42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for actions taken under an official policy or custom.

Stella Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School District Board of Education · filed 1991-03-20

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only for official policies or customs.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for every act, including unlawful acts, of a city official merely because the municipality empowered that official.

Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo · filed 1991-04-25

We hold that the mere empowering of a city official does not subject the city to section 1983 liability for every act of that official, including unlawful acts.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a government entity when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional-rights violation.

Arthur v. Hillsborough County Bd. of Criminal Justice · filed 1991-05-08

In order to allege and prove an actionable section 1983 claim against the Board, the appellant was required to establish that the governmental officials or employees, of whose actions he complains, deprived him of his constitutional rights by acting pursuant to an official policy or custom of that governmental entity even if that particular custom had not been formally sanctioned or ordered.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional injuries caused by an official policy or custom, but not solely by employee actions.

Saffold v. City of Chicago · filed 1991-08-26

Under the principles set forth in Monell and its progeny, we conclude that Saffold has not alleged facts sufficient to establish municipal liability on the part of the City under § 1983.

A school district is entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 due process claim when the plaintiff offers no evidence of a custom, practice, or policy tied to the alleged violation.

Doe Ex Rel. Pahssen v. Merrill Community School District · filed 2009-03-26

Second, with respect to Plaintiffs due process claim, Plaintiff has not advanced evidence of a custom, practice or policy related to the re-enrollment of John Doe at Merrill or any other affirmative act by which Plaintiff alleges that Merrill violated her due process rights under a state-created danger theory.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on local governments for constitutional torts committed by their agents or employees, but allows municipal liability based on an official policy or custom.

Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am. · filed 2009-03-26

Generally, a local government cannot be held liable under section 1983 for a constitutional tort committed by its agent or employee because respondeat superior does not apply.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof of an official policy or custom adopted with deliberate indifference to affected persons' constitutional rights.

Solovy v. Morabito · filed 2009-03-30

“Section 1983 actions against municipalities require satisfaction of certain special elements, including proof (1) that the City pursued an official custom or policy of failing to adequately train, supervise, or discipline its officers in a particular matter, and (2) that such official policy or custom was adopted by the official makers of policy with ‘deliberate indifference’ towards the constitutional rights of persons affected by the policy or custom.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with policymaking authority takes action attributable to the municipality that causes the plaintiff’s injury.

D.N. Ex Rel. Nelson v. Snyder · filed 2009-03-31

In the context of the instant motion, plaintiffs have thus alleged that Township officials with policymaking authority took specific action attributable to the Township within the ambit of Monell liability. Moreover, the complaint adequately sets forth the causal connection between this official action and the tragic abuse of D.N. and S.N. The Township may be subject to liability under these circumstances. Its request for dismissal will be denied.

A pattern and practice of discriminatory treatment can establish the municipal policy required for liability under § 1983.

Adorno v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2009-03-31

Although the Port Authority makes a separate argument that plaintiffs’ § 1983 theory fails because a municipality (and the Port Authority is treated as a municipality for purposes of § 1983) is liable under § 1983 only when there is proof of a municipal policy, here, as discussed below, the evidence of a pattern and practice of discriminatory treatment is tantamount to evidence of a municipal policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Hawkins v. Lanier · filed 2009-04-01

Even when all reasonable inferences are made in favor of Mr. Hawkins, his constitutional claims against the District of Columbia fail because he does not allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Hawkins v. Lanier · filed 2009-04-01

A complaint that does not allege such a policy or custom fails to allege a necessary element of liability under § 1983, and that claim must be dismissed.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof that an inadequate policy resulted from a deliberate or conscious municipal choice.

Tortes v. King County · filed 2003-06-02

This deliberate indifference requires proof that the inadequate policy resulted from a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipality.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs the person who caused the injury; liability requires an official policy or municipal custom.

Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co. · filed 2006-02-28

We affirm, however, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city on Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claims. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Section 1983 requires proof of a policymaker, an official policy, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom for municipal liability.

Davis v. Tarrant County, Tex. · filed 2009-04-08

Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not permit county liability when its officers committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Martinez v. Beggs · filed 2009-04-21

As we have concluded that the individual county defendants (Kirkland, Edwards, Brandon, and Epps) did not violate Ginn’s constitutional rights, Beggs and the county cannot be held liable as a matter of law.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege facts showing that the municipality caused the civil rights violation; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Jones v. Delaney · filed 2009-04-21

While a municipality may be sued under § 1983 for civil rights violations, such a suit may be maintained only if the complaint includes factual allegations tending to show that the municipality was the driving force behind the civil rights violation, and not on a respondeat superior theory for the conduct of a wayward municipal employees.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for a violation caused by its official policy or custom, but not solely because it employs the person responsible.

Caldwell v. Pleasantville Municipal Court · filed 2009-04-21

The District Court was correct that a municipality or local government unit cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor unless the violation was caused by an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence of a city policy or custom relevant to the claim.

Roark v. City of Cotton Plant · filed 2009-04-24

We find no error in the grant of JAML to the City, because Roark failed to offer evidence of a City policy or custom relevant to her claims.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an affirmative link between a government policy and the alleged constitutional violation.

Elkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-04-27

A plaintiff must demonstrate an affirmative link between the District’s policy and the constitutional violation alleged.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a complaint to identify a municipal custom or policy and link the challenged conduct to a municipal decisionmaker.

McTernan v. York · filed 2009-04-27

Because McTernan does not adequately plead a custom or policy, or a link between the challenged restriction and a municipal decisionmaker, the restriction cannot “fairly be said to represent official policy,” warranting the imposition of municipal liability.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Holman v. York · filed 2009-04-27

Holman’s municipal liability claims would have inevitably failed at the summary judgment stage, since we conclude that no constitutional deprivation occurred.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that the challenged actions carried out an official policy or custom articulated by final policymakers.

Albert Edward Pearson, Jr. v. The City and County of Denver · filed 1991-10-23

In order to state a claim against a municipality, however, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged actions were taken in execution of an official policy or custom, see Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), as articulated by final policymakers, see Ware v. Unified School Dist., 902 F.2d 815, 817 (10th Cir.1990) (on rehearing).

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a municipality only when an official policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Maguire v. Municipality of Old Orchard Beach · filed 1992-02-18

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege even the barest allegations of municipal liability under section 1983 in his Complaint. See Complaint. For instance, he makes no mention of any official policy or custom of the Police Department, or of its “deliberate indifference” to the rights of others, such as Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no entitlement to discovery in the absence of allegations of the fundamental elements of a liability claim. The Complaint’s failure to allege necessary predicate factors in respect to municipal liability is fatal to the claim. The Court agrees with Defendants that “Plaintiff should not be allowed to conduct a ‘fishing expedition’ of discovery against Defendants ...” See Defendants’ Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance of Trial and Other Relief at 2. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the Municipality on Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the Municipality.

Section 1983 limits municipal liability to actions that implement local policy.

Auriemma v. Fred Rice, and City of Chicago · filed 1992-02-28

For the reasons we have given, Monell’s effort to limit municipal liability under § 1983 to acts that carry out local policy entails distinguishing legislative from executive functions — a distinction always present in principle even though blurry in practice.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an official's conduct if that official's decisions represent municipal policy; unresolved facts about that authority can preclude summary judgment.

Brophy Ahern Development v. Manchester, No. 91 0389522 (Aug. 13, 1992) · filed 1992-08-13

While a municipality cannot be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for the actions of its employees, a municipality may be held liable where the actionable conduct may be attributable to the municipality itself. ... The defendant has set forth no affidavits or other documentary evidence showing that the town manager is not a person whose "edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy," Monell v. Department of Social Services, supra, 694; Pembauer v. Cincinnati, supra; St. Louis v. Praprotnik, supra, 121. Therefore, because there are unresolved questions of fact as to whether the defendant can be held liable under section 1983, the motion for summary judgment as to this ground is denied.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official’s act represents final municipal policy or a municipal policy or custom causes the constitutional harm.

Smith v. City of Boston · filed 1992-11-05

In conclusion, we cannot say that Consalvo’s acts are attributable to the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith failed to show that Consalvo possessed final policy making authority with respect to the complained-of activities and failed to demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy, express or implied, that caused the constitutional harm. The authority to act for the city does not necessarily grant license to establish final policy.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional deprivation; conclusory claims of inadequate training or supervision do not establish a triable claim.

Carnegie v. Miller · filed 1993-01-12

I therefore accept and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. ... He has, accordingly, failed to meet his burden of coming forward with specific facts showing that there is any genuine issue for trial as to whether a “policy or custom” of the NYCHA or the Port Authority was responsible for the constitutional deprivations he has alleged.

Section 1983 makes municipal liability depend on whether the challenged acts represent official municipal policy.

Herro v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1993-04-05

Rather, Milwaukee’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on whether the acts which form the basis of Herro’s claim represent official Milwaukee policy, or whether, instead, they are merely the unapproved acts of its employees.

Section 1983 permits county liability when inadequate supervision, discipline, and training of deputies demonstrate deliberate indifference to arrestees’ rights.

Johnny Vineyard v. County of Murray, Georgia, Bill Hansird, as Former Sheriff of Murray County, Monte Chastain, Robert B · filed 1993-05-17

We find substantial evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion that Murray County had inadequate policies of supervision, discipline and training of deputies in the Murray County Sheriff’s Department and that these policies demonstrated the deliberate indifference of the County to the rights of arrestees to be free from the use of excessive force by the County’s deputies.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an abusive police practice when those responsible for municipal policy adopt it through deliberate or reckless indifference to complaints.

Wilson v. City of Chicago, Jon Burge · filed 1993-12-08

Deliberate or reckless indifference to complaints must be proved in order to establish that an abusive practice has actually been condoned and therefore can be said to have been adopted by those responsible for making municipal policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when the alleged conduct represents official municipal policy.

Columbia v. Sabo, No. 0060552 (Feb. 2, 1994) · filed 1994-02-02

Viewing the plaintiff's allegations in the most favorable light, it can be concluded that Sabo's alleged harassment and discrimination represented official municipal policy, sufficient to hold the City of Torrington liable under 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for its officers’ assault absent a causal link to an official county policy or custom.

Owens v. Haas · filed 1978-09-12

In short, on the pleadings before the court, there is simply no “causal link” to connect the assault on plaintiff with any sort of official county policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its official policy causes an employee to violate constitutional rights; the municipality cannot be liable solely under respondeat superior.

Cale v. The City of Covington, Virginia · filed 1978-11-03

We add only that the liability of the City of Covington under § 1983 may depend upon factual issues not developed in the current state of the record, for Monell makes it clear that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory,” 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036, and that only a local government which “under color of some official policy ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights” may be liable.

A city is a proper defendant under § 1983 when it enforces a policy that violates the plaintiffs’ rights.

Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 728 v. City of Atlanta · filed 1979-03-23

The court therefore concludes that the City of Atlanta is a proper defendant, as there is no doubt that it is enforcing a policy against plaintiffs of the sort made actionable against cities under section 1983 by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Monell’s recognition of municipal damages liability under § 1983 applies to cases still pending when Monell was decided.

Aiello v. City of Wilmington · filed 1979-03-28

The Court concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell applies to this case to revivify plaintiff’s claim for damages against the City of Wilmington.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when its policy-making officials engage in a systematic, widespread discriminatory practice.

North American Cold Storage Co. v. County of Cook · filed 1979-04-10

Although Monell would prevent a county from being held liable for an isolated unconstitutional act by a government employee, an allegation that policy-making officials have engaged in a systematic, widespread discriminatory practice is sufficient to state a cause of action against the governmental unit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by an officially recognized policy, even if the policy is unwritten.

Shuman v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1979-04-18

Whether this challenge is framed as an attack on § 10-110 of the City Charter, as the parties have contended, or as a test of an unwritten yet widely-recognized official policy, as we believe, the prerequisites for municipal liability under § 1983 have been met.

Section 1983 permits damages and injunctive relief against a municipality for actions implementing an official policy that infringes constitutional rights.

Mark Heimbach, Individually and as Acting President of Citizens Committee to Save Water Street v. Village of Lyons (Wayn · filed 1979-04-26

As the appellant alleges actions implementing an official policy of harassment and encroachment upon first amendment rights, he states a claim for damages anfl injunctive relief against the village.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s conduct solely under respondeat superior.

State of Mo. Ex Rel. Gore v. Wochner · filed 1979-06-29

The City of St. Louis also cannot be held legally responsible for the alleged conduct of defendant Wochner in bribing defendant Marino, because the imposition of liability here would be by a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a town to be sued directly over an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.

Martin v. Wray · filed 1979-07-10

Thus, the Town of Brookfield could be sued directly under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim against a governmental entity can survive a motion to dismiss despite alleging discrimination against only one person if the plaintiff could prove the acts reflected a generalized discriminatory policy.

Oshiver v. Court of Common Pleas · filed 1979-04-27

Finally, defendant urges that the complaint does not state a cause of action under Section 1983 for the reason that it alleges only a single act of discrimination against plaintiff, not a systematic policy of the Court of Common Pleas to discriminate against female and/or older employees. ... It is true that the complaint alleges acts of discrimination against only one individual. Plaintiff may, however, be able to prove at the ultimate plenary hearing that her firing and her failure to win promotion are not isolated events but reflect a generalized discriminatory policy. Thus there is a conceivable set of facts under which plaintiff could prove a cause of action under this count. The possibility of such proof requires that a motion to dismiss a count be denied.

Section 1983 requires a basis for alleging that a municipality adopted a policy or custom that abridged civil rights; municipal liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Crocker v. Padnos · filed 1980-01-24

There must be a basis for the contention that the local governing body adopted a policy or custom abridging one’s civil rights. There are no allegations to this effect; nor, in the opinion of the court, would any such allegations square with the remainder of the contentions in the complaint. As this count is directed against the City of Brockton, it must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county to survive dismissal when the complaint alleges official policy, unlawful conduct pursuant to that policy, and a departmental head’s complicity.

Halsworth v. Hatfield · filed 1980-02-28

Plaintiff has, however, alleged an official policy, unlawful conduct pursuant to that policy, and complicity in the unlawful conduct by a departmental head. ... But I cannot say, at this juncture, that plaintiff’s allegations against the county fail to meet the Conley test.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when grossly negligent supervision of its officers results in a constitutional deprivation.

Hild v. Bruner · filed 1980-07-28

The Court is of the opinion that the jury reasonably could have inferred that Newton’s failure to conduct some kind of psychological tests of its police officers, at least after 1975 (when, according to expert testimony, such testing became widely accepted), constituted gross negligence.

Section 1983 permits suits for declaratory relief against local governments for allegedly unconstitutional action under a municipal ordinance.

Wigginess Inc. v. Fruchtman · filed 1979-12-28

However, because Monell authorizes § 1983 actions against substate government entities for declaratory relief, plaintiffs need only amend their complaint and name the city as a defendant to cure this technical pleading deficiency.

A single alleged incident of police misconduct, without a pattern of city-supported abuse, does not establish a municipal policy or custom for Section 1983 liability.

Magayanes v. City of Chicago · filed 1980-09-04

Magayanes alleges a single instance of individual officers’ misconduct that, however reprehensible if true, does not indicate systematic, city-supported abuses of the nature to which Monell makes reference.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a mayor’s challenged actions carry out authority delegated by the city council.

Katris v. City of Waukegan · filed 1980-09-05

It appears that city policy was to leave the manner of issuance of licenses to the mayor’s discretion. Therefore, when the mayor denied plaintiff’s application without a hearing or reasons he was acting pursuant to authority given him by the council, and his actions must be viewed as those of the city.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Walters v. City of Ocean Springs and Kevin Alves · filed 1980-10-03

Instead, it appears to rely upon a theory of respondeat superior, which cannot support section 1983 liability, id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2035; Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.11, 1336-37 (5th Cir. 1980).

A municipality may face liability under § 1983 for a governmental custom without formal, documentary approval of that custom.

Gomez v. City of West Chicago, Ill. · filed 1981-01-21

In order to prove a Monell claim, it is not necessary to show formal, documentary approval of a governmental custom.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional violation only when its official policy or practice caused the violation.

Hirsch v. Burke · filed 1994-11-18

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), teaches that municipalities are liable under Sec. 1983 only when it can be shown that the municipality, in executing its official policy or practice, has caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom, or action by a final policymaker, for municipal liability.

Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital · filed 1994-12-19

Moreover, to hold the defendants liable under Section 1983 the Court must find that under state law Mr. Brodsky, the Material Supervisor at Bronx Hospital, and Ms. Galan, the Medical Material Chief at Bronx Hospital, had final policy-making authority regarding discriminatory practices in hiring HHC employees. ... Therefore, I find as a matter of law that actions taken by Mr. Brodsky and Ms. Galan, even if they were discriminatory, were not a result of an official policy of The City, HHC or Bronx Hospital. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed with prejudice.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom proximately causes a constitutional deprivation.

Littlefield ex rel. Langley v. Deland · filed 1981-05-12

Under these standards and in view of the record before us, we find that substantial evidence supports the finding of the district court that the County’s policy or custom proximately caused plaintiff’s constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations supporting a municipal policy or custom to state a claim against a municipality; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Hamrick v. Lewis · filed 1981-05-13

In order to state a claim for relief against a municipality, a section 1983 plaintiff must do more than merely parrot the language of Monell or copy conclusory language from assorted decisions of other courts in which Monell-type claims have been upheld, at least at the pleading stage, as Hamrick has apparently done in the case at bar.

A Section 1983 claim based on municipal inaction must allege recklessness that creates a substantial probability of increased subordinate misconduct.

Spriggs v. City of Chicago · filed 1981-08-31

What are needed instead are averments that municipal inaction has been reckless, defined here to mean inaction which has created a substantial probability that undesirable subordinate behavior will manifest itself in increased and significant amounts.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional deprivation results from action pursuant to an official municipal policy.

Hill v. City of Atlanta · filed 1981-09-08

The Court is concerned, however, that extensive discovery costs may be incurred by the City defendants and that discovery may yield nothing more than several isolated events on which plaintiff must rest his case, thus failing to meet Monell’s requirement of “action pursuant to official municipal policy” before recovery may be had.

Section 1983 municipal liability for police conduct requires evidence that municipal policymakers had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct.

Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington · filed 1995-09-15

Although the district court found that Hang On had presented evidence of a pattern or practice by Arlington of conducting the allegedly unconstitutional searches, the court correctly concluded that Hang On failed to present any evidence that policy-making officials in Arlington had any knowledge, actual or constructive, of the police officers actions during the investigative searches of Hang On's cabaret.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy directly causes a constitutional violation.

Christopher MACKINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Garon NIELSEN, Dash Butler, Al Littles, and City of Berkeley, Defendants- · filed 1995-11-06

A municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the execution of its policies, express or implied, has directly caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional deprivation directly linked to a government policy or custom.

Freeman v. Fairman · filed 1996-02-15

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest; and (2) a direct causal link between the alleged constitutional deprivation and a governmental policy or custom.

A county’s liability under § 1983 requires an established rule, regulation, policy, or custom; it cannot rest solely on its agents’ acts.

Scott v. Kreiger · filed 1981-12-19

However, such § 1983 actions cannot successfully be premised on theories of respondeat superior alone, but rather depend upon the existence of an established rule, regulation, policy or custom of the political subdivision, Monell, supra; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Painter v. Baltimore County, Md. · filed 1982-04-01

This fails to state a claim under § 1983, because a municipality’s liability under § 1983 cannot be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for deputies’ acts solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Kroes v. Smith · filed 1982-06-14

As noted above, Monell precludes the court from holding the county liable under § 1983 for the acts of the defendant deputies where the basis for liability rests on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against a local government or municipality on a respondeat superior theory.

Miller v. Barry · filed 1982-06-23

It is well settled that a plaintiff may not recover against a local government or municipality under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires allegations that the challenged conduct followed a municipal custom, policy, or practice.

Lester v. Brezenoff · filed 1982-09-30

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Department of Social Services was acting pursuant to any custom, policy, practice, or regulation in filing a late petition, and in thereby holding the child without authority. Accordingly, the Monell standard has not been satisfied, and the Department of Social Services is not liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a mayor’s firing decision constitutes official city policy.

Thomas Berdin, Cross-Appellants v. John Duggan, Cross-Appellees · filed 1983-04-01

Thus, the inquiry becomes one of whether Florida City had any policy, ordinance, or regulation that could fairly be said to represent official policy granting the mayor the authority to fire public employees. ... We agree with the district court that Duggan’s actions constituted the official policy of Florida City within the meaning of Monell.

Section 1983 does not allow local government liability based on respondeat superior.

Walden v. Marcia H. Wishengrad, Monroe County Department of Social Services, County of Monroe · filed 1984-09-18

Local governmental liability under section 1983 cannot be grounded on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a nonpolicymaking supervisor’s actions merely because the supervisor is its employee.

Pilarowski v. MacOmb County Health Dept. And MacOmb County Board of Commissioners · filed 1988-04-12

We find no error in this aspect of the district court's decision, which we interpret to hold that evidence of action taken by an individual non-policymaking supervisor (not a defendant) was not to be considered the act of the defendant in the case.

Section 1983 permits damages against an entity only when the employees’ alleged violation of federal rights resulted from the entity’s policy or custom.

Trebian v. Merrimack County HOC · filed 2001-07-31

An entity such as the MCHOC may not be held liable for ... damages based on § 1983 unless the employees who allegedly violated the plaintiff's federal rights were acting pursuant to a "policy" or a "custom."

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence of a municipal policy or custom behind the alleged misconduct.

Larson v. City of Denver · filed 2002-05-29

there is no basis for imposing municipal liability against the City of Denver since there is no evidence that the Denver Police Department had a policy or custom of using threats to obtain permission to conduct warrantless seizures at pawn shops; ... Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the parties’ briefs, and the pertinent case law, we agree with the district court’s analysis and its conclusions.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a policy causes a constitutional injury through deliberate indifference.

Foust v. McNeill · filed 2002-11-12

To establish liability for a policy or practice, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the local government or official promulgated a policy; (2) the decision displayed “deliberate indifference” and proved the government’s culpability; and (3) the policy decision lead to the particular injury.

Section 1983 makes a city liable for an officer’s excessive force based on its hiring decision only if the violation was a plainly obvious consequence of hiring the officer in light of what the city knew about his background.

Crete v. City of Lowell · filed 2005-08-11

There was insufficient evidence on which a jury could base a finding that a "plainly obvious consequence" of the City's decision to hire Ciavola was the ... violation of Crete's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for an employee’s conduct to show that a municipal custom or policy caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Russo v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2007-06-12

Municipal liability under § 1983 for the conduct of employees below the policymaking level requires that a plaintiff show a violation of his constitutional rights that resulted from a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs an officer who violated someone’s rights.

Belcher, Ryan L. v. Norton, Vaughn · filed 2007-08-15

However, a municipality may not be held liable based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires evidence connecting county policymakers to an unconstitutional custom or policy, such as their awareness or ratification of it.

White Lion Van Lines, Inc. v. Palm Beach County · filed 2008-02-20

We affirm because no evidence in the record supports ... the conclusion that the County Commissioners were aware of or ratified any custom or policy that violated the equal protection or due process rights of the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for an officer’s actions merely because it employs the officer; the plaintiff must connect those actions to city policy or custom.

Arshad v. Congemi · filed 2009-03-09

There is simply nothing to show that Officer Miller acted pursuant to City policy, and to hold the City responsible for his actions would impose respondeat superior liability for Officer Miller’s ... actions—a result barred by § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when the municipality’s policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation.

Miller v. City of Columbus · filed 1996-03-28

A municipality is liable under section 1983 only if the municipality itself caused .the constitutional deprivation. ... Plaintiff has failed to show that the theft of her property was incurred because of the execution of the Division of Police’s policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the challenged conduct was taken pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Contreras v. City of Chicago · filed 1996-03-29

Because there is absolutely no evidence in this ease from which a factfinder could conclude that the conduct of Schulter or Shoenberger in allegedly furthering the Khamises’ discriminatory animus was taken pursuant to an official City policy or custom, the City is entitled to judgment as matter of law as to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom attributable to municipal officials to hold a city liable.

Canney v. City of Chelsea · filed 1996-05-07

Even if Chelsea municipal officials were shown to have been a part of the alleged retaliation against Canney, it appears that they would have been powerless to act, since their authority to do so had been taken by the legislature and delegated to Spence through the Receivership Act. Thus, Can-ney is unable to state an actionable section 1983 claim against Chelsea as matter of law.

Section 1983 provides no basis for municipal liability when all claims of underlying federal constitutional violations fail.

Harrison v. Oakland County · filed 2009-05-01

Having awarded summary judgment to Defendants as to all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims asserting federal constitutional violations, it follows that there is no basis for the imposition of liability against Defendants Oakland County and the Oakland County Sheriff's Department under count IX of Plaintiff's complaint.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes the plaintiff's injury.

Watts v. Smart · filed 2009-05-01

Concomitantly, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for Collin County because a municipality is liable under § 1983 if a plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality based on official action by its governing board.

Smith v. Atlanta Independent School District · filed 2009-05-04

This was an official action by APS’s properly constituted legislative body and is jus-ticiable under section 1983. Because Plaintiff has shown that the Board acted with respect to her request, it is irrelevant whether Drs. Carter and Adger made their decisions regarding Plaintiffs situation pursuant to an official policy or custom of APS. The court declines to grant summary judgment on this ground.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality automatically liable for its officers’ conduct; a claim against the municipality requires an alleged official policy or custom.

Wilson v. Tillman · filed 2009-05-07

Thus, the city of Mobile is not automatically liable under § 1983 even if it inadequately hired, trained or supervised its police officers and those officers violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. If plaintiff fails to allege an official policy or custom, then his claim against the municipality is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 permits suits against school districts but does not make them liable solely for an employee’s discriminatory conduct.

Augustin v. Enlarged City School Dist. of Newburgh · filed 2009-05-11

Local government bodies, including school districts, are considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, however, they cannot be held liable under this statute solely because of the discriminatory actions of one of their employees.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom; complaints about the treatment of other people in the same investigation did not establish one.

Beckett v. Ford · filed 2009-05-11

With regard to the statement made by Atkins, complaints about the alleged unconstitutional arrests and treatment of other persons in connection with Cunningham’s murder do not establish a policy or custom of such action by the City.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to establish local government liability; a single incident generally does not establish one.

Carlisle v. City of Yonkers, Yonkers Police Department, Detective Lyons, and Detective Surlack · filed 1996-11-29

As a general matter, however, a municipal policy cannot be inferred from a single incident of illegality. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). Because Carlisle's complaint and supporting documents were insufficient to establish a custom or policy of discriminatory arrests, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the City and the YPD.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy, practice, or custom causes the constitutional deprivation.

Morris v. City of Alvin, Tex. · filed 1997-01-16

When analyzing a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the Court must first decide if the City promulgated “an official policy, practice, or custom,” which could subject it to § 1983 liability. ... The facts of this case do not present an “official policy” under these definitions.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for an official policy or custom, not merely because the municipality employed the person who caused the injury.

Hadad v. Croucher · filed 1997-01-28

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only for official policies or customs.

A municipality is not entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the record leaves a genuine factual dispute about its liability for an official’s actions.

Dorris v. Absher · filed 1997-03-25

Under these circumstances, Defendant Sumner County has not established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Section 1983 claim. Therefore, Defendant Sumner County is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

A city can be liable under § 1983 when its policy causes a constitutional violation through deliberate indifference.

Hernandez v. Metro-Dade County · filed 1997-05-07

Plaintiff in the instant case sufficiently alleges that his rights were violated due to City actions, which actions amounted to deliberate indifference and were based on City policy.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 when no constitutional violation occurred.

Leslie v. CITY OF SAND CITY · filed 2009-05-12

Thus, municipal defendants cannot be held liable when no constitutional violation has occurred.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged wrongdoing.

Swinson v. D.C. Metro Police Department · filed 2009-05-12

A municipality may be liable as a person under § 1983 but only if the alleged wrongdoing resulted from an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom promulgated or sanctioned by the municipality.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an alleged constitutional violation when no constitutional deprivation is established.

Denning Ex Rel. Denning v. Metropolitan Government · filed 2009-05-12

In any event, because appellants have not established that there was an unconstitutional deprivation of Denning’s constitutional rights, their claim of municipal liability necessarily fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Collins v. West Hartford Police Dept. · filed 2009-05-12

On his claims against West Hartford, the West Hartford Police Department, and Captain Lori Coppinger, Collins failed to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused him injury, or plausibly allege an equal protection violation.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be held liable for a constitutional injury caused by its policy or custom, but not solely for an employee’s conduct.

Schliske v. Albany Police Department · filed 2009-05-13

However, plaintiff cannot hold the City of Albany liable for alleged constitutional deprivations caused by its employees; plaintiff must assert § 1983 claims against the individual City of Albany police officers who allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, neither the City of Albany nor Albany PD is a proper defendant with respect to plaintiffs claim for unlawful seizure, and Albany PD’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Hu v. Village of Midlothian · filed 2009-05-14

“A municipality is liable under § 1983 when a deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by a municipal policy or custom.” ... As with Hu’s § 1981 claims, he has presented no evidence of any Village policy or custom. Therefore, summary judgment is granted for the Village on Count XII.

Section 1983 municipal liability for inadequate police training requires deliberate indifference and an underlying constitutional violation.

Wiley v. Oberlin Police Department · filed 2009-05-15

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However, because Wiley failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation by any of the City Defendants, the district court correctly determined that her claim for municipal liability must also fail. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 238.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal or supervisory liability when no injury or constitutional violation has occurred.

Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Department · filed 2009-05-18

Because Byrd has suffered no substantive due process deprivation, his claim against Maricopa County necessarily fails. Byrd has not alleged that any action apart from the cross-gender search performed by O'Connell violated his substantive due process rights, and "[n]either a municipality nor a supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred."

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege a municipal policy or custom, or conduct by an official with final policymaking authority.

Creighton v. City of Livingston · filed 2009-05-19

The complaint does not refer to any custom, policy, or practice of the City, nor does it allege that Warne had any final policymaking authority under Christie.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, regulation, or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Ellison v. City of New Rochelle · filed 2009-05-19

The City defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged that they, as opposed to the individual officers, violated 42 USC § 1983. ... In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of any such relevant policy, regulation, or custom (see R.A.C. Group v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 295 AD2d 489 [2002]; Serpa v County of Nassau, 280 AD2d 596 [2001]).

A § 1983 municipal-liability claim does not require multiple named plaintiffs to allege that they suffered the same harm.

Lehr v. City of Sacramento · filed 2009-05-20

Finally, Defendants cite to no authority, nor is the Court aware of any, standing for the proposition that, in order to properly maintain a Monell claim, multiple named Plaintiffs must allege to have suffered the same harm.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires proof that its alleged inaction caused the claimed harm.

TZ EX REL. CG v. City of New York · filed 2009-05-22

Absent such a showing, plaintiff cannot establish that the school’s inaction caused the sexual assault on her, which is an essential element of the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a government policy or custom causes the injury.

Bolduc v. Town of Webster · filed 2009-05-22

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when the “execution of the government’s policy or custom” causes the injury.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an unconstitutional act by an individual municipal actor.

Habash v. City of Salisbury, Md. · filed 2009-05-26

Similarly, Wicomico County is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts 1, 3, and 4. See Int'l Ground Transp. v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Md., 475 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir.2007) (holding that "a municipality may not be found liable for a constitutional violation in the absence of an unconstitutional act on the part of at least one individual municipal actor”). This same analysis applies to each of the claims brought against either Wicomico County or the City of Salisbury.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim based on an excessive force policy is moot when a jury’s finding of no officer liability establishes that the plaintiff was not injured by the alleged policy.

Washburn v. Fagan · filed 2009-05-26

A unanimous jury found that Fagan and Contreras were not liable under § 1983 for the alleged use of excessive force. This finding moots Washburn’s Monell claim because it establishes that he was not injured by any alleged police department policy concerning the use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not make a county board or a sheriff sued in an official capacity liable merely because an employee violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Brocks v. Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County · filed 2009-05-27

Under § 1983 neither the Board nor the sheriff (sued in his official capacity) is liable simply because an employee violated Mr. Brocks’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a proven civil rights violation.

McKenna v. Incorporated Village of Northport · filed 2009-05-29

The Monell claim was, it turns out, therefore properly dismissed for want of any proven civil rights violation.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for constitutional violations arising from official municipal policy, not merely from its employees’ actions.

Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor · filed 2009-06-02

Finally, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the District of Columbia. “Under § 1983 a municipality is liable not under principles of respondeat superior, but only for constitutional torts arising from ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy.’”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policymaker, an official policy, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

Burris v. Davis · filed 2009-06-03

Thus, in order to establish municipal liability, Plaintiff must prove the following three elements: 1) a policymaker; 2) an official policy; and 3) a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s actions when the employee is not a municipal policymaker.

Delancey v. City of Austin · filed 2009-06-03

The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the City must fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs cannot establish that Ms. Ruby is a policymaker for the City.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Watson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2009-06-04

Because Watson has failed to identify any policy or custom of the PHA that resulted in her deprivation, the PHA cannot be held liable under § 1983 and summary judgment is granted for the defendant.

A city may be liable under Section 1983 when a municipal policymaker makes or ratifies a discriminatory decision.

Edward Lentz, Jr. v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-06-04

Sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to permit the jury to conclude that City policymakers either discriminated against him themselves or ratified a subordinate’s decision to do so.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its deliberate indifference to training or supervision is sufficiently pleaded as causing a constitutional injury.

Babi-Ali v. City of New York · filed 1997-10-21

As it result, this Court finds that, for purposes of judgment on the pleadings or a failure to state a claim, Plaintiff can establish a § 1983 claim that the City of New York was deliberately indifferent.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when final policymakers ratify unconstitutional acts or commit unconstitutional acts themselves.

Matthews v. High Island Independent School District · filed 1998-01-22

Municipal liability can arise under section 1983 in two circumstances. Iii the first, a municipality’s final policymakers are held effectively to have made policy or condoned a custom by ratifying the unconstitutional or illegal actions of those subject to their control. In the second, illegal or unconstitutional actions of the final policymakers themselves in setting and achieving the municipality’s goals may create liability for the municipality.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be sued when its officials’ alleged misconduct is attributable to the municipality as policymaking action.

Johnson v. City of Chester · filed 1998-07-31

Thus, the actions of the Chester Mayor and Police Commissioner, in allegedly twice prosecuting Johnson for disorderly conduct, may be regarded as policymaking actions attributable to the City of Chester. Therefore, the City of Chester is, at least at this point, a proper defendant in this action.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Edwards v. Two Unknown Male Chicago Police Officers · filed 2009-06-08

A municipality is only liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom results in a constitutional injury to the plaintiff. ... Because Edwards has not shown a policy or custom of allowing excessive force nor a failure to train, discipline, or supervise, I grant summary judgment for the City on count II.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a school board when the plaintiff has not established an underlying constitutional violation.

Gc v. School Bd. of Seminole County, Florida · filed 2009-06-10

Because the Court has already concluded that G.C. has failed to establish a constitutional violation, any attempt to impose § 1983 liability on the School Board must be rejected.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires proof of a formal policy or a well-settled custom known actually or constructively to city policymakers.

Henry v. City of Taylor, TX · filed 2009-06-10

Plaintiff thus bore the burden of substantiating either a formal policy officially adopted and promulgated by city policymakers, or a well-settled and common practice by city officials or employees of which the city or its policymakers were actually or constructively aware.

Section 1983 liability for a school board requires an underlying constitutional violation.

G.C. ex rel. Cosco v. School Board · filed 2009-06-10

Because the Court has already concluded that G.C. has failed to establish a constitutional violation, any attempt to impose § 1983 liability on the School Board must be rejected.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for an employee’s constitutional violation only when a municipal policy or custom caused it.

Cordova v. Aragon · filed 2009-06-17

A municipality is not liable for the constitutional violations of its employees simply because such a violation has occurred; a policy or custom must have actually caused that violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a city when its officers caused no underlying constitutional violation.

Arnold v. City of Boulder City · filed 2009-06-17

Because we conclude that the officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Arnold’s § 1983 claims against Boulder City also fail.

Section 1983 allows a municipality to be held liable for a constitutional violation only when an official policy or custom, known or constructively known to a policymaker, is the moving force behind it.

McGregory v. City of Jackson, MS · filed 2009-06-26

Instead, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff can establish (1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Camden County v. Lewis · filed 2009-06-29

By his complaint, Lewis failed to assert that any employee was a policymaker for the County in matters concerning the illegal issuance of a stop work order or improper enforcement of its ordinances against the property of its citizens and introduced no evidence in opposition to the County’s motion for summary judgment. As such, Lewis cannot state a claim under § 1983 because he failed to point to any evidence of an officially adopted and promulgated County policy or custom. Doss, supra, 290 Ga. App. at 674 (1).

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue for deprivation of constitutional or federal statutory rights under color of state law and requires a municipal policy, custom, or practice for municipal liability.

Perkins v. City of Rochester · filed 2009-06-30

In order to maintain a cause of action pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the City violated her Constitutional or federal statutory rights, and that the City did so while acting under color of state law. ... Where a Section 1983 claim is alleged against a municipality on the grounds of unconstitutional acts by its employees, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her injuries resulted from a municipal policy, custom, or practice. ... Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of an unconstitutional custom or policy on the part of the City, her Section 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom for a constitutional-rights claim against a municipality.

Kilpatrick v. Hernandez · filed 2009-06-30

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kilpatrick’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Robert Hernandez because Kilpatrick presented no evidence of an official policy or custom that violated Kilpatrick’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a treasurer’s personnel decisions when no county policy is implicated.

Harding v. Rosewell · filed 1998-09-29

Since no policy is implicated, Cook County cannot be liable for the Treasurer’s personnel decisions, including his decision to fire Mr. Harding and his decision (if any) to protest Mr. Harding’s unemployment insurance claim on the grounds of misconduct.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior; a discriminatory municipal policy must support the claim.

KI Morgan Co., Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1998-11-20

A municipality may not be held liable under § 1981 or § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. ... Under the undisputed facts, there is no evidence of a racially discrimination policy by defendant.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a state court judge’s actions when the judge is acting as a state rather than county policymaker.

Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani · filed 1999-01-25

Accordingly, Los Angeles County is not responsible for Judge Comparet-Cassa-ni’s actions and cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot rest on a city’s later ratification of the challenged conduct alone, because that ratification cannot be the moving force behind the violation.

Alexander v. Beale Street Blues Co., Inc. · filed 1999-03-19

Although ratification might tend to establish the existence of a policy of acquiescence that in itself was a “moving force,” mere ratification of the conduct at issue by itself cannot legally suffice as a “moving force.”

A municipality’s § 1983 liability claim fails when the underlying constitutional claims against its officer fail.

Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa · filed 2009-07-06

Having affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on the Cavataios’ constitutional claims, we also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on the municipal liability claims.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because its officers allegedly violated someone’s rights; municipal liability requires an official policy or custom that caused the violation.

Walker v. City of Dallas, TX · filed 2009-07-07

At best, he argues that the officers deprived him of a constitutional right,6 but he has not sued the officers and the municipality cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior standing alone.

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to impose municipal liability for a facially lawful policy; negligence is insufficient.

Moyle v. Anderson · filed 2009-07-09

Although the actions of the county and its employees in placing Christenson in the AIU might be seen as negligent, appellants have not made out a record of deliberate indifference as required to impose § 1983 liability on the county.

A § 1983 claim against a city based on a custom or practice fails without evidence of a widespread practice or custom of the alleged violations.

Poole v. City of Burbank · filed 2009-07-10

Poole proceeds on the second theory, but provides no evidence of a widespread practice or custom of condoning violations like those alleged by Poole. This is fatal to his claims against the City.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability for failure to train when there is no individual liability for a constitutional violation.

Smith v. Pike County, Kentucky · filed 2009-07-10

Finally, because there is no individual liability for a constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability for failure to train.

Section 1983 does not support a municipal liability claim when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Weinstein v. City of Eugene · filed 2009-07-10

Because we find no underlying Fourth Amendment violation, Weinstein’s claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), fails.

Section 1983 permits local government liability when its policy or custom inflicts an injury.

Philbrook v. Perrigo · filed 2009-07-14

Under § 1983, a local government may be held liable for injury inflicted by its employees or agents only when the execution of the government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury.

Section 1983 permits a county to be liable for inadequate inmate supervision even when no individual officer is liable.

Arnold v. County of Nassau · filed 2000-02-10

Thus, the County could logically be found hable under § 1983 in the absence of individual liability.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior; the constitutional injury must result from a municipal policy or custom.

Rogers v. USA, et al. · filed 2000-06-21

It is well established that a municipal entity cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability; the municipality itself must proximately cause the constitutional injury, through the promulgation (or tacit approval) of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on an employee’s conduct; the alleged deprivation must be caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Rossi v. City of Amsterdam · filed 2000-07-27

Moreover, since municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983 cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory, the cause of action against the City should have been dismissed (see, Monell v Department of Social Servs., supra; see also, Higgins v City of Oneonta, supra; Howe v Village of Trumansburg, supra; Kolko v City of Rochester, supra).

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on an official's decision when meaningful administrative review prevents that official from having final policymaking authority.

Cremeens v. City of Montgomery · filed 2000-09-15

The rule of law in Scala provides that a municipality is not liable for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when final policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability when execution of a government policy or custom inflicts the injury.

Watson v. Abington Township · filed 2009-07-15

As stated in our earlier ruling, the Supreme Court held that municipal liability under § 1983 “only attaches when the ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’ ” ... Nevertheless, Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment on Monell grounds because of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Chief Kelly ever committed the requisite action necessary to hold the municipality liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its lower-ranking employees.

Section 1983 allows a municipality to be held liable for a constitutional violation caused by a widespread custom, policy, or practice.

Franko v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-07-16

The alleged discriminatory treatment, then, was not isolated; but rather occurred over a significant span of time so that a jury could find a widespread custom, policy or practice deliberately implemented by the City.

A municipal liability claim under Section 1983 can survive summary judgment when the underlying constitutional claims remain viable.

O'Mara v. Dionne, et al. · filed 2009-07-20

Finally, with Claims One and Three still viable, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their Monell claim.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires evidence of a policy or custom, a responsible government policymaker, and a direct causal link to the claimed injury.

Weller v. Ransom-Garner · filed 2009-07-20

As the District Court correctly determined, the evidence is inadequate as to the critical issues here, including the questions which government officials were responsible for the alleged policy or custom at issue in this case, what the government’s intent was with respect to the alleged policy or custom, and how the alleged policy or custom directly caused Weller’s claimed injuries.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a triable issue that the municipality was responsible for a constitutional tort.

Sanders v. City of Fresno · filed 2009-07-21

The district court also did not err in granting summary judgment to Fresno on the issue of municipal liability, since Sanders failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to whether the city was responsible for a constitutional tort.

Section 1983 does not make municipalities liable for their employees’ actions under respondeat superior principles.

Holder v. Town of Newton · filed 2009-07-23

As the county defendants point out, § 1983 does not make municipalities, including counties and their agencies, liable for the actions of their employees under respondeat superior principles.