42 U.S.C. § 1983

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Livingston v. Borough of Edgewood · filed 2011-06-02

Furthermore, in order to maintain a § 1983 claim against the Borough of Edgewood, a municipality, Livingston must prove that an official policy or custom caused him to be denied a constitutional right pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that any such policy or custom existed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district when a policy or custom caused the alleged injury, and allegations that the board itself denied complaints and a hearing can suffice at the pleading stage.

Bonillas v. Harlandale Independent School District · filed 2011-06-02

A municipality may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” ... Construing the facts in her favor, she has alleged sufficient facts that she may be able to prove that a policy or custom of the Board resulted in the actions taken against her.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school board when an express policy causes a constitutional deprivation or a final policymaker causes the alleged injury.

Mnyofu v. Board of Education · filed 2011-06-02

By contrast here, Mnyofu has adequately pled that the Board had an express policy that caused Mnyofu a constitutional deprivation and that his alleged constitutional injury was caused by a Board member with final policy-making authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold the District of Columbia liable to allege that its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation; a heavy caseload alone does not establish a discriminatory policy.

Ivey v. FENTY · filed 2011-06-06

While plaintiff alleges that she had a larger caseload than any other caseworker, and that other older workers were also asked to carry a heavy load, this is not enough to state a claim that defendant used a “discriminatory policy or practice” to distribute more cases to older employees because of their age.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a county policy or custom caused the injury.

Bowers v. Livingston County · filed 2011-06-06

The county is a municipal entity, so to establish municipal liability under § 1983, the inmates must show that their injuries were caused by a county policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation results from an official policy or custom.

Simon v. City of Phoenix · filed 2011-06-06

The district court properly dismissed Simon’s § 1983 claims against the municipal defendants because Simon failed to allege that the constitutional violations were the result of an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury; a single unlawful arrest does not establish such a policy or custom.

Dormu v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-07

Even when the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to Dormu, he has not presented evidence on the basis of which a reasonable juror could find that the District had a policy or custom that caused the violation of his constitutional rights. ... Summary judgment must therefore be granted with respect to the District’s liability for any § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 claim against a city requires facts establishing a municipal policy or custom; words such as “pattern” or “cooperation” do not suffice.

Harper v. City of New York · filed 2011-06-07

Indeed, just like the presence of the words “custom” or “policy” is not necessary to make out a successful claim against a municipality under Section 1983, the mere presence of the words “pattern” or “cooperation” is insufficient to cure facts that fail to establish a policy undertaken by the City in violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.

Lewis v. McKinley County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2011-06-07

Ms. Lewis’s detention claim must fail because a state political subdivision such as McKinley County may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s constitutional violation even when qualified immunity shields the officer from individual liability.

Bass v. Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center · filed 2011-06-07

Accordingly, there is a reasonable explanation that reconciles the jury’s verdicts, and the explanation is that the jury found that Officer Goodwill violated Mr. Bass’s constitutional rights, as necessary to support its verdict against the Jail under principles of municipal liability, but the jury did not impose liability against Officer Goodwill because it found that he nonetheless acted reasonably and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the municipality itself causes a deprivation of rights.

Alexander v. Brookhaven School District, e · filed 2011-06-08

With respect to her identical claim against the District, a municipality or local government can be liable under § 1983 only if “the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by its officers.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-08

The plaintiff cannot proceed on a theory of vicarious liability, that is, holding the District of Columbia responsible for any constitutional violation allegedly committed by Officer Cady or Detective Tighe.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional injury to hold a municipality liable.

Garcia v. Newtown Township · filed 2011-06-10

In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever that Newtown Township or any of its policymaking employees promulgated, permitted or were deliberately indifferent to a custom, practice or policy on the part of its officials or employees which authorized, sanctioned or condoned retaliatory actions or terminations for speech concerning a matter of public concern by anyone. Summary judgment is therefore also properly entered in favor of the defendants as a matter of law as to Count Three in its entirety.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom caused an underlying constitutional violation.

Thurmond v. Wayne, County of · filed 2011-06-10

In order to prevail against a municipality in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, it is well settled that “[t]here can be no Monell liability under § 1983 unless there is an underlying unconstitutional act.” Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Because deputies Mears, Jones, and Rodgers did not violate Thurmond’s constitutional rights, it necessarily follows that Wayne County cannot be liable under Monell and thus the grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a local government entity when no constitutional violation occurred.

Kuster v. Foley · filed 2011-06-10

Finally, Kuster’s § 1983 claim against the County of Maui fails because absent a constitutional, Kuster cannot maintain his claim against the government entity.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when officials know of a pattern of employee misconduct and deliberately fail to address it.

McClure v. Watson · filed 2011-06-13

A plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference or tacit authorization [by municipal officials] of the offensive acts by [failure] to take remedial steps following notice of a pattern of such acts by ... subordinates.” ... The Court finds plaintiffs state sufficient facts to support their claims under §§ 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy or custom, but not solely because the municipality employs the person responsible.

Spanish Church of God of Holyoke, Mass., Inc. v. Scott · filed 2011-06-20

Although a municipality is considered a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 liability, it cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory of liability. ... Here, Plaintiffs have not identified a similarly deliberate course of action.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a violation results from a policymaker’s actions or an official policy or custom.

Duncan v. County of Dakota · filed 2011-06-21

The evidence supports the plaintiffs’ assertion that the actions were taken either by policy-makers or pursuant to an official policy or custom and practice of the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from an officially adopted ordinance, without requiring deliberate indifference.

Barnes v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-24

That rule, although not enforced since March 2009, is clearly an example of an “express municipal policy” that could lead to Section 1983 liability for the District, whether or not the Distinct was “deliberately indifferent” to the overdetention problem. Section 1983 creates liability for a local government when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a[n] ... ordinance ... officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

Section 1983 makes a school district liable only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Santino v. Columbus Public Schools · filed 2011-06-24

Since no trier of fact could reasonably find from the evidence that defendant had a custom or policy of permitting its employees to engage in disparate treatment, retaliation or harassment on the basis of national origin, or of failing to address or control such discriminatory practices engaged in by its employees, no grounds have been shown for the imposition of § 1983 liability on the defendant.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a rights violation, including through a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Knight v. Brown · filed 2011-06-27

A municipal entity may be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ actions where one of its customs or policies caused a violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. ... In any event, even if Ms. Brown did commit, participate in, or ratify discriminatory acts, she is not an official with “final policymaking authority” for King County.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employed the person who committed it.

Bryson v. Oklahoma County ex rel. Oklahoma County Detention Center · filed 2011-06-30

However, the County cannot be held liable for violating section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional injury; unsupported failure-to-train and failure-to-discipline theories do not state a municipal liability claim.

Barker v. City of Boston · filed 2011-07-05

None of the facts pleaded in the complaint support an inference that Boston’s alleged failure to train police officers regarding the handling of mentally ill individuals caused the shooting of Barker. Moreover, no facts alleged could support a conclusion that Boston persistently failed to discipline officers who used excessive force, thereby creating a de facto policy condoning the use of excessive force. Because the Amended Complaint does not support either of these theories of municipal liability, the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible section 1983 claim against Boston.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when no individual defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Long v. CITY OF COOPERTOWN · filed 2011-07-05

Because the plaintiff has not shown that the individual defendants violated his constitutional rights, his § 1983 claim against the Town must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an employee’s execution of an official policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Barnes v. City of Dothan · filed 2011-07-06

Under this color-of-state law requirement, a municipality can only be held liable under § 1983 when an employee’s execution of an official policy or custom is responsible for the plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 permits a local government to be liable when its official policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Washington v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2011-07-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant City of Los Angeles because Washington failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Los Angeles Police Department’s use-of-force policy was the moving force behind the police officer’s alleged use of excessive force. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (local government may be liable under § 1983 when official policy is “the moving force of the constitutional violation”).

Section 1983 does not impose municipal or supervisory liability when no injury or constitutional violation has occurred.

Charles Williams, Jr. v. Porterville Police Department · filed 2011-07-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City of Porterville Police Department because Williams did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation had occurred. See Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality ... nor a supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred.”)

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation results from a municipal policy or custom rather than respondeat superior.

Fulmore v. City of Greensboro · filed 2011-07-06

To establish municipal liability for a widespread illegal custom or usage among the City’s police force, Fulmore must show (1) that the City had “ ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ of the custom and usage by its responsible policymakers,” and (2) that there was a failure by those policymakers, “ ‘as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference,’ to correct or terminate the improper custom and usage.” ... Fulmore has not alleged facts plausibly satisfying these requirements.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or failure to train causes a constitutional injury.

N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area School District · filed 2011-07-08

Because the plaintiff has alleged liability on the basis of improper training related to investigation, she has properly pleaded a claim of municipal liability under Monell against the county.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a school district for an equal protection violation to show that the alleged harassment resulted from a district policy or practice.

Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District · filed 2011-07-13

To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Sanches must show that her sexual harassment was the result of a poli- cy or practice of the district.

Section 1983 extends liability to a county when its final policymaker has final authority to establish county policy concerning the challenged action.

Edelen v. Board of Commissioners · filed 2011-07-13

Section 1983 extends liability to a county if its "decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish [county] policy with respect to the action ordered." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 LEd.2d 452 (1986).

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a local government for a constitutional injury caused by its policy or custom.

Hunter v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-15

The result is no different if plaintiff was attempting to bring Count VI under section 1983 because he has failed to satisfy the Supreme Court’s test as promulgated in Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In Monell, the Supreme Court held “that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional deprivations caused by municipal policy or by a personally involved official, subject to qualified immunity.

Paige v. City of New York Correction Department · filed 2011-07-15

Pro se plaintiff Zaire Paige (“Paige”) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of his federal constitutional rights in connection with incidents of assaults against him committed by other inmates while Paige was in custody at a facility of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”). ... Mindful of these considerations, the Court grants the City Defendants’ motion. ... As to Paige’s claims against the City, the Court is persuaded that Paige failed to identify the existence of any policy or practice that would establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), as to the circumstances presented by this action. ... Paige’s claims against Cobham must be dismissed because the allegations Paige makes in his complaint and in his deposition fail to establish any personal involvement by Cobham in any of the injuries that form the grounds for Paige’s claims. ... In any event, the Court finds that Cobham would be entitled to the protection against suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 633-34 (2d Cir.2000).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker causes a constitutional injury.

Branson v. Newburgh Police Department · filed 2011-07-18

Due to his involvement in the actions that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim pursuant to Section 1983, the Town is subject to liability. ... Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability for deliberately indifferent failures to provide training or supervision that cause constitutional injuries.

HUTHNANCE v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-19

“Deliberate indifference” liability isn’t based on failure to abide by prevailing standards. It is premised on failing to provide training or supervision that is obviously necessary in light of the particular facts that are actually known or that should be known to the municipality.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a constitutional or federal-law violation caused by the municipality’s custom or policy.

Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coalition v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-21

To prove a § 1983 violation by the District, a plaintiff must allege both “a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law” and “also that the municipality’s custom or policy caused the violations.”

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability complaint to plead a federal rights violation caused by the municipality’s policy or custom.

Davis v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-21

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint asserting municipal liability under § 1983 must plead facts alleging (1) a violation of a constitutional right or rights conferred by federal law and (2) facts alleging that the municipality’s policy or custom caused that violation.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability when a policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation and individual liability requires personal participation.

Reed v. Baca · filed 2011-07-22

Municipalities may be held liable under Section 1983 only where the plaintiff can show (1) that he was “deprived of [his] constitutional rights by defendants and their employees acting under color of state law; (2) that the defendants have customs or policies which ‘amount to deliberate indifference to ... constitutional rights; and (3)that these policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violations.’ ” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681-2 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473-77 (9th Cir.1992)). ... “[Individual liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) and Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.1979)).

Section 1983 does not give municipalities qualified immunity for constitutional violations.

Russell Ex Rel. Jn v. Virg-In · filed 2011-07-22

In a § 1983 action, municipalities are simply not entitled to qualified immunity under federal law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom causes a constitutional injury, including a custom supported by repeated uninvestigated and unpunished violations.

Hunter v. County of Sacramento · filed 2011-07-26

[3] In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities may be held liable as “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but cautioned that a municipality may not be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees solely on a respondeat superior theory. 436 U.S. at 691. Rather, the Supreme Court has “required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an individual officer is liable on the underlying constitutional claim, and training or supervisory liability requires causation.

Moore v. City of Desloge, Mo. · filed 2011-07-28

Moore’s claims against Chief Bullock and the city are based upon alleged failures to train and supervise Officer Malady, as well as policies or customs which gave rise to Moore’s injuries. “This circuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). Similarly, to maintain an action for training or supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show the failure to train or supervise caused the injury. See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996). Because Moore failed to establish Officer Malady violated Moore’s constitutional rights, Moore cannot maintain this action against either Chief Bullock or the city.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipal entity to show that its custom or official policy caused the claimed violation of constitutional rights.

Delgado v. City of New York · filed 2011-07-28

The section 1983 claim, however, should be dismissed as against defendant NYCHA. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any custom or official policy of NYCHA caused the claimed violation of their constitutional rights (see Rossi, 274 AD2d at 878).

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation to hold a municipality liable; two different misdiagnoses years apart do not establish such a policy or a failure to train.

Wright v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-29

Second, two incidents years apart and based on misdiagnoses of different injuries do not constitute evidence of a policy or a general lack of supervision or training.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to provide at least minimal factual allegations beyond generic restatements of the elements of a claim.

Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas · filed 2011-08-01

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided only generic, boilerplate recitations of the elements of claims against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom or practice, failure to adequately train or supervise, and negligent hiring of officials. Although Plaintiffs allegations are fairly lengthy, they consist only of a list of number of broadly-defined constitutional violations (for example, “excessive force” and “unlawful searches and seizures”) followed by the assertion that there was a pattern of such violations, that there was a failure to train, or that the violations resulted from improper hiring. This does not provide the city with fair notice of the grounds for which it is being sued, or allow the Court to plausibly infer actionable misconduct by the city. As discussed above, Plaintiff must provide at least minimal factual allegations regarding the city’s liability that go beyond generic restatements of the elements of such a claim. Because he has not done so, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted without prejudice with respect to this claim.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability claim to identify an official policy or well-settled custom causing the alleged constitutional violation and does not permit respondeat superior liability.

Peterson v. City of Uniontown · filed 2011-08-01

When a suit against a municipality is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the alleged constitutional violation must carry out either an official policy or a custom so “well-settled as to virtually constitute law.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657-58 (3d Cir. 2009).

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability when execution of a government policy or custom inflicts an injury and requires a clear causal link for liability based on a single decision.

Downton v. Phone · filed 2011-08-01

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attaches to the municipality only when “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single unconstitutional decision by a board with final policymaking authority.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-08-01

Applying that principle, a decision by the Board, which was the District’s final decisionmaker with respect to parole and parole policy, was an act of official government policy to which section 1983 applies.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable to show that an established policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Blakey v. City of Pittsburgh Police Department · filed 2011-08-03

In order for the City to be liable, Blakey would have to show that it had an established policy or custom that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations at issue.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages against a county only when a county policy, widespread practice, or custom caused the injury.

Weichman v. Clarke · filed 2011-08-04

Specifically, Milwaukee County may be liable for monetary damages under § 1983 only if Weichman presents evidence that a county policy, widespread practice, or custom caused his injuries.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the injury.

Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court · filed 2011-08-05

Without a municipal policy or custom directing the actions of those employees, Jessamine County Fiscal Court cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a local government liable for constitutional injuries caused by carrying out its officially adopted policies.

Ickes v. Borough of Bedford · filed 2011-08-09

A local governing body is liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or practice causes a constitutional violation.

K.W. v. City of New York · filed 2011-08-09

Since there is no municipal policy or practice alleged that caused a constitutional violation, there is no municipal liability under Monell.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Griffith v. Louisiana · filed 2011-08-10

“[m]unicipal liability for Section 1983 violations results if a deprivation of constitutional rights was inflicted pursuant to official custom or policy.” ... This Court concludes that Griffith’s claims do not afford a basis for finding that the City, through Denet, maintained an official policy or custom that caused Griffith’s injuries.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Knight v. Pugh · filed 2011-08-10

Plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 claims against the City of Ozark because the facts alleged in her complaint do not demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policy or custom causes a violation of constitutional rights.

ASS'N FOR LA DEPUTY SHERIFFS v. County of LA · filed 2011-08-12

To bring a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must plead that a municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A plaintiff states a § 1983 claim against a county by alleging that a county policy caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2011-08-12

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants’ policies caused violations of their constitutional rights, and therefore Plaintiffs have stated Monell claims against the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Byrd v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-08-16

Without addressing the merits of the parties’ arguments with respect to the first prong of Section 1983 analysis, the Court finds that no policy or custom of the District of Columbia acted as a “moving force” behind the purported constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s misconduct solely because it employed that person; liability requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Olivieri v. County of Bucks · filed 2011-08-16

There is also no evidence that any policymaker knew of the harassment and acquiesced to its continuation. The only basis for linking Neil’s actions to the County would be through respondeat superior liability, and the Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly refused to allow § 1983 actions to proceed against local governments on that basis.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy, practice, or custom is a moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Dougherty v. City of Covina · filed 2011-08-16

A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable solely for its employees’ acts; a municipal policy or custom must cause the constitutional violation.

Barr v. David Gee, Paul Fitts · filed 2011-08-16

A county does not incur § 1983 liability solely for injuries caused by its employees, and the mere fact that a municipal employee caused an injury does not imply municipal culpability and causation.

A municipal liability claim under § 1983 must allege a constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom that caused it; sufficient allegations of both survive a motion to dismiss.

Dcfs USA, LLC v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-08-17

To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a court must conduct a two- step inquiry. ... These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ acts solely because it employs them.

Irvin v. City of Shaker Heights · filed 2011-08-18

Under § 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when officials know a ban on guard sexual contact with prisoners has failed and respond so inadequately that a jury can find deliberate indifference to prisoners’ safety.

Cash v. Cnty. of Erie · filed 2011-08-18

Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on a municipal liability claim under § 1983. Because defendants owed plaintiff an affirmative duty of care, and because any sexual contact between a guard and a prisoner is absolutely proscribed by New York state law, a reasonable jury could have found that once defendants learned that guards were violating an absolute proscription in any respect, defendants’ actions to prevent future violations were so deficient as to manifest deliberate indifference to a risk of the full range of proscribed sexual conduct, including the sexual assault suffered by plaintiff.

Section 1983 prohibits vicarious municipal liability for officers’ acts, so a conflicting state statute cannot support such a federal claim.

Siler v. Webber · filed 2011-08-22

On one side, Monell and its progeny hold that § 1983 prohibits vicarious municipal liability; on the other side, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 allows it. Tennessee law thus conflicts with § 1983 and may not be used to maintain a federal action in this instance.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the municipality’s agent committed no constitutional wrong.

Nelson v. Village of Lisle · filed 2011-08-22

On appeal Nelson offers no theory of municipal liability for the defendant Village of Lisle under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and at all events the Village is free from liability because its agent has done no constitutional wrong.

Section 1983 makes a county liable only for its own policies, customs, or practices, not vicariously for city police officers’ conduct.

Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2011-08-25

Furthermore, the city’s actions cannot form the basis of a claim against the County. The County can only be liable for its own policy, customs or practices.

Section 1983 requires pleadings to give a municipality notice of a Monell liability theory before the municipality can be held liable under it.

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. Chertoff · filed 2011-08-26

Faced with Valadez- Lopez’s many amended complaints, none of which cited Monell or related cases and only the last of which introduced language referencing them, Yolo County cannot be blamed for being caught unaware as to Valadez-Lopez’s claims. Nor can it be held liable under them.

Section 1983 permits liability against a municipality only for violations resulting from an official policy or custom.

Agarwal v. Schuylkill County Tax Claim Bu · filed 2011-08-26

We further agree that the Agarwals failed to state a viable constitutional claim against HASD, which is only liable under § 1983 for violations resulting from official municipal policy or custom.

A § 1983 failure-to-train or ratification claim cannot succeed without an underlying constitutional violation.

Padula v. Leimbach · filed 2011-08-29

Since Padula’s underlying claims for wrongful arrest and excessive force failed, his claims for failure to train and for condoning and ratifying excessive force must also fail.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city to show that a rights violation occurred pursuant to a city policy or custom.

Mersch v. City of Coral Springs · filed 2011-08-30

Because he brings suit against the city, he must demonstrate not only that his rights were violated, but also that they were violated pursuant to a policy or custom of the city.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from an official policy, a widespread practice, or a final policymaker’s conduct; allegations of discriminatory enforcement by city policymakers can state such a claim.

Reiff v. Calumet City · filed 2011-08-30

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the violation of her constitutional rights was the result of (1) an express policy, (2) a widespread practice, or (3) the conduct of a person with final policymaking authority. ... These allegations sufficiently state a Monell claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

A deputy whose discretion is constrained by other policies and whose decisions are reviewable is not a municipal policymaker for § 1983 liability.

Pintar v. Houck · filed 2011-09-01

Moreover, though Deputy Morgan is given some discretion in exercising the authority she holds as a deputy for the Utah County Sheriff's Office, as the district court concluded, she "cannot be considered a policy maker for Utah County because her actions, though discretionary, are still constrained by other policies, and because her decisions are reviewable by others."

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for an employee’s unconstitutional act only when official municipal policy authorized the act.

Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins · filed 2011-09-01

As a final matter, under § 1983, a municipality is liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees only where the action was authorized by official municipal policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability on a school district for its officials’ actions unless those actions violated a constitutional right.

Kirby v. Loyalsock Township School District · filed 2011-09-06

Because the Court has found that the actions of Defendant DiMarco and Defendant Mextorf did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights, there can be no liability imposed on the District for their actions.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom directly causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Abuiz v. Brennan · filed 2011-09-07

For municipal liability to attach, there “must be a „direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation . . . .‟” Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, ... Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). ... Although Abuiz alleged that Susquehanna County had a policy of not adequately training prison staff and of taking disciplinary action against prisoners even for actions allowed under the prison‟s handbook, he never came forward with evidence linking those alleged policies to his asserted injuries.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by an official policy or custom, but the plaintiff must show that the policy was deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights.

Schiff v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2011-09-08

Only deprivations occurring pursuant to municipal custom or policy can give rise to municipal liability. Thus, a plaintiff must establish the existence of an official policy, and that this policy evidences a deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights. ... Here, Schiff has failed to present any admissible evidence showing that the City had a policy or custom of promoting individuals on the basis of race during the relevant time period.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; allegations of such a policy or custom and resulting injury can survive a motion to dismiss.

Harris v. Wooden · filed 2011-09-09

Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff alludes to unconstitutional policies or customs (the taking of her property without notice or hearing) and resulting injury as a result of the policies. The court finds these allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the procedural due process claims alleging municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that an official policy caused a constitutional violation.

Dave v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-12

Thus, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is not futile because it sufficiently alleges that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s due process rights by implementing an official policy: the termination of probationary employees by letter.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 when its officers did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Symonette v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2011-09-12

Because the officers did not violate Symonette’s constitutional rights, the district court also properly concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a single unconstitutional incident without proof that a municipal policy caused it.

Konah v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-14

Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell “absent proof that the activity was caused by a municipal policy.”

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy causes the alleged constitutional injury.

Ord v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-15

Plaintiff's claim also fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the District's policy caused any alleged deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, custom, or practice causes the alleged injury.

Anderson v. City of New York · filed 2011-09-20

Thus, plaintiff must allege facts showing that the City’s policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged injury. ... Here, plaintiff has failed present, much less allege, any facts to create a triable issue regarding the City’s liability under Section 1983. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff has alleged any claims pursuant to Section 1983 against defendant City, these claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from a municipality to show that a municipal policy, practice, or custom caused the violation of a federal right.

600 Marshall Entertainment Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis · filed 2011-09-21

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality-e.g., a city or local government or one of its departments-liable for damages under § 1983 must also establish that the violation of plaintiffs federal right is attributable to a policy, practice, or custom of the municipality. ... As 600 Marshall has offered no evidence or argument whatsoever on the issue of municipal liability, there is simply no basis on which the Court could find the City liable for damages as a result of Godwin’s conduct.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when a policy or custom showing deliberate indifference causes a violation of constitutional rights.

Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, AL · filed 2011-09-21

For the City to be liable, Alexander had to establish: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [City] had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the injury.

Li Min v. Morris · filed 2011-09-21

Because Min failed to show that the alleged custom of hiring individuals with criminal records caused the harm that she suffered, the District Court properly granted summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s conduct solely because it employs that person.

Boyle v. Barnstable Police Department · filed 2011-09-22

The doctrine that a municipality cannot incur liability under section 1983 based on respondeat superior is well established.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a denial of a constitutional right.

Adams v. City of New York · filed 2011-09-22

Rather, to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Id.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality for its employees’ unconstitutional acts to show that the injuries resulted from a municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Robinson v. County of Yates · filed 2011-09-23

Where a Section 1983 claim is alleged against a municipality on the grounds of unconstitutional acts by its employees, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his injuries resulted from a municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

Berry v. Village of Millbrook · filed 2011-09-26

To successfully bring a claim against Millbrook under § 1983, Monell requires Plaintiff to allege that the purported malicious prosecution was part of a custom or formal policy on the part of Millbrook.

Section 1983 requires facts tying a school district’s alleged constitutional deprivation to an established policy, longstanding custom, or final policymaker; vague allegations of a widespread practice are insufficient.

Ashford v. Edmond Public School District · filed 2011-09-28

Further, the District may be held liable under § 1983 only if Plaintiffs allege facts to show that the purported constitutional deprivation was the result of an established policy, a longstanding practice or custom, or the conduct or decision of a final policymaker. ... These vague, conclusory allegations fail to identify a custom or practice of the District on which its liability for any substantive due process violation could be based.

The District of Columbia is a person under § 1983 and can be liable when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

DOES I THROUGH III v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-30

As a municipal corporation, the District is a "person” within the meaning of the statute and therefore subject to liability "when an official policy or custom causes [a] complainant to suffer a deprivation of constitutional right.”

A school district may face liability under § 1983 when evidence permits a finding that its board participated in a discriminatory employment decision.

Kantrowitz v. Uniondale Union Free School District · filed 2011-09-30

As discussed supra, plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of fact regarding whether the Board, through the influence of Dr. Magnum, was involved in the decision to abolish plaintiffs position based upon allegedly discriminatory motives. Accordingly, plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence regarding her § 1983 equal protection claim against the School District, to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plead facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Paul v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-30

The District’s motion to dismiss must be granted, as Mr. Paul fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under Section 1983. To pursue municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that the alleged constitutional violations were caused by a District policy or custom.

The District of Columbia is a person subject to liability under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Jane Doe I v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-30

As a municipal corporation, the District is a “person” within the meaning of the statute and therefore subject to liability “when an official policy or custom causes [a] complainant to suffer a deprivation of constitutional right.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a policy or custom that caused the injury; factual allegations of discriminatory practices can suffice at the pleading stage.

Williams v. Richland County Children Services · filed 2011-09-30

Thus, in order for a plaintiff to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiffs injury. ... In this case, Williams’ claims sufficiently allege unconstitutional policies or customs utilized by the Richland Defendants.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable solely for an officer’s conduct; the constitutional violation must be caused by a city policy, practice, or custom.

Kerkeles v. City of San Jose · filed 2011-10-04

Section 1983 does not assign liability to a local government under a respondeat superior theory, but the entity may be liable if the constitutional ... violation was caused by its official policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a governmental entity vicariously liable for an employee’s excessive force.

Harris County v. Nagel · filed 2011-10-05

This requirement is necessary because governmental entities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for violation of the constitutional right to be free from the use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Kevin Smith, Jr. v. Los Angeles County · filed 2011-10-06

Because Smith failed to state a constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Bozung v. Rawson · filed 2011-10-07

“To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights.” ... Because this Court finds Officer Rawson did not use excessive force in violation of Bozung’s Fourth Amendment rights, the Township cannot be held liable.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate police training when the deficiency amounts to deliberate indifference to the injured person’s rights.

Clifton v. Borough of Eddystone · filed 2011-10-07

Inadequate police training — or the absence of training altogether — may be the basis for a § 1983 suit if the deficient training amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of the person aggrieved.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show an official policy or custom and a causal link to the constitutional harm.

Phillips v. City of Methuen · filed 2011-10-11

A plaintiff must make a two-part showing in order to support a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. He must demonstrate, “both the existence of a policy or custom and a causal link between that policy and the constitutional harm.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official county custom or policy causes a constitutional deprivation; a district attorney acting as a state agent does not make the county liable.

Joseph Johnson, Jr. v. Conner · filed 2011-10-12

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s § 1983 municipal liability claim against Santa Clara County because its District Attorney acted as an agent of the state, not the county, in committing the alleged constitutional violations, and Johnson failed to state a viable claim that his constitutional deprivations resulted from any official county custom or policy.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for supervisory neglect when a widespread practice amounts to city policy and makes a civil rights violation reasonably probable; one incident is insufficient.

Allen v. New · filed 2011-10-14

To maintain such an action against the City, Allen would have to allege (1) a widespread practice of such supervisory neglect which (2) amounted to de facto City policy and (3) made reasonably probable that such an unsupervised police officer would commit rape or other similar deprivation of civil rights. ... This Complaint alleges only the events of this incident. Not even one other similar incident is alleged. The facts alleged are therefore insufficient to state a cause of action against the City.

Section 1983 claims against a supervisor or municipality for policies or customs that caused excessive force fail without a constitutional injury.

Dionne v. Amatucci et al. · filed 2011-10-17

Dionne has also filed Section 1983 claims against Chief Crombie and the City for maintaining policies or customs that caused the officers on scene to use excessive force. These claims fail because there has been no cognizable constitutional harm.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a policy, practice, or custom behind the alleged constitutional injury.

Brown v. Fogle · filed 2011-10-18

Plaintiff’s sweeping allegation of omission fails to identify a policy, practice or custom undergirding the wrongdoers’ unconstitutional behavior. Therefore, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to the extent that it is brought against the District of Columbia and the individual defendants in their official capacity.

A municipal employee whose decisions are subject to review and implementation by a higher authority is not a final policymaker for § 1983 municipal liability.

Palka v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-10-18

Because Tobias’s decisions were subject to review and implementation by a higher authority, he cannot be a final policymaker for purposes of municipal § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s actions solely because it employed or supervised that person.

Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps · filed 2011-10-20

Thus, the City Defendants cannot be held liable under Section 1983 pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior simply because Clipps was in their employ or under their supervision.

Section 1983 requires a municipal equal-protection claim to plausibly allege a city policy, custom, or practice of intentional discrimination.

McCauley v. City of Chicag · filed 2011-10-20

To state a Monell claim against the City for violation of Mersaides’s right to equal protection, McCauley was required to “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the City maintained a policy, custom, or practice of intentional discrimination against a class of persons to which Mersaides belonged.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plead that its policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Garabis v. Unknown Officers of the Metropolitan Police · filed 2011-10-25

To state a claim against a municipality under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to indicate the municipality was acting in accordance with an official government policy or custom, and that it was the policy that caused the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an individual's constitutional violation results from a municipal policy, custom, or practice, even if another individual defendant committed no violation.

Lee v. City of Syracuse · filed 2011-10-27

Municipal liability under § 1983 can only be predicated on individual wrongdoing that is carried out in accordance with a municipal policy, custom, or practice. ... Since Heenan was not the only wrongdoer, the jury’s finding that he did not violate Lee’s constitutional rights does not shield the City from Monell liability.

A municipality is liable for damages under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Britt v. Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority · filed 2011-10-27

A municipality may be held liable for damages under § 1983 only when execution of government policy or custom inflicts the injury in question. ... Britt alleges no such policy or custom, nor presents any evidence to that effect. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of federal rights.

Shepard v. City of Portland · filed 2011-10-31

The Court, however, finds it unnecessary to address whether plaintiff can establish an initial claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as I find the issue of whether the City had a policy of violating employees’ First Amendment rights dispositive. The City asserts that it did not have a policy, practice or custom of retaliating against employees who exercised their free speech rights. Plaintiff offers no argument or evidence in response. In fact, plaintiff has completely failed to address this element in his briefs. Thus, based on this record, even if the City had violated plaintiffs constitutional rights, plaintiffs section 1983 claim against the City fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 generally makes a county liable when its policy or custom is the moving force behind a violation.

Butler v. Douglas County · filed 2011-11-03

As a local government entity, the County is generally only liable for a potential 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation if a plaintiff shows the existence of a government policy or custom that was the moving force behind the violation.

A local government may be liable under § 1983 when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional tort.

Glenn v. Washington County · filed 2011-11-04

“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be liable for constitutional torts committed by its officials according to municipal policy, practice, or custom.”

A § 1983 claim against a municipality for failure to train requires proof that the failure resulted from the municipality’s deliberate indifference.

Cilman v. M. Reeves · filed 2011-11-04

Even assuming that Vienna failed to train Officer Reeves, Cilman must show that the failure to train was the result of a “deliberate indifference” on the part of the city.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. Richey · filed 2011-11-08

To the extent that Williams sued the officers in their official capacities, the district court also properly granted summary judgment on the claim of municipal liability because Williams failed to demonstrate any underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a policy or custom caused the alleged violation.

Eldridge v. Municipality of Norristown · filed 2011-11-10

Therefore, although Eldridge asserts federal statutory and constitutional violations (i.e., disparate treatment, retaliation, and deprivation of procedural due process), she fails to detail a policy or custom that has affected her, to identify a policymaker that has shown deliberate indifference or acquiescence to these alleged violations, or to demonstrate any sort of causation. Her failure to adequately address these issues warrants a grant of Norristown’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Eldridge’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Titus v. Town of Nantucket · filed 2011-11-10

Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiffs injury.” ... In the instant case, Titus has not presented any facts to establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused an underlying constitutional violation.

Hunter v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-11-15

Though the Plaintiff has sufficiently identified a predicate constitutional violation, Plaintiff fails to identify a relevant “policy or custom” for which the District could be held liable.

A Section 1983 claim against a municipality does not require naming the officers who committed the underlying constitutional violation.

Hunter v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2011-11-15

The officers or agents who committed the underlying constitutional violation do not have to be ... named in a suit under Section 1983; the municipality is liable so long as the plaintiff proves the underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 makes a city liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Loch v. City of Litchfield · filed 2011-11-17

Even if Cassidy had suffered a constitutional deprivation, the City of Litchfield would not be liable unless it had a policy or custom that was the "moving force of the constitutional violation." ... Thus the § 1983 claim against the City of Litchfield is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employed officers who allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Aleman v. Village of Hanover Park · filed 2011-11-21

The Village was not implicated in the alleged misbehavior of its officers and cannot in a section 1983 suit be held liable just by virtue of having been the officers’ employer.

A school district can be liable under § 1983 for a principal’s hostile work environment when the principal has final authority over that conduct.

Zambrano-Lamhaouhi v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2011-11-21

Because Kwait was fully and finally responsible for any hostile work environment to which he subjected Plaintiff, this conduct can be attributed to the BOE.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Hanner v. City of Dearborn Heights · filed 2011-11-22

Hanner failed to allege the existence of a municipal custom or policy that was the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A city is not liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff has shown no underlying constitutional violation.

Payne v. City of Missoula · filed 2011-11-22

Moreover, because Payne has not shown any underlying constitutional violation, liability does not attach to the City of Missoula.

A § 1983 claim against a county requires facts showing that a county custom or policy caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Peter Navarro, Jr. v. State of California · filed 2011-11-28

To the extent that Navarro asserts a § 1983 claim against Solano County based on his registration as a sex offender, dismissal was proper because Navarro failed to allege facts showing that a county custom or policy caused him injury.

Section 1983 does not allow a county to be held liable solely because its employees committed the alleged injury.

Larson v. Agos · filed 2011-11-29

But the complaint identifies nothing more, and it identifies no other allegedly unconstitutional conduct by the County other than the acts of defendants Deputies Agos and Gross. Given that, the district court properly concluded that Mr. Larson’s theory of liability was based solely on respondeat superior, and it rejected that theory as a basis for finding County liability.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that its policy or custom caused a violation of federal rights.

Costello v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-12-01

To state a § 1983 claim against the District, then, a plaintiff “must allege not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law, but also that the [District’s] custom or policy caused the violation.”

A city is not liable under § 1983 for an officer’s unreasonable seizure unless the plaintiff connects the violation to a city policy or custom.

Courtney v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-12-02

Even if Courtney had shown that individual police officers acted unreasonably in seizing her money, she did not assert in her unreasonable-seizure claim that the City had a policy or custom of encouraging Fourth Amendment violations.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the alleged constitutional violation stems from its official policy or custom.

Redmond v. Commonwealth of Pa · filed 2011-12-05

We also agree that Redmond failed to state a claim against Montgomery County because he did not allege that the constitutional violations of which he complains stemmed from an official policy or custom of the county.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional deprivation results from an official policy or governmental custom.

Chizmar v. Borough of Trafford · filed 2011-12-05

For a governmental entity to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate either a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by [its] officers” or “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental „custom‟ even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government's official decisionmaking channels.”

A disputed officer mistake does not establish municipal liability under § 1983 without evidence of a widespread practice or deliberate indifference by municipal policymakers.

Lobrow v. Village of Port Barrington · filed 2011-12-08

... this mistake would not bear on whether she suffered a violation of her constitutional rights by virtue of a widespread governmental practice or the deliberate indifference of Village policymakers.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipality's policies and the alleged constitutional violation for municipal liability.

White v. The City of Atlanta, at Al · filed 2011-12-09

White challenges on two grounds the judgment in favor of the City, but both of his grounds lack merit. First, White argues that the policies of the City caused the “conspira[tors] to violate [his] civil rights,” but White failed to provide any “‘direct causal link between’” the policies regarding arrest quotas and acceptance of fabricated warrants and the alleged coercion by the corrupt officers, Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989)).

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability unless an official municipal policy causes a constitutional tort.

Stepnes v. Ritschel · filed 2011-12-09

Summary judgment was also proper as to the city of Minneapolis because municipalities may not be held liable under § 1983 "unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality; its official policy or custom must be the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Norton v. City of South Portland · filed 2011-12-09

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities “cannot be held vicariously liable in an action under section 1983 unless its official policy or custom was the moving force’ behind the alleged violation of constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Collington v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-12-14

The second question to be answered when assessing the sufficiency of a §1983 claim is: does the complaint state a “claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation”? Id. The law is clear that the Court must determine whether a plaintiff has alleged this “affirmative link” between the policy and the injury; the municipal policy must be alleged to be the “moving force” behind the violation.

Section 1983 permits claims for deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law, subject to municipal liability requirements.

Clay v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-12-14

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Court agrees, however, that the Amended Complaint does not present the type of exceptional circumstances necessary to trigger Section 1983 liability for an IDEA violation under Walker. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim for violation of the IDEA will be dismissed. ... To impose liability on the District of Columbia for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must show not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution, but also that the District’s custom or policy caused the violation.” ... Since the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts supporting the “custom or policy” element under Monell, their Section 1983 Claim based on alleged violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for an employee's actions and requires a policy or custom for municipal liability.

Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie · filed 2011-12-20

Thus, to the extent that the first, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action sought to impose vicarious liability on the City for the actions of Labrada pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the City is entitled to summary judgment dismissing those portions of the causes of action.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Bell v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2011-12-20

Instead, a municipality is liable only where its official policy, custom, or practice is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. ... Plaintiff does not present any evidence whatsoever to show that the Los Angeles Police Department or the City of Los Angeles had a policy, custom, or practice that caused a violation of his rights. As a result, there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and Defendant City of Los Angeles is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that the constitutional injury resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Alexander v. City of Syracuse · filed 2011-12-22

Finally, we conclude that there is no evidence that Alexander was wrongfully detained pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Thus, Alexander’s claim against the City was properly dismissed. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities and does not duplicate state tort law.

Vince v. ROCK COUNTY, WIS. · filed 2011-12-22

As for the City and the County: they are responsible for their own policies, but not vicariously liable for the guards’ conduct. ... Section 1983 does not duplicate state tort law.

Section 1983 permits a local government to be held liable when its policy or custom inflicts an injury, rather than solely because an employee caused it.

Majchrzak v. County of Wayne · filed 2011-12-22

The County argues that Plaintiff must establish that his termination resulted from an official County policy in order to impose municipal liability, citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). ... [A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiffs evidence is more than sufficient to establish that his termination resulted from an official County policy.

Section 1983 allows a local government to be liable for constitutional violations committed by its officials according to municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Glenn v. Washington County · filed 2011-12-27

“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be liable for constitutional torts com- mitted by its officials according to municipal policy, practice, or custom.”

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom causes the violation of a constitutional right.

Robinson v. Town of Kent · filed 2011-12-29

Rather, a plaintiff must show that a violation of his or her constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because it employs a wrongdoer; liability can arise when a final policymaker causes the constitutional harm.

Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside · filed 2011-12-29

Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ... Instead (as relevant here), plaintiffs must show that a person with final policymaking authority over the challenged conduct caused their constitutional harm.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior and requires a municipal policy or custom directly causing the constitutional violation.

Fowkes v. Wayne County · filed 2011-12-29

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable under a theory of respondeat superior, Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to dismissal. ... Plaintiffs cannot identify the municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged injury. Even if the “custom” that Plaintiffs identify could be considered a custom under the appropriate analysis, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a direct causal link between the “custom” and the alleged injury. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence that the alleged misconduct resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Field v. Board of Water Commissioners · filed 2011-12-30

At the outset, the district court observed that Mr. Field failed to establish municipal liability against Denver Water because there was no evidence that the alleged misconduct resulted from a municipal policy or custom. ... Because we cannot improve upon the court’s detailed and well-reasoned analysis, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated in the court’s order dated March 28, 2011.

Section 1983 permits liability against a municipality or public entity only when a constitutional violation is committed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Phelan v. Torres · filed 2011-12-30

A constitutional violation, however, is only the threshold showing in order to establish liability of a municipality or public entity. In addition to showing that a public employee violated a foster child’s substantive due process rights through gross negligence, plaintiffs must also establish that the violation occurred under an official custom or policy. Thus, the City, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, KCHC, and SVS may be held liable under § 1983 only for a violation of constitutional rights committed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of law, and municipal liability requires an official policy causing the injury.

Curtis v. City of Gooding · filed 2012-01-04

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States” by any person acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” ... To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of law. ... In order to sue a municipal entity—including employees acting within their official capacities—a plaintiff must meet the oft-cited Monell standard, i.e., the plaintiff must show that the alleged injury was inflicted through the execution or implementation of the entity’s “official policy.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a viable constitutional violation that occurred pursuant to a county policy or custom.

Barreto v. County of Suffolk · filed 2012-01-12

We find no error in the district court’s holding that Appellant failed to raise a plausible claim of municipal liability against the County of Suffolk because Appellant failed to demonstrate either a viable constitutional violation or that such violation occurred pursuant to a county policy or custom.