42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy or a persistent, widespread custom to hold a county liable; an isolated incident does not establish a custom.

Keele v. Glynn County · filed 2013-03-29

Thompson’s isolated, albeit tragic, incident does not provide evidence of the County or GCDC’s “persistent” or “widespread” custom or practice.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single unconstitutional decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Moon v. Brown · filed 2013-03-29

However, under appropriate circumstances, a single decision by an official policymaker can establish the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an established custom when policymaking officials know of and acquiesce in the practice.

Flores v. Lackage · filed 2013-03-31

Under this theory of § 1983 municipal liability, Flores may establish a municipal “custom” through proof of the knowledge of policymaking officials and their acquiescence in the established practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional violation only when a custom, policy, or practice caused or condoned it.

Soriano v. Town of Cicero · filed 2013-04-02

A municipality like the Town of Cicero cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation in the absence of a custom, policy or practice that effectively caused or condoned the alleged violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Staten v. Adams · filed 2013-04-08

Based on this record, plaintiff fails to show that the City of Houston has a policy regarding “pain compliance” that . was the moving force of plaintiffs alleged constitutional violation from Officer Adams’s striking him on the face with a gun that would give rise to municipal liability against the City of Houston.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Ward v. Olson · filed 2013-04-08

To establish municipal liability under § 1983 a plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom was the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s conduct when the constitutional violation results from a municipal custom or policy.

Vargas v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-10

To hold a municipality liable under section 1983 for the conduct of employees below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his or her constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694 [1978]; Dwares v City of New York, 985 F2d 94, 100 [1993]).

Section 1983 claims against a township and police chief based on arresting officers’ conduct require an underlying constitutional violation by those officers.

Russell v. Davis · filed 2013-04-10

Russell brings additional § 1983 claims against St. Clair Township and against Police Chief Donald Hyatt. As Russell concedes, the viability of these actions presupposes an underlying constitutional violation committed by the arresting officers. Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that no such violation occurred, we likewise affirm its decision to grant summary judgment on these derivative § 1983 claims.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; without an underlying violation, the municipal liability claim fails.

O'Leary v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-11

Because this Court has already concluded, supra, that Plaintiff has not suffered any violation of his constitutional rights, his Monell claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely because a municipality employs someone who committed a violation; the violation must result from municipal policy or custom.

Freeman v. Town of Hudson · filed 2013-04-15

Absent this information, the complaint fails to state more than respondeat superior liability on the part of the Town and the Commission. This is not enough to support a section 1983 action against a municipality, Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, and the district court correctly dismissed the claims against the Town and the Commission.

Section 1983 permits a county to be held liable for deputies’ excessive force only when a county policy or custom caused it; the county is not vicariously liable for the deputies’ acts.

Cameron v. Craig · filed 2013-04-16

Under federal law, the County cannot be held vicariously liable for its deputies’ acts of excessive force. The County may be held liable only if it “has adopted an illegal or unconstitutional policy or custom” that resulted in the excessive force. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)). Cameron has not identified any custom or policy of the County that guided the deputies’ use of force in the search and arrest. The County is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when an official policy or custom known to a policymaker is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Lon Brown v. Lynch · filed 2013-04-16

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.”

Section 1983 claims against a city may proceed when the complaint alleges facts attributable to the city, even if related claims against individual officials lacked allegations of their personal involvement.

Davis v. City of Memphis Fire Department · filed 2013-04-16

Davis pleaded several additional facts attributable to Memphis that he did not plead with respect to Payton and Benson, and did not, as Memphis asserts, rest his constitutional claims solely on Payton and Benson’s actions. Therefore, the Court DENIES IN PART Memphis’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Davis’ claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police department for its policies when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Joseph v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2013-04-17

But, since there was no constitutional violation, the Department is not liable and, thus, was entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing municipal liability to establish the alleged violation by reference to an official custom or policy.

Jimmy Smith, Jr. v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept · filed 2013-04-19

Because Smith abandoned his claims against the individual officers and proceeded only against the Department under a theory of municipal liability, he had to establish deliberate indifference by reference to an official custom or policy.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Lon Brown v. Lynch · filed 2013-04-22

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality when its employees committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Bobolakis v. DiPietrantonio · filed 2013-04-23

Because, however, the officers had probable cause to arrest Bobolakis, he suffered no violation of his constitutional rights and there is no basis for imposition of liability on the Town.

A city waives its Monell defense to a Section 1983 claim when it fails to raise the defense in its appellate briefing.

RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio · filed 2013-04-23

RBIII brought its federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the City has not raised a defense based on Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) in its appellate briefing. For the reasons set forth in Kinnison v. City of San Antonio, 480 F. App’x 271, 274-76 (5th Cir. 2012), we hold that the City has waived any Monell defense with respect to this appeal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that an official policy or custom caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Waddlington v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-23

In order to state a section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights was caused by an official policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, including when an established practice differs from a written policy.

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County · filed 2013-04-24

The Court concludes, therefore, that because Columbia County, the CCSO, and Sheriff Dickerson in his official capacity had a policy or custom of prohibiting inmates from receiving magazines, those Defendants are liable under § 1983 for violations of inmates’ First Amendment right to receive magazines.

A claim for damages against a government entity under section 1983 requires an alleged constitutional violation.

Perry v. County of Fresno · filed 2013-04-26

However, appellants‟ section 1983 cause of action against the County does not allege what constitutional right the County violated. An award of damages against a government entity in a Monell action requires constitutional harm. (City of Los Angeles v. Heller (1986) 475 U.S. 796, 799.) Based on the absence of this element of a Monell claim, the trial court properly sustained the County‟s demurrer to the section 1983 cause of action.

A single employment decision supports municipal liability under § 1983 only when the decisionmaker has final authority to set municipal policy for that action.

Hess v. Abels · filed 2013-04-26

Hess has failed to allege facts indicating that the City delegated final policymaking authority to Ables, Lawson, or Maynard for the termination of city employees. As such, the district court properly dismissed the official capacity claims and the claims against the City.

A § 1983 municipal claim fails when the plaintiff has not made the requisite showing for municipal liability.

Customers Bank v. Municipality of Norristown · filed 2013-04-26

Even assuming the existence of a constitutional injury, Plaintiffs have not pointed to a policy or custom propagated by Defendant Kilkenny, or any other Defendant, for which the municipality could be held liable.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability claim to identify an official custom, pattern, or policy that permits deliberate indifference to or violates civil rights, or show that the municipality ratified unlawful conduct.

Shearer v. Tacoma School District No. 10 · filed 2013-04-29

In order to set forth a claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s employees or agents acted through an official custom, pattern or policy that permits deliberate indifference to, or violates, the plaintiffs civil rights; or that the entity ratified the unlawful conduct.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional deprivation results from its official policy or custom.

Kean v. Henry · filed 2013-04-30

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the plaintiff shows that a constitutional deprivation emerged from that entity’s official policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation.

Childress v. Walker · filed 2013-04-30

Indeed, at the end of the day, Childress’s arguments are premised on a theory of respondeat superior, which is not an appropriate basis for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Doe v. Forest Park Police Officer Lee · filed 2013-05-06

Because the record, viewed favorably to plaintiff, does not support the inference that her alleged injuries were caused by a municipal policy, the Village is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable for an officer’s conduct to allege that an official custom or policy caused the injury.

Grimes v. City of New York · filed 2013-05-07

The 42 USC § 1983 claim was correctly dismissed, because plaintiff failed to allege that his injury resulted from the officer’s execution of official custom or policy (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658 [1978]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a local government or a private entity acting under color of state law for an employee’s conduct to show that an entity policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Defreitas v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility · filed 2013-05-07

To bring a § 1983 claim against a local government or government entity (including a private corporation, like CMC, that is alleged to be acting under color of state law, see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003)) for the actions of an employee of one of those entities, a plaintiff cannot rely upon respondeat superior liability, but he must show that the entity had a policy or custom that caused his deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires liability of an individual state actor on an underlying claim before a plaintiff may recover damages from a municipality for unconstitutional policies or customs.

Lyons v. Richmond Community School Corp. · filed 2013-05-08

But a plaintiff must prove that individual state actors are liable on an underlying substantive claim in order to recover damages from a municipality for its unconstitutional policies or customs.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when its district attorney acts as a county policymaker in establishing policies and training concerning jailhouse informants.

Goldstein v. City of Long Beach · filed 2013-05-08

Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the Los Ange-les County District Attorney represents the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action may lie against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors and a city must allege specific facts that plausibly support supervisory or municipal liability.

Dorf v. Bjorklund · filed 2013-05-09

The district court reviewed the proposed second amended complaint and concluded that it, too, failed to state a plausible claim for relief for supervisory or municipal liability. ... We have reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, and we conclude that Ms. Dorf’s proposed second amended complaint did not contain “enough specific factual allegations to ‘nudge [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,’” id. at 1219 (brackets omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that an official policy or established custom caused a constitutional injury.

Fluker v. County of Kankakee · filed 2013-05-10

As discussed earlier, because Plaintiffs failed timely to add any individual defendants, they may only pursue a Monell action against the named municipal defendants. Plaintiffs do not allege that any of Defendants’ official policies or established customs led to the injury that Plaintiff suffered. On this ground alone, summary judgment may be granted.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom that caused it.

Sutherlin v. Independent School District No. 40 · filed 2013-05-13

Municipal liability under Monell requires a plaintiff to show “(1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” ... Having found that plaintiffs have stated a § 1983 claim based upon the Equal Protection Clause, the first element of Monell has been satisfied.

A city’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition designee does not become a final policymaker merely by representing the city, so that designation alone cannot establish municipal liability under § 1983.

Heinrich v. City of Casper · filed 2013-05-15

A corporation (and a city is just that) may choose to use a final policymaker as its representative at a deposition, but the Rule doesn’t command it to do so and the selection of a person to serve as a corporate representative doesn’t necessarily imply that person enjoys any kind of final decisionmaking authority.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or practice is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Cook County · filed 2013-05-15

Hill and Johnson being alone in a room together might have been a contributing factor to the sexual assault, but it is not enough to show that a widespread practice or policy was a factor in the constitutional violation; it must have been the moving force.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for applying a federal regulation that is not attributable to it.

James v. Dallas Housing Authority · filed 2013-05-16

However, DHA cannot be held liable for a policy that is not attributable to it; that regulation was promulgated by the federal government and does not give rise to DHA’s liability as a municipality under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional deprivation; an isolated incident of alleged police misconduct does not establish such a policy or custom.

Ulrich v. Pope County · filed 2013-05-21

Generally, an isolated incident of alleged police misconduct, such as Ulrich alleges occurred here, cannot, as a matter of law, establish a municipal policy or custom creating liability under § 1983.

An unwritten municipal practice cannot support § 1983 liability when the complaint identifies only five similar incidents over more than twenty years.

Starks v. City of Waukegan · filed 2013-05-21

Even assuming that these four cases involved misconduct by thé Waukegan police similar to that to which Starks allegedly was subjected, five cases (including Starks’s) over a period of more than twenty years are insufficient to create municipal liability for a “widespread practice.”

Section 1983 permits liability against a governmental entity only when the entity itself causes the constitutional violation.

Ritchie v. Coldwater Community Schools · filed 2013-05-22

A governmental entity, such as the School Board, can be found liable under § 1983 only where the entity itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation results from an official custom, policy, or failure to train.

Kolwitz v. Lincoln County Ex Rel. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office · filed 2013-05-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Kolwitzes’ § 1983 claim because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from a decision by an official with final policymaking authority over that action.

Congine v. Village of Crivitz · filed 2013-05-28

Municipalities are not liable under § 1983 unless a plaintiff proves that the constitutional violation was caused by (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread, although unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal agent with “final policymaking authority.” ... Accordingly, because Chief Frievalt was in effect acting as the Village in making the decision to remove Congine’s flag on July 4, 2009, the Court determines that municipal liability is appropriate here.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its police officers’ actions.

Rodgers v. City of New York · filed 2013-05-29

Thus, to the extent that the seventh cause of action sought to impose vicarious liability on the City defendants for the actions of Parsekian and other police officers pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the City defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing that portion of the cause of action.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged rights violation to hold a municipality liable.

Winkey v. Campanale · filed 2013-05-30

As the defendants point out, there is no evidence in the record concerning any custom or policy of the District that caused the alleged violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Defs.’ Mem. at 7. Absent such evidence, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the District fail.

A § 1983 equal protection claim against a school district must allege facts supporting municipal liability.

Houston v. Independent School District No. 89 · filed 2013-05-30

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs pleading fails to state a § 1983 equal protection claim against the District and its Motion to dismiss Count TV should be granted, but that Plaintiff should receive an opportunity for further amendment.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof that an official policy or tolerated custom caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Ray v. Davis · filed 2013-06-04

Furthermore, in order to show municipal liaiblity, Ray would have to prove that an injury occurred pursuant to an officially executed policy, or toleration of custom that led to, caused, or resulted in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993). Ray has set forth no facts demonstrating proof of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; a complaint that alleges no such policy or custom fails to state a municipal liability claim.

Carter v. Dekalb County, Georgia · filed 2013-06-04

Because Carter’s complaint does not allege any unconstitutional policy or custom, the court did not err in dismissing Carter’s municipal liability claim against the County.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for an employee’s constitutional violation only when a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind it.

McCormick v. The City of McAlester · filed 2013-06-04

And to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the acts of its ... employees, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.”

For an official-capacity § 1983 claim, a sheriff’s statement that staff acted within their authority does not make the substance of their decisions jail policy.

Bailey v. Kerns · filed 2013-06-05

We agree with the district court that such comments about staff’s proper exercise of decision-making authority does not show that the content of their judgments were jail policy.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when its custom or policy causes the injury.

Vadis J. Frone, Sr. v. City of Riverdale · filed 2013-06-05

Frone failed to state a § 1983 claim against the City because he has not alleged any facts that would implicate a city custom or policy responsible for his injury.

Section 1983 permits liability for a government’s agents only when a constitutional deprivation results from a government policy or custom.

Jordan Ex Rel. Y.F. v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-06-07

The District may be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of its agents only if a plaintiff can show that: (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; and (2) the deprivation was the result of a government policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the claimed injury.

Chapman v. Finnegan · filed 2013-06-07

Instead, under Monell and subsequent cases, a plaintiff seeking to prove municipal liability under Section 1983 must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury. ... He has pointed to no policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show a policy or custom that caused the constitutional harm.

Barbosa v. Conlon · filed 2013-06-10

Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under Section 1983 must “demonstrate both the existence of a policy or custom and a causal link between that policy and the constitutional harm.” Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 381 (1st Cir.1989). Here, the plaintiffs have failed to make the requisite showing.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district when its discriminatory policy or custom plausibly caused a violation of equal protection.

Hunt v. Central Consolidated School District · filed 2013-06-12

The Court concludes that, reading the Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, and making all reasonable inferences in their favor, the Plaintiffs state a plausible equal-protection claim in violation of § 1983 against the CCSD based on their Mormon status, because their Complaint makes plausible that a CCSD policy of discrimination against Mormons was the moving force behind their reassignments.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a sheriff’s employment decisions when the sheriff has final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Ezell v. Darr · filed 2013-06-12

These unreviewable decisions include denials of promotions and refusals to allow the earning, or use of comp time. Since these decisions are not subject to meaningful review, the Sheriff is the final decisionmaker for them.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations linking a municipal policy or custom to the alleged constitutional violation to state a claim for municipal liability.

Jackson v. Metropolitan Police Department District of Columbia · filed 2013-06-13

Absent any factual allegations to show an “affirmative link” between a policy or custom and the purported constitutional violation, the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable to prove that an official municipal policy caused the injury.

Almodovar v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-06-13

Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that “„action pursuant to official municipal policy‟ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Perzynski v. Cerro Gordo County · filed 2013-06-18

Perzynski has failed to set forth sufficient evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County could be held liable because she has failed to demonstrate that an official governmental policy or custom caused the alleged violation of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom; an isolated incident or employee mistake is insufficient.

Morris v. Dallas County · filed 2013-06-18

At most, Plaintiffs have raised a material issue of fact regarding an isolated incident or mistake by an employee or employees of the jail, which is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city's custom of ignoring violent police misconduct and failing to supervise or discipline officers is a moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Doe v. City of Marianna, AR · filed 2013-06-20

A jury could reasonably infer, based on this evidence, that Marianna's custom of ignoring violent misconduct and failing to supervise or discipline officers was a moving force behind Gay's assault on Doe.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege that an official policy, custom, or practice caused the injury.

Rihm v. Hancock County Public Library · filed 2013-06-20

Thus, to establish liability against a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that his injury was caused by an official policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to allege that a constitutional violation resulted from an official custom, policy, or failure to train.

Bear v. Pierce County · filed 2013-06-20

The district court properly dismissed Gummo’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants City of Seattle, King County, and Pierce County because Gummo failed to allege facts demonstrating that any alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities, but a municipal liability claim may proceed when the alleged decision could have been made by officials with final policymaking authority.

Hardesty v. Waterworks District No. 4 of Ward Four · filed 2013-06-21

While inartfully pled, it does appear that the plaintiff is asserting he was terminated because of the unilateral decision of the Board members who may have possessed “final policy-making authority” over employment decisions within District 4. Without further information from the parties (information on local ordinances, charters, regulations, and manuals), the court cannot discern whether the Board actually had final policymaking authority, and thus dismissal of the municipal liability claim against District 4 would be premature. Accordingly, while the court will dismiss the plaintiffs complaint to the extent it asserts a vicarious liability claim against District 4, it still finds that the plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to establish a potential municipal liability claim against District 4.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a governmental policy or custom to hold a county liable for a constitutional deprivation.

Rigsby v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2013-06-24

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to demonstrate that the County is liable for constitutional deprivations committed pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if an official policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Wilson v. Milam County · filed 2013-06-25

In regard to his claims against Milam County and the City of Cameron, Wilson failed to specifically identify any official policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must allege a municipal policy, custom, or knowing act that caused the constitutional deprivation.

Pierce v. Village of Horseheads Police Department · filed 2013-06-27

A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 USC § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior, and plaintiff did not allege any policy, custom or knowing act by the County itself that led to the alleged constitutional deprivation (see Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830, 832-833 [2009]; Payne v County of Sullivan, 12 AD3d 807, 809 [2004]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to allege a policy, custom, or practice that caused the injury.

Shelley v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2013-06-27

Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint is devoid of any allegation that their injuries were the result of a county policy, custom, or practice of mishandling human remains. Therefore, this portion of Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted; however, Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend is also granted.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when the sole relevant employee caused the alleged harm but committed no constitutional violation.

Hammel v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation · filed 2013-06-28

Therefore, because I find that Ms. Day did not deprive plaintiffs of a constitutional right, I also find that TriMet did not deprive plaintiffs of a constitutional right. To find otherwise would be to impose respondeat superior liability, and such liability is forbidden under § 1983.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when evidence permits a jury to find that its policymakers knew of a harmful custom or practice and were deliberately indifferent.

Taylor v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-07-01

Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create genuine disputes of material fact as to the knowledge of the District policy makers, and as to whether there existed customs or practices or overall “deliberate indifference” to render the District liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when the municipality itself causes a constitutional violation through its policy or custom.

Oyarzo v. Tuolumne Fire District · filed 2013-07-01

Rather, liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through a “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence that the unconstitutional action was taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Steinberg v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-07-02

In order for his section 1983 claim against the District to survive this motion for summary judgment, Mr. Steinberg must identify a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the unconstitutional action was taken pursuant to a policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts showing that a policy or custom caused the alleged rights violation or that a failure to train or supervise reflected deliberate indifference.

Runnymede-Piper v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-07-03

In summary, because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts which show that a policy or custom of the District Defendants was a “moving force” behind the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or that the District Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference in connection with the execution of District of Columbia child neglect and abuse law, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the District Defendants requires dismissal.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts showing a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged violation of a federal right.

Alexander v. Hedback · filed 2013-06-28

Alexander has failed to set forth sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the city of St. Paul’s policy or custom and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to combine inadequate hiring, failure to train, and ratification into a hybrid theory that bypasses the requirements of each theory of municipal liability.

Cacioppo v. Town of Vail, Colorado · filed 2013-07-08

Indeed, this hybrid theory would permit a plaintiff to circumvent the specific requirements of each of the three individual theories. Standing bereft of legal support, we decline to recognize Mr. Cacioppo’s amorphous hybrid theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot be established merely by showing that other discrimination complaints were made.

Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2013-07-08

Merely showing that other complaints were made is not sufficient to show that there was a custom or policy condoning or promoting racial discrimination.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an employee’s acts solely through respondeat superior; the complaint must give notice of a municipal liability claim.

LeFever v. Ferguson · filed 2013-07-09

And since there is no respondeat superior liability in Section 1983, allegations against Dr. Raker did not put Licking County on notice that Virginia intended to sue on a Monell claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege a municipal policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Sanders v. Lanier · filed 2013-07-10

Assuming without deciding that plaintiff alleges constitutional violations, his claims still fail because he does not allege the existence of a municipal policy or custom, the application of which violated a constitutional right.

Section 1983 makes a school board liable only when its policy, custom, or practice causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Madison County School Board · filed 2013-07-12

There must be some evidence that the constitutional deprivation alleged by the plaintiff was caused by a policy, custom, or practice of the Board.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation occurs pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Traudt v. Roberts, et al. · filed 2013-07-15

Instead, liability attaches to a municipality under § 1983 only if the violation occurs pursuant to an official policy or custom.”

A § 1983 claim against a city requires evidence that the alleged deprivation of rights resulted from an express or implied municipal policy or custom.

Bah v. City of New York · filed 2013-07-17

In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff produced no evidentiary support for her claim that the acts which allegedly deprived her of her constitutional rights were performed pursuant to an express or implied policy or custom of the City, and thus failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see e.g. Rodgers v City of New York, 106 AD3d 1068 [2013]; Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 847 [2011]; Graham v City of New York, 279 AD2d 435, 436 [2001]; Holmberg v Sheriff’s Off., County of Orange, 279 AD2d 551 [2001]; Mann v Alvarez, 242 AD2d 318, 319-320 [1997]; Jackson v Police Dept. of City of N.Y., 192 AD2d 641, 642 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1004 [1994]; Jenkins v City of New York, 478 F3d 76, 95 [2007]; see generally Cozzani v County of Suffolk, 84 AD3d 1147 [2011]; Bryant v City of New York, 188 AD2d 445, 446 [1992]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for a Section 1981 violation to show that an official policy, custom, or usage caused the injury.

Olatunji v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-07-19

Since plaintiff must pursue his § 1981 substantive claims through the § 1983 remedial mechanism, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was injured pursuant to some official policy, custom, or usage of the District of Columbia.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when sufficient evidence shows a custom or policy behind employees’ retaliatory termination.

Williams v. Riley · filed 2013-07-22

The County asserts a lack of evidence to show that Appellees’ termination occurred because of or in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights. Based on the facts noted above and review of pertinent portions of the record, we are persuaded there was sufficient evidence of a custom or policy.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy, practice, custom, or a policymaker’s order caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Kocar v. City of Vader · filed 2013-07-24

Finally, Kocar’s Monell claim fails because Kocar has not shown that any alleged constitutional violation was “caused by a policy, practice, or custom of the entity, or . . . the result of an order by a policy-making officer.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury, or when a final policymaker commits or ratifies the unconstitutional action and its basis.

Hobbs v. City of Long Beach · filed 2013-07-26

A local government may be held liable under § 1983 when (1) implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury or (2) the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a governmental unit based on officers’ actions when the officers inflicted no constitutional harm.

Greer v. Harris County, Texas · filed 2013-08-02

There is no authority for an award of damages against a governmental unit based on the actions of particular officers when the factfinder has found that those officers inflicted no constitutional harm.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a Monell claim when the complaint fails to state an underlying constitutional violation.

D.B. Ex Rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp · filed 2013-08-02

Accordingly, the complaint fails to state an equal-protection claim against Kopp and Moravits. With that conclusion, the Monell claim against Grant County necessarily fails.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the constitutional violation results from official municipal policy.

C. Line, Inc. v. City of Davenport · filed 2013-08-02

To prove a constitutionally based § 1983 claim against a municipality, C. Line must demonstrate that the constitutional violation resulted from an action taken pursuant to “official municipal policy.”

Section 1983 claims against supervisors and municipal defendants fail when the officers they allegedly failed to train or supervise violated no constitutional right.

Aipperspach v. McInerney · filed 2013-08-02

However, if those subordinates did not violate anyone’s constitutional rights, then the claims against their superiors fail. ... Because Officer McLaughlan, Sergeant Ballard, and Officer Westrieh did not violate Al-Hakim’s constitutional rights, the Court grants summary judgment to the City of Riverside, Missouri, Police Chief Gregory Mills, and the KCBOPC on Plaintiffs section 1983 claims.

A government entity may be liable under § 1983 when its policy, practice, or custom is a moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Goodman v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2013-08-02

“A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” ... Accordingly, these facts defeat LVMPD’s attempt to secure summary judgment notwithstanding the individual officers’ unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to link a City policy or custom to a constitutional violation.

Thomas v. City of Houston · filed 2013-08-05

Thomas’s § 1983 claims fail because he cannot link any City policy or custom to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a policy or custom causes the injury; a municipality is not liable merely because it employs the officer.

Glover v. City of Wilmington · filed 2013-08-07

In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held a municipality cannot be found liable for § 1983 claims on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Rather, a municipality can only be held liable when the execution of its policy or custom inflicts the injury. ... Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Monell claim.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof that the municipality itself was at fault and caused the constitutional violation.

Criscuolo v. Grant County · filed 2013-08-08

No reasonable jury could find that Lamens’s actions “reflected [the] implementation of a generally applicable rule,” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997), or attribute fault and causation to Grant County itself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its custom or policy caused a constitutional violation.

Garabis v. Unknown Officers of the Metropolitan Police · filed 2013-08-08

Even if plaintiff could establish that D.C. police officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights, her section 1983 claim still fails because she has not demonstrated that the District’s custom or policy caused those violations.

Section 1983 permits a county to be liable for its own violation, but not merely because its employee is liable.

Belbachir v. County of McHenry · filed 2013-08-12

What’s true is that if a County employee were liable, the County itself would not be liable merely by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior; the doctrine is inapplicable in section 1983 cases. But an institution can violate section 1983 just as an individual can.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; deliberate indifference by high-level officials can establish such a policy or custom.

Floyd v. City of New York · filed 2013-08-12

One way to establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom is through a showing of “deliberate indifference” by high-level officials. ... For the foregoing reasons, the City is liable for the violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming municipal liability for failure to train to show deliberate indifference and a causal connection between the training failure and a constitutional injury.

Martin v. Unknown U.S. Marshals · filed 2013-08-15

To establish a Section 1983 cause of action against a municipality for failure to train, supervise, investigate, or discipline its police officers, the plaintiff must show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. ... Plaintiffs’ “failure to train” allegations do not encompass an allegation that either of the municipalities’ alleged policies or customs — inadequate investigatory and crime scene training — led to Linda and Dwayne’s seizure.

A local government is liable under § 1983 only if its custom, policy, or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. County of Monterey · filed 2013-08-19

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s due process claim because, despite several opportunities to amend, Johnson failed to allege that a County custom, policy, or practice was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to plausibly allege a municipal policy or custom; an isolated incident of misconduct does not suffice.

Burbar v. Incorporated Village of Garden City · filed 2013-08-19

Moreover, as here, “allegations of a single, isolated, incident of [municipal] misconduct will not suffice” for purposes of demonstrating the existence of a municipal policy.

A complaint states a municipal liability claim under § 1983 when it plausibly alleges that an official had final policymaking authority over the challenged decision.

Wiseman v. City of Michigan City · filed 2013-08-19

While discovery will likely shed further light on this question and may ultimately lead to an opposite conclusion, the complaint adequately states a claim for municipal liability against the City of Michigan City under section 1983.

A municipality’s liability under § 1983 based on an unconstitutional custom requires evidence that the custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Schultz v. Utah County · filed 2013-08-19

Plaintiffs’ statements regarding Utah County’s practices were unsupported and insufficient to show that Utah County is liable for Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries on the basis of an unconstitutional custom.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for supervisory or municipal liability.

Salyers Ex Rel. Estate of Salyers v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2013-08-21

For both, “a prerequisite to [liability] is that a constitutional violation has occurred.” ... Because Davis committed no constitutional violation and the remaining defendants barely interacted with Salyers, if at all, Plaintiff’s claims against them also come up short.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for failure to train or supervise officers without notice of a need for training or supervision in the relevant area.

Proescher v. Bell · filed 2013-08-21

Plaintiff has not alleged that Gwinnett County received any “notice of a need to train or supervise” its police officers regarding the practice of detaining armed citizens for identifications, and the official-capacity claim is required to be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a policy or custom that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

S. J. Beaulieu, Jr. v. Pearl River Town · filed 2013-08-22

Moreover, Haisch did not identify a specific policy that served as the moving force behind the alleged underlying constitutional violation.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim can rest on an express policy, a widespread custom, or a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Drager v. Village of Bellwood · filed 2013-08-22

To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead the constitutional violation was caused by (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal agent with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality or officials in their official capacities for discrimination to show that the challenged acts followed a municipal policy or custom.

Moore v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2013-08-22

Because Moore cannot demonstrate that MTA had a custom or policy of discrimination, he is unable to state a claim against MTA or the individual Defendants in their official capacities under §§ 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a federal law tort caused by a municipal policy or custom without a judgment against the individual actors.

Askins v. City of New York · filed 2013-08-23

It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff must obtain a judgment against the individual tortfeasors in order to establish the liability of the municipality. It suffices to plead and prove against the municipality that municipal actors committed the tort against the plaintiff and that the tort resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for an officer’s constitutional injury only when a municipal policy or custom caused it; employing the officer alone is insufficient.

Walters v. Muhlenburg Township Police Department · filed 2013-08-27

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability attaches to a municipality only where the “government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Here, Walters did not point to any facts suggesting that the Department had a policy or custom of permitting its officers to use excessive force in making arrests.

A municipality has no liability under § 1983 when no constitutional violation occurred.

Tubbs v. Gohrman · filed 2013-08-29

Because there were no constitutional violations, the County has no municipal liability, see Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), and we need not address the Estate’s arguments regarding qualified immunity.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom that causes the constitutional violation; a report that does not put the municipality on notice of the relevant practice is insufficient to establish municipal liability.

Robinson v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2013-08-30

The Court agrees and finds that the 2003 CCRB Report did not put the District on notice of a custom or policy of constitutional violations such that municipal liability under Section 1983 can be imposed on the District.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the municipality causes a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Correia v. Town of Framingham · filed 2013-09-03

Municipalities may only be held hable under § 1983 if the governmental body causes a person to be subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when its officers committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Powell v. Murphy · filed 2013-09-03

Having established that Murphy, Suppa and Truesdell did not violate the Plaintiffs constitutional rights, the Court finds that the Defendant County cannot be held liable under § 1983, regardless of whether the Murphy, Suppa and/or Trues-dell acted pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or unofficial custom causes a constitutional injury.

Pierre v. City of Miramar, Florida, Inc. · filed 2013-09-05

To establish the City’s liability under section 1983, Pierre must identify an official policy or unofficial custom that caused a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits suits against local governments but does not make them vicariously liable for employees’ constitutional violations.

Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton · filed 2013-09-06

While local governments may be sued under § 1983, they cannot be held vicariously liable for their employees’ constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a municipality’s conduct and its officers’ acts, such that the municipality’s conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights.

Davis v. Town of New Durham, NH · filed 2013-09-10

To succeed on that theory, plaintiff must show an “affirmative link” between the acts of the “municipality or its supervisory personnel” and the “acts . . . of the offending employee,” such that the municipality’s conduct amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for its employees’ actions merely because it employs them.

Murphy-Taylor v. Hofmann · filed 2013-09-12

Even if the County can, in some respects, be viewed as the employer of those individuals, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a municipal policy or custom; conclusory allegations of one do not suffice.

Falk v. Perez · filed 2013-09-12

Plaintiff names the wrongs she suffered and alleges that they resulted from a policy or custom. These bare allegations of a policy or custom are not entitled to the presumption of truth.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim fails when the underlying claims against the individual defendants do not survive.

Zimmerlink v. Zapotosky · filed 2013-09-13

Additionally, because no claims against the individual defendants survive, Zimmerlink’s municipal liability claims against the County were properly dismissed by the Magistrate Judge.

A school district may face Section 1983 municipal liability when the complaint sufficiently alleges that its principal was the final policymaker for the challenged conduct.

Eldridge v. Rochester City School District · filed 2013-09-13

Such allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to permit Eldridge to state a municipal liability claim against the District under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed past dismissal when allegations of inadequate training and the city’s response to an officer’s conduct adequately support the claim.

Hunter v. Prisbe · filed 2013-09-13

Although these allegations are somewhat thin, and although the standard for asserting municipal liability under Monell is a challenging one, we nonetheless find at this point that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded a claim for Monell liability relating to the alleged underlying conduct of Corporal Prisbe in this case and the City’s response thereto, and we thus find that the motion to dismiss this claim should be denied, and that the parties proceed with discovery on this claim.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability based on an arrest require an underlying constitutional violation.

Gray v. Ector · filed 2013-09-18

Because probable cause existed, Mr. Gray’s arrest also cannot serve as an underlying constitutional violation to establish supervisory liability for the other individual defendants or municipal liability for the City.

Under § 1983, a local government is liable only if its policy was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Jones v. Rutherford · filed 2013-09-19

Thus, because Jones provided no evidence that Jacksonville had a policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations, the district court correctly granted Rutherford summary judgment.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation is caused by its custom or policy.

Konah v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-09-20

Constitutional claims against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-step analysis. ... First, a court must find that the plaintiff suffered “a predicate constitutional violation.” ... At the second step, a court must determine whether “a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation is caused by a municipal policy, custom or practice, or a municipal policymaker’s decision.

Pearce v. Labella · filed 2013-09-20

In order to hold the City liable under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove that the constitutional violation was caused by: (1) a municipal policy; (2) a municipal custom or practice; or (3) the decision of a municipal policymaker. ... Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to the City’s Monell liability.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a decision by a final policymaker; review by an independent arbitrator does not make the decision nonfinal.

Francis R. Carter, Jr. v. City of Melbourne, Florida · filed 2013-09-23

An independent arbitrator’s review of a decision by a city employee does not constitute a “review by the municipality's authorized policymakers,” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988), and the underlying decision reviewed by the arbitrator would be ... final for the purposes of municipal liability (so long as there are no other forms of meaningful review of the decision by city policymakers).

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when no constitutional injury occurred.

Reppucci v. Winchester P D , et al. · filed 2013-09-23

For the reasons discussed above, it is plain that none of the defendants violated any of Reppucci’s constitutional rights (and, at a minimum, that he is precluded from relitigating his claims to the contrary in this forum). Consequently, his Monell claims necessarily fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires liability on an underlying substantive claim; the police board could not be liable when none of the individual defendants was liable.

Burton v. St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners · filed 2013-09-24

But "[i]n order for municipal liability to attach, individual liability must first be found on an underlying substantive claim." Cooper v. Martin, 634 F.3d 477, 481–82 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, none of the individual defendants are liable on Burton's § 1983 claims, so Burton's claims against the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners necessarily fail.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable solely for its officers’ acts; municipal liability requires an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Cevallos v. Silva · filed 2013-09-25

A city is not liable under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior; a municipality is only liable for acts directly attributable to it “through some official action or imprimatur.” Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). ... Nowhere does Cevallos’ amended complaint allege that a policy, practice, custom, or procedure of the City or of the police department was the moving force behind the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 claim against a city can survive dismissal when the complaint plausibly alleges that the body responsible for the challenged action had municipal policymaking authority.

Oberg v. City of Taunton · filed 2013-09-25

Given that the City Council had the power to call an executive session and failed to do so, serves as the disciplinary body for the City, and voted to place Plaintiff on administrative leave, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient information at this juncture to plausibly conclude the City Council had policymaking authority in this area. Plaintiff’s claims against the City in Counts One, Three, and Five are thus not subject to dismissal on this ground.

Section 1983 requires proof of a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality or an official-capacity defendant liable for discrimination.

Urquhart v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2013-09-25

Because Urquhart cannot demonstrate that MTA had a custom or policy of discrimination, he is unable to state a claim against MTA or the individual Defendants in their official capacities under §§ 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation, not merely because it employed the person responsible.

Sinclair v. City of Grandview · filed 2013-09-26

However, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against municipalities. ... Instead, liability will attach to a municipality only when “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city to allege that a city policy or custom caused the injury.

George Ballard, III v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-09-27

Finally, the District Court dismissed Ballard’s § 1983 claim against the City of Philadelphia because Ballard did not allege that a policy or custom of the City caused his injury. ... Finding no error in the District Court’s legal conclusions, we will not disturb the District Court’s judgment.

Section 1983 holds municipalities liable for constitutional injuries caused by their policies or customs, not solely because they employ the person responsible.

Biswas v. City of New York · filed 2013-09-30

Thus, for § 1983 claims, municipalities are not subject to liability under a theory of respondeat superior, but rather on the basis that their policies or customs inflicted the alleged injuries under the Monell doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Smith v. Ciesielski · filed 2013-09-30

There can be no municipal liability under Section 1983, however, unless there has been a constitutional violation in the first place. ... It is on this fundamental, antecedent question of constitutional harm that Plaintiffs claim founders.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by decisions of a board to which it has delegated final policy making authority.

Stotts v. Pierson · filed 2013-09-30

As such the City of Athens is subject to municipal liability under § 1983 for constitutional torts flowing from the acts of its Board of Zoning Appeals.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a local government to identify a deprivation of federal rights caused by its policy or custom.

Chaney v. Fayette County Public School District · filed 2013-09-30

In order to state a § 1983 claim against government entities such as the District, a plaintiff must identify a specific deprivation of federal rights and the local government policy or custom that caused the deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plausibly allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional injury.

Jackson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2013-09-30

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Jackson’s First Amendment claim against the District without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to plausibly allege that his constitutional injury was caused by a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its officers’ actions solely because it employs them.

Dejarnett v. Willis · filed 2013-10-04

To the extent Dejarnett is asserting her § 1983 claim against the City, a plaintiff cannot rely on a respondeat superior theory to hold a municipality liable for individual actions of its officers.

Section 1983 municipal liability for speech retaliation requires a policy or custom targeting the right to speak free from retaliation.

Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch Bd · filed 2013-10-07

In order to establish the School Board’s liability based on an adverse employment decision in response to her protected speech, Goudeau needed to demonstrate a policy or custom targeting the right that was violated (i.e., the right to engage in protected speech free from retaliation), rather than a policy concerning conduct about which she spoke (i.e., the changing of students’ grades).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold the District of Columbia liable to plead facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged violation.

Brookens v. United States of America · filed 2013-10-07

However, the plaintiffs rely solely on the events surrounding the prosecution of Brookens as evidence of a municipal policy or custom, and they have not pled facts plausibly alleging that the arrest and prosecution of Brookens establishes that there was a municipal policy orchestrated through multiple actors, culminating in the prosecution of Brookens for the improper practice of law, to steer pro bono work away from predominantly African-American law firms, to infringe Brookens’ right to free speech, or to infringe Brookens’ or Todd’s rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a default judgment against an officer based solely on the officer’s individual actions when the municipality had no opportunity to respond.

Banks v. Slay · filed 2013-10-08

In this case, Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus compelling the City and the Board to pay the default judgment entered against Officer Williams in Plaintiffs’ underlying § 1983 action. ... For the foregoing reasons, this court cannot conclude, based upon the Court’s rationale in Brandon, that any legal authority exists to require the City or the Board to pay the default judgment entered solely against Officer Williams.

Section 1983 permits a Monell claim to proceed when allegations plausibly show that an official policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department · filed 2013-10-09

Newell alleges that the correctional staff acted pursuant to an official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates’ medical issues and/or complaints about problems with walking if they are ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene items such as adult diapers to inmates, among other things. The allegations are sufficient; they amount to what can be considered a “moving force.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation results from an official custom or policy.

Whiting v. Bonazza · filed 2013-10-16

But municipal liability under § 1983 arises only when a constitutional deprivation results from an official custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to plead incidents occurring before or after the alleged injury to establish a pattern or practice for municipal liability.

Davila v. Northern Regional Joint Police Board · filed 2013-10-21

It follows that all alleged instances of the pattern or practice, whether occurring before or after the incident in question, may be pled to establish the Plaintiffs claim for § 1983 municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when the city has not deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.

Francia v. City of San Jacinto · filed 2013-10-23

Finally, because Francia has failed to establish that the City deprived her of a federal constitutional right, she cannot establish liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability claims fail when the plaintiff does not state a predicate constitutional violation.

Douglas v. District of Columbia Housing Authority · filed 2013-10-25

Further, because plaintiff failed to state a claim for any predicate constitutional violation by Officer Millhouse, plaintiff’s supervisory and Monell liability claims in Counts II and III fail as well.

Section 1983 makes municipal liability depend on an underlying violation of rights by a municipal officer.

Peters v. Woodbury County · filed 2013-10-25

However, the failure to allege (or establish or generate a genuine issue of material fact on) a single violation of rights by a municipal officer is fatal to a claim of “Monell liability” against the municipality.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities only when an official policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Amaya v. City of San Antonio · filed 2013-10-30

However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the third element of municipal liability under Monell—namely, “a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted). ... Because “[a] customary municipal policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from [a] single constitutional violation[],” Plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, because Plaintiff has not been afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend with respect to his § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an unconstitutional act is caused by a municipal policy, custom, or final policymaker.

Hall v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-10-30

Because an “unconstitutional act” is a requirement for Monell liability, Plaintiffs cannot base their Monell claim on any of the encounters that were dismissed above.

Section 1983 requires municipal liability to be established for claims against a municipality regardless of the constitutional violation alleged.

Kerns v. Independent School District No. 31 · filed 2013-10-31

This argument reflects a misunderstanding of basic principles of § 1983 law, as municipal liability must be established regardless of the type of alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability plaintiff to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged federal violation.

Burgess v. Fischer · filed 2013-11-01

A plaintiff raising a municipal liability claim under § 1983 must demonstrate that the alleged federal violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.