42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or tolerated custom causes a deprivation of rights.

Burgess v. Fischer · filed 2010-09-29

Rather, a government entity is liable under § 1983 only if a plaintiff can establish that an officially executed policy or the toleration of a custom within the government entity deprived the plaintiff of that right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that the municipality itself caused the constitutional deprivation.

Mallin v. City of Eastlake · filed 2010-09-29

Simply put, to impose § 1983 liability upon a local government body, a plaintiff must show that the municipality itself is the wrongdoer.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an official policy, practice, or custom that was the moving force behind the injury.

Rees v. Office of Children and Youth · filed 2010-09-30

I further conclude that Rees’s claims against the County are independently insufficient under § 1983 in that they fail to allege that an official policy, practice or custom was the “moving force” behind her injury.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to hold a city liable; a single instance of misconduct by its employees is insufficient.

Hayes v. Perotta · filed 2010-09-30

Instead, Plaintiff has, at most, alleged a single instance of unconstitutional misconduct by employees of Poughkeepsie, which, of course, falls far short of the bar he must clear to survive Defendants’ Motion.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a municipality only when the municipality itself caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Cline v. City of Mansfield · filed 2010-09-30

Simply put, to impose § 1983 liability upon a local governmental body, a plaintiff must show that the municipality itself is the wrongdoer.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the injury; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle · filed 2010-10-04

Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely upon a theory of respondeat superior; rather, the plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused his injury.

A Section 1983 claim against a municipality must adequately plead municipal liability; incorporating earlier allegations into a count does not, by itself, state a Monell claim.

White v. Brommer · filed 2010-09-30

Second, while the Complaint is not a model of clarity, plaintiff is correct that the paragraphs referencing Section 1983 and municipal liability are incorporated by reference under Count III. Despite plaintiffs incorporation by reference of all prior paragraphs, Count III fails to state a Monell claim against the Borough of Columbia.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom; a single instance of police misconduct, standing alone, does not establish one.

McElroy v. City of Lowell · filed 2010-10-05

While the existence of a municipal custom may be evidenced by the repetition of unlawful acts by officers, a single instance of police misconduct in the field, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the endorsement of an informal policy or custom by the City.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because its employees violated someone’s rights.

Burke v. Twp. of Cheltenham · filed 2010-10-05

Such respondeat superior allegations are not the stuff of Monell liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a municipal failure-to-train claim to allege facts showing a policy of deliberate indifference; one incident and a vague reference to a custom are insufficient.

Santiago Ex Rel. C.S. v. Bloise · filed 2010-10-05

Even with the facts of the complaint taken as true, plaintiffs do not adequately set forth a proper section 1983 claim. One specific incident with Bloise combined with a mere reference to a custom of failure to train and supervise its constables is insufficient for Count II to survive a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability only when a municipal policy or practice results in a constitutional deprivation.

Palka v. Shelton · filed 2010-10-07

But because his complaint fails to state a claim for any constitutional violation, the City and County cannot be held liable; a Monell claim requires a municipal policy or practice that results in a constitu- tional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a local government liable to show that an official policy or widespread custom of unconstitutional conduct caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Marksmeier v. Davie · filed 2010-10-08

When a plaintiff is seeking to impose section 1983 liability on a local government body, the plaintiff must show that there is an official policy or a widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits liability against the District only when its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Cohen v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2010-10-08

To impose liability on the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution, but also that the District’s custom or policy caused the violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Marvel v. County of Delaware · filed 2010-10-14

To hold municipalities liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify either a “policy, statement, ordinance regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision making channels.” ... Next, Mrs. Marvel has failed to establish that there were any ‘customs’ or ‘policies’ of the Delaware County ARD program that caused a deprivation of Mr. Marvel’s federal rights, such as requiring workers to labor in direct sunlight or failing to give them water.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its custom or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Shuler v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-10-15

Even if Ms. Shuler had proffered evidence sufficient to support an equal protection claim, in order to impose liability on the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she must show also that the District’s custom or policy caused the violation. ... Ms. Shuler has pointed to no custom or policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an official had final policymaking authority over the relevant subject before the official’s decision can support municipal liability.

Whaumbush v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2010-10-15

Upon careful analysis of Monell, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ mere labeling of Green and King as “official policymakers” responsible for “policies and practices” of the Sheriffs Office and Prison System insufficient to establish a plausible claim for municipal liability. While Plaintiffs allege broadly that Defendants Green and King are policymakers for their respective departments, the Court finds no facts in the Amended Complaint alleging that these Defendants had final, unreviewable discretion with respect to the subject matter in question—the creation or termination of municipal contracts.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a decision by an official with final policymaking authority over the matter.

Powercomm, LLC v. Holyoke Gas & Electric Dept. · filed 2010-10-19

Plaintiffs claims of equal protection and due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail because they implicate no final policymakers. ... Lavelle, however, was not in a position to establish final policy because his recommendations could not become final without approval from the commissioners of HG & E, the final decision makers.

A Section 1983 municipal liability claim fails when the underlying constitutional claim fails.

Simpson v. Village of Riverside · filed 2010-10-20

Moreover, since Simpson’s underlying retaliation claim fails, his Monell claim against the Board and the Village necessarily fails as well.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a school district for negligent training or supervision; the plaintiff must allege a policy of deliberate indifference.

Jane Doe, Etc. v. Alhambra School District · filed 2010-10-26

Under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the District could not be held liable for “negligent training and supervision,” which was the only § 1983 related allegation against the District in the Complaint. Rather, Doe needed to allege that the District’s actions amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a municipal policy or custom and the specific constitutional violation for municipal liability.

Guerrero v. Deane · filed 2010-10-27

Even assuming that the Resolution’s directives had been implemented on November 24, 2007, and even assuming those policies caused an atmosphere of distrust between police officers and Hispanic citizens, Plaintiffs have made no showing of the necessary affirmative link between identified policy or custom and specific violation at issue here.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on negligent municipal hiring, training, or supervision without an underlying constitutional violation.

MacFall v. City of Rochester · filed 2010-10-27

Such a claim under § 1983 must be dismissed, however. A § 1983 claim based upon alleged negligence in hiring, training or supervision of municipal employees will not lie in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to connect the alleged injury to an official policy, an official with final policymaking authority, or a pervasive custom or practice.

Summers v. City of Dothan · filed 2010-10-29

Thus, to satisfy the under-color-of-state law standard, a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit against a municipality must establish that the acts giving rise the injury arose from one of three sources: (1) “an official government policy”; (2) “the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy”; or (3) “a custom or practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.”

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plausibly allege that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional injury; merely reciting that officials’ actions were official policy is insufficient.

Moss v. United States Secret Service · filed 2010-10-29

Barely stating that “the individual Police Defendants’ decisions to order and implement the aforesaid police actions constituted the official policy of their respective public employers” is simply not enough. Section 1983 claims against City of Jacksonville, therefore, should be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy, widespread custom, or act by a final policymaker to hold a local government liable.

Hendricks v. New Albany Police Department · filed 2010-11-01

Thus, “in order to survive summary judgment,” Plaintiff must “present evidence demonstrating the existence of an official policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a county decision-maker of the municipality or department.” ... Plaintiff has neither proffered the requisite evidence nor explained her dearth of evidence regarding NAPD’s customs, policies, or practices. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiffs federal claims against NAPD.

A city may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Peck v. City of Boston · filed 2010-11-01

In order to meet the second element, “a plaintiff must show that a policy or custom of the city led to the constitutional deprivation alleged. This requires that plaintiff demonstrate both the existence of a policy or custom and a causal link between that policy and the constitutional harm.” ... In the instant case, the undisputed facts show that Peck stopped performing at Faneuil Hall as a result of the City’s policy on street performers.

Section 1983 requires facts suggesting a county policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation to state a municipal liability claim.

Webster v. Bronson · filed 2010-11-02

Webster also failed to state a Monell claim because he alleged no facts suggesting that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes a plaintiff’s injury.

Florida Transportation Service, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2010-11-02

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused his injury, and cannot simply try to impose liability under respondent superior principles.

A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when its employee commits a constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind it.

Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City · filed 2010-11-03

“A plaintiff suing a municipality under Section 1983 for the acts of one of its employees must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” ... Because we decide otherwise, Woods Cross City may be liable for Officer Davis’s actions.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a county policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Jones v. Muskegon County · filed 2010-11-04

Liability may be imposed on a county only when a county “policy” or “custom” caused the plaintiff’s injury and a “direct causal link” existed between the policy and the purported denial of the right to adequate medical care.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the challenged conduct reflects an express policy, a widespread practice, or an action by an official with final policymaking authority.

Fox v. Rice · filed 2010-11-04

However, because we are proceeding under a municipal liability analysis, even if this hold were invalid WCCC cannot be liable unless retaining Fox in reliance on this invalid-for argument's sake-hold constitutes an express policy, widespread practice, or action by one with final policy-making authority. Again, as an isolated incident, this cannot be deemed an express policy or widespread practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Spencer v. Roche · filed 2010-11-08

Plaintiff has not sufficiently established that any violation of his constitutional rights was the fault of a deficient policy or custom on the part of the city. Even when taking all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could not find the city liable for a § 1983 violation based on an unconstitutional policy or practice.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its official policy or custom deprives a person of civil rights.

Huggins v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD. · filed 2010-11-09

A municipality is only liable under section 1983 if it deprives an individual of civil rights through an official policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation only if its officers were executing its official policy or custom.

Simmons v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-11-09

Even if the District violated plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, the District is only liable for this violation if the corrections officers were executing the District’s “official policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation before the municipality can be held liable.

Simmons v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2010-11-09

Although plaintiff has provided evidence in support of his claim that this body-cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment, he has not provided any evidence to support his claim that the corrections officers were executing the District’s official policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability fails when no officer committed a constitutional violation.

Schoelch v. Mitchell · filed 2010-11-12

Because we conclude that he has not presented a submissible case that any officer committed a constitutional violation, the claim for municipal liability necessarily fails as well.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final decisionmaker’s actions or a deliberately indifferent failure to train and supervise may have caused a constitutional violation.

Sebast v. Mahan · filed 2010-11-16

There is ample evidence on record to support two bases for Albany County’s liability on Sebast’s retaliation claim. First, from Sebast and Campbell’s testimony and Campbell’s several internal memoranda, a reasonable jury could find that the acts and omissions of Sheriff Campbell, an official with final decision-making, authority, caused or contributed to the freedom of speech violations alleged by Sebast. Second, a jury could reasonably conclude from Mahan and Crouch’s alleged actions that Campbell failed to properly train and supervise them, and that his failure to do so amounted to deliberate indifference to Sebast’s rights.

A § 1983 claim against BOCES must plausibly allege a policy, custom, or practice that caused the claimed harm.

Vieira v. Honeoye Central School District · filed 2010-11-17

With regard to BOCES, Plaintiff has not alleged any policy, custom, or practice under which the alleged harm was caused to J.V.

A municipality can face a Section 1983 claim when the complaint plausibly alleges that officials with delegated final policymaking authority made the challenged arrest.

Lum v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2010-11-18

The court finds that plaintiffs have pled a factual predicate that gives rise to a plausible finding of municipal liability as to plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 makes local governments responsible for their own policies, but does not make them vicariously liable for employees’ conduct.

Vince v. Rock County, Wisconsin · filed 2010-11-18

As for the City and the County: they are responsible for their own policies, but not vicariously liable for the guards’ conduct.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Knight v. Pugh · filed 2010-11-22

The plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 claims against the City of Ozark because the facts alleged in her complaint do not demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that its failure to train or an official policy or custom caused the injury.

Williams v. County of San Mateo · filed 2010-11-24

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s remaining claims because he failed to show that the injuries he suffered were the result of the County’s failure to train or an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs seeking prospective relief against a municipality to show that a municipal policy or custom caused their injury, just as plaintiffs seeking damages must.

Los Angeles County v. Humphries · filed 2010-11-30

We conclude that Monell’s holding applies to §1983 claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal custom, practice, or policy causes a constitutional deprivation.

Stone v. Walsh · filed 2010-12-06

In the absence of any indication that the District infringed upon the plaintiffs due process rights resulting from a custom, practice or policy, the plaintiffs municipal liability claim fails.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district only when a district policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged discrimination.

Allen v. Murray-Lazarus · filed 2010-12-06

In order to hold the District liable under Section 1983, Allen must show that the District had a policy, practice, or custom of discriminating against black teachers, and that such a policy caused his termination.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires evidence connecting a policy to a constitutional injury; speculation about understaffing is insufficient.

HUNT EX REL. CHIOVARI v. Dart · filed 2010-12-06

We simply cannot take the leap from Mr. Hunt collapsing and later dying with multiple bruises on his body to an unconstitutional policy of understaffing — or any policy — on the part of the Sheriff without more from plaintiff to fill in the gap.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the challenged conduct results from a municipal policy, regulation, or custom.

Hudson Valley Marine, Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt · filed 2010-12-07

Here, the Town presented evidence sufficient to establish its prima facie burden of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of 42 USC § 1983 insofar as asserted against it, by demonstrating that the criminal charges brought against the plaintiff, which the plaintiff alleged violated its rights under 42 USC § 1983, did not result from a policy, regulation, or custom of the Town (see Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830 [2009]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county for a jail official’s act or omission to show a county policy, custom, or rule that permitted or caused it.

William Brown, Jr. v. Harris County, Texas · filed 2010-12-15

Moreover, to prevail on a claim against the County, Harris must show “a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the [County] that permitted or caused the act or omission.”

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a school district’s policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury to hold the district liable.

Green v. NICHOLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2010-12-15

This Court finds Plaintiff's averments, however, do not make a factually plausible claim that the Nicholas County School District's customs or policies led to Plaintiff D.G.'s injuries.

A school district is a person subject to § 1983 suit, but a claim against it requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Green ex rel. D.G. v. Nicholas County School District · filed 2010-12-15

As set forth above, this Court finds the Nicholas County School District is a “person” subject to suit 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but does not enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Further, Plaintiff has not averred any policy or custom on the part of the Nicholas County School District that led to any violation of Plaintiff D.G.’s constitutional rights.

A city can be liable under Section 1983 only if an official policy or custom caused the alleged violation of rights.

Bishop v. Ken Savage · filed 2010-12-16

We agree with the district court that Bishop effectively sued only the City of Fort Smith (City), and that the City could not be liable under section 1983 because Bishop did not allege that his rights were violated as a result of an official policy or custom of the City.

A city is not liable under § 1983 for an employment decision by an official whose decisions are subject to review and who lacks final authority to set human resources policy.

Alonza Baker, Jr. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2010-12-16

On Baker’s § 1983 claim, the Court held that although “Lawton may have had some discretion in disciplining and firing employees,” she lacked final authority to make human resources policy for the Commission because her decisions were subject to the Commission’s review. App. at 36. These determinations were not in error. The Court properly granted summary judgment in the City’s favor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a county policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Clark v. County of Tulare · filed 2010-12-21

Thus, plaintiff has failed to introduce a policy, custom or practice by the County which violated his rights, and plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that Wittman was responsible such that Wittman could be personally liable.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy.

Harris v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-12-21

In this case, Plaintiff failed to allege the existence of an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires factual allegations supporting its liability for the alleged misconduct.

J. D. Nettles, Jr. v. City of Leesburg · filed 2010-12-22

Nettles’s Second Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the City of Leesburg Police Department is liable for any misconduct under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policy causes a constitutional violation, even if the policy is facially constitutional.

Barreto v. County of Suffolk · filed 2010-12-22

But even a facially constitutional policy can impose municipal liability “if the policy can be shown to produce constitutional violations.”

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy or custom to establish municipal liability.

Walnut Hill Estate Enterprises, LLC v. City of Oroville · filed 2010-12-27

We agree with the district court that Walnut Hill did not adduce evidence of a “policy or custom” of the City of Oroville as required to establish § 1983 municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978).

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of the municipality’s fault and a causal link to the alleged constitutional violation.

Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home · filed 2010-12-28

Even if Veatch could show a Fourth Amendment violation based on Leonard’s execution of an arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside his presence, she has failed to satisfy the “rigorous standards of culpability and causation” that are required for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing public officials in their official capacities to show that a municipal policy, custom, or practice played a part in the alleged constitutional violation.

Thomas v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF BRANDYWINE SCHOOL · filed 2010-12-30

In particular, in suing the Board Defendants and Harter in their official capacities, Plaintiff must come forward with facts sufficient to establish that the District’s “policy, custom, or practice” played a part in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires proof that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of federal rights to hold a city liable.

Cox v. City of Ft. Worth, Tex. · filed 2010-12-30

Plaintiffs, conversely, have adduced no summary judgment evidence that City had a policy or custom that caused a deprivation of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights, or that any training policy of City was inadequate, or that there was any policy or custom of City that would have encouraged or found acceptable conduct of the kind plaintiffs allege in their complaint against Moore. Nor have plaintiffs identified an official policymaker who could be held responsible for enforcing a policy that caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against City.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality for failing to train or supervise its officers when the complaint plausibly alleges that the failure caused a constitutional violation.

Dawkins v. City of Honolulu · filed 2010-12-30

A municipality can also be liable under Section 1983 for failing to adequately train, supervise, or discipline its employees. ... The Complaint contains factual allegations on which it can plausibly be inferred that the City failed to adequately supervise and train its police officers, resulting in the unlawful arrest of Plaintiff. ... Defendant City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment arrest without probable cause claim based on the City’s failure to train or supervise the police officers is DENIED.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school board liable to identify a policy or custom that caused a deprivation of federal rights.

Hattie Porter v. Duval School Board · filed 2010-12-30

To impose liability on a municipal government entity, such as a school board, under § 1983, “the plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom causing the deprivation of federal rights.” ... Porter failed to identify a custom or policy that caused the deprivation of her or her daughter’s federal rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality or other local government solely because it employs a person who caused an injury.

Posey v. Pruger · filed 2011-01-03

The City also argues that it must be dismissed from Counts I through III, which assert federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute does not permit respondeat superior liability to be imposed on a municipality or other local government unit.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison medical contractor when its policy or custom deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Burgos v. PHILADELPHIA PRISON SYSTEM · filed 2011-01-03

An entity such as PHS may be liable under § 1983 only if it adopted a policy or custom that deprived Burgos of his constitutional rights. ... PHS may be held liable under the theory of municipal liability because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not there was a policy and if that policy violated Burgos’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs a person who committed the alleged violation.

Alexander v. City of Greensboro · filed 2011-01-05

However, a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a customary pattern requires evidence of conduct frequent and longstanding enough to show the governing body's knowledge and acceptance.

Dean v. Walker · filed 2011-01-06

Neither of these allegations rises to the level of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct as required for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that an official policy, custom, regulation, or decision caused the constitutional injury.

Comfort v. City of Norfolk · filed 2011-01-06

A cause of action may be brought against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by that body’s officers.” ... Comfort has not identified a City “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision,” pursuant to which the Defendants have acted.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the constitutional injury; assigning deputies to election duty alone does not establish that link.

HODINKA v. Delaware County · filed 2011-01-07

Moreover, plaintiffs present no evidence demonstrating that the policy of using deputy sheriffs was a proximate cause of their injuries. While the policy or custom complained of need not be unconstitutional in itself, it still must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Lightfoot v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-01-10

Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, the inquiry divides into two: the plaintiff must first establish a predicate constitutional violation; thereafter, the plaintiff must establish that a “policy or custom”4 of the municipality caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 makes a local government liable for a constitutional injury only when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Brian Banks, Sr. v. Deschutes County · filed 2011-01-11

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be liable for constitutional violations only “when execution of [the] government’s policy or custom” inflicts the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when no underlying constitutional violation is established.

Stepnes v. Ritschel · filed 2011-01-12

Here, the Monell claim fails because Stepnes’s Complaint does not establish a constitutional violation by Ritsehel, and therefore no § 1983 municipal liability can apply.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold the District liable to show that a District custom or policy caused a constitutional violation.

Cohen v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-01-13

Not only has Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a Due Process violation, he also has failed to point to any custom or policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation. To impose liability on the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show not only a violation of his rights under the Constitution, but also that the District’s custom or policy caused the violation.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; inadequate training requires deliberate indifference.

Gomez v. Lozano · filed 2011-01-21

Because Mr. Gomez has not alleged that Miami Beach had a custom or policy of making its police officers detain or beat innocent pedestrians without rhyme or reason or that Miami Beach showed a deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom the police interacted, I dismiss Mr. Gomez’s § 1983 claim against Miami Beach without prejudice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but not under a respondeat superior theory.

Stillwell v. Lawrence · filed 2011-01-21

Under § 1983, a local government or municipality may be held liable for adopting an official policy or custom causing a violation of constitutional rights, but local governments can not be sued under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

A municipality has no liability under § 1983 when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Davila v. City of Tracy · filed 2011-01-24

Because there is no constitutional violation, there is no claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the City of Tracy.

A § 1983 claim against a county requires evidence that a constitutional right was violated pursuant to a county policy, practice, or custom.

Prukop v. King County Sheriff · filed 2011-01-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Prukop failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom of the County.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality to allege an official policy or custom that caused the injury.

McCormack v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2011-01-25

McCormack fails to plead municipal liability against the City. McCormack does not allege in even bare terms the existence of an official policy or custom in Count I.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority under established custom makes the challenged decision.

Cooley v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago · filed 2011-01-25

That testimony provides uncontroverted evidence that Board had the invariable custom and usage of vesting the decisional authority in principals to make renewal decisions as to probationary counselors. That unequivocal evidence, coupled with relevant state law, compels the conclusion that Azcoitia’s final decision imposes Monell — based liability on Board under Section 1983.

A Section 1983 claim against a county must plausibly allege a county custom or policy that violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Nieves v. County of Monroe · filed 2011-01-25

Here, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the County engaged in any custom, pattern or policy in violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional violation only when the violation results from its policy or custom.

Alexander v. CITY OF MUSCLE SHOALS, ALA. · filed 2011-01-26

As discussed previously, a governmental entity may only be liable for an alleged constitutional violation under § 1983 where that violation was a result of a policy or custom of that entity.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation results from its policy or custom.

Cleary v. County of Macomb · filed 2011-02-02

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may be liable to a plaintiff under § 1983 if the plaintiff demonstrates that a constitutional violation occurred and that it was the result of a “policy or custom” of the municipality. Id. at 694. Where, as here, there is no constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.

An officer’s action can be attributed directly to a municipality under § 1983 only if the officer has final policymaking authority that is not subject to review.

Tucker v. CITY OF FLORENCE, ALA. · filed 2011-02-02

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Glover had the kind of functionally unreviewable, final policymaking authority required to impute any of his actions directly to the City.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality to allege that its policy caused a constitutional violation.

OLANIYI v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-02-04

Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint asserting a § 1983 claim must allege a predicate constitutional violation which was caused by a policy of the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 does not permit derivative municipal liability when the officer violated no constitutional right.

Vaughn v. Jenkins · filed 2011-02-07

Because we conclude that Smith’s acts violated no constitutional right of Jenkins, summary judgment in favor of the City of Orlando appropriately was granted on Plaintiffs’ derivative § 1983 claim against the City of Orlando.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a Monell claim without an underlying violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Goss Ex Rel. Goss v. Alloway Township School · filed 2011-02-07

Because the Court has already found that Plaintiff has failed to state a protected liberty interest, Plaintiffs Monell claim fails.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking prospective relief against a municipality must allege injury from a municipal policy or custom; municipal authorization of controlled access qualifies as a policy.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Sagardía De Jesús · filed 2011-02-07

Although the Supreme Court recently held that even plaintiffs who seek only prospective relief under section 1983 must satisfy Monell’s “policy” or “custom” requirement, ... the appellants plainly allege that their injuries result from the municipalities’ policies or customs. Authorization of controlled access is on its face an implementation of municipal policy.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Feller v. TOWNSHIP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD · filed 2011-02-10

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Township’s policies were, indisputably, the moving force behind the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 permits liability against a governmental unit only when its own custom or policy causes the deprivation of rights.

Simmons v. Catton · filed 2011-02-10

A governmental unit is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the deprivation of rights is caused by its own custom or policy.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires individual liability on the underlying substantive claim.

Cooper v. Martin · filed 2011-02-11

Because Martin is entitled to qualified immunity, the official-capacity defendants cannot be subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a county to be held liable solely for the acts of its employees or agents.

McIntyre v. County of Centre · filed 2011-02-11

Instead, McIntyre’s amended complaint and his other submissions illustrate that he seeks to impose respondeat superior liability on Centre County. Such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Hampton v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2011-02-14

Thus, a complaint that fails to allege a municipal policy or custom that resulted in the constitutional violation fails to allege a necessary element of a § 1983 claim. ... Here, plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding policies or customs, which would sustain a claim against the District.

Section 1983 makes the District of Columbia liable for a constitutional violation only when an official policy or custom causes it.

Stoddard v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-02-18

The District of Columbia, then, is subject to liability under Section 1983 only “when an official policy or custom causes the complainant to suffer a deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 claims against a supervisor or municipality require factual allegations supporting their responsibility for an underlying constitutional violation; conclusory allegations of a policy are insufficient.

Zembiec v. County of Monroe · filed 2011-02-22

Since I have found the allegations insufficient with respect to the underlying violations, I find no basis for a claim against O’Flynn or the County. In addition, plaintiffs conclusory allegations that O’Flynn and the County maintained a policy of publishing confidential medical records and retaliating against employees, absent some factual allegations in support of those assertions, also render these claims defective and subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Stoddard v. Fenty · filed 2011-02-22

Absent any allegation of the existence of a municipal policy or custom, and “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation,” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385, the complaint must be dismissed.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation; it cannot be held liable solely for an employee’s actions.

Turner v. Jones · filed 2011-02-23

It is well established that a municipality cannot be held liable for a § 1983 violation based upon the theory of respondeat superior; it must have itself caused the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when officers committed no constitutional violation.

Law v. City of Post Falls · filed 2011-02-23

Where there is no constitutional violation by the officers, however, there can be no municipal liability. ... Because the Court has concluded above that no constitutional violation occurred, the Motion will be granted as to the claims against the municipal Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation to hold a county liable.

Perez v. County of Monroe · filed 2011-02-24

A local government such as Monroe County may not be held liable under § 1983 unless the challenged action was performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Bouchard v. Whetstone · filed 2011-02-24

A municipality is responsible under § 1983 only when the execution of a government policy or custom actually causes an injury of constitutional dimensions. ... Bouchard has not cited any evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning his fourth claim for relief, his Monell claim against the City of Denver.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a policy, custom, or decision by a final policymaker to hold a municipality liable.

Anderson v. City of West Bend Police Department · filed 2011-02-28

As allegations of a policy, custom, or decision by a final policy-making authority are required to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, it is apparent that plaintiffs’ claims are against the defendants in their individual capacity, rather than their official capacity.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a violation of a federal right.

Youngbey v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-03-01

To succeed on a claim for relief under § 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must prove that the violation of a federal right occurred as the result of an illegal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county board for a policymaker’s conduct when the plaintiff fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Underwood v. The Board of County Commission · filed 2011-03-08

Because the Board’s liability depends on Mr. Underwood’s success against Mr. Dale, the district court also properly granted summary judgment to the Board.

Section 1983 permits liability against a county when a specific county policy or custom is the moving force behind the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Stewart v. King County Jail · filed 2011-03-09

The district court properly dismissed Stewart’s claims against King County because he failed to allege sufficient facts showing that a specific county policy or custom was “the moving force” behind the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employed the person who committed it.

Gallashaw v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2011-03-09

In this case therefore, even if Miles deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights, the City of Philadelphia is not liable under § 1983 simply as Miles’s employer.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the individual defendants inflicted no constitutional harm.

Cardenas v. San Antonio Police Department · filed 2011-03-10

Moreover, because the individual defendants did not inflict any constitutional harm on Cardenas, the district court properly granted summary ... judgment for the City of San Antonio.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence that the challenged conduct resulted from a municipal policy, custom, or practice, or a failure to train officers.

Armstrong v. Siskiyou County Sheriff's Depa · filed 2011-03-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Monell claim because Armstrong failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tharsing’s direction of Armstrong to the halfway house was pursuant to a municipal policy, custom, or practice, or because of a failure to train officers to avoid issuing such directives.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged unconstitutional conduct to hold a county or city liable.

McCarter v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2011-03-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McCarter’s excessive force claims against San Bernardino County and the City of Rancho Cucamonga because he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a specific policy or custom was “the moving force” behind the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires an unconstitutional act to hold a municipality liable for its policy or custom.

Yachnin v. Village of Libertyville · filed 2011-03-10

Monell claims require an unconstitutional act and, as discussed above, the procedures associated with the Village’s “No Refusal Weekend” did not violate Yachnin’s constitutional rights. As such, her Monell claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior.

Tuttelman v. City of San Jose · filed 2011-03-11

But Tuttelman does not have a claim against the City because respondeat superior is not a theory of municipal liability under § 1983.

Under § 1983, a municipality is liable for a decision only if the decisionmaker had final authority to establish municipal policy for that action.

Stickley v. Sutherly · filed 2011-03-14

A plaintiff suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that his or her injury was caused by municipal policy or custom. ... Stickley has failed to show that either Sutherly or Fauber possessed the final authority required to establish municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not make a municipal entity liable for an official’s constitutional violation solely because it employed the official.

Bjorklund v. Miller · filed 2011-03-15

TCPFA cannot be liable for any constitutional deprivation caused by Miller’s statements to the press based simply on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an unconstitutional official policy or an unconstitutional custom shown by repeated acts of a final policymaker.

ATHEISTS OF FLORIDA v. City of Lakeland, Fla. · filed 2011-03-15

In any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, a municipal entity is liable either if its official policy is constitutionally repugnant or if “the repeated acts of the final policymaker of the entity” demonstrate “an unofficial custom or practice” that is unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional tort authorized or directed by an official with final policymaking authority over the conduct at issue.

Vodak v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-03-17

A person who wants to impose liability on a municipality for a constitutional tort must show that the tort was committed (that is, authorized or directed) at the policymaking level of government—by the city council, for example, rather than by the police officer ... who made an illegal arrest.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a complaint to allege a longstanding municipal policy or custom and an employee’s violation of civil rights while following it.

Adams v. Selhorst · filed 2011-03-18

A § 1983 complaint against a municipality must allege (1) the existence of a custom or policy of the municipality which is of such long standing as to have the force of law, and (2) that one of the municipality’s employees violated the plaintiffs civil rights while acting pursuant to this custom or policy.

A § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Hamilton v. Rhee · filed 2011-03-18

The second prong requires a determination of whether “a policy or custom of the District of Columbia caused the constitutional violation alleged under the first prong.” ... Here, the plaintiff has not specified, described or even hinted at any District of Columbia practice or policy that resulted in the alleged violation of her due process rights.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a county to identify a county policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights.

Jackson v. Aaron Thomas, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County, · filed 2011-03-23

As the trial court correctly found, the Complaint did not allege or identify a policy or custom of Jackson County that resulted in the deprivation of any of her rights. Therefore, the Complaint failed to state a claim against Jackson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the trial court correctly dismissed the § 1983 claim against the County.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to allege that a municipal policy, practice, or custom caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Robinson v. Washington County · filed 2011-03-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City of Beaverton and Washington County because Robinson failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation and failed to allege that any policy, practice, or custom by the municipalities caused the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its failure to train officers on removing inmates from suicide watch amounts to deliberate indifference.

Hawkins v. County of Lincoln · filed 2011-03-25

In sum, while the Plaintiff has not alleged that the actions of individual officers were deliberately indifferent, there remains an issue of fact as to whether Lincoln County acted with deliberate indifference by failing to have a specific policy for determining when an inmate can be removed from suicide watch and placed in a situation that may increase the likelihood of a successful suicide attempt.

Section 1983 requires more than respondeat superior to hold a municipality liable.

Islam v. City of Bridgeton · filed 2011-03-28

Both a § 1983 claim and a claim under New Jersey’s Civil Rights Act require more than respondeat superior to hold a municipality liable.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires specific facts supporting a municipal policy or custom; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Swinton v. City of New York · filed 2011-03-28

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, “[p]laintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations; they must add specific factual support to show the existence of a pattern.” ... These conclusory assertions do not state a plausible § 1983 claim against the City, especially in light of New York’s requirement that a grand jury indict a potential criminal defendant on every charge to be tried based on a finding of probable cause.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plausibly allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury.

In Re Dayton · filed 2011-03-31

Consequently, Plaintiffs' federal claims must be dismissed as to Middletown and Orange County, because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead the existence of a policy or custom by either municipality.

A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when a municipal policymaker violates a person’s constitutional rights.

Frisenda v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF MALVERNE · filed 2011-03-31

With respect to the second argument, municipal liability can be established by a plaintiff, inter alia, (1) by demonstrating an official policy or custom of the municipality, or (2) by showing that a municipal “policymaker” violated plaintiffs constitutional rights. As discussed below, although the Village argues that there is a lack of sufficient evidence of an official policy or custom in this case, no argument whatsoever has been made by the Village as to why municipal liability cannot be based in this case on the alleged unconstitutional actions of Village policymakers— namely, the Chief of Police and the Village Board. Thus, summary judgment can be denied on that basis alone.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a police chief’s actions without proof that the chief was acting as a final policymaker or that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation.

Stone v. City of Grand Junction, Tenn. · filed 2011-03-31

In this case, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Ryan was a final policymaker or that he was acting in a policymaking capacity when he swore out the affidavits of complaint against her. Accordingly, she has failed to establish a basis for municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation; conclusory allegations of a policy or custom are insufficient.

Creecy v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-03-31

These allegations are conclusory and fail to plausibly show that a municipal policy or custom caused Creecy’s constitutional rights to be violated.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plead facts that plausibly support the existence of an unlawful municipal policy or custom.

Dayton v. City of Middletown · filed 2011-03-31

Plaintiffs must first state plausible facts giving rise to a reasonable inference of an unlawful municipal policy, as required by Iqbal, before they may proceed to discovery on their Monell claim. Therefore, because Plaintiffs have not pled facts which plausibly make out a Monell claim, Orange County’s and Middletown’s motions to dismiss are granted as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when one of its policies causes a constitutional injury.

American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations v. City of Miami · filed 2011-04-05

A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when one of its policies causes a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school district for alleged constitutional violations tied to its policy or custom.

Moss v. Spartanburg County School District No. 7 · filed 2011-04-05

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the School District can be subject to § 1983 liability only for Plaintiffs’ alleged violations pertaining to the retention of released time permission forms on school property, allowing SCBEST to maintain a table at PTO open houses, and allowing SCBEST to perform promotional visits in classrooms.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality for prospective relief requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged injury.

Collura v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2011-04-06

Given that Monell is applicable, we perceive no legal error in the District Court‟s conclusion that Collura failed to produce any evidence, let alone a preponderance of evidence, showing that his visiting privileges at Independence Branch were suspended pursuant to a City or Free Library policy or custom of doing so when a patron threatens or initiates civil litigation.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that a county policy or deliberate indifference caused an officer’s constitutional violation before the county can be held liable.

VINATIERI v. Mosley · filed 2011-04-07

Without more, these are not facts plausibly suggestive of a county policy endorsing or condoning the constitutional violations alleged, or even that the Sheriff knew enough about the neighbors’ dispute to have been alert to the possibility officers beneath him would abuse authority to favor one side over the other. Vinatieri’s Monell claim therefore must be dismissed, with leave to amend.

A § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia must allege a municipal policy or custom, or deliberate indifference to an ongoing practice.

Elkalibe v. Ibiza Nightclub Dc, LLC · filed 2011-04-13

Plaintiffs have therefore conceded that they failed to allege an essential element of a constitutional violation by the District. Plaintiffs also do not allege that the District knowingly ignored an ongoing practice or was deliberately indifferent. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state the elements of a section 1983 claim against the District of Columbia.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Nettles v. Pensacola Police Department · filed 2011-04-13

Moreover, there is no basis for holding the City of Pensacola liable. Nettles’ amended complaint does not allege that the Fourth Amendment violation occurred pursuant to any policy or custom by the City of Pensacola, despite the magistrate judge’s warning that his amended complaint had to allege as much.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality for an officer’s arrest without evidence linking it to inadequate training or supervision of the officer.

Narvaez v. City of New York · filed 2011-04-14

As to the section 1983 claims, these defendants also showed that they had no role in training or supervising the arresting officer. Plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating otherwise.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to be the moving force behind a constitutional violation; an abstract claim that policies authorize unconstitutional conduct is insufficient.

Garcia Ex Rel. Estate of Acosta-Garcia v. Clark County · filed 2011-04-18

Maria failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Sandra’s, Maria’s, or Genesis’ constitutional rights were violated, and whether a County policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation. ... Maria’s contention that County policies authorize unconstitutional conduct in the abstract is “quite beside the point[]” with respect to the County’s liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a local government for an injury caused by its policy or custom, but the claim fails if its employees violated no constitutional right.

Graves v. Amber Bowles · filed 2011-04-18

A local government may be liable pursuant to section 1983 if its employees or agents injure the plaintiff through “execution of [the] government’s policy or custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, we have decided that Graves’s claims against the Glasgow Police Defendants fail because they did not violate his constitutional rights. Therefore, his claims against the City of Glasgow fail.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an official’s decision if the official had final policymaking authority; whether that authority was delegated depends on state and local law.

Love v. Rehfus · filed 2011-04-21

We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved in order to determine whether, as a matter of state law, Sugar Creek Township is liable under § 1983 for the Chief‟s actions.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plead facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused a violation of federal rights; speculation that an unidentified policy or custom exists is insufficient.

Trimble v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-04-26

Since Trimble has failed to plead sufficiently the existence of a municipal custom or practice that violates federal constitutional or statutory rights, she has not stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must plead facts supporting a policy or custom that caused a violation of federal rights; speculation about an unidentified policy is insufficient.

Trimble v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2011-04-26

As in Bonaccorsy, Sanders, Plater, and Ekwem, merely speculating that an unidentified policy and uncorroborated practice or custom exists without providing any factual heft to support the allegation is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its officers’ actions; municipal liability requires an official policy or custom that caused the violation.

Coleman v. Gillespie · filed 2011-04-29

Section 1983 does not allow a municipality to be held vicariously liable for its officers’ actions on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 generally limits municipal liability to a local government’s own illegal acts; an exception requires supporting evidence.

Terry Hebert, Sr. v. Rodriguez · filed 2011-05-10

As to his municipal-liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hebert failed to present evidence to support one of the very few exceptions 5 to the general rule that local governments are liable only for “their own illegal acts.”6 Thus, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Irby v. Nueces County Sheriff · filed 2011-05-11

For a municipality to be liable pursuant to § 1983, there must be: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence that a city policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged injury.

Ciampi v. City of Palo Alto · filed 2011-05-11

In its review of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of his opposition brief, the Court has found no evidence suggesting that the City of Palo Alto maintains a policy, practice, or custom, written or otherwise, that could be considered the “moving force” behind Plaintiffs alleged injuries.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when no individual defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Mignault v. Ledyard Public Schools · filed 2011-05-16

“Because the Court has found that the individual defendants have not violated the Plaintiffs constitutional rights, a fortiori, the [municipal defendant] cannot be found liable for violations of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights.”

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 when its officer caused no constitutional injury.

Rodriguez v. City of Fresno · filed 2011-05-16

Where, as here, there was no violation of any constitutional right, Heller applies. Defendant City of Fresno is not liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an official’s final policymaking authority to hold a government body liable for that official’s conduct.

Doe v. Lake Oswego School District · filed 2011-05-18

In addition, plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege any action by an official policy-maker. Whether a particular official is a final policy-making official for purposes of section 1983 liability is purely a legal question and not one of fact.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; an unlawful act by a final policymaker may also support liability.

Kastritis v. City of Daytona Beach Shores · filed 2011-05-18

Instead, a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 if a plaintiff can show “(1) that [her] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” ... Upon consideration of the record evidence, the Court finds that there is a factual dispute that precludes the Court’s ruling on this issue.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for an unwritten custom only if the custom is so well-settled and permanent as to constitute law.

Jordan v. Cicchi · filed 2011-05-20

To the extent that Jordan asserted that the deprivation of a contact visit in his case was pursuant to an unwritten internal custom, in order to establish the county’s liability under section 1983, Jordan would have to show that the custom is so well-settled and permanent as to constitute law.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Okon v. Harris County Hospital Dist · filed 2011-05-23

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, Okon must show that the District had a policy or custom that caused her constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an unconstitutional action implements an official policy or follows a governmental custom.

Doe v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2011-05-23

However, municipalities bear liability only when the action alleged to be unconstitutional “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or the action is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision making channels.”

A § 1983 claim based on a policy or custom must allege facts identifying the challenged conduct and the policy or custom it advanced.

Cozzani v. County of Suffolk · filed 2011-05-24

Although the complaint alleged as a legal conclusion that the defendants engaged in conduct pursuant to a policy or custom which deprived the plaintiff of certain constitutional rights, it was wholly unsupported by any allegations of fact identifying the nature of that conduct or the policy or custom which the conduct purportedly advanced (see Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US —, —, 129 S Ct 1937, 1950-1951 [2009]; Dwares v City of New York, 985 F2d 94, 100 [1993]; see generally Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d 700, 703-704 [2010]).

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

RHYAN v. City of Waukegan · filed 2011-05-25

The facts included in Defendants’ statement of facts do not indicate that a policy or custom was responsible for the alleged constitutional violations in this action.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker’s actions violate constitutional rights.

Kaminski v. Anderson · filed 2011-05-27

Accordingly, if plaintiff proves that she suffered retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the Town of Amherst may be liable for those actions taken by defendant Anderson. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment of the Town of Amherst on the grounds of municipal liability is denied.

A county is not liable under § 1983 for decisions that do not amount to policy-making, or for a failure to train without a showing that the training was constitutionally required.

Emery v. Pierce County · filed 2011-06-01

The due process claims asserted against the county under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), were properly dismissed because, first, their allegations do not implicate “policy-making,” as opposed to mere “decision- making,” Delia, 621 F.3d at 1083-84; and second, because plaintiffs made no showing that any supposedly-lacking training was constitutionally required.