42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a violation of an identifiable federal right; a violation of federal law alone is insufficient.

Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico · filed 2016-09-30

Even assuming that IGRA preempts the Individual Defendants’ actions, the Plaintiffs do not identify a federal right that is cognizable under § 1983. ... Accordingly, Counts III and IV fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to enforce a federal statute unless it confers an individual right; Medicaid’s transfer penalty calculation provision confers no such right.

Kadingo v. Johnson · filed 2017-01-26

Similar to the courts in Lemmons and Bernard , this court concludes that section 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)(I) does not confer a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim based solely on a violation of state open meeting laws.

Williams v. Alhambra School District No. 68 · filed 2017-02-13

To the extent that Williams asserts a claim for a violation of state open meeting laws with respect to her, those claims cannot be brought under § 1983 since such claims are not secured to her by the Constitution or laws of the United States, Such claims are, therefore, dismissed.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal law, not violations of a state constitution alone.

OH ex rel., Jeff Faulkner v. City of Middletown, OH · filed 2017-05-08

Since Faulkner’s § 1983 claims under the Ohio Constitution assert only violations of state law, they were properly rejected by the district court.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a state procedure only when the challenge invokes a federal statutory or constitutional right.

Cachet Beckham v. City of Euclid · filed 2017-05-10

A plaintiff may therefore challenge a state procedure in a § 1983 action “only to the extent that the challenge invokes federal statutory or constitutional rights.” Id. at 375-76. That is what plaintiffs do here.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights; a violation of state law alone is not a cognizable claim.

Wellman v. St. Louis County · filed 2017-06-08

Wellman’s claim that the Special Order violates state law is not a cognizable § 1983 claim and requires that I exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statutory right only when Congress unambiguously confers that right; the Medicaid free-choice-of-provider provision does not confer such a right on patients.

Planned Parenthood of AR, etc. v. Gillespie · filed 2017-08-16

Given our conclusion that § 23(A) of the Medicaid Act does not give the Jane Does or the class of Medicaid beneficiaries an enforceable federal right that supports a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiffs do not have a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only when a plaintiff asserts a violation of a federal right.

S.R. v. Pa. Dep't of Human Servs. · filed 2018-03-23

A plaintiff must therefore assert a violation of a federal right to seek redress under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights.

Weaver v. Alabama Marine Patrol · filed 2018-05-07

Sixth, the complaint does not allege that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights, as also required for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal law by state actors, but does not enforce provisions of a state constitution.

Mitchell v. Richard · filed 2018-12-14

Mitchell cannot enforce a provision of the ... Illinois Constitution by suing under section 1983, which vindicates violations of federal law by state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on a violation of federal nursing facility regulations.

Odhuno v. Reed's Cove Health & Rehab., LLC · filed 2018-12-14

The Court notes that while Odhuno alleges Defendants violated the federal Medicare regulations governing nursing facilities, he cannot bring a claim for violation of these regulations under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights, not violations of a state constitution.

Johnson v. Hamilton · filed 2018-12-21

Therefore, to the extent Johnson’s § 1983 claims are premised on violations of the Minnesota Constitution, or to the extent Johnson intends to assert claims directly under the Minnesota Constitution, those claims will be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not state constitutional or statutory rights.

Slaven v. Brad Livingston, William Stephens, and Lynn M. Clark · filed 2019-02-28

A § 1983 claim must be based on violations of the United States Constitution or federal law, not on violations of a state constitution or state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law, but not for violations of a state constitution.

Rodriguez v. City of Chi. · filed 2019-03-27

Because § 1983 only provides a right of action for violations of federal law, ... the Court cannot consider any claims for violations of the Illinois Constitution under that count.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law, not the Illinois Constitution.

Rodriguez v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-03-27

Because § 1983 only provides a right of action for violations of federal law, see Flynn v. Sandhal, 58 F.3d 283, 290 (7th Cir. 1995), the Court cannot consider any claims for violations of the Illinois Constitution under that count.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state professional conduct rules without a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Story v. The Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility · filed 2019-05-08

For the reasons below, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and orders the case dismissed sua sponte. ... In the report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that an alleged violation of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct does not comprise a viable § 1983 claim as a deprivation of a constitutional right by a party acting under color of law or otherwise support a legal cause of action against an attorney.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a violation of New York’s FOIL alone cannot support a claim.

Herman v. Town of Cortlandt, Inc. · filed 2019-05-30

And a violation of New York’s FOIL does not, standing alone, support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal statutory rights, including rights under § 1981.

Bowman v. Birmingham, City Of · filed 2019-06-19

The district court erred by construing Bowman’s § 1983 claim as alleging a constitutional violation under the First Amendment instead of a statutory one under § 1981. As we have explained, § 1983 “provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 997 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 requires a violation of an enforceable federal right; eligibility for LIHEAP benefits alone does not establish one.

Ward v. Jones · filed 2019-07-03

Here, Plaintiffs allege a violation of federal law, but cannot demonstrate a violation of a federal right.

Section 1983 provides a right of action for a federal statutory violation only when the statute unambiguously grants an individual right.

Clancy v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-22

Section 1983 provides a right of action for a violation of a federal statute only when the statute unambiguously grants an individual right.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress without a deprivation of a federal right.

Nichols v. Livingston County · filed 2019-08-20

In other words, Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because such a claim does not implicate the Constitution or any other federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of prison policies alone.

Markham v. Rios · filed 2019-08-27

Defendant Allbaugh’s alleged violation of ODOC policies cannot sustain a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not for a claim based on the Tennessee Constitution.

White v. Wilson · filed 2019-09-10

As Plaintiffs have not cited any authority permitting them to assert a violation of the Tennessee Constitution through Section 1983, that portion of the claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy in state court for deprivation of rights under the Social Security Act even when those rights are not constitutional.

Thiboutot v. State · filed 1979-08-31

With some hesitancy in view of the close division in Chapman, we conclude that section 1983 afforded appellants a remedy in the Superior Court for deprivation of rights under the Social Security Act even though those rights were not of constitutional dimension.

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal laws unrelated to equal rights.

McCoy v. Bergland · filed 1981-08-06

In presenting this argument, the State Commissioner has asserted an erroneous proposition of law. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2503-2506, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), the Supreme Court specifically rejected such an analysis of Section 1983, and concluded that this statute contemplated violations of federal laws unrelated to equal rights. For this reason, the defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; state tort claims alone do not suffice.

Clark v. Johnson and Johnson Company · filed 2019-09-30

While the Complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the allegations do not speak to constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires the violation of a federal right; the Supremacy Clause itself cannot support a claim because it creates no such right.

McCluskey v. Imhof · filed 2019-09-30

Accordingly, the Supremacy Clause itself may not serve as the basis for McCluskey’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone does not state a claim.

Kapfhammer v. Conrad · filed 2019-10-16

The Kentucky Open Records Act is a state law, and a violation of that statute does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

(PC) Lipsey v. Hand-Ronga · filed 2019-12-17

To state a claim under § 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal rights; an alleged violation of state law alone does not state a claim.

(PC) Williams v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2019-12-19

Plaintiff’s complaint fails for the same reason. Although it mentions Due Process, the crux of the complaint is that defendant Kernan’s actions violated California law, not that he deprived Plaintiff of due process or otherwise infringed his federal constitutional rights. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim in the First Amended Complaint upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law; a violation of state prison policy alone does not state a claim.

Williams 225280 v. Loomis · filed 2019-12-20

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors for violations of federal statutory rights as well as constitutional rights.

K. B. v. The City of Venice, Florida · filed 2019-12-23

This contention, however, is without merit as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes actions against state actors for “violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a state constitutional right.

Burke v. Vision Government Solutions, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15

Because a violation of a statute constitutional right is not cognizable under § 1983, the Court will decline review of Mr. Burke’s Section 1983 claim based on Article I, § 15 of the Connecticut Constitution.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right; an alleged violation of Texas Government Code Chapter 614 alone does not state a constitutional claim.

Cunningham v. Wood County · filed 2020-02-06

Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that her due process rights were violated under a state statute do not suffice to state a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on violations of local ordinances, which do not create federal rights.

Price v. Sparta, City of · filed 2020-02-20

The Sparta City Code consists of local ordinances, and therefore does not create federal rights that that may give rise to a § 1983 claim. Price therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983, and the Complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of law for violating federal rights, but creates no rights of its own.

Estate of Margaret A. Fluegge v. City of Wayne · filed 2020-03-02

Section 1983 does not create rights itself; it authorizes a person to bring a claim against a person who, acting under color of law, violates one’s rights established elsewhere, that is “by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.” ... Because they have no standing to raise the claims in Counts I and II, the separate count invoking section 1983 must be dismissed as well.

Section 1983 permits damages for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not state-law duties.

Perkin v. Jackson Public School District · filed 2020-03-20

But, this is insufficient for a § 1983 claim, which only allows Perkin and Gish to obtain damages for violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes.

Section 1983 provides a claim for violations of federal rights, but defamation alone does not establish such a violation.

Nahwooksy v. Elam · filed 2020-03-30

Section 1983 “provides a vehicle for vindication of rights arising under the constitution or other federal laws, not rights arising under state laws.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights, but not for violations of state law or a state constitution.

JOHNSON v. CITY OF BIDDEFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-04-15

This assertion fails to recognize that § 1983 provides a right of action for violations of the United States Constitution and of federal law, but not violations of the Maine Constitution or of state law.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for violations of federal rights; a claim based only on a state constitution does not qualify.

Mega Vape, LLC v. The City of San Antonio · filed 2020-04-22

Typically, proceeding under § 1983 is sufficient to provide federal question jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any claim under federal law or the United States Constitution. It asserts its constitutional violation only under the Texas Constitution. Such a constitutional claim is state claim, not a federal one.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federally protected right; protections supplied only by Puerto Rico law cannot support a claim.

Borras-Borrero v. Corp del Fondo del Seguro del · filed 2020-05-01

Whether or not Borrás has a legitimate claim under state law that the SIFC retaliated against his free expression, his Section 1983 claims cannot succeed to the extent that they rely on protections that are present in Puerto Rico law but not in the U.S. Constitution or any federal statutes, as they therefore do not vindicate "federal rights," Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49, secured by the United States' "Constitution and laws," 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 protects federally guaranteed rights and does not enforce state law provisions.

Sawyer v. Howard · filed 2020-05-11

To the contrary, the district court properly analyzed whether Sawyer “state[d] a claim for [a] violation of federal law,” reasoning that “state law provisions are not enforceable in an action brought under § 1983 which is concerned with the protection of federally guaranteed rights.” ROA at 98 (quotations omitted, emphasis added).

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal rights, not violations of a state penal code.

Fabela v. Corpus Christi Independent School District · filed 2020-05-21

But, as Defendant argues, Section 1983 only permits claims for the violation of federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights; violations of state or local law alone do not establish a claim.

EPCOR Water Arizona Incorporated v. Brady · filed 2020-08-10

The City therefore does not violate § 1983 solely by running afoul of state and local anti-electioneering laws.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a right secured by federal law or the United States Constitution.

Mack v. Howell · filed 2020-08-10

As discussed above, to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the laws or Constitution of the United States. Mack therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not rights arising solely under a state constitution.

Arndt v. Hatfield · filed 2020-08-20

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be premised on the alleged violation of the state constitution, rather § 1983 is the vehicle by which a person seeks relief for violation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not violations of a state landlord-tenant statute alone.

Perry v. Chronister · filed 2020-08-28

Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants’ violation of Florida’s landlord-tenant statute affected any of his federally protected rights, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the deprivation of a federal right; failure to follow federal policy manuals alone does not support a claim.

Tanner v. Idaho Department of Fish & Game · filed 2020-09-09

Additionally, § 1983 claim may only be asserted for violating a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; it does not allow a cause of action simply for failure to abide by federal policy manuals.

Section 1983 protects federal rights; state-law medical negligence and malpractice claims are not independently actionable under it.

George v. Moore · filed 2020-09-30

Section 1983 was intended to protect only federal rights guaranteed by federal law.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; reliance on a state-law decision alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Parchem v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County · filed 2020-10-07

With respect to a § 1983 action, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first element to state a § 1983 claim, i.e., that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 48. Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to relief based on a state appellate court decision that interpreted and applied state law. See supra at 2.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based solely on a violation of prison directives that does not violate a constitutional or federal statutory right.

People v. Bruen · filed 2020-10-08

A violation of a Department of Corrections and Community Supervision directive does not rise to a violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights sufficient to support a civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Holcomb v Lykens , 337 F3d 217, 224 [2d Cir 2013]; Shakur v Selsky , 391 F3d 106, 119 [2004]; Pollnow v Glennon , 757 F2d 496, 501 [2d Cir 1985]; Garraway v Smith , 2019 WL 2135479, *4, 2019 US Dist LEXIS 82944, *10 [WD NY, May 16, 2019, No. 12-CV-924S (WMS)]; Melendez v Fischer , 2013 WL 5592497, *3, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 146937, *8 [WD NY, Oct. 10, 2013, No. 13-CV-6231 (CJS)]; see generally Gomez v Toledo , 446 US 635, 640 [1080]).

Section 1983 provides a right of action for violations of federal rights, not rights protected only by state law.

Moore v. Bullard · filed 2020-10-20

Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot proceed on a claim under § 1983 based on a purported violation of the Illinois Constitution.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not state rights.

Gilmore v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2020-12-09

Claims brought under Section 1983, however, may only seek relief for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights—not violations of state rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of rights under the federal Constitution or laws.

Taylor v. Henderson · filed 2020-12-15

Here, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim should be dismissed because he failed to allege any deprivation of rights under the federal constitution or laws of the United States. (ECF No. 6.) The Court agrees, and in the absence of any objection by Plaintiff, finds that the R. & R. should be adopted.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights by officials acting under color of state law, but not for violations of state law.

Mason v. Clover · filed 2021-01-06

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of the federal Constitution or federal law by officials who were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law or departmental regulations alone.

Nelson v. Payne · filed 2021-01-22

Section 1983 protects against federal constitutional violations, not violations of state law or departmental regulations or practices.

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal law or the federal Constitution, but not for violations of state law alone.

Rainer v. Lucksted · filed 2021-01-25

But §1983 allows a plaintiff to sue only for violations of federal law or the federal Constitution, not for violations of state law.

Section 1983, together with § 1343, confers subject matter jurisdiction over claims against individual licensing-committee members, and a mere denial of the complaint’s allegations does not defeat jurisdiction.

Barrette v. City of Marinette · filed 1977-09-07

In the July 22, 1977, ruling, it was found that 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 confer subject matter jurisdiction over the individual members of the licensing committee of the common council for the city of Marinette. ... The plaintiff is correct in responding that a simple denial of the complaint’s allegations does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, I find that the court has jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1983 gives state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over civil-rights actions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Young v. Board of Education of Fremont County School District, Re-3 · filed 1976-07-23

Section 1983 actions can be brought in state courts as state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not support federal jurisdiction for a challenge to an urban-renewal program where the plaintiffs show no credible discrimination or violation of a federally protected right.

Garland v. Ruskin · filed 1965-12-28

(8) Although the complaint purports to invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (“Civil rights and elective franchise”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Civil action for deprivation of rights”), the record now before the court raises grave and serious doubt as to whether either of these provisions is applicable and whether this case even remotely has anything to do with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution or any federally protected right, privilege or immunity. ... Such charges, if true arguendo, would not create jurisdiction under the civil rights statutes here invoked by the plaintiffs. ... Nor do the plaintiffs’ charges create jurisdiction under the civil rights statutes here invoked. ... Finally, plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions do not constitute legally sufficient factual allegations of violations of constitutional or similar rights.

Section 1983 permits private individuals to sue for violations of rights secured by federal law, and the Voting Rights Act does not displace that remedy.

Gray v. Main · filed 1966-09-07

The question raised by the defendants’ motions concerning plaintiffs’ standing to assert the substantive provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act is considered by this Court to be largely an academic question since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seems clearly to permit individuals such as plaintiffs to bring an action alleging violations of § 1973i. ... Nothing in the Voting Rights Act precludes the exercise of or dilutes the rights conferred by § 1983.

Section 1983 gives federal courts jurisdiction over state prisoners’ nonfrivolous claims that their conditions of incarceration are unconstitutional.

Freeley v. McGrath · filed 1970-07-01

Federal courts have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act over claims of unconstitutional conditions of incarceration brought by state prisoners, if not frivolous on their face.

A § 1983 civil-rights action arising from a non-violent arrest and short detention may be dismissed at the pleading stage when the record shows no constitutional violation, no appreciable physical or psychic harm, and no aggravating circumstances.

Boag v. Johnson · filed 1972-02-10

“(1) [Wjhen the facts as determined from an uncontradieted record of a state trial or hearing are clear they may be ‘presumed to be correct’ (cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), and if (2) there is a claimed violation of constitutional rights by non-violent arrest and a short detention occurring during a regular criminal prosecution, and if (3) there has been no appreciable physical or psychic harm above that to be expected in a legitimate and lawfully conducted prosecution, and if (4) there are no aggravating circumstances such as racial prejudice, or an independent design to deprive the defendant of a constitutional right such as free speech [citations omitted] or action shocking to the conscience [citations omitted], a civil rights action may be dismissed at the pleading stage, [citations omitted.]” ... “Accordingly, in light of the facts judicially noticed, dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.”

Section 1983 does not provide a recovery for an arrest the plaintiff deliberately procured, even if the officer exceeded the state statute or the statute was unconstitutional.

Clark v. William M. Bird, Jr. · filed 1966-01-14

The plaintiff has no cause of action. He cannot complain that he was confined against his will, when it was his will that he be confined. Even if the defendant acted beyond the statute, or if the statute were unconstitutional, the plaintiff cannot recover.

Section 1983 does not provide jurisdiction for a claim alleging only deprivation of a right under state law rather than a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Rader v. Cliburn · filed 1972-06-28

The court construes the complaint in this action as alleging merely a deprivation of a right under a state statute, and not as alleging a deprivation of a Federal constitutional right of any Federal civil right. Clearly, this court has no jurisdiction of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as this action is not one for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law for the plaintiff to have a cause of action.

Allen v. Sisters of Saint Joseph · filed 1973-06-13

It is the opinion of this Court that the Hill-Burton funds, welfare receipts, licensing procedures, and similar matters alleged by plaintiff to be the factors giving rise to the color of law action required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not sufficient and that the defendant in this ease is not operating under color of law so as to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a jurisdictionally sufficient colorable equal-protection claim that permits pendent adjudication of a related statutory claim.

Doe v. Lukhard · filed 1974-02-26

With the colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 present, the district court unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the claim of statutory preemption under its pendent jurisdiction.

State-court judgments have their normal res judicata effect in § 1983 actions.

Omernick v. LaRocque · filed 1976-01-30

In view of these statements, the fact that this is a civil rights action does not impair the...res judicata...effect of the civil action plaintiff brought in the Dane County Circuit Court.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to any plaintiff for a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right by a person acting under color of state law, allows qualified immunity as an affirmative defense for individual school-board members, treats school boards as persons, and does not require exhaustion absent a showing that adequate administrative remedies exist.

Strong v. Demopolis City Bd. of Ed. · filed 1981-06-10

The rights created by the fourteenth amendment are enforced against persons who act under color of state law through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Any rights afforded a woman to be free from sex discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment can be vindicated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... None of these arguments is persuasive. First, section 1983 affords a remedy to any plaintiff, regardless of the plaintiff’s skin color, for action taken by a defendant under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Second, although school board members are entitled to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to liability in their individual capacity the burden of pleading and proof is upon the defendant. ... The availability of the defense of qualified immunity does not bar a 1983 action against a defendant. It only provides an affirmative defense. ... Third, the Supreme Court had laid to rest any doubts that school boards are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Fourth, the defendants have made no showing that adequate administrative remedies exist which would require the plaintiff to exhaust those remedies before filing this 1983 action. ... For these reasons the motion of the defendants to dismiss the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted is denied.

The Civil Rights Act does not authorize nationwide service of process in actions brought under Section 1983.

Carter v. Three Unknown Police Officers of the Wilmington Police Department · filed 1986-07-18

Although it has been argued to the contrary, the Civil Rights Act, ... does not authorize nationwide service of process in actions brought under the Act.

Concurrent state-court jurisdiction over § 1983 claims does not prevent a defendant from removing the action when the federal district court has original jurisdiction.

Spencer v. South Florida Water Management District · filed 1986-12-31

The mere fact that concurrent jurisdiction exists under this statute does not prohibit a defendant from properly removing a case to federal court so long as the main requirement under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), is met; namely, that the district court have ... original ... jurisdiction over the matter, regardless of which court the complainant initiated the action first.

Once a Section 1983 complaint alleges a federal violation, whether state action actually exists is a merits issue rather than a subject-matter-jurisdiction question.

Kulick, Robert J. v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. Banks, Joseph, in His Capacity as President of Pocono Downs Racing · filed 1987-04-23

In this case, the district court used its finding about the existence of state action on the preliminary injunction motion to resolve the issue of state action for purposes of jurisdiction. This use of the preliminary injunction was improper, for the factual existence of state action was not a question of jurisdiction.

A court may dismiss a pro se habeas petition seeking prison medical treatment without prejudice to the prisoner bringing those civil rights claims in a § 1983 action.

Martin v. Overton · filed 2004-12-01

Therefore, following the reasoning of Erwin, the district court should have dismissed the petition without prejudice to allow Martin to raise his potential civil rights claims properly as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights by officials acting under color of state law.

Holy Ghost Revival Ministries v. City of Marysville · filed 2015-04-07

The court finds that LUPA’s 21-day filing deadline is inconsistent in both purpose and effect with the remedial objectives of Section 1983. ... The court declines to apply this deadline as a de facto statute of limitations.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil remedy for a failure to give Miranda warnings.

Fortson v. L. A. City Attorney's Office · filed 2017-04-07

Miranda claims, however, are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner claiming that prison officials violated his rights by confiscating legal materials must bring a separate action under § 1983 rather than raise the claim in a habeas proceeding.

Thompson, Rodell v. Foster, Brian · filed 2019-07-29

Nor is this habeas proceeding the proper forum in which to determine whether WCI violated any prison regulations or petitioner’s rights in confiscating the materials from Wheeler’s cell or in allowing Pastor Zimmerman to pick them up; that claim would have to be raised in a separate lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A district court may construe a prisoner's habeas petition challenging conditions of confinement as a § 1983 action, but may decline to do so when the petition lacks information needed for a civil rights complaint.

Rodriguez v. Neuschmid · filed 2019-11-21

Although a district court may construe a habeas petition by a prisoner attacking the conditions of his confinement as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), the Court declines to do so here.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a court may decline to convert a habeas petition into a civil rights action when the claim appears to allege only a state-law violation.

Gleghorn v. Gastlo · filed 2020-07-07

Second, to raise a cognizable civil rights claim, petitioner would need to demonstrate a violation of federal law. ... Here, it appears that petitioner’s claim based on Proposition 57 concerns only an alleged violation of state law, and not federal law. ... In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that, with respect to Ground Two, the instant Petition is not amenable to conversion to a § 1983 action, and therefore is dismissed without prejudice to petitioner filing a separate federal civil rights action, with the required filing fee, if he chooses to do so.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to enjoin state action alleged to violate the First Amendment.

Lanner v. Wimmer · filed 1981-10-13

It is clear that § 1983 is the proper remedy to enjoin state action alleged to violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not authorize these prisoners to seek injunctive relief to stop another prisoner's execution.

Daniels v. Zant · filed 1980-06-27

Neither the Constitution nor the laws give these prisoners the right to ask for injunctive relief for Jack Potts under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action to remedy racial discrimination in a state jury-selection system and permits injunctive relief requiring nondiscriminatory procedures.

Mitchell v. Johnson · filed 1966-01-18

There is no question that under Secti(m 1983> Title 42j United States Code, these plain_ tíff under the evidence in thig cas6) are entitled to the relief they geek and are entitled to have the defendants adopt procedures that will ingure that they and „ ,, .... , , ... . , all other qualified members of their class . _ . . in Macon County serve on Juries- ... The relief to be afforded in thig cage win involye not only the iggu_ ance 0f a prohibitory injunction, but an . . ,. . . . ... ... mjunctl0n requmng immediate affirma‘ tlve actlon by the Jury commissioners by their emptying the Macon County jury box, abandoning the present Macon County jury roll without any further use of either, and by their compiling a jury roll and refilling the jury box in strict accordance with the law of Alabama and the constitutional principles herein set forth.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief against a threatened constitutional deprivation even before the deprivation occurs.

Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt · filed 1969-03-24

Injunctive relief is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides: ... The fact that the deprivation has not occurred, but is threatened, does not bar this court from providing relief.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil-rights cause of action for abuse of prosecutorial function and authorizes injunctive relief.

Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees · filed 1970-08-12

It is clear that plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action, cognizable in federal court, and it certainly cannot be said, upon examination of the pleadings alone, that they will be unable to factually support their allegations. “A civil complaint asserting such an abuse of prosecutorial function would state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1983 and justify injunctive relief, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 1965, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22.”

Section 1983 authorizes a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief against public school officials for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Jinks v. Mays · filed 1971-09-28

Such a suit is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the court finds it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (1970).

Section 1983 permits parolees to maintain a class action for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief challenging unconstitutional parole-revocation procedures.

Hickman v. Arkansas Board of Pardons and Paroles · filed 1973-06-13

The Court finds that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief; under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a Rule 23(b)(2) class action by civilly committed juveniles seeking injunctive relief for alleged unconstitutional involuntary servitude by state officials.

King v. Carey · filed 1975-12-11

The class is so numerous as to make joinder impractical. There are common questions of law and fact, whether the acts of the defendants violate the thirteenth amendment and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The claims of the plaintiffs, as representative parties, are typical of the claims of the class. The plaintiffs are represented by The Legal Aid Society of New York City and, therefore, the representative parties will adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class. Finally, the parties opposing the class have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class making the declaratory and injunctive relief the plaintiffs seek appropriate. Therefore, this class action, based on the § 1983 claim of involuntary servitude, is properly maintainable as a Rule 23(b) (2) suit.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief against action under color of state law, regardless of whether the action is legislative, executive, or judicial.

Jordan v. Hutcheson · filed 1963-09-17

They are not authority for treatment of the rights of the plaintiffs here under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, where an equitable remedy is specifically granted against action under color of state law without any limitations as to the form which that action may take, whether legislative, executive or judicial.

Threatened enforcement of an invalid ordinance that violates free-speech rights states a claim for affirmative relief under § 1983.

Patel and Patel v. City of South San Francisco · filed 1985-04-19

Plaintiffs complaint alleges that plaintiff is being threatened with enforcement of an invalid ordinance in violation of its free speech rights. Thus it states a claim for affirmative relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief for a meritorious constitutional claim arising from a labor dispute between a municipal employer and its employee despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s anti-injunction provisions.

Reuter v. Bob Skipper · filed 1993-10-07

We hold that Norris-LaGuardia does not deny a plaintiff in a labor dispute, who has a meritorious constitutional claim under section 1983, any of her available remedies.

In § 1983, “laws” means statutory law and does not include the Constitution.

Baines v. City of Danville, Virginia, Hildreth G. McGhee v. City of Danville, Virginia · filed 1966-01-21

The revisers of 1875 knew this, for in Section 1979 of the revised statutes, incorporating the provisions of Section 1 of the Act of 1871, now carried forward to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, the reference is to “the deprivation of any rights * * * secured by the Constitution and laws.” Clearly, there, the word “law” was not intended to include the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for a police officer’s unjustified shooting that violates the victim’s constitutional rights.

Aldridge v. Mullins · filed 1973-03-06

After full consideration of the record, the briefs and arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that the trial court’s findings of facts are not clearly erroneous and that únder the circumstances surrounding this shooting, where the defendant had no reason to believe that a crime had been committed and no justification for drawing his gun, and certainly no justification for firing his gun, the award of punitive damages was not error.

Section 1983 permits police officers to avoid civil liability for an arrest if they acted in good faith and reasonably believed the arrest was lawful.

Mrs. Cornelius Cuthbertson Hill v. W. A. Rowland and B. S. Treadaway · filed 1973-03-14

We think the lower court was in error in instructing the jury that the test of liability in this § 1983 action was the objective test of “probable cause” rather than the partly subjective test of the reasonable good faith belief of the police officers in the legality of the arrest.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue a civil-rights claim for conduct that also constitutes common-law torts such as false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.

Colton v. Swain · filed 1973-04-24

After examining the pleadings it is clear to this Court that the plaintiff Robert Colton could have brought the instant action as either a civil rights violation, as he did, or as a tort action for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 shields a police officer from liability when the officer acts in good faith with a reasonable belief that the conduct is lawful.

Moats v. Village of Schaumburg · filed 1983-03-14

The test for liability under section 1983 is whether a police officer acts in good faith and with reasonable belief that his conduct is lawful. If he does, his acts are immune from liability.

Section 1983 preserves absolute witness immunity, so police officers and other witnesses cannot be sued for damages based on testimony given in judicial proceedings.

Briscoe v. LaHue · filed 1983-03-07

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that witnesses are absolutely immune from damages liability based on their testimony, and rejected the petitioners’ contention that government officials who testify about the performance of their official duties may be held liable under § 1983 even if other witnesses may not. We agree with that conclusion.

Section 1983 provides a federal damages remedy for constitutional violations caused by unlawful arrest and temporary imprisonment.

Rue v. Snyder · filed 1966-02-02

The arrest and the temporary imprisonment of the plaintiff under the circumstances of this case constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be free from unlawful arrest and to be free from unlawful imprisonment, and accordingly violated the plaintiff’s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for false arrest or imprisonment under color of state law when an otherwise facially lawful arrest is used for an improper purpose, and a complaint alleging that conduct may survive dismissal.

Lessman v. McCormick · filed 1979-01-26

Two elements are necessary for recovery under that section. ... The allegations are sufficient, at least as to policeman White and the bank employee Reynolds, to find action under color of state law. ... Thus her complaint states a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment under color of state law. ... We read this case as support for the proposition that an arrest which might be lawful on its face can be an abuse of power, condemned by the Civil Rights Act, if done for an improper purpose. ... This may be close to the line of being an insubstantial deprivation of liberty, but without the development of facts we cannot say that it is, at least as to White and Reynolds. ... But we hold the complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss as to the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of liberty when a state actor makes a warrantless, malicious arrest without probable cause.

Reeves v. City of Jackson, Mississippi · filed 1979-12-21

Reeves’s seizure and confinement under these circumstances would fit the requirement that he be deprived of a constitutionally-protected right, since a warrantless and malicious arrest based on no probable cause violates liberty, and hence section 1983.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 when intentional, knowing, or reckless material omissions in a warrant presentation undermine probable cause.

Lopez v. Ruhl · filed 1984-04-06

Thus if Defendant Ruhl intentionally, knowingly or recklessly made material omissions in his showing to the magistrate, probable cause may be challenged, and if found lacking, liability may lie under § 1983.

Failure to give Miranda warnings or honor a request for a lineup does not itself create section 1983 liability.

Williams v. Tansey · filed 1985-06-20

Defendants’ alleged failure to read plaintiff his rights and refusal of his request for a lineup are not actionable under § 1983 and the complaint is insufficient with respect to the conspiracy claim.

Police violate rights enforceable under § 1983 by continuing to hold an arrestee after probable cause ends unless he signs a release of claims.

Hall v. Ochs · filed 1985-11-27

Even if defendants had probable cause when they arrested (an assumption contrary to jury findings in this case), when they subsequently obtained additional information and no longer had probable cause to continue to hold the person under arrest, they were forbidden by state and federal constitutional law to require, as a condition of discharge from custody, that plaintiff sign a release of his claims against them for what they had already done.

An arrest and detention without probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a warrant violates federally protected rights and may support a Section 1983 action.

Dennis v. Glen Warren, Individually And, Scott County Sheriff · filed 1985-12-30

An individual’s right to be free from such unlawful arrest and detention is a federally protected right, the violation of which may be grounds for a suit under section 1983.

A § 1983 false-arrest or false-imprisonment claim based on mistaken identity requires an invalid warrant or unreasonable conduct by officers who failed to consider the warrant information properly.

Howard v. Regional Transit Authority · filed 1987-08-11

To maintain a cause of action under § 1983 for false arrest or imprisonment due to mistaken identity, the plaintiff must demonstrate either that the arrest warrant was invalid, or that the law enforcement officers acted unreasonably and failed to properly consider the information regarding the outstanding warrant, which they obtained from the computer system.

Section 1983 claims for compensatory damages based on unlawful imprisonment must await habeas corpus proceedings.

Kellogg v. Shoemaker · filed 1996-06-03

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensatory damages based upon unlawful imprisonment must await habeas corpus proceedings.

A conviction for the offense of arrest gives police officers a complete defense to § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

White v. Tamlyn · filed 1997-03-31

A separate and related reason for precluding plaintiff from bringing claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983 is that under long-established common law principles, plaintiff’s conviction gives the defendant police officers a complete defense.

A § 1983 false arrest claim against a person who reports a crime requires proof that the arrest lacked probable cause and that the reporter instigated the arrest.

Busch v. City of Anthon, Iowa · filed 2001-11-09

The comparable “constitutional” claim, the court concludes, requires proof that the arrest was without probable cause, which is the constitutional violation, see Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 758, and that the person reporting the purported crime actually “instigated” the arrest, as the factual basis for the reporting person’s liability.

Section 1983 permits damages for foreseeable consequences of an unlawful arrest, even when those consequences are not independent constitutional violations.

Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, Illinois, and Winnetka Police Officers Powell and Colleran · filed 2002-11-05

And when an illegal arrest sets off a chain of indignities inflicted on the hapless victim, including offensive physical touchings that would be privileged if the arrest were lawful, she is entitled to obtain damages for these indignities whether or not they are independent violations of the Constitution. For they are foreseeable consequences of the illegal arrest, and the ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.

A plaintiff who accepts an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal waives the right to challenge probable cause in a § 1983 false arrest or imprisonment claim.

Hock v. Kline · filed 2003-04-24

By accepting an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ... in satisfaction of the underlying criminal proceedings against him stemming from his December 18, 1998 arrest, plaintiff waived his right to challenge, in connection with both his state and federal claims sounding in false arrest and imprisonment, whether there was probable cause for his arrest (see Roesch v Otarola, 980 F2d 850 [1992]; Singleton v City of New York, 632 F2d 185 [1980], cert denied 450 US 920 [1981]; see also Tersigni v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 293 AD2d 366 [2002]).

Section 1983 does not provide a false arrest or false imprisonment claim when the plaintiff was detained pursuant to legal process.

Morales v. Busbee · filed 1997-06-20

Plaintiffs complaint also alleges that defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned plaintiff, in violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights and section 1983. The court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims. As the court will proceed to explain, because plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned pursuant to legal process, a false imprisonment or false arrest cause of action is not available to plaintiff in this case.

Section 1983 false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims against a police officer fail when the officer had probable cause to arrest.

Abbott v. Sangamon County · filed 2013-01-29

The existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983 claim against a police officer for false arrest or false imprisonment.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims are evaluated using the elements of a false arrest claim under state law.

Cook v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-20

For purposes of evaluating a Section 1983 action based on claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, courts in this circuit look to the elements of a false arrest claim under state law.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim when the arrest lacked probable cause or other justification.

Hemphill v. Farr · filed 2020-04-15

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” ... From the face of the Complaint, construing all facts in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he was arrested without probable cause.

Section 1983 false arrest claims follow the law of the state where the arrest occurred; under New York law, false arrest and false imprisonment are the same claim.

Vasquez v. Yadali · filed 2020-10-30

As to Plaintiff’s fourth “claim,” which he described as “wrongful (unlawful) imprisonment (confinement)” (App. at 3), his false arrest claim is the same as one for false imprisonment. “In analyzing a claim for false arrest under § 1983, federal courts look to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred,” Cooper v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-1517, 2019 WL 3642996, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “New York draws no distinction between false arrest and false imprisonment.”

Section 1983 permits absolute immunity for municipal legislators and officials acting in a legislative capacity, and claims against a municipality and officials sued in their official capacities are subject to the state limitations period applicable to the municipality.

Aitchison v. Raffiani · filed 1983-05-13

Recognizing the strong authority of Lake Country, we hold that members of a municipal council acting in a legislative capacity are absolutely immune from damage suits under section 1983. ... We conclude, therefore, that the district court properly invoked the two-year statute of limitations under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

Section 1983 covers a sheriff acting under color of law, and the sheriff has no greater immunity than a police officer for wrongful conduct.

Campise v. Hamilton · filed 1974-08-09

A sheriff enjoys no more immunity than a police officer when his conduct, under color of law, is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Legislators are immune from personal liability under § 1983 for legislative acts within their traditional sphere.

Athanson v. Grasso · filed 1976-03-30

Furthermore, the plaintiffs are immune from liability for their actions, as legislators, in setting tax rates and allocating revenues. ... The plaintiffs, insofar as they fix the tax rate and allocate the tax revenue to educational or other purposes, are acting as legislators.

Section 1983 does not treat a municipality as a person entitled to sue, and state legislators are immune from suit for acts within the traditional sphere of legislative activity even when their motivation is questionable.

City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield · filed 1976-04-12

The District Court's holding that the City of Safety Harbor is not a proper party under the Civil Rights Act constitutes a proper extension of the reasoning of recent Supreme Court cases which have established that a municipality is not a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the municipality is sued as a defendant. ... Accordingly, there is no reason why the Supreme Court's clear holdings in the context of suits against municipal defendants that municipalities are not persons within the meaning of the 1871 Civil Rights Act do not also apply where the municipality seeks to bring suit as plaintiff. ... In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state legislator acting within the traditional sphere of legislative activity was immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and that the privilege is not destroyed even where the motivation for the challenged conduct is questionable or unworthy. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court correctly held that the defendant legislators were immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

Section 1983 makes federal constitutional violations by state legislators actionable despite state constitutional speech-and-debate immunity.

Gewertz v. Jackman · filed 1979-03-29

Art. IV, § 4, ¶ 9, of the New Jersey Constitution, which tracks the federal speech and debate clause, cannot immunize a state legislator from liability for violation of federal constitutional rights made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits for injunctive relief against state legislators for activities within the traditional sphere of legislative activity.

Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino · filed 1980-01-02

We therefore hold that the defendant members of the New York State Legislature in the present case are immunized from suit for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought against enforcement of their subpoenas duces tecum which were issued in the course of a fully-authorized, legitimate investigation into child pornography and the involvement of organized crime in the production and distribution of sexually-oriented material.

Section 1983 gives a social worker who is entitled under state law to only good-faith immunity no more than qualified good-faith immunity in the constitutional context.

Doe v. County of Suffolks · filed 1980-07-14

Under the circumstances, it is apparent that a social worker, who by New York State legislation is only entitled to a good faith immunity, is entitled to no more than a qualified good faith immunity in the constitutional context of § 1983. As a social worker employed in the Suffolk County Child Protective Service, defendant Altman is not absolutely immune from suit for a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 preserves absolute immunity from damages for municipal legislators when they act in a legislative capacity, even when the legislation is alleged to be unconstitutional.

Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky · filed 1980-07-22

Notwithstanding the unqualified nature of its language, section 1983 was not intended to abrogate the federal common law immunities enjoyed by persons performing certain governmental functions. ... In short, absolute legislative immunity for municipal legislators promotes the public good and does not eliminate an essential check on (or remedy against) unlawful governmental conduct. Because the zoning ordinance in question here was not challenged as anything but a legislative act, we must conclude the city directors are absolutely immune from damage liability for its passage.

Section 1983 grants absolute immunity from suit to legislators of any state political subdivision when they act in a legislative capacity.

Bruce v. Riddle · filed 1980-09-10

We think, therefore, that if legislators of any political subdivision of a state function in a legislative capacity, they are absolutely immune from being sued under the provisions of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights suit against a court reporter for alleged misconduct, because court reporters do not receive absolute immunity from suit under the statute.

Odom v. Wilson · filed 1981-06-26

Court reporters do not enjoy absolute immunity from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity from attack for decisions made in a legislative capacity by governing members of state political subdivisions.

Burris v. Willis Independent School District · filed 1982-04-19

Decisions made in a legislative capacity by governing members of political subdivisions of the states are absolutely immune from attack under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state or territorial law, and absolute legislative immunity applies to claims under the statute.

Joyner v. Mofford · filed 1982-05-24

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that portion of the plaintiff’s Complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that before a plaintiff may succeed in his action he must demonstrate that some person has deprived him of a federally protected right. Second, the plaintiff must allege that the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law. ... Traditional absolute legislative immunity is applicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits.

Section 1983 grants elected local officials absolute immunity from suits alleging constitutional violations based on their legislative acts.

Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis. · filed 1983-04-14

Thus, this Court holds that elected local officials are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations stemming from legislative acts.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to absolute legislative immunity for municipal officials acting in a legislative capacity, while claims against a municipality and officials in their official capacities borrow the state-law limitations period applicable to governmental entities.

Aitchison v. Raffiani · filed 1983-05-13

In this suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), we hold that the members of a borough council, the mayor, and the borough attorney are entitled to absolute immunity for acts done in a legislative capacity. We also conclude that in a suit of this nature brought against a municipality and its office holders in their official capacities, the appropriate statute of limitations is that provided by state law for actions against governmental entities. Finding ourselves in agreement with the district court, we affirm.

State legislators performing legislative activities retain absolute legislative immunity in § 1983 suits even when plaintiffs allege that those activities violated constitutional rights.

Colon Berrios v. Agosto · filed 1983-09-07

Legislative activities otherwise entitled to immunity in a § 1983 suit do not lose the full protection of that immunity merely because plaintiffs allege that such activities violate their constitutional rights.

For § 1983 legislative immunity, a state’s characterization of an official’s activity as legislative is not controlling.

Stanley v. Magrath · filed 1983-10-11

Their rule-making powers are limited solely to the regulation of that institution. That state law may characterize their activity as “legislative” for some purposes is not controlling in the interpretation of a federal statute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Legislative immunity in a § 1983 employment case cannot be resolved on bare pleadings when whether the challenged hiring decision was legitimate legislative activity depends on undeveloped facts.

Torres v. Grunkmeyer · filed 1984-05-17

Without more before us than the bare allegations of the Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss must be denied.

State legislators have absolute common-law immunity from § 1983 damages suits for acts within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.

Hartley v. Fine · filed 1984-06-21

Nonetheless, it is well-established that members of a state legislature are afforded absolute common law immunity from damage suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State legislators acting within the legitimate legislative sphere have absolute immunity from § 1983 suits, and federal law determines the scope of that sphere.

Thompson v. Ramirez · filed 1984-09-28

It is well settled law that state legislators, when acting “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” enjoy a ... absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... What constitutes a “legitimate sphere of legislative activity” subject to immunity in a Section 1983 suit is a matter of federal law for federal courts to decide.

Legislators do not have absolute immunity from a § 1983 suit for actions taken without strictly following the legislative rules and resolutions that authorize them.

Thompson v. Ramirez · filed 1984-10-25

If the challenged subpoenas were not issued pursuant to an authorized legislative resolution, do the legislators enjoy immunity from suit under Section 1983? ... Therefore, we now find that the legislators do not enjoy absolute immunity when the Legislative Rules and Resolutions are not strictly followed in taking action.

Municipal legislators have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for legislative acts such as passing an ordinance, regardless of their motives, but not for executive or administrative enforcement acts.

Kennedy v. Hughes · filed 1984-11-07

This doctrine bars plaintiffs’ claims against the Mayor and City Commissioners for damages caused by the enactment of the ordinance itself, irrespective of the legislators’ motives, because passing an ordinance is legislative activity. ... The absolute protection afforded by legislative immunity does not apply to acts which are executive or administrative rather than legislative in character.

Absolute legislative immunity bars a section 1983 claim arising from employment decisions about a legislative staff position closely connected to the legislative process.

Bostick v. Rappleyea · filed 1985-07-05

After careful consideration of the facts and relevant case law, the Court concludes that the position of Legislative Budget Analyst is connected closely enough to the legislative process so that decisions regarding such position warrant the protection of legislative immunity, and thus, defendants’ motion as to the § 1983 claim and the EPA claim is granted and those claims are dismissed.

Municipal legislators do not have absolute legislative immunity from Section 1983 damages for unconstitutional employment decisions because they act as employers, not legislators, in making those decisions.

Kukla v. Village of Antioch · filed 1986-11-06

A legislator making an employment decision functions not as a legislator but essentially as any other employer would. He or she therefore has no absolute immunity from a damage award for an unconstitutional employment decision.

A municipal legislator has absolute immunity from § 1983 liability only for acts within legitimate legislative activity, not political or other nonlegislative conduct.

Mirshak v. Joyce · filed 1987-01-14

But the Supreme Court has found state and regional legislators to be immune from Section 1983 liability for acts taken within the sphere of legitimate legislative action. ... Consequently and in summary, the court holds that Joyce is immune from liability under Section 1983 only for his introducing an ordinance in the City Council.

Local officials are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages when performing legislative functions.

Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann · filed 1987-12-04

Having found no persuasive argument in the case law for distinguishing municipal from state or regional legislators for purposes of immunity, this court holds that local officials performing legislative functions are absolutely immune from damages in §§ 1983 and 1985 suits.

Local officials receive absolute legislative immunity from § 1983 damages only for acts performed through the legally prescribed legislative process.

Donivan v. Dallastown Borough · filed 1987-12-15

In consideration of these authorities, the result is simply stated: legislative powers require enactment of an ordinance; if an act is accomplished by means other than an ordinance, it is not an exercise of legislative activity. Therefore, the doctrine of absolute immunity does not attach.

Local officials are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for proposing and voting on rezoning policy as legislative acts.

New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County · filed 1988-11-21

The filing of an application for rezoning, as well as voting on the rezoning proposal require these defendants to balance social needs in their official capacity. ... As such, these defendants are entitled to an absolute immunity from the alleged § 1983 violations.

Council members waive absolute legislative immunity from a Section 1983 claim by failing to invoke it in the district court.

Fraternal Order of Police Hobart Lodge 121, Inc., James Richards, and George Luke v. City of Hobart · filed 1988-12-29

The council members failed to invoke their absolute legislative immunity ... in the district court, and have therefore waived it in this court.

Section 1983 liability is barred when a defendant is immune for the challenged acts; judicial and prosecutorial acts may have absolute immunity, while a state trooper may have qualified immunity.

Lechiara v. Gary M. Gaskins Kenneth L. Gorby Stephen R. Dolly Geraldine Floyd · filed 1989-03-23

Second, each of the defendants was immune from Sec. 1983 liability for his actions. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (magistrates' judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutor's absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982) (state trooper's qualified immunity for actions not violative of clearly established rights of which reasonable person would know).

District of Columbia councilmembers may invoke legislative immunity in Section 1983 suits, but their administrative personnel decisions do not receive absolute legislative immunity.

Teri-Ann Gross v. Nadine P. Winter, Councilmember, Council of the District of Columbia · filed 1989-05-26

In sum, we hold that Councilmember Winter is not absolutely immune to Ms. Gross’s constitutional claims under Section 1983, because Councilmember Winter’s contested personnel decisions were taken in her administrative, not legislative, capacity.

Section 1983 abrogates municipal immunity, so municipal officials sued in their official capacities cannot claim absolute legislative immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Goldberg v. Whitman · filed 1989-08-08

Section 1983 abrogated whatever immunity previously existed for municipal entities. ... The result is not different simply because the plaintiff has named municipal officials as defendants in their official capacities in lieu of— or in this case, in addition to — the municipal entity itself.

City council members have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims for acts taken in a legislative capacity.

PCB PARTNERSHIP v. City of Largo · filed 1989-09-27

City council members enjoy absolute immunity in civil rights actions when acting in a legislative capacity.

Section 1983 legislative immunity does not protect statements made at a press conference to defend a legislative committee’s work.

Lunderstadt v. Colafella · filed 1989-10-17

We believe that the district court gave too broad a scope to legislative immunity when it held that statements at a press conference are encompassed thereby.

Section 1983 damages claims against a judge for judicial acts are barred by absolute immunity, and claims against a state are barred by sovereign immunity.

Burgess v. Hollie Pihl, the State of Oregon · filed 1989-12-04

Burgess filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against Judge Hollie Pihl of the Oregon state circuit courts. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Judge Pihl possesses absolute immunity from damages for the actions complained of, pursuant to Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and an action against the state of Oregon is barred by sovereign immunity, under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). We agree and affirm.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against prosecuting attorneys or a state court judge for conduct protected by their immunity.

Gallagher v. Morrow County Howard Hall, Prosecutor Tom Elkin Lee McClelland · filed 1989-12-08

The district court correctly determined that the prosecuting attorneys are immune, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), as is the state court judge. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-63 (1978).