42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a suit against a municipality only when its own policy or custom causes the injury.

Conklin v. Anthou · filed 2012-08-30

A municipality cannot be constitutionally liable under respondeat superior; a § 1983 suit may lie only when the municipality itself, via an execution of policy or custom, inflicts the injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom is the moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.

Okolo v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2012-08-30

To plead a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of Metro was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of Plaintiffs rights.

A county is liable under § 1983 only if a policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Mark Mills v. County of Lapeer · filed 2012-09-04

The County is liable under § 1983 only if “the constitutional violation was caused by a particular policy or custom.” Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009). Mills has not identified any such “policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality or its officials in their official capacities liable for discrimination.

Mazyck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2012-09-04

Because Plaintiff Mazyck cannot demonstrate that the MTA had a custom or policy of discrimination, he is unable to state a claim against the MTA or the individual defendants in their official capacities under §§ 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior for a violation of § 1981.

Robinson v. City of Arkansas City · filed 2012-09-04

There can be no liability against a municipality under a respondeat superior theory under § 1983 for violation of rights enumerated in § 1981.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting a municipal policy or custom that caused a constitutional injury; boilerplate assertions are insufficient.

Matthews v. City of New York · filed 2012-09-05

Such “boilerplate” assertions, however, are plainly insufficient to sustain a Monell claim.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation; without one, a municipal liability claim fails.

Bedingfield Ex Rel. Bedingfield v. Deen · filed 2012-09-06

The district court correctly concluded that this claim fails because Plaintiffs did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Trey suffered a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an adequately alleged underlying constitutional violation.

MacFall v. City of Rochester · filed 2012-09-07

Given that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege an underlying constitutional violation, the district court did not err in dismissing their claim for municipal liability.

A county’s liability under § 1983 requires evidence that a final policymaker made the challenged decision, delegated policy-making authority, or ratified the challenged action.

Schmidt v. Contra Costa County · filed 2012-09-10

Schmidt failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact as to the County’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she does not present evidence that the County Counsel was a final policy-maker for the County or the Superior Court, Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992), or that County Counsel Silvano Marchesi either delegated his policy-making authority to Deputy County Counsel Mary Ann Mason or ratified her allegedly unconstitutional actions.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it jointly creates and administers a protocol that allegedly causes a constitutional injury.

Phillips v. County of Orange · filed 2012-09-11

Therefore, because it was contemplated that such a protocol would be jointly created and administered between the local department of social services and the law enforcement agency — in this case, between the County of Orange CPS and the Village of Goshen Police Department — the Village of Goshen may be liable under § 1983.

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 without evidence of an unconstitutional official policy or custom.

Bellmon v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-09-11

The record discloses no evidence of an unconstitutional official policy or custom of the City sufficient for a reasonable juror to impose § 1983 liability on the City.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires allegations and evidence that a municipal policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional violation to survive summary judgment.

Pooler v. Hempstead Police Department · filed 2012-09-14

However, as discussed supra, plaintiff would need to allege, and have evidence, that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a municipal policy, practice or custom in order for a Monell claim against the Village to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plead facts showing that its policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

Ford v. Donovan · filed 2012-09-18

Instead, to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff has to plead facts that demonstrate that the municipality’s “policy or custom” caused the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind the injury.

Jewell v. Ridley Township · filed 2012-09-19

A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff identifies a municipal “policy” or “custom” that was the “moving force” behind the injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege facts showing a municipal policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights.

Poindexter v. D.C. Department of Corrections · filed 2012-09-20

Accepting plaintiffs factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the plaintiff has not identified any facts illustrating a government practice or custom, or alleged how the District was deliberately indifferent in taking on such a practice, to sufficiently form the basis of liability under Section 1983.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a violation of constitutional rights.

Fahy v. Tarbox · filed 2012-09-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Fahy’s conspiracy and municipal liability claims because Fahy failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether his constitutional rights were violated.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities.

Hansen v. Nieves · filed 2012-09-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against LVMPD because there is no respondeat superior liability against municipalities under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), and there is no evidence that any of the defendants violated the Hansens’ constitutional rights, see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Rebolar v. City of Chicago · filed 2012-09-21

In addition, to the extent plaintiff asserts Monell claims of liability against defendant City of Chicago, those claims are dismissed as well because a Monell claim depends entirely on the validity of the underlying constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not make the District of Columbia liable for an official’s unconstitutional actions solely through respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Rowe v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-09-24

Nor can the District of Columbia be held responsible for Catania’s alleged unconstitutional actions on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation proximately caused by defendants’ conduct under an official county policy, custom, practice, or procedure.

Nugyen v. Sacramento County · filed 2012-09-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nguyen’s claims against the remaining defendants because Nguyen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged constitutional violations were proximately caused by defendants’ conduct under an official county policy, custom, practice, or procedure.

Section 1983 requires evidence that municipal policymakers consciously disregarded a constitutional violation or an obvious risk to impose municipal liability for failure to train or supervise an officer.

Manville v. Town of Greece · filed 2012-09-24

I conclude, then, that there is no basis for a claim against the Town based on any theory of deliberate indifference. Whether the claim is framed in terms of a failure to train or to supervise, or based on the Town’s alleged ratification or condoning of Schamerhorn’s actions, the evidence does not support a finding that the Town had actual or constructive knowledge of an actual or potential constitutional violation, and that the Town, acting through its policymaking officials, consciously chose to ignore that violation or that obvious risk.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a county custom or policy caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Barnes v. Dekalb County · filed 2012-09-24

Thus, in order to recover against DeKalb County for his constitutional violations, plaintiff must show that: (1) the County had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights and (2) the custom or policy caused the alleged violations. ... While questions of fact exist regarding the violation of plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff has failed to identify any DeKalb County custom or policy that was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights or causally related to his alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when its policy of implementing safety plans without procedural safeguards causes a due process violation.

Isbell v. Bellino · filed 2012-09-25

While the Complaint fails to establish a substantive due process claim for the County’s reliance upon Defendant Bellino and other physicians in abuse investigations, the Plaintiffs have successfully pled that the County has a policy of implementing safety plans without procedural safeguards, in violation of due process standards.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s constitutional violation only when an official policy or governmental custom causes the injury.

Ghaster v. City of Rocky River · filed 2012-09-26

A political subdivision is liable for the acts of its employees under § 1983 only for injuries that result from an official policy or from governmental custom, even if that custom has not been formally approved.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 for its officers’ conduct when the officers committed no constitutional violation.

Huntley v. City of Owasso · filed 2012-09-27

The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the § 1983 claims, among other reasons, because the officers had committed no constitutional violations. Inasmuch as we have affirmed that conclusion, we also affirm the district court’s disposition of the § 1983 claims against the City.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ actions without a municipal policy or widespread custom.

Dellutri v. Village of Elmsford · filed 2012-09-28

However, as described above, in the absence of a formal municipal policy or a widespread custom, Elmsford may not be held liable for these actions simply because they were committed by actors who were its employees.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom, even if a constitutional violation and final policymaking authority are assumed.

Ruble v. Escola · filed 2012-09-28

Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate as to Plaintiffs § 1983 Monell claims because even if a constitutional violation and final policymaking authority is assumed, Plaintiff did not produce evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom that would support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot rest solely on officers’ passing quiz grades and an absence of excessive force reports.

Cote v. Town of Millinocket · filed 2012-09-28

The Court concludes that passing grades on Police Department quizzes and an absence of reports of excessive force do not generate a genuine issue of fact as to the municipality’s § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when an alleged constitutional violation results from its official policy or custom.

Suber v. Guinta · filed 2012-09-28

However, when a suit against a municipality is brought under § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional violation implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the municipality or informally adopted by custom.

Section 1983 permits liability against a government entity only for its own acts or policies, not for its employees’ conduct alone.

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-09-30

Because a government entity can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for its own acts or policies, and not for the conduct of its employees, the Court will dismiss the Sierra County Detention Center from the lawsuit.

A municipality can be sued under § 1983 for an alleged constitutional injury only when the challenged action implements an official policy or follows a governmental custom.

Daoud v. City of Wilmington · filed 2012-10-01

One can sue a local governing body directly for relief under § 1983 only if “the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or is a “constitutional deprivation visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

Section 1983 permits liability against a police department only when a policy or custom caused the alleged violation of rights.

Jayne v. Blunk · filed 2012-10-04

Furthermore, the Anderson Police Department cannot be held liable under § 1983 absent evidence that the purported violation of Jayne’s rights was effected pursuant to a policy or custom of the Department.

Section 1983 failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against a school board require an underlying constitutional violation.

Minnis v. Sumner County Board of Education · filed 2012-10-05

And without a constitutional violation, appellants cannot establish their failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against Sumner.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s own acts or omissions to support supervisory liability; a municipality is liable only when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Gericke v. Weare P D , et al. · filed 2012-10-15

It is well-established that “[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.” ... She has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that any custom or policy enacted or implemented by Chief Begin caused her alleged injuries.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom directly causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Estate of LeeRoy Hickman, Jr. v. Moore · filed 2012-10-15

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, noting that under § 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the injury suffered was a direct result of the city’s official policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Jewell v. Miller County · filed 2012-10-15

After careful review, we agree with the district court that Jewell failed to state an official-capacity claim against Linda Rambo or a municipal-liability claim against Miller County, as nothing in Jewell’s complaint demonstrated that a municipal policy or custom caused his injuries.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only if the alleged unconstitutional conduct conformed to an official policy or custom.

Phillips v. City and County of San Francis · filed 2012-10-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City and County of San Francisco on Phillips’s federal claims because Phillips failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct conformed to an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate police training or supervision when the plaintiff alleges a city policy or custom that directly caused a constitutional deprivation.

Stewart v. City of Prairie Village · filed 2012-10-17

Because the Plaintiff has met all four requirements, she has stated a claim for municipal liability under § 1983 for inadequate training or supervision of police officers.

Section 1983 does not impose institutional liability based on respondeat superior; liability may depend on an ultimate policymaker’s conduct or ratification.

MacFarlan v. Board of Education School District 65 Evanston Skokie · filed 2012-10-18

In that respect it is quite true that the Complaint is replete with respondeat-superiortype language that Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2 611 (1978) forecloses as the predicate for institutional liability under Section 1983. But once again the submissions to this Court do not answer the questions whether the individually-named defendants were the ultimate policymakers for District 65 (so that its potential liability is not simply framed in respondeat superior terms) or whether others who were District 65’s ultimate policymakers ratified the asserted conduct about which MacFarlan complains.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2012-10-18

Because I have determined above that plaintiff has not established any underlying constitutional violations, his Monell claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting the existence of an unconstitutional county custom, policy, or practice to state a claim for direct county liability.

Ismail v. County of Orange · filed 2012-10-18

But the plaintiff conspicuously fails to allege any facts from which the Court could infer the existence of such a constitutionally infirm custom, policy, or practice on the part of the County or the OCDA’s office.

Section 1983 permits local government liability for constitutional deprivations caused by an official policy or custom, but not on a theory of respondeat superior.

Olivieri v. Bucks County · filed 2012-10-24

The touchstone of a § 1983 action is an allegation that an official policy is responsible for a constitutional deprivation, but local governments may also be sued for constitutional deprivations pursuant to a custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from a local government to show a constitutional injury caused by its employees or agents and resulting from its policy or custom.

Hernandez v. City of El Paso · filed 2012-10-24

A plaintiff under § 1983 seeking damages from a local government must meet the well-known, two-prong test provided in Monell: constitutional injury at the hands of the local government’s employees or agents; and injury resulting from execution of the government’s policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy”.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional injury.

Levine v. City of Bothell · filed 2012-10-24

Defendant City of Bothell is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs injury was not inflicted pursuant to city policy, regulation, custom or usage.

A local government is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation and it is at least deliberately indifferent to the resulting harm.

Santora v. Red Clay Consolidated School District · filed 2012-10-26

Plaintiff thus must provide evidence that (1) a policy or custom of the local government entity caused the constitutional deprivation and that (2) the entity was at least deliberately indifferent to the harm the policy caused.

Section 1983 requires evidence of deliberate indifference to support municipal liability for failure to train or supervisory liability for failure to supervise.

Turkowitz v. Town of Provincetown · filed 2012-10-26

In order to sustain a claim of municipal liability based upon failure to train or supervisory liability premised upon § 1983 a plaintiff must adduce evidence of “deliberate indifference.”

Section 1983 requires plausible facts connecting an alleged constitutional violation to a municipal policy or inadequate training or supervision; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Ismail v. Freeman · filed 2012-10-30

Plaintiff merely asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the City had customs, policies, or practices (including inadequate training and supervision) that led to or encouraged the alleged constitutional violations. ... Consequently, the federal claims against the City and its Police Department, including those based on failure to train or supervise, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim may survive summary judgment when a factual dispute exists over whether a final policymaker caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Steinberg v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-11-02

This Court agrees with Mr. Steinberg that the Chief of the Fire Department is a final policymaker for the purposes of decisions not to reinstate and compensate agency employees against orders of the OEA. ... There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Chief was the “moving force” behind the non-compliance with the OEA order. Accordingly, Mr. Steinberg’s municipal liability claim under § 1983 may survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on local governments, but inadequate employee training can support liability when it directly causes a constitutional injury.

B.A.B. v. The Board of Education · filed 2012-11-02

Turning to the § 1983 claims against the Board, the district court correctly noted that a local government entity may not be sued under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability, but may be subject to § 1983 liability for inadequate training of its employees that directly causes constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality unless a government policy or custom caused the injury.

Estate of Salvador Buruca v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-11-06

If there is no municipal policy or custom at the root of the plaintiff’s injury, the District cannot be held liable under § 1983. The court will therefore grant the District’s motion for summary judgment on Count II.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to identify a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Johnson v. City of Murray · filed 2012-11-09

Plaintiff has failed to identify any City policy or custom that would allow liability to attach to the City under § 1983 for the alleged gender discrimination by Mr. Bowman. ... Plaintiffs evidence of a discriminatory City custom or policy is insufficient to allow liability to attach to the City pursuant to § 1983 for Mr. Bowman’s alleged gender discrimination. ... Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Plaintiffs Equal Protection claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 lets a person sue for a constitutional rights violation caused under state law, while municipal liability requires a policy or custom and individual damages liability requires personal involvement.

Edwards v. Jericho Union Free School District · filed 2012-11-16

A municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 for its employees’ alleged constitutional violations only if the alleged conduct was undertaken pursuant to “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [its] officers” or a “governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through [ ] official decisionmaking channels.” ... “It is well-settled in [the Second Circuit] that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, plaintiffs motion to amend her Complaint to add a Section 1983 claim is granted as to Ciuffo, Bauer, and Sinanis, and is denied as futile as to Grishman and Prisinzano.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from state action and imposes municipal liability when the deprivation results from a city policy or custom.

Niemeyer v. Williams · filed 2012-11-16

For a municipality to be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, it must be the result of a policy or custom of the city.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Winder v. Erste · filed 2012-11-19

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Winder must allege "a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law" and that the District's "custom or policy caused the violation." ... Winder never even alleges in his second amended complaint that such a policy or custom was in place. This deficiency alone dooms his municipal liability claim.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a connection between the alleged injury and an official custom, practice, or failure to train.

Lafonzo Turner v. Sacramento County Jail · filed 2012-11-19

Moreover, Turner failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether any incident of alleged excessive force was the product of an official custom or practice or failure to train.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a county to allege that a county policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Kastner v. the Hon. Tom Lawrence, Individually and as Harris County. Justice of the Peace · filed 2012-11-21

However, his petition did not include a section 1983 cause of action. He did not mention section 1983, nor did he allege that a policy, pattern, practice, custom, or usage of Harris County caused Judge Lawrence and his clerks to act in ways that violated due process.

A county is not liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff fails to show that its officers’ actions caused his injuries.

Tolsma v. King County · filed 2012-11-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Tolsma’s claims against King County because Tolsma failed to show that the officers’ actions resulted in his injuries.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because it employed a tortfeasor.

Kriss v. Fayette County · filed 2012-11-16

As a municipality, Fayette County may not be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employed a tortfeasor.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, and the complaint must allege facts connecting that policy or custom to the injury.

Faison v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-11-30

“[A] municipality can be found liable under [Section] 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” ... Regardless of the circumstances under which plaintiff’s car and cash were taken, his complaint sets forth no factual allegations regarding the existence and enforcement of a municipal policy, custom or practice that directly caused a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. This pleading defect is fatal.

Section 1983 claims against a town and police supervisors fail when the claim against the officer fails and no municipal policy is at issue.

Kenney v. Floyd · filed 2012-11-30

Since plaintiff's case against Officer McKay fails and there was no municipal policy at issue, the claims against the town and McKay's supervisors also fail.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal custom or policy caused conduct that violated a federal right.

Boar, Inc. v. County of Nye · filed 2012-12-03

The Snowdons have not established a § 1983 constitutional violation, as they have raised no issue of fact that a municipal custom or policy compelled conduct that violated a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, see, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for failing to adopt a medical procedures policy without a direct causal link between that failure and an alleged constitutional violation.

Coffey Ex Rel. I-VII v. McKinley County · filed 2012-12-04

She has thus failed to demonstrate a direct causal link between McKinley County’s failure to adopt a 14-day medical-procedures policy and any alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city deliberately fails to meet a known need to train or supervise officers and that failure causes a constitutional violation; employment of the officer alone is insufficient.

Rodriguez v. City of Miami · filed 2012-12-04

Here the Court finds insufficient evidence to sustain Plaintiffs claims of municipal liability under Section 1983. Plaintiff offers no record evidence indicating that the City knew of a need to train and/or supervise officers in situations like the one at bar, that it chose to take no action, and that its deliberate indifference precipitated violations of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Plaintiff appears to rest her municipal claims merely on a theory of respondeat superior, a non-cognizable basis on which to sustain municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits a school board to face liability for retaliation allegedly carried out by the board itself through its members.

Lewis v. Eufaula City Board of Education · filed 2012-12-04

Here, Lewis alleges that the board itself, as controlled through the board member defendants, unlawfully retaliated against her, and thus, nothing in Monell exempts the board from liability here.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability for an employee’s acts to identify a policy or custom that caused the injury.

Doyle v. Lehi City · filed 2012-12-06

Rather, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury before municipal liability for an employee’s acts may be triggered.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for the conduct of a state circuit court over which the county has no control.

Tibor v. Kane County, Illinoi · filed 2012-12-06

Tibor has not sued the entity whose conduct aggrieves him. ... The Circuit Court is not part of any county, and none of these three counties has any control over pending litigation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a policymaker promulgated an unconstitutional policy with deliberate indifference and that the policy caused a constitutional violation.

Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Brown v. Bolin · filed 2012-12-13

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must put on evidence demonstrating that (1) a policymaker; (2) exercised deliberate indifference in promulgating an unconstitutional policy; and (3) the unconstitutional policy was a moving force in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a policymaker adopted an unconstitutional policy with deliberate indifference and that the policy was a moving force behind the rights violation.

Brown v. Wichita County · filed 2012-12-13

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must put on evidence demonstrating that (1) a policymaker; (2) exercised deliberate indifference in promulgating an unconstitutional policy; and (3) the unconstitutional policy was a moving force in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional injury is attributable to the municipality’s own policy or decisions.

Robinson v. City of Arkansas City · filed 2012-12-14

The Court agrees that the City is subject to Monell liability under the first and third theory of liability. ... The Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, the City itself was the wrongdoer and is properly subject to liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead and prove that an official policy or custom caused a denial of constitutional rights.

Nasca v. Sgro · filed 2012-12-19

Here, the plaintiff failed to allege that Sgro’s alleged misconduct was part of a widespread practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a deliberately indifferent policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Evans v. City of San Diego · filed 2012-12-19

Plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff fails to put forth any evidence to establish that the San Diego Police Department had a policy amounting to the deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs constitutional rights, or that the policy was the driving force behind the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy, custom, practice, or final policymaker’s decision causes a violation of federal rights.

Harris v. Hammon · filed 2012-12-19

A municipality is subject to liability under § 1983 only when the violation of the Plaintiffs federally protected right can be attributable to the enforcement of a municipal policy, custom, practice, or decision of a final municipal policymaker.

A city is not liable under § 1983 on an official-policy theory when its employees act contrary to that policy.

Sanchez v. City of Fresno · filed 2012-12-26

The FAC alleges that individual agents of the City acted in contravention of AO 6-23. This is indisputably insufficient to trigger municipal liability under Monell and Plaintiff offers no other basis upon which this form of liability could exist.

Section 1983 permits county liability for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or custom; general assertions of inadequate training or supervision do not establish that liability.

Littleton Ex Rel. Estate of Boggs v. Swonger · filed 2012-12-28

A county’s liability under Section 1983 is limited to constitutional violations caused by “official policy or custom.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). ... Here, Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of a county policy or custom, deficient training, or knowledge that Swonger engaged in conduct that posed a risk of constitutional injury. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Prince George’s County on Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional and negligent training claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable to allege an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Dema v. City of Mesa · filed 2013-01-02

The district court properly dismissed Dema’s § 1983 claims against the City of Mesa because Dema failed to allege the existence of any unconstitutional policy or custom.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for the acts of an official with final policymaking authority over the challenged conduct.

Vaher v. Town of Orangetown · filed 2013-01-02

However, where a plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by a municipal official who has “final policymaking authority” with respect to the activities alleged in the complaint, the actions of that final policymaker may be adequate to subject the government to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employed a person who committed a constitutional violation.

Konah v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-01-03

But a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior, solely because it employed a tortfeasor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to allege that a county custom or policy caused the constitutional deprivation.

Gaston v. St Clair · filed 2013-01-03

The district court properly dismissed Gaston’s action because Gaston failed to allege that any constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of a custom or policy of Snohomish County.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that the county instituted a discriminatory policy affecting a class of employees.

Volpe v. Nassau County · filed 2013-01-03

Specifically, plaintiffs allege a policy of unequal pay based upon gender that (1) applies across a class of all men employed by the Nassau County Police Department as PCOs and PCOSs, and (2) was instituted by the County in response to the settlement of the Ebbert lawsuit, to which the County itself was a party. These contentions are sufficient to allege a discriminatory policy under Monell that survives a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits a municipal claim to proceed at the pleading stage when the allegations leave open whether the official who acted had final policymaking authority.

Morris v. Town of Lexington · filed 2013-01-04

As in Brown, the present plaintiffs allegations against Police Chief Mark Bowers “leave open the possibility” that he wielded final policy-making authority on law enforcement issues. At the stage of a motion to dismiss, the parties have not yet had the opportunity to submit evidence on the Town of Anderson’s relevant ordinances, rules, regulations, customs, and practices. Accordingly, this court will deny the motion to dismiss the claims against the Town of Anderson based on the actions of its Police Chief, Mark Bowers.

Section 1983 permits damages against a county when its custom causes a constitutional violation.

B.S. Ex Rel. T.S. v. Somerset County · filed 2013-01-08

And, because there is no question that what the County calls its “Summary and Order procedure” (Appellees’ Br. at 23) violated Mother’s right to a prompt post-removal hearing, we conclude that the County is liable under § 1983 for whatever damages a jury may deem appropriate to redress that violation.

A county is not liable under § 1983 for its employees’ conduct without evidence that its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Farneski v. County of Hunterdon · filed 2013-01-09

There is no record evidence that the County was deliberately indifferent to how its employees carried out these policies. In the absence of such a showing, the County cannot be liable under § 1983, and the Court will grant summary judgment in its favor on this claim.

Section 1983 permits a municipal ratification claim where a reasonable jury could find that a final policymaker approved a subordinate’s excessive use of force and its basis in a sufficiently extreme factual scenario.

Hobart v. City of Stafford · filed 2013-01-09

However, the totality of the facts here, including the physical evidence from the February 18, 2009 incident, evidence of Officer Estrada’s state of mind, and indications in the record that Chief Krahn did not consider it his role to evaluate the reasonableness of Officer Estrada’s assessment of the threat level convince this Court that a reasonable jury could find the City liable on a ratification theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the alleged injury.

Leichter v. Lebanon Board of Education · filed 2013-01-09

As Plaintiff fails to allege any policy or custom that resulted in his due process injury, he has failed to plausibly state a claim for municipal liability under Monell to maintain his Section 1983 claim against the Board and against Tyler in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employment decision only when the decision reflects official policy made by an authorized policymaker; discretion to fire an employee alone does not establish final policymaking authority.

Raymond v. Ector County, Texas · filed 2013-01-10

We agree that, although Serrano had discretionary power to terminate Raymond’s employment, the Juvenile Board retained final policymaking authority over employment policies, and Raymond failed to show that the Board delegated this authority to Serrano.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation by a municipal agent or employee before a municipality can be liable for negligent hiring, training, or retention.

Stricker v. Twp. Of Cambridge · filed 2013-01-14

The standard for municipal liability in negligent hiring, training, and retention is deliberate indifference. Id. at 238. However, “[e]ven before reaching the issue of whether the municipality was deliberately indifferent . . . the plaintiff must demonstrate a constitutional violation at the hands of an agent or employee of the municipality.” Id. Because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that there were any constitutional violations, their municipal liability claim fails as well.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an alleged policy or failure to train or supervise when the underlying excessive force claim fails.

Rodriguez v. Village of Ossining · filed 2013-01-14

Because Plaintiffs claim of excessive force fails, so too does her claim alleging that the force used was-authorized by the Village of Ossining’s policies and procedures or caused by its failure to supervise or train its employees.

A school district cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation, even if its policy caused the injury.

Estate of C.A. v. Grier · filed 2013-01-16

Because no constitutional violation was present, the existence of causation did not state a § 1983 claim.

A municipal policy claim under § 1983 fails when the underlying constitutional claim fails.

Murphy v. Village of Plainfield · filed 2013-01-16

The Murphys’ policy claim against the Village under Monell rests on allegations that they were wrongly prosecuted in violation of the equal protection clause. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-53. The failure of that claim dooms the Monell claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Perez v. School Board · filed 2013-01-17

These counts fail to state a claim because they fail to identify a municipal custom or policy that caused Plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability for failure to train when a jury finds that the plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation.

Reiff v. Marks · filed 2013-01-22

We need not review the merits of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough because a municipality may not be held liable on a failure to train theory when a jury has found that the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional violation.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for its officials’ actions if those actions caused no constitutional harm.

Robinson v. Cook · filed 2013-01-23

Similarly, policy or practice aside, a municipality cannot be liable for the actions of its officials under Monell if those actions "inflicted no constitutional harm." City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show a municipal policy or custom directly caused the alleged injury.

Hutchinson v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2013-01-23

Instead, “ ‘to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom, and 2) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.’ ”

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege facts showing that a municipal policy caused a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Claims of Torres v. City of New York · filed 2013-01-25

In short, because plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts supporting the existence of a municipal policy that resulted in a violation of plaintiffs’ rights, the complaint is defective on its face for Monell liability.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a single employee’s alleged misconduct without evidence of a county policy or custom.

Mulholland v. Government County of Berks · filed 2013-01-28

Without more, Berks County, the municipality of which BCCYS is simply an agency, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single caseworker‟s alleged deviation from the requirements of the CPSL.

A county or an official sued in an official capacity is liable under § 1983 only when an unconstitutional custom or policy caused the injury.

Nguyen v. Franklin County Sheriffs Department · filed 2013-01-29

The Magistrate Judge recommended that their motion be granted on the grounds that: (1) Nguyen failed to establish liability against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony in his official capacity because he did not demonstrate that they maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy that caused the alleged injury, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); ... We have reviewed the record and discern no error in the reasoning of either the Magistrate Judge or the District Court regarding Nguyen’s other claims.

A § 1983 due process claim against the District requires allegations of a municipal policy or custom.

Speed v. Mills · filed 2013-01-30

Because Mills does not allege the existence of a municipal policy or custom, he fails to state a due process claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality or a municipal officer in an official capacity to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Ogle v. Hocking Cty. · filed 2013-01-31

Therefore, in order to state a cause of action in their official-capacity claim, the Ogles must allege that the defendants deprived the Ogles of their rights pursuant to either (1) an official municipal policy or (2) a municipal custom.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff liable in his official capacity for an officer’s unlawful shooting without a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused it.

Gandy v. Sheriff of Hamilton County Sheriff's Office, Jasper, Florida · filed 2013-01-31

The fact that Mr. Whetstone’s shooting might have been unjustified and unlawful does not subject Sheriff Reid to liability in his official capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right.

Genovese v. Town of Southampton · filed 2013-02-01

When a plaintiff lacks any underlying claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right, the claim of municipal liability on the part of the municipal defendant must be dismissed as well.

A § 1983 claim against a county need not identify the individual officers when the complaint describes the incident and alleges that county employees were involved.

Medrano v. Kern County Sheriff's Officer · filed 2013-02-01

The Court agrees that the failure to identify the individual officers allegedly involved is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the County where the Complaint sets forth the date, location, and victim of the shooting, and alleges that the officers involved were employed by the County.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

K.D. ex rel. Duncan v. White Plains School District · filed 2013-02-05

Plaintiffs failure to allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the deprivations is fatal to their § 1983 claims against the WPSD.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes a deprivation of civil rights.

Brown v. City of Memphis · filed 2013-02-05

Municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for deprivations of civil rights when the deprivation resulted from the “execution of a policy or custom” of the municipality. ... Beyond that, however, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that suggests the City deliberately allowed this custom to continue in order to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights. Nor have Plaintiffs demonstrated how such a “custom” directly resulted in Sease robbing and falsely imprisoning Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city’s custom of failing to investigate excessive force complaints and discipline officers causes the plaintiffs’ injuries.

Ortega v. City of Denver · filed 2013-02-06

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to their claim for municipal liability based on Denver’s custom of failing to adequately and timely investigate citizen complaints for excessive force and to timely and properly discipline the officers implicated therein. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on this theory of municipal liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on deliberate indifference requires notice of a likely constitutional violation.

Atkinson v. City of Mountain View · filed 2013-02-08

Notice is the touchstone of deliberate indifference in the context of § 1983 municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when longstanding jail conditions amount to a custom that causes a constitutional deprivation.

Duran v. Merline · filed 2013-02-08

In light of the 24 years of overcrowding at the ACJF, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that these conditions amounted to a custom, which caused the harm alleged by Plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be sued directly for its unconstitutional policies and for unconstitutional acts by officials with final policymaking authority.

Hawkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-11

Before doing so, the Court quickly notes that the District remains a proper § 1983 Defendant here, a point not challenged by the Government. A municipality may be sued directly under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies and for unconstitutional acts taken by officials with final policymaking authority in the relevant area. ... The General Order falls into the former category, and the Police Chief’s discipline of Hawkins falls into the latter.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when evidence supports a finding that a county custom caused a constitutional injury.

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County · filed 2013-02-11

Between Heacock’s testimony and the evidence of the County’s treatment of previous inmates who were not treated as suicidal, despite red flags, because they did not self-report suicidal ideations, Plaintiffs have a raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an unconstitutional custom, to which the County was deliberately indifferent, and which was the moving force behind Plaintiffs’ injury. The Court denies summary judgment on the federal portion of Count 1.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the injury; its employees’ conduct alone is insufficient.

Fullen v. City of Columbus · filed 2013-02-12

Under this statute, “a local government may not be sued ... for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible.... ”

Section 1983 allows municipal liability when high-level officials’ deliberate indifference establishes an official policy.

Ligon v. City of New York · filed 2013-02-14

One way to establish an official policy is through a showing of “deliberate indifference” by high-level officials.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional violations; a municipal policy or custom must cause the injury.

Collins v. City of New York · filed 2013-02-15

Section 1983 does not make municipalities vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of their employees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that the municipality’s custom or policy caused the constitutional injury.

Matthews v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-19

The evidence on this record, were it introduced at trial, would not allow a reasonable jury to find that a custom of allowing strip or body cavity searches, a failure to train officers about these searches, or any other policy of inaction caused plaintiffs’ injuries.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when its officers caused no constitutional injury.

Garber v. Vizcarra · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garber’s claim alleging municipal liability because Garber failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers violated any constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official policy or enforcement custom; a single unconstitutional incident is insufficient unless it resulted from a policy attributable to a municipal policymaker.

Clift v. City of Burlington · filed 2013-02-19

A municipality is thus liable for both its articulated policies and its custom of enforcing; however “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Lanier Construction Co. v. City of Clinton · filed 2013-02-20

In other words for a plaintiff to have recourse against a municipality under § 1983, he must show a constitutional injury cause by a municipal policy or custom. ... Here, plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence of an official policy or persistent practice of racial discrimination by the City of Clinton in awarding public contracts. The evidence presented in this matter is almost entirely limited to the exchange between the two parties on a single disputed bidding event. As the plaintiff has offered no evidence of a practice or policy, summary judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim is appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy, practice, or custom that caused the injury before a borough can be held liable.

Kocher v. Larksville Borough · filed 2013-02-20

Based on the foregoing, Kocher has failed to establish that the dissemination of the contents of his personnel file to Kingston Borough occurred pursuant to a Larksville Borough policy, practice, or custom.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s conduct without proof that a final policymaker took or ratified the action.

Arnold v. City of Columbus · filed 2013-02-20

With regard to Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were ordered not to congregate or discuss their complaints during work, that the Dispatch articles constituted a form of retaliation, and that Arnold was “written-up” by other officers, Plaintiffs have not shown that these actions were taken or ratified by a final policymaker.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the claimed violation.

Maldonado v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-21

As the foregoing discussion concludes, the plaintiff has failed to plead facts that would establish a municipal policy or custom that caused his alleged injuries, and therefore the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts I and II) must be dismissed against the defendant District.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs someone who committed a constitutional violation.

Thomas v. Venditto · filed 2013-02-21

A municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 for alleged unconstitutional actions committed by its employees solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires allegations of deliberately indifferent training procedures to support a failure-to-train claim against a city.

Turner v. Craig · filed 2013-02-26

Plaintiff has not alleged deliberately indifferent training procedures sufficient to establish a claim against the City of Oakland under Monell.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy promulgated by its policymaker is the moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.

Jackson v. Ford · filed 2013-02-27

Because the plaintiffs did not show that an official Travis County policy promulgated by the municipal policymaker was the moving force behind a violation of Jackson’s constitutional rights, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the § 1983 claims in favor of Travis County.

Section 1983 permits a county to be held liable when its policy or custom causes a violation of federal rights.

Ihnken v. Gardner · filed 2013-02-27

Furthermore, the county itself (and not just its officers in their individual capacities) may be held liable under § 1983 where “the execution of a policy or custom of the [county] caused the violation.”

Section 1983 allows a municipal liability claim to survive dismissal when the complaint alleges a city policy or practice that caused a constitutional violation and gives the municipality fair notice of the claim.

Isabel MORENO Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Et Al., Defendants · filed 2013-02-28

If, as the Court finds here, “a complaint alleging municipal liability under § 1983 may be read in a way that can support a claim for relief, thereby giving the defendant fair notice of the claim, that is sufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a violation of federal rights.

Suber v. Guinta · filed 2013-02-28

Additionally, I grant the within motion and enter judgment in favor of the City because the Mhloyi plaintiffs have not produced sufficient record evidence demonstrating that (a) an official policy or custom of the City caused a violation of the Mhloyis’ rights to equal protection of the laws; and (b) any decision — or policy-maker within the Coatesville police department or the City’s administration was aware of, and acquiesced to, any such policy or custom, so as to provide a basis for municipal liability against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Clyce v. Hunt County Texas · filed 2013-03-05

However, even assuming that the Clyces presented evidence sufficient to establish that this was an official municipal policy, they have failed to present evidence that the policy was the moving force behind the alleged delay in providing medical care to C.C.

Section 1983 holds a public entity liable only when its policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation; it does not impose vicarious liability for an employee’s actions.

Rideau v. Keller Independent School District · filed 2013-03-05

But there is no evidence in the record establishing that a policy or unofficial practice of the District was itself the moving force behind T.R.’s injuries. And because Evans’s actions cannot be vicariously attributed to the District, as they can under the ADA and RA, there is no legal basis here for holding the District liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely for an employee’s misconduct; liability requires a municipal policy or custom, a qualifying failure to train, or ratification by a final policymaker.

Estate of Villarreal v. Cooper · filed 2013-03-06

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against municipalities. ... Plaintiffs’ claims for municipal liability under the theory that any constitutional violation was caused by a failure to train or was due to an official policy or longstanding custom or practice are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, Plaintiffs may pursue a municipal liability claim under a theory of ratification.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom, or supervisory deliberate indifference, to hold a county liable for an employee’s constitutional violation.

Seale v. Cnty · filed 2013-03-07

Moreover, Ms. Seale fails to plausibly allege a § 1983 equal protection claim for hostile work environment against the County because she fails to allege that the County had a policy or custom pursuant to which Episcopo acted and/or that Episcopo’s supervisory officials had knowledge of his actions but were deliberately indifferent.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly alleging a municipal policy or custom to hold officials liable in their official capacities.

Trombley v. O'Neill · filed 2013-03-07

Third, even when it is construed with the utmost of special liberality, Plaintiffs Complaint has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting a widespread policy or custom promulgated by Defendants’ municipal employer necessary to hold the Defendants liable in their official capacities for Plaintiffs injuries.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom caused the alleged violation; a vague custom unconnected to the injury does not suffice.

Nelson v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-03-08

Not only is this alleged custom too nebulous to support a claim against the District but the alleged result of the custom is wholly disconnected to “the injuries of which [the Plaintiff] complained.”

A § 1983 claim against a municipality can survive dismissal when the complaint plausibly alleges that an official had de facto authority to set the policy that caused the alleged violation.

Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills · filed 2013-03-11

We also find that Kristofek has plausibly pled, albeit barely, that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a Monell claim against the Village of Orland Hills.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on an express policy, including an ordinance enacted by the municipality.

McCoy v. City of Columbia · filed 2013-03-11

The Ordinance is an express policy of the City. ... Therefore, the Ordinance is a policy or custom for which the City may be liable.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its deliberate indifference to jail conditions and its policies caused a detainee’s constitutional injury.

Layton v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-03-12

Accordingly, Appellants have “presented evidence of disputed material facts sufficient to create a genuine question as to whether [the County] was deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the [jail],” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 921, and regarding whether the County’s policies were the moving force behind Mr. Holdstock’s death. As such, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Whetsel and the County on Appellants’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 municipal liability for an arrest requires a constitutional violation; probable cause defeats a claim based on that arrest.

Arrington v. Kinsey · filed 2013-03-13

If there was probable cause for arrest, then there was no constitutional violation and no municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on an officer’s actions when the jury finds that the officer caused no constitutional harm.

Martin v. County of San Diego · filed 2013-03-15

A municipality is not liable “based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

Section 1983 does not make a local government liable solely because its employees or agents caused an injury.

Mackenzie Brown v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio · filed 2013-03-15

A local government is not responsible under § 1983 solely because injuries were inflicted by its employees or agents.

A city may be liable under § 1983 only if its illegal or unconstitutional policy or custom caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Knotts v. Carreira · filed 2013-03-18

The City of Santa Clara may be held liable only if it “has adopted an illegal or unconstitutional policy or custom” that resulted in a violation of Knotts’s constitutional rights. ... Because Knotts did not argue or show that the City has any such policy or custom, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a discriminatory municipal policy or custom that caused the employment action before a municipality can be liable for its officials’ conduct.

Lewis v. Denver Fire Department · filed 2013-03-19

Generally, for discriminatory employment practices of municipal officials, such as officers of the Denver Fire Department, to create liability for the municipality, the plaintiff must show that the employee acted pursuant to a policy or custom of discriminatory employment practices.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional injury results from an established policy or custom.

Houston v. Township of Randolph · filed 2013-03-21

As to the municipal defendants, I find that there is no proof, or even really an allegation, that any arguable constitutional deprivation resulted from an established policy or custom, as required by Monell.

Section 1983 permits damages against a municipality when an injury results from its official policy, established custom, or final policymaker’s decision.

Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre · filed 2013-03-22

Under Monell, municipalities are subject to damages under § 1983 in three situations: when the plaintiff was injured pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, a long-standing practice or custom, or the decision of a “final policymaker.”

A county cannot be liable under § 1983 for an alleged due process violation caused by a state court applying state law when the county has no relevant policymaking authority.

Slaven v. Engstrom · filed 2013-03-22

Hennepin County cannot be liable to the Slavens under § 1983 for the violation of their procedural due process rights based on the allegations contained in this complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Opalenik v. LaBrie · filed 2013-03-22

Although Plaintiffs proffer some evidence in support of their claims — namely, a letter from the Town of South Hadley Selectboard, stating that it “does not conduct investigations of its Police Department involving issues of search and seizures,” and the Badgequest internal study with regard to the Town of Hadley — the court concludes that they have not sufficiently shown customs, policies, or practices that caused them any constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence to support municipal liability based on a failure to train caseworkers.

Irwin v. Crofton · filed 2013-03-25

As discussed above in Part II(c)(iv), Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that Suffolk County is liable under a theory of municipal liability based upon its alleged failure to train its caseworkers.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality fails when the plaintiff does not establish municipal liability.

Curtis v. Anthony · filed 2013-03-26

Here, for the same reasons provided in Winfrey, we affirm summary judgment as to Wright, Fort Bend County, the City of Houston, and the unknown HPD and Fort Bend County employees, on qualified immunity grounds and for failure to establish municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom causes the denial of a constitutional right; an attenuated causal link is insufficient.

Usavage v. Port Authority · filed 2013-03-26

Second, even if the argument were not waived, it would fail because of the rule that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless a policy or custom causes a plaintiff to be subjected to denial of a constitutional right. Here, the requisite causal link between the municipal policy and the alleged denial of a constitutional right is extraordinarily attenuated — so attenuated that, in the relevant sense of the term, PATH’S policy of preserving video footage cannot be said to have caused the alleged excessive use of force. Summary judgment on this claim is therefore proper.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an official’s licensing decision when that decision does not itself constitute municipal policy.

Pineiro v. Gemme · filed 2013-03-26

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court is compelled to conclude that Chief Gemme’s licensing decision with regard to plaintiffs application did not itself constitute a “policy” of the City of Worcester within the meaning of § 1983 and Monell.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; conclusory allegations of such a policy or custom are insufficient.

Handy v. Lane County · filed 2013-03-26

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability of a local governing body arises when “action pursuant to official [policy or custom] of some nature caused a constitutional tort” and not on the basis of respondeat superior. ... Here, Handy fails to allege any facts indicating that the County has such a policy or custom.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official authorized to set policy makes the decision that causes the constitutional violation.

Bassett v. City of Rye · filed 2013-03-27

Here, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could have rationally determined that the arrest of Michael M. Bassett resulted from the decision of an official policymaker or policymakers of the defendant.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a widespread pattern of similar constitutional violations amounts to a municipal custom.

Davis v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-28

The allegations in this case lie close to the core of custom-based Monell liability, not at the periphery like the claim in Connick.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a municipality’s own illegal acts or for a policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation, but not merely for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct.

Ross v. Borough of Dormont · filed 2013-03-29

It is well settled that a municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 merely because its employees have acted unconstitutionally. Rather, a municipality may only be found liable for their own illegal acts or where the plaintiff is able to identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the constitutional violation.