42 U.S.C. § 1983

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the official's conduct could not have violated a clearly established right known to a reasonable official in that position.

McDonald v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2012-06-22

At least, therefore, Gallaher is entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct in this case could not have violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable official in his position would have known.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show a genuine factual dispute over whether the official violated a constitutional right.

Todd v. Montoya · filed 2012-06-24

Because Todd has not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact whether Montoya acted with deliberate indifference, Montoya is entitled to qualified immunity on Todd’s Fourteenth Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest when they had arguable probable cause.

Joyce v. Ward · filed 2012-06-27

The arresting officers therefore had arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for trespassing. The arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars personal liability under § 1983 when the officials’ conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the evidence before them.

Swetlik v. Crawford · filed 2012-06-27

In light of the evidence presented to them, it is clear that the defendants are immune from personal liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant judgment on the pleadings in a § 1983 action when the accepted allegations establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Zion v. Nassan · filed 2012-06-27

The plaintiffs’ allegations, which are assumed to be true at this stage, establish that Nassan violated Haniotakis’ clearly-established right to be free from deadly “seizures.”

Officers sued under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s unlawful search are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established law required them to intervene in those circumstances.

Mehta v. Foskey · filed 2012-06-29

The law was and is far from clearly established that the Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were under a constitutional duty to confront, challenge, and prevent Bloodworth from inspecting Mehta’s phone and laptop. Accordingly, the Canine Handlers and the Alma Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ claims related to the phone and laptop.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, does not establish objectively reasonable conduct.

Benny Falcon v. Tyler Holly · filed 2012-07-03

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Falcon, it is not possible to conclude as a matter of law that Holly acted in an objectively reasonable manner, which would entitle him to qualified immunity.

For a § 1983 qualified immunity defense, the rights against race discrimination in government contracting and deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation without due process were clearly established.

Jones v. McNeese · filed 2012-07-05

To clarify, the constitutional rights on which the plaintiffs premise their claims are: 1) the right to be free from discrimination based on race in contracting with the government to provide a service; and 2) the right not to be deprived of a liberty interest in reputation without due process of law. As a matter of law, those rights were clearly established at the time Dr. McNeese removed Jones, ADCS, and Healing Circle from the list of approved providers in June 2009.

Qualified immunity did not justify summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against a jail nurse.

Benson v. Rutledge · filed 2012-07-09

Therefore, Rutledge is not entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity on false arrest and malicious prosecution claims when an officer had at least arguable probable cause to arrest or prosecute.

Barcomb v. Sabo · filed 2012-07-10

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on such claims if he or she can establish that there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest or prosecute the plaintiff.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right that a reasonable person would have known.

Estate of David E. Morgan, Jr. v. Cook · filed 2012-07-10

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). ... Cook was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim for failing to adjust handcuffs after repeated, specific complaints of pain when the arrestee no longer poses a threat.

Howard v. Ealing · filed 2012-07-10

Although, when Taylor discovered the gun, Howard did pose a threat to the officers, once he was patted down for the second time, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car, he no longer posed a threat to the officers. Moreover, based on Howard’s version of the events, he did not resist arrest or disobey the officers’ orders. Therefore, Taylor and Heath are not entitled to qualified immunity regarding Howard’s § 1983 claim of excessive force arising from their failure to loosen or adjust the handcuffs after Howard’s repeated and specific complaints of pain.

In a § 1983 damages suit, qualified immunity shields an official unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Nelson v. City of Davis · filed 2012-07-11

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages in a civil suit unless the plaintiff can make the showing that the official’s actions violated a constitutional right, and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violative conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To survive the defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must succeed on both prongs. We hold that Nelson has succeeded in alleging facts that, if true, would support the finding that the officers’ conduct constituted a violation of clearly established law. The district court therefore did not err when it denied the officers qualified immunity for their use of force against Nelson.

Qualified immunity warranted summary judgment for the two officials on this § 1983 claim.

McCaster v. Clausen · filed 2012-07-12

Mattson and Darling are thus entitled to qualified immunity, and we reverse the district court’s order denying summary judgment with respect to them.

The denial of qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim was affirmed at summary judgment.

Saad v. Krause · filed 2012-07-16

On the extant record, the district court held that Krause was not entitled to qualified immunity or governmental immunity. ... Although we review the district court’s ruling de novo, we find no error. Accordingly, finding that a separate opinion would be duplicative and unnecessary, we hereby AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Krause’s motion for summary judgment on the reasoning of its opinion.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when they use violent force against a subdued, nonthreatening suspect in violation of clearly established law.

Malory v. City of Ferndale · filed 2012-07-16

In light of that conduct, reasonable officers would have understood that an obvious legal norm prohibited them from tackling a suspect who made only a mild show of resistance, pressing his head into the ground, and punching him.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against officials subject to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and a clearly established right.

Turk v. Comerford · filed 2012-07-17

Section 1983, however, does not make government officials liable for every act later held unconstitutional. Rather, “[q]ualified immunity, shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors who deprive people of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

Thomas v. Myers · filed 2012-07-17

“Every person who, under color of . . . [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Qualified immunity,” however, “shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Harrell v. Southern Oregon University · filed 2012-07-20

We exercise that discretion and we conclude that Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity. ... A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the purported constitutional right was not “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.

Section 1983 permits claims against prison officials, subject to qualified immunity when the allegedly violated right was not clearly established.

Bardo v. Clendenin · filed 2012-07-23

We review de novo, Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. ... The district court properly held that defendant prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because Bardo did not have a clearly established First Amendment right to retain the ad depicting side-view nudity.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against officials who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Chester Huff v. Crites · filed 2012-07-23

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from civil liability for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Taylor v. Edward Reilly, Jr. · filed 2012-07-17

We conclude that application of those regulations did not violate any clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known at the time of the hearings. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Taylor’s damages suit on the ground of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under Section 1983 may claim qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Hill v. Richard Trinci, Dominto Carrillo, Jackie Dent, Warner Lumpkins, Lee Williams, and Kandice Woodard · filed 2012-07-24

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from a suit for damages under section 1983 so long as the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would be aware. ... Hill provided no evidence that appellees acted unreasonably to overcome appellees’ defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit must be assessed for each officer based on the allegations against that officer.

Abella v. Officer Hector Valls · filed 2012-07-26

The district court erred when it based its decision on the collective actions of all defendants instead of deciding whether these three officers were entitled to qualified immunity based on the allegations about each of them. Valls, Del Valle, and Salazar are entitled to dismissal of the three counts about retaliation in the complaint against them based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable prison official could have believed the challenged conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Howard v. Hedgpeth · filed 2012-07-30

The district court also properly granted summary judgment to the other defendants on the basis of qualified immunity because a reasonable prison official could have believed that instructing Howard to push a pallet through the doorway with loose metal was not an Eighth Amendment violation.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a Section 1983 claim when the complaint and reasonable inferences leave the defense unresolved.

Griffin v. City of New York · filed 2012-07-31

Because of this heightened standard, dismissal of the claims against the individually named defendants on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts determine whether officers acted in a law-enforcement capacity.

Brown v. Jenne · filed 2012-08-01

Therefore, as in Thompson, a jury question is presented. If the officers were acting in their law enforcement capacity, the decedent’s right to be free from the use of excessive force in his seizure was clearly established. The officers were not entitled to a summary judgment on qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established.

Anderson v. Worstell · filed 2012-08-01

While the court was correct to conclude there were disputed issues of fact as to Anderson’s apparent level of intoxication and danger to himself at the time of the stop, it is unclear how such facts can be considered material in light of Anderson’s burden to show a violation of clearly established law. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, Anderson has failed to carry this burden. The district court’s denial of the officers’ motion to dismiss Count 1 of Anderson’s complaint was therefore error.

In a § 1983 action, material factual disputes about officers’ conduct can require denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Cherry Dietzmann v. City of Homer · filed 2012-08-01

The record reflects factual disputes including whether the children were hostages in Anderson’s car at the time of the shootout, whether the Homer Defendants had time to deliberate the decision to join the attempted arrest at the airport, and whether their actions during the execution of that attempted arrest were a reasonable use of force. As the district court concluded, these factual disputes require the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Individual board members sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when there is no evidence that they took action violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Richmond v. Coastal Bend College District · filed 2012-08-01

At the hearing the Court found that there was no evidence that the individual board defendants took any action that violated the constitutional rights of any of the plaintiffs. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot overcome the individual board defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit may be denied qualified immunity at the pleadings stage when the allegations do not establish that the defendant is entitled to it.

Odom v. Kaizer · filed 2012-08-01

Based on the foregoing, Kaizer has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. However, he is free to renew the defense upon a later motion or at trial if one is necessary.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right and reasonable officers could not disagree about its unlawfulness.

McGarry v. Pallito · filed 2012-08-03

Plaintiff-Appellant Finbar McGarry brought a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants-Appellees violated his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. ... We also hold that, at this preliminary stage in the proceedings, defendants have not established an entitlement to qualified immunity.

A supervisor sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when it was clearly established that his sexual harassment violated a subordinate’s rights.

Crutcher-Sanchez v. Wagner · filed 2012-08-03

It was clearly established in 2007 that a supervisor’s attempt to have sex with a subordinate violates the subordinate’s civil rights. ... Based on the facts the district court likely assumed, the district court correctly denied Herron summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Duncan v. Herron · filed 2012-08-03

Because Herron did not violate Duncan’s right to equal protection, this court needs not address the other prong of the qualified-immunity analysis: whether the law was clearly established that Herron’s conduct violated Duncan’s right to equal protection when the actions occurred. ... Herron is entitled to qualified immunity on Duncan’s claim.

A state officer sued under § 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for false arrest and imprisonment when he has not established probable cause for the arrest.

Chevallier v. Hand · filed 2012-08-06

Because Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs false arrest and imprisonment claims on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield officials from § 1983 liability without resolving whether they violated a constitutional right.

Sudler v. City of New York · filed 2012-08-07

We conclude that the Defendants-Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity without reaching the question whether Plaintiffs-Appellants’ constitutional rights were violated.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the facts known to the officer provided probable cause to arrest.

Galarnyk v. Fraser · filed 2012-08-07

Because Galarnyk’s presence at the restricted site and Libonate’s and Major Asleson’s ostensibly credible statements established probable cause to arrest Galarnyk for trespass, Galarnyk’s false arrest claim fails. See Anderson, 327 F.3d at 770 (“A claim of false arrest brought pursuant to § 1983 fails if the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.”).

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Austin v. Redford Township Police Depart · filed 2012-08-08

Defendants’ legal argument that this Circuit’s precedent on the use of excessive force on subdued and unresisting subjects is irrelevant to situations involving noncompliance with police orders fails.

Qualified immunity is unavailable as a defense to a § 1983 claim seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief.

Daugherty v. Luong · filed 2012-08-10

Qualified immunity was not an available defense in this action because Daugherty asked only for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether they violated the clearly established knock-and-announce rule.

Russell Marcilis, II v. Township of Redford · filed 2012-08-14

It has long been clearly established in this Circuit that “the Fourth Amendment forbids the unannounced, forcible entry of a dwelling in the absence of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 1981). The district court did not err in declining to find the officers are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Ghaith v. Don Rauschenberger, Jr. · filed 2012-08-14

Because there was probable cause at the time of arrest that Ghaith committed extortion by threatening his family, the district court properly held that there was no constitutional violation and the state police officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits liability for an investigator who knowingly or recklessly makes material false statements to establish probable cause, and qualified immunity does not support summary judgment when material facts remain disputed.

Cline v. Myers · filed 2012-08-17

“An investigator may be held liable under § 1983 for making material false statements either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth to establish probable cause for an arrest.” Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003). ... Thus, questions of material fact remain as to whether Snavely’s actions were made with reckless disregard for the truth, and whether the information was material to the finding of probable cause. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to Snavely.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the facts known to the officer leave no arguable probable cause for an arrest.

Daniels v. Bango · filed 2012-08-20

We affirm the finding of the district court that Bango should not be granted qualified immunity. We further affirm the finding that, considering all the facts and circumstances known to Bango, no arguable probable cause existed to issue a warrant for Daniels’s arrest.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

JoAnn Cooper v. Black · filed 2012-08-20

Because “preexisting law [did not] provide [Black] with fair notice that” firing 24 shots was unreasonable in these circumstances, he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Appellees’ Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure.

Section 1983 claims against state employees are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Hutson v. Walker · filed 2012-08-20

The record before the court does not make out any substantive due process violation. The district court therefore did not err in granting qualified immunity to Walker, Baumgardner, and West on the Hutsons' § 1983 claims.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably could conclude that the asserted constitutional property right was not clearly established.

Austell v. Sprenger · filed 2012-08-22

The DHS defendants reasonably could have concluded TYBE had no constitutionally protected property interest in the renewal of its license, and such a conclusion entitles them to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for an arrest without probable cause are not entitled to qualified immunity when the absence of probable cause was clearly established.

Patrizi v. Huff · filed 2012-08-24

Huff and Connole appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds arguing that they did have probable cause to arrest Patrizi or, in the alternative, the fact that they lacked probable cause to initiate the arrest was not clearly established. Because, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Patrizi, the law was clearly established that Huff and Connole lacked probable cause to arrest Patrizi, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of summary judgment.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer from a false arrest claim when probable cause supported the arrest despite information omitted from the warrant application.

Stahl v. Czernik · filed 2012-08-27

The district court should have granted Czernik’s motion for qualified immunity because probable cause supported Stahl’s arrest and the information Czernik omitted from the warrant application was not material.

In a § 1983 suit, an official’s qualified immunity defense shifts the summary judgment burden to the plaintiff to show a genuine factual issue about whether the official violated clearly established law.

Grant v. Fortner · filed 2012-08-27

When an official pleads qualified immunity as a defense, this alters the summary judgment burden of proof by shifting it to the plaintiff “who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.”

A privately employed physician providing psychiatric services at a public prison cannot assert qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when neither common-law history nor the statute’s purposes support it.

McCullum v. Tepe · filed 2012-08-28

Despite the Supreme Court’s somewhat cryptic comment in Richardson that a doctor may have had immunity from damages at common law, there does not appear to be any history of immunity for a private doctor working for the government, and the policies that animate our qualified-immunity cases do not justify our creating an immunity unknown to the common law. Thus, although we express no opinion on the ultimate validity of McCullum’s claims, we AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Tepe is not entitled to assert qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued under § 1983 when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Tilley v. Maier · filed 2012-08-29

Even if we were to consider defendants’ conduct to be constitutionally deficient, they did not violate clearly established law.

A prison records analyst may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a court order makes clear that failing to correct a prisoner’s release date would violate his constitutional rights.

Ward v. Brown · filed 2012-08-29

In the face of this May 23, 2008 order, a reasonable case records analyst would have known that failing to adjust plaintiffs release date in accordance with the court order would violate plaintiffs constitutional rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer with the same knowledge could have believed probable cause existed.

Tebbens v. Mushol · filed 2012-08-30

Even assuming, however, that probable cause did not exist to arrest Mr. Tebbens, Officer Mushol nevertheless is entitled to qualified immunity.

A sheriff sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity on a failure-to-protect claim when the plaintiff cannot show that he knew of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate.

Ard v. Rushing · filed 2012-08-30

Plaintiff has fallen short of showing that Miller had a longstanding, well-documented pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior toward female inmates such that Rushing reasonably could be found to have had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm posed by Miller. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot overcome Rushing’s asserted qualified immunity defense on her claim based on a failure to protect.

Government employees performing discretionary functions are immune from Section 1983 claims unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Stefan v. Ed Olson · filed 2012-08-31

Immunity is available to government employees ... performing discretionary functions as a wholesale shield to litigation unless: (1) “the plaintiff has alleged facts which . . . show that the defendant-official’s conduct violated a constitutionally protected right”;and (2) “that right was clearly established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have understood that his behavior violated that right.”

Qualified immunity can be denied at summary judgment in a § 1983 action against jail employees.

Walsh v. Conaway · filed 2012-09-11

After review of the record and briefs, the Court concludes the Defendants-Appellants have not shown reversible error in the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity may be raised as a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Walsh v. Jeff Davis County · filed 2012-09-11

After review of the record and briefs, the Court concludes the Defendants-Appellants have not shown reversible error in the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes determine whether the defendant violated a clearly established right.

King v. Taylor · filed 2012-09-12

Genuine disputes of material fact preclude upholding the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Taylor’s defense of qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when genuine factual disputes bear on arguable probable cause and excessive force.

Thompson v. Mostert · filed 2012-09-12

The district court did not err when it ruled that Mostert and Smoak were not entitled to qualified immunity. The record reveals genuine issues of material fact about whether the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Thompson for obstructing justice, see Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 764–67 (11th Cir. 2006), and whether the officers used excessive force to effectuate the arrest, see Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1288–92 (11th Cir. 2011).

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when they authorize a private citizen to conduct video surveillance of a home in violation of clearly established law.

Shafer v. City of Boulder · filed 2012-09-12

Police officers act irresponsibility and unreasonably when they give a citizen surveillance cameras to spy on his neighbors on behalf of the police and fail to conduct a follow-up inquiry to ensure the cameras are not being used to conduct unreasonable search. Qualified immunity cannot protect police officers from such behavior. For these reasons, qualified immunity does not shield Defendants Chase and Dubois from liability.

State officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when they follow a reasonable interpretation of the governing law.

Rex Rammell and Lynda Rammell v. State of Idaho · filed 2012-09-14

The Rammells’ § 1983 claims against Risch and Huffaker are barred by qualified immunity. In Idaho, state officials can avail themselves of qualified immunity from § 1983 claims if they followed a reasonable interpretation of the law at issue.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Chandler v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Transportation · filed 2012-09-19

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the complaint allegations do not state a constitutional violation. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this action.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from an unlawful-arrest claim when the plaintiff’s account shows no arguable probable cause and the right was clearly established.

Dennis v. Town of Loudon, et al. · filed 2012-09-20

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Dennis, a rational jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Dennis, in violation of her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on this claim on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against officials acting under color of law for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-09-21

In order to establish a claim against Cady under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that Cady, acting under color of the law of the District of Columbia, deprived him of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions and laws” of the United States. ... The Court concludes that Cady is protected by qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation; the court need not then decide whether the asserted right was clearly established.

Hall v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2012-09-24

The detectives therefore enjoy qualified immunity as to this claim, and we need not address whether the right Hall asserts was clearly established at the time of his interrogation.

A private attorney retained by a municipality may be entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim.

McGreal v. AT & T Corp. · filed 2012-09-24

Here, it is irrelevant: if Melody is named in his individual capacity, he is entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates clearly established law and a reasonable official would not have believed it lawful.

Lancaster v. Carey · filed 2012-09-25

The district court properly denied qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings because, assuming that Lancaster’s version of the facts is true, defendants’ retaliation would constitute a violation of clearly established law and a reasonable official would not have believed his conduct was lawful.

Government officials are immune from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Ross v. Early · filed 2012-09-25

I find that Officer Early is entitled to qualified immunity and is therefore immune from § 1983 liability.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Gruenberg v. Gempeler · filed 2012-09-26

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability under Section 1983 “for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Gruenberg’s Eighth Amendment claims.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when reasonable officers could disagree whether their conduct constituted an arrest or the person consented to remain.

Pelayo v. Port Authority · filed 2012-09-27

The PA officers are also entitled to qualified immunity. ... At the very least, reasonable officers could disagree over whether the actions of the PA officers constituted any arrest at all and whether Kauts consented to remaining with the PA officers to fill out the DIR form.

A defendant in a § 1983 action who raises qualified immunity late without justification may lose the chance to have it decided before trial, while retaining the ability to raise it at trial.

Brust v. City of Worcester · filed 2012-09-27

Under the circumstances, the Court will decline to address the immunity issue on the merits at this point in the proceedings.... As noted, the Court’s ruling does not prevent defendant from raising the defense of qualified immunity at trial through a timely motion, the presentation of evidence, or otherwise.

Officers sued under § 1983 for wrongful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Sanchez v. Bremer · filed 2012-09-28

Viewing the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court finds that Bremer and Cardenas had probable cause to arrest Sanchez. Therefore, not only are Bremer and Cardenas entitled to qualified immunity, they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on the pleadings when an undeveloped record prevents the court from deciding whether their warrantless entry was objectively reasonable.

Snyder v. Daugherty · filed 2012-09-28

Thus, without a developed record, it is inappropriate to conclude that the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied without prejudice with regard to Counts IV and V.

An officer is protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful.

Machado v. Weare Police Department · filed 2012-10-02

But even if we assume arguendo that the handcuffs and the detention in the cruiser exceeded the limits of a permissible Terry stop, compare Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 15, with Flowers, 359 F.3d at 30, this is a sufficiently debatable case that an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was not violating Machado's constitutional rights, Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, which is enough to create qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Arencibia v. Barta · filed 2012-10-03

Qualified immunity shields the Defendants from § 1983 liability.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give them fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Mills v. Iowa · filed 2012-10-03

Under these circumstances, Mason, Campbell, and True could not reasonably have been expected to know that their comments regarding Plaintiff, based on the Stolar Report, and that did not directly impugn Plaintiffs honesty, morality, criminality, or the like, were actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity can bar damages under § 1983 for one alleged constitutional violation while allowing a separate damages claim against the same officials to proceed.

Davis v. Powell · filed 2012-10-04

All of the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the First Amendment claims against them, in count two, and their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for civil damages on this basis is GRANTED. The Defendants are not, however, entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment allegations in count one, and their motion to dismiss on this basis is DENIED.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead specific facts about an individual defendant’s conduct to overcome qualified immunity; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Fleming v. Tunica County Mississippi · filed 2012-10-05

Fleming’s amended complaint does no more than recite various legal theories upon which a jailer may be liable for unlawful detention under this court’s precedents. His pleadings’ failure to allege the specific factual underpinnings of these legal conclusions is fatal in the face of the individual defendants’ assertions of qualified immunity.

An appeals court reviewing a denial of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit may affirm after reviewing the record even if the disposition is called a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Estate of Kelly A. Allen v. City of West Memphis · filed 2012-10-09

After this review if we reach the same conclusion as did the district judge, as we do here, it would seem that what we are doing is affirming that judgment. Whether we call it a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or an affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity, the result is the same.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when preexisting law did not give fair notice that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Joann Cooper v. Black · filed 2012-10-12

Because “preexisting law [did not] provide [Black] with fair notice that” firing 24 shots was unreasonable in these circumstances, he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Appellees’ Fourth Amendment claim for ... unreasonable seizure.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must rebut a discretionary government official’s qualified immunity defense by showing that the alleged conduct violated clearly established law.

Arcade Comeaux, Jr. v. Sutton · filed 2012-10-12

When a defendant in a § 1983 case “pleads qualified immunity and shows he is a governmental official whose position involves the exercise of discretion, the plaintiff then has the burden to rebut this defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 480 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871–72 (5th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Qualified immunity shields officials from liability under Section 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

White v. Searcey · filed 2012-10-15

Defendants sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court2 denied Defendants’ motion, and Defendants now appeal. We affirm. ... “Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A sheriff or undersheriff has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false imprisonment claim because no clearly established law requires investigating every lead alleging wrongful detention.

Hendricks v. Sheriff, Collier County, Florida · filed 2012-10-15

Assuming arguendo that Appellants’ detention constituted false imprisonment under § 1983, there was and is no clearly established law requiring a sheriff or undersheriff to investigate every lead alleging wrongful detention.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officials in the defendants’ position would not have understood that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Darnell Dukes v. v. Lizaola · filed 2012-10-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on Dukes’s pepper spray decontamination claim because it would not have been clear to reasonable prison officials in defendants’ position that the decontamination would amount to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on relevant statutes, regulations, and case law and do not violate a clearly established right.

Adamo v. Dillon · filed 2012-10-16

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to their decision to eject Adamo and the failure to hold a pre- or post-deprivation hearing, because Defendants were reasonably reliant upon relevant statutes, regulations, and case law.

Qualified immunity shields a caseworker from § 1983 damages when a reasonable caseworker could believe the child’s removal was lawful.

Xiong v. Wagner · filed 2012-10-19

Thus, because defendants could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed sufficient to justify Thor’s seizure—and accordingly would not have understood their actions to violate clearly established law—qualified immunity shields them from any alleged liability stemming from Thor’s initial removal.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established, even if their conduct may have violated the Constitution.

Miller v. Harbaug · filed 2012-10-19

Even if IYC St. Charles’s decision to use the metal bunk beds in rooms occupied by mentally disturbed, but not imminently suicidal, residents amounted to deliberate indifference, and thus amounted to a viola- tion of Jamal’s constitutional rights, the law in this area was not clearly established enough to defeat the super- visory defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment when a factual dispute must be decided to determine whether an officer’s arrest was objectively reasonable.

Adams v. May · filed 2012-10-19

Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate because qualified immunity can only be determined after the factual dispute has been resolved by a fact-finder.

Qualified immunity protects these individual defendants from the § 1983 claims against them.

McCormick v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-10-22

Counts II and IV also charge constitutional violations against defendants Patten and Brown pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court finds that qualified immunity protects these defendants, and so does not discuss these counts here.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they have not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Titus v. Horrell · filed 2012-10-22

Because Titus had no protected property interest in his continued employment, he suffered no due process violation, and appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 false arrest claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Kaufman v. Higgs · filed 2012-10-23

As a practical matter, we implement this standard by asking whether there was “arguable probable cause” for an arrest – if there was, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest.

Zann v. Whidby · filed 2012-10-24

Under the facts presented here, in the light most favorable to Zann, Deputy Whidby had at least arguable probable cause to arrest him. As such, there was no constitutional violation and Deputy Whidby is entitled to qualified immunity on Zann’s claim of false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Zeitchick v. Lucey · filed 2012-10-26

An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless: 1) the plaintiff shows that the government official violated a constitutional right; and 2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. ... We hold that there is no clearly established First Amendment right against the retaliatory cessation of negotiations.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of constitutional or statutory rights.

Williams v. Zurz · filed 2012-10-30

Because Williams has not demonstrated that a violation of her constitutional or statutory rights occurred, we agree with the district court that Zurz is entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant does not waive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by failing to seek or secure dismissal before trial.

Strange v. Spokane County · filed 2012-10-30

The cited decisions do not hold that a defendant who fails to seek or secure dismissal of a § 1983 claim before trial waives immunity. It is not waived.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials reasonably believed their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services · filed 2012-11-02

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds for alleged unconstitutional conduct in connection with his arrest and incarceration for a PRS violation on April 2, 2008 and his continued incarceration until September 2008.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Mpoy v. Fenty · filed 2012-11-05

Even if this Court were to find Plaintiff’s speech to be protected, his § 1983 claim against Presswood and Rhee – the District having been dismissed earlier – would nonetheless be barred by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek money damages from government officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Titlow v. Corrections Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-07

Plaintiffs may seek money damages from government officials who have violated their constitutional rights. But the officials may claim qualified immunity “so long as they have not violated a clearly established right.” ... To defeat qualified immunity, Titlow must satisfy a two-step inquiry: First, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Titlow, has she shown that a constitutional violation occurred? Second, was the right clearly established at the time of the violation?

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Akrawi v. Remillet · filed 2012-11-08

A defendant who violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right is entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not clearly established such that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, subject to qualified immunity.

B.K. v. NH Dept. HHS · filed 2012-11-14

So , whether or not the ... defendants’ complained-of actions here amounted to reasonable efforts at such an accommodation, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from BK’s claims against them for money damages under § 1983 (which, as already discussed, are the only claims remaining in the case).

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Elwell v. Byers · filed 2012-11-14

Because the Elwells’ constitutional rights were violated, we must consider whether those rights were clearly established. ... But given the state of the case law, we must reverse the district court’s qualified immunity determination.

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against state officers, subject to qualified immunity.

Estate of Kelly A. Allen v. City of West Memphis · filed 2012-11-14

After this review if we reach the same conclusion as did the district judge, as we do here, it would seem that what we are doing is affirming that judgment. Whether we call it a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or an affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity, the result is the same.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against state officials who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

BK v. Toumpas · filed 2012-11-14

For the reasons just discussed, Wilder and its progeny hardly establish beyond debate that the Free Exercise clause bestows on parents the right to reasonable efforts towards accommodating their religious preferences when the state places their children in foster care. ... So, whether or not the defendants’ complained-of actions here amounted to reasonable efforts at such an accommodation, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from BK’s claims against them for money damages under' § 1983 (which, as already discussed, are the only claims remaining in the case).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Wood v. Farmington City · filed 2012-11-16

Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Deputy Boucher to believe that Mr. Wood posed a serious-threat of physical harm. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis because they have failed to demonstrate that Deputy Boucher’s use of lethal force was objectively unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Government officials performing discretionary duties are immune from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Suetta Smith v. County of Lenawee · filed 2012-11-20

Government officials are immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing discretionary duties, provided “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Even if we view the facts, as we must, in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Sergeant Dye is entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can justify staying discovery in a Section 1983 action while a defendant’s summary judgment motion is pending.

Will Palmer v. Salazar · filed 2012-11-20

The district court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending a ruling on defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Qualified immunity confers upon officials a right, not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 5 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review).

In a § 1983 suit, an officer acting within the scope of discretionary authority may invoke qualified immunity.

Collins v. Ensley · filed 2012-11-21

Thus, for the purposes of qualified immunity, we conclude that Whittenbarger was “acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1254 n.19 (quotations omitted).

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim challenging SWAT team deployment when no clearly established right prohibits that deployment.

Fortunati v. State of Vermont · filed 2012-11-26

We conclude that the district court was correct; there was no “clearly established” right in this Circuit to be free from the deployment of a police SWAT team.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2012-11-27

Because we announce today for the first time that segregated confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing, we conclude that it would not have been clear to reasonable officers in 2006 that their behavior violated LaChance’s right to due process. We therefore remand the case for entry of summary judgment for the defendants with respect to those claims that allege constitutional violations in the defendants’ individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest claim against officers who lacked probable cause and were not entitled to qualified immunity because they also lacked arguable probable cause.

Ackerson v. City of White Plains · filed 2012-11-29

Having decided that neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause existed for the arrest as a matter of law, we also conclude that the district court erred in denying Ackerson’s motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his false arrest claims against Fisher and Fottrell.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

James v. Wilkes Barre City · filed 2012-11-29

Having found no constitutional violation, we hold that Officer Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable official in the same circumstances would know the conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Andrews v. Hickman County, Tennessee · filed 2012-12-03

The State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable DCS employee faced with the same circumstances would know that her conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 when reasonable officials would not have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Sutton v. Bailey · filed 2012-12-03

For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that Patricia Bailey and Kellie Thomas are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity from all § 1983 individual-capacity damage claims asserted in Toby Sutton’s Complaint.

In a § 1983 damages claim, a plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time to overcome qualified immunity.

Drendolyn Sims v. Stanton · filed 2012-12-03

In a claim for civil damages under § 1983, to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the occurrence.

Qualified immunity did not warrant dismissing a pleaded § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against the officer.

Mitchell v. Township of Willingboro Municipality Government · filed 2012-11-28

However, Defendant Perez argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. This argument is unpersuasive.

Government officials are protected from damages under § 1983 when their actions do not violate clearly established rights.

Kramer v. Pollard · filed 2012-12-05

Kramer’s group-worship claims under § 1983 cannot succeed if the defendants, who are government officials, are protected by qualified immunity. ... Having concluded that qualified immunity bars Kramer from recovering damages on his group-worship claims, we need not separately evaluate his claims regarding Green Bay’s denial of Odinist group-practice items.

An officer facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs cannot show that his conduct violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Harney v. City of Chicago · filed 2012-12-10

Even if the court were to find consent lacking, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate—and cannot demonstrate in light of this court’s holding in Gerald M.—that Officer Midona’s following of his prisoner Harney into his apartment was unreasonable, much less a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. ... As such, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Midona would still be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Lawson v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2012-12-11

Since the officers therefore had arguable probable cause to arrest Lawson for trespassing, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court accordingly dismisses Count I.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Woodard v. Shanley · filed 2012-12-12

Even assuming arguendo that the "some evidence" standard is not satisfied in this case, defendants nevertheless have qualified immunity from liability because they did not violate clearly established law.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest damages claim when a reasonable officer would have known the arrest lacked probable cause.

Rogers v. Cofield · filed 2012-12-12

Accordingly, as determined in the Memorandum and Order and consistent-with the aforementioned discernable facts found by the jury, including the absence of a harmful or offensive contact, and the jury’s affirmative answer to the immunity question (Docket Entry # 52, No. 11), Officer Cofield is not entitled to qualified immunity from damages -on-the section 1983 false arrest claim.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Anderson v. City of Naples · filed 2012-12-17

Because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson, Officer Anthony is entitled to qualified immunity from Anderson’s First and Fourth Amendment false arrest claims.

An officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s excessive force may be personally liable under § 1983 and cannot claim qualified immunity when the duty to intervene was clearly established.

Taylor v. Hale · filed 2012-12-17

Second, the duty of an officer to protect inmates in their care from assault by fellow officers had been clearly established for years prior to these defendants’ alleged failure to intervene or protect Plaintiff on this occasion. ... As such, Defendant Mead’s and Defendants Burks and Weiss’s motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are also due to be DENIED.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows they violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp · filed 2012-12-18

Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing: 1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and 2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct.... As a matter of law, Appellees are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit receives qualified immunity when no clearly applicable law gave fair warning that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Phaneuf v. Collins · filed 2012-12-19

Thus, in the absence of any clearly applicable law giving him “fair warning” that his actions were unconstitutional, Collins must receive qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Freeman v. Carroll · filed 2012-12-19

In the absence of clearly established authority that Mr. Freeman was entitled to notice of potential sanctions, the board defendants are protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officials overseeing a foster child’s case when the alleged failure to investigate violates the child’s clearly established right to reasonable safety; qualified immunity does not bar such a claim at the pleading stage.

Schwartz v. Booker · filed 2012-12-19

Consequently, it was apparent, in light of pre-existing law, to a reasonable official in Booker’s and Peagler’s positions that failing to investigate the child abuse referrals and dismissing Chandler’s case without investigation was an abdication of duty that would violate Chandler’s substantive due process right to be reasonably safe from harm as a foster child. See Moore, 438 F.3d at 1042-43. Therefore, on the record presently presented, Booker and Peagler are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Novick v. Staggers · filed 2012-12-20

Although the Court reexamines portions of its earlier ruling, and reaches a different conclusion in regards to whether a prima facie case was established, it ultimately denies the Motion for Reconsideration because qualified immunity still dictates that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law, taking the plaintiff’s supported account as true at summary judgment.

Newman v. Guedry · filed 2012-12-21

Therefore, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Newman at the summary-judgment stage, the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a protected property interest or speech made as a private citizen.

Looney v. Black · filed 2012-12-21

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District Court erred in determining that Defendant-Appellant Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to Looney’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as Looney has not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. We hold also that the District Court erred in determining that Defendants-Appellants Black, Clark, and LaBella were not entitled to qualified immunity as to Looney’s First Amendment claim, as Looney does not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 false arrest claim when disputed facts bear on whether the officers reasonably believed they had probable cause.

Barksdale v. Colavita · filed 2012-12-26

Thus, the facts in dispute are “material to a determination of reasonableness,” and we vacate the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Barksdale’s claim for false arrest against Officers Colavita and Quatrone.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against officials when prior law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Humphries v. Coun · filed 2012-12-26

Although Humphries maintains that the denial of her application violated her right to due process, we agree with Muniz and his supervisor that qualified immunity protects them from any liability for this decision.

An official acting within discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established law.

Wordley v. San Miguel · filed 2013-01-03

In this matter, given that Defendant was arresting Plaintiff at the time in question, Defendant was acting within his discretionary authority. Thus, Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that Defendant violated clearly established law. Plaintiff has not met this burden.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a supervisor when the alleged sexual assault could violate clearly established law.

Fields v. Atlanta Independent School System · filed 2013-01-04

Accordingly, qualified immunity does not bar Fields’ § 1983 claim against Lovelace, and genuine questions of fact exist as to whether there is a basis to hold Lovelace liable for the harassment, and it is therefore RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be DENIED with respect to Fields’ § 1983 hostile work environment sexual harassment claim against Lovelace.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from damages in a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Gallegos v. Freeman · filed 2013-01-07

Accordingly, because the particularized right at issue was not “clearly established,” the trial court correctly ruled that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity against this claim.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the official did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Raeford v. Williams · filed 2013-01-09

Because Bozinovski did not violate Raeford’s constitutional rights, she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an official from liability under Section 1983 when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Rick Thaler · filed 2013-01-10

In the absence of a constitutional violation, qualified immunity protects Adams from liability.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to government entities and officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Campbell v. Iowa, Third Judicial District Department of Correctional Services · filed 2013-01-11

If the Judicial District and Scholl asserted qualified immunity, it would not be available.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Stickley v. Byrd · filed 2013-01-14

We hold only that, in the circumstances presented in this case, the Defendants’ refusal to grant Stickley’s request for additional toilet paper did not violate any clearly established right. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 must show that an officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time to overcome qualified immunity.

Drendolyn Sims v. Stanton · filed 2013-01-16

In a claim for civil damages under § 1983, to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the occurrence.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, officers cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when disputed facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show significant force without significant provocation or warning.

Furnace v. Sullivan · filed 2013-01-17

Applying the Hudson factors to the facts as Furnace alleges them, we find that a significant amount of force was employed without significant provocation from Furnace or warning from the officers. We therefore conclude that qualified immunity was inappropriately granted at the summary judgment phase of this litigation.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from a First Amendment religious diet claim when a reasonable officer could have believed that requiring verification of religious belief was constitutional.

Grimes v. Tilton · filed 2013-01-17

The district court erred in denying defendants qualified immunity on Grimes’ First Amendment claim because a reasonable officer in defendants’ position could have concluded, pursuant to California regulations in force at the time, that requiring verification of Grimes’ religious belief before providing a vegetarian diet was constitutional.

Section 1983 officers who rely on a prosecutor’s legal advice in securing an arrest warrant are presumptively entitled to qualified immunity.

Fiore v. City of Bethlehem · filed 2013-01-18

Because the officers relied on ADA Taschner‘s legal advice in securing the arrest warrant, we must presume that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence supports a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Rutherford v. McKissack · filed 2013-01-22

Officer Chin was not entitled to qualified immunity because the trial testimony viewed in the light most favorable to Rutherford supported a conclusion that Officer Chin violated Rutherford’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

An officer facing a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when factual disputes remain over whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Phat's Bar & Grill v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2013-01-22

To determine whether Officer Smith violated Williams, Jr.’s constitutional rights, the Court will analyze the malicious prosecution claim as a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Officer Smith fails to show that a constitutional violation did not occur, he is not entitled to federal qualified immunity at this time.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 false-arrest claim when an officer acts within his discretionary authority and no binding law clearly establishes that his conduct is unconstitutional.

Amber C. Maughon v. City of Covington · filed 2013-01-28

Moreover, Maughon has failed to cite any binding authority clearly establishing, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, that an extra-jurisdictional arrest supported by arguable probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, Fuller is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

When an officer asserts qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Smith v. McCord · filed 2013-01-29

But once an officer asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the “heavy two-part burden” of showing both that (1) “the defendant violated . . . [a] constitutional . . . right[],” and (2) the “infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his or her challenged conduct was illegal.” Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007).

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had actual or arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Depalis-Lachaud v. Noel · filed 2013-01-30

In false-arrest cases like this one, the qualified immunity standard requires the plaintiff to show that the officer lacked both actual probable cause and arguable probable cause for the arrest; thus, if an officer shows that he had either type of probable cause, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct violated clearly established law.

Spiker v. Allegheny County Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2013-01-30

Kelly is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Spiker’s § 1983 claims in counts I, II, and III of the second amended complaint for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer in their circumstances would not have understood that their care of a person in protective custody violated his constitutional rights.

Lucia v. City of Peabody · filed 2013-01-30

In short, a reasonable police officer under the circumstances presented here would not have understood that his conduct violated Lucia’s constitutional right to proper monitoring and care while incarcerated. Accordingly, the Court finds that Officer Pickering, Officer Kenney, Lieutenant Wlasuk, and Sergeant Yeo are entitled to qualified immunity and will grant them summary judgment on the plaintiffs § 1983 claims on that basis.

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under § 1983 when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Benn v. Kissane · filed 2013-01-31

We need not reach the issue of whether probable cause actually existed, however, because the information known to the officers at the relevant times plainly gave rise to an “arguable” case that the probable cause standard was satisfied in these circumstances.