the same preclusive effect that it receives under state law.

Camarano v. City of New York · filed 1986-10-29

Consequently, New York law would preclude Camarano’s Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, and a federal court is bound under normal circumstances to give the prior state-court judgment the same preclusive effect.

A successful New York Article 78 proceeding does not bar a later § 1983 damages action when the Article 78 court could not properly award the damages sought.

Davidson v. Clement B. Capuano, David R. Harris and Joseph P. Keenan · filed 1986-09-05

Because Davidson could not properly have obtained in the state court Article 78 proceeding the damage relief he seeks here, we hold that his present action is not barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata when the state and federal proceedings concern the same alleged wrong, but a prior state proceeding does not bar a § 1983 claim based on a different wrong.

E. Robert Gallagher, and Michael Warning and John Houck v. L. Thomas Frye, John E. Peetz, Gerald E. Newfarmer, and Cecil · filed 1980-10-23

In this Circuit, when a party seeks relief in the state court for an alleged wrong, the state court judgment bars the plaintiff from seeking relief on constitutional grounds from the same defendant, for the same wrong, in federal court. ... The rule is applicable to actions brought pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985. ... We therefore hold that plaintiff’s claims for violation of his constitutional rights in connection with the defendants’ attempts to terminate his employment are not barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 actions may be barred by preclusion principles when the same federal constitutional claim was previously litigated to judgment in state court.

Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers · filed 1978-09-29

We agree with the district court that appellant is precluded from proceeding under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not exempt a federal civil-rights action from res judicata or collateral estoppel when a competent state court has already decided the same constitutional issue.

William Thistlethwaite and Sol Lockshon v. The City of New York · filed 1974-05-13

While we recognize the particular nature of the Civil Rights Act and the intent of Congress embodied therein, we are not of the opinion that the trial judge applied the doctrines of res judicata “mechanically” to the facts of this case; further we do not read in the act any intent to foster career litigants. ... Thus, we do not see reason to overturn the judgment of the court below.

Section 1983 claims may be barred in federal district court when the same constitutional claims were actually raised and litigated on the merits in prior state proceedings.

Hammer v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 1977-11-11

When constitutional claims are litigated in state court, res judicata bars their relitigation in federal district court. ... In contrast with the usual rules of res judicata, a constitutional claim is not barred by prior state proceedings simply because it would have been appropriate to litigate the claim in those proceedings. Rather, a constitutional claim is barred only if it was actually raised and litigated in the state court action. ... Accordingly, the instant action is barred by res judicata, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or as a collateral attack on a final state-court judgment when the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional issues in state court.

Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers · filed 1978-01-03

A party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional issues before the highest state courts cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a substitute for a right of appeal, or as a means of collateral attack on the final judgment of the state court.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a prior state-court judgment necessarily decided the dispositive issues against the plaintiff.

Winters v. Lavine · filed 1978-01-16

In summary then, we hold that the Appellate Division's decision bars Winters from relitigating here in the context of a § 1983 suit the issue of the constitutionality of the denial of Medicaid benefits for the services of a Christian Science nurse.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to hear constitutional claims that were not actually raised in a prior state-court action; a constitutional issue actually raised there may not be relitigated federally.

Ornstein v. Regan · filed 1978-04-04

On the other hand, our decisions have clearly established that where a constitutional issue has been actually raised in the state court, the litigant has made his choice and may not relitigate that issue in a federal court in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to initiate a federal action unless the plaintiff fully presented the federal claims in the prior state court proceeding.

Williams v. Codd · filed 1978-10-24

At the same time, unless it is demonstrated that a plaintiff fully presented his federal claims to the state court he is not barred from initiating a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a substitute for appellate review of a state-court judgment; an independent federal action cannot be used to collaterally attack that judgment.

Barbier v. GOVERNOR, STATE OF NJ · filed 1979-08-22

In the first place, such actions cannot be filed as a substitute for appeal in the usual course.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil-rights action on a constitutional claim despite the plaintiff’s having previously raised that issue in a state criminal suppression hearing.

Johnson v. Alan Mateer, John Holmes, R. A. Dietrich, Steven Crockwell, Betty Lieu, All Individuals · filed 1980-08-07

We hold that Johnson’s assertion in this section 1983 action of his fourth amendment claim that the search of his premises was illegal is not foreclosed by collateral estoppel as a consequence of his earlier assertion of that contention in a suppression hearing in his defense against criminal charges in state court. To rule otherwise in this case would deprive Johnson of his access to a federal forum for his federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata when the constitutional issue was actually raised and passed upon in a prior state-court proceeding.

Rothstein v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1980-09-08

In contrast to the usual formulation of the rule which bars the relitigation of any claim that might have been but was not actually raised and decided, a line of Second Circuit decisions has established that a constitutional claim will only be barred in a civil rights action if the issue was both actually raised and passed upon in the state court proceeding.

Section 1983 claims cannot relitigate an issue already decided in a state criminal proceeding when preclusion principles apply.

Muhammed v. Coburn · filed 1980-12-11

The papers on file in the case show that the issue of voluntariness of the confession was presented and decided, both by the trial court and by the jury, at his New Jersey trial. At least by collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment (since the defendants here were not parties to the criminal cases) this issue is not open for trial in this § 1983 case. It was tried and decided against him.

Section 1983 does not give federal district courts jurisdiction to reverse or modify final state-court judgments.

Kimball v. The Florida Bar · filed 1980-12-18

“This Court has held on numerous occasions that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other theory to reverse or modify the judgments of state courts.”

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata only when they were actually decided by a state tribunal, not merely when they could have been raised there.

Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, Etc. · filed 1981-07-06

In a suit brought under section 1983, res judicata will bar only those claims that were “actually decided by the state tribunals,” not those that “could have” or “might have been raised before the state court” but were not.

Section 1983 does not prevent a state-court judgment from having binding effect when the state court had proper jurisdiction and gave the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate their federal claims.

Korup v. Flaherty · filed 1981-10-27

nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights.

State-court judgments receive the same preclusive effect in Section 1983 constitutional litigation that they receive in the rendering state’s courts.

Florian v. Highland Local School District Board of Education · filed 1983-09-15

The doctrine that federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as would be accorded those judgments in the state courts from whence they emerged is likewise applicable in actions bringing constitutional challenges which originate from civil disputes.

A Section 1983 plaintiff is precluded from relitigating issues that were or could have been presented in a prior state-court proceeding.

Merriman Construction Co. v. County of Geauga · filed 1983-10-18

Since ... Allen, ... the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed that a § 1983 plaintiff “is precluded from relitigating not only the issues which were actually involved in the [state] proceeding, but also the issues which he might have presented.”

A factual issue fully and fairly adjudicated in state criminal proceedings may be barred from relitigation in a later Section 1983 action under the state’s collateral-estoppel rules.

Baker v. McCoy · filed 1983-10-14

Turning to the second issue, it is the opinion of this Court that the operation of collateral estoppel in the case at bar establishes, as a matter of fact, that defendants did not beat plaintiff in Room 1 prior to giving his statement. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff bases his claim that his constitutional rights were violated on the alleged beating in Room 1 prior to giving his statement, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A Section 1983 action may be barred by state issue preclusion when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and no special circumstances justify relitigation.

Robert Vance, D.O. v. State of Utah · filed 1984-10-01

We must determine whether Utah law precludes relitigation of the issues presented in his § 1983 action and whether there are any special circumstances which would warrant a departure from the general rule barring such relitigation. ... We agree with the district court that the Utah preclusion law bars the relitigation of the issues raised. ... The appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues to be decided. The case presents no special circumstances which would entitle him to relief.

Collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a Section 1983 action when the issues were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Tyler v. Milt Harper, Cris Egbert and Gary McConnell · filed 1984-10-23

The state court gave Tyler an opportunity to prove that the appellees intimidated his alibi witnesses and he failed; we cannot grant him a second opportunity in this section 1983 action.

A plaintiff who could have raised a Section 1983 theory in prior state litigation cannot omit it there and then bring a separate federal action on the same claims.

Casagrande v. James Agoritsas, Etc. · filed 1984-11-19

Appellants’ decision, therefore, not to include § 1983 as support for their claims in the state court proceeding may not now provide a justification for bringing a separate federal court action.

A federal court may not give preclusive effect in a Section 1983 action to a collective-bargaining arbitration award, particularly when the state court did not decide the underlying state-law property issue after Pullman abstention.

Kovats v. Rutgers · filed 1984-12-04

Since under McDonald a federal court may not give preclusive effect to an arbitration decision, and since the state court, after Pullman abstention, did not address the state law issue properly before it--whether the regulations create a property interest in tenure--the district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the state adjudication. On remand the district court should address the property issue.

A federal court hearing a Section 1983 action must give a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect that the rendering state’s courts would give it.

Brister v. Parish Of Jefferson · filed 1984-12-06

Under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, ... a federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect that a court of the state in which the judgment was rendered would give it. ... This rule applies in all federal litigation, including actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot relitigate claims of bribery and perjury that he had a full and fair opportunity to raise during his state criminal trial and appeals.

Taylor v. Detective Fitzroy Douglas · filed 1985-05-13

Upon consideration of the district court record in light of the arguments presented by the parties in their appellate briefs, this Court concludes that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit because he had a full and fair opportunity to present his charges of bribery and perjury during his state criminal trial and appeals thereof which he failed to do.

A state-court judgment on a constitutional issue precludes relitigating the same issue as the basis for a federal § 1983 damages action when state preclusion requirements are met.

Mears v. Town of Oxford · filed 1985-05-22

All these requirements are met and Mears may not now re-litigate the same issue as the basis for his § 1983 action for damages in federal court.

Federal courts determine the preclusive effect of state judgments in Section 1983 actions under the state's preclusion law.

Beltran v. State of Cal. · filed 1985-09-19

... this court must apply the preclusion ... law of California.

A § 1983 civil-rights claim is not precluded by a prior criminal conviction when it involves different issues and seeks redress for constitutional violations by state officials.

Wall v. Heath · filed 1985-10-17

To accept defendants’ argument on claim and issue preclusion would effectively abrogate § 1983 as a method of challenging unconstitutional action whenever a criminal conviction resulted from such state action. This court cannot wittingly do so.

A federal court assessing preclusion of a § 1983 claim must give a prior state-court judgment the same preclusive effect that the rendering state’s law would give it.

Cimasi v. City of Fenton, Missouri · filed 1986-01-03

a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.

Res judicata bars a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating constitutional issues that the plaintiff raised and lost in prior state child-neglect proceedings.

Lesher v. Lavrich · filed 1986-02-18

Appellants raised each of the constitutional issues in their § 1983 action as a defense to the neglect proceedings in the juvenile court. Affirmance of the juvenile court by the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, and dismissal of the appeal by the Ohio Supreme Court, indicate that the courts of Ohio have conclusively found that the challenged child protection proceedings comported with the requirements of the due process clause.

A state-court judgment receives the same claim- and issue-preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that it would receive in the rendering state's courts.

Prizio v. City of Revere · filed 1986-02-28

Thus, the beginning and end of this Court’s inquiry must be whether the Massachusetts courts would find Prizio’s suit barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

A state judgment that has been reversed on appeal loses its preclusive effect and cannot support dismissal of a Section 1983 claim.

Ewing v. Huntington National Bank · filed 1986-03-20

Under Ohio law, a judgment loses all preclusive effect when it is set aside or reversed on appeal.

Prior state-court judgments receive preclusive effect in later federal Section 1983 actions.

Falk v. State Bar of Michigan · filed 1986-04-10

Section 1983 actions in federal court are not immune from the preclusive effect of prior state court judgments.

State-court review of an administrative decision triggers full-faith-and-credit preclusion of a later Section 1983 action, even though administrative proceedings alone would not.

Sharpley v. C.W. Davis · filed 1986-04-15

While the resort to administrative proceedings alone does not preclude subsequent federal action, subsequent state court review will bar a later federal action.

A state-court judgment receives the same preclusive effect in a federal Section 1983 case that the judgment would receive in the rendering state's courts.

Devargas v. Robert Montoya, Antonio Devargas v. Clyde Malley, Roberto Montoya · filed 1986-07-08

The state court judgment is entitled to the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would be given in the New Mexico courts.

A state-court judgment has the same preclusive effect in a federal Section 1983 action that it would have in state court.

St. George's School of Medicine v. Department of Registration & Education of Illinois · filed 1986-07-30

A state court judgment has the same preclusive effect in a § 1983 action brought in federal court as it would have in a state court action.

A state-court judgment receives the same preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that another court of that state would give it.

Freeman v. Ramada Inn, Inc. And Detective Jenney and Detective Balogh, Defendants · filed 1986-10-02

[U]nder the Full Faith and Credit Act [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738] a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.

A prior state-court judgment receives the same claim- and issue-preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that the rendering state’s courts would give it.

Dr. Victor L. Leal v. Robert Krajewski, Individually and as Superintendent of Schools of the City of East Chicago · filed 1986-10-14

Even if the present federal suit states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 still applies.

Res judicata bars a § 1983 action when a final state judgment involved the same cause of action and parties or privies, including issues that could have been raised there.

Hartke v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1986-10-16

In short, then, there is privity between the plaintiffs-signatories of this case and the plaintiffs (including a signatory) in the Lipinski case. Since all three prerequisites of res judicata are thus present, res judicata applies and bars this action.

Section 1983 claims brought in federal court remain subject to issue preclusion and claim preclusion based on prior state-court judgments.

Lawrence v. McGuire · filed 1987-01-08

Claims brought in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not exceptions to the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

A state agency’s adverse factual determination precludes a later § 1983 action when the agency acted judicially, the issues were properly before it with an adequate opportunity to litigate, and state courts would give the determination preclusive effect.

Kirkland v. City of Peekskill · filed 1987-01-16

Elliott ... teaches, then, that a state agency’s resolution of factual issues adverse to the complainant will bar a federal court action brought under the Reconstruction civil rights statutes if (1) the state agency was acting in a judicial capacity; (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them; and (3) the courts of the particular state would give the agency’s factfinding determinations preclusive effect.

State-law claim-preclusion rules apply to § 1983 actions, and a § 1983 theory arising from the same factual footing is not necessarily a different cause of action from the prior state claim.

Gregory v. Drury · filed 1987-01-27

The court closed that door in ... Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, ... noting that “the policy concerns underlying § 1983 would [not] justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and the claim preclusive effect of state-court judgments.” ... We rejected the suggestion that a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was necessarily a different cause of action from a state cause of action for tort drawn from the same facts.

A prior New York Article 78 judgment does not claim-preclude a later federal § 1983 damages action arising from the same facts when damages were unavailable in the Article 78 proceeding.

Davis v. Halpern · filed 1987-03-09

Both Davidson and Giano expressly held that a New York plaintiff is not barred from seeking damages, in federal court, on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment on the same underlying facts in an Article 78 proceeding requesting injunctive or affirmative relief. The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights suits such as this one.

A state-court probable-cause finding precludes relitigation of probable cause in a later Section 1983 action when the accused had and used a full opportunity to contest the issue at a preliminary hearing.

Edward Coogan and Margaret Coogan v. City of Wixom, Bruce Kirby and Philip Leonard · filed 1987-06-01

However, where the state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a preliminary hearing and the accused does so, a finding of probable cause by the examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a subsequent § 1983 action.

State-court preclusion applies in Section 1983 actions only to claims or issues that were actually litigated or could have been litigated with a full and fair opportunity; a dismissed criminal charge does not preclude an unlitigated false-imprisonment issue.

Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court Nickie Hornsby and William Stoll · filed 1987-06-04

This principle applies to civil rights actions under section 1983 with respect to issues actually litigated (collateral estoppel or issue preclusion) and issues which could have been but were not litigated in the state court proceeding (res judicata or claim preclusion). ... Giving preclusive effect to state court judgments is, however, inappropriate “where the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court.” ... Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is not applicable in the present case because neither the validity of the summons nor the legality of the arrest was litigated or decided in the prior state court proceeding.

Issue preclusion applies in Section 1983 actions, but it does not bar relitigation when the prior state court may have applied a different burden of proof to the issue.

Cinelli v. City of Revere · filed 1987-06-11

It is well established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). ... Because it is unclear whether the state courts imposed the proper burden of proof, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude Cinelli from litigating the question of prejudice in this action.

A final state-court judgment can bar a later Section 1983 action when the federal suit merely reasserts the same claims under a new statutory label.

Prince Lewis, Jr. v. East Feliciana Parish School Board · filed 1987-06-26

We have already determined that the allegations presented to the Louisiana courts and the allegations presented here are the same. Accordingly, an identity of demand exists, and res judicata is applicable. ... However, in our case, Lewis does not present a new theory of relief, but only reasserts his previous claims under § 1983.

The ordinary rules of claim and issue preclusion apply to § 1983 actions, with a prior state decision receiving the preclusive effect prescribed by state law.

Wicker v. Board of Education of Knott County, Kentucky · filed 1987-08-14

The Supreme Court has held that the same preclusion principles govern a section 1983 action as any other kind of action.

A state agency's adverse factual findings preclude a later § 1983 action when the agency acted judicially, the issues were properly before it with an adequate opportunity to litigate, and state courts would give the findings preclusive effect.

Kirkland v. City of Peekskill · filed 1987-09-11

Elliott teaches that a state agency's resolution of factual issues adverse to the complainant will bar a federal court action brought under the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 in this case) if (1) the state agency was acting in a judicial capacity, (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them, ... and (3) the courts of that particular state would give the agency's factfinding determinations preclusive effect.

An unappealed final state-court judgment receives res judicata effect and bars a later § 1983 action challenging the same decisions.

Geyer v. H. Victor Millner, Jr. Andrew W. Todd Clarence Edmonds James F. Ingram B.A. Davis · filed 1987-09-14

The court reasoned that Geyer was likewise precluded from maintaining the Sec. 1983 action in federal court, citing Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984), and Mears v. Town of Oxford. Maryland, 762 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir.1985). We agree and affirm on the well-reasoned decision of the district court.

State law governs the preclusive effect of a prior state judgment in a § 1983 action, and under Tennessee law a judgment remains preclusive until reversed or vacated.

Thompson v. Bruce McDonald Warden · filed 1987-10-21

State law controls res judicata issues. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738; Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). In Tennessee, the res judicata effect of a judgment remains in place until a judgment is reversed or vacated.

Offensive collateral estoppel should not preclude litigation of facts in a § 1983 action when the prior unemployment proceeding presented different issues and gave the parties substantially less incentive to litigate exhaustively.

Sewall v. Taylor · filed 1987-11-04

The Court finds, however, that the use of offensive collateral estoppel to preclude re-litigation of the above factual issues would be inappropriate in this case. ... For both parties, there is less incentive to exhaustively litigate in an unemployment compensation hearing the factual issues that are subject to litigation in a subsequent § 1983 action. It would be unfair to permit the use of collateral estoppel under these circumstances.

A fact adequately determined in a state administrative proceeding can have preclusive effect in a later § 1983 action even though the agency could not adjudicate the § 1983 claim itself.

Shoemaker v. City of Bremerton · filed 1987-12-16

While the Commission could not have adjudicated the section 1983 claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, it may have decided an issue of fact that is common to both Shoemaker's petition for reinstatement before the Commission and to his section 1983 claim. If it did, and if the adjudication was adequate under the Restatement standards adopted here, then the issue has been decided for all purposes.

Issue preclusion cannot bar a § 1983 claim against a new defendant when the relevant issue may not have been decided earlier and a full and fair opportunity to litigate depended on joining that absent defendant.

Doerinkel v. Hillsborough Twp. & Hillsborough Twp. Board of Adjustment · filed 1987-12-29

In these circumstances we are satisfied that the district court’s decision barring the action against the Township because of issue preclusion was unjustified. We think that enforcement of principles of issue preclusion against a litigant is not justified when the full and fair opportunity ... to that litigant to have had the issue determined in the earlier action was dependent on an entity which, in fact, was not a party having been joined in the earlier action.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred when a prior state Article 78 proceeding necessarily resolved the same factual issues after a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Gould v. Newton · filed 1992-10-05

Upon review of the record, and upon comparison of the claims presented in the Complaint here and in the Article 78 petition considered by the Appellate Division, I find that the facts and issues are identical and that Plaintiff therefore is barred from relitigating these issues in federal court.

A prior state habeas denial can preclude a prisoner from relitigating a procedural due process challenge in a § 1983 action.

Zarate v. James Rowland, Director B.J. Bunnell, Warden L.R. Snider J. Negrete J.F. Austin Charles D. Marshall, Wa · filed 1998-04-24

The district court did not err by concluding that the state court's denial of Zarate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus precluded Zarate from challenging his placement in the SHU as a violation of his procedural due process rights in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies, but an adverse state administrative decision may preclude a later § 1983 suit.

Hatler v. Tuolomne County · filed 2003-10-30

Hatter was not required to exhaust his remedies in state court-indeed, he could have filed his action immediately in federal court after the building components were destroyed. But when he sought relief before the board, he voluntarily opened up the possibility that, unless he managed to prevail before the board or in his administrative mandamus action, the board’s conclusions would be binding.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil action challenging a warrantless arrest, but a state conviction that necessarily includes probable cause can bar the later claim.

Cameron v. Fogarty · filed 1985-08-20

This same rule applies to a § 1983 action predicated upon a warrantless arrest. ... Thus, although a finding of probable cause to arrest was not necessary to sustain plaintiff’s conviction, see United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), under the law of New York, that conviction, sustained on appeal, necessarily includes a finding that there was probable cause to arrest and thereby bars a subsequent civil suit challenging the existence of probable cause for the arrest.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a defendant who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

CAIBY V. FERGUSON · filed 2020-10-26

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ... However, he has failed to identify a defendant or defendants who violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; a defendant against whom the complaint makes no allegations is dismissed.

Tallman v. Gugler · filed 2020-05-04

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law. ... There are no allegations against a John Doe defendant, therefore that individual will be dismissed from the complaint.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly connecting an individual defendant to the alleged harm or linking a private corporation’s liability to its custom or policy.

High v. Silverdale Core Civic of America · filed 2019-09-26

Specifically, the amended complaint again does not set forth specific facts to support Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the mold is making Plaintiff’s mental health problems worse, allow the Court to plausibly infer that any of the named Defendants is personally responsible for the mold at Silverdale and/or the failure to remove the mold, or allege that the mold has resulted from a custom or policy of Silverdale/Core Civic America. In other words, Plaintiff has simply failed to provide any facts, including but not limited to the official positions of the individuals he has named as Defendants, from which the Court can even plausibly infer that that these Defendants may be liable for Plaintiff claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims require personal involvement by the defendant in conduct under color of state law that deprived the plaintiff of federal rights.

McDonald v. McCracken · filed 1974-12-19

It is a fundamental rule of law that an official will not be liable for damages in a civil rights case unless it is demonstrated that he directly and personally participated in the conduct under color of state law which deprived the plaintiff of his rights, privileges or immunities as secured to him by the federal constitution. Indeed it is an essential element in a case of this kind that the particular defendant be personally involved in the denial of the constitutional right.

Section 1983 liability requires an official to have directed or personally participated in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Needleman v. Bohlen · filed 1974-12-20

Liability under § 1983 will lie where it is shown that the official charged directed or personally participated in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 liability may be adequately alleged when defendants are claimed to have known or should have known of, or personally directed, unconstitutional procedures, rather than being named only under respondeat superior.

Black v. Brown · filed 1975-03-20

This is more than a mere respondeat superior theory and it is a sufficient allegation for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on prison officials without a showing that they were personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Collins v. Bordenkircher · filed 1975-11-03

The Court agreed with defendants Ready and Faulkner that they cannot be held liable for damages without some showing that they were personally involved.

Section 1983 damages liability requires proof that the defendant participated in, or knew of and acquiesced in, the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

United States Ex Rel. Bennett v. Prasse · filed 1976-02-25

These cases require proof of participation or knowledge and acquiescence in the allegedly offending conduct.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant was personally responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Horowitz v. Anker · filed 1977-09-07

At the outset, it must be noted that liability of a defendant for deprivation of civil rights under § 1983 is predicated only upon a sufficient showing of that defendant’s personal responsibility for the claimed constitutionally impermissible conduct.

Section 1983 imposes liability when a defendant's conduct has a causal connection to the deprivation of federal rights; supervisory officials may be liable when an adopted policy affirmatively causes the violation.

University of Missouri at Columbia-National Education Ass'n v. Dalton · filed 1978-09-11

This “personal involvement” prerequisite to liability under § 1983 is perhaps more correctly stated in terms of a causation test. ... It is, therefore, quite clear that the individual defendants, as members of the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, by adopting a policy of not permitting use of University facilities by unions or associations which have as one of their major goals collective bargaining with the University, caused, or was an affirmative link in causing, Chancellor Schooling and President Ratchford to deny plaintiffs their request that they be permitted to utilize campus facilities for UMC-NEA purposes. ... Consequently, defendants may be held answerable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the actions taken by various University officials which are the subject matter of this lawsuit.

Section 1983 requires personal participation by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisor is not liable solely because of a subordinate’s acts.

Mingo v. Patterson · filed 1978-09-12

This circuit has consistently recognized that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 liability requires proof that the official personally acted in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights and cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Gardner v. Zahradnick · filed 1978-10-25

Liability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show the defendant's personal involvement in the activities that allegedly deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Carwile v. Ray · filed 1979-11-26

The law is clear that in order to successfully impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show personal involvement by the putative defendant in the activities that allegedly deprived plaintiff of any constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant's personal involvement in the deprivation and does not impose liability merely for failing to prevent unlawful conduct.

Himmelbrand v. Harrison · filed 1980-02-05

An individual defendant’s mere failure to prevent unlawful conduct — despite his knowledge of it and despite his probable ability to prevent it — is not sufficient personal involvement to warrant § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be responsible for the alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Galda v. Bloustein · filed 1980-06-12

The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint against a defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be that the particular defendant is responsible for the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, not that the particular defendant is strategically situated in the bureaucratic structure so that he can provide a convenient channel for communication to the other individuals involved in the litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public officials for a private person's abuse absent affirmative state action or the officials' personal involvement in the deprivation.

Davis v. Casey · filed 1980-07-02

The complaint does not allege that the named defendants abused Rochelle— nor that affirmative state action played any part in her ordeal. The complaint does not allege that Rochelle’s attacker was employed or supervised by — or even known to — the defendants. Accordingly, it fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and the motions of all defendants for summary judgment are allowed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional injury for that defendant to be held liable.

Bruner v. Bates · filed 1980-09-09

The suit is based upon an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as the Civil Rights Act. In order for any of the defendants to be held under that Act, personal involvement must be shown.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

United States Ex Rel. Sommer v. Dixon · filed 1981-10-09

There has to be a personal involvement and the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation for a damages award, and respondeat superior does not apply.

Carter v. Parsons · filed 1981-11-25

Since personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged deprivation would be required ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a prerequisite to an award of damages and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, there could be no recovery against the defendant.

To state a claim under § 1983 for monetary damages, a plaintiff must show the personal involvement of each defendant.

Franklin v. Israel · filed 1982-04-29

With respect to the claims for monetary damages, plaintiff is required to show the personal involvement of each defendant in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery to allege and prove each defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Stoute v. Berman · filed 1982-11-01

Finally, the plaintiff seeks money damages against the defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires allegations and proof of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation as a prerequisite to recovery.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation and does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Lowe v. Carter · filed 1982-12-29

Since defendants are the persons responsible for conducting the monthly administrative segregation reviews, it is clear that there is sufficient 42 U.S.C. § 1983 personal involvement in this case. Therefore, the respondeat superior defense is rejected.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages against a defendant who neither participated in nor was responsible for the plaintiff's guilty plea and sentencing.

Stuart v. Lockhart · filed 1983-05-26

In short, even if the trial court, the State, or the plaintiff’s attorney failed to inform him fully of the applicability of Act 93, the defendant in this case neither took part in, nor is responsible for the taking of the plaintiff’s guilty plea and the imposition of sentence. The defendant therefore, cannot be liable for damages pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who did not participate in the challenged conduct.

Barada v. Pioneer Fellowship House · filed 1983-06-01

The other named defendants cannot be made liable under § 1983 for these defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 liability may be assessed against officials only when they were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Greer v. DeRobertis · filed 1983-07-18

As both sides recognize, Section 1983 liability can be assessed against officials only if they were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, in this case the imposition of disproportionate punishment.

Section 1983 liability for a student's suspension rests on the official personally responsible for the deprivation and not school-board members who did not participate.

Boyd v. Board of Directors of the McGehee School District No. 17 · filed 1985-06-14

Given the fact that it has been the custom and practice of the Board of Directors of the MeGehee School District to delegate to the head football coach the responsibility to supervise the selection of the homecoming queen each year and the proof further demonstrates that the board members did not personally participate in the suspension of Johnson, the Court holds that only Coach Gill may be held accountable to Johnson and Mason for the deprivation of their First Amendment rights under this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant to have personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional violation.

Tucker v. Dickey · filed 1985-07-23

However, such inferences are clearly insufficient to establish personal responsibility as an undisputed fact, and personal responsibility is a requirement for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for discriminatory public employment requires the defendant's personal involvement or participation in denying civil rights.

McAdoo v. Toll · filed 1985-08-19

... liability under § 1983 is conditioned on a showing of some personal involvement or participation in the denial of civil rights.

Section 1983 liability cannot be imputed through respondeat superior to defendants who were not personally involved in the alleged violation.

Green v. Johnson · filed 1985-11-04

Plaintiff has alleged personal involvement by only one of the named defendants, Nurse Gonzales. The district court correctly noted that liability may not be imputed to the remaining defendants on the theory of respondeat superior.

Mere negligent disregard by supervisory officials is insufficient to establish section 1983 liability.

Flood v. Lane · filed 1986-06-10

mere negligent disregard is inadequate to establish Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement and cannot rest on respondeat superior; adjudicative officers are also protected by judicial immunity for their judicial acts.

Johnny West v. Roberts · filed 1986-10-20

The hearing officer was properly dismissed from the action on the basis of judicial immunity. ... The Commissioner was not Commissioner at the time of appellant's alleged wrongful deprivation. Having no personal involvement in the proceedings, he cannot be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 damages require a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the constitutional deprivation, ordinarily through the defendant's personal participation.

McDonald v. Krajewski · filed 1986-11-13

It is apparent from the language of the statute that a causal connection must exist between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights before the defendant is liable under § 1983. Under the statute, a deprivation becomes actionable only when the defendant “subjects” or “causes to be subjected” another individual to deprivation of any of his rights, privileges and immunities.

State officials are not subject to Section 1983 liability unless they affirmatively participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Kim King and Kent Norman v. Atiyeh · filed 1987-04-08

State officials are not subject to suit under section 1983 unless they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Beard v. Michael Dutton, James Vandever, Lt. Crary, Rosa Johnson, Joe Sargeant, Charles Tracy, and Alvis Hut · filed 1987-06-11

In an interlocutory order dated November 15, 1985, the district court properly dismissed the complaint regarding those defendants against whom plaintiff did not allege personal involvement in the unconstitutional activities alleged in the complaint.

Section 1983 causation includes setting in motion acts by others that the defendant knows or reasonably should know will cause a constitutional injury.

Merritt v. MacKey · filed 1987-09-16

The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires direct or indirect involvement by the named defendant.

Ross v. Arnold Hopkins, Commissioner of Corrections · filed 1988-02-17

Ross failed to show any direct or indirect involvement on the part of his named defendant, as is necessary to assert a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s personal involvement in or knowledge of the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Gomez v. Coughlin · filed 1988-04-20

It is clear that personal involvement or knowledge of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for an alleged constitutional deprivation; members of a state correction commission with only oversight and grievance review duties are not liable for prison conditions without personal involvement.

Brody v. McMahon · filed 1988-04-27

The express function of the Commission of Correction is to insure public awareness of conditions within the State Correctional facilities. Its responsibility is one of adequate and effective oversight. There is no hiring, firing, or disciplinary power over any supervisory staff or personnel of the correctional facilities. There is no direct power to control or direct the customs and policies of the facilities. To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, there must be some showing of personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional deprivation, and plaintiff has to allege direct and personal responsibility for the purported unlawful conduct of subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation; merely filling out a disciplinary report at another official’s direction does not suffice.

Salahuddin v. Harris · filed 1988-04-27

Egger, on the other hand, is alleged only to have filled out the disciplinary report at Capuano's direction. This is exactly the lack of personal involvement addressed by Williams. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted dismissing the case against Egger.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong, which may be shown by personal direction or by actual knowledge and acquiescence alleged with particularity.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1988-04-28

Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a state official’s own conduct and the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; naming an official without alleging personal involvement does not state a claim.

Badfoot v. Deukmejian · filed 1988-05-13

The district court also correctly determined that Badfoot's civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 failed to state a cause of action. Generally, state officials are not subject to suit under section 1983 "unless they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir.1987). ... Therefore, Badfoot failed to allege the required causal connection between the defendants and the claimed deprivations, see Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743-44, and the district court properly dismissed the claim.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a prison superintendent for every constitutional error by a disciplinary board or for merely negligent review of its decision.

Feagin v. Broglin · filed 1988-06-01

The court is not prepared to hold that a prison superintendent is strictly liable for all constitutional errors by disciplinary boards, or that negligence in the review of a disciplinary action is sufficient to render a prison administrator personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the constitutional errors of others. The law does not justify such a holding.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement by the defendant in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Branham v. John Jabe Tom Taylor · filed 1988-08-05

Review of the record as to those claims indicates that plaintiff failed to allege any personal involvement on the part of defendants in those events. Such participation, however, is fundamental to the imposition of liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants for another officer’s search when they did not participate in it.

Barney v. Cynthia D. Kinser, James Bledsoe, David Johnson, and Marvin O. Radcliff · filed 1988-09-09

The uncontroverted evidence indicated that Officer Radcliff conducted the search. Even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Radcliff's actions were improper, since he was never served, they are not at issue here. The other defendants are not liable for Officer Radcliff's acts.

A Section 1983 defendant who shows no involvement in the challenged policy or search is entitled to summary judgment.

Tribble v. Gardner · filed 1988-10-25

Thus, to the extent that a named defendant shows that he did not play a role in creating the digital body cavity search policy or that he did not participate in the search upon Tribble, he is entitled to summary judgment. Here, however, no named defendant has attempted to make such a showing.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have been personally involved in the deprivation of a federal right to be liable for damages.

Morgan v. Ward · filed 1988-11-07

A defendant cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 unless he was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an officer whose conduct did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.

Unwin v. Campbell · filed 1988-12-09

Because the undisputed facts show that Furlone and Campbell did not cause Unwin's injuries, their conduct did not violate clearly established law and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on corrections officials solely because of their positions when they neither personally violated the plaintiff’s rights nor caused the challenged conduct.

Donald v. Robert Brown, Jr., John Jabe · filed 1988-12-12

Defendants Brown and Jabe appear to be named only because they are corrections officials. Donald does not contend that they personally violated his rights or caused the complained of conduct; therefore, the suit was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 makes a defendant liable only if the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Brown v. Coughlin · filed 1989-01-04

A defendant is liable in a section 1983 suit only if he or she had some personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a sheriff and chief deputy for unconstitutional conduct when each is personally involved.

Terry v. Cook · filed 1989-01-12

Both the sheriff and his chief deputy may be liable for unconstitutional conduct under section 1983 when personal involvement by both officers is alleged.

An inmate’s evidence that he informed a warden of unconstitutional prison conditions can create a triable issue of the warden’s personal knowledge in a § 1983 claim, despite the warden’s general denial of knowledge of regulation violations.

Jamison-Bey v. Thieret · filed 1989-02-09

There is no mention of Thieret’s lack of knowledge of Jamison-Bey’s specific claims, nor any refutation of his alleged contact with Jamison-Bey regarding these problems. In light of Jamison-Bey’s affidavit evidence that he informed Thieret of the unconstitutional conditions on numerous occasions, a material question of fact exists, and Thieret’s conclusional statements, effectively without evidentiary support, are insufficient on summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action to impose individual liability.

Goldberg v. Weil · filed 1989-02-10

Any claim for individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must contain “a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervision alone does not establish individual liability.

Smallwood v. Renfro · filed 1989-02-23

In the sense required for Section 1983 liability, Coupland did not “cause or participate” in the Eighth Amendment violations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation to be liable.

Durre v. Dempsey · filed 1989-02-28

In order to be liable pursuant to § 1983, a defendant must have personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement in the willful deprivation of a constitutional right or knowledge that subordinates were causing such a deprivation.

Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District · filed 1989-04-12

To be liable under section 1983 a defendant must have been personally implicated in the wilful act causing the deprivation of a constitutional right, or must have had or been chargeable with knowledge that his subordinates were causing a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for another officer’s constitutional violation without an affirmative link between the defendant and the violation.

Peter A. Kaiser and Martha Rhoades v. Thomas Lief, Does I and II · filed 1989-05-10

Such is not the law, as this circuit has held that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be applied to hold liable under section 1983 an officer who has no affirmative link with the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a showing of each defendant’s personal responsibility and does not permit liability solely under respondeat superior.

Wright v. Santoro · filed 1989-06-07

Nor can any of the defendants be sued on a theory of respon-deat superior; a showing of personal responsibility by each defendant is required.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers merely because they were present when another officer violated a person’s civil rights; liability requires proof of their actual participation.

Riner v. Gardner · filed 1989-06-14

Absent some proof of their actual participation in the wrongdoing, defendants mere presence does not give rise to a constitutional violation sufficient to maintain a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation; a person who did not participate in or cause the deprivation is not liable.

Stevenson v. Koskey · filed 1989-06-26

Based on the foregoing analysis, we find that defendant was completely out of the chain of causation for the alleged constitutional deprivation. It matters not whether plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated by the corrections officer. Defendant did not participate in such violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for a later constitutional deprivation when an official was personally involved in the acts causing it or there is a causal connection between the official’s acts and the violation.

Merritt v. Harris County · filed 1989-06-29

Under § 1983, the constables can be liable for the subsequent deprivations if they are personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of constitutional rights or if there is a causal connection between the act and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have been personally involved in the acts complained of.

Policano v. Koehler · filed 1989-07-07

In addition, plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants Koehler and Hopkins were personally involved in the acts complained of, a prerequisite to a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded against that defendant.

Liscio v. Warren · filed 1989-07-13

Personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof that each defendant was personally and directly involved in, or caused, the events that violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Lopez v. Garriga · filed 1989-08-21

A finding of liability against a defendant requires that it be alleged and proved that he was personally and directly involved in the events that violated plaintiffs’ civil rights or in causing those events to happen.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officials whose affirmance and condoning of a disciplinary decision on appeal establishes their personal involvement.

Clemons v. Stephen H. Norris, Commissioner Herman C. Davis, Warden · filed 1989-10-16

Finally, defendants have not challenged plaintiff's claim that they affirmed and thus condoned the disciplinary decision on appeal, which is sufficient personal involvement to state a claim against them.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to present evidence of a defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed deprivation of constitutional rights to avoid summary judgment for that defendant.

Johnson v. Pelker · filed 1989-12-12

The burden was on Johnson, not Lane, to present evidence of Lane’s involvement. Johnson presented none.

Section 1983 requires an official to have caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Saenz v. Murphy · filed 1989-12-14

An official cannot be held liable in a sec. 1983 action unless he or she caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment must present evidence of a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Johnson v. Pelker · filed 1989-12-18

The burden was on Johnson, not Lane, to present evidence of Lane's involvement. Johnson presented none.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials for constitutional violations over which they had no control.

Akai-Ismalili-Mahammad v. Chadwick · filed 1990-01-08

Mahammad has failed to demonstrate how these persons could have remedied these problems if they had known about them. They cannot be held liable for any purported constitutional violations over which they had no control.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing to impose individual liability.

Bryant v. Maffucci · filed 1990-01-23

In order to prevail in a Section 1983 action against an individual, a plaintiff’s allegations must indicate some personal involvement by a defendant in the claimed wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a forfeiture on defendants who had no personal involvement in it.

Jackson v. Francis J. Wren M. Chambers J. Montange, Sgt. D. Lucas Wayne County Sheriff's Department · filed 1990-01-23

Finally, the defendants had no personal involvement in the forfeiture of Jackson's monies as the record indicates that the forfeiture proceedings were initiated by the state of Michigan. Thus, the defendants were entitled to judgment as to this claim as well.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Pruitt v. Robert Brown, Jr. Richard McKron Henry Grayson Vicki Loss Elaine Wingard, Thomas Taylor · filed 1990-01-23

None of the named individuals had any personal involvement in Pruitt's allegedly invalid extradition. This lack of involvement is fatal to a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

James v. Detective O'Mally · filed 1990-02-27

Failure to show any personal involvement by defendant is fatal to a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a state official’s personal involvement in the alleged civil rights violation; a high position of authority alone does not establish personal liability.

Duffy v. Wetzler · filed 1990-04-10

There has been no showing that any of the State defendants personally engaged in any activity in connection with the taxation of Federal pensions so as to give rise to a section 1983 claim. The fact that these defendants were or are in a high position of authority is an insufficient basis for the imposition of personal liability.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting the defendant personally to the alleged wrongdoing.

Miller v. H.L. Underwood, Superintendent · filed 1990-04-17

The magistrate correctly found that Miller had alleged no facts which could support a claim against the defendant in this case, who had no involvement in those proceedings.

Section 1983 requires an alleged constitutional deprivation attributable to the defendant to state a claim.

Riley v. Schweikert · filed 1990-04-17

However, plaintiff has alleged no constitutional deprivation attributable to the defendant in the instant case. Therefore, the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for an alleged deprivation; prison hearing panel members are not liable for a records office's failure to forward their report.

Simpson v. Montague · filed 1990-05-10

The fact that the records office failed to forward the report to the plaintiff when he was moved to a different prison does not give rise to personal liability on the part of the hearing panel members or anyone else who was not a member of the records office staff.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded.

Kaminsky Ex Rel. Estate of Kaminsky v. Rosenblum · filed 1990-05-21

The personal involvement of a defendant in the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor based solely on notice of a decision concerning the alleged deprivation.

Kopec v. Coughlin · filed 1990-06-21

The only allegation levied against Coughlin is that he was informed of the Review Board’s decision. But mere notice does not give rise to a § 1983 claim against Coughlin in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the illegal acts before damages can be awarded; mere negligence is insufficient.

Jackson v. Mowery · filed 1990-07-24

The plaintiff must allege more than mere negligence on the part of the defendant; personal involvement by the defendant in the illegal acts is required before damages can be awarded under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the acts or omissions complained of to hold a defendant liable.

Harris v. Murray · filed 1990-07-25

Therefore, as there has been no personal involvement alleged on the part of defendant Murray in the acts or omissions complained of and as plaintiff has stipulated to his dismissal, Edward Murray is dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant was personally involved in the alleged incident to sustain a claim against that defendant.

Williams v. David A. Garraghty, C. Hall Cottrell · filed 1990-07-25

The claim against Warden Garraghty was properly dismissed because Williams failed to show any evidence that the warden was personally involved in any fashion in the alleged incident.

Section 1983 does not impose personal-capacity liability on supervisors who were not personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Dockerty-Bostron v. Waukesha County · filed 1990-08-01

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, so lack of personal involvement precludes any liability for Klink and Conine in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation; officials whose investigation did not cause a prisoner’s segregation are not liable for that segregation.

Baker v. Howard N. Lyles, Warden Lawrence Carpenter, Security Chief Major Thompson, Acting Security Chief Lt. · filed 1990-08-02

These defendants did not conduct the original hearing and did not participate in the review as members of the Classification Team. The allegations of the complaint do not set forth valid claims against them. It was not the investigation by these officers that caused Baker’s restraint; it was the action of the hearing officer and the Classification Team that resulted in his segregation from the general prison population.

Section 1983 requires conduct by the defendant that supports liability; a school employee’s violation of students’ rights alone does not make school officials liable.

J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School District 11 · filed 1990-08-03

The plaintiffs do not allege that any of the school defendants deprived them of these other civil liberties but that the school defendants' agent violated these liberties. What the plaintiffs need to show is not an expansive list of liberties allegedly taken from them but some action by the defendants that would justify the imposition of liability.

Section 1983 individual-capacity liability requires facts showing the defendant’s knowledge of or personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Percy Green, Ii v. St. Louis Housing Authority · filed 1990-08-07

We can find no instance where Green pointed to facts which supported his contention that the mayor even knew Green had been discharged or that the mayor had any involvement in the alleged "purge" of HA employees.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials who did not participate in the act alleged to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Goldberg v. Whitman · filed 1990-08-15

Since they did not participate in the act alleged to have violated Goldberg’s first amendment rights, the court grants summary judgment in their favor.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer whose own use of suborned testimony, bribes, or false evidence causes an unconstitutional arrest, even if the officer did not make the arrest.

Stokes v. City of Chicago · filed 1990-08-24

Furthermore, the alleged actions by defendants, consisting of suborned testimony, bribes and false evidence, were the basis for the allegedly unconstitutional arrest. In these circumstances, at least Pochordo (and I think Rotkvich as well for his alleged role in suborning testimony) may still be liable for committing constitutional torts even if they did not make the arrest and defendants cite no authority to convince this court otherwise.