42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make supervisory officials vicariously liable for their subordinates’ actions.

Rodriguez v. Lozano · filed 2004-06-17

In addition, Lozano and Alvarado cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of the correctional officers, because “[u]nder § 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 requires specific allegations supporting a supervisor’s responsibility or personal involvement in the challenged conduct.

Harris v. Cockrell · filed 2004-06-17

On the other hand, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim against Dr. Monte Smith. Harris made no specific allegations in support of his assertion that Dr. Smith failed to supervise properly. He also failed to allege that Dr. Smith was personally involved in his medical treatment.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff who was not personally involved requires proof that the sheriff implemented a deficient policy that caused the constitutional violation.

Cooper v. Thomas · filed 2004-06-24

Because Cooper sued only Sheriff Thomas and did not allege that Sheriff Thomas was personally involved in his claims, Cooper was required to show that Sheriff Thomas “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 treats a supervisor’s knowing failure to remedy an ongoing constitutional violation as personal involvement sufficient to state a claim.

Carrasquillo v. City of New York · filed 2004-06-25

Read most charitably, Plaintiffs complaint alleges that these supervisory officials were made aware of the medical staffs unconstitutional practices, but nevertheless let them continue. That is sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; a supervisor may be liable for creating or allowing an unconstitutional custom or for grossly negligent supervision.

Davis v. Reilly · filed 2004-07-08

In this case, the plaintiff fails to allege that Reilly was directly involved in his injuries. Furthermore, to the extent that Reilly is a state actor in a supervisory role, the plaintiff fails to allege that Reilly created or allowed any custom regarding wet floors to exist or acted in a grossly negligent manner in managing the officers he supervised.

Section 1983 supervisory liability cannot rest solely on subordinates’ acts or a supervisor’s failure to act.

Summers v. Simon Leis, Sheriff · filed 2004-07-09

The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing unless a recognized basis for supervisory liability applies.

Haywood v. Alcantara · filed 2004-07-09

Additionally, the district court properly dismissed Haywood’s complaint as to the supervisory defendants because he failed to allege any of the supervisors’ personal involvement in the inmate assault; nor did Haywood’s complaint fall into any of the narrowly tailored categories that allow for supervisory liability without the supervisor’s participation in the alleged wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their position; liability requires their own acts or omissions.

De Velez v. Zayas · filed 2004-07-26

Plaintiffs also omit any direct involvement at the hand of the previously named Defendants. In cases such as the case at bar where a plaintiff alleges that a supervisor’s conduct caused a constitutional deprivation, the Supreme Court has firmly rejected respondeat superior as a basis for § 1983 liability of supervisory officials.

Section 1983 generally permits failure-to-supervise liability only when there is a history of widespread abuse.

Brown v. Craven · filed 2004-07-26

Moreover, Brown has not suggested that there a “history of widespread abuse.” Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986) (generally, failure to supervise gives rise to liability only if there is a “history of widespread abuse”).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability when the supervised officers committed no constitutional violation.

Huggins v. Weider · filed 2004-08-03

There can be no liability under § 1983 on the part of a supervisory official in the absence of a consti- tutional violation on the part of those supervised.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

Baptist v. Hinsley · filed 2004-08-05

But § 1983 “does not allow actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others,” so a prison official cannot incur liability unless he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference, and that inaction causes the plaintiff's injury.

Arbaugh v. BOARD OF EDUC., COUNTY OF PENDLETON · filed 2004-08-06

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices [ ]; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. ... Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Thompson was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Heavner was abusing his students. ... Therefore, a reasonable jury could find an affirmative causal link between Thompson's inaction and Arbaugh's injury.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor’s deliberate indifference to a known risk is causally linked to the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.

Arbaugh v. Board of Education · filed 2004-08-06

In conclusion, Thompson cannot meet his burden to prove his defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court finds that, under the alleged facts, a reasonable jury could hold Thompson liable for Ar-baugh’s injuries.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior; a supervisor’s reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights can support liability.

Vélez-Herrero v. Guzman · filed 2004-08-13

Section 1983 liability “may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior,” Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.1999), unless a plaintiff can show that the “supervisor’s conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.” Id. at 49 (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989)); see also Herrera v. Davila, 272 F.Supp.2d 154, 162 (D.P.R. 2003).

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a supervisor and the alleged constitutional deprivation to establish supervisory liability.

Serna v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2004-08-18

Accordingly, no requisite “affirmative link” exists between Warden Novak and any alleged constitutional deprivation committed by the Special Operations Response Team against Mr. Serna in removing him from his cell.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor without evidence that the supervisor participated in the alleged violation or failed to train or supervise the employees involved.

Jacobsen v. Department of Transportation · filed 2004-08-26

Here, Jacobsen has not directed the court’s attention to any record evidence from which to conclude that Governor Vilsack participated in the alleged violations or failed to train or supervise the offending employees. Therefore, Governor Vilsack cannot be held liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 and this portion of defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment is granted.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability for subordinates' unconstitutional acts when plaintiffs show an affirmative link through active participation or acquiescence.

Reeves v. Churchich · filed 2004-09-02

A supervisor “may be held liable for the alleged unconstitutional acts of his subordinates if [plaintiffs] demonstrate an ‘affirmative link’ through facts showing that he actively participated or acquiesced in the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable to allege that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.

Bennett v. Smith · filed 2004-09-17

In order to find supervisory personnel hable under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the supervisor condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory or grievance officials liable for a dentist’s conduct when the dentist did not violate the prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Davis v. Powell · filed 2004-09-17

Additionally, the officials are not liable under § 1983 for supervising the dentists or for denying Davis’s grievances as we have determined that Dr. Corsi and Dr. Shields were not deliberately indifferent to Davis’s dental needs.

Section 1983 permits supervisor liability when a supervisor sets in motion acts that he knew or reasonably should have known would cause a constitutional injury.

Motley v. Parks · filed 2004-09-21

A supervisor can be liable under section 1983 if he "set[s] in motion a series of acts by others ..., which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991), and holding that the liability of the superior officer was an issue for the jury).

A supervisor’s knowledge of past misconduct alone does not establish personal liability under § 1983; plaintiffs must also show the supervisor could have taken steps to prevent the violation and failed to do so.

Barham v. Ramsey · filed 2004-09-24

Any personal liability cannot rest on the Mayor’s knowledge of past events; plaintiffs also have to show that Mayor Williams could have, and failed to, take steps to prevent the Pershing Park arrests.

Section 1983 permits liability for supervisors who know an inmate’s injury is serious and condone or turn a blind eye to inadequate treatment.

Franklin v. McCaughtry · filed 2004-09-27

Even if there was evidence of deliberate indifference by the nurse and doctor, McCaughtry and Wegner could share liability only if they knew the injury was serious and yet condoned or turned a blind eye to the inadequate treatment.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the plaintiff shows an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s acts or omissions and the constitutional injury.

Walczyk v. Rio · filed 2004-09-29

A supervisor may be held liable for a constitutional tort by his employees only if the plaintiff can show an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s acts or omissions and the plaintiffs injury. ... Plaintiffs have provided evidence that creates an issue of fact as to whether there was such a link, in the form of Deschenes’s testimony that Rio was involved in preparing the warrant affidavit.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Phillips v. Bailey · filed 2004-09-29

Because the court concludes that no constitutional violation has occurred, the plaintiffs supervisory liability claims against Mr. Terry must also be dismissed. It is well settled that there can be no supervisory liability when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 fails when the subordinates’ conduct poses no unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; the court need not decide whether the supervisors knew of that conduct.

Jennings v. UNIVERSITY OF N. CAR. AT CHAPEL HILL · filed 2004-10-27

Because their behavior did not pose an unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether these other defendants had knowledge of their behavior. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate on Ms. Jennings’ supervisory liability claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for inadequate training or supervision requires an underlying constitutional violation.

McNally v. Colorado State Patrol · filed 2004-11-02

Because McNally has not established any constitutional violations by the defendants, his claim against the Colorado State Patrol supervisors for failure to adequately train and supervise must also fail.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on an officer for the conduct of officers he did not supervise.

Walsh v. Taylor · filed 2004-11-10

The unrebutted evidence indicates that both Taylor and Margosian occupied the status of lieutenants assigned to the COMET task force, both supervised narcotics teams, neither had supervisory authority over the other, and both answered to Commander Charles Schumacher, COMET's leader. Furthermore, no facts tended to establish that on July 22, 2000, COMET Lieutenant Taylor had any supervisory authority over Krutell, who also occupied the positions of lieutenant and acting chief of the Mount Clemens Police Department. Under these undisputed circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court erred by denying Taylor's motion for summary disposition of plaintiff's § 1983 claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires the supervisor’s own active unconstitutional conduct; mere inaction or tacit approval is insufficient.

Alexander v. Newman · filed 2004-11-22

Section 1983 supervisory liability may not be based on a “mere failure to act,” a “passive role,” or “mere tacit approval.” The plaintiff instead must base liability on the supervisor’s own “active unconstitutional behavior.”

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before damages may be awarded against that official.

Nassau County Employee "L" v. County of Nassau · filed 2004-11-29

The personal involvement of a supervisory official in the alleged constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2004-11-30

A civil rights plaintiff may not sue any supervisor on a theory of respon-deat superior, which is not a theory of liability cognizable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a constitutional deprivation and a supervisor’s personal participation, direction, or failure to supervise before the supervisor can be liable.

Walters v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2004-12-07

However, “[a] supervisor is not liable under § 1983 unless an ‘affirmative link’ exists between the constitutional deprivation and . . . the supervisor’s personal participation, his [or her] exercise of control or direction, or his [or her] failure to supervise.” Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993). Because the assault and battery that Walters allegedly suffered does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation, Steer and Swenson cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor witnesses a constitutional violation and fails to act to stop it.

Covington v. Fairman · filed 2004-12-09

In the light of our conclusion that the alleged beating described above violated the Eighth Amendment (and also in consideration of the evidence of beating by additional defendants who either did not seek qualified immunity or did not appeal its denial), the allegations that the supervisors failed to act establishes supervisory liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor based on a subordinate’s actions only if the supervisor participated or acquiesced in the constitutional violation.

Quint v. Cox · filed 2004-12-13

A supervisor may be held liable in his or her individual capacity under § 1983 for the actions of a subordinate only if the supervisor participated or acquiesced in the constitutional violation of the prisoner.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; merely repeating the legal standard is insufficient.

Davis v. County of Nassau · filed 2005-02-07

A complaint that essentially regurgitates the relevant “personal involvement” standard, without offering any facts indicating that, or how, an individual defendant in a supervisory role was personally involved in a constitutional violation, cannot withstand dismissal.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a sheriff personally when his policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Lingenfelter v. Board of County Commissioners of Reno County · filed 2005-03-14

Liberally construed, however, the complaint alleges that Sheriff Henderson had final authority to determine the policies and procedures affecting detainees in the jail, that he had a policy or custom of not effectuating probable cause determinations for detainees who were arrested without a warrant, and that this policy or custom caused the deprivation of plaintiffs rights. Such allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Sheriff Henderson personally.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Coleman v. Beard · filed 2005-05-13

The District Court correctly dismissed the complaint as to the remaining defendants because Coleman does not allege any personal involvement of these defendants; it is well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 liability is personal, so an individual officer’s liability depends on that officer’s own conduct.

Doran v. Dennis Eckold, in His Official Capacity as President of the Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City · filed 2005-06-06

Third, the district court concluded that the prior investigation by “the police” was inadequate and then attributed these inadequacies to the Street Narcotics Unit officers brought in solely to execute the warrant. This analysis of the police conduct in gross would be proper in deciding a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal prosecution of Doran arising out of the search. But § 1983 liability is personal. The question here is whether the conduct of Officer Grant and Sergeant Greenwell was constitutionally unreasonable.

Section 1983 liability is personal; an officer’s conduct is assessed in light of whether the officer reasonably relied on information from other law enforcement officers.

Doran v. Eckold · filed 2005-06-06

But § 1983 liability is personal. The question here is whether the conduct of Officer Grant and Sergeant Greenwell was constitutionally unreasonable. The answer to that question must take into account the settled principle that law enforcement officers may rely on information provided by others in the law enforcement community, so long as the reliance is reasonable.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; involvement only in a later grievance process does not establish liability, and respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Alexander v. Gennarini · filed 2005-08-02

As the District Court correctly noted, to be liable under § 1983, a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoings. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Section 1983 liability cannot be found solely on the basis of respondeat superior. See id. The District Court properly dismissed Alexander’s claims as against Defendants Klem and Burks, as the allegations related to these defendants merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of a supervisor’s personal direction of, or knowledge and acquiescence in, the alleged wrongdoing; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Evancho v. Fisher · filed 2005-09-12

Like the superintendent in Gay, Evancho has not alleged any facts to indicate that Attorney General Fisher individually directed Evancho’s transfer or knew of and acquiesced in it. Implicitly, her amended complaint, similar to the prisoner’s complaint in Gay, rests on the doctrine of respondeat superior, contrary to Rode. Thus, by analogy to Gay, we necessarily must conclude that the district court’s dismissal of Evancho’s amended complaint was proper.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in causing the deprivation of a constitutional right; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Lewis v. Mitchell · filed 2005-10-05

Section 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personal involvement in the alleged violation and does not impose liability solely because of a supervisory role.

Roach v. SCI Graterford Medical Dept. · filed 2005-11-04

Civil rights claims cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988). Rather, each named defendant must be shown to have been personally involved in the events or' occurrence which underlie a claim. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir.1976).

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to allege a defendant’s personal involvement or responsibility for a constitutional violation and does not permit liability against officials under respondeat superior.

Beck v. Hvass · filed 2005-12-09

Having reviewed the record de novo, we conclude dismissal was proper. See Beck v. LaFleur, 257 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (prisoner must allege defendant’s personal involvement or responsibility for constitutional violations to state § 1983 claim); Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 1995) (civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue section 1983 claim against officials under respondeat superior theory).

Section 1983 requires allegations supporting supervisory liability or a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Holloway v. Oguejiofor · filed 2006-02-15

Finally, Holloway made no specific allegations in support of his assertion that Dr. Charles Mullins failed to supervise his employees at the University of Texas System, Health Services Division properly. He also failed to allege that Drs. Mullins or Oguejiofor were personally involved in his medical treatment.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged property damage; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Miller v. Hassinger · filed 2006-04-06

To prevail on this claim against Hassinger, Miller must demonstrate personal involvement by Hassinger in damaging his property.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection to hold a warden personally liable; two letters about medical treatment are insufficient.

Ramsey v. Spoores · filed 2006-06-13

Finally, that Ramsey may have written two letters about his medical treatment to defendant Warden Duke was insuffi-...cient to establish the causal connection necessary to show that Duke was personally liable.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant for alleged misconduct in which he neither participated nor supervised.

Ames v. Brown · filed 2006-07-07

Defendant Bruning did not participate in or supervise Ames’s transport to and detention at the Logan County jail. He therefore is not liable for anything that may have occurred when Ames was in the Logan County officers’ control.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the rights violation; supervisors are not vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct.

Fisher v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2007-01-19

Defendants are not vicariously hable. Moreover, plaintiffs proffered no allegation or evidence that any of the named defendants, except Mr. Yott, personally participated in activities that violated their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a causal link and direct responsibility for a deprivation of rights; supervisory liability requires specific facts showing personal involvement or direct responsibility.

Clemmons v. Armontrout · filed 2007-02-12

"Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [the plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights."

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Baskett v. Quinn · filed 2007-03-21

The district court properly concluded Baskett failed to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege defendant’s personal involvement in an Eighth Amendment violation and the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable.

A § 1983 claim may proceed at the pleading stage against prison officials who did not personally deny medical care when the allegations may show they failed to prevent an Eighth Amendment violation.

Wallace v. Hamrick · filed 2007-04-09

While Wallace has not alleged that the individual defendants personally participated in the failure to treat him, his allegations, if true, may ultimately show that the defendants did nothing to prevent the violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for a supervisor to incur personal liability; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Wilson v. Johnson · filed 2007-07-05

“Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” ... There is no evidence that defendants Davis, Johnson, Lee, Simek, and Yovella were aware of the content of the painted messages or banners prior to their removal. Although the remaining defendants, Brooks, Cummings, and Moles, were aware of the content of the banners, there is no evidence that they either removed, or instructed the removal of, the banners.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional wrong for liability, and a supervisor is liable when the supervisor was the moving force behind it.

Monk v. Williams · filed 2007-09-27

It is an established principle that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not an acceptable basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Under Third Circuit case law, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. ... Liability of a supervisor under § 1983 occurs when the supervisor was the “moving force” behind the subordinates constitutional tort.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official who directs conduct causing a constitutional deprivation, even without directly participating.

Viilo v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2008-02-12

An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of § 1983 if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent. ... Therefore, Eyre and Carter were working together in seizing Bubba, and the claims against Eyre should not be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for deputies’ entry when he had no personal involvement and the alleged cover-up and deficient investigation policy lacked record support.

Durr v. Sheriff McNesby · filed 2008-02-13

Durr’s allegations that defendant sheriff McNesby participated in covering up the entry into Durr’s residence and that McNesby had a policy of inadequately investigating and covering alleged civil rights violations of his deputies were wholly unsupported by the record. ... Sheriff McNesby, as the chief law enforcement officer of Escambia County, ordered an internal affairs investigation into the entry into the Durr residence pursuant to a citizen’s complaint. He had no personal involvement in the entry.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role or failure to take corrective action after receiving a grievance.

Pressley v. Beard · filed 2008-02-26

Several named defendants, such as the Secretaries of the Department of Corrections or Superintendents, were named only for their supervisory roles in the prison system. The District Court properly dismissed these defendants and any additional defendants who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action when grievances or investigations were referred to them.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation for individual liability, including supervisory liability only when an affirmative link exists.

Fogarty v. Gallegos · filed 2008-04-18

Personal involvement is not limited solely to situations where a defendant violates a plaintiffs rights by physically placing hands on him. We have recognized at least two other ways in which a plaintiff may show a defendant’s involvement. An officer who fails to intervene to prevent a fellow officer’s excessive use of force may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes damages liability personal to the individual defendants.

Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center, Inc. v. Arft · filed 1978-07-20

However, liability for damages under § 1983 is a personal liability of the individual defendants.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for the alleged deprivation and does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Butler v. Commissioner of Mental Health · filed 1978-09-28

Defendant Marshall, the Superintendent of Lakeshore, and defendant Jordan, the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation base their motions on the ground that respondeat superior is not a basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While defendants are correct in this regard, and while their reading of plaintiff’s complaint as a respondeat superior claim appears to be the most reasonable reading of it, the Court cannot dismiss the claims on this basis.

Section 1983 permits liability against individual defendants whose acts cause a constitutional deprivation.

Miller v. City of Mission, Kan. · filed 1981-07-01

That amount could properly be assessed against all the individual defendants because their acts made plaintiff’s termination without a hearing a deprivation of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for constitutional rights violations caused by the defendant’s own conduct or an official policy or custom for which it is responsible.

Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1982-10-07

As indicated, we pass these questions, however, because we conclude that in any event Clements could not be held liable under § 1983 for any deprivation of rights that occurred in the respect charged. There is no evidence that Clements participated directly in any of the events of Fisher’s detention. He cannot be held liable vicariously under § 1983 for any conduct of his subordinates. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977). Neither could he be held liable on the basis of a failure adequately to supervise or control any conduct that directly caused the specific deprivation charged. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 376-77, 96 S.Ct. 598, 603-604, 606-607, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). Only if the evidence showed that conduct directly causing the deprivation was done to effectuate an official policy or custom for which Clements was responsible could he be liable. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926. The evidence would not support such a finding.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from supervisory officials to allege and prove their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Evans v. Headley · filed 1983-06-22

The defendants also seek dismissal of Evans’ damages claim against Coughlin and Headley since Evans has failed to allege their personal awareness of the alleged deprivations of Evans’ constitutional rights. ... The defendants are correct in asserting that Evans’ complaint fails to allege such personal awareness. ... Of course, Evans still has the burden of proving such personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Padilla v. Crawford · filed 2008-08-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Guinn because Padilla made no allegations that Guinn participated in, or had knowledge of, the alleged misconduct. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (explaining there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory authority alone is insufficient.

Sandlin v. Poole · filed 2008-09-08

These defendants may have had some supervisory authority during the period in question, but even if plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, that is not enough to make them liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking personal liability against a supervisory defendant to show the defendant's personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Gillard v. Kuykendall · filed 2008-10-02

First, there was no evidence that Sheriff Morris knew of Gillard’s medical problems or of problems with the administration of his medication. See Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir.) (to establish personal liability of supervisory defendant, plaintiff must show personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, deprivation of constitutional rights), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 155 (2007).

Section 1983 does not make an official liable for others’ discriminatory use of his voting advice when he had no racial motivation.

Justice v. Town of Blackwell · filed 1987-05-29

Even if 2 this advice was in some manner misinterpreted and used by others as a means to deliberately deny Blacks the vote because they were Black, Cronin is not liable under section 1983 under these circumstances and a fortiori did not violate clearly established federal law.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement or a basis for supervisory liability to recover damages from a state officer in an individual capacity.

Construction v. Comm., NHDES, et al. · filed 2009-01-27

The plaintiffs fail to allege any conduct by Commissioner Burack or Attorney General Ayotte that establishes (1) that either was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights, or (2) supervisory liability. ... The plaintiffs’ claim for damages under § 1983 against Commissioner Burack and Attorney General Ayotte in their individual capacities is therefore dismissed.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not permit respondeat superior liability.

Johnson v. Rush · filed 2009-02-03

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability, and each defendant must be personally involved in the constitutional violations alleged.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged violation to impose supervisory liability.

King v. D.T. Nation · filed 1990-11-06

However, this Court has repeatedly held that liability of supervisory personnel under section 1983 must be based on something more than the right to control the actions and conduct of subordinate employees.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so a plaintiff must show a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.

McCullock v. Los Angeles County Sheriff · filed 2009-04-03

The district court also properly concluded that there was no triable issue regarding Sheriff Baca’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (“There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”)

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for supervisory liability and does not impose liability based solely on a subordinate’s unconstitutional act.

Rahman v. Fisher · filed 2009-04-10

The personal involvement and liability of supervisory personnel is established when the supervisory official has “actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional practices and demonstrates gross negligence or deliberate indifference by failing to act.”

Section 1983 damages require a defendant’s personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Coronado v. LeFevre · filed 1995-05-11

It is well settled that the personal involvement of a defendant is a prerequisite for the assessment of damages in a § 1983 action, ... and that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 claims. ... It therefore appears that the plaintiff will have great difficulty satisfying § 1983’s personal involvement requirement.

A plaintiff seeking money damages under § 1983 from a prison commissioner must allege the commissioner’s personal involvement in the challenged conditions.

Pettus v. Morgenthau · filed 2009-01-28

Pettus has failed to allege that Goord was personally responsible for the conditions at Southport, which prevents Pettus from obtaining money damages from Goord, the only form of relief he seeks.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Brown v. Rinehart · filed 2009-04-30

He cites no evidence of Drysdale’s personal involvement through participation, knowledge, or acquiescence.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

McCain v. Abraham · filed 2009-06-10

Additionally, McCain’s claims are barred at the outset by the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, including an affirmative link between the defendant and the violation.

Doyle v. Ritter, Jr. · filed 2009-06-18

Mr. Doyle is simply incorrect insofar as he argues that he has demonstrated personal participation by showing that the named defendants received a copy of the complaint or exercised general supervisory capacity; rather, there must be an affirmative link between the named defendant and the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; at the motion-to-dismiss stage, allegations that supervisors knew of and acquiesced in the alleged violations sufficiently plead that involvement.

McGrath v. Johnson · filed 1999-09-24

It is well established that liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on the operation of respondeat superior. In order to be liable, a defendant in a § 1983 action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrong. ... Thus, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, he has sufficiently pled the personal involvement of defendants Horn, Love and Williamson.

Section 1983 permits claims against individual public officials for constitutional deprivations under color of state law and requires personal involvement or qualifying supervisory knowledge and inaction.

Ross v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2009-09-03

The same legal standard applies to equal protection claims brought pursuant to § 1983 as intentional discrimination claims brought under Title VII. ... Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the court finds that Ross has presented sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of fact on his § 1983 equal protection claim. ... In general, supervisors are not vicariously- liable for § 1983 violations of their subordinates unless they knew or should have known of their subordinates’ misconduct and failed to act to prevent it. ... For a government official to be held liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish “some personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, essentially directing or consenting to the challenged conduct.”

Section 1983 makes an official liable only for the official’s own misconduct, not for a subordinate’s acts under a theory of supervisory liability.

Nelson v. Norris · filed 2009-10-02

In a § 1983 case an official “is only liable for his . . . own misconduct” and is not “accountable for the misdeeds of [his] agents” under a theory such as respondeat superior or supervisor liability. ... Norris is thus liable only if he personally displayed deliberate indifference to the hazards and pain resulting from shackling an inmate such as Nelson during the final stages of labor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a supervisory official individually to allege the official’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Garcia v. Selsky · filed 2010-01-29

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual capacity must allege that the supervisor was personally involved in the violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement or a sufficiently deficient policy for supervisory public officials to be liable for constitutional deprivations.

Anthony v. School Board of Iberia Parish · filed 2010-02-05

Supervisory public officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 on any theory of vicarious liability. To be liable under § 1983, a supervisory public official must be personally involved in the act causing the alleged constitutional deprivation, or must have implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself acts as a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking personal liability to show that a government official caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Ortiz v. City of Chicago · filed 2010-02-18

To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the government official “caused the deprivation of a federal right.”

Section 1983 permits liability when a defendant's conduct sets in motion foreseeable acts by others that cause a constitutional deprivation.

Jaundoo v. Clarke · filed 2010-02-22

The causal connection required under § 1983 “can be established not only by some kind of personal participation in the [constitutional] deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” ... Even if Kearnan was not directly responsible for the medical decision to take away the plaintiffs crutches under the DOC’s policy, the plaintiff has alleged facts showing that his conduct set in motion a series of actions by others that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, this court recommends that Jaundoo’s motion to amend be allowed with respect to the addition of Kearnan as a defendant.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Williams v. University Medical Center · filed 2010-02-25

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in or direction of a violation; it does not impose supervisory liability.

John Fabricius, Ii v. Maricopa County · filed 2010-11-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the access-to- courts claim because Fabricius failed to establish that defendant Mangan “personally participated in or directed a violation.” James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 653 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (there is no supervisory liability in section 1983 actions).

Section 1983 imposes personal liability on an individual defendant only for direct participation in the wrongful acts.

Bey v. Department of Corrections · filed 2011-03-16

“An individual may be personally liable under Section 1983 only if it is shown that he or she directly participated in the wrongful acts.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to cause or participate in the constitutional deprivation; supervisory rank alone does not establish liability.

Kozel v. Village of Dolton · filed 2011-04-11

Kozel has offered no evidence that allows a reasonable inference that Fox caused or participated in Kozel’s arrest. Fox’s position as chief of police for the Dolton Police Department, standing alone, is not sufficient to give rise to such an inference.

Section 1983 permits liability against a defendant who participated in or directed the alleged violations, or knew of them and failed to prevent them.

Thompson v. Luna · filed 2011-07-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Luna because Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Luna “participated in or directed the [alleged] violations, or knew of the [alleged] violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), or whether “a policy or custom . . . played a part in the [alleged] violation[s],” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability, so a plaintiff must plead each defendant's own unconstitutional actions.

Weise v. Jenkins · filed 2011-07-13

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Section 1983 permits personal liability only for an official’s own misconduct and does not allow respondeat superior liability.

Douglas v. Brookville Area School District · filed 2011-12-08

An official sued under § 1983, however, may only be held personally liable “for his or her own misconduct.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a defendant's personal involvement and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Carter v. Yarborough · filed 2012-01-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Carter’s access-to-court claim because Carter failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the warden knew that the prison staff was not following the directive to provide legal materials to the prisoners with court deadlines. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; plaintiff must show defendant’s personal involvement in alleged violations).

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an official whose overruled recommendation caused no injury.

Fisher v. Fulwood · filed 2012-03-13

To the extent that plaintiff’s claim against Howard in his personal capacity has survived, see Fz'sher, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 60-61, the Court now finds that the claim fails because plaintiff carmot establish an injury for which Howard may be held personally liable. Even if Howard erroneously applied the 2000 guidelines, his recommendation was overruled - and essentially rendered moot - by the Commission’s adoption of Denton’s recommendation to apply the 1987 regulations.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Bertuglia v. City of New York · filed 2012-03-19

A plaintiff must plead the personal involvement of each defendant in a violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires proof of a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation or supervisory responsibility for a policy that caused it.

Myers v. Coats · filed 2012-03-29

Section 1983 liability depends upon proof of a defendant’s personal or supervisory liability. ... By evaluating Myers’ personal involvement with Coats’ plight and using the Brown test for supervisory liability, we find that Coats has not carried his burden to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact establishing that Myers personally deprived Coats of a liberty interest and failed to afford him sufficient process.

Section 1983 liability requires proof that the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or responsible for a policy that caused it.

Myers v. Jarod Coats · filed 2012-03-29

Section 1983 liability depends upon proof of a defendant’s personal or supervisory liability. ... Accordingly, we find that summary judgment for Myers should have been granted on this issue.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for liability and does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their general responsibility.

Obama v. Burl · filed 2012-05-11

Next, we agree with the district court that Obama failed to state a claim against the named defendants for inadequate medical care, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (de novo review), as he did not name any medical personnel and he did not allege that he was denied treatment recommended by medical personnel, see Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2007) (in § 1983 action, prison officials cannot be held liable under respondeat-superior theory; officials must know of and disregard excessive risk to inmate health and safety); Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (general responsibility for supervising prison operations is insufficient to establish personal involvement required for § 1983 liability; official who is not involved in medical decisions and has no medical expertise cannot be liable for medical staff’s diagnostic decisions).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation, or personal direction of it or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Oryem v. Richardson · filed 2012-10-12

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants personally participated in a constitutional violation, see Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996), or “personally directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance,” Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1074 (10th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 limits liability to public employees for their own misdeeds and does not impose vicarious liability for subordinates' failings.

Hoban v. Godinez · filed 2012-11-06

Section 1983 limits liability to public employees “for their own misdeeds, and not for anyone else’s.”

Section 1983 requires each defendant to have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing and does not allow respondeat superior liability.

McCain v. Wetzel · filed 2012-11-13

Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on the theory of respondeat superior; instead, each individual defendant „must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.‟”

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement in the alleged actions and cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Santos v. Bush · filed 2012-11-13

Liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed absent personal involvement in the alleged actions, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976); Chincello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986), and there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Balicki had any direct and intentional involvement in any of the decisions to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to Santos.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Robinson v. Phelps · filed 2013-05-21

A § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior. In order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in unlawful conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Velasquez v. Hayman · filed 2013-11-20

But liability under § 1983 requires personal participation in unlawful conduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Stones v. McDonald · filed 2014-01-02

In addition, a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and, in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

Section 1983 liability requires evidence connecting an alleged constitutional violation to an official policy, the defendant’s personal involvement, or the defendant’s conduct.

Rainwater v. McGinniss · filed 2014-03-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment because, even assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Rainwater failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any such constitutional deprivation resulted from an official county custom or policy, whether McGinness was personally involved in any constitutional violation, or whether there was a causal connection between McGinness’s conduct and any such violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor personally involved in a deprivation of rights through a policy or custom tolerating misconduct, deliberate indifference, or grossly negligent supervision.

Burhans v. Lopez · filed 2014-06-10

Here, Plaintiffs adequately allege Silver’s “personal involvement” in the unconstitutional conduct, through Silver’s creation of a de facto policy or custom of tolerance of sexual harassment, through Silver’s deliberate indifference to Lopez’s misconduct and through Silver’s grossly negligent supervision of Lopez.

Section 1983 permits liability when an official's direct acts or omissions, or conduct amounting to condonation or tacit authorization, cause a constitutional injury.

Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat · filed 2014-09-17

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "[p]ublic officials may be held liable . . . for a constitutional violation only if a plaintiff can establish that his or her constitutional injury resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization." ... Hence, the inference of notice, combined with the complaint's allegation that the letters went unanswered, makes it plausible that the adverse employment actions with respect to a particular appellant "resulted from the direct acts or omissions . . . or from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization" by the appellees named in that appellant's letter.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone cannot establish liability.

Wright v. Warden Forest SCI · filed 2014-11-17

It appears that Wright relied on the supervisory role of the Defendants, but liability under section 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 bars respondeat superior liability and requires a defendant’s personal involvement, including participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Tenon v. Dreibelbis · filed 2015-03-31

A § 1983 action cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Defendant Dreibelbis must have ... personal involvement, including participation, or actual knowledge and acquiescence, to be liable. Id.

Section 1983 does not impose personal or supervisory liability for excessive force without evidence supporting that basis.

Ringgold v. Keller · filed 2015-04-08

Nor has Ringgold adduced any evidence that either Stoner or Wright stood by while he was beaten or otherwise encouraged the use of excessive force, cf., e.g., Smith, 293 F.3d at 649-51; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), or that either had failed to adequately train his subordinates or “respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like” Ringgold, ... 2014 WL 1317604, at *6 (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989))—that is, any other basis, personal or supervisory, for liability for use of excessive force.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only for a defendant's own unconstitutional conduct and does not permit respondeat superior or supervisory liability without direct participation or knowing acquiescence.

Waters v. Drake · filed 2015-04-24

The Court agrees with the Defendants. “Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on their own unconstitutional behavior.”

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation and does not permit supervisory liability based only on a supervisor's position.

Mihalitsas v. Howard · filed 2015-05-01

Plaintiffs conclusory allegation that Defendant Dougherty “acted in a supervisory capacity” over Defendant Howard is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be based. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim pursuant to § 1983 against Defendant Dougherty is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability for a defendant's own constitutional tort and does not permit tort by association.

Duke Grider v. B. Bowling · filed 2015-05-11

"Liability for damages for a federal constitutional tort is personal, so each defendant's conduct must be independently assessed. Section 1983 does not sanction tort by association."

Section 1983 liability for damages is personal, so each defendant’s conduct must be assessed independently.

Davis v. White · filed 2015-07-28

As § 1983 liability for damages for a federal constitutional tort is personal, each defendant’s conduct must be independently assessed.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and does not impose respondeat superior liability, while supervisory liability requires a specific failed practice or procedure, awareness of an unreasonable risk, deliberate indifference, and a link to the injury.

Chavarriaga v. State of NJ Department of Corr · filed 2015-11-16

To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, an inmate must (1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. ... Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing a defendant's personal involvement in or causation of a constitutional violation.

MacKenzie v. Hutchens · filed 2015-11-27

The district court properly dismissed MacKenzie’s individual capacity claim against Hutchens because MacKenzie failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Hutchens was personally involved in any constitutional violation or that her conduct caused any such violation.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an official’s own involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory responsibility alone does not establish individual liability.

Smith v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-12-15

In the absence of any factual allegations from which the Court could conclude that defendant Smith himself acted unlawfully, plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against defendant Smith in his individual capacity will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for an official’s own actions, including actions taken while making and enforcing policy.

Heard v. Tilden · filed 2016-01-11

Moreover, contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Dr. Shicker’s further involvement as a policy maker does not insulate him from personal liability for his own actions, even when making and enforcing policy.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for damages and permits supervisory liability in specified circumstances.

Streeter v. Goord · filed 2007-10-19

Nevertheless, if a plaintiff seeks to bring a § 1983 action for supervisory liability, liability on the part of the supervisor may exist in one or more of the following ways: 1) actual direct participation in the constitutional violation, 2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, 3) creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or allowing such a policy or custom to continue, 4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates who committed a violation, or 5) failure to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Grubbs v. University of Delaware Police Department · filed 2016-03-29

In order to prevail on a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must assert that the individual defendant had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, and liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

A Section 1983 judgment against an officer in a personal-capacity suit is the officer’s liability, even if state law requires the municipality to indemnify the officer.

Deocampo v. Potts · filed 2016-09-08

Vallejo may be obligated by statute to indemnify the Officers for the amount of the Judgment, but this “purely intramural arrangement” does not alter the fact that the Judgment itself is binding on the Officers and the Officers alone.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on prison officials for other employees’ negligence or for their own negligence.

Streckenbach v. Van Densen · filed 2017-08-21

All we hold today is that VanDensen, the prison’s warden, and the deputy warden are not personally liable in damages under §1983 for the negligence of other employees, or given Daniels even for their own negligence.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for state officers who, acting under color of state law, cause a deprivation of federal rights.

O'Donnell v. Knott · filed 2017-10-04

It is well established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 subjects state officers to personal liability "for actions taken under color of state law." ... Defendants' motion will therefore be denied in this regard.

Section 1983 liability is personal, so each officer’s conduct must be assessed separately.

Frederick v. City of Rogers, Arkansas · filed 2017-10-17

We assess the reasonableness of each individual officer’s conduct, because “§ 1983 liability is personal.” ... Officer Motsinger entered the store only seconds before Torkelson discharged his taser, so Motsinger cannot be personally liable for this use of force.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation and does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors.

Drapes v. Hardy · filed 2018-01-16

Section 1983 does not create collective or vicarious responsibility.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to have caused or participated in the constitutional deprivation; a supervisor is liable only if the supervisor directed it or knew of and consented to it.

Brown v. Sanchez · filed 2018-01-30

Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated on fault so to be held liable, an individual must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability, so courts assess each defendant’s conduct separately.

Cravener v. Shuster · filed 2018-03-27

Because liability under § 1983 is personal, courts must assess the reasonableness of each defendant’s conduct independently.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights; a supervisor is not vicariously liable for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct.

Alverson v. White · filed 2018-04-24

“A supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” ... Because the Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations against either Separate Defendant Sheriff Ron Brown or Lt. Vena Cupp, who are both named in their personal capacities only, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; liability cannot rest solely on supervision of others.

S. Martin v. Clark · filed 2018-07-27

Similarly, a defendant in a section 1983 civil rights action must have a sufficient level of personal involvement in the commission of the alleged wrongs, and liability cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on officials solely because they supervise those allegedly responsible for a violation.

R.S. Shick, pro se L.D. Shick v. Wetzel · filed 2018-09-10

In the instant matter, all of the Shicks’ claims are based on a theory of respondeat superior, which is insufficient to support a valid Section 1983 claim against the named Respondents.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts tying each defendant to the alleged deprivation, including personal involvement or awareness of an ongoing violation.

Lal v. Flores · filed 2018-12-10

The district court properly dismissed Lal’s claims against defendants Woodford, Felker, Roche, Grannis, and McDonald because Lal failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were either (1) personally involved in the alleged deprivations, (2) were made aware of any ongoing violations, or (3) acted with deliberate indifference to his medical condition.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an official personally liable to allege the official’s direct involvement in the wrongful conduct or actual knowledge and acquiescence.

Jeannot v. Phila. Hous. Auth. · filed 2018-12-19

To impose personal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff is required "to allege, and be prepared to prove, that the defendant has been personally and directly involved in the alleged wrongful conduct or alternatively that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred within the defendants' actual knowledge and acquiescence."

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have caused or participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Howell v. Houston · filed 2019-01-09

Section 1983 is premised on the wrongdoer’s personal responsibility; therefore, an individual cannot be held liable in a civil rights action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 liability is personal, so each defendant’s conduct must be assessed separately.

Green v. Lake · filed 2019-03-25

Because § 1983 liability is personal, each defendant’s conduct must be independently assessed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; liability requires a causal connection between the official and the alleged deprivation.

Gates v. Pfister · filed 2019-05-02

A supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for the tortuous acts of subordinates in § 1983 actions, and “some causal connection or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued is necessary.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Jones v. Rickman · filed 2019-05-09

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege how each individual Defendant personally participated in the alleged violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Christensen v. Braithwaite · filed 2019-05-30

Plaintiff may not name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

SAISI v. MURRAY · filed 2019-05-30

As noted supra, a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Singleton v. Zimmerman · filed 2019-06-10

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Haubrich, either due to his status as Defendant Zimmerman’s supervisor, or for failing to intervene. “[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable under § 1983 for a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights, the inmate must show that the defendant was personally responsible for that violation.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation, including when liability is based on a supervisory role.

Ornder v. Elkins · filed 2019-06-13

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to include any facts regarding Holland’s participation in the alleged acts, either as an individual or as a supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervising someone who violated a right does not alone create liability.

Strong v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2019-07-24

This means that when choosing whom to name as defendants, the plaintiff should name only those individuals who personally deprived him of his constitutional rights; the fact that someone may have supervised the person who deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights does not make the supervisor liable under §1983.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation; a supervisor’s failure to respond after learning of it can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Parker v. Corrigan Radgowski DOC Staff · filed 2019-08-09

“It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [section] 1983.’” ... Because Parker alleges that she informed Faucher, Cronin, and Diloretto about the use of force incident, and none of them took any corrective or investigative action in response, I will permit the excessive force claim to proceed against those supervisory defendants at this time.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors automatically liable for their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct; a claim must identify the defendant’s own actions.

Thomas v. Loving · filed 2019-08-14

Supervisory officials may not be held automatically liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for a school board member whose individual vote causes a deprivation of a federal right.

Smith-Hosch, Ed.D v. Bramble · filed 2019-08-28

If, however, a plaintiff can make 1) specific allegations regarding the individual conduct of a member of board, and 2) that individual action is found to have deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, then the individual member of that board may be held liable for his or her actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory authority and referring a complaint for investigation alone do not establish liability.

Brinson v. Doe · filed 2019-08-28

It is well-settled that Supt. Fields cannot be held liable simply because he is in a position of authority at Fishkill or because he received plaintiff's letter and referred inquiry of the alleged assault to Department of Correction and Community Supervision’s Office of Special Investigation or a subordinate. Therefore, plaintiff fails plausibly to allege Supt. Fields’s personal involvement as required for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a personal-capacity claim against an official who created or enforced an unconstitutional policy that injured the plaintiff.

Gordon v. Schilling · filed 2019-09-04

The defendants are incorrect, however, in their assertion that a person injured by an unconstitutional policy is limited to an official-capacity claim against the official who created or enforced that policy.

Section 1983 imposes personal liability based on fault.

Walker, Jr. v. Thompson · filed 2019-09-05

Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; supervisory authority alone is insufficient.

Saddler, Jay v. Hewitt, Jessica · filed 2019-09-06

But to be liable under § 1983, a defendant must have some personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation at issue.

Section 1983 liability requires personal responsibility for a constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior does not establish liability.

Knox v. Lashbrooks · filed 2019-09-09

The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires allegations that each defendant was personally involved in the conduct underlying the claim; supervisors are not liable solely for their subordinates’ actions.

Hawkins v. Budish · filed 2019-09-09

A plaintiff cannot establish the individual liability of any defendant for constitutional violations absent allegations showing that each defendant was personally involved in the conduct which forms the basis of his claims.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; a supervisor’s knowledge and consent can satisfy that requirement.

Jaimes v. Cook County · filed 2019-09-13

Liability exists under Section 1983 when an individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. ... The Court also finds that plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently plead personal involvement.