42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits recovery from a local government for a constitutional injury caused by an official policy or custom, certain deliberate omissions, or ratification by a final policymaker.

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa · filed 2010-01-14

The Clouthiers may recover from the County under § 1983 for failure to prevent harm to Clouthier under one of three theories of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate training when the policy is deliberately indifferent and directly causes a constitutional violation.

Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano · filed 2010-01-14

It is, however, “clear that a municipality’s policy of failure to train its police officers can rise to § 1983 liability.” Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000). ... For Sanders-Burns to succeed on her failure to train claim against Plano, she must demonstrate that: (1) Plano’s training policy procedures were inadequate, (2) Plano was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused Sanders’s death. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 treats municipalities as persons that may be liable for causing constitutional deprivations.

Young v. City of Visalia · filed 2010-01-15

Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a person acting under color of state law who deprived him of a constitutional right and requires a municipal liability claim to show a policy or custom caused the violation.

Rev. Tom Walker, II v. SunTrust Bank of Thomasvill · filed 2010-01-19

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may sue an individual who, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Collier v. Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007). Municipalities and other local government entities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In order to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show that: (1) his constitutional rights were violated; (2) the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a city based on conduct by employees of an independent public benefit corporation when the plaintiff has abandoned the claims against city officers.

Morrison v. City of New York · filed 2010-01-26

The other claims do not implicate the City because Elmhurst Hospital and its doctors and employees are part of the Health and Hospitals Corporation, “a public benefit corporation independent of the City of New York.” DeJesus v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 309 A.D.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003). Since Plaintiff has abandoned her claims against the court officers, Plaintiff has no ... claim against the City.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable to identify a municipal policymaker and a policy or custom directly linked to the alleged constitutional violation.

Reyes ex rel. Estate of Ceballos v. City of Plainview · filed 2010-01-26

Under the second prong, the plaintiff must identify a policymaker and show that an official policy is the “moving force” behind the municipal employee’s allegedly unconstitutional act. ... More importantly, the Ceballos Family has failed to identify a policy or custom that is directly linked to the alleged violation here.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional injury follows from official municipal policy.

Crowe v. Wrisley · filed 2010-01-27

However, Monell is clear that the constitutional tort must follow from “official municipal policy.” Plaintiffs do not allege that Escondido or Oceanside municipal policy permits or encour- ages the practice of coercing confessions. Therefore, the Monell claims fail.

Section 1983 bars municipal liability based solely on employment of a tortfeasor and requires an official custom or policy causing the constitutional deprivation.

Caldwell v. Egg Harbor Police Department · filed 2010-01-28

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue when a municipality's policy or custom causes a constitutional rights violation.

Gallo v. Washington County · filed 2010-01-28

attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by [municipal] policymakers. Only where a failure to [act] reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality — a “policy” as defined by our prior cases — can a [municipality] be liable for such a failure under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when an official policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation, and a nonbinding recommendation does not make its author the final policymaker.

Mayor of Baltimore v. Guttman · filed 2010-02-02

To the extent that Ms. Mullins continues to argue that her § 1983 claim against Mr. Gallagher is based on the assertion that Mr. Gallagher was the final policymaker and thus ultimately responsible for the termination of Ms. Mullins’ contract, her claim must fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

McIntosh Ex Rel. Estate of McIntosh v. Smith · filed 2010-02-02

In order to assert a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy or custom, and (3) a violation of a constitutional right the “moving force” of which is the official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits official capacity claims against a county only when a county policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Francis v. Marshall · filed 2010-02-02

Francis failed to show that Marshall or any other official violated the Constitution. Thus, the official capacity claims asserted against the County Defendants under § 1983 must be dismissed. ... The claims are also dismissed because Francis has not shown that the County Defendant put in place a policy or custom that was a “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations. ... A “municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Holder v. Town of Newton, et al. · filed 2010-02-03

Holder argues that even if the officers have qualified immunity, their respective towns should be held liable for the warrantless home entry. Because “municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity,” it is theoretically possible for them “to be held liable for the actions of lower-level officers who are themselves entitled to qualified immunity.” Joyce, 112 F.3d at 23 (citing Owen v . City of Independence, 445 U.S. 6 2 2 , 650 (1980)). But for that to happen, Holder would need to show that a municipal “policy or custom” caused a violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Est. of Bennett v . Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 177 (1st Cir. 2008). He has not presented any evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a municipality.

Mortimer v. Baca · filed 2010-02-05

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for employee or agent actions executed pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice.

Hutchison v. Metropolitan Government · filed 2010-02-05

Rather than a respondeat superior theory of liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal governments may only be held liable for employee or agent actions executed pursuant to an official policy, custom or practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify the policy or custom that caused the injury.

Campbell v. Anderson County · filed 2010-02-08

In order to impose municipal liability, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim against a municipality must identity the policy or custom that caused her injury.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local governmental entity when a constitutional deprivation was caused by a deliberately indifferent municipal policy.

Meas v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-02-09

To impose liability on a local governmental entity under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on local government units under respondeat superior unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

S.J. Ex Rel. S.J. v. Perspectives Charter School · filed 2010-02-09

Local government units like Perspectives and the Board cannot be held liable for § 1983 violations under the doctrine of respondeat superior “unless the deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by a municipal policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking local-government liability for failure to preserve constitutional rights to show a constitutional deprivation, a municipal policy, deliberate indifference, and that the policy caused the violation.

Dunham v. Kootenai County · filed 2010-02-10

To impose liability on a local governmental entity for failing to act to preserve constitutional rights, a § 1983 plaintiff must satisfy four criteria: (1) the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when an official with authority to make public policy commits the alleged constitutional violation.

Catcove Corp. v. Heaney · filed 2010-02-11

The Complaint sufficiently pleads that Mr. Heaney and Mr. Murphree had the authority to make public policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that its custom or policy caused the constitutional or federal-law violation.

Bonaccorsy v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-02-12

A plaintiff suing the District of Columbia under § 1983 “must allege not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law, but also that the municipality’s custom or policy caused the violation.”

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights under color of state law and limits municipal liability to wrongdoing caused by an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom.

Smith v. FENTY · filed 2010-02-16

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by a person acting under color of state, territorial or District of Columbia law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Miller, Fenty and Brown correctly assert that the plaintiff has not stated a claim against them in their individual capacities because the allegations in the complaint fail to establish their personal involvement in any injurious conduct. ... A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only if the alleged wrongdoing resulted from an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom promulgated or sanctioned by the municipality. ... Liability cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious acts.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a policy or custom, including deliberately indifferent failure to train or provide medical care, causes a constitutional violation.

Mays v. City of Middletown · filed 2010-02-16

To establish a prima facie case that a municipal actor has violated 42 USC § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States” (Snider v Dylag, 188 F3d 51, 53 [1999]). Although individual actors may be held liable under 42 USC § 1983, a municipality can be held liable “only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue” (Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 385 [1989], citing Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658 [1978]). Thus, “[i]t is only when the execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983” (Canton v Harris, 489 US at 385 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker’s action causes a constitutional deprivation.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-02-18

Accordingly, as the District has provided no other legal authority or case law in support of its argument that it cannot be held liable for the Board’s quasi-judicial decision to revoke Singletary’s parole, the Court finds that the District has not shown that Singletary’s Section 1983 claim must fail. ... The Court today finds only that the District has failed to show that it may not be held liable for the decision of the now-defunct District of Columbia Board of Parole to revoke an individual’s parole in violation of the individual’s due process rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation results from an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom.

Nasious v. Littleton Police Department · filed 2010-02-19

The record contains no evidence establishing the elements of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against municipalities when an unconstitutional act is caused by an official policy, widespread custom, or final policymaker.

Elliott v. SHERIFF OF RUSH COUNTY, IND. · filed 2010-02-22

A municipality may be liable for damages under Section 1983 “if the unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.”

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or directive from an official policymaker for a city to be held liable.

Murray v. Johnson 260 · filed 2010-02-22

As for Murray’s claim against New York City, the City may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the actions allegedly constituting deliberate indifference were performed pursuant to some official municipal policy, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), or were “directed by those who establish governmental policy,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom.

Walden v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, RI · filed 2010-02-23

Municipal defendants may be held liable under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to an official policy or an official custom that violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability unless a municipality's employee is found liable.

Murray v. Lene · filed 2010-02-23

Because we have consistently held that a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless one of its employees is found liable, ... we conclude that the county was entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery to show that defendants personally participated in the deprivation or that it resulted from their pattern or custom.

Avalos v. Baca · filed 2010-02-24

However, in order to recover from the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Avalos must show either that they personally participated in his over-detention or that it was the result of a pattern or custom on their part.

A private corporation that contracts to provide jail medical services is treated like a municipality for liability under § 1983.

Minix v. Canarecci · filed 2010-02-26

Like Madison Center, Memorial Home Care is a corporation that contracted with the jail to provide medical services, so Memorial is treated the same as a municipality for liability purposes under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate police training when the claim is supported by evidence.

Irwin v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, INDIANA · filed 2010-03-02

Inadequate training of police can form a basis for municipal liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker to be the moving force behind a constitutional violation for municipal liability.

Unger v. Taylor · filed 2010-03-02

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused a deprivation of rights before a city can be held liable.

Gray v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA · filed 2010-03-04

The Plaintiffs have not designated facts from which a reasonable jury could find that the existence of a policy, procedure, or custom on the part of the City of Hammond resulted in the deprivation of any of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when there is a basis to attribute the alleged constitutional violation to the municipality.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-04

In other words, even assuming someone denied plaintiffs overtime opportunities, the City is not liable under § 1983 unless a basis for Monell liability exists.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failure to train or an unlawful policy requires individual liability on the underlying claim.

Moore v. CITY OF DESLOGE · filed 2010-03-08

Further, as noted above, plaintiff's claims of failure to train and unlawful municipal custom or practice asserted against defendants Bullock and City of Desloge require a showing of individual liability for the underlying substantive claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when the complaint plausibly alleges that its practice caused a constitutional violation, even if the practice conflicts with its written policy.

C.B. v. Sonora School District · filed 2010-03-08

Defendant City of Sonora’s motion to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action is DENIED. The allegations of the FAC suffice to state a claim for Monell liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation; an employee’s conduct alone is insufficient.

Stepney v. City of Columbia · filed 2010-03-09

Municipalities are included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. ... However, the constitutional tort must result from official municipality policy and not merely under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom directly linked to the alleged injury; evidence concerning an officer’s hiring, training, and supervision may be sufficient to send the claim to a jury.

Plascencia v. City of St. George · filed 2010-03-09

To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom and 2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged. ... Further, the Court finds Plaintiff has at least made a prima facie showing sufficient to establish municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional deprivation results from an official custom or policy.

Clarke v. City of Madera · filed 2010-03-10

The district court properly dismissed the federal claims against the City of Madera because Clarke failed to allege constitutional deprivations resulting from any official custom or policy.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged violation of rights; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Martin v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-03-12

Under Monell and its progeny, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that a violation of his rights by an employee or agent of a municipality was the result of a “policy or custom” of the municipality.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district only when the alleged constitutional violation results from the district’s official act, policy, or custom.

Moore v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2010-03-16

In addition, a local government entity like an independent school district cannot be ... held liable under a respondeat superior theory; the alleged constitutional violation must constitute the official act, policy, or custom of the district.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when the plaintiff plausibly alleges a policy or custom connected to a constitutional violation.

Varricchio v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-03-17

The Court finds that plaintiffs complaint, liberally construed, has adequately alleged a policy or procedure with regard to denying prisoners the right to a speedy trial.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its employees.

Jessup v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2010-03-18

To succeed on her § 1983 claim against Miami-Dade, Jessup must show that the County, and not just its employees, was deliberately indifferent to the possibility that Jessup would harm herself, since neither respondeat superior nor vicarious liability exists under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to be the moving force behind a constitutional violation for the municipality to be liable.

Sexton v. KENTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER · filed 2010-03-18

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ federal claim against the county defendants must fail because the plaintiffs have not identified a policy or custom that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 for an arrest that caused no constitutional injury, regardless of its arrest policy.

Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-03-19

Because we conclude that the Officers did not inflict a constitutional injury on Edgerly by arresting him, Edgerly cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against the City on the basis of his arrest, regardless of whether the City had a policy of making arrests under section 602(l) where probable cause was ... lacking.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege facts showing that an unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom caused the rights violation; merely calling individual conduct official policy is insufficient.

Harris v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-03-22

Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations whatsoever demonstrating how the individual actions cited in his Complaint constitute “the official policy” of the District of Columbia. ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy a key requirement for stating a claim under § 1983, and therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 Claims in Counts I; II, IV, V, and VI for Failure to State a Claim is granted.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability on a respondeat superior theory.

CASTANZA v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2010-03-22

A municipality or municipal entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

A Section 1983 municipal liability claim under Monell fails when the plaintiffs establish no civil rights violation by the municipality’s officers.

Lincoln v. Hanshaw · filed 2010-03-22

As plaintiffs have failed to establish that any of Upper Darby Township’s officers violated plaintiffs’ civil rights, their Monell claim also must fail.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when a county policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Grindling v. Hirayama · filed 2010-03-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against the County because Grindling failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the County.

Section 1983 requires evidence tying an individual officer to the alleged misconduct or identifying a department custom or policy responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

Richardson v. New York City · filed 2010-03-24

To the extent Richardson challenges the district court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law on his claims against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority police and unnamed officers, that argument fails because Richardson did not adduce sufficient evidence either (1) tying Sergeant Smith to the complained-of conduct, or (2) identifying a department custom or policy responsible for the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy, custom, or practice causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Nelson Ex Rel. Nielson v. Ulster County, New York · filed 2010-03-26

And as to Ulster County’s liability, the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that Ulster County had a constitutionally deficient policy, custom, or practice that caused the Nelsons to be deprived of their property without due process of law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a local government’s own policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Briner v. City of Ontario · filed 2010-03-26

A local government entity violates § 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipal entity liable for its employees’ acts solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Frenkel v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp. · filed 2010-03-29

Because OTB, the sole defendant in this action, is a municipal entity, it may not be held liable under Section 1983 for the alleged actions of its employees under the respondeat superior theory of liability.

A Section 1983 claim against a municipality must allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

CHEN v. Monk · filed 2010-03-29

These allegations standing alone are insufficient to state a claim against the District of Columbia under Section 1983 because they do not identify a custom or policy by the District of Columbia that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a municipal custom or policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-03-29

These allegations standing alone are insufficient to state a claim against the District of Columbia under Section 1983 because they do not identify a custom or policy by the District of Columbia that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when the enactment of an ordinance is the alleged unconstitutional act.

Waterfront Renaissance Associates v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2010-03-30

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless “the execution of a policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or actions may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” ... Here, passing the ordinance is the alleged unconstitutional act. The city can be held liable for the enactment of an ordinance.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority causes a constitutional violation.

Everitt v. DeMarco · filed 2010-03-30

Therefore, because the Commission had final authority to impose discipline upon Everitt pursuant to state and local law, and further because the Defendants have cited insufficient facts and no law to contradict the provisions of municipal and state law cited above, the Town may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Plaintiffs are able to demonstrate at trial that their constitutional rights were violated by the Defendants.

Section 1983 does not require proof of deliberate indifference when the challenged municipal action itself violates federal law.

Joyce v. Town of Dennis · filed 2010-03-30

This case involves allegations that municipal action itself was unlawful and thus a showing of deliberate indifference is not required.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional injury.

Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 2010-03-30

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nakamura’s claims for municipal liability because he had not suffered any constitutional injury.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Vulcan Pioneers v. City of Newark · filed 2010-03-31

It is well established that a municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the plaintiff suffers a constitutional deprivation that results from an official custom or policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a city liable to show that an unconstitutional policy or custom caused the injury.

El-Alamin v. Radke · filed 2010-03-31

Finally, we conclude that the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) is not a suable entity, see Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992), and that even liberally construing the claim against MPD as one against the City of Minneapolis, El-Alamin did not show he suffered an injury caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom, see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (plaintiff seeking to impose § 1983 liability on local government body must show official policy or widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused deprivation of constitutional rights).

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes a denial of a constitutional right.

Simpson Ex Rel. Simpson v. Uniondale Union Free School District · filed 2010-03-31

To prevail against a municipality in a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) caused the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right. ... In this case, Plaintiffs have not shown that they were deprived of a constitutional right or that the District had an official policy to inflict such an injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a school district or an official in that capacity to show that the challenged conduct followed a municipal policy or custom.

Schreiber Ex Rel. S.S. v. East Ramapo Central School District · filed 2010-03-31

When, as here, “the defendant sued for discrimination under ... § 1983 is a municipality — or an individual sued in his official capacity — the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.” ... These two statistics are insufficient to show any discriminatory custom or widespread practice of the District.

Section 1983 municipal liability can proceed when evidence raises a factual dispute over whether officers acted pursuant to official city policy.

Zalaski v. City of Hartford · filed 2010-03-31

The deposition testimony of Detective Wiebusch and Officer Hart creates questions of material fact with respect to whether the Plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to official City policy.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a single act of misconduct by an employee below the policymaking level without a causal link to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Bowen v. County of Westchester · filed 2010-03-31

And, even if it could be assumed that PO Stapleton did this knowingly, the most that could be said for Plaintiffs’ case is that it involves one instance of illegal conduct by a non-policymaking employee of the county. Such a single instance of employee misconduct does not state a Monell claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a school board or supervisory officials for a teacher’s conduct when the teacher committed no constitutional violation.

D.D. Ex Rel. Davis v. Chilton County Board of Education · filed 2010-04-06

No substantive due process violation having been established on the part of Alford, there can be no liability on the part of the other individual Defendants or the Board for a violation of substantive due process, regardless of what policy or custom may have been in place.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality for an injury caused solely by its employees or agents.

Palermo v. Town of North Reading · filed 2010-04-09

The district court was correct to conclude that where municipal civil rights liability under § 1983 is premised solely on the actions of municipal employees or representatives, as was the case in the Palermos' amended complaint, liability does not attach.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability claims fail when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Unger v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2010-04-13

Because Unger has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a constitutional violation, her supervisory and municipal liability claims also fail.

Municipalities are persons under § 1983 and may be liable when a constitutional deprivation causes the plaintiff’s harm and the municipality is responsible for it.

Vargo Ex Rel. Vargo v. Plum Borough · filed 2010-04-19

Municipalities, which are considered “persons” under § 1983, may be liable for constitutional torts if two prerequisites are met: (1) the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional deprivation; and (2) the municipal entity is responsible for that violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if a violation of constitutional rights is attributable to its policy or custom.

Getlin v. Zoll · filed 2010-04-20

Accordingly, in order to bring a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must establish both a violation of his constitutional rights and that the violation was attributable to a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for injury the municipality causes, but not solely because it employs the person who caused it.

Hall v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2010-04-20

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when it inflicts injury; it may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Under § 1983, a public charter school is a municipal entity and cannot be held liable for its employees’ acts through respondeat superior.

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy · filed 2010-04-21

Because the Academy is a public charter school, principles of municipal liability apply. That is, because the Academy is a local governmental entity, it cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs a person who violated someone’s rights.

Kraft v. City of New York · filed 2010-04-21

Further, plaintiffs argument that the HHC can be held vicariously liable for Dr. Nadrich’s procedural due process violations fails because a municipal defendant cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality only when its employees acted pursuant to a governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Rosendale v. Brusie · filed 2010-04-22

To the extent that he has named the Town of Amenia as a defendant separate from Smith and Brusie, his claims also fail under § 1983, as a § 1983 claim against a municipality can succeed only where a plaintiff has alleged that the municipal employees acted pursuant to a governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a constitutional violation occurred pursuant to its official policy or custom.

Schneider v. Harris County Sheriff Department · filed 2010-04-22

The record does not show that Schneider’s constitutional rights were infringed pursuant to an official policy or custom of the defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for employee acts absent official policy or custom, and adequate state postdeprivation remedies can defeat a procedural due process claim.

Manning v. DAKOTA COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2010-04-23

Two related doctrines preclude Manning's claim under § 1983. First, under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1983 as it pertains to municipalities and the doctrine of respondeat superior, a school district is not liable for the acts of its employees when those acts do not represent the official policy of the school district. Second, under what is known as the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, [19] there is no federal due process violation under color of state law when the deprivation was the result of "random and unauthorized" acts by state employees and the State provides adequate postdeprivation remedies.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a local government absent an official policy or widespread custom or practice causing the deprivation, and an official-capacity claim against a public official is treated as a suit against the governmental entity.

Winnett v. Saline County Jail · filed 2010-04-26

As to all defendants, the complaint should be interpreted as containing only official-capacity claims, see Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007) (if complaint is silent about capacity in which defendant is sued, court interprets complaint as including only official-capacity claims), and thus should be viewed as a suit only against Saline County (County), see Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (suit against public official in official capacity is actually suit against entity for which official is agent). Further, Winnett neither alleged nor presented evidence indicating that defendants had acted pursuant to an official custom or policy of the County.

Section 1983 permits excessive force liability based on an officer’s integral participation and permits municipal liability when a city policy or custom directly causes the constitutional deprivation.

Nelson v. City of Davis · filed 2010-04-29

Excessive force liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be predicated on an officer’s “integral participation” in the alleged violation. ... In addition, the City of Davis can be liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) if a direct causal link is identified between its own policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability and permits municipal liability only when an injury results from municipal policy or custom.

Burks v. Beary · filed 2010-04-29

As Plaintiff recognizes, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions under § 1983, and a municipality “may only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the injury caused was a result of municipal policy or custom.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. ... In sum, Plaintiff has not presented evidence creating a fact issue as to the § 1983 municipal liability claim. The Sheriffs motion for summary judgment shall be granted with regard to Count I.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom of deliberate indifference to hold a governmental entity liable for student-on-student sexual harassment.

Schaefer v. Las Cruces Public School District · filed 2010-04-30

Because there was no official policy or institutional custom of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment by students against other students, the Court will dismiss the Schaefers’ equal-protection claim against the Defendants in their official capacity.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability even when individual officers are not liable, unless the verdicts would be inconsistent.

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-05-03

The actual rule, as we interpret it, is much narrower: a municipality can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation; county liability also requires evidence that the county was the moving force behind the challenged conduct.

French v. Daviess County, Kentucky · filed 2010-05-05

Because French did not suffer a constitutional violation, the County cannot be found liable under § 1983. Further, there is no evidence that the County was the moving force behind the alleged policies or decisions of its medical employees.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a policy, custom, or practice causing the alleged misconduct to hold a school district liable.

Mahone Ex Rel. Mahone v. Ben Hill County School System · filed 2010-05-05

Further, Appellants pointed to no policy, custom, or practice of condoning or ignoring excessive force against students.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for the isolated acts of one member of a multi-member policymaking board.

Wragg v. Village of Thornton · filed 2010-05-07

As to the board of trustees, we agree with the district court that there can be no municipal liability for the isolated acts of only one member of a multi-member board.

Section 1983 requires proof of an action by a municipal policymaker to establish municipal liability based on a custom or policy.

Watkins v. New Albany Plain Local Schools · filed 2010-05-10

In order to establish municipal liability on the basis of a custom or policy, plaintiff has to present some proof of an action taken by a municipal policymaker.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an alleged custom of excessive force without evidence of a pattern of violations or deliberate indifference to that pattern.

Stewart v. Moll · filed 2010-05-11

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence of a pattern of excessive force or that the City of Allentown was indifferent to such a pattern. ... Here, Plaintiffs have not provided anything similar, and therefore, the Monell claim must be dismissed.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for discrimination by a department director who has final policymaking authority over its operations and promotions.

Raneri v. McCAREY · filed 2010-05-13

On the basis of the foregoing, this Court rules as matter of law that, for all internal purposes within the Department, McCarey was the final policymaker. Therefore, if Raneri proves that McCarey engaged in discrimination through his control or management of the Department or promotional decisions taken within the Department, Orange County may be held liable for the same. For these reasons, Raneri’s claims against Orange County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survive.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its policy caused the constitutional injury and that it acted with at least deliberate indifference.

Perkins v. CITY OF CREOLA · filed 2010-05-14

Under § 1983, the “requisite degree of culpability” is that the municipality acted with at least “deliberate indifference” to the consequences of its actions. Plaintiffs must show not only that the municipal officers violated their constitutional rights, but that the City’s policies were the “moving force” behind their injury.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an employee’s isolated failure to follow a constitutional policy.

Clemmons v. City of Long Beach · filed 2010-05-18

Because the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ isolated failure to abide by a constitutional policy, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in its favor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy caused a constitutional deprivation.

Lockett v. City of Akron · filed 2010-05-19

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, the plaintiffs must show: “1) that [Lockett] was deprived of a constitutional right; 2) that the municipality had a ‘policy’; and 3) that the policy was ‘the moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an unconstitutional policy.

Hogan v. Buttofocco · filed 2010-05-26

As to Appellant’s remaining claims, we conclude, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court, that: (1) sufficient evidence of probable cause existed to defeat Appellant’s claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution; (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate any personal involvement by defendants Nardone and Smith; and (3) Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of any unconstitutional policy that would support a claim of municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Roberts v. Mentzer · filed 2010-05-27

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 unless the policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation; a failure to train must show deliberate indifference.

Miller v. Sanilac County · filed 2010-06-04

Finally, Miller asserts a § 1983 claim of municipal liability based on alleged Sanilac County policies and practices of failing to adequately train and supervise its officers. ... Although we disagree with this conclusion for the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court as to the claim asserted against Sanilac County because Miller has not shown that a policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violations or that there was deliberate indifference based on prior instances of unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation results from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Cunningham Ex Rel. Cunningham v. City of West Point Mississippi · filed 2010-06-07

Accordingly, regardless of whether Cunningham suffered a constitutional deprivation, the City cannot be liable under the facts of this case because the claimed deprivation was not the result of an official policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify an official policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury and link it to the municipality.

Saieg v. City of Dearborn · filed 2010-06-07

Three general rules govern a municipal liability claim. First, “a municipality cannot be held liable [under § 1983] solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” ... Second, “[a] local government entity violates § 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights.” ... Third, “[t]he burden of proof is on the plaintiff to set forth the unconstitutional policy and link it with both the municipality and the injuries at issue.” ... Because the Court has found that enforcement of the handbilling ban in the inner and outer perimeters is constitutional, Plaintiff cannot establish an unconstitutional policy or custom. His municipal liability claim, therefore, is not viable.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for failing to adopt a policy only when that failure reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

DER v. Connolly · filed 2010-06-11

The failure to have a policy does not give rise to municipal liability unless such failure reflects a deliberate indifference to the citizenry’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government only for its own wrongdoing, such as an official policy or custom that deprives someone of constitutional rights.

Vos v. Cordray · filed 2010-06-16

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. ... A plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under § 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing. ... A local government entity violates § 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy or practice to hold a municipality liable for retaliation against an employee’s First Amendment rights.

Tabb v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-16

In a subsequent portion of the Opinion, the Court also determined, however, that it was appropriate to grant judgment for the District of Columbia on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim because plaintiff had failed to proffer evidence that the District of Columbia had a policy or practice of retaliating against employees for exercising their First Amendment rights. See Tabb v. District of Columbia, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 95-95. Hence there could be no municipal liability for a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on employees’ conduct when those employees did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Vereecke v. Huron Valley School District · filed 2010-06-18

Because the individual defendants did not violate his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, Vereecke cannot rely on their conduct to establish a claim of municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation follows from its official policy.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2010-06-18

However, Monell is clear that the constitutional tort must follow from “official municipal policy.” Plaintiffs do not allege that Escondido or Oceanside municipal policy permits or encourages the practice of coercing confessions. Therefore, the Monell claims fail.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a decision by an official whose final policymaking authority over that decision is established by local custom or usage.

Medina v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-18

Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the Court concludes that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that a well-established custom and usage made the Chief of Police the final decision maker of transfer decisions so that his decision may serve as the premise of municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin · filed 2010-06-21

Although liability may not be imposed on a municipality for a single instance of misconduct by an official without final policymaking authority, liability may be imposed on a municipality for "a single decision by a final policymaker." Welch, 542 F.3d at 942 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation is attributable to a municipal policy, practice, or decision of a final policymaker.

Swift v. McKeesport Housing Authority · filed 2010-06-22

A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when the alleged violation is attributable to the enforcement of a municipal policy, practice, or decision of a final municipal policymaker.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on respondeat superior.

Rudder v. Williams · filed 2010-06-22

Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the theory of respondeat superior is inapplicable to a civil rights claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city to plead facts plausibly showing that an official policy or custom caused a denial of constitutional rights.

Ezagui v. City of New York · filed 2010-06-24

To state a Section 1983 claim against the City, Plaintiff must plead facts making it plausible to believe that “(1) an official policy or custom ... (2) cause[d] the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by a policy or custom showing deliberate indifference; without a constitutional violation, the claim against the school board fails.

Tw Ex Rel. Wilson v. School Bd., Seminole, Fla. · filed 2010-06-29

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment against T.W.’s claim under section 1983 against the School Board. “[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Garrett violated T.W.’s constitutional rights, T.W.’s dependent claim against the School Board fails too.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom; without an underlying violation, the claim fails.

T.W. v. School Board · filed 2010-06-29

“[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004). Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Garrett violated T.W.’s constitutional rights, T.W.’s dependent claim against the School Board fails too.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes the alleged injury.

Deshotels v. Norsworthy · filed 2010-07-01

Moreover, the policies and/or customs of the LCPD were not the moving force behind plaintiffs’ alleged violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims made by plaintiffs against the City will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting a municipal policy or custom; conclusory allegations of a failure to train do not state a claim against a municipality.

Martin v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-01

Plaintiffs conclusory statements' — unsupported by additional factual allegations— are simply insufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against the District.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an obvious risk created by a jail policy even when individual officers lack the actual knowledge required for individual liability.

Estate of Wells v. Bureau County · filed 2010-07-02

It would likewise not be unreasonable to conclude that there was, or should have been, an objective awareness of the risk of harm even if there was no subjective awareness; while insufficient to establish individual liability, objective awareness can form the basis for municipal liability where a risk is obvious.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against city officers requires a showing that a city policy or custom caused the alleged violation of rights.

Marlin Jones v. City of North Platte · filed 2010-07-06

In dismissing the claim, the district court first determined that Jones was suing the North Platte Defendants in their official capacities, which in effect meant that he was suing the city. Because of this, the court found that to state a cause of action under § 1983, Jones must make a showing that it was the policy or custom of the city to engage in the acts that violated his rights. ... We affirm the dismissal of the cause of action for the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough orders.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Hamilton v. City of Washington, District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-06

To prevail on their § 1983 claim against the District, plaintiffs must show a predicate constitutional violation which resulted from a "policy or custom" of the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff’s office liable for its employees’ constitutional violations under respondeat superior.

Lefemine v. Davis · filed 2010-07-08

The Sheriffs Office cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior for the constitutional violations of their employees.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 even if individual officers are exonerated, but the plaintiff must show an underlying constitutional tort attributable to the municipality.

Kennedy Ex Rel. B.D.K. v. Town of Billerica · filed 2010-07-13

Their argument also incorrectly states the law; the Town may be liable even if individual officers are ultimately exonerated, for instance because the officers are granted qualified immunity or for failure of proof, but plaintiffs must still show some underlying constitutional tort attributable to the Town.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for violations resulting from an official municipal policy or custom.

Agarwal v. City of Jersey City · filed 2010-07-13

The Agarwals also fail to state a claim against the City of Jersey City, which is only liable under § 1983 for violations resulting from official municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Chase v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-13

The District may be considered a “person” liable under § 1983 “only if [its] agents acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom.”

Section 1983 permits liability against a governmental entity when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation; conclusory allegations of a pattern or practice are insufficient.

Lausin Ex Rel. Lausin v. Bishko · filed 2010-07-15

In this case, Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations of pattern and practice, and provide no evidence of an official or unofficial policy that would give rise to the Board of Education’s liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege harm caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Thibert v. CITY OF OREGON, OHIO · filed 2010-07-15

First, as to the Section 1983 claims against the City, Plaintiff fails to allege that she was harmed by a “policy or custom” of the City, which is required for municipal liability under Section 1983.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Barnhardt v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-16

Absent a showing that a policy or practice of the District of Columbia caused a violation of Barnhardt’s constitutional rights, the District of Columbia cannot be held liable under § 1983, and Count 4 therefore fails.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege facts supporting an inference that an official policy or custom caused a violation of federal rights.

Emerson v. City of New York · filed 2010-07-19

Without facts tending to support an inference of an official policy or custom that violated his federally protected rights, Emerson’s allegations do not state a plausible § 1983 claim against the City.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 when an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Kinnison v. City of San Antonio · filed 2010-07-21

To establish a claim pursuant to Section 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.’ ” ... As a result, the evidence and admissions before the Court establish Kinnison’s claim against the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or action directly causes a constitutional injury.

Kastner v. Lawrence · filed 2010-07-23

Harris County can be liable under Section 1983 “only for acts that are directly attributable to it through some official action or imprimatur.” ... A plaintiff must show “in addition to a constitutional violation, that an official policy promulgated by the municipality’s policymaker was the moving force behind, or actual cause of, the constitutional injury.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal custom or policy causes a violation of rights.

Copeland v. Locke · filed 2010-07-30

Under Monell, the City of Bella Villa may be held liable under § 1983 for Chief Locke's actions if one of its customs or policies caused the violation of Steibel's rights. ... Therefore, the district court's decision to dismiss Steibel's municipal liability claims is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for a single official’s decision unless that official had final policymaking authority.

Valle v. City of Houston · filed 2010-07-30

Although Captain Williams’s decision to order entry into the home was arguably the “moving force” behind the constitutional violations that resulted in Esparza’s death, because his decision was not a decision by a final policymaker of the City, the City cannot be liable.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury, but not solely because the municipality employs the wrongdoer.

Grassia v. PIERS · filed 2010-08-03

A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain constitutional violations but not under a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, liability attaches when the execution of the government’s policy or custom, whether performed by its lawmakers or by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy, custom, or action by a final policymaker causes the alleged constitutional injury.

Galloway v. Town of Greece · filed 2010-08-05

However, Plaintiffs’ papers do not expressly discuss or address how the Town is liable for the actions of the clerks, and do not allege a policy, practice, or custom, except in conclusory terms.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights or it directly causes an employee to violate those rights.

Woodward v. Morgenthau · filed 2010-08-09

In order to be held liable for a constitutional violation, a municipality must have adopted a policy or custom that caused a deprivation of constitutional rights, or it must have directly caused an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.

A municipality and officials sued in their official capacities may be liable under § 1983 when the challenged action is taken by the municipality’s final decisionmaker.

Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner · filed 2010-08-12

The Town, through the Town Board, acted as the final decisionmaker in processing the Church’s SEQRA application under New York State and Town of Greenburgh laws. The Town designated itself Lead Agency and possessed final authority regarding various decisions throughout the SEQRA review process including, ultimately, whether to grant or deny the Church’s application. Thus, the Town, Town Board, and Town Board members (including Supervisor Feiner) sued in their official capacities, may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on an employee’s conduct requires proof that the employee caused a constitutional violation.

Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2010-08-13

Because Totman’s claim against Hornback fails, he has not established a constitutional violation on which to base a claim of municipal liability. Totman’s claim against Metro is accordingly without merit.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Green v. Missouri · filed 2010-08-17

A municipality can only be liable for a § 1983 violation if the execution of the municipality's official policy or custom inflicts a constitutional injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Green has presented no evidence of a city custom or policy to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights by conspiring to engage in malicious prosecutions. As a result, the City of St. Louis is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits a mayor to serve as a municipality’s final policymaker even though the mayor heads its executive branch.

Newman Marchive Partnership v. Hightower · filed 2010-08-18

The court also notes that the mayor’s role as the head of the city’s executive branch, rather than the city’s legislative branch, does not disqualify him under the law from serving as a final policymaker in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on respondeat superior; the alleged constitutional deprivation must be caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Guntlow v. Barbera · filed 2010-08-19

Inasmuch as her section 1983 claim against the City of Albany and its police department is predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior, rather than a demonstration that any policy or custom of the City or the police department caused the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights, that claim must fail (see Rossi v City of Amsterdam, 274 AD2d 874, 877-878 [2000]; Ellsworth v City of Gloversville, 269 AD2d 654, 657 [2000]; see also Thomas v Roach, 165 F3d 137, 145-146 [1999]).

A § 1983 claim against a municipal entity fails when none of its employees violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Phillips v. Northwest Regional Communications · filed 2010-08-20

Having concluded that no Northwest employee infringed Mark Phillips’s right to equal protection, the claim that Northwest is vicariously liable – under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – necessarily fails as well.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, custom, or an official policymaker’s act is causally connected to the constitutional violation.

Lewallen v. City of Beaumont · filed 2010-08-23

As Lewallen chose to sue the City under § 1983, she had to show that her sex-based adverse employment action was causally connected to a policy, custom, or act of an official policy maker.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom directly causes a constitutional deprivation.

Fils v. City of Aventura · filed 2010-08-23

Aventura can be liable under § 1983 only if there is a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its officers’ actions solely because it employs them; municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the violation.

Borton v. City of Dothan · filed 2010-08-24

Because under § 1983 a municipality cannot be held liable for the individual actions of its officers on the basis of respondeat superior, Count VIII presents no potentially viable theory of liability against the City.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability based on a custom to show more than a list of individual actions.

Frontera v. City of Columbus Division of P · filed 2010-08-30

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Frontera, the list of individual actions that Frontera relies upon in this case are insufficient to establish an actionable “custom” or to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the CPD had such a custom.

A school district is liable under Section 1983 for an employee’s constitutional violation only if it arose from a district custom or policy.

Spencer v. HOLLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2010-08-31

In short, plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that the District pursued, enforced, condoned or ratified any discriminatory policy that might render it liable for the individual defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Lucero v. Bush · filed 2010-09-01

It is only if a municipal custom or policy has caused the deprivation of the constitutional right that the municipality may be held liable. ... Consequently, the City of Sturgis and its chief of police, James Bush, in his official capacity, may both be liable for plaintiffs civil rights claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for an employee’s unconstitutional act only when it results from the municipality’s policy or custom, not merely from the employment relationship.

Pointer v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-05

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the torts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. ... Plaintiffs have neither pled, nor proven, that Sergeant O’Bryant’s actions were the execution or implementation of an official policy or custom of the District. Accordingly, their claim must fail on that basis.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for an employee’s unconstitutional act solely because the employee had final authority to make the decision; municipal liability requires final policymaking authority.

Delia v. City of Rialto · filed 2010-09-09

Chief Wells’s final decisionmaking authority regarding whether to order Delia to produce the rolls of insulation, standing alone, is insufficient to subject the City to liability for his action.

Section 1983 does not make a county vicariously liable for its employees’ unconstitutional acts; county liability requires a policy or custom that caused the violation.

Dahl v. Rice County, Minn. · filed 2010-09-13

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a governmental entity may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of employees. ... However, a governmental entity may be held liable if a plaintiff proves that its policy or custom was the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” ... There is no evidence that this single incident of Sheriff Cook losing his temper represents a policy of Sheriff Cook’s or of Rice County’s.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights to establish municipal liability.

Fanor v. Alvarado · filed 2010-09-13

Fanor did not produce evidence showing that the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights was the result of a policy or custom of the Newark Police Department.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or established custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.

Whittier v. City of Sunrise · filed 2010-09-14

For purposes of § 1983, local governments cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional behaviors of their employees unless the plaintiff shows that an official policy or custom of the city was the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when a government policy or custom causes a civil rights violation.

Robinson v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-09-14

In order to hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations under § 1983, the municipality must have acted in accordance with a “government policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to allege that a county policy or custom caused the violation of their rights.

McCroy v. Douglas Co. Corrections Center · filed 2010-09-16

... we agree with the district court that McCroy failed to state a claim, because he effectively sued only Douglas County, yet he did not allege that his rights were violated as a result of any policy or custom of Douglas County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single unconstitutional act by an official with final policymaking authority.

Mangino v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue · filed 2010-09-23

Municipal liability may attach under § 1983 when a policymaker takes action that violates an individual’s constitutional rights, and such liability may be based on one individual action by a policymaker.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise unless the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a federal right.

Phillips v. Allen · filed 2010-09-28

However, before analyzing whether a municipality caused a plaintiffs harm, a court must determine that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was in fact a deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs an officer who caused a constitutional injury; liability requires an attributable policy, custom, or action by a final policymaker.

Silva v. City of San Leandro · filed 2010-09-29

Under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. ... Nor is there any evidence of a policy or custom to which the relevant conduct of the Defendant officers can be attributed. Therefore, Defendants’ request for entry of summary judgment on the claims against the City of San Leandro and the police chief is granted.