42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when officials with final policymaking authority use that authority to carry out an unconstitutional act.

Guichard v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2014-06-16

Under Monell, the Town can be held liable if Tohill and. Incagliato used their policy making authority to effectuate an unconstitutional cleanup of Plaintiffs property.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be sued only when its policy or custom injures the plaintiff.

Pittman v. Martin · filed 2014-06-17

A municipality may be sued under § 1983 only when its execution of a government policy or custom injures the plaintiff.

Section 1983 holds a school district liable only for its own policies or customs; a complaint must plausibly allege such a policy or custom.

Carmichael v. Galbraith · filed 2014-06-19

“Under § 1983, a municipality or local governmental entity such as an independent school district may be held liable only for acts for which it is actually responsible,” ie., the school district’s policies and customs.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ actions based solely on their employment relationship.

Jackson v. Pena · filed 2014-06-19

A municipality or employer cannot be held vicariously liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the actions of its employees based solely on an agency relationship.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to be the moving force behind an alleged constitutional violation for a city to be liable.

Cornu-Labat v. Merred · filed 2014-06-24

Cornu-Labat also fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City of Quincy had a “policy or custom” that served as the “moving force” behind an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when the alleged constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.

Ball v. City of Muncie · filed 2014-06-25

Plaintiffs allegation that Mayor Dennis Tyler’s decision as a final policymaker led to a constitutional violation is sufficient to state a plausible Monell claim, defeating the City of Mun-cie’s request to be dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes an injury or inadequate training or supervision is the moving force behind a deprivation of rights.

Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2014-07-01

To impose liability on a local government under § 1983, the Sandovals must prove that an “‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). In the alternative, they must prove that inadequate training or supervision was the moving force behind the deprivation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387–90 (1989). The Sandovals’ bare- bones allegations of municipal liability on the grounds that “multiple officers with varying degrees of experience” were involved in the events are insufficient to establish municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not make a local government vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by its agents or employees.

Ickes v. Grassmeyer · filed 2014-07-02

Nonetheless, a local government cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by its agents or employees.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation causally connected to a municipal policy.

Cucuta v. New York City · filed 2014-07-03

Moreover, and most importantly, the Court’s determination that Cucuta has not proven a constitutional violation (see Part II above) is fatal to his Monell claim, because the existence of a municipal policy only would be actionable if it were causally connected to a constitutional violation.

A § 1983 claim against a county can survive dismissal when the plaintiff plausibly alleges a policy or custom supporting municipal liability.

McLaine v. Lackawanna County · filed 2014-07-03

Additionally, viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the McLaine, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show the presence of a policy, rule, regulation, or custom so that liability under Monell would follow.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a policymaker’s official policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Pugh v. Byrd · filed 2014-07-03

For Jackson County to be held liable under § 1983, there must be “proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” ... Because the writing of bail bonds does not give rise to a constitutionally protected interest, the third element, violation of a constitutional right, is lacking, thus barring the County from being held liable under § 1983 for any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation; a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence of such a policy.

Cloes v. City of Mesquite · filed 2014-07-07

First, we hold that the district court properly granted the motion for summary judgment on Cloes’s Monell claim against the City. The district court held that Cloes did not provide evidence to show that a City policy was the moving force behind a constitutional injury. We agree.

A city is liable under § 1983 for an employee’s sexual harassment only if an official policy or a widespread, pervasive custom caused the injury.

Sheryl v. Mooers v. City of Lake City, Minnesota, Karen England, individually · filed 2014-07-07

To show that the city nevertheless had a widespread custom of permitting sexual harassment, Mooers would have to show that sexual harassment was “pervasive” and “widespread.” Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mooers, the record contains no evidence of a widespread and pervasive custom of permitting sexual harassment, but rather is limited to Dunbar’s actions.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the alleged violation; an employee’s decision does not establish liability unless the employee had final policymaking authority.

Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-07-07

The Court therefore concludes that Director Sarvis is not a policy maker for the purposes of section 1983 liability, and that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to establish Monell liability in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a discriminatory municipal policy, but the complaint must allege facts supporting the policy’s existence.

Carmichael v. City of Cleveland · filed 2014-07-07

Plaintiff appears to put more weight into her argument that the City of Warrensville Heights and the City of Cleveland have in place a policy and practice of not making prompt investigations of missing persons when the person is African-American. While such a claim would be viable under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), merely alleging that such a policy is in place is not enough.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a causal link between the municipality’s conduct and the constitutional harm; notice received too late to prevent the violation does not establish liability.

Singh v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-07-08

If the District knew about the likelihood of violations too late and had no reason to know of the violations sooner, it is not liable under Section 1983 because to hold otherwise would be to impose respondeat superior liability; this is because municipal liability under Section 1983 demands a causal link between the District’s actions (or inactions) and the constitutional harm, which respondeat superior does not require.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for an employee's constitutional violation only when a municipal policy or custom caused it.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-07-08

In a case against a municipality in which a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation by municipal employees, the statute's causation requirement is satisfied if (and only if) a municipal "policy or custom" is the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an authorized policymaker approves an officer’s decision and its basis.

Benson v. City of San Jose · filed 2014-07-11

Because a jury could find that Chief Davis’s conclusion that “Pettis had acted reasonably and within Police Department policy and procedure,” constituted official approval of Pettis’s decision and the basis for it, we remand on the question of municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality or an official sued in an official capacity without an underlying constitutional violation.

Royal v. Spragins · filed 2014-07-11

In the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, there is no municipal liability for the City or for the Chief of Police sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable to show that a district policy or custom caused the injury.

Jahn v. Farnsworth · filed 2014-07-16

The Court finds Defendant Marysville Public Schools is not liable for Jake’s suicide because Jake’s suicide was not caused by Defendant Marysville Public Schools’ policies or customs.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a municipality; municipal liability requires an injury caused by a government policy or custom.

Reiner v. Dandurand · filed 2014-07-16

There is no respondeat superior liability under Monell; instead, municipalities are only liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury.” ... The Complaint makes no such allegations, and dismissal of any latent § 1983 liability against Defendant Town of Hebron is appropriate.

A school district can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury, including a deliberately indifferent failure to train coaches.

Mann v. Palmerton Area School District · filed 2014-07-17

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants had a policy or custom of failing to medically clear student athletes and failing to enforce and/or enact proper and adequate policies for head injuries. In addition, they adequately allege that failure to train the coaches on proper procedures and a safety protocol amounts to deliberate indifference to recurring head injuries, a common hazard associated with football.

A municipality’s deliberate indifference under § 1983 requires notice that its procedures are inadequate and likely to violate constitutional rights.

Wall v. Stanek · filed 2014-07-18

Given the uncertainty of the law, as discussed above, Wall cannot show that Hennepin County demonstrated deliberate indifference, i.e., that Hennepin County had notice that its procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged injury; employee misconduct alone is insufficient.

Koolen v. Town of Warren · filed 2014-07-21

Mr. Koolen has failed to show on the developed summary judgment record that the Town established a well-settled and widespread policy or custom that led to his alleged damages.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county when its officers committed no constitutional violation.

Hawkins v. Gage County · filed 2014-07-22

Without a constitutional violation by the officers, there can be no liability for the county.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation was caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Louis v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-07-23

For a Monell claim to survive a municipal-defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court must conclude that there is evidence both (1) of a “predicate constitutional violation” and (2) “that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.”

A plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 must allege facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Mayzick v. County of Nassau · filed 2014-07-23

From a careful review of the Complaint, it is clear that Plaintiff alleges no facts that plausibly suggest the existence of any policy or custom by the County of Nassau that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the injury.

McKay v. City of New York · filed 2014-07-24

The claims against the City must be dismissed because the plaintiff has submitted no evidence that any municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the plaintiffs arrest or prosecution.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable solely because it employs the person who caused the injury.

Potkay v. Ament · filed 2014-07-24

Although cities are “persons” for purposes of section 1983, liability against them may not arise vicariously; cities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an alleged custom of discrimination without evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the custom existed.

Rouei v. Village of Skokie · filed 2014-07-28

For these reasons, the Court holds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Rouei has made out a Monell claim and therefore grants summary judgment in the Village of Skokie’s favor on that claim.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality to identify facts showing that a policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Kitko v. Young · filed 2014-07-29

Cameron’s allegations against Clearfield County similarly fail to plausibly state a claim. Under § 1983, a municipality may be held liable only if “the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” ... The second amended complaint alleges that Clearfield County “maintained a policy, custom or practice of approving search warrants without probable cause,” but pleads no factual details substantiating that claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Norton v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2014-07-30

Rather, in order to sustain a claim for relief pursuant to § 1983 against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must show the existence of an official policy or custom that caused injury and a direct causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has set forth sufficient allegations to support Monell liability against the Town.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on an unwritten policy of deliberate indifference to employees’ conduct, which requires evaluating that conduct.

Floyd v. City of New York · filed 2014-07-30

Where, as here, the § 1983 claims are based on an unwritten policy owing to the City’s deliberate indifference to its employees’ conduct, liability necessarily turns on an analysis of that conduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a city policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Winston Garner v. The City of Memphis · filed 2014-07-31

However, even taken in the light most favorable to Garner, these allegations do not establish an unlawful policy or custom on the part of the City which would give rise to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be held liable when the municipality itself causes a rights violation.

Suber v. Wright · filed 2014-07-31

Municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, accordingly, they may be held liable under § 1983 when the municipality itself causes the violation.

Section 1983 does not make a municipal entity liable solely for its employees’ actions; the plaintiff must allege that its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Epps v. Gray · filed 2014-07-31

“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983,” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95), and, therefore, the DCHA cannot be held liable solely on account of the actions of its employees, see Harris, 489 U.S. at 385.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

Escobar v. Harris County · filed 2014-07-31

To establish municipal liability, there must be proof of three elements: a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a violation of a constitutional right whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. ... Since Escobar failed to come forward with evidence to raise an issue of material fact on elements of each of the theories of liability for the County that she presented, the trial court did not err, by granting summary judgment for the County.

A municipality is liable under section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Rivera v. Co. of Riverside CA4/2 · filed 2014-08-01

A municipality, such as the County, can be liable under section 1983 only when the constitutional tort results from a policy or custom of the municipality.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an unwritten discriminatory practice based on a single incident; the practice must be persistent and widespread.

Carmichael ex rel. Estate of Moore v. City of New York · filed 2014-08-01

Although a jury could well find that there was differing treatment of the two cases, and even assuming that this differential treatment could be taken as racially motivated, it is well established that a single case, even so tragic a case as Ms. Moore’s, cannot itself show a practice so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality for acts of its police chief in his official capacity when the complaint plausibly alleges that he was the final law enforcement decision maker.

Hernandez v. Theriot · filed 2014-08-05

The Plaintiff has plead facts, which if true, raise a plausible right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Sorrento for the official capacity acts of its Police Chief Earl Theriot, Jr.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires facts supporting municipal responsibility for a constitutional violation; bare assertions about policies and training are insufficient.

Cooper v. Rhea County · filed 2014-08-06

Plaintiff has offered no factual content from which the Court could reasonably infer Rhea County is liable for the misconduct alleged, making Plaintiffs bare legal assertions insufficient to support his allegation that Rhea County is responsible for a constitutional violation under one of the Spears sources of municipal liability.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality to allege an official policy or unofficial custom that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Thompson v. Mercer · filed 2014-08-07

To state a claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “that there was either an official policy or an unofficial custom, adopted by the municipality, that was the moving force behind the claimed constitutional violation.” ... Moreover, neither the complaint nor the amended complaint makes any mention of such a policy or custom. The claim against the County was therefore properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an unconstitutional policy or practice based on a single Brady violation.

Truvia v. Julien · filed 2014-08-08

The existence of a single Brady violation is insufficient to support a government entity’s liability under Section 1983 for an unconstitutional policy or practice.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires sufficient evidence of a city policy or custom.

Smith v. City of St. Ann · filed 2014-08-12

First, we agree with the district court that Smith’s evidence did not sufficiently establish a City policy or custom that would subject City to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single challenged decision made by an official with policymaking authority.

Giscombe v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2014-08-12

Walcott, as DOE Chancellor, was a policymaker under § 1983. Fanning, the school’s principal, was also a policymaker, as he signed-off on the disciplinary charges. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 retaliation claim is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a rights violation results from a municipal policy, custom, or decision by a policymaking official.

Torres v. Police Officer Jones · filed 2014-08-13

As an additional ... ground for dismissal of the cause of action in action No. 1 alleging the violation of the plaintiffs civil and constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 insofar as asserted against the City, and the cause of action in action No. 2 alleging “municipal liability” against the NYPD, the City and the NYPD established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the criminal charges brought against the plaintiff did not arise from the implementation or application of an unlawful or unconstitutional municipal policy, regulation, custom, or practice (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694 [1978]; Pendleton v City of New York, 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2007]).

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs an officer who caused a constitutional injury.

Marcano v. City of Schenectady · filed 2014-08-13

It is well settled that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

J.D.D., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Clinton, Mich. · filed 2014-08-14

Under § 1983, the Township is liable only if it had a “policy or custom” that resulted in the constitutional deprivation.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom directly causes a civil rights violation or its failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference.

Tyler Young v. Owens · filed 2014-08-15

However, “[a] municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that his civil rights have been violated as a direct result of that municipality’s policy or custom or if a failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to such rights.” ... Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to prove the existence of a policy or custom that would support a claim against the Township.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional harm by an employee when county liability is based on that employee’s actions.

Range v. Douglas · filed 2014-08-15

“Where, as here, [a county’s] liability is alleged on the basis of the unconstitutional actions of its employees, it is necessary to show that the employees inflicted a constitutional harm.” ... Having concluded that, as to County employees Kersker and Dr. Cleveland, Plaintiffs have not shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of Plaintiffs= constitutional rights, we must also conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Hamilton County on this claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district for a discriminatory decision made by an official with final policymaking authority over that decision.

Benedith v. Malverne Union Free School District · filed 2014-08-15

However, the Court finds that there is evidence that Romano acted as a “final policymaker” with respect to the assignments of administrative duty. Therefore, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing Besson’s race-based discrimination claims under Section 1981 and 1983 against the District on the basis of the disparate assignments of administrative duty.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city when the plaintiff plausibly alleges a discriminatory policy or custom attributable to a final policymaker.

Hagan v. City of New York · filed 2014-08-15

This is sufficient to allege that a final policymaker was either responsible for, or acquiesced in, a policy or custom of discrimination.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on repeated constitutional violations against one person when a municipality’s failure to respond supports an inference that it condoned the conduct.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2014-08-19

Whether a municipality’s failure to respond involved a string of unrelated incidents involving different people, or a string of related incidents involving the same individual—the logical inference available from such a course of “deliberate indifference” is the same, i.e. that the municipality encouraged, or at least condoned, a course of unconstitutional activity by failing to take action to deter or eliminate it.

Section 1983 claims against a city for failure to train or supervise fail when the officers had probable cause to arrest and are not individually liable.

Gibson v. Rick Cook · filed 2014-08-20

Our conclusion that Officers Mitchell, Benton, and Cook are not individually liable because they had probable cause to arrest Gibson forecloses these § 1983 claims against the City.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a North Carolina county when its sheriff, as the county’s final law enforcement policymaker, plausibly acted in a way that constitutes county policy.

Wilcoxson v. Buncombe County · filed 2014-08-20

Based upon the foregoing, then, the Court concludes that the North Carolina Constitution and general statutes, together with North Carolina case law, support the conclusion that a North Carolina sheriff is not a State actor but a county’s chief law enforcement officer, and is the ultimate policymaker for the. county regarding matters of law enforcement. Further, in this matter, the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that Sheriff Bobby Medford plausibly engaged in improper actions that could constitute county policy for which Buncombe County would sustain liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege that a municipal policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation.

Lesesne v. Doe · filed 2014-08-21

Assuming for the sake of argument that Lesesne has stated a claim for a predicate constitutional violation,2 his claim against the District still must be dismissed because the amended complaint fails to allege a custom, policy or practice of the District or the DOC that caused Lesesne’s injuries.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for constitutional violations allegedly committed by its employees.

Laster v. City of Tampa Police Department · filed 2014-08-22

The City cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment allegedly committed by its individual employees.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes the deprivation of a federal right.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-08-25

Plaintiff does not allege (nor state any facts suggesting) that Burke was following official policy, practice or custom when he produced the alleged fraudulent affidavit and police report. Therefore, no federal claim has been stated against the District of Columbia, and the claim against the District is dismissed.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a constitutional violation by a municipal employee.

Estate of Michael Mark Pollard v. Hood Coun · filed 2014-08-25

To impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, plaintiffs must first show that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation—here, deliberate indifference to Pollard’s known suicide risk.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused its employees’ unconstitutional acts.

Dodson v. Board of Education of the Valley Stream Union Free School District · filed 2014-08-25

Rather, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must plead that the unconstitutional acts of its employees are attributable to a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

Mpala v. City of New Haven · filed 2014-08-26

Mpala’s argument regarding the City’s liability for Tonelli’s conduct is best characterized as a respondeat superior theory. It is well established that “‘a municipality cannot be made liable’ under § 1983 for acts of its employees ‘by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.’” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986)).

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom directly causes the alleged injury.

Warden v. City of Grove · filed 2014-08-26

There are simply insufficient evidentiary materials to establish that these unidentified employees were acting pursuant to municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff cannot meet the test articulated in Hinton with respect to these alleged retaliatory acts.

Section 1983 liability based on a supervisor’s or municipality’s knowledge of an officer’s prior misconduct requires facts plausibly showing actual knowledge of the risk.

Smith v. City of Sumiton · filed 2014-08-27

While those allegations are enough to plead that Smith was assaulted, they do not support a plausible claim that the City or Chief Burnett was aware of or knew about Daughtery’s alleged prior sexual harassment or assaults.

Section 1983 requires proof of a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality liable; one incident without such proof is insufficient.

Pittman v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead · filed 2014-08-27

Consequently, as the Plaintiff complains of only one incident without proof of any policy or custom, the Village cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its policy or custom caused the violation of a constitutional right.

Santora v. Red Clay Consolidated School D · filed 2014-08-28

Therefore, Santora’s § 1983 due process claim against Red Clay must ultimately show that Red Clay maintained a policy or custom that caused a violation of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when an official with final policymaking authority commits the alleged violation.

Barrella v. Village of Freeport · filed 2014-08-28

In sum, the Court finds that (1) a reasonable jury could conclude that race played a motivating factor in Hardwick’s decision to appoint Bermudez instead the Plaintiff to the position of the Chief of Police; (2) Hardwick cannot prevail on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity; and (3) the evidence supported a Monell claim against the Village.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for its employees’ acts only when those acts represent an official policy or custom.

Brock v. Dunning · filed 2014-08-29

Referring to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1983, we have observed that a municipality is not liable for the acts of its employees when those acts do not represent the official policy or custom of the municipality.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Grabow v. Macomb Cnty. · filed 2014-08-29

Absent an underlying constitutional violation, Grabow’s claim against the county under § 1983 must also fail.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a policymaker, an official policy, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

Woodard v. County of Waller · filed 2014-08-29

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove three elements: “a policy maker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” ... He does not allege any facts giving rise to a claim of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when deliberately indifferent training or supervision amounts to an official policy or custom that causes a constitutional injury.

Herrera ex rel. Herrera v. Schools · filed 2014-08-29

Accordingly, there is enough evidence that a jury could deem the SFPS Defendants’ response to the pattern of suspicionless searches to be deliberately indifferent training or supervision and, therefore, to be an official policy or custom for municipal liability purposes.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a county policy or practice directly causes a constitutional injury.

Poore v. Glanz · filed 2014-08-29

In short, a reasonable jury could infer that Glanz’s and TCSO’s policy and practice of housing juvenile female inmates in a wing of the medical unit — which was not under direct supervision, had no cameras, and was frequently single-staffed — placed those inmates at a substantial risk of sexual assault by Jail staff. There is a direct causal connection between those municipal policies and practices and the staff on inmate sexual abuse which plaintiff allegedly suffered. The motion for summary judgment on-the municipal liability claim is accordingly denied.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a practice only when it is persistent and widespread enough to make the municipality the moving force behind the challenged activity.

Cetina v. Longworth · filed 2014-09-03

Moreover, Cetina fails to allege facts that, if true, would demonstrate the existence of a practice so persistent and widespread that it would establish, in effect, that the municipality was the "moving force" behind the activity.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must establish a basis for holding the municipality itself liable.

Delozier v. Bradley County Board of Education · filed 2014-09-04

A municipality cannot be liable under a respondeat superior theory for § 1983 violations. ... Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that a final decision maker, McDaniel, acted with the requisite improper motive necessary to implicate municipal liability. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against the BCBE.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the individual officers committed no constitutional violation.

Aipperspach Ex Rel. Estate of Al-Hakim v. McInerney · filed 2014-09-05

Absent a constitutional violation by the individual defendants, the municipal defendants are not liable to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city’s policy or custom causes an injury, and allegations that a city tacitly endorsed a practice of denying constitutional rights can suffice at the pleading stage.

Kirkland v. DiLeo · filed 2014-09-10

To find Linden liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be determined that Linden’s “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury” of which the Kirklands complain. ... The Complaint set forth sufficient allegations that the City tacitly endorsed a practice of denying defendants their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an injury inflicted solely by its employee or agent.

Lepore v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2014-09-10

“A municipality is not liable under 42 USC § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents”

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Martin v. Maurer · filed 2014-09-10

A municipality cannot be liable under Monell absent an underlying constitutional violation. ... Here, because Martin’s complaint failed to state a constitutional violation, the district court correctly held that her Monell claim likewise fails.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on a single failure to investigate an officer’s alleged excessive force; a municipal custom requires more.

Womack v. Bradshaw · filed 2014-09-10

And even assuming that Sergeant Bradshaw employed excessive force and Howell County failed to investigate after Captain Peterman reviewed the use of force report, this one incident, without more, is insufficient to suggest a municipal custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts supporting the existence of a policy or custom; a bare assertion that one exists is insufficient.

Thompson v. Hicks · filed 2014-09-11

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s claim of municipal liability for a pattern or practice of abuse against restrained inmates. Thompson merely asserted that the jail had a “policy and custom” of abusing restrained inmates. However, he failed to allege facts supporting the existence of such a pattern or practice, such as that King County had an actual policy of abusing restrained inmates or that the jail director knew of the purported pattern of abuse Thompson is challenging, despite Thompson’s being given multiple opportunities to amend his complaint.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for a child removal decision merely because the official who made it had final authority over that decision; the official must have authority to set city policy in that area.

P.A. v. City of New York · filed 2014-09-11

I conclude that Gibbs was not a “policymaker” within the meaning of the cases interpreting Pembaur, nor was his decision one of “policy,” so the City cannot be held responsible under § 1983 for his actions.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a parole board’s unconstitutional decision when the board lacks final policymaking authority.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-09-12

The Board thus was “constrained by policies not of [its] making,” and its decision to “depart[]” from those policies by revoking Singletary’s parole based on unreliable hearsay was not an “act of the municipality” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that the municipality’s deliberate conduct caused the injury.

Harris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2014-09-15

In order to impose liability on a municipality pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the municipality, through its deliberate conduct, was the moving force behind the injury.

A municipal liability claim under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Kilduff v. Rochester City School District · filed 2014-09-16

A plaintiff cannot maintain a Monell claim where she has not established an underlying constitutional deprivation. ... Therefore, her Monell claim must fall with her First Amendment retaliation claim.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Mazur v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2014-09-16

Because Plaintiff fails to establish that an underlying constitutional violation occurred, the DOE cannot be held liable under Monell.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 on a ratification theory when the complaint alleges ratification without facts showing that a final policymaker knew of and approved the challenged conduct.

Waters v. City of Geneva · filed 2014-09-19

The Complaint does not allege that a City employee with final decision-making authority even knew about the events that culminated in Officer Hughes’s alleged misconduct. The Complaint’s attempt to hold the City liable for the § 1983 constitutional violations in Counts I and II is solely based upon a conclusory allegation that the “City ratified [Officer Hughes’s] conduct.” (Compl. ¶¶ 27-28.) Legal conclusions that are devoid of factual support do not satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)’s facial plausibility standard.

Section 1983 allows a municipal liability claim when an official policy or custom causes a denial of a constitutional right; allegations of repeated violations and inadequate training can suffice to plead that claim.

Corbley v. County of Suffolk · filed 2014-09-22

To state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show three elements: “(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” ... The Court finds that these allegations sufficiently allege a claim for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a direct suit against a city for unconstitutional action that implements its official policy; the complaint must plausibly allege a discriminatory policy, custom, or practice.

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville · filed 2014-09-25

To state a claim against the City for a violation of equal protection, NSMA must “plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the City maintained a policy, custom, or practice of intentional discrimination.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s act only when the official had final policymaking authority over the subject of that act.

Fernandez v. Bal Harbour Village · filed 2014-09-29

For the Village to be liable for Hunker’s alleged conduct, Plaintiff must have alleged that Hunker was “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Plaintiff did not. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights that is premised on municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy, custom, practice, or final policymaker’s decision causes a violation of a federally protected right.

Waller v. City of Middletown · filed 2014-09-29

Thus, to hold a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the asserted violation of a federally protected right was caused by a municipal policy, a municipal custom or practice, or the decision of a municipal policymaker with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an assistant district attorney’s conduct in prosecuting a case without a municipal policy causing the alleged violation.

Hudson v. County of Dutchess · filed 2014-09-29

Put simply, the complained-of conduct was “action[ ] ... undertaken in the prosecution of a criminal case,” which “cannot be said to represent the actions of a policymaker responsible for a delineated policy that caused a constitutional deprivation.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim against Dutchess County related to the assistant district attorney’s alleged conduct is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when there is sufficient evidence that final policymakers supported the challenged conduct.

Peterson v. Miranda · filed 2014-09-29

Therefore, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence of final policy-maker involvement to allow the Peterson’s Monell claim to proceed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Stevens v. Gooch · filed 2014-09-30

In order to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom for county liability; a county charter cannot make the county vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Baity v. Kralik · filed 2014-09-30

Therefore, the Court will not adopt Plaintiffs novel reading of the Rockland County Code as providing vicarious grounds for § 1983 liability that circumvent the requirement that Plaintiff demonstrate liability under Monell without resorting to the principle of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation of a municipal policy, custom, or practice to support a claim against a city or an official in her official capacity.

Little v. Municipal Corp. · filed 2014-09-30

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to plausibly establish a policy, custom, or practice that would provide plausible grounds for a § 1983 claim against the City or Commissioner Schriro in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits claims against a municipality based on its policy or custom, but not solely on its employment of the officers involved.

Amin-Akbari v. City of Austin · filed 2014-10-01

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims are premised on Monell liability rather than respondeat superior liability, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to these claims against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an unconstitutional policy or custom, including preliminary injunctive relief when the plaintiff shows a likelihood of establishing that liability.

Abdullah v. County of St. Louis · filed 2014-10-06

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities may be liable for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the municipality. ... This evidence is sufficient at the preliminary injunction stage to show likelihood of success in establishing municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when a municipal policy causes a constitutional violation or a policymaker commits one.

Carr v. Montgomery County · filed 2014-10-06

A county’s liability under § 1983 requires, at least, a municipal policy that was the “moving force” behind its employee’s action to violate a person’s constitutional rights, or the unconstitutional actions of a policymaker. ... However, the four specific instances shown in Exhibit 4 that accompany plaintiffs pleadings are sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability at the pleading stage.

The court rejected an official-capacity Section 1983 failure-to-train claim where it found no clearly established constitutional right had been violated by the individual defendants.

Badder v. Schmidt · filed 2014-10-07

Because the Court has concluded that the individual WCMEO defendants did not violate any clearly-established constitutional right, Plaintiffs cannot make out a § 1983 official capacity claim against Defendant Schmidt based on failure to train/supervise or negligent hire.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a county or its office in an official capacity to rest on an official custom or policy; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Adolph Funches, III v. Bucks County · filed 2014-10-08

First, we agree with the District Court that the Funches’ claims against Bucks County and the Clerk’s Office must be dismissed because they were improperly based on a theory of respondeat superior. As the District Court explained, bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County and the Clerk’s office in their official capacities requires that the disputed action be pursuant to an official custom or policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on respondeat superior or an officer’s position alone.

Hill v. Whitford · filed 2014-10-14

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the mere position of code compliance officers Whitford and Snyder in the “employee hierarchy” is insufficient to establish § 1983 liability. Section 1983 liability cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 when an allegedly unconstitutional action implements an official policy, such as an ordinance.

Allen v. County of Lake · filed 2014-10-14

According to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), a municipality can be liable under § 1983 where the allegedly unconstitutional action implements an officially sanctioned policy, such as an ordinance. ... Because Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants were implementing an official policy, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a theory of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional injuries caused by an official policy or custom, including deliberately inadequate training or supervision.

Rowlery v. Genesee County · filed 2014-10-16

In a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipality, liability may be imposed only where a constitutional injury was caused by action taken “pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature.”

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior and requires a policy or custom causing the plaintiff’s injury.

Silvestre Moreno, Jr. v. Donna Independent School · filed 2014-10-20

With respect to the County, we agree with the district court that a municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), and that Plaintiff did not allege any municipal policy or custom as the cause of his injury.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when a municipality’s policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Jones v. Nueces County, Texas · filed 2014-10-21

As to the failure to protect claim, Jones cannot demonstrate that Nueces County had a policy or custom that caused the failure to protect Jones. ... We hold that Jones has failed to raise a fact issue as to the existence of a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations. The claims against Nueces County were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 allows municipalities to be held liable for their own illegal acts when an official policy causes a constitutional violation.

Vincent v. City of Sulphur · filed 2014-10-21

The constitutional violation alleged was done pursuant to the decision of a policy-making official — namely, Chief Coats. ... As the no trespass warning was issued pursuant to the decision of a policy-making official, the claims against the municipality need not proceed under a failure to train theory. ... For all of the foregoing reasons, a grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of municipal liability is not warranted at this time. ... IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [Doc. 23] as to the plaintiffs claims based on municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be and hereby is DENIED.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must show that the municipality’s own illegal acts caused the alleged injury.

Gremar v. Bexar County, Texas · filed 2014-10-22

Until Congress amends § 1983 or the Supreme Court overturns Monell, every plaintiff who seeks to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must show that ... the municipality’s “own illegal acts” caused the alleged injury.

A Section 1983 claim against a sheriff’s office or private prison health provider requires facts showing that a policy or custom harmed the plaintiff.

Dubois v. Washoe County Sheriff's Office · filed 2014-10-22

The district court properly dismissed DuBois’s claim against defendants Washoe County Sheriff’s Office and Prison Health Services because DuBois failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was harmed by a policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional tort.

Rivera v. County of Riverside CA4/2 · filed 2014-10-23

A municipality, such as the County, can be liable under section 1983 only when the constitutional tort results from a policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged injury; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Grider v. Cook · filed 2014-10-24

Here, Grider failed to plead sufficient facts of a custom or policy to state § 1983 claims against the municipal defendants.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a custom requires evidence of a persistent or regular pattern of conduct that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Egudu v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-10-29

In order to establish municipal liability based on “custom,” there must be evidence that the municipality’s employees engaged in a persistent or regular pattern of conduct that gave rise to the alleged constitutional violations.

A town board’s direct involvement in an action can establish the municipal policy required for Section 1983 liability if the action is unconstitutional.

Ferreira v. Town of East Hampton · filed 2014-11-04

The actions about which plaintiff complains were taken pursuant to resolutions passed by the Town Board acting in accordance with the Town Code. The direct involvement of the Town Board in these actions suffices to establish a municipal policy giving rise to liability under Monell if plaintiff can establish that the actions were unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when official policy causes a constitutional injury.

T.E. v. Pine Bush Central School District · filed 2014-11-04

In other words, “to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused the alleged constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a sufficient link between the municipality’s policies or decisions and the alleged deprivation; an unsupported ratification theory cannot establish that link.

Murphy v. Spring · filed 2014-11-04

There is not a sufficient link between TPS’ policies or decisions and the accessing of Murphy’s private email account, and Murphy’s “ratification” theory of municipal liability fails.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Knellinger v. York Street Property Development, LP · filed 2014-11-06

In a Section 1983 suit, a municipality can be liable only when the implementation of an officially adopted policy or informally adopted custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations connecting a constitutional injury to a municipal policy or custom; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Nielsen v. City of Rochester · filed 2014-11-06

Plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim for Monell liability against the City because his allegations are conclusory, and he fails to support them with facts in his complaint.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation.

Morello v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-11-07

“[A] municipality can be found liable under [Section] 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom caused a violation of federal rights.

Burchwell v. Warren County, Ohio · filed 2014-11-13

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only where the plaintiff’s federal rights were violated because of a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose a police officer’s liability automatically on the employing county.

Estate of Adam Brown v. Thomas · filed 2014-11-13

It’s true that a suit under section 1983 is not governed by the common law doctrine of respondeat superior; liability for a police officer’s violation of constitutional rights while acting within the scope of his employment is not automatically imposed on his employer, in this case Brown County.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability for employees’ actions to show that a municipal policy, practice, or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Scotch v. Letsinger · filed 2014-11-14

To hold a municipality liable for the actions of its employees in a § 1983 suit, “the plaintiff must show that the municipality had adopted a policy, practice, or custom that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an employee’s acts represent official policy, including acts by a final decision maker.

Lane v. City of Pickerington · filed 2014-11-14

However, a municipality may be liable for the actions of its employees or agents under § 1983 where the “acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” ... Summary judgment for the City based on Monell is inappropriate where Taylor, the City Manager, appears to have been the final decision maker when dealing with city employees.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation.

Milo v. City of New York · filed 2014-11-14

A municipality can be found liable under section 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 permits a municipal agency claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that a final policymaker made the challenged decision.

Mucha v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2014-11-18

However, the complaint alleges enough to state a claim for Monell liability against the ERS. This is so because the complaint alleges that Allen made the decision to release the report and that Allen is a person with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show an underlying constitutional violation, a municipal policy or custom, and a direct causal link between them.

J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County · filed 2014-11-19

Rather, to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) that an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation; (ii) that a municipal policy or custom exists; and (iii) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom, and the injury alleged.

A § 1983 claim against a city can proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges that a final policymaker ordered the challenged conduct.

Sifre v. City of Reno · filed 2014-11-19

It is very unlikely that Pitts did not have final policymaking authority over officer assignments, and Plaintiff need only allege it at this stage, which he has.

A Section 1983 municipal claim can proceed under a single-violation theory when its elements are adequately pleaded.

L.R. v. School District · filed 2014-11-20

Because plaintiff has adequately plead the elements of her Monell claim under the “single-violation theory,” the Court will allow plaintiffs cause of action to proceed against the District and the Commission.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts showing a municipal policy or custom.

Fortson v. City of Elberton · filed 2014-11-21

These facts do not demonstrate that the City had a custom or policy that subjects it to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the injury.

Mpras v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-11-21

The law is well-defined and unambiguous: a plaintiff who hopes to survive a motion to dismiss when bringing § 1983 claims against the District must sufficiently plead a custom or policy that caused injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable for wrongful detention to show that an official policy or practice caused the violation.

Gant v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-11-24

Ventura’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against the San Bernardino defendants fails because assuming these facts to be true does not establish that San Bernardino’s failure to investigate Ventura’s complaint was the result of an official policy or practice.

Section 1983 requires a municipal custom or policy; an isolated employee’s failure to follow a stated policy does not establish one.

Vila ex rel. estate of Vila v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2014-11-25

Isolated incidents of a government employee’s disregard of a stated policy are insufficient to establish a custom or policy for the purposes of section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a Texas school district must allege facts showing a policy or custom attributable to its board of trustees.

G. M. Ex Rel. Lopez v. Shelton · filed 2014-12-01

Without alleging facts to show that the district’s employees were acting in conformance with a custom that could be attributed to the board of trustees, the allegations do not adequately state a claim under which the board may be held liable.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a government policy or custom causes the alleged injury.

Coppet v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-12-02

But the Court need not determine whether plaintiff has stated a due process claim because even if Wicks was improperly involved in both the preliminary and final decisions, plaintiff has not alleged that it was a “policy or custom” of the District to allow a final decision-maker to be part of an initial disciplinary decision.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely for its employees’ conduct.

Vail v. City of New York · filed 2014-12-02

It is well-settled that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 “by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Shue v. Laramie County Detention Center · filed 2014-12-04

In particular, like the district court, we conclude that Mr. Shue is hard-pressed to show that the LCDC’s policies were the moving force of any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an employee’s acts when the employee committed no constitutional violation.

Hawker v. Sandy City Corporation · filed 2014-12-05

And because Albrand committed no constitutional violation, the City cannot be held liable.

A school district is liable under Section 1983 only when an employee acts pursuant to an official policy or longstanding custom, or acts as a final policymaker.

Ryan v. Mesa Unified School District · filed 2014-12-05

In other words, plaintiffs neither allege in their complaint' nor argue in their opposition that a School District employee removed plaintiffs from the team pursuant to an official District policy, or that a District employee was acting pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom, or that a District employee was acting as a final policymaker. Without one of these allegations, the complaint merely pleads facts that are consistent with the District’s liability. Count III will be dismissed as it relates to the School District.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on inadequate police training requires facts supporting a longstanding, widespread practice or custom.

Lindsey v. City of Fontana CA4/2 · filed 2014-12-11

Plaintiffs seem to argue, based on this single incident, that they can allege defendants have a custom, policy, or practice of not training their police officers adequately. Plaintiffs, however, have not—and apparently cannot—allege facts showing a longstanding, widespread practice or custom.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom without a plausibly alleged underlying constitutional violation.

K.W. v. Lee County School Board · filed 2014-12-11

Because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a deprivation of J.W.’s constitutional rights, the custom and policy claims fail.

Section 1983 allows a municipality to be held liable for constitutional violations caused by its customs or practices.

Westfahl v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-12-12

A municipality may be held liable for the constitutional violations of its officers if they are caused by municipal customs or practices.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local governmental entity only when the challenged conduct occurred under an official policy or longstanding practice or custom.

T.L. ex rel. Lowry v. Sherwood Charter School · filed 2014-12-18

Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that T.L. fails to establish that Defendants had a custom, practice, or policy of suspending students without due process. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (local governmental entities liable under section 1983 only when challenged conduct occurred pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a longstanding practice or custom). Additionally, Defendants contend that even if T.L. establishes such a custom, practice, or policy, she received adequate post-deprivation process when her suspension was removed from her record. Because I agree with Defendants on the Monell issue, I do not address the post-deprivation process issue.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom unless a city employee violated the plaintiff’s federal rights.

Aziz v. Eldorado Resorts, LLC · filed 2014-12-18

However, it is well established that “[a] § 1983 action against a city fails as a matter of law unless a city employee’s conduct violates one of the plaintiffs federal rights.”

Section 1983 requires evidence of an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom to hold a city liable for its officers’ conduct.

Jaramillo v. City of San Mateo · filed 2014-12-19

Jaramillo has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the officers’ conduct was pursuant to an unconstitutional “policy or custom” as required to hold the City liable under § 1983.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 based on an employee’s act requires evidence that the employee had final policymaking authority.

Lovette-Cephus v. Village of Park Forest · filed 2014-12-19

But as the district court properly explained, she did not submit any evidence showing that the individuals connected to the Village’s business-licensing process had final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation.

Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water District · filed 2014-12-23

Absent a constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional act only if a municipal policy, custom, or practice actually caused the violation.

Ortiz v. City of New York · filed 2014-12-24

To establish municipal liability for unconstitutional acts by municipal employees, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights was actually caused by a municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations that a municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving force behind an employee’s constitutional violation.

Dietrich Hill v. City of Memphis · filed 2014-12-30

Moreover, to hold the city accountable for the actions of an employee acting under color of state law who violates a person’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff must prove that a city policy or policy of inaction was the moving force behind the violation. Postal Workers Union, 361 F.3d at 902. While the plaintiffs’ complaint includes many of the “buzz words” applicable in § 1983 actions—such as “deliberate indifference” and “moving force,” the complaint contains no specific factual allegations regarding a city policy/custom or policy of inaction with respect to unlawful seizures or deprivation of property/unlawful retention of property.

Section 1983 municipal and supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Jacoby v. Baldwin County · filed 2014-12-31

And, because any supervisory liability as to Sheriff Mack or municipality liability as to Baldwin County can attach only if Mr. Jacoby’s constitutional rights were violated, neither is liable here.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a predicate constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Shahid v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-01-05

Because the Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts both regarding a predicate constitutional violation and tracing such a violation to a policy or custom of the District of Columbia, the Amended Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim against the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an allegation that the challenged conduct was undertaken pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Martinez v. Queens County District Attorney · filed 2015-01-07

Nor do we find any error in the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Reading Police Department, the New York City Police Department, and the City of New York, for failure to allege that their challenged conduct was undertaken pursuant to an official policy or custom, as required to establish § 1983 municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978).

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to seek equitable relief against governmental policies that violate constitutional rights, even when monetary relief is available from individual officers.

Swanigan v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-01-09

Some cases have remedial import beyond the individual plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages, and § 1983 provides a vehicle for obtaining other judicial relief against governmental policies that violate constitutional rights.

A county is liable under § 1983 only if its custom or policy was the moving force behind the challenged conduct.

Laubis v. Witt · filed 2015-01-09

Nonetheless, as the district court correctly held, Laubis failed to allege that a custom or policy that was the “moving force” behind Witt’s conduct, so municipality liability does not come into play.