42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a prison official liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely because the official supervises that subordinate.

Ballard v. Boyd · filed 2020-08-10

A prison official, such as Warden Boyd, “may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.” Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1079 (8th Cir.2007)). ... The court finds and concludes that the foregoing allegations contain sufficient facts to state a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Boyd for deliberate indifference in failing to protect Ballard from the use of excessive force, in violation of Ballard’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability; a defendant must cause or participate in the violation.

Brockington v. Livers · filed 2020-08-11

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make wardens or commissioners liable solely because they supervise officials accused of misconduct.

Crippen v. Jok · filed 2020-08-12

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold certain Defendants liable because of their roles as Wardens or TDOC Commissioner, these Defendants cannot be held liable solely because of their supervisory positions.

Section 1983 makes public employees liable for their own misconduct, not for the misconduct of others they supervise.

Verrier v. Murphy · filed 2020-08-12

Next, Verrier may not proceed on “failure to supervise” claims against any defendants. Section 1983 makes public employees liable “for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.”

Section 1983 does not make an employer or principal liable solely because an employee or agent committed misconduct.

Hamilton v. Little · filed 2020-08-12

Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when an affirmative link connects the alleged constitutional deprivation to the supervisor’s personal participation or failure to supervise.

Hill v. Brown · filed 2020-08-12

Liability can be imposed on a supervisor under §1983 only where there is an “affirmative link” between the alleged constitutional deprivation and the supervisor’s personal participation or failure to supervise.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; failing to take corrective action after an inmate grievance does not establish it.

Watkins v. Quality Correctional Health Care · filed 2020-08-12

Furthermore, a failure to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the necessary personal involvement for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor only when the supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or the violation is directly attributable to the supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction.

Allen v. Booth · filed 2020-08-13

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims against Secretary Diaz and Warden Montgomery must be dismissed because supervisors may be held individually liable in a Section 1983 suit only if they engaged in some “culpable action, or inaction, [that] is directly attributed to them.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest on an official’s mere receipt of a grievance without a response or other action.

Girard v. Collao · filed 2020-08-13

The receipt of a grievance does not establish supervisory liability unless the official responds to or acts upon it, and Plaintiff does not show that Defendant Griffen responded to or acted on the grievances.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must allege the defendant’s own actionable wrongdoing.

Skinner v. Morisson · filed 2020-08-14

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for another officer’s use of force when that force was not excessive.

Kapuscinski v. City of Gibralter · filed 2020-08-17

But because Mitchell did not use excessive force against Kapuscinski, Robinson cannot be liable under this doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Shakur v. McNeil · filed 2020-08-17

Moreover, he cannot sue a defendant for damages solely because of the Defendant’s supervisory position.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; a plaintiff must show a causal connection to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

WASHINGTON v. TAYLOR · filed 2020-08-17

Section 1983 claims may not be brought against supervisory officials solely on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervisor based solely on the supervisor’s position.

Caruth v. Illinois Department Of Corrections · filed 2020-08-17

It is clear from this statement that Caruth impermissibly relies on a theory of respondeat superior for his § 1983 claim against Pfister.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983 must show that the supervisor was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it.

Roberts v. Tomlinson · filed 2020-08-17

As such, courts require Plaintiffs seeking to hold supervisors liable in the § 1983 context prove that the supervisors were subjectively aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it.

Section 1983 requires facts linking a supervisor’s own conduct to a subordinate officer’s alleged violation; supervisory status and summoning the officers alone do not suffice.

Hatik v. State of Massachusetts · filed 2020-08-17

That Kaiser summoned the SERT officers and spoke with them prior to Hatik being called to floor 8-1 where he was assaulted and that Kaiser was the SERT officers’ supervisor are not sufficient for the court to infer that Kaiser was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of harm to Hatik, that Kaiser encouraged, condoned, or acquiesced to the SERT officers’ conduct, or that Kaiser acted on the basis of Hatik’s protected conduct.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, an inadequate response, and a causal link to the plaintiff’s injury.

Hall v. Dameron · filed 2020-08-18

Accordingly, Hall has failed to establish that Dameron could be held liable as a supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each supervisor’s own misconduct; a supervisor is not liable merely because a subordinate violated the plaintiff’s rights.

(PC) Godinez v. Algazzaly · filed 2020-08-18

To impose liability under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege specific misdeeds that each defendant committed, rather than the misdeeds of those he or she supervised.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their employees’ actions; a plaintiff must allege a causal link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.

(PC) Patton v. Loadholt · filed 2020-08-19

Plaintiff is informed that under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because the supervisor oversees the staff involved.

Kucinsky v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2020-08-19

that claim is DISMISSED without prejudice because respondeat superior, or supervisory,liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their supervisory positions.

Guitron v. Strong · filed 2020-08-20

Guitron cannot hold Verheyen and the sergeants liable merely because of their supervisory positions. Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability based on respondeat superior or negligent supervision of subordinates.

Fields v. Dennison · filed 2020-08-24

Alleging liability based on theories of respondeat superior or negligent supervision of subordinates is not sufficient to establish a claim against an individual under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for staff misconduct solely because they oversee the staff; liability requires personal involvement.

Bunch v. Carter · filed 2020-08-24

There is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and these defendants cannot be held liable for the misdeeds of other prison staff simply because they oversee operations in the prison or supervise lower-level employees.

Section 1983 does not make prison supervisors liable for money damages solely because they oversee prison operations.

Swisher v. Payne · filed 2020-08-24

There is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and they cannot be held liable for money damages solely because they oversee operations in the prison.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor who was not personally involved in the alleged violation and did not actively encourage it.

Perry v. Parris · filed 2020-08-25

Plaintiff’s allegations against Warden Parris do not suggest any personal involvement in the events leading up to the alleged assault on Plaintiff, nor does Plaintiff contend that Warden Parris actively encouraged a failure to follow policy. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 action against Warden Parris in his individual capacity.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only when personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or sufficiently connected to it through the supervisor’s own conduct.

Mondragon v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-08-26

Moreover, supervisory officials may only be held liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff alleges their “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or … a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” ... Plaintiff makes no such allegations in his Complaint. Therefore, the Court dismisses Defendant Gore sua sponte based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they oversee employees who violate someone’s rights.

Ellis v. J.E.A.N. Team Task Force · filed 2020-08-26

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a prison superintendent.

Coleman v. Neal · filed 2020-08-26

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor who neither participated in the alleged discrimination nor knew of it until afterward.

SANTANA v. PETTY · filed 2020-08-26

Finally, any claim against defendant Thompson must be dismissed. Mr. Santana has not alleged that Thompson participated in any discriminatory treatment or that he knew that Petty and Storms were allegedly discriminating against Mr. Santana until after the fact.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; liability cannot rest solely on a subordinate’s conduct or the supervisor’s denial of grievances.

Valdes v. Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2020-08-26

“Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” ... At most, Plaintiffs claims are that these Defendants denied his grievances or failed to act upon Defendant Blevins’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct. As such, the claims against Defendants Ferguson, Durrett, and Kenney must be dismissed for a failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official’s personal involvement; merely receiving an inmate’s letter is insufficient.

Fowler v. Fischer · filed 2020-04-17

Courts have held that merely receiving a letter from an inmate is insufficient to establish personal involvement required to hold a supervisory official liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation.

Davis v. Strus · filed 2020-06-01

Finally, in § 1983 claims, supervisory liability can be imposed only if (1) the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... Because the Riverside Defendants do not dispute that Murray and Kramer were supervisors for the purposes of § 1983, the Court will grant the motion.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for failing to correct staff conduct requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Prince McCoy, Sr. v. Norwood · filed 2020-08-27

Moreover, to the extent McCoy separately alleged that Norwood is liable for his own failure to correct the medical staff’s deliberate indifference, he has not alleged a basis for supervisory liability because he has not shown an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a connection between a supervisor’s personal involvement or policy responsibility and the alleged constitutional violation.

Orozco v. Sandoval County · filed 2020-08-27

None of the facts asserted or the record cited by Plaintiff show sufficient personal involvement by Edwards, much less a nexus between the alleged violations and any policy or custom promulgated by him.

Section 1983 supervisory liability is not necessarily precluded by a lapse of time between a supervisor’s deliberate indifference and the injury when the supervisor had ample notice of likely further violations and the causal connection remains.

Garza v. Lansing Sch. District · filed 2020-08-28

Taking into account the circumstances involved in this case, we conclude that a lapse of time between a defendant’s deliberately indifferent conduct and a plaintiff’s injury does not necessarily preclude that defendant’s supervisory liability—at least where the defendant had ample notice of the supervisee’s likelihood of continuing violations, and the passage of time was not so great as to erase the connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the student’s subsequent abuse.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position; the plaintiff must link each defendant’s conduct to the alleged injury.

Rivera v. Sheppard · filed 2020-08-28

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. ... Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, was aware of a deprivation and failed to act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Abernathy v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2020-08-28

With respect to his claims against the DOC Commissioner and the C.C.I. Warden, Mr. Abernathy cannot sue these defendants for damages solely because of their supervisory position.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against supervisors based on respondeat superior.

Bergman v. Cook County · filed 2020-08-28

Defendants are correct that § 1983 does not permit claims against supervisors like Dart based on a respondeat superior theory.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim requires facts supporting a reasonable inference that a supervisor’s purposeful or deliberately indifferent conduct caused the constitutional violation.

Cox v. Lamm · filed 2020-08-28

To state a plausible § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts that allow the court to reasonably infer purposeful or deliberately indifferent conduct on the part of defendants Rocky Mount, Moore, Williams, and Robinson caused the constitutional violations in this case.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s actions.

Shaw v. Giles · filed 2020-08-29

Vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to show that the supervisor’s own response to a known risk of constitutional injury amounted to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization.

Campbell v. Florian · filed 2020-08-31

Accordingly, a § 1983 plaintiff must show more than mere supervision. The supervisor’s own response to the knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury must be “so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices.’” Id. (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to link a defendant’s own conduct to the alleged deprivation; a supervisor is not liable merely for a subordinate’s conduct.

(PC) Stout v. Newsom · filed 2020-08-31

The complaint does not demonstrate how defendant Newsom, through his own individual actions, has violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the deprivation of rights; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

(PC) Ochoa v. Fletcher · filed 2020-08-31

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. ... Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Spearman cannot solely be based on the fact that as the Warden of HDSP, he was technically defendant Fletcher’s supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff solely because a constitutional tort occurred under the sheriff’s supervision.

Fields v. Rozzi · filed 2020-08-31

There is no respondeat superior liability for constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional tort solely because of the supervisory relationship.

El v. Chambers · filed 2020-08-31

To the extent Plaintiff attempted to allege that Doellinger should be liable for the actions of his employees under a theory of supervisory liability because he is the Chief of the Town of Chester Police Department, those claims must be dismissed because all of the underlying claims are dismissed, see Jones v. Harris, 665 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and because even if Plaintiff had pleaded a constitutional tort, a supervisor cannot be held liable for constitutional torts of subordinates on a theory of respondeat superior, see Ying Li v. City of N.Y., 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to know about and facilitate, approve, condone, or deliberately ignore the conduct at issue before the supervisor can be held liable.

Adell v. Ray · filed 2020-09-01

To be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ constitutional violations solely because of their supervisory roles.

(PC) Muhammad v. Orr · filed 2020-09-01

The remaining allegations against medical supervisors fail to state a claim based on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor; the plaintiff must connect the supervisor’s own conduct to the deprivation of rights.

Ladiner v. Lowery · filed 2020-09-01

There is no vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... With regard to personal involvement, plaintiff has not demonstrated a link between any action or inaction on the part of Director Precythe, and the deprivation of one of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Jones v. Layton · filed 2020-09-01

Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 continues to permit supervisory liability claims after Iqbal.

THORPE v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-09-01

Therefore, the Court rejects the City’s argument that Mr. Thorpe’s § 1983 supervisory liability claim is no longer cognizable in light of Iqbal.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor in her individual capacity fails when the complaint does not allege that she was responsible for a deficient policy that caused injury.

Lumsden v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director · filed 2020-09-02

His complaint did not allege that Davis was responsible for a deficient policy that resulted in injury; rather, his complaint indicated that there were policies in place implemented by Davis and that others were not abiding by the policies.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the complaint must allege a causal link to the claimed constitutional violation.

(PC) Abalos v. Lizarraga · filed 2020-09-02

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory authority alone does not create liability.

Renee v. Neal · filed 2020-09-02

A high-ranking prison official can’t be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because he oversees operations within the prison or supervises other correctional staff.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a defendant must cause or participate in the violation.

Fetz v. Nevels · filed 2020-09-02

While Fetz has named Sheriff Nevels as a defendant, the body of the complaint makes no mention of Sheriff Nevels. There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, the current complaint does not state a claim Sheriff Nevels.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for others' unlawful conduct without their personal involvement.

DAVIS v. LOOP · filed 2020-09-02

Even if Mr. Davis had suffered a constitutional deprivation, the defendants may not be held liable for the unlawful conduct of others under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to know of and participate in, approve, or deliberately disregard the alleged misconduct; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Brown v. Picknell · filed 2020-09-03

To be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Brown has offered no evidence that Picknell, Williams, Delaney, or Sawyers were aware of his grievances, let alone any evidence that they acted unreasonably in response to any such grievances, he has no § 1983 claim against them.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for a deprivation of rights to impose personal liability.

Johnson v. Cook · filed 2020-09-03

Furthermore, Mr. Johnson does not allege that either Defendant Cook, Defendant McCollum, or Defendant Harris was personally involved in the maintenance of unconstitutional conditions at the MCDC.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely because of their management or policymaking roles.

DAKER v. HEAD · filed 2020-09-04

These Defendants’ roles in management and policy-making, without more, are insufficient to form the bases for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they employ or supervise someone who caused the alleged deprivation.

Drogosz v. Carter · filed 2020-09-04

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and supervisors cannot be held liable simply because they employ or supervise someone else.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Riggins 286725 v. Cook · filed 2020-09-04

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires factual allegations connecting the supervisor to the constitutional violation, including a plausible basis for deliberate indifference.

Thorn-Freeman v. Valdez · filed 2020-09-04

Merely alleging that “no one apparently monitors the video as Defendant Valdez can be seen entering Plaintiff’s cell on numerous occasions in violation of WNMCF policy”—without factual (and non-conclusory) allegations of prior instances—falls short of adequately pleading the mental state required to support a supervisory liability claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

WOODELL v. PA. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AT GRATERFORD · filed 2020-09-04

In the instant case, Woodell’s claims against the above-named defendants largely suffer from two pleading flaws: (1) his failure to allege with specificity how these defendants personally participated in the alleged wrongdoing and (2) his attempt to assign liability based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 may hold a prison official liable for ignoring notice of an ongoing constitutional violation, but ordinarily not for denying a grievance about completed misconduct.

Smith v. Engelage · filed 2020-09-08

However, a high-level official typically cannot be roped into a constitutional claim merely by denying a grievance concerning a “completed act of misconduct.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct for individual liability; responsibility for training or supervision alone is insufficient.

Charles v. Lee County, Kentucky · filed 2020-09-08

In other words, the supervisor must have some personal involvement in the underlying misconduct that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; an individual defendant must directly participate in the alleged misconduct.

Exclusive Brands LLC v. City of Garden City · filed 2020-09-08

Plaintiff’s individual liability theory cannot proceed without allegations of direct action. “Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... Because Plaintiff’s pleading fails to allege sufficient facts supporting an individual liability theory against Dougherty, Plaintiff’s claim fails to state a claim against Dougherty in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an unconstitutional policy to hold a private contractor liable, or knowing acquiescence to hold a supervisor liable, for an employee’s alleged violation.

Davis v. Alvarez · filed 2020-09-08

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Stafford concluded that Trinity and Perry cannot be held liable for the challenged conduct because “[t]he two incidents [Plaintiff] alleges in his complaint are not enough to show that Trinity had an unconstitutional policy of allowing rocks in its food, or that Perry acquiesced to Alvarez knowingly serving food with foreign objects.” ... The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stafford’s analysis as to this issue and rejects Plaintiff’s objection.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a warden based solely on the warden’s position; the warden must be personally involved in the challenged conduct.

Kalafi, G'esa v. Brown, Lebbeus · filed 2020-09-09

As such, it appears Kalafi would like to proceed against Haines solely because of his position as warden in January of 2015. Because Kalafi may not pursue such a claim under § 1983, see Zimmerman, 226 F.3d at 574 (7th Cir. 2000), he may not proceed against Haines.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a basis for holding the defendant responsible for the subordinate’s conduct; an official who did not supervise the alleged wrongdoer cannot be held liable on that theory.

Lowe v. Williams · filed 2020-09-09

Neither Ballard, nor Terry, were supervisors of Williams, who was employed by the WVDOC’s Central Office, not MOCC, at the time in question. Therefore, the facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Lowe, do not show that Ballard and Terry’s conduct violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s failure to correct widespread abuse plausibly connects the supervisor to a constitutional deprivation.

Goodson v. Poe · filed 2020-09-09

Therefore, Bridges has plausibly pled individual supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory position; each defendant must personally participate in the deprivation of rights.

(PC) Guzman v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange · filed 2020-09-09

There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference or tacit authorization, and a causal link to the plaintiff’s injury.

Matemu v. Brienzi · filed 2020-09-09

Plaintiff appears to adequately state a plausible claim for supervisory liability by alleging the following: ... that because of the supervisors’ inaction, the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the prosecution of Plaintiff was allowed to continue.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a rights violation, directs it, or knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct; conclusory allegations of failure to train or supervise do not suffice.

HILL v. WETZEL · filed 2020-09-09

“Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” ... Hill asserts in conclusory fashion only that Wetzel, Ferguson and Goodman failed to train and supervise subordinate corrections officials. This is not sufficient to state plausible claims since there is no allegation that any Defendant maintained with deliberate indifference a policy, practice or custom which directly caused constitutional harm, or was personally involved or acquiesced in the destruction of Hill’s legal material and other property.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; notice of threats alone does not establish liability for later retaliation.

Galarza v. Erfe · filed 2020-09-11

Galarza fails to allege any non- conclusory facts to show that Warden Erfe failed to act on the information about the threats or that he became aware that those threats materialized into adverse actions and thus constitutional violations that required remedies.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because they employ or supervise someone who violated a person’s rights.

Rackemann v. Carter · filed 2020-09-11

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and supervisors cannot be held liable simply because they employ or supervise someone else.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Jones 655116 v. Adams · filed 2020-09-11

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Snider 834248 v. Corizon Medical · filed 2020-09-11

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 requires a specifically alleged causal link between a supervisor and the claimed constitutional violation; a supervisor is generally not liable merely for an employee’s actions.

(PC) Hudson v. Cargill · filed 2020-09-14

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because they employ or supervise someone who violated a person’s rights.

Pierson v. Neal · filed 2020-09-14

To the extent Mr. Pierson is alleging Warden Neal didn’t properly supervise, Warden Neal can’t be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because he employs or supervises others.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must allege what each defendant personally did or failed to do.

McDade v. Corizon Health · filed 2020-09-14

A plaintiff in an action brought under § 1983 may not rely on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement; conclusory allegations of inadequate supervision do not suffice.

Santos v. Wood · filed 2020-09-15

Unadorned claims such as these are insufficient to plausibly allege Defendants’ personal involvement in their subordinates’ misconduct.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when the supervisor’s conduct is plausibly connected to a subordinate’s unconstitutional use of force.

Roarty-Nugent v. Cuyahoga County · filed 2020-09-15

Accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint plausibly alleges a claim of supervisor liability. ... As such, Mr. Ivey is not entitled to qualified immunity on Count 17 at this time.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because people under that supervisor allegedly violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Jones v. Baldonado · filed 2020-09-16

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Legardy v. Redon · filed 2020-09-16

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... Plaintiff lists several defendants on the title page of his complaint but has failed to describe the actions of any specific defendant.

Section 1983 applies a rigorous standard to claims seeking to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s actions.

Allen v. Sheriff Sam St. John · filed 2020-09-17

To the extent Allen seeks to hold St. John liable for Mills’ acts and omissions, his effort fails. Under § 1983, “[t]he standard by which a supervisor can be held liable for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for subordinates’ actions solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Gallashaw v. Moody · filed 2020-09-17

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Lee liable for the actions of the other Defendants, such a theory of liability is not viable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal fault; a supervisory liability claim needs allegations connecting a supervisor’s conduct to the deprivation of rights.

Haughie v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-09-17

As noted, Section 1983 requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant’s personal conduct. ... The Amended Complaint is bereft of allegations concerning the presence of supervisors or any reports to supervisors. ... Accordingly, I conclude that Haughie has failed to state a claim for supervisory liability against Wexford in Count I.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for failure to train or supervise unless the supervisor authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Goodell v. Ervin · filed 2020-09-17

A supervisor’s failure to supervise, train or control an employee is not actionable under § 1983, unless the plaintiff shows “the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct . . .” Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). ... He, therefore, fails to state a claim against them and they will be dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 allows a supervisory liability claim based on a supervisor’s own deliberate indifference to known, pervasive misconduct, but does not impose liability merely because the supervisor employed the wrongdoer.

Hughes v. School Board of Henrico County · filed 2020-09-18

Because the Court finds that the Amended Complaint raises claims that generally require fact-specific inquiries, the Court will allow Counts I-IV and VI-VII to proceed past the pleadings stage. ... The “doctrine of respondeat superior has no applicability to § 1983 claims.”

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s misconduct when the supervisor directs or consents to it.

Williams v. Mejia · filed 2020-09-18

The only time a supervisor will be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct is if the supervisor directs or consents to the misconduct.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for personal participation in a rights deprivation, knowing failure to prevent violations, or a deficient policy that caused the violation.

(PC) John v. Hughes · filed 2020-09-18

Liability may be imposed on a supervisor under § 1983 if (1) the supervisor personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights, or (2) the supervisor knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them, or (3) the supervisor implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy itself ‘is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). As it stands, the complaint has no facts showing Baughman’s personal participation in or knowledge of the inmate attack or Hughes’s failure to protect plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a supervisor who did not cause or participate in the violation.

Wilson v. Neal · filed 2020-09-18

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; adjudicating grievances alone does not establish it.

ROSADO v. JANE DOE (LAW LIBRIAN) · filed 2020-09-18

The roles of Wetzel and Mahally in adjudicating Rosado’s grievances do not constitute personal involvement and, as such, are insufficient to establish supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor affirmatively participates in the constitutional deprivation or implements an unconstitutional policy that causes the injury.

Garza v. Davis-Director TDCJ-CID · filed 2020-09-21

A supervisory official may be liable under §1983 only if he “affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation” or “implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the injury.”

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for an equal protection violation only if the supervisor personally participated in it or caused it through the supervisor’s actions.

Doe v. Perkins · filed 2020-09-21

For a supervisor to be liable under § 1983 for an equal-protection violation, the complaint must allege either that he personally participated in the alleged violation or that there is a causal connection between his actions and the alleged deprivation. ... These facts do not support Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant Parker personally participated in any constitutional violation. Nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged any facts to establish that a causal connection between Parker’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 through personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Wortham v. Waldura · filed 2020-09-21

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their supervisory roles.

Johnston v. Allison · filed 2020-09-21

This is because there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional injury and a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and that injury.

LeMaitre v. Grindstaff · filed 2020-09-21

Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisory Defendants’ alleged inaction and the any constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege facts connecting the supervisor to the constitutional injury.

Fortune v. Clarke · filed 2020-09-22

Supervisory liability under § 1983 may not be predicated only on the theory of respondeat superior. ... Fortune’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to establish supervisory liability against the defendants and, thus, do not state a plausible § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Ramirez v. Gutierrez · filed 2020-09-22

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Wiseman v. Wilkinson · filed 2020-09-22

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prison supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for an inmate’s suicide without evidence that the supervisor was deliberately indifferent in creating a deficient suicide prevention policy.

Newsome-Goudeau v. State of Louisiana · filed 2020-09-22

In applying the above law to the case at hand, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Goodwin cannot survive because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodwin was deliberately indifferent in crafting DWCC’s suicide prevention policy, meaning that Plaintiff cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation nor can she establish supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must show their personal involvement in a rights violation.

(PC) Dosio v. Odeluga · filed 2020-09-23

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against defendants Odeluga, Kubicki, and Shitiu because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege a causal link between the supervisor and the claimed violation; supervision alone does not establish liability.

(PC) David Roberts v. CSP - SAC · filed 2020-09-23

Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. ... However, plaintiff does not allege how defendants were aware of the actions allegedly taken by the correctional officers against plaintiff. Without this information, the undersigned cannot determine whether plaintiff has stated a potentially colorable claim against defendants. For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to impose individual-capacity damages liability on a supervisor; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Brown v. Cook · filed 2020-09-23

Thus, “liability for supervisory government officials cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior because § 1983 requires individual, personalized liability on the part of each government defendant.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for the unconstitutional acts of subordinates.

Woodard v. Perez-Lugo · filed 2020-09-23

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Dr. Perez-Lugo liable for the actions of others, such as nurses or other employees, his claim fails. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer or supervisor solely for an employee’s actions.

Hughley v. Matthews · filed 2020-09-23

It i well established, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor personally participates or the supervisor’s actions are causally connected to the constitutional deprivation.

Moore v. Calvin · filed 2020-09-23

A supervisor is liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 only if he personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or when there is a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must allege that each official’s own actions violated the Constitution.

Franklin v. Hernandez · filed 2020-09-23

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, violated the Constitution.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged, however, facts that would be sufficient to show that Defendant Howell or Defendant Dreesen played any role in the date that Plaintiff was released from NDOC ... custody or any role in the alleged modification of his parole release date. ... The Court therefore dismisses this equal protection claim without prejudice as to these two defendants.

Section 1983 does not make prison supervisors liable merely for denying a grievance or failing to correct another official’s alleged violation.

Ivy v. Wingo · filed 2020-09-24

And a prison official’s allegedly improper processing of grievances or appeals, without more, does not provide an independent basis for section 1983 liability. ... Thus, because Ivy alleges Defendants Anderson and Pollard’s only involvement was their failure to intervene or correct Wingo and Cottrell’s alleged due process violations, he fails to state a claim against them as well.

Section 1983 requires individual responsibility; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Rouse v. Pittman · filed 2020-09-24

It is well established that supervisory liability or respondeat superior liability is not applicable in Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make administrators liable solely because of their positions; respondeat superior does not apply.

Seidelman v. Conn · filed 2020-09-24

Conn and Nalewajka cannot be held liable based solely on their positions as administrators as the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Johnson 561762 v. Miller · filed 2020-09-24

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for denying a grievance; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor personally participated in the unconstitutional conduct.

Black v. Emanoilidis · filed 2020-09-25

A supervisor’s denial of a grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983 absent allegations that the supervisor personally participated in the purported “unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Stewart v. Precythe · filed 2020-09-25

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a constitutional violation involving the supervisor or an unconstitutional policy attributable to the supervisor.

Delbert Rogers v. Caswell · filed 2020-09-28

Also, he has not alleged a basis for supervisory liability because he neither specifies a constitutional violation in which they were involved nor ascribes to them an unconstitutional policy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on someone solely because of a supervisory role.

(PC) Turner v. Baughman · filed 2020-09-28

Baughman appears to be named as a defendant simply because of his role as a supervisor, which is not a proper basis for liability.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations linking a supervisory defendant to the claimed constitutional violation.

McGhee v. Broomfield · filed 2020-09-28

When a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the supervisory defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for money damages on prison supervisors solely because they oversee operations.

Swisher v. Payne · filed 2020-09-28

There is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and they cannot be held liable for money damages solely because they oversee operations in the prison.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on a single incident without facts showing supervisory indifference to or tacit authorization of misconduct.

Bogues v. Bishop, Warden · filed 2020-09-28

Plaintiff’s assertion regarding this single event does not demonstrate a pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely for denying administrative grievances or failing to act on prisoner complaints.

Hunter 242663 v. Custin · filed 2020-09-28

However, “[t]he ‘denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison superintendent solely because the superintendent supervises officers who allegedly violated a prisoner’s rights.

YINGLING v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-09-28

At best, he or she may have been included as a defendant due to the supervisory role of a superintendent at a prison; however supervisory liability alone is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s misconduct when the supervisor directly participated in it or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in it.

Bey v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2020-09-28

A claim against a supervisor for failure to train or supervise an offending subordinate is actionable if that supervisor (1) “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it” or (2) “implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.”

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable merely because of his position or failure to act.

Cosper v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-28

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot seek to impose liability on Defendant Genovese merely because he is Warden of the facility, as a court may not impose liability under § 1983 based on a failure to act and/or a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a subordinate’s misconduct and facilitates, approves, condones or turns a blind eye to it.

Pickett v. Jones · filed 2020-09-29

Under §1983, a supervisor will be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct if the supervisor knows about the misconduct and facilitates it, approves it, condones it or turns a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff for a subordinate’s conduct.

Jones v. Chief of Police · filed 2020-09-29

The Court overrules this objection because there is no vicarious liability in cases brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior.

McClafferty v. Portage County Board of Commissioners · filed 2020-09-29

Finally, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability to supervisory personnel.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or a sufficient causal connection to it.

Walsh v. King · filed 2020-09-29

Plaintiff, however, has not presented evidence that the Supervisory Defendants were involved in the alleged constitutional violation as required by § 1983 or that Defendants Peters, Gower, Bell, Cain, Gilmore, King, Turner, Aly and Landaverde were involved in a joint conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory liability cannot rest solely on the supervisor’s position.

MALDONADO v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2020-09-29

Next, Mrs. Maldonado’s § 1983 supervisor liability claim against Aguero fails because Aguero never contemporaneously acquiesced in the complained of misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory status.

Fields v. McCloud · filed 2020-09-29

In short, supervisory capacity, standing alone, cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely because of a supervisory position.

Anderson v. Meneses · filed 2020-09-30

A defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely on the basis of supervisory responsibility or position.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisor must be personally involved in the constitutional violation or have a sufficient causal connection to it.

Soria v. Hernandez · filed 2020-09-30

Vicarious liability does not apply to Section 1983 actions; rather, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” ... Here, Soria fails to allege facts to infer any personal involvement by defendant Puentes, or a causal connection between defendant Puentes’ conduct and the alleged assault. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a claim against defendant Puentes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s actions.

Vaught IV v. Oppedisano · filed 2020-09-30

But there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a supervisory position.

Waters v. Akinbayo · filed 2020-09-30

It is well-established that there is no respondeat superior lability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against a warden for alleged constitutional violations under a theory of supervisory liability.

Lawson v. McGee · filed 2020-09-30

2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 19] shall PROCEED against (1) Officer McGee for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm and medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and (2) Warden Bryner for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment under a theory of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor who was personally involved in the wrongful conduct.

Al Momani v. Butler · filed 2020-09-30

A supervisor can be held liable for a Section 1983 claim when the supervisor was personally involved in the wrongful conduct.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor to condone, knowingly acquiesce in, encourage, or directly participate in the specific misconduct before the supervisor can be liable.

Morgan v. Wayne County · filed 2020-09-30

To be liable as a supervisor under § 1983, Sergeant Pendergrass had to have condoned, knowingly acquiesced in, “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some way directly participated in it.”

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged harm; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

GLENN v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-09-30

The Court finds Plaintiff has not asserted any factual allegations that would support that each Administrator and Supervisor defendant had personal involvement in the alleged harm nor that they had knowledge of the of the condition in the Ad-Seg housing unit during the relevant time period.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a superintendent’s position alone does not establish it.

Valverde v. Folks · filed 2020-09-30

First, Plaintiff’s claim that Capra was personally involved in the transfer “by virtue of the provisions of New York Correction Law § 23” is simply an attempt to hold Capra liable based solely on his status as superintendent, which cannot establish personal involvement.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor’s policy directly causes a constitutional injury.

Tolentino v. Xue · filed 2020-09-30

As to defendant Price, the court held that the complaint as supplemented sufficiently states a claim for supervisory liability against Price based on plaintiff’s allegation that she refused to adequately staff the medical department, resulting in the failure of medical staff to respond to Tolentino’s sick call requests for one week.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only when the plaintiff alleges the required elements of that liability.

Carelock v. Boone · filed 2020-09-30

The Magistrate Judge then turned to Defendant Kenny Boone and explained that, while supervisors may be liable for constitutional violations by their subordinates in certain circumstances, here Plaintiff did not allege any of the necessary elements for supervisory liability to attach. ... As the Magistrate Judge properly considered and addressed each of these arguments, the court adopts the recommendations therein.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise requires a causal link to a rights violation and deliberate indifference.

Rose v. Dallas County Texas · filed 2020-09-30

To survive summary judgment against a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff is required to create a dispute of fact that (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate officer; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference. ... This evidence did not raise a fact issue on the issue of King’s, Lang’s and Valdez’s deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor only if the supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Williams v. Vick · filed 2020-10-01

Under §1983, a plaintiff may sue only those individuals who were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires factual allegations connecting a supervisor’s conduct to the alleged denial of care or injury; a conclusory claim that the supervisor knew staffing was inadequate is insufficient.

Brown v. Cook · filed 2020-10-01

The court dismissed Brown’s supervisory liability claims as conclusory. ... He alleged no facts suggesting that the staffing levels were related to the alleged lack of treatment by the other defendants or any alleged injuries suffered by Brown. ... This is the same conclusory statement the court rejected on initial review and his arguments all flow from this conclusory assumption. Reconsideration is therefore not warranted.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal participation. A supervisor is liable for an employee’s constitutional violation only if the supervisor participated in or directed it, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Byers v. Hughs · filed 2020-10-01

However, as defendants point out, liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing of personal participation by each defendant, and a supervisor is not liable for the constitutional violations of employees unless the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff relies solely on his proposed Third Amended Complaint in response to defendants’ motion and presents no evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding Jackson’s or Bowser’s participation in the alleged deprivation of his rights.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for the acts of their subordinates.

Douthit v. State of Texas · filed 2020-10-02

Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the defendant to have some degree of control over the person who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

WADSWORTH v. MSAD 40/RSU 40 · filed 2020-10-02

A plaintiff “must establish that [the defendant] had some degree of control over” the actor who allegedly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... Here, Ms. Wadsworth made no allegation that Mr. Nguyen had control over Mr. Cavanaugh’s actions.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for overseeing a subordinate who violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Burford v. Brun · filed 2020-10-05

Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory, or upon a supervisor’s mere failure to act.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s delay in medical care solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Knight v. Anderson · filed 2020-10-05

Even if Dr. Patterson was a supervisor in the Health Services Unit, that would not make him liable for the delay in treating the plaintiff’s knee.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because they oversee other officers; a claim must allege their personal involvement or knowing indifference that caused the injury.

Newell v. Major Fleming · filed 2020-10-05

In other words, a supervisor cannot be held liable for a civil rights violation perpetrated by another person, simply because the supervisor oversees the other person.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s direct participation, encouragement, authorization, or acquiescence in a constitutional violation for liability.

Farr v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC (PSLC1) · filed 2020-10-06

Thus, Defendant Walker has met his burden to show that he did not directly participate, encourage, authorize, or acquiesce in any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights such that he may be liable for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against him under § 1983.