42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for an employee’s act to prove a constitutional violation by the employee and a municipal policy or custom that caused it.

Estate of Bleck v. City of Alamosa · filed 2013-11-04

“A plaintiff suing a municipality under section 1983 for the acts of one of its employees must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to identify a county policy or custom that caused the injury.

Alston v. Pepper · filed 2013-11-04

To state a § 1983. claim against Kent County, plaintiff must identify a county policy or custom that caused the his injury. ... The complaint has no such allegations and, therefore, the court will dismiss the § 1983 claim against Kent County.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plead a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused the alleged violation.

Yancey v. St. Elizabeths Hospital · filed 2013-11-06

Even if the Court were to assume that such a constitutional violation had occurred, however, Dr. Yancey’s claims against the District cannot succeed, as she has failed to adequately plead a municipal custom, policy or practice leading to the purported violation.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or practice that caused the constitutional violation for a school district to be liable.

Daniels v. School District · filed 2013-11-07

However, it remains a necessary prerequisite to municipal liability under § 1983 that the offending personnel were operating under an official policy or practice. ... There is simply no evidence in the record that an official School District policy or practice was the “moving force” behind any of the events complained of in this case.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to cause the constitutional injury before the municipality can be held liable.

duBois v. Payne County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-11-08

We agree with the district court and the defendants that there is simply no evidence that any policy or custom of PCJ was the moving force behind, or caused or enabled, Peter’s suicide.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because its employees violated municipal policy.

Hudson v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2013-11-13

Thus, Hudson cannot establish municipal liability under § 1983 by merely alleging that municipal employees violated the City’s policy.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

MOORE v. COUNTY OF BUTTE · filed 2013-11-14

Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where an official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort.

Section 1983 permits a school district to be held liable when an alleged failure to train its employees causes a constitutional deprivation.

Moeck v. Pleasant Valley School District · filed 2013-11-14

We find that plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to support causation based upon a failure to train policy. Read in conjunction with plaintiffs factual averments, these allegations may impose municipal liability against the School District.

Section 1983 provides no basis for municipal liability when the officers did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Clark v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 2013-11-15

Because the officers did not violate the Clarks’ constitutional rights, there is no basis for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a federal marshal’s conduct when he acts under color of federal law rather than municipal authority.

Johnson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2013-11-15

Because Dillard, as Superior Court Marshal, was at all times a federal official acting under color of federal law, the organic theory provides no basis for finding the District liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability even if no employee is found individually liable.

Van Orden v. Caribou County · filed 2013-11-15

In addition to predicating municipal liability on a showing that an Individual Defendant violated Bannister’s constitutional rights, a municipality may be liable under Monell, even if no employee is found individually liable.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a city policy or widespread practice caused the injury to hold the city liable.

Davenport v. Dovgin · filed 2013-11-15

But Judge Coleman properly granted summary judgement to the City because Davenport merely speculated that her injuries resulted from a City policy or widespread practice; instead, she must produce some evidence so showing.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable to show that an official policy was a moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Jones v. Houston Independent School District Board of Trustees · filed 2013-11-15

Because Jones has failed to identify any specific evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of fact that there was an official HISD policy that was a moving force for a constitutional wrong against him, summary judgment is appropriate in Defendants’ favor on this additional ground.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Sampson v. City of Brunswick · filed 2013-11-18

In this case, the City and County cannot be liable because, as we’ve already discussed, we’ve identified no violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by ... the individual Defendants.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a governmental policy or custom to be the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Maxfield v. Bressler · filed 2013-11-18

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff successfully alleged an unofficial custom of disregarding First Amendment rights, the Amended Complaint contains no facts to suggest that the Board of Commissioners’ alleged custom was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires an unconstitutional custom or policy; training officers to follow lawful investigatory stop procedures does not establish one.

Prall v. City of Boston · filed 2013-11-18

The custom or policy required to sustain a § 1983 claim is absent when Prall faults the City for training officers to comply with Terry stop procedures.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a public official’s act when an official municipal policy or a final policymaker caused the constitutional injury.

Massena v. Bronstein · filed 2013-11-19

In order to prevail against a municipality based on the acts of a public official, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the constitutional injury was caused “pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), or by a municipal policymaker with “final policymaking power” over the challenged action, Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2008).

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Howard v. City of Demopolis · filed 2013-11-25

Moreover, the policy, custom, or practice must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation and not just “tangentially related to a constitutional deprivation.” ... Moreover, the Howards present no evidence that the absence of a written policy regarding use of force when interacting with the mentally ill, was the “moving force” behind Sergeant Bryant’s actions.

Section 1983 does not make a city vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional violations; a city may be liable only for its own actions.

Boyd v. City of Houston, Texas, et a · filed 2013-11-26

When a city’s action violates constitutional rights, victims of that action may seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but § 1983 does not impose vicarious liability. The city may be held liable only for its own actions.

Section 1983 requires evidence that an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation to hold a city liable for its officers’ conduct.

Carpenter v. City of New York · filed 2013-11-27

Regarding the excessive force claims, even though these claims survive summary judgment, plaintiffs have introduced no evidence that the excessive force allegedly used by the individual defendants is part of an “official policy or custom” of the City of New York. Accordingly, the Monell claims are dismissed in their entirety.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Hayes v. County of San Diego · filed 2013-12-02

Because we agree that there was no violation of Appellant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm summary judgment to the County as to any Monell claim made on this basis.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its own policy or custom causes the constitutional injury; liability cannot rest solely on an employee’s conduct.

Page v. Mancuso · filed 2013-12-04

Instead, under the rule promulgated in Monell, a city can only be held liable under § 1983—either in its role as a supervisor of the employees who undertake unconstitutional actions or directly—when its own “policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury[.]” 436 U.S. at 694.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when decisions by its policymaking authorities directly cause a constitutional deprivation.

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2013-12-04

The Court finds that the combination of contracting, funding, legislating, and monitoring decisions made by the policymaking authorities for the Cities directly caused the truncated case handling procedures that have deprived indigent criminal defendants in Mount Vernon and Burlington of private attorney/client consultation, reasonable investigation and advocacy, and the adversarial testing of the prosecutor’s case. The Cities are therefore liable under § 1983 for the systemic Sixth Amendment violation proved by plaintiffs.

A § 1983 claim based on a municipality’s supervision policies requires showing that the municipality was aware of the risks those policies posed and failed to act.

Rankins v. County of Milwaukee · filed 2013-12-05

And even if Rankins had identified such an exception, Thomas (like Rankins) did not report her assault until the next morning, and thus her evidence would not help Rankins establish that the County should have been aware of the risks posed by its supervision policies and yet failed to act (as required for Rankins to succeed on a Monell claim).

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom as the basis for a claim against a municipality.

Chick v. County of Suffolk · filed 2013-12-06

Nor does the amended complaint allege actions on the part of the individual defendants establishing a municipal policy or custom that would serve as the basis for a Section 1983 claim against the municipality.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, custom, or final policymaker is responsible for the wrongful action.

Kocher v. Borough Larksville · filed 2013-12-10

To establish his claim, Kocher must prove the Borough was responsible for the wrongful action, either because the action was made pursuant to an official ... policy, custom, or practice of the Borough, or because it was undertaken or ratified by a final policymaker.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing the District of Columbia to allege that a District custom or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Colbert v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-12-13

To state a claim against the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a custom or policy of the District of Columbia caused the constitutional violation.

A county cannot be liable under § 1983 for failure to train its agents when the plaintiff has not established an underlying constitutional violation by an agent.

Corring v. Pearl River County Jail Staff, e · filed 2013-12-20

Additionally, as Corring failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation by Lumpkin, i.e., deliberate indifference by her to his serious medical needs, Pearl River County cannot be liable on his theory that it had an official policy of failing to train its agents.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the alleged constitutional violation resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Jones v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-20

Even if an underlying constitutional violation did occur, to hold the City and the District Attorney liable plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the result of a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal and supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Nixon ex rel. A.N. v. Hardin County Board of Education · filed 2013-12-27

In this case, the Plaintiff in her responsive brief identifies the constitutional violation supporting her municipal/supervisor liability claim as that alleged under the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the Court’s dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention claim, to the extent it is grounded in federal law, must also fail.

A § 1983 claim based on a municipality’s acquiescence in unconstitutional conditions requires evidence of a widespread, persistent practice known to supervisors.

Johnson-Schmitt v. Robinson · filed 2013-12-30

Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege unconstitutional conditions that “were sufficiently widespread and persistent to support a finding that they constituted a custom, policy, or usage of which supervisory authorities must have been aware.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s acts only when the official has final policymaking authority over those acts.

Eisenhour v. Weber County · filed 2013-12-31

“[A] municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for the acts of a municipal official only when the official possesses ‘final policymaking authority’ to establish municipal policy with respect to the acts in question.”

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that an official policy or custom caused the alleged injury to hold a county liable.

Duffie v. Wichita County · filed 2013-12-31

Without enough facts to permit the inference of an official custom or policy that resulted in Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, their claims against Wichita County (and the Officer Defendants in their official capacities) necessarily fail.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional deprivation results from its official policy or governmental custom.

Adams v. City of Federal Way · filed 2014-01-02

The district court properly dismissed Adams’s claims against the City of Federal Way because Adams failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants’ actions “implement[ed] or execute[d] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the City, or that any deprivation was inflicted “pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

A § 1983 excessive force claim based on a municipal policy or custom fails when the plaintiff names neither the town nor the police chief as a defendant.

Lamonds v. J. T. Pierce · filed 2014-01-06

Turning to the excessive force claim, Lamonds asserts that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated as the result of ... an official policy or custom of the municipality or the police department. However, she names neither the town nor the police chief as a defendant. Thus, this claim must fail.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a deliberate indifference theory without facts supporting an underlying constitutional violation and a risk that its agents will violate constitutional rights.

Fouch v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-01-08

Because plaintiff has not pled that the District’s agents violated his constitutional rights or are likely to violate anyone else’s, plaintiff’s emphasis on the “deliberate indifference” theory cannot save his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for municipal liability based on employees’ conduct.

Cavanaugh v. McBride · filed 2014-01-09

And finally, because Cavanaugh has not demonstrated that McBride or Nowicki violated his constitutional rights, his claims against Otsego County are also without merit and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not support municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Dillard v. Clark · filed 2014-01-10

And absent an underlying violation, her § 1983 claims for municipal liability were indeed moot.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly show that a city policy caused a constitutional deprivation.

Freeman v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2014-01-15

The plaintiff has, therefore, pled facts sufficient to plausibly allege that the City’s policies were the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation that he suffered.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation; allegations that the city ignored repeated complaints of illegal searches can sufficiently plead such a claim.

Hoskin v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2014-01-15

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus may be held liable for violations of civil rights, so long as the municipality has adopted or otherwise promulgated a policy or custom that violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. ... The plaintiff has, therefore, pled facts sufficient to plausibly allege that the City’s policies were the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation that he suffered.

An official capacity § 1983 claim against a police chief requires the plaintiff to show that deliberate municipal conduct was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

human v. Colarusso, Jr., et al. · filed 2014-01-16

Similarly, to state an official capacity claim against a police chief, for the purpose of holding the municipality liable, the plaintiff "bears the burden of showing that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force" behind the constitutional violation. ... Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to warrant service of an official capacity claim against Chief Colarusso, with respect to the allegations of police harassment and intimidation, retaliatory arrest, and retaliatory prosecution.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Garressa Smith v. Gransden · filed 2014-01-16

Municipal liability under § 1983 must be based on the “execution of a government‟s policy or custom” that actually results in a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an adequately alleged underlying constitutional violation.

Kuder v. City of Rochester · filed 2014-01-16

Initially, having determined that plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional violation that might trigger municipal liability, the Court is constrained to conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s unconstitutional acts when a municipal custom or policy caused the violation.

Reyes v. City of New York · filed 2014-01-16

Accordingly, in order to establish the liability of a municipality in an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by a municipal employee, a plaintiff must establish that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to hold a municipality liable for employees’ rights violations arising from a facially lawful custom.

Boyd v. City of Houston, Texas, et a · filed 2014-01-20

This principle complements the principle that a municipality can be held liable if—and only if—it is the entity doing the acting. That is a city may act by directing a facially lawful raid, but absent proof of deliberate indifference, it cannot be held liable for its employees’ actions during that raid where those actions are alleged to be due to its custom.

Section 1983 does not permit county liability on a failure-to-train theory when the plaintiff fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation by the county's agent.

Corring v. Pearl River County Jail Staff, e · filed 2014-01-20

Additionally, as Corring failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation by Lumpkin, i.e., deliberate indifference by her to his serious medical needs, Pearl River County cannot be liable on his theory that it had an official policy of failing to train its agents.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when the plaintiff has not alleged an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 2014-01-22

Because he has not alleged a valid underlying constitutional deprivation, his claim against New York City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), must also fail.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policy or custom causes the plaintiff's injury.

Griffin v. Hillsborough, et al. · filed 2014-01-29

"[A] plaintiff who brings a section 1983 action against a municipality bears the burden of showing that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged. Such a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury." ... The facts alleged by Griffin as to the policies interposed by defendants to delay or deny treatment of Griffin's knee and kidney stones warrant service of his claims against Hillsborough County, and ... Dr. Masewic, Nurse Ryan, and Superintendent Dionne, all in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for municipal liability.

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo · filed 2014-01-31

Chavez has not, however, demonstrated the first element of a municipal liability claim — that an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation. Without a constitutional violation, the municipal liability claim fails.

A principal’s decision to terminate a teacher cannot establish municipal liability under § 1983 when the decision is subject to appeal to the Chancellor and the Department of Education.

Fierro v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2014-02-04

However, with respect to termination of teachers’ employment, principals do not have final decisional authority; their decisions are subject to appeal to the Chancellor and the DOE.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional or statutory rights violation caused by a local government custom or practice.

Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio · filed 2014-02-06

But “[l]iability against [a local government] arises only if it violated a constitutional or statutory right through a custom or practice of doing so.” Hidden Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519, 523 (6th Cir. 2013). Because we conclude that Reed suffered no violation of his constitutional rights, Reed’s claims against Franklin County fail. His Monell claims are therefore without merit.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; allegations of repeated similar misconduct can plausibly establish that policy or custom at the pleading stage.

Reyes v. County of Suffolk · filed 2014-02-06

The Plaintiffs Complaint also contains more than three examples of instances involving other motor vehicle owners where the County-Appointed Magistrates and Assistant County Attorneys applied a less stringent standard than the one laid out by Krimstock. Thus, the Plaintiffs satisfactorily pleads Monell liability for his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural due process claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policies or customs cause a violation of constitutional rights.

Schnitter v. City of Rochester · filed 2014-02-07

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, established that, pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff may assert claims against a municipality when the municipality’s policies have led to violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, either by failure to train its employees or by sanctioning policies or customs that lead to such violations. ... Schnitter does not allege specific facts supporting a claim that the City of Rochester violated his rights under either of these theories.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead a policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Fasciana v. County of Suffolk · filed 2014-02-07

To properly plead a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) an official policy or cus-, tom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” ... Accordingly, the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for municipal liability is DENIED.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when a constitutional injury results from its custom, policy, or practice; a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority can satisfy that requirement.

Shelley v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2014-02-07

Under Monell, a municipality like San Joaquin County cannot be found liable for actions of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory, and is liable under § 1983 only if the constitutional injury was the result of a “custom, policy, or practice.” However, a “single decision may satisfy Monell’s municipal policy requirement” if that decision was “properly made by one of the municipality’s authorized decision makers,” i.e., “by an official who ‘possesses final authority to establish a municipal policy with respect to the challenged action.’ ” Gobel v. Maricopa Cnty., 867 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (9th Cir.1989) (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)).

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely for employing an officer; the plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Parker v. Chard · filed 2014-02-10

It is well-established that a governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ... And, Parker has not pled any facts that show there was any municipal policy or custom that resulted in her alleged constitutional violations. As a result, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Parker’s Count V claims against the City of Minneapolis.

A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when its failure to train or supervise employees amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Crews v. County of Nassau · filed 2014-02-11

For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of fact as to the County’s alleged failure to train and/or supervise Det. Lemma that precludes summary judgment on the municipal liability claim.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim is plausibly pleaded when factual allegations connect a municipal policy or custom to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Bohannon v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2014-02-11

Doing so, and for the reasons more fully discussed above, the Court determines that the plaintiff has alleged facts that state a Monell claim against the City that is plausible on its face. The evidence adduced during discovery may ultimately prove that this is not the case, but that is an inquiry for another day. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is obliged to deny the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the plaintiffs Monell claim against the City.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the alleged constitutional violation implements its policy or custom.

Dennis v. DeJong · filed 2014-02-12

The Dennises’ claims against the County fail because, as the District Court recognized, and as the Dennises do not challenge on appeal, they set forth no evidence to establish (1) that the alleged misrepresentations in the ex parte memorandum constituted policy or custom of the County or that the statements were made by a policy-making official, or (2) that it was the policy of the County to require a full home study of the parents’ preferred caregivers when the parents and the preferred caregivers maintain the parents’ innocence.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train when the allegedly violated constitutional right was not clearly established.

Brady ex rel. Estate of Murray v. City of Westland · filed 2014-02-18

This reasoning is fully applicable here, where Plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Hagans, has failed as a matter of law to demonstrate a violation of Mr. Murray’s clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force. It follows that the Defendant City is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs § 1983 claim of municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Bowens v. Superintendant of Miami South Beach Police Department · filed 2014-02-19

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only where it causes the constitutional violation at issue, which means Bowens was required to plead a policy, practice, or custom that caused the violations he alleged.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school board for retaliation based on its policy, widespread custom, or a constitutional injury caused or ratified by a final policymaker.

Cooksey v. Board of Education · filed 2014-02-19

CPS can be held liable for retaliation under section 1983 through “(1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread practice constituting custom or usage; or (3) a constitutional injury caused or ratified by a person with final policymaking authority.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to identify a policy or custom and show that it caused the injury.

Jordan v. City of Detroit · filed 2014-02-21

To succeed on a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [County] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.”

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for ratification merely because a city fails to discipline officers for allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francis · filed 2014-02-21

The mere failure to discipline Reynolds and Holder does not amount to ratification of their allegedly unconstitutional actions.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failing to prevent a subordinate’s misconduct requires deliberate indifference to that misconduct.

Kramer v. Wasatch County Sheriff's Office · filed 2014-02-25

Where a plaintiff seeks to create § 1983 municipal liability for failing to prevent the bad acts of a subordinate, the plaintiff must show that the municipality evidenced “deliberate indifference” to the impermissible conduct.

Section 1983 permits potential municipal liability when an alleged constitutional violation involves a city policymaker.

Parrish v. City of Wilmington · filed 2014-02-28

Finally, the Court finds no question that Riley, as Mayor of Wilmington, was a “policy-maker” for purposes of imposing potential liability on the City.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a policy when no officer violated the plaintiff’s rights and the policy caused no injury.

Mocek v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2014-02-28

Absent a violation of his legally cognizable rights, even if the City or the AAPD had “in force and effect a policy, practice, or custom” of violating individual rights, such a policy was not the proximate or legal cause of any injury to Mocek.

Section 1983 requires an official custom or policy for county liability and personal involvement or a causal connection for supervisory liability.

Jones v. Baca · filed 2014-03-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment because, even assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any such constitutional deprivation resulted from an official county custom or policy, whether Baca was personally involved in any constitutional violation, or whether there was a causal connection between Baca’s conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an alleged constitutional violation results from an official custom, policy, or failure to train.

Gustafson v. City of West Richland · filed 2014-03-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Gustafson’s § 1983 claims against the City of West Richland because Gustafson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or failure to train.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for constitutional violations occurring pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Collins v. Barber · filed 2014-03-03

The district court properly dismissed Collins’s claims against the City of Los Angeles because Collins failed to allege the existence of any unconstitutional policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; two strip searches alone do not establish such a policy or custom.

Glassman v. The City of New York · filed 2014-03-04

Municipalities are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” ... We agree with the district court that Glassman has not adduced sufficient evidence of a municipal policy or custom of unconstitutional arrestee strip searches to survive a motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Galarza v. Szalczyk · filed 2014-03-04

Galarza’s claims against Lehigh County arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, Galarza must plead two elements: first, that he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, and, second that the deprivation of those rights was caused by an official government policy or custom.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Gillis v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2014-03-04

Hall and Gillis do not prevail on their supervisory and municipal liability claims because we find no underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires an employee to have acted under color of law before a city can be held liable for that employee’s conduct.

Jarret Fate v. Harper · filed 2014-03-05

We find no error in the District Court’s instruction requiring the jury to find that Detective Walker acted under color of law before imposing liability against the City. Section 1983 affords a remedy for constitutional deprivations brought about by state actors.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a city's own policies or customs, including those established by a police chief with delegated policymaking authority.

Backe v. City of Galveston · filed 2014-03-05

This Court is similarly persuaded on the summary judgment record that the Chief of the Galveston Police Department is properly considered a policymaker for the City of Galveston in this case.

A Section 1983 municipal liability claim requires evidence of a municipal pattern and practice sufficient to support the claim.

Garcia v. City of New York · filed 2014-03-06

The motion court also correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish a claim for municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983 (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658 [1978]). Plaintiff failed to establish any municipal pattern and practice sufficient to support such a claim, and failed to show that supervisory police officials were grossly negligent or otherwise acted with “deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s rights (see Prowisor v Bon-Ton, Inc., 426 F Supp 2d 165, 174 [SD NY 2006], affd 232 Fed Appx 26 [2d Cir 2007]; Pendleton v City of New York, 44 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2007]).

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a practice that causes a constitutional violation unless the municipality was deliberately indifferent to others’ rights.

Jones v. Norton · filed 2014-03-07

In the absence of any clear legal guidance cited by the Plaintiffs, and given the motivation behind the practice, the County’s choice to implement such a practice was not deliberately indifferent to others’ rights. Accordingly, Uintah County is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when a constitutional violation results from its policy, custom, practice, failure to train, or an act attributable to a municipal policymaker.

Lieberman v. City of Rochester · filed 2014-03-07

Plaintiffs fail to establish that the individual defendants’ actions were the result of any policy or failure to train, or that any of the individual defendants exercised poli-cymaking authority such that this single episode could possibly be attributed to the municipal authority.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim can proceed when officials are plausibly alleged to have final policymaking authority over the challenged actions.

Spalding v. City of Chicago · filed 2014-03-10

That greatly overreads Auriemma, which holds only that the City Council is the sole policymaker with respect to the particular employment decisions challenged in that case — those based on considerations (race and politics) made unlawful by ordinance. ... Accordingly, the Monell claim survives dismissal.

A county is entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 claim based on inadequate training or supervision when it presents evidence that its policies were reasonable and the plaintiff offers no contrary evidence.

Penigar Ex Rel. Porter v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2014-03-11

Penigar claimed his civil rights were violated as a result of inadequate training and supervision policies of the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department on the use of tasers. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In support of its motion for summary judgment, the County submitted evidence that its training and supervision policies were reasonable. Penigar did not offer any evidence to the contrary, nor did he designate an expert on the subject. Penigar also failed to ask the district court to extend the discovery deadline until after it had passed. Because Penigar failed to demonstrate the presence of an issue of genuine material fact for trial, summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when a local entity merely follows a mandatory state law without making an independent policy decision.

Snyder v. J. King etal · filed 2014-03-11

When state law unequivocally instructs a municipal entity to produce binary outcome X if condition Y occurs, we cannot say that the municipal entity’s “decision” to follow that directive involves the exercise of any meaningful independent discretion, let alone final policymaking authority. ... It is the statutory directive, not the follow-through, which causes the harm of which the plaintiff complains.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom for a claim against a municipality, whether the plaintiff seeks damages or prospective relief.

Snyder v. J. King · filed 2014-03-11

The Supreme Court has squarely held that Monell’s “policy or custom” requirement applies in Section 1983 cases irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a Monell claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

Harris v. New Orleans Police Depart · filed 2014-03-12

Since Appellants have not shown that there was a constitutional violation in this case, the district court properly dismissed the Monell claim against the City of New Orleans.

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom to hold a county liable; a single failure to follow county policy is insufficient.

Rivera v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-03-12

That officials apparently failed to implement that policy properly in this one instance is not sufficient for Los Angeles County to be liable. A single instance is not sufficient to show that a “practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s acts only when the official has final policymaking authority over those acts.

Eisenhour v. Weber County · filed 2014-03-12

“[A] municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for the acts of a municipal official only when the official possesses ‘final policymaking authority’ to establish municipal policy with respect to the acts in question.” ... We apply this test to the two types of alleged acts: (1) Judge Storey’s inappropriate touching, and (2) his establishment of a rule that Ms. Eisenhour had to obtain prior approval before missing work.

A zoning ordinance qualifies as an official municipal policy for purposes of prospective relief under § 1983.

Mhany Management Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City · filed 2014-03-17

Rather, the Court finds that the enactment of a zoning ordinance, such as R-T zoning, qualifies as “an official policy or its equivalent” adopted by the Village.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation is caused by an express policy, a widespread custom or practice, or a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Estate of Brown v. Thomas · filed 2014-03-17

Even if a constitutional violation is shown, however, the County cannot be liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by (1) an express municipal policy; (2). a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal agent with “final policymaking authority.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that an official municipal policy caused the constitutional injury.

Jackson v. City of New York · filed 2014-03-17

To “prevail on a claim against a municipality under section 1983 based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2008).

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy, practice, or custom to hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation.

Carter v. Columbus Consolidated Government · filed 2014-03-18

Because the district court correctly determined that Mr. Carter failed to produce evidence of any policy, practice, or custom sufficient to create a factual dispute as to the City’s liability under § 1983, we need not decide whether Mr. Carter’s constitutional rights were violated by the arrest.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for police officers’ conduct when the city does not control their department or employ them.

Estate of Anderson v. Strohman · filed 2014-03-19

The Court concludes, based on governing Maryland and federal law, that a § 1983 claim cannot be brought against the City for Baltimore police officer conduct because it does not sufficiently control the BPD and cannot be considered to employ Baltimore police officers.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for an employee’s misconduct solely because it employs that person; liability requires a board policy or custom that caused the deprivation.

Thorpe ex rel. D.T. v. Breathitt County Board of Education · filed 2014-03-21

However, because the theory of respondeat superior is unavailable in Section 1983 claims, Thorpe has failed to establish that the Board violated D.T.’s constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when a final policymaker’s decision causes the alleged violation of rights.

Bretemps v. Town of Brentwood · filed 2014-03-24

Here, a jury could find that Wright, in her capacity as Mayor, set municipal policy with respect to law enforcement and ordered Risik to scrutinize or retaliate against Bretemps.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional injury is caused by an official policy or custom.

Lovette-Cephus v. Village of Park Forest · filed 2014-03-25

A municipal entity can be held liable under Section 1983 only when the municipal entity “violates constitutional rights via an official policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires proof of a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality or an official sued in an official capacity liable.

Kellman v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2014-03-26

This evidence does not permit a finding that MTA had a policy or custom of discrimination. ... Therefore, Kellman is unable to state claims against MTA or MeConville in his official capacity under §§ 1981 or 1983, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims is GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not make a school district or school board liable for an employee’s conduct solely because it employed that person.

Lawrence v. School District No. 1 · filed 2014-03-28

Neither can the school district and board be held liable simply because they employ Dr. Greer. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court expressly held that municipal defendants — public school districts and school boards included — can’t be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely because they employ a person who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality for deprivation of a federal right to be based on the municipality’s official policy or custom.

Harris v. City of Balch Springs · filed 2014-03-28

It is well-settled law that a section 1983 lawsuit brought against a municipality for the deprivation of a constitutional or federally protected right must be based upon an official policy or custom of that municipality.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if an officer violated a constitutional right and a municipal policy or custom directly caused the injury.

Tapia v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2014-03-31

As the Court has explained, to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) that an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation; (ii) that a municipal policy or custom exists; and (in) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged. ... The Plaintiffs have pointed to no such custom or policy. Accordingly, the Court finds that the City of Albuquerque is not subject to liability for the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an official’s actions unless the official has final policymaking authority over the challenged action or the injury results from a municipal policy.

Fotopolous v. Board of Fire Commissioners of the Hicksville Fire District · filed 2014-03-31

Because they do not have this authority, Lang, Korona and Sullivan are not final policymakers in this area, and as such, their actions of suspending Plaintiff or forcing or coercing Plaintiffs resignation cannot subject Defendants, as municipal entities, to liability.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy caused the alleged constitutional violation to hold a city liable.

Hollinghead v. City of York · filed 2014-03-31

In this case, the plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence to show that the City maintained policies that were the moving force behind any of the constitutional violations alleged in this case.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipality’s policies or practices deprive people of federal rights.

Lewis ex rel. Estate of Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2014-03-31

Where a municipality’s policies or practices deprive individuals of their federal rights, the municipality may be held liable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality or an official in an official capacity to prove that a municipal policy caused the constitutional injury.

Rodriguez v. City of Rochester · filed 2014-03-31

To mount a successful § 1983 action against a municipality or municipal employee sued in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff is required to establish: (1) the actions were taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional violation only when an official policy or custom caused the injury.

Key v. Shelby County · filed 2014-04-01

In order to hold a municipal entity like Shelby County liable for constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court must determine “(1) whether [Key’s] harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether [Shelby County] is responsible for that violation.” ... In sum, Key must connect the alleged constitutional violations to an official SCSO policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom directly causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Keahey v. Township of Bethel · filed 2014-04-01

A party seeking to impose liability under § 1983 against a municipality must show that his injury was caused by either a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or a “governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

A municipality may face liability under § 1983 when evidence of a widespread custom and its causal role in a constitutional injury creates a triable issue of fact.

Doe v. City of San Diego · filed 2014-04-01

Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of a code of silence that exists within the SDPD, and which could constitute the moving .force behind her constitutional injuries.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Young v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2014-04-04

Finally, because Young did not present evidence that she suffered a constitutional violation, summary judgment was appropriate on her claims for supervisory liability, municipal liability, and conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 Monell liability cannot survive when the underlying Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim fails.

Gangstee v. County of Sacramento · filed 2014-04-07

Our decision on Gangstee’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim is fatal to Gangstee’s additional § 1983 claims for Monell liability.

A city cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for an alleged injury when its officials committed no constitutional violation.

Ashcraft v. City of Vicksburg · filed 2014-04-08

Lastly, because we find that Chief Deputy Dolan’s traffic stop was valid and that neither his actions nor those of Mayor Winfield violated Ms. Ashcraft’s constitutional rights, the City of Vicksburg cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for Ms. Ashcraft’s alleged injury.

Section 1983 liability based on an employee’s decision requires that employee to have final policymaking authority under state law.

Barrett v. Board of Education · filed 2014-04-09

Because none of the school board officials and employees named in the complaint are authorized under state law to exercise final policymaking authority for the Board, the acts and decisions of the individual defendants cannot be legally said to represent official Board policy and thus cannot provide the basis for the Board’s liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when allegations of supervisory officers’ direct involvement and similar prior attacks plausibly establish a policy or custom and causation.

Rosembert v. Borough of East Lansdowne · filed 2014-04-09

Viewing the facts alleged in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, supervisory officers were directly involved in using an excessive amount of force in arresting Plaintiff. Particularly in light of the alleged history of officer attacks on African-American individuals, these facts are sufficient to establish a policy and/or custom for Monell liability. Additionally, the alleged direct involvement of policymakers in the attack would satisfy the causation element.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city only if a city employee committed a constitutional violation pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice.

Montgomery v. City of Ames · filed 2014-04-10

As for the City of Ames, it is liable in a § 1983 suit only if an individual city employee committed a constitutional violation pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a policy or custom only when it results in a constitutional violation.

Customers Bank v. Municipality of Norristown · filed 2014-04-11

Municipal liability under § 1983 must be based on the “execution of a government’s policy or custom” that actually results in a constitutional violation.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Thomas v. City of New York · filed 2014-04-15

Finally, because Thomas has not alleged a valid underlying constitutional deprivation, his claim against New York City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), must also fail.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a custom requires evidence of a settled practice and senior policymakers’ acquiescence.

Prince v. County of Nassau · filed 2014-04-16

There is insufficient evidence that the harassment Prince cites, which was personal to himself, rose to the level of a “permanent and well settled . . . custom or usage with the force of law.” Nor was there sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude that the County’s “senior policy-making officials” knew or should have known of the pattern of harassment described by Prince.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a county policy or custom caused the alleged violation of federal rights.

Doerr v. Sisson · filed 2014-04-16

Moreover, even if the affidavit were insufficient, Doerr cannot prevail in a § 1983 suit against the County because he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that the County’s policy resulted in the alleged violation of his rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior; a claim requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged harm.

Sykes v. Seasons Pizza · filed 2014-04-17

Regardless, municipalities cannot be liable under § 1983 for the acts of their agents under a theory of respondeat superior.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when a constitutional violation results from its policy, custom, or practice.

Parker v. City of Long Beach · filed 2014-04-18

The district court also properly dismissed Parker’s Monell claims. To prevail on these claims, Parker must establish that he suffered a constitutional violation and that the violation resulted from an identified municipal “policy,” “custom,” or “practice.”

Section 1983 municipal failure-to-train liability requires prior unconstitutional conduct that put the municipality on notice of deficient training likely to cause injury.

Hunt v. City of Cleveland · filed 2014-04-21

To establish a failure-to-train claim, Hunt must show “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege an official policy or custom directly linked to the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Marchand v. Simonson · filed 2014-04-28

In order to state a Monell claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must allege the existence of an official policy or custom and a direct causal link between that policy or custom and his alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaking body adopts an unconstitutional action as official policy.

Michalesko v. Freeland Borough · filed 2014-04-29

It appears the council is the Borough’s policy-making body. If that is so, any action it takes would necessarily establish official policy, thereby creating potential liability under Monell. As such, the motion to dismiss is denied because the Monell theory of liability is a necessary part of the facially valid § 1983 claims discussed above.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a widespread practice requires more than allegations of misconduct by three officers.

Vázquez v. Village of Bensenville · filed 2014-05-05

The allegations of unconstitutional misconduct on the part of three officers do not support Vázquez’s allegations of a widespread practice.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an official’s failure to rehire someone when that official lacks final policymaking authority over hiring.

Click v. Thompson · filed 2014-05-06

Because Thompson was not a final policymaker with regard to the failure to rehire Click, his claim against the county for that action must be dismissed.

A § 1983 claim based on an unofficial municipal policy must identify an official with final policymaking authority over the challenged act.

Hoefling v. City of Miami · filed 2014-05-06

More fundamentally, Hoefling fails to plead the necessary elements of an unofficial policy claim because he wholly fails to identify, as is required, “those officials who speak with final policymaking authority for that local governmental entity concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular constitutional violation in issue.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

DeBower v. County of Bremer · filed 2014-04-30

However, a municipality may be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts implement or execute an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability claims survive a motion based solely on the failure of the underlying claims when those claims remain viable.

Ojo v. HC DOC, et al. · filed 2014-05-07

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Ojo’s § 1983 claims of supervisory and municipal liability on the sole basis that those claims are derivative of the claims against Turcotte, Balles, Barbera, and Mercer. As the court denies the motion for summary judgment on the claims against the subordinates and also declines to comb the record to find other, unasserted bases for granting summary judgment on the claims of municipal and supervisory liability, the motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 81) on the federal supervisory and municipal liability claims is denied.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional injury results from an official policy or established custom.

Suarez v. City of Bayonne · filed 2014-05-07

A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “„only . . . when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.‟”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying violation of constitutional rights.

Williams v. City of Scranton · filed 2014-05-07

Because Plaintiffs have not established any violation of Williams’s constitutional rights, we also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Monell claims against the City of Scranton.

Section 1983 allows claims against school boards, but a board cannot be held liable solely for an employee’s actions; the plaintiff must identify action attributable to the board.

Lee-Khan v. Austin Independent School District · filed 2014-05-07

Local governments, municipalities, and school boards are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983, but they cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Lewis v. City of New York · filed 2014-05-07

A municipality can be found liable under section 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Windham v. City of Fairhope · filed 2014-05-14

As an initial matter, Windham’s § 1983 claim against the City of Fairhope fails for want of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker’s decision causes a constitutional violation, without requiring proof of a failure to train.

Vincent v. City of Sulphur · filed 2014-05-15

As the no trespass warning was issued pursuant to the decision of a policy-making official, the claims against the municipality need not proceed under a failure to train theory.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the plaintiff fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Tellez v. City of Belen · filed 2014-05-20

Lacking a constitutional violation, it was also appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Belen on the claim of municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipality to be held vicariously liable for its officers’ conduct.

Scott v. City of New Rochelle · filed 2014-05-21

As the plaintiff concedes, the section 1983 claim insofar as asserted against the City under a theory of respondeat superior must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges that a city policy caused a constitutional violation.

Price v. City of Fayetteville · filed 2014-05-21

The complaint sufficiently alleges facts permitting an inference that the violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights on April 28, 2012, was caused by an existing unconstitutional municipal policy.

A city can be liable under § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional conduct results from its policy or custom.

Jones v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2014-05-23

We conclude that Jones failed to state a section 1983 claim, because he did not allege that the acts at issue occurred as a result of a City policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability for inadequate training requires evidence of prior unconstitutional conduct that put the municipality on notice of the training deficiency.

Griffith v. Kemba Fin. Credit Union, Inc. · filed 2014-05-29

To establish municipal liability under Monell in a case like this one, a plaintiff must point to “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Here, Griffith had no evidence of other mistaken arrests by Whitehall police officers. Thus, the district court correctly granted Whitehall’s motion for summary judgment on Griffith’s Monell claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public entity based on an explicit wrongful policy or a sufficiently established custom of wrongful acts.

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-05-29

To recover against a public entity defendant under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove either (1) an explicit wrongful government policy pronouncement or (2) a pattern of wrongful acts by governmental officials which are “so permanent and well-settled as to constitute an (unspoken) 'custom or usage’ with the force of law.” ... The Court therefore finds that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the County of Los Angeles.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an allegation that a municipal policy or custom caused the claimed injury.

Wisoff v. City of Schenectady · filed 2014-05-30

We also conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Wisoff’s due process claim against the City pursuant to Monell for failure for failure to allege a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused Wistoff’s alleged injury.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the deprivation of a federal right or it failed to adequately train its employees.

Frank Snider, III v. Peters · filed 2014-05-30

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom caused a plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right or if the municipality failed to adequately train its employees.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Collier v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-05-30

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality such as the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must allege that a custom or policy caused the constitutional violation. ... While the Fourth Amendment allegations against the District are thin, they are sufficient to survive the District’s motion to dismiss.

A county is liable under § 1983 when its inadequate custom or policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Estate of Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Gillespie County · filed 2014-06-02

To establish a county’s liability on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the county had some inadequate custom or policy that acted as the moving force behind a constitutional violation. ... Third, there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether the prevailing policies at the time of Schroeder’s detention were the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional injury to hold a municipality or officials sued in their official capacities liable.

Thyng v. City of Quincy · filed 2014-06-02

Because any injury would arise from conduct outside of a custom or policy, summary judgment must be granted in favor of the municipal defendants, i.e. the City of Quincy, the Quincy ConComm, and the persons sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when the only named city officer committed no constitutional violation.

Wigley v. County of Bernalillo · filed 2014-06-04

Lacking a constitutional violation by Officer Williamson, the only City employee named in the complaint, the district court properly dismissed the claims against the City of Albuquerque.

A § 1983 claim that a municipality failed to train or supervise requires facts identifying a policy or custom and connecting it to the alleged constitutional violation.

Wood v. Williams · filed 2014-06-04

The complaint was also deficient in alleging a claim for failure to train or supervise. The complaint did not allege facts showing any particular or specific policy or custom, or how it allowed the claimed constitutional violation to occur, identifying the policymaker or decisionmaker, or showing prior notice through a pattern of similar constitutional violations.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional policy or custom without a viable underlying claim.

Ray v. Anoka County · filed 2014-06-04

To the extent Ray alleges a claim against the City and County Defendants under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), for an unconstitutional policy or custom, that claim also fails because, as discussed, there are no viable underlying claims.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or practice is a moving force behind the violation; it is not liable solely because it employs the person responsible.

Fortson v. City of Elberton · filed 2014-06-04

A § 1983 claim against a municipality cannot be based on principles of responde-at superior. ... Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City of Elberton had a policy or practice that was a moving force behind the alleged Fourth Amendment violation asserted here.

A municipality cannot be liable under Section 1983 when the plaintiff fails to show an underlying constitutional violation.

Chrebet v. County of Nassau · filed 2014-06-05

Since, however, plaintiff has failed to raise evidence of a constitutional violation, his municipal liability claim must also fail.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a policy only when it violates the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights.

Rivera Petty v. City of Chicago · filed 2014-06-09

Even if the City had a policy of detaining witnesses until they gave up information, Petty’s Monell claim could not succeed because it is not his rights that would be violated by such a policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city enforces an ordinance that is unconstitutional as applied.

Galbreath v. The City of Oklahoma City · filed 2014-06-11

Consequently, if the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Galbreath’s conduct, then Oklahoma City “may be subject to liability under § 1983.” Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1280.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation.

McDonald v. City of Tacoma · filed 2014-06-11

Because McDonald failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on his underlying constitutional claims, the district court also properly granted summary judgment on McDonald’s municipal liability claims.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy or practice that caused the alleged constitutional injury to hold a city liable.

Chaparro v. City of Chicago · filed 2014-06-12

Since Chaparro has failed to addúce any evidence at all of a City policy or practice promoting sex discrimination or harassment, her Section 1983 claim against the City fails.