42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their employees’ conduct; liability requires their own misconduct or maintenance of a policy or custom that violates rights.

JACKSON v. LITTLE · filed 2020-02-06

Although supervisors and high-ranking officials may be held liable for violating a plaintiff s rights if they participated in the wrongdoing by virtue of their own misconduct or their maintenance of a policy or custom that violated plaintiff's rights, supervisors are not subject to liability under § 1983 based solely on the conduct of their employees.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of widespread unconstitutional harassment and fails to correct it.

Massey v. Dorning · filed 2020-02-07

Applying this standard, the court finds that Massey alleges facts that would plausibly establish Sheriff Dorning’s supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the violation.

Inman v. Neal · filed 2020-02-07

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, Warden Neal was not sufficiently involved for liability to attach, and summary judgment must be granted in his favor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts connecting the supervisor’s own conduct to the alleged violation; establishing a program and assigning a subordinate to act is insufficient.

Taylor v. Eastpointe, City of · filed 2020-02-07

Simply alleging that Smith instituted a program to initiate seizure proceedings against vehicles used in OWI offenses and had a subordinate tasked to seize Plaintiff’s vehicle does not state a sufficient claim for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a supervisor’s position.

Walker v. Lawson · filed 2020-02-07

Claims sounding in respondeat superior are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that position.

Caraffa v. CHS · filed 2020-02-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability; a public employee is responsible only for violations the employee causes or participates in.

Mock v. Holliday · filed 2020-02-10

Additionally, Mock should note that there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Stephens v. Ferguson · filed 2020-02-11

However, because Stephens has failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation, any supervisor-liability claim must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant supervises someone who violated a federal right; a supervisor must participate in or direct the violation, or know of it and fail to prevent it.

(PC) Paton v. Brockenborough · filed 2020-02-11

As for defendants Brockenborough and Sacks, it is well-settled that there is no supervisory liability under Section 1983. ... For these reasons, plaintiff has not stated cognizable equal protection claims against defendants Brockenborough and Sacks.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors require factual allegations connecting them to the alleged misconduct.

Cometa v. Doe · filed 2020-02-11

The undersigned readily concludes that Cometa’s SAC fails to state claims to relief that are plausible on their face as to Defendants Woods, Bowen, Shelton, Richards, and Velez because Cometa supplies no actual facts, much less sufficient facts to state any claims against these Defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely because an official holds a position of authority.

Renkowicz v. Mici · filed 2020-02-11

Respondeat superior is inapplicable in the Section 1983 context, thus liability may not attach solely based upon the official’s position of authority.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on rank alone when the supervisor was unaware of the challenged practices.

GILLMORE v. LAMAS · filed 2020-02-11

Additionally, Gillmore acknowledges in his Amended Complaint that Kenneth Eason was unaware of the policies or procedures used to hold Gillmore in the dry cell, yet he seeks to hold him accountable for those procedures, apparently based on his rank. That is not a sufficient basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and a constitutional violation to hold the supervisor liable.

(PC) Washington v. Spearman · filed 2020-02-12

Thus, plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between Spearman’s inaction and his injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely because they supervise others.

Haynes v. Juarez · filed 2020-02-12

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Drain v. Hardin County, Kentucky · filed 2020-02-12

The Court notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability to supervisors.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct based merely on a supervisor’s failure to act.

McNair 513007 v. Pratt · filed 2020-02-12

The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for an alleged due process violation without the supervisor’s involvement or an attributable unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom.

Johnson 151089 v. Thornell · filed 2020-02-13

The facts in the record before the Court do not show that Ryan was involved in the decision to remove Plaintiff from the Step-Down Program, and Plaintiff has not shown that the process of removing him was attributable to any unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs that could be attributed to Defendant Ryan.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory authority.

Lang v. Wilcher · filed 2020-02-13

supervisory authority alone cannot be the basis of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Butcher 136204 v. Washington · filed 2020-02-13

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their positions; a plaintiff must allege their personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Palmer v. Flood · filed 2020-02-13

Accordingly, because it appears that plaintiff seeks to impose liability on these defendants simply because of the supervisory positions they hold, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them are implausible and are thus dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because an employee committed a wrong; the supervisor must have participated in or directed the violation, or known of it and failed to act.

Penunuri v. Davis · filed 2020-02-14

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), which means that a person is not automatically held responsible simply because he or she is a supervisor of an employee who commits a wrong.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in, or causally connected to, the alleged violation.

Snodgrass v. Williams · filed 2020-02-14

Here, any supervisory claim against the RMC Warden fails because Snodgrass has failed to allege any facts suggesting that the RMC Warden was personally involved in, or otherwise causally connected to, any alleged violations of his federal statutory or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing a supervisor’s knowledge of the alleged misconduct; a conclusory failure-to-instruct allegation is insufficient, while alleged notice of prior improper stops can support a claim.

Dreyer v. Hernandez · filed 2020-02-14

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that these Defendants “willfully failed to instruct” is not enough; Plaintiff must allege facts indicating Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff’s past issues with being stopped for the alias warrant or the alleged improper connection between Plaintiff and the alias. ... The Court believes those allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Phillips v. Ferris · filed 2020-02-14

Absent specific allegations of his personal involvement with respect to the removal of her children, Phillips’ § 1983 claim against Ferris fails.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a supervisor solely because of a supervisory role; the supervisor must have been involved in the alleged deprivation.

It, Anthony v. Pesevento · filed 2020-02-18

As an initial matter, however, plaintiff may not proceed against defendants Warden Novak, Security Director Weber or Schmidtketch, since none of them were involved in denying plaintiff any meals. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 674 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting § 1983 actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability; a defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Reiman v. Fatheree · filed 2020-02-18

If he wishes to pursue his claims, Reiman must file an amended complaint describing how defendants, named as a party in the case caption, violated his rights, keeping in mind that in Section 1983 actions, there is no supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisor to allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for the rights violation; naming the supervisor and her position is insufficient.

Briesemeister v. Johnston · filed 2020-02-18

Briesemeister names MSOP Executive Director Nancy Johnston as a party in the caption and identifies her position and address at MSOP, but he does not refer to her anywhere else in the complaint. This is insufficient to allege Johnston’s personal involvement in or direct responsibility for the alleged violations as required to plead a § 1983 claim against a supervisory defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory or administrative position.

Barrett v. Kelly · filed 2020-02-18

Plaintiff cannot hold the defendants liable simply because they held supervisory or administrative positions.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for a constitutional violation; a supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Jones v. Martinez · filed 2020-02-19

Accordingly, a person’s position as a supervisor, on its own, is not enough for a person to be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of administrative oversight of another person’s conduct.

McCloskey v. Welch · filed 2020-02-19

A § 1983 ac- tion cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violation solely because of their supervisory role.

I.V. v. Vacaville Unified School District · filed 2020-02-19

Defendant Shamieh states, correctly, that she cannot be held liable for Klopson’s constitutional violations under § 1983 purely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a rights violation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the violation.

Kehano v. Harrington · filed 2020-02-19

Kehano apparently seeks to hold HCF Warden Harrington liable based solely on his supervisory position as Warden. He alleges no facts personally connecting Warden Harrington to the alleged denial of adequate medical care. Absent personal involvement in a civil rights deprivation, a supervisor can only be found liable if “there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying an administrative grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Treadwell v. King · filed 2020-02-19

With respect to defendants Lindsey, Napier, and Wang, section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not require a supervisor’s overt personal participation when a sufficient causal connection links the supervisor’s conduct to the constitutional violation.

Harper v. Ryan · filed 2020-02-20

Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, overt personal participation in Harper’s healthcare is not required for supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement or a deliberately indifferent policy that causes the constitutional violation; a subordinate’s acts alone do not establish supervisory liability.

GONDOR v. MCKEOWN · filed 2020-02-20

Because Gondor has not alleged facts showing that these defendants were either personally involved in the events giving rise to his claims or that they maintained a policy with deliberate indifference that caused the alleged constitutional violations, we shall dismiss Gondor’s claims against them.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in a constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

Quinette v. Dilmus Reed · filed 2020-02-21

In this Circuit, a supervisor may be held responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by subordinates where either (1) the ... supervisor personally participated in the constitutional violation, or (2) there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional violation. ... Because our caselaw does not lead to a conclusion that Supervisor Defendants violated clearly established law, they may not be held liable for Reed’s unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denies a grievance or fails to act on information in it.

Johnson 807918 v. Ulberg · filed 2020-02-21

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a supervisor’s position or general responsibility for a policy.

Botany, Arthur v. Carr, Kevin · filed 2020-02-24

Plaintiff also cannot seek to hold Carr liable solely because he is the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and had overall responsibility for implementing the policy regarding mailing supplies.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Good 197972 v. Goodell · filed 2020-02-24

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of that position; a supervisor may be liable for failing to act on information about constitutional violations.

Coleman v. Cuomo · filed 2020-02-24

With respect to individuals sued because of their capacity as a supervisor, it is well established that supervisors cannot be liable under section 1983 solely by virtue of being a supervisor, "and [liability] cannot rest on respondeat superior." ... Further, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant Racette failed to take corrective action to prevent the kind of harm that Plaintiff allegedly suffered.

Supervisors are liable under § 1983 only if they were personally involved in the constitutional violation.

TAGGART v. OWENS · filed 2020-02-25

To hold supervisors liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish their personal involvement in the constitutional violation. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has not alleged how defendants were personally involved in depriving him of recreation time.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors, but allegations of a supervisor’s deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise can support an individual-capacity claim.

Nicholas v. Brazos County, Texas · filed 2020-02-26

Under § 1983, supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability. ... The court finds that Nichols’s allegations are sufficient to plausibly state a claim against Kirk. ... The defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim made against Kirk in his individual capacity is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department · filed 2020-02-26

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 makes supervisors liable for their own acts, not automatically for the acts of their subordinates.

FORD v. CALHOUN · filed 2020-02-26

But “[l]iability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal participation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Stanton v. Dunn · filed 2020-02-27

Without personal participation or a causal connection between the supervisor’s action and the alleged constitutional deprivation, there can be no liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Anderson v. Worthington · filed 2020-02-27

Thus, for a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, he or she must have personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct in order to be held liable for the conduct about which the plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denies a grievance or fails to act on its allegations.

Churchwell 21369-040 v. Unknown Party · filed 2020-02-27

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a supervisory claim requires facts showing deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Baptiste v. Executive Office of Health & Human Services · filed 2020-02-28

Supervisory liability under § 1983 is different in kind from vicarious liability. ... Even if we were to assume that the action or inaction by the VOA employees violated the Eighth Amendment, the motion judge properly found that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest that the DYS individual defendants were on notice of, and were deliberately indifferent to, the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participated in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Wright v. Dunne · filed 2020-02-28

In order for Newman to be liable under § 1983 as a supervisor she must have personally been involved in the constitutional violation or there must be a sufficient causal connection between Newman’s alleged wrongful action and the constitutional deprivation. As discussed supra, the SAC does not allege facts indicating that Newman was personally involved in any deliberate indifference to Decedent’s risk of suicide. While the SAC alleges that Newman had some responsibility in supervising Dunne in her duties, it does not allege facts sufficient to meet the required causal connection between Dunne’s deliberate indifference to Decedent’s medical needs and Newman’s action or inaction as a supervisor.

A supervisor cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s actions or a policy when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Turner v. Oklahoma County Board of Comm. · filed 2020-03-02

But Sheriff Whetsel “cannot be held liable in his individual capacity for implementing [OCDC] policies or for the actions of [HM Scott] under a theory of supervisory liability, when there was no violation of [Mr. Turner’s] constitutional rights.” Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009); accord Burke, 935 F.3d at 1010 (stating that a supervisor may not “be held liable based on an unconstitutional policy where there is no evidence of a constitutional violation by any individual subordinate”). We therefore affirm dismissal as to Sheriff Whetsel.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Valenzuela v. Rogers · filed 2020-03-02

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that a supervisor knew of a pattern of constitutional violations and approved or acquiesced in it; denial of administrative appeals alone is insufficient.

(PC) Hernandez v. Marcelo · filed 2020-03-02

Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that Cryer was on notice of a pattern or practice of constitutional violations, such that his denials of Plaintiff’s appeals constituted approval or acquiescence to such practice.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim to proceed at initial screening when notice of repeated failures to administer medication sufficiently alleges the supervisors’ involvement.

Schlosser v. Droughn · filed 2020-03-02

Although only one incident described in the Amended Complaint rises to the level of a potential constitutional violation, the notification about repeated failure to administer proper medication doses is sufficient at this time to permit a claim for supervisory liability to proceed against defendants Jones, Maldonado, Walker, and Tiriolo.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

WILSON v. MYERS · filed 2020-03-02

The only theory of liability against Sheriff Myers is that he is the head administrator and policy maker of the jail. But “[l]iability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “Individual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). Mr. Wilson has not alleged any personal actions or inactions taken by Sheriff Myers concerning the alleged black mold, has not alleged that Sheriff Myers personally knew of the black mold and refused to remedy the situation, or that Sheriff Myers implemented a policy to keep, and not remove, black mold.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Fletcher v. Corcoran · filed 2020-03-02

It is well established, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison supervisors solely because of their supervisory positions.

Dudley v. Brown · filed 2020-03-02

Rather, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Warden Clark and Lucas liable solely because their supervisory positions at DCP, which he cannot do. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Warden Clark and Lucas.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim against a supervisor only if that failure caused a constitutional deprivation.

Ragelis v. Haase · filed 2020-03-03

As a threshold matter, a supervisor can be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise only if that failure caused a constitutional deprivation, see Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007), and the undisputed facts in this case fail to show a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must participate in, direct, or know of and fail to prevent the violation.

Stuckey v. State of California · filed 2020-03-03

Respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a private medical contractor or supervisor without allegations that a policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Pullen v. Brown · filed 2020-03-03

Supervisory officials, including private corporations like Centurion, cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of supervisory liability in the absence of allegations identifying a policy or custom that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor without personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Dodson v. Carter · filed 2020-03-03

Whether Trooper Ennis was the “officer in charge” of the stop, as Mr. Dodson claims, he can’t be held liable under § 1983, even if the search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a jail director knows the jail is failing to protect inmates, abandons a duty to address that failure, and thereby causes a constitutional injury.

Troutman v. Louisville Metro Department of Corrections · filed 2020-03-03

Bolton could only be liable if he knew that LMDC was failing to protect at-risk inmates and abandoned his duty to mitigate those risks; and if abdication of that responsibility caused the deliberate indifference to Charles’s serious medical needs alleged by the plaintiff.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor based on prison policies requires deliberate indifference.

Conway v. Vannoy · filed 2020-03-03

Even assuming that Plaintiff’s extensive list of these Defendants’ failures did constitute specific, identifiable “policies,” (see Am. Pet.¶ 25, Doc. 28), Plaintiff’s claims fail for lack of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor knows of and acquiesces in a subordinate’s constitutional misconduct.

HARRISON v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE · filed 2020-03-03

Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately alleged Fuentes could be liable under a “knowledge and acquiescence” theory, which is “clearly established.”

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ misconduct.

Skinner v. Liller · filed 2020-03-04

There is no vicarious liability, or respondeat superior liability, under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a claim requires their direct participation or a causal connection between their actions and the alleged violation.

Dipietro v. Medical Staff at Fulton County Jail · filed 2020-03-04

DiPietro cannot rely on such vicarious liability to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Smith 267009 v. Burk · filed 2020-03-04

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role; the defendant must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Allen v. Centurion of Mississippi, LLC · filed 2020-03-04

“Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.”

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for creating a policy that causes a constitutional violation, even without personally carrying it out.

Patterson v. Calderin · filed 2020-03-04

“A supervisor may be liable if there exists either(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation . . . Supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”56 Based on the allegations, Dzurenda created the ethnic/tribal enrollment policy that preventedPattersonfrom practicing herreligion.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim may survive summary judgment when material facts remain disputed about the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to potential Eighth Amendment violations.

Bartlett v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-03-04

Namely, the Magistrate Judge stated accurately and in detail the law of the Fourth Circuit as to supervisor liability in § 1983 actions and accurately described the evidence adduced against Defendants by Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge rightfully concluded that issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendant McFadden was deliberately indifferent to potential violations of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable solely because they employ the people who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Thunderhorse v. Tilley · filed 2020-03-05

Supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable in § 1983 cases solely on the basis of their employer-employee relationship.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor in an individual capacity when the supervisor personally knows of and is involved in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Hairston v. Allen · filed 2020-03-05

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Hairston, the court concludes that Hairston has adequately asserted that Sheriff Allen “had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation” of Hairston’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. Wright, 766 F.2d at 850.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or has a causal connection to it.

TALTON v. DEESE · filed 2020-03-05

A supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 if he personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or if a causal connection exists between his acts and the constitutional infirmity.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; merely approving an arrest is insufficient.

Vasquez v. Yadali · filed 2020-03-05

“[A] defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because he [or she] held a high position of authority.” ... To this end, however, the mere fact that Trombley signed off on Plaintiff’s arrest, without more, is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the supervisor must have participated in or knowingly approved the alleged misconduct.

Sales v. Smith · filed 2020-03-05

It is well-established that liability cannot be imposed on supervisory officials under § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; a supervisor is liable only if the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.

Vogt v. Murphy · filed 2020-03-05

To hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, plaintiff “must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct[.]”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on prison officials or private corporations for the conduct of others.

Manley v. Wagner · filed 2020-03-06

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim asserts Waggoner is responsible in her role as Warden for alleged delay in treatment by non-parties, respondeat superior liability does not apply to prison officials or to a private corporation under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because they control the employees who committed the alleged misconduct.

Robison v. Harmon · filed 2020-03-09

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable based on their supervisory authority over other WCRJ staff, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisors to be held liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Howard v. Unknown named CEO · filed 2020-03-09

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on supervisory status; a plaintiff must show the supervisor’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the rights violation.

Walsh v. Gaffney · filed 2020-03-09

Plaintiff, however, has not presented evidence that the Supervisory Defendants were involved in the alleged constitutional violation as required by § 1983. Accordingly, Defendants Peters, Gower, Cain, Bell, Gilmore, and King are dismissed form this case.

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s misconduct only if the supervisor directs or consents to it.

Maus v. Lade · filed 2020-03-10

The only time a supervisor will be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct is if the supervisor directs or consents to the misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for damages on a prison official who did not treat the prisoner and whose handling of appeals did not delay prescribed medication.

(PC) Huckabee v. Medical Staff at CSATF · filed 2020-03-10

Specifically, the magistrate judge found that the undisputed evidence before the court on summary judgment established that: (1) defendant McGuiness did not treat plaintiff; (2) defendant McGuiness’ handling of plaintiff’s inmate appeals did not cause any delay in plaintiff receiving his prescribed medication; and (3) defendant McGuiness is not liable as a matter of law for any of the damages claimed by plaintiff based on supervisory liability. ... Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including plaintiff’s objections, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor personally participates in or directs a violation, or knows of it and fails to prevent it.

(PC) Van Nort v. Martel · filed 2020-03-10

Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under Section 1983 only if the supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or directed the violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. ... Here, plaintiff has not stated that either defendant Martel or defendant Racavey were personally involved in his treatment and care.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ misconduct.

Chaney v. Angle · filed 2020-03-10

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an actual constitutional violation by a subordinate.

Allen v. Eckard · filed 2020-03-11

There are several ways to establish supervisory liability under § 1983. ... However, all of them require a showing that there was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of subordinates.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff personally liable solely because he supervises employees; individual liability requires personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation.

Turner v. Cook County Department Of Corrections · filed 2020-03-11

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so the mere fact that a sheriff is a supervisor is insufficient to impart liability, even if he was negligent.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on respondeat superior.

Robinson v. Shelby County, Kentucky · filed 2020-03-11

Defendants are correct that respondeat superior principles are inapplicable in the context of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Darby v. May · filed 2020-03-11

It is well-established that supervisory officials cannot be liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on a supervisory role alone; a defendant must personally participate in the alleged events.

Peper v. Port Orchard Prison Authorities · filed 2020-03-12

Section § 1983 does not make defendants liable for their supervisory roles alone; it requires that a defendant personally participated in the alleged events.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a failure to supervise or train, a causal link to a rights violation, and deliberate indifference.

Trask v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-03-12

Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that (1) Sheriff Smith either failed to supervise or train the subordinate officials; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of Plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.36 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts to support supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires personal wrongdoing for supervisory liability; a supervisory position alone is insufficient.

Williams v. Corcoran · filed 2020-03-12

And, the supervisory functions of Corcoran and Bishop do not equate to personal wrongdoing, which is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable merely because of their rank; their personal involvement in a constitutional violation must be shown.

Smith v. Dinoia · filed 2020-03-12

Neither Diaz nor Del Treste can be held liable under § 1983 merely because he may have a supervisory or high-ranking role at the Jail.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the constitutional violation or have a sufficient causal connection to it.

Moreno v. V. Hull · filed 2020-03-12

Finally, vicarious liability does not apply to Section 1983 actions; rather, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisor’s personal involvement or a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Valenzuela v. Torres · filed 2020-03-13

Cervantes’ conclusory allegations against defendant Villalobos are, thus, insufficient to establish individual liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because of a subordinate’s misconduct.

Johnson v. Overall · filed 2020-03-13

However, an individual cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely based on their supervisory role of others under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make prison administrators liable solely because they supervise employees; liability requires their own involvement in the constitutional deprivation.

Walker v. Harrington · filed 2020-03-13

Accordingly, Walker cannot bring Section 1983 claims against Atchison and Harrington based solely on their positions as administrators of the facility.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against prison wardens solely because they supervise a prison.

Harris v. Kempker · filed 2020-03-13

To the extent plaintiff claims that the defendants Steele and Wallace are liable merely because they are wardens of their respective prisons, such a respondeat superior claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of responsibility for a prison; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged misconduct.

Sanchez v. Wetzel · filed 2020-03-13

Such allegation does not demonstrate any personal involvement and seeks to impose liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior, which cannot form the basis of a civil rights claim under §1983.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant personally participated in the alleged misconduct; supervisory liability requires personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Ali v. Benning · filed 2020-03-13

Importantly, individual liability will be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. ... Ali fails to meet his burden. He neglects to go beyond the conclusory allegations contained in his complaint and provide evidence of personal direction or of actual knowledge in the underlying conduct of which he complains.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must plead that each supervisor’s own actions caused a constitutional violation.

Haynes v. Chau · filed 2020-03-16

Plaintiff does claim Roberts is responsible to “hire & employ doctors for the operation of State Prisons,” see Compl., at 2, but “[v]icarious liability is inapplicable to … § 1983 suits, [and] a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through [his] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution,” in order to plead a plausible claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Buckler v. Ducheck · filed 2020-03-16

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not make officials liable merely because they supervise someone who violated constitutional rights.

Mendoza v. Inslee · filed 2020-03-17

Moreover, the law is clear that individuals are not liable under civil rights statutes—including §§ 1983 and 1985—merely because they are responsible for their subordinates’ actions.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged violation or has a causal connection to it.

Clark v. Lynne Sheffield, Sheriff · filed 2020-03-17

Supervisory liability occurs only when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisory official’s actions and the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose individual-capacity supervisory liability for drafting a policy when that act is too remote from the alleged constitutional violation.

Carter v. Cain · filed 2020-03-17

The Court finds that the allegation of drafting a policy is too attenuated from the alleged violation in this case to support a supervisory liability claim.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s actions.

Kopatz v. McMullen · filed 2020-03-17

Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Mallory v. Burton · filed 2020-03-18

Thus, for a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, he or she must have personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct in order to be held liable for the conduct about which the plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

OmarHill 851731 v. Bauman · filed 2020-03-18

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a supervisor merely for failing to remedy a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Montgomery v. Whidbee · filed 2020-03-18

A supervisor’s failure to remedy the allegedly unconstitutional behavior of a subordinate does not state a claim under Section 1983, which “must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon a mere failure to act.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 does not make a warden liable for subordinates’ conduct solely because of his supervisory position.

Andrew L Kicking Horse McCarter v. Lake · filed 2020-03-19

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff is purporting to allege a claim against Warden Johnson arising from his role as “chief executive officer of CSP-LAC” (ECF No. 1 at 11), supervisory personnel such as a warden are not liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison official who knows of allegedly unconstitutional medical treatment and fails to use his authority to address it.

Weaver v. Martija · filed 2020-03-19

On this record, summary judgment in favor of Lamb is not appropriate. “[D]eliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.” ... Because the evidence could allow for a finding against Lamb, the question of his liability must be left to the factfinder.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for supervisors who implement or fail to correct unconstitutional policies, but does not impose vicarious liability for their subordinates’ acts.

Oliver v. Gusman · filed 2020-03-19

While it is true that there is no vicarious liability under § 1983, the Moving Defendants’ argument conflates personal involvement with individual liability, which can be imposed for implementing or failing to correct unconstitutional policies.

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely because a defendant supervises someone who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Quintanilla v. Bryson · filed 2020-03-20

Liability under Section 1983 cannot attach based merely on a defendant’s supervisory status.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Gakuba v. Brown · filed 2020-03-20

The doctrine of respondeat superior (blanket supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s position; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Shotwell v. Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland Security · filed 2020-03-23

Again, there are no allegations of Sapp’s personal involvement in this regard and there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim against Sapp will be granted.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged misconduct; reviewing a grievance appeal alone does not establish liability.

SMITH v. ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES LLC · filed 2020-03-23

“Liability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” ... Here, Mr. Smith has alleged only that Warden Zatecky and Assistant Warden Alsip failed to act after reviewing the appeal of his grievance. He has not alleged that these officials were personally involved in refusing to replace the allegedly unsafe hot beverage containers or that either of these individuals retained operational responsibility for doing so. Consequently, at this point, Mr. Smith has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Warden Zatecky and Assistant Warden Alsip.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of widespread constitutional misconduct, responds with deliberate indifference, and that inaction causes injury.

Canter v. Mamboob · filed 2020-03-23

Further, as mentioned previously, Plaintiff has alleged a causal link between the supervisors’ inaction, in spite of their actual or constructive knowledge of her medical needs, and the harm that she suffered from lacking access to her prescribed care and from being retaliated against for requesting it. See, e.g., ECF No. 44-1 ¶¶ 202, 212. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a claim of supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts.

CAMPS v. SCHOLTZ · filed 2020-03-23

A supervisor is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of his or her subordinates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on respondeat superior. ... Here, Plaintiff has not established Warden Scholtz’s knowledge of any unconstitutional acts, nor has he alleged in a nonconclusory manner that Warden Scholtz maintained a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

DeJesus v. Chutney · filed 2020-03-23

Additionally, having determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that a constitutional violation has occurred, there was no wrong to remedy, and no supervisory liability can exist against Defendant Venettozzi.

A § 1983 supervisory liability claim may proceed when the complaint identifies a policy for which the supervisor is responsible and connects it to the alleged injury.

Williams v. Light · filed 2020-03-23

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s pleading, giving it the liberal construction due a pleading filed by a pro se litigant, accepting its allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a § 1983 claim against Director Crow for supervisory liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows or should know of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference or tacit approval, and that inaction causes the injury.

Brown v. Marion Co. Detention Center · filed 2020-03-23

Accordingly, Plaintiff has presented a genuine issue as to whether prison officials such as Page and Woodberry knew of the pervasive risks caused by live exposed wires and nonetheless allowed their subordinates to expose prisoners to such conditions.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional acts based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Benton v. Walker County, Alabama · filed 2020-03-24

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by their subordinates based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability principles.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based on a bare allegation that a supervisor knew of a subordinate’s conduct.

Leen v. Thomas · filed 2020-03-24

Here, the bare accusation that Ramsey knew of Thomas’s actions is insufficient to state a plausible claim that he authorized, directed, or ratified any of the allegedly unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires plausible allegations that the supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to subordinates’ violations of constitutional rights.

Hammond v. Burns · filed 2020-03-24

A supervisor liability claim requires Plaintiffs to “show that the supervisor acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs’ amended claims simply allege that Defendants were responsible for policymaking and have failed to add anything to plausibly allege that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiffs’ supervisor liability claims must fail.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege personal involvement or direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights.

Jones v. Layton · filed 2020-03-24

However, a respondeat superior theory is inapplicable in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Shook v. Giles · filed 2020-03-25

The administrator’s theory against the ADOC officials fails because she has not shown any causal relationship between their actions and Giles’s actions.

Section 1983 does not allow supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Pateman v. The City of White Plains · filed 2020-03-25

It is well established that respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor and a constitutional violation; an unlawful policy or custom can establish that connection.

Alston v. Swarbrick · filed 2020-03-26

For a supervisor to be liable under § 1983, he must be causally connected to the constitutional issue by having an unlawful policy or custom. ... Therefore, no reasonable jury could conclude that the Sheriff was causally connected to any potential violation of Alston’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or her wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Davis v. Wykoff · filed 2020-03-26

Under Section 1983, a supervisor may be liable if a plaintiff demonstrates either: (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. ... Plaintiff’s claims against Gastello in her individual capacity are based solely on her supervisory position as Warden of CMC. Plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating that Gastello was personally involved in or individually caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a civil rights claim against Gastello in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Adger v. Coupe · filed 2020-03-26

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional acts solely because of their supervisory position.

Marshall v. Connolly · filed 2020-03-26

The Warden cannot be held liable under either theory. First, “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates committed a violation; the supervisor must participate in, direct, or know of the violation and fail to prevent it.

Ellis v. Mivev · filed 2020-03-26

First, he fails to state a claim against Dr. Mivev because Ellis fails to allege that Dr. Mivev knew about how the nurses were conducting blood draws or the conditions of Ellis’s particular blood draw (if Ellis’s blood was, in fact, drawn).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor individually liable solely for the alleged misconduct of staff.

Montemayor v. Rudd · filed 2020-03-26

Moreover, a defendant’s role as a supervisor does not make him individually liable for the alleged misdeeds of staff.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting an individual defendant to the alleged constitutional violation; senior officials may also be liable for systemic violations without knowing of a plaintiff’s specific complaints.

Wilson v. Obaisi · filed 2020-03-27

Under § 1983, senior officials can be held liable for systemic constitutional violations—even if they were not personally aware of the plaintiff’s specific complaints.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s personal involvement in the challenged policy or custom.

Owens v. Finney County, Kansas · filed 2020-03-27

To hold Bascue, Welch, and Lawson individually liable, Plaintiff must also show “personal involvement.” Id. at 997.

A supervisory official can be liable under § 1983 only if personally involved in the constitutional deprivation; a supervisory title alone is insufficient.

Lilly v. Town of Lewiston · filed 2020-03-27

A supervisory defendant must have been personally involved in a constitutional deprivation to be held liable under § 1983. ... The only allegation against Salada in the Amended Complaint is that he “is sued individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police” (Dkt. 10 at ¶ 9), which is not sufficient to allege Salada’s personal involvement. ... Accordingly, the claims against Salada must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior; a supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Smith v. Ekwunife · filed 2020-03-27

Further, supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 by respondeat superior.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires facts showing deliberate indifference to a pervasive and unreasonable risk of unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

HINES v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-03-30

At no point do Plaintiffs allege any specific facts as to any prior incidents or conduct that would tend to show Defendants Johnson and Jones were “deliberately indifferent to a pervasive and unreasonable risk of unconstitutional action” by Doe Deputies 1-10. Plaintiffs’ claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 against Defendants Jones and Johnson in their individual capacities must fail.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on a supervisor’s failure to investigate a grievance.

Young v. Muncy · filed 2020-03-30

In addition, an alleged failure of Defendant Thompson to investigate Plaintiff’s grievance is not enough to establish supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a defendant’s conduct to a federal rights violation; supervisory status alone does not state a claim.

Gardner v. Reille · filed 2020-03-30

With respect to Defendants Shrag, Powers, and Maylin, Plaintiff must further describe their actions and how they violated his constitutional rights. Failure to follow prison regulations or procedures fails to state a federal claim. Simply that one of these defendants is a supervisor also fails to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Boone v. Oliveros · filed 2020-03-30

A supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because their subordinates allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Fletcher v. Logsdon · filed 2020-03-30

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct unless the supervisor encouraged or directly participated in it.

Darby v. May · filed 2020-03-30

And to the extent that Plaintiff is claiming Warden May or other defendants are liable in their supervisory capacity for the alleged deliberate indifference of RCI medical staff, a supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 for the alleged unconstitutional conduct of subordinates in the absence allegations that the supervisor encouraged the unconstitutional conduct or directly participated in it.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct; liability requires personal involvement.

Camirand v. Cain · filed 2020-03-30

Superintendent Cain cannot be held accountable under a respondeat superior theory of liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires facts showing that a supervisor participated in, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Kensu v. Borgerding, M.D. · filed 2019-09-30

This objection is frivolous, as Magistrate Judge Davis in fact cited Taylor and addressed whether Mr. Kensu alleged facts to show that Defendants “participated in, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish liability.” ... The Court therefore finds no error in Magistrate Judge Davis’ analysis of Mr. Kensu’s supervisory liability claims.

A Section 1983 claim against a supervisor must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim of supervisory liability.

Winn v. Neven · filed 2019-10-21

The district court properly dismissed Winn’s claims against defendants McDaniel, Neven, and Fierro because Winn failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability).

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a supervisory defendant to the alleged wrongdoing; naming a supervisor alone is insufficient.

ALLEN v. DOE 1-4 · filed 2020-03-02

Although in his complaint he lists a jail supervisor, also a John Doe, as a defendant, Mr. Allen does not make allegations against a supervisor.

Section 1983 supervisory liability fails when there is no underlying liability for the alleged constitutional violation.

Langley v. Lye · filed 2020-03-31

Finally, the Court turns to the claims against Defendant Warden, who Plaintiff claims should be held liable under a theory of supervisor liability in her capacity as a Health Care Administer. However, as the Court has found no underlying liability, Plaintiff’s theory necessarily fails.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct solely because of their supervisory role.

Udd v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2020-03-31

Moreover, even if Detective Stanley had included false statements in the search warrant affidavit, Roberts cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory for Detective Stanley’s actions.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when the allegations establish the supervisor’s knowledge of and participation in the alleged wrongdoing.

ZISA v. HAVILAND · filed 2020-03-31

These allegations are sufficient to establish knowledge and participation in the alleged wrongdoing that is necessary to plead a supervisory liability claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct solely because of their supervisory roles.

Lewis v. Phillips · filed 2020-03-31

Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor for excessive force when no subordinate violated the Constitution.

Evans (ID 68035) v. Schnurr · filed 2020-04-01

Because Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional violation against any Defendant, a supervisor cannot have any liability.