42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 officers may receive qualified immunity on an excessive force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Abston Ex Rel. Estate of Abston v. City of Merced · filed 2013-01-31

Because plaintiffs’ body compression claim survives Saucier’s qualified immunity test, the district court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that claim. The district court erred, however, in denying partial summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ Taser claims on the ground of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense.

Sylvester Martin v. Seal · filed 2013-01-31

Martin, not Appellants, had the burden to plead facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference and overcome a qualified immunity defense.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that a strip search was unreasonable and lacked a legitimate penological justification.

Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep't of Corrections · filed 2013-01-31

Thus, the district court did not err in holding that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stoudemire, a reasonable officer would have been on notice that the search was unreasonable under the circumstances and devoid of any legitimate penological justification related to security and order.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not clearly establish that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Chappell v. Mandeville · filed 2013-01-31

We hold that both Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time Chappell was on contraband watch did not clearly establish that their actions were unconstitutional.

Individual officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Kaibel v. Municipal Building Commission · filed 2013-01-31

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ termination and that individual Defendants Rybak, Goodman, Opat and Stenglein are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from Section 1983 claims for an arrest without arguable probable cause that violates clearly established First and Fourth Amendment rights.

Merenda v. Tabor · filed 2013-02-01

Therefore, the district court’s finding that Tabor is not entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment claims is due to be affirmed.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for using unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force against an unarmed, secured person.

William Meyers, Sr. v. Baltimore County, Maryland · filed 2013-02-01

The use of any “unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force,” whether arising from a gun, a ... baton, a taser, or other weapon, precludes an officer from receiving qualified immunity if the subject is unarmed and secured.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established and a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct was unlawful.

Boggs v. Hoover · filed 2013-02-04

Qualified immunity was thus properly granted because Boggs’s right to procedural safeguards was not “clearly established” and it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer” that failure to provide Boggs with notice and a name-clearing hearing was “unlawful in the situation . . . confronted.”

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Watson v. City of Leland · filed 2013-02-04

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for entry of partial summary judgment in Bryant’s favor on his qualified-immunity defense to Ms. Watson’s Fourth Amendment claim.

In a § 1983 false arrest suit, qualified immunity shields an officer when omitted facts in an arrest warrant affidavit were not clearly material to probable cause.

Kirhy Smith v. Sheriff, Clay County, Florida · filed 2013-02-05

Detective Matos’s conduct was neither plainly incompetent nor a knowing violation of the law, and he is therefore shielded by the aegis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 gives a public employee qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black · filed 2013-02-07

We agree with Black that the validity of such a discrimination claim was not clearly established at the time of Black’s actions. ... Black was therefore entitled to summary judgment on Allstate’s hostile-work-environment claim.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim depends on whether the specific right asserted was clearly established when the officials acted.

Occupy Columbia v. Haley · filed 2013-02-07

The court agrees with Defendants that it was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests that there was a constitutional right to camp, sleep, or live continuously on the State House grounds.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law gave fair warning that the alleged use of deadly force was unlawful.

Morton v. Kirkwood · filed 2013-02-08

“[I]n the light of pre-existing law,” here Garner and Vaughan, “the unlawfulness” of Kirkwood’s alleged actions was “apparent,” and so qualified immunity does not apply.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could show that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Milfort v. Prevete · filed 2013-02-13

Given the factual dispute as to the type and degree of force Defendants employed against Plaintiff, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for Defendants to believe they were not violating Plaintiffs rights. ... Therefore, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied as to the excessive force claims against Defendants.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official would have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional requirements.

Bailey v. Pataki · filed 2013-02-14

We also agree with the district court that a reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known that the process by which the plaintiffs were committed did not satisfy basic constitutional requirements and that the defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Dorsey v. Hogan · filed 2013-02-14

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the State required him, an individual detained under the Act after a probable cause hearing, to participate in a sex offender treatment program.

An official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Marsilio v. Vigluicci · filed 2013-02-14

The Court accepts the conclusion of the magistrate judge that even if plaintiff could demonstrate a violation of her First Amendment rights, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim in his individual capacity.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff facing an officer’s qualified-immunity defense must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Smith v. McCord · filed 2013-02-15

But once an officer asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the “heavy two-part burden” of showing both that (1) “the defendant violated . . . [a] constitutional . . . right[],” and (2) the “infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his or her challenged conduct was illegal.” Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007).

Qualified immunity shields an officer from personal liability under Section 1983 when the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Brown v. Wilhelm · filed 2013-02-15

The Court therefore will not address Wilhelm’s equally plausible argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity, Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 10-12, except to conclude that he is correct. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (“Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.”) (citation, internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that the officer used unreasonable force.

Rivera v. Bell · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rivera’s excessive force claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity because Rivera failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant used unreasonable force in trying to gain control over, search, and arrest Rivera after Rivera refused to obey instructions, behaved erratically, and tried to resist the officer.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim if not every reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have known the conduct violated the Constitution.

Will Aguilar v. Williamson County, Texas · filed 2013-02-19

We conclude that not every reasonable official in Robertson’s circumstances would have known this conduct violated the Constitution. We reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to Robertson and remand to the district court for entry of judgment dismissing him from the suit.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful and the right was clearly established.

James v. City of Birmingham · filed 2013-02-19

No reasonable officer would think that drinking or holding a beer in a private residence constitutes drinking in public. Accordingly, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that drinking in a private residence does not provide probable cause for drinking in public. Thus, defendant Looney is not entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may defer deciding qualified immunity when the pleadings lack facts needed to resolve the defense.

Fox v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-20

But at this stage, the Court will deny their motions for judgment on Counts 2 and 3 because it does not have sufficient facts to determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged facts could show force against a person who posed little or no threat and the right was clearly established.

McCaig v. Bangor City Police Officer, Kevin Raber · filed 2013-02-21

Because it was clearly established that the use of force on a non-resistant or passively-resistant individual may constitute excessive force, and because a reasonable jury could find that McCaig posed little or no threat based on the facts alleged, the district court did not err in denying Officer Raber’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence permits a finding that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Quigley v. Thai · filed 2013-02-21

The estate has established that Thai violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. Thai is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if they reasonably could have believed probable cause existed, even if it did not.

Reiver v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-22

Thus, even if there was not sufficient probable cause, defendants will still be immune from suit if reasonable officers in their positions “could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [plaintiff].” Hunter v Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1991).

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when genuine disputes remain over facts material to that defense.

Jiggets v. Long · filed 2013-02-22

We hold that, in light of the spartan record before us, the disputes concern facts material to Jiggetts’ § 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive use of force. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s holding that, at this stage of litigation, genuine disputes of material fact exist sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in favor of Long.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not give them fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Jackson v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2013-02-26

Thus, because the state of the law in 2007 did not give the defendants fair warning of the potential unlawfulness of their conduct, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a correctional officer when the evidence permits a finding that he retaliated against an inmate for using the prison grievance process.

Santiago v. Blair · filed 2013-02-27

Taken in the light most favorable to Santiago, a reasonable jury could conclude that these facts demonstrate that Blair took the above-described adverse actions because of Santiago’s continued use of the prison grievance procedure. Thus, Blair is not entitled to qualified immunity on Santiago’s retaliation claim.

A municipality cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Becker v. Bateman · filed 2013-02-27

While Officer Bateman is entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense, the City is not.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the governing law was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Jackson v. Lombardi · filed 2013-03-01

The district court did not err when it granted in part the officers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that all three tasing officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Jackson’s Fourth Amendment claims. At the time Jackson was tased, the law regarding excessive-force claims involving the use of tasers was not clearly established in this circuit.

Individual defendants sued under Section 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Nichols v. Brown · filed 2013-03-03

Claim Two of the First Amended Complaint, challenging the application of City of Redondo Beach Municipal Code sections 4-85.01 and 4-35.20, is DISMISSED without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the claims against the individual Redondo Beach Defendants Chief Leonardi, Officer Heywood, and Does 1-10, as they are entitled to qualified immunity, and with leave to amend as to the Monell claims against the City of Redondo Beach.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the record, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, supports a violation of clearly established law.

Mazzeo v. Gibbons · filed 2013-03-05

Thus, because the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mazzeo, “support[s] a claim of violation of clearly established law,” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9, the district court did not err in denying Young’s motion for summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 shields an officer from damages through qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Winfield v. Trottier · filed 2013-03-06

Accordingly, Trottier’s actions were “‘objectively legally reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken,’” X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations omitted) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639), and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity, and claims against municipalities require a basis for municipal liability.

Curtis v. Anthony · filed 2013-03-06

Here, for the same reasons provided in Winfrey, we affirm summary judgment as to Wright, Fort Bend County, the City of Houston, and the unknown HPD and Fort Bend County employees, on qualified immunity grounds and for failure to establish municipal liability.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could allow a jury to find that officers lacked even arguable probable cause.

Graham v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-06

A reasonable jury could believe Plaintiffs assertion that he provided his registration to Defendant Glenn, and, therefore, not even arguable probable cause existed and there was no basis for Officer Defendants to arrest Plaintiff or use any force against him. Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment on the theory that the Officer Defendants are immune.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could allow a jury to find that the officer used excessive force.

Simonelli v. Mt. Snow Ltd. · filed 2013-03-07

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot grant the motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. ... The Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in regard to the claim for assault and battery (Count I), excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III).

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when the complaint alleges an arrest without arguable probable cause in violation of a clearly established right.

Petithomme v. Counmty of Miami-Dade · filed 2013-03-08

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a violation of the clearly established constitutional right to not be arrested absent probable cause, and the district court properly denied the Officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity as to the seizure.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a Section 1983 due process claim when no reasonable official would believe that following the statutory procedures violates federal due process rights.

Hill v. Giani · filed 2013-03-08

Thus, Collier is immune from suit for all of the procedures she followed during the investigation that were required by statute, because no reasonable official would have reason to believe that conduct required or permitted by statute would violate a licensee's federal due process rights.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when plaintiffs lack sufficient facts to support an alleged constitutional violation.

Hootstein v. Collins · filed 2013-03-08

In this case, Plaintiff Grandparents fail to clear the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis because they have not set forth sufficient facts in support of any count in their complaint that are sufficient to maintain their claims that Defendants violated their constitutional rights. Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A finding of bad faith in an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim does not automatically bar a defendant from asserting qualified immunity under Section 1983.

Henry v. Dinelle · filed 2013-03-08

While such a per-se ban on the qualified-immunity defense may be the rule under New York State law, it is not the rule under federal law.

A court must consider a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim at the motion to dismiss stage, before allowing discovery.

Cobb v. City of Harahan, Louisiana · filed 2013-03-12

We first note that the district erred in refusing to consider the merits of Mosca’s qualified immunity defense. ... If Cobb’s allegations, accepted as true, do not defeat Mosca’s qualified immunity defense, Mosca should not be subjected to the burdens of further litigation, including discovery.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when genuine factual disputes remain over the alleged constitutional violation.

Spence v. Nelson · filed 2013-03-14

Because we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the issues discussed above, we also find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for seeking an arrest warrant if a reasonable officer could have believed the warrant should issue.

Garcia v. Thorne · filed 2013-03-19

Even if this Court were to find that Thorne lacked probable cause in seeking Garcia’s arrest, Thorne is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may prevail on a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 medical care claim when the plaintiff cannot establish that the officer knew of a serious risk of harm or intended to cause it.

Stevenson v. Canton Police Department · filed 2013-03-19

Stevenson’s inability to establish that Officer Young had either an objective or subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm or that he intended to cause such harm renders his summary judgment motion meritless whether its denial was based on § 1983 liability or a qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity shields officers from a § 1983 unlawful entry claim when they reasonably believe they have consent to enter, even if that belief is mistaken.

Seifert v. Rivera · filed 2013-03-19

For the reasons already discussed, it was objectively reasonable for the Defendants to believe they have been given consent to enter and therefore an objectively reasonable officer would believe his actions in entering a premise with consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even if the Defendants made a mistake of fact as to whether consent had been given, qualified immunity would still shield them for making such a reasonable mistake of fact.

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Moriarty v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-03-20

But when, as here, “a defendant asserts qualified immunity at ... summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”

A defendant facing Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims is entitled to qualified immunity when arguable probable cause supported the arrest.

Sharnick v. D'Archangelo · filed 2013-03-22

Since arguable probable cause existed for Sharnick’s arrest, Podpolucha is entitled to qualified immunity from the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 seizure claim when clearly established law warned that unreasonable handcuffing could turn an investigative stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.

Plascencia v. Taylor · filed 2013-03-26

The district court did not adopt a per se rule that the use of handcuffs constitutes an arrest. It instructed the jury that if Taylor used handcuffs “because he reasonably believed that such measures were necessary to protect his own safety, then the use of such measures does not necessarily mean that Mr. Plascencia was arrested.” This statement is consistent with clearly established Tenth Circuit law at the time of the arrest. ... Accordingly, we reject Taylor’s qualified immunity argument.

Qualified immunity does not defeat a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the evidence supports a violation under either potentially applicable constitutional standard.

Davis v. Pickell · filed 2013-03-26

The Court need not decide at this stage whether the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment governs the plaintiffs claims, because on the record as it stands, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat the defendants’ asserted qualified immunity defense under either standard.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation that was clearly established at the time.

Daker v. Steube · filed 2013-03-27

To do so, the plaintiff must show that the official committed a constitutional violation in a way that was clearly established at the time. Id. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting Riley qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Hearring v. Sliwowski · filed 2013-03-27

Sliwowski is thus entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether her conduct amounted to a violation of B.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights, and we express no opinion as to whether there was a constitutional violation in this case.

In a Section 1983 false-arrest claim, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause was at least arguable.

Moses v. Mele · filed 2013-03-27

The case at hand exemplifies this point; where, as here, a section 1983 action rests on a claim of false arrest, the qualified immunity standard is satisfied "so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable."

Section 1983 shields officers from false arrest and malicious prosecution liability through qualified immunity when they reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Levy v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-29

The Court finds that Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and thus are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs false' arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s version of the facts shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Adams v. Stokes · filed 2013-04-01

Thus, at this stage in the proceedings, where we must ... accept Adams’s version of events as true, Stokes is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability for objectively reasonable mistakes.

Lord v. Hall · filed 2013-04-02

We do note that perhaps the officers could have behaved differently to avoid injuring an innocent man, but qualified immunity allows for all but unreasonable mistakes.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Collvins v. Hackford · filed 2013-04-03

Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has any precedent that would have put Defendants on notice that their actions may have been unconstitutional, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim against officers whose conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right; qualified immunity does not shield those officers from damages.

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights · filed 2013-04-09

A reasonable officer should have known that subduing an unarmed, minimally dangerous, and mentally unstable individual with compressive body weight, head and body strikes, neck or chin restraints, and torso locks would violate that person’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force. The Constitution does not countenance this level of force. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when no reasonable officer could believe their stop and arrest were lawful.

Jackson v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-16

No reasonable officer would have believed he was justified in stopping — not to mention arresting — Plaintiff, absent any unlawful behavior. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiffs surviving causes of action.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Belizaire v. City of Miami · filed 2013-04-16

Because Ms. Belizaire has failed to satisfy her burden of alleging the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the Court finds that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities have qualified immunity when the facts do not establish a constitutional-right violation.

Rizzo v. Connell · filed 2013-04-17

Qualified immunity applies if (1) the facts do not establish the violation of a constitutional right, or (2) the right at issue is not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. ... The District Court carefully and thoroughly explained its basis for concluding that Rizzo could not establish that his constitutional rights were violated by any actions of the defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Rizzo, 2012 WL 32206, at *3-11. We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez · filed 2013-04-18

Rocket Learning challenges only the district court's dismissal of the three constitutional claims for money damages alleged as the basis for its § 1983 action against the Secretary in his personal capacity. ... We affirm on the ground that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a Section 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show they had no reasonable cause to believe a child faced imminent serious bodily injury requiring warrantless removal.

Kemper v. County of San Diego CA4/1 · filed 2013-04-22

Kemper's complaint alleges that the police officer defendants had no reasonable cause to believe Kemper's child was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and a delay to obtain a warrant would not have placed the child in any danger. Assuming these facts to be true, defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims cannot proceed against a defendant entitled to qualified immunity.

Lyon v. Thacker · filed 2013-04-23

Dismissal of Lyon’s claims for damages was proper because defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute over whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Tolan v. Cotton · filed 2013-04-26

Accordingly, and because Robbie Tolan has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact for whether Sergeant Cotton’s shooting him was objectively unreasonable under clearly-established law, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

A defendant preserves qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim when its pleading gives the plaintiff notice of the defense and causes no prejudice.

Soto v. Ortiz · filed 2013-04-26

Defendants’ answer provided notice to Soto that Defendants were seeking immunity in defending against Soto’s claims, and Soto has not asserted he was prejudiced in any way. We therefore conclude that Soto’s waiver argument fails.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be granted when disputed material facts prevent the court from determining whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Lyttle v. Redford Police Officer Riley · filed 2013-04-29

We cannot grant qualified immunity to Riley because disputed issues of material fact preclude a determination of whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Apothecary Development Corp. v. City of Marco Island · filed 2013-04-29

We agree with the district court that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint based on qualified immunity grounds at the motion-to-dismiss stage is not appropriate in this case.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law gave fair notice that the force was unlawful.

Aranda v. City of McMinnville · filed 2013-04-29

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aranda, Broyles is not entitled to qualified immunity for his use of force.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for warrantless home arrests without exigent circumstances when the right was clearly established.

Garay v. Liriano · filed 2013-05-03

Because the Court has already determined as a matter of law that no exigent circumstances were present here, see Section III.A.1.a.i, supra, the warrantless arrests of Garay and Jennifer in their apartment were unlawful. Additionally, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity here as this right has been clearly established.

A defendant facing a § 1983 false arrest claim is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings unless the complaint establishes actual or arguable probable cause.

Barnett v. Mount Vernon Police Department · filed 2013-05-03

We agree with the district court that the defendants have failed to show “on the face of the complaint” that probable cause or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Barnett.

An officer sued under § 1983 may be denied qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause.

Pleasants v. Town of Louisa · filed 2013-05-07

On these pleadings, Pleasants has stated a claim for false arrest, and on the limited record before us, Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability under § 1983 unless the official violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

LaCross v. City of Duluth · filed 2013-05-08

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, Mark is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate LaCross’s then clearly established constitutional rights.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Norton v. Stille · filed 2013-05-13

Because Stille’s actions, based on the facts as alleged by Norton and assumed by the district court for summary judgment purposes, were a violation of Norton’s Fourth Amendment rights and those rights were clearly established at the time of the incident, Stille is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows government officials to assert qualified immunity, but officers alleged to have removed a child without reasonable cause cannot establish that defense at the pleading stage.

Kemper v. County of San Diego CA4/1 · filed 2013-05-13

Under section 1983, government officials are generally entitled to "qualified immunity," which "shields [them] from liability for civil damages if (1) the law governing the official's conduct was clearly established; and (2) under that law, the official objectively could have believed that her conduct was lawful." (Mabe, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1106.) ... Assuming these facts to be true, defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer facing a § 1983 false arrest claim may receive qualified immunity if a corrected warrant affidavit would have supported arguable probable cause.

Norwood v. Mason · filed 2013-05-14

In reviewing false arrest claims on qualified immunity motions, “a court should put aside allegedly false material [in the warrant affidavit], supply any omitted information, and then determine whether the contents of the ‘corrected affidavit’ would have supported a finding” of arguable probable cause. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate where “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], discloses no genuine dispute that a magistrate would have issued the warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In a Section 1983 false arrest or imprisonment claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity upon showing arguable probable cause.

Caraballo v. City of New York · filed 2013-05-14

In the context of a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, moreover, “the defending officer need only show ‘arguable’ probable cause” to be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Beasley v. City of Keizer · filed 2013-05-14

Because existing precedent hardly “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083, Beasley cannot demonstrate the violation of a clearly established right. Thus, both the District Attorneys and the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

School officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Yoder v. University of Louisville · filed 2013-05-15

Because we conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the SON’s policies are neither overbroad nor vague, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer would believe probable cause existed, but not from an excessive force claim when the alleged force violated clearly established law.

Ramirez v. Jim Wells County, Texas · filed 2013-05-15

In summary, we hold Deputy Martinez is entitled to qualified immunity on Ramirez’s false arrest claim but not on Ramirez’s excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity shields prison officials from Section 1983 damages claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Williams v. Ozmint · filed 2013-05-15

We conclude that the prison warden who imposed the challenged actions is shielded by qualified immunity from the inmate’s claim for monetary damages because, under the facts presented here, the inmate did not have a clearly established constitutional right to visitation.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official in their position would not have understood the challenged conduct to be unlawful.

Isiah Lucas, Jr. v. Miranda · filed 2013-05-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to reasonable prison officials in defendants’ position that following prison housing protocols prioritizing epileptic inmates for lower bunks would amount to deliberate indifference.

When a district court denies qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim, it must explain its decision clearly enough to permit interlocutory appellate review.

Robbins v. Randy Becker, Sr. · filed 2013-05-22

The district court must resolve immunity questions with sufficient clarity for the court of appeals effectively to exercise its interlocutory review of the legal issues surrounding the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers whose conduct did not violate a right clearly established at the time.

Eichler v. Sherbin · filed 2013-05-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eichler’s deliberate indifference claim because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their conduct did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Qualified immunity shields jail officials from a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim when no clearly established law covers the circumstances.

Bennett v. Lynch · filed 2013-05-23

Besides, the individual jail officials were entitled to qualified immunity on Bennett’s deliberate indifference claim, given the lack of clear preexisting law obviously on point, in the circumstances.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged conduct violates clearly established law.

Ramirez v. Jim Wells County, Texas · filed 2013-05-24

Here, Ramirez alleged he posed no threat to the officers and yet was tased twice, including once after he was handcuffed and subdued while lying face down on the ground, in violation of clearly established law. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Martinez qualified immunity on Ramirez’s claim for excessive force.

Qualified immunity bars damages against officers under § 1983 when the law at the time would not have made the alleged violation clear to a reasonable officer.

MacDonald v. Town of Eastham · filed 2013-05-24

Faced with this absence of controlling authority and conflicting precedent, a reasonable officer would not have known whether his actions violated Macdonald’s Fourth Amendment rights. The officers here are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether an officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Robinson v. City of San Diego · filed 2013-05-28

Since the determination of the objective reasonableness of the officers’ conduct turns on disputed facts, Defendants motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is DENIED.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 excessive force claim when the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable and violates no constitutional right.

J.B. v. Sheriff Larry Amerson · filed 2013-05-28

Because J.B. fails to show that Amerson’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity in favor of Amerson.

Section 1983 does not impose false arrest liability on officers who reasonably believe they have probable cause to arrest.

Crostley v. Lamar County Texas · filed 2013-05-29

Appellees were not objectively unreasonable in concluding that these pieces of evidence, taken together, gave them probable cause to arrest Appellants. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees with respect to Appellants’ § 1983 false arrest claims.

Public school officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Wyatt v. Fletcher · filed 2013-05-31

Fletcher and Newell were entitled to qualified immunity for this suit with respect to the federal claims, because, based on undisputed facts, there was no violation of a clearly established federal right.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against officials who administratively imposed post-release supervision after circuit law clearly established that doing so without a court order was unconstitutional.

Betances v. Fischer · filed 2013-06-04

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court, denying defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity, substantially for the reasons stated in our reversal of the grant of such immunity in Vincent.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim alleging a plausible violation of a clearly established right.

Bush ex rel. Estate of Bush v. City of Utica · filed 2013-06-04

Similarly, defendants maintain that Chief Brooks is entitled to qualified immunity because no constitutional violations occurred. However, as noted above, plaintiffs state a plausible equal protection claim. Moreover, defendants do not contend, nor could they, that the right to nondiscriminatory administration of protective services was not clearly established as of September 2009. Accordingly, Chief Brooks is not entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Allen v. Gooden · filed 2013-06-04

As a result, Gooden did not violate Allen’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the district court did not err in finding that she was entitled to qualified immunity on both claims.

A supervisory official sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity as a matter of law on the present record when the alleged conduct continued after the constitutional rule was clearly established.

Vincent v. Yelich Earley v. Annucci · filed 2013-06-04

We conclude that in these actions, as the record stands, given our conclusion that Earley I clearly established that DOCS violated federal law in adding PRS terms to the sentences of prisoners who had not received such terms from the court, the district courts erred in ruling that Annucci was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause to detain a person who alluded to committing suicide.

Jenna Hall v. City of Fremont · filed 2013-06-04

The district court did not err in holding that Officer Miskella is entitled to qualified immunity as to Hall’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We are aware of no case that would preclude a reasonable officer from believing there was probable cause to detain a person who alluded to committing suicide.

A plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of malice does not overcome qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim without showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Marlon Smith v. Bexar County Sheriff's Office, et · filed 2013-06-05

Smith’s conclusory allegations—that, for example, Rodriguez “should not be granted qualified immunity” because “he acted out of intent with malice”—do not show that Rodriguez violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Officers sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity from excessive-force claims when the plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

Buchanan v. Gulfport Police Department, et a · filed 2013-06-05

Because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the excessive-force claims for the tasing and the shooting, we need not address whether the Heck doctrine also bars those claims.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer did not participate in the alleged constitutional violation.

Khother v. DeEulis · filed 2013-06-06

He sued the officers and the Township under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. ... DeEulis did not engage in the alleged constitutional violation, and therefore qualified immunity shields him from Khother’s excessive-force claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

True Blue Auctions v. Foster · filed 2013-06-10

Thus, our case law does not clearly establish a right to videotape police officers performing their official duties such that the officers here should have been on notice that Dreibelbis had a First Amendment right to film them. Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

McKay v. City of Hayward · filed 2013-06-11

The individual officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ excessive force claim under § 1983, and the Court GRANTS the individual officers’ motion for summary judgment.

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Yadon v. Hilton · filed 2013-06-11

“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”

A prison guard cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim for malicious and sadistic force used to cause pain.

Tedder v. Johnson · filed 2013-06-12

Johnson therefore cannot claim qualified immunity because malicious and sadistic use of force for the very purpose of causing pain is always in violation of clearly established law.

In a § 1983 suit, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the alleged violation involved a clearly established right.

Findlay v. Lendermon · filed 2013-06-14

Because Findlay has not carried his burden of showing the violation of a clearly established right, Lendermon is entitled to qualified immunity.

Parole officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when a reasonable official would not have known their conduct was unlawful at the time.

Pickett v. Allen · filed 2013-06-17

Assuming without deciding that the Defendants violated Pickett’s constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the events giving rise to Pickett’s claims, it would not have been “clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

In a § 1983 suit, material factual disputes can prevent summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Ware v. Donahue · filed 2013-06-19

Given there remain material factual disputes, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence supports a finding that he used gratuitous and disproportionate force against a secured, unarmed person.

Wolfe v. Routzahn · filed 2013-06-20

Regardless, the evidence at trial suggests that Routzahn is not entitled to qualified immunity. There was evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude that Routzahn used excessive force without sufficient justification. Such “unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force to seize a secured, unarmed citizen” does not warrant the protection of qualified immunity.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they could reasonably believe their conduct complied with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Spavone v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2013-06-20

No reasonable jury could conclude, on the record here, that it would have been objectively unreasonable for a public official in the position of these Defendants-Appellants to believe that he or she was acting in a manner consistent with Spavone’s rights to equal protection and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. We therefore hold that individual Defendants-Appellants have qualified immunity from Spavone’s constitutional claims.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.

Deon Wade v. Fresno Police Department · filed 2013-06-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because Wade failed to show that at the time of his arrest, the law was clearly established that a reasonable officer in defendants’ position would have known that the use of non-lethal force was unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer should have known that seizing and frightening a child to induce another student’s confession was unlawful.

Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, Department of Safety & Homeland Security · filed 2013-06-25

To overcome qualified immunity, Hunt must demonstrate that Pritch-ett’s conduct violated a “clearly established” right. ... Pritchett should have known that it was unreasonable to seize Hunt and intentionally frighten him, in order to teach another student a lesson.

An officer with probable cause to arrest and prosecute has arguable probable cause and is protected by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Stansbury v. Wertman · filed 2013-06-26

If an officer had probable cause, he or she also had arguable probable cause and is protected by qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity unless the challenged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kelly v. Unknown Manriquez · filed 2013-06-26

The district court properly dismissed Kelly’s action because defendant is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Kelly’s claim that defendant’s conduct violated Kelly’s Eighth Amendment rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right).

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim if they had arguable probable cause to arrest for any offense.

Gonzalez v. Butts County Georgia · filed 2013-06-27

So long as an officer has “arguable probable cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply.” ... They are entitled to qualified immunity for Gonzalez’s arrest.

A school official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Herrera v. Santa Fe Public Schools · filed 2013-06-28

The Court thus concludes that Romero is entitled to qualified immunity on the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against her, and the Court will dismiss with prejudice Count I against Romero in her individual capacity.

An officer defending a Section 1983 claim has qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged search violated clearly established law.

Richardson v. Mason · filed 2013-07-01

Under these factual circumstances, the Court finds that a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would not have known under clearly established law that the manner of this search violated Mrs. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, Mason is entitled to qualified immunity on Mrs. Richardson’s Fourth Amendment claim.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Rojas v. Anderson · filed 2013-07-09

“When a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict two-part test: first, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff must show that this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”

An officer aware that tight handcuffs would aggravate a detainee’s medical condition may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim.

Rabin v. Flynn · filed 2013-07-09

Given that Rabin was already handcuffed, no reasonable officer who was aware of Rabin’s medical conditions would have believed that exacerbating Rabin’s medical problems (i.e., by keeping the handcuffs as tight as they were) was necessary to ensure safety, and that doing so would be permissible under clearly established law. Therefore, Knepper is not entitled to qualified immunity at this summary judgment stage, and he will have an opportunity at trial to dispute Rabin’s story or explain why he did not loosen the handcuffs.

Individual school board members sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Doctor Awanna Leslie v. Hancock County Board of Education · filed 2013-07-12

We dismiss the appeal of the Board and its officials for lack of jurisdiction, and we reverse the denial of qualified immunity for the individual Board members because it is not clearly established that a policymaking or confidential employee who speaks about policy, as Leslie and Richardson did, can prevail under the balancing test of Pickering.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonably competent officer would have known their conduct was unlawful; plaintiffs bear the burden of showing immunity does not apply.

Mimi Lee v. City of Norwalk, Ohio · filed 2013-07-12

Qualified immunity applies unless it would be obvious to a reasonably competent official that the actions taken were unlawful, and the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when clearly established law requires a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances to arrest someone in a home, and neither condition is met.

Hogan v. City of Corpus Christi, Texas · filed 2013-07-15

At the time of the Officers’ conduct, the Supreme Court and this court had made it abundantly clear that either a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances is required to arrest an individual in his home. The Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on Hogan’s unlawful-arrest claim, assuming, as we must, that Hogan’s version of the events is accurate.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit protects a correctional officer who reasonably restrains an inmate who lies down during an escort.

Bryan Cooper v. Morales · filed 2013-07-15

Cooper offered no evidence to show that it is not objectively reasonable for a correctional officer to restrain an inmate who lies down. Thus, these actions were reasonable procedures within the scope of Trevino’s qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when it was clearly established that he lacked probable cause.

Courtney v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Department of Public Safety · filed 2013-07-15

It was therefore clearly established that Smith lacked probable cause to arrest Courtney for violation of the felon-in-possession statute. ... The district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Smith as to Courtney’s claims of unlawful arrest without probable cause is reversed.

State employees sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Helm v. Liem · filed 2013-07-15

The district court did not err in finding that the state employees were entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for First Amendment retaliation when the facts viewed in the employee’s favor show a violation of a clearly established right.

Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Board · filed 2013-07-16

On a final note, the individual defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... When the issue is framed properly, it is clear that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Hobgood’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Thomas v. R. Holly · filed 2013-07-17

Based upon the following qualified immunity analysis, we hold that Deputy Matthews and Deputy Gilstrap are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s excessive force claims, but that Detective Babb and Deputy Estes are not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.

Qualified immunity bars damages claims under Section 1983 against protected officials but does not bar claims for injunctive relief.

Munson v. Gaetz · filed 2013-07-17

While Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs claims for damages, Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief necessarily survive the qualified immunity analysis.

An officer sued under Section 1983 for false arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if the arrest was supported by arguable probable cause.

Chevallier v. Deputy Sheriff Joel Hand · filed 2013-07-18

Consequently, Deputy Hand met his burden of showing arguable probable cause, and he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Chevallier's false arrest claim.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Martel, et al. v. Town of Chichester, et al. · filed 2013-07-18

Therefore, in the absence of a clearly established constitutional right, Adinolfo is entitled to qualified immunity.

A jail official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the facts establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Chariell Glaze v. Andrews · filed 2013-07-19

An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the facts alleged establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. ... A jail official violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to a pre-trial detainee and fails to protect the detainee. ... There is no admissible evidence to establish that Andrews knew about a substantial risk to Glaze’s safety. Andrews is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established under the circumstances they faced.

Easterling v. Pollard · filed 2013-07-22

In this case, application of the general principles to a demand by just one prisoner for a religious accommodation that would entail such significant challenges and expense for prison officials was not and still is not clearly established. Accordingly, we conclude that defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the damages claims under the First Amendment and Section 1983.

Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Zalaski v. City of Hartford · filed 2013-07-23

Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from § 1983 claims for money damages provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was constitutional.

Romo v. Largen · filed 2013-07-23

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Romo’s § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity protects an official from personal liability under § 1983 when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established federal right.

Lane v. Central Alabama Community College · filed 2013-07-24

Having concluded that Lane failed to establish even a prima facie case for a violation of a federal right, we necessarily also conclude that Lane failed to demonstrate that Franks violated a federal right of Lane’s that was already clearly established before Franks acted.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer through qualified immunity when the alleged facts show that he violated a clearly established right by affirmatively creating a danger.

Robinson v. Lioi · filed 2013-07-30

Daniel Lioi (“Lioi”), a police officer with the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”), filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of his Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on his assertion of qualified immunity against plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court that, on the facts alleged, Lioi is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity shields officials from liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Bishop v. Deputy Dale Glazier · filed 2013-07-30

In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known. ... Glazier is thus entitled to qualified immunity, because he did not violate Bishop’s then clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the allegations, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, do not establish that defense.

Raub v. Bowen · filed 2013-08-02

With such a sparse record, the Court cannot ascertain whether the County Defendants had probable cause or, at the very least, whether the vagaries of existing precedent left the officers without “clearly established” precedent to guide them in the particular circumstances that they faced. Because the Court is bound to construe the allegations in Raub’s favor, it must deny qualified immunity, at least at this stage.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 liability for using force against a nonresisting suspect when the right to be free from that force was clearly established.

Eldridge v. City of Warren · filed 2013-08-05

Having discerned a constitutional violation and the clearly-established nature of the right underlying that violation, we conclude that the district court properly denied qualified immunity for the allegations arising from the use of the Taser.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a Section 1983 suit unless the official violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Saterdalen v. Spencer · filed 2013-08-05

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 suit unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known.

Scott v. Baldwin · filed 2013-08-06

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 damage actions if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Because Baldwin’s conduct was not clearly “unlawful in the situation he confronted,” he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Santos v. Frederick County Board of Commissioners · filed 2013-08-07

Nonetheless, we conclude that the individual defendants are immune from suit because at the time of the encounter neither the Supreme Court nor this Court had clearly established that local and state law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual based on a civil immigration warrant.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer fails to adequately confront evidence that he seriously injured the plaintiff after handcuffing him.

Thomas v. Adrahtas · filed 2013-08-07

In this interlocutory appeal, defendant Thomas P. Adrahtas challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity on plaintiff Everett Thomas’s excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After reviewing the record, we affirm.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when clearly established law forbids the officer’s use of force.

Sawyer v. Asbury · filed 2013-08-13

Our precedent made it clear to any reasonable officer that “mere use of foul language . . . does not justify an objectively reasonable police officer knocking [an arrestee] down, jumping on him, and breaking his nose.” ... Accordingly, the district court’s rejection of Deputy Asbury’s qualified immunity defense was legally correct.

Qualified immunity can support dismissal of a § 1983 claim.

Tapp v. University of Texas Health Sciences Center at Houston-School of Dentistry · filed 2013-08-13

With regard to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, dismissal based on qualified immunity is affirmed for ... essentially the reasons given by the district court in its Memorandum and Opinion filed August 6, 2012.

Section 1983 does not give a school official qualified immunity when clearly established law gave fair warning that the alleged use of force violated a student’s rights.

Hatfield v. O'Neill · filed 2013-08-13

O’Neill also claims that in the event we find a constitutional violation, she is still entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right she violated was not clearly established. We disagree. The right to be free from “excessive corporal punishment, at least where not administered in conformity with a valid school policy authorizing corporal punishment,” is clearly established under the law of this circuit.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue an officer for violating constitutional rights under color of state law.

Rainey v. Patton · filed 2013-08-15

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 liability unless “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and “the right was clearly established” such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when the employee received the pre-termination process the Constitution requires.

Devlin v. Kalm · filed 2013-08-15

Because Devlin’s objections to the pre-termination process he received lack merit, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on his procedural due process claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Nelson v. Green · filed 2013-08-15

While I have found that Green’s alleged conduct in this case rose to a substantive due process violation of Plaintiffs parental rights, I do not find that this liberty interest was clearly established at the time of her alleged actions here in the Fourth Circuit. Accordingly, I will grant Green (along with the rest of the ACDSS Defendants) qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs constitutional claims (Counts I, II, and III) in this case.

Qualified immunity does not shield correctional officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer would know the alleged conduct violates constitutional rights.

Pratt v. Deeds · filed 2013-08-16

Because a reasonable correctional officer would know that the treatment alleged would violate Pratt’s constitutional rights, we decline to affirm on the alternate ground that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Pierson v. Bassett · filed 2013-08-20

“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”