42 U.S.C. § 1983

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that her conduct violated a constitutional right.

Maddox v. Stephens · filed 2013-08-21

And, after thorough review, we hold that, even assuming arguendo that Maddox has established a procedural due process violation and even assuming arguendo that Stephens violated Maddox’s substantive due process rights, Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that Stephens’ actions were so conscience shocking as to violate Maddox’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of J.O.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Armbruster v. Frost · filed 2013-08-26

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff has not shown that Officer Frost violated her Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during her arrest. Therefore, Officer Frost is entitled to qualified immunity on the Section 1983 claim, and the Court will grant his motion for summary judgment on Count II.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officers who reasonably rely on social workers’ safety concerns when accompanying them on a search.

Bostrom v. New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services · filed 2013-08-26

Torres and McCloy reasonably believed that Schuh and Broglin feared for their safety and this was a sufficient reason for Torres and McCloy to accompany them on the search. A reasonable officer in their position would have done the same. Therefore, McCloy and Torres are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the challenged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Patrick v. Moorman · filed 2013-08-27

Based on the foregoing, we need not reach the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis since Patrick’s constitutional rights were not violated. Deputy Moorman’s actions were reasonable and, therefore, he satisfies the first prong of the inquiry and is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady · filed 2013-08-28

We therefore conclude that there was “arguable” probable cause and that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for Gonzalez’s false arrest claim under § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive due process claim when the plaintiffs fail to allege a violation of clearly established rights.

Pioneer Aggregates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2013-08-30

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s finding that because the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the defendants violated their clearly established substantive due process rights, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Jasinski v. Tyler · filed 2013-09-03

Dismissal based on qualified immunity is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege the violation of a constitutional right that is clearly established.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing the asserted right was uncertain.

Demers v. Austin · filed 2013-09-04

Finally, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti.

Officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary acts are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Cooper v. Rogers · filed 2013-09-04

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden as to her deliberate indifference claim, and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as to this claim.

Qualified immunity on a § 1983 retaliation claim may be deferred when the complaint plausibly alleges that officials acted with an improper retaliatory motive.

Washington v. Gonyea · filed 2013-09-10

Here, Washington has plausibly alleged that Defendants-Appellees acted with an improper retaliatory motive. ... Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, Washington’s allegations are sufficient to require deferral of the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right that a reasonable person would have known.

Mitchell v. Josh Shearrer · filed 2013-09-10

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages suit when disputed falsehoods in a warrant affidavit may be material to probable cause.

Sanseverino v. Chrostowski · filed 2013-09-11

“Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from § 1983 claims for money damages provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware.” ... We cannot therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that the alleged falsehoods in the affidavit were immaterial to establishing probable cause, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Officers’ qualified immunity defense.

A probation officer is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when existing law did not clearly establish that her conduct violated a constitutional right.

Williams v. Dawn Morahan · filed 2013-09-11

In sum, it was not clearly established in late 2008/early 2009 that Officer Morahan’s alleged conduct—while certainly disturbing and not cause for commendation—would subject her to liability under § 1983.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence permits a finding that they used deadly force against a suspect who had fully surrendered.

Jamison v. Metz · filed 2013-09-12

Because it is clearly established law that it is objectively unreasonable to use deadly force on a suspect who has fully surrendered, moreover, Officers Davis and Metz are also not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

C. B. v. City of Sonora · filed 2013-09-12

Because the law was, and still is, not “clearly established” that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a relative’s place of business implicates Fourth Amendment rights, McIntosh and Prock are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful at the time.

Bland v. Roberts · filed 2013-09-18

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... We conclude that the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity concerning Carter’s, McCoy’s, and Dixon’s claims because in December 2009 a reasonable sheriff could have believed he had the right to choose not to reappoint his sworn deputies for political reasons, including speech indicating the deputies’ support for the Sheriffs political opponent.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified immunity defense must be raised with notice to the plaintiff and an opportunity to respond before the court can address it on interlocutory appeal.

Taylor v. Lantagne · filed 2013-09-19

Because Taylor did not receive notice of Lantagne’s claim of qualified immunity until the instant appeal, we find that the defense was not properly raised.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 damages claim for using force after a person’s resistance and risk of flight have ended.

J.W. Ex Rel. Williams v. Roper · filed 2013-09-19

Although the first macing was reasonable due to G.S.’s initial resistance, that resistance does not shield Officer Clark from liability when he used force after the resistance and risk of flight was over.

An official facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity unless the facts show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Thompson v. Ulenzen King · filed 2013-09-20

When an official asserts qualified immunity in response to a § 1983 action, we conduct a two-pronged analysis: "(1) [whether] the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) [whether] the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." ... Therefore, because the constitutional right was clearly established, the district court properly denied Officer King qualified immunity.

Prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when a reasonable official would know that forcing a prisoner to strip naked for exercising constitutional rights is unlawful.

Ayotte v. Barnhart · filed 2013-09-24

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge: “[A] reasonable official would have known, based on longstanding legal precedent, that requiring a prisoner to strip naked in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of his constitutional rights violates those rights.”

Qualified immunity protects individual defendants from a Section 1983 claim when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Soundview Associates v. Town of Riverhead · filed 2013-09-30

Because, based on the undisputed facts of this case, no rational jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for defendants Thomas and Ehlers to believe that by declining to move forward with the 2005 Applications as submitted — so as to consider the cumulative environmental impact of both sets of projects proposed for the particular parcel of land — they were not violating a clearly established right, summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is warranted in their favor.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 liability for prolonged warrantless retention of property when no reasonable officer could believe the retention was lawful.

Gonsalves v. Cleveland · filed 2013-09-30

Qualified immunity does not apply to Count I as pertaining to the warrantless retention of the items seized from Blue Jeans for five months without probable cause. Defendants are liable for this misconduct as a matter of law.

Officers sued under § 1983 for an arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if they had arguable probable cause.

Jenkins v. Gaither · filed 2013-10-04

“An arrest without probable cause is unconstitutional, but officers who make such an arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause.” ... In the light of all this evidence, Gaither and Acosta had arguable probable cause to arrest Jenkins for driving under the influence.

Qualified immunity can support summary judgment for defendants in a § 1983 action.

Sera v. Harmon · filed 2013-10-04

The district court2 granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Sera appeals. Having carefully reviewed the record de novo and considered Sera’s arguments for reversal, we agree with the district court’s reasons for granting summary judgment to defendants on the claim.

Officers sued under Section 1983 may be denied qualified immunity when a jury could find that their conduct violated clearly established rights and that they could not reasonably believe it was lawful.

Negron v. City of New York · filed 2013-10-04

For all these reasons, and construing the evidence of the relevant facts and circumstances in the light most favorable to plaintiff, I conclude that a reasonable jury could find facts that would, under clearly established law, constitute a violation of Morales’ Fourth Amendment rights, and that would render it objectively unreasonable for Pigott and Marchesona to have believed that their conduct was lawful. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs Section 1983 claim is therefore denied.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the officer violated clearly established law.

McCreary v. Richardson · filed 2013-10-07

Richardson is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on all of McCreary’s § 1983 claims.

In a § 1983 damages suit, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show they lacked a legal basis to stop and arrest the plaintiff.

Wilson Ex Rel. T.W. v. Martin · filed 2013-10-08

Thus, at this stage of the litigation, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity as to T.W.’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful seizure and detention.

State officials sued individually under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

McCreary v. Richardson · filed 2013-10-09

State actors sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force suit depends on whether a reasonable officer could believe the force alleged by the plaintiff was lawful.

Araujo v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8 · filed 2013-10-11

Under those doctrines, no liability exists if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed, even if mistakenly, that his actions were lawful under the circumstances. ... Because respondents do not confront appellant‟s evidence of claimed excessive force, their legal arguments miss the mark.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, even if their assessment of a victim’s condition was mistaken.

Hottenstein v. City of Sea Isle City · filed 2013-10-11

Even assuming that Tracy were alive, as the Plaintiffs’ experts conclude was "possible,” the police acted reasonably under the circumstances by immediately responding and checking Tracy's pulse and breathing, thereby granting them the protection of Qualified Immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Clayborn v. Struebling · filed 2013-10-16

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Clayborn. The officers’ conduct did not show plain incompetence or a knowing violation of the law. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer performing discretionary duties is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim unless the officer violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

King v. Lumpkin · filed 2013-10-16

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities, unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of ... which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Officer Lumpkin is entitled to qualified immunity for King’s § 1983 claims.

In a § 1983 suit, once an officer shows that he was performing a discretionary function, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity.

Smallwood v. Ainsworth · filed 2013-10-16

The parties do not dispute that Ainsworth was engaged in a discretionary function when he made the arrest in this case; Smallwood therefore ... shoulders the burden of proving that Ainsworth does not enjoy qualified immunity protection. This she cannot do.

In a Section 1983 action, a state official who removes a child without parental consent or a court order has qualified immunity if there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe the child faced imminent harm.

Doe v. Whelan · filed 2013-10-17

A state official who takes a child into custody without parental consent or court order is entitled to qualified immunity if there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an imminent threat of harm to the child.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when reasonable officers could have believed their conduct was lawful.

Harwe v. Floyd · filed 2013-10-17

Even if there were a material question as to the reasonableness of the scope and duration of plaintiffs’ stop, we would conclude, as the district court did, that Floyd was entitled to qualified immunity on the second step of analysis because at least some officers of reasonable competence in Floyd’s position could have believed that the half-hour stop in this case “was within the bounds of appropriate police responses.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001) (holding qualified immunity warranted in such circumstances); see Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d at 388–89.

A private psychiatrist working under contract at a state prison cannot invoke qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Lee v. Willey · filed 2013-10-17

With no good reason to disturb our holding in McCullum, we conclude that there is no meaningful distinction between the psychiatrist in that case and Mehra; thus, we conclude that, under McCullum, Mehra is not eligible to invoke the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a Section 1983 action when the plaintiff has not shown a constitutional violation.

WILLIAMS v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2013-10-17

It necessarily follows that because Williams has not shown a constitutional violation, the defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity.

A government hospital employee may claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when a reasonable official would not have known that her conduct violated a clearly established right.

Minick v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville · filed 2013-10-21

Because a reasonable official in Mason’s shoes would not know that her response violated Minick’s clearly established rights, qualified immunity shields Mason from liability.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s supported version of the facts shows a violation of clearly established federal law.

De La Cruz v. Coastal Bend Regional Court Residential Treatment Center · filed 2013-10-21

Defendant Diaz is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because, if the facts are as De La Cruz alleges, then Diaz’s conduct violated clearly established federal law.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when a jury could find that the official’s discriminatory enforcement was unreasonable under clearly established law.

Savino v. Town of Southeast · filed 2013-10-21

Likewise, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Tessmer’s actions in enforcing the zoning code against Savino, Inc. were unreasonable in light of the aforementioned clearly established law. ... Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment in favor of Tessmer based on qualified immunity must be denied.

For a § 1983 claim, the right to be free from a warrantless, nonconsensual administrative search is clearly established for qualified-immunity purposes.

Lewis v. Weck · filed 2013-10-24

Addressing Weck’s qualified-immunity defense, the court correctly found that the right to be free from an administrative search conducted without a warrant, and without consent, is clearly established.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest are not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Williams v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-10-24

Based on those factual assumptions, there was no basis for reasonable minds to differ on whether there was probable cause to arrest Williams. On this record, these officers are not entitled to summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a malicious prosecution claim for a Fourth Amendment violation and subjects officials to qualified-immunity limits.

Howard v. Melton · filed 2013-10-25

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability for torts committed while performing their discretionary duties, unless their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. ... A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove both a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against officials who, under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Marquez v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-10-28

Following discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims arguing they were protected by qualified immunity. ... When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff owns the burden of showing that the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state official for violating a constitutional right, subject to qualified immunity.

Gibson v. Kilpatrick · filed 2013-10-29

Because we conclude that Gibson acted pursuant to his official job duties in making the reports, we need not consider the remaining prongs of the First Amendment retaliation test, since he cannot show that Kilpatrick violated his First Amendment rights. In the absence of such a showing, Gibson cannot overcome Kilpatrick’s qualified immunity defense. Thus, the district court erred in denying Kilpatrick’s motion for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity, and we reverse.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when the defendant's conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Cruz v. Davidson · filed 2013-10-31

Because Cruz has not alleged a violation of the Fourth Amendment by Davidson, Davidson is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may raise qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim at trial even after an appellate court reverses summary judgment on that defense.

Meyers v. Baltimore County · filed 2013-11-01

Conversely, Officer Mee is not barred under the “mandate rule” from raising a qualified immunity defense as to the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 (Count III).

Qualified immunity protects an officer sued under Section 1983 when existing law does not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutional.

Stanton v. Sims · filed 2013-11-04

Finally, our determination that Welsh and Johnson are insufficient to overcome Stanton’s qualified immunity is bolstered by the fact that, even after Johnson, two differ- ent District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have granted qualified immunity precisely because the law regarding warrantless entry in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemean- ant is not clearly established.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a public official when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Tuft v. State of Texas · filed 2013-11-04

Tuft has not shown that Gonzalez’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The rights that Tuft asserts in this action were not clearly established at the time of the search under either controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive authority.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff · filed 2013-11-04

In sum, the right to avoid disciplinary segregation in a cell with a solid metal door and a confrontational cell mate for 182 days with weekly access to the shower and recreational yard was not a clearly estab- lished right in September 2009 when the conduct occurred. Therefore, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer permitted a person to leave a traffic stop and then arrested her for doing so.

Wynn v. Estes · filed 2013-11-04

On the facts as to which the district court found a genuine dispute of material fact, the district court properly denied qualified immunity. ... No reasonable officer would believe that he could constitutionally arrest a person who left the scene of a traffic stop with the officer’s permission.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity at summary judgment must present specific evidence that each official violated clearly established law.

Brown v. United States · filed 2013-11-04

Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because Brown had, and failed to meet, the burden of proving that each official was not entitled to qualified immunity by alleging facts sufficient to show that the official's act violated clearly established law at the time that it was committed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials entitled to qualified immunity because the violated right was not clearly established.

iMatter Utah v. Njord · filed 2013-11-04

As a result, the court finds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and awards no damages to the Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim if the officer reasonably but mistakenly concludes that probable cause exists.

G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc · filed 2013-11-04

Under the second prong, an officer is not liable for an unlawful arrest if he “reasonably but mistakenly” concludes that probable cause exists.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Santiago v. Ringle · filed 2013-11-05

Because Santiago has not shown that a constitutional violation occurred, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s award of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when disputed facts could show that an officer violated a clearly established right.

Coker v. Arkansas State Police · filed 2013-11-05

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity shields a government official from liability "unless his conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). ... We reverse the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Officer Cartwright and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 claims against officials acting within their discretionary authority are subject to qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established right.

Lewis Martin Moton, Jr. v. K. Walker · filed 2013-11-05

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Because Moton’s clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated, Walker is entitled to qualified immunity on Moton’s Fourth Amendment claim.

A sheriff’s qualified-immunity defense to a § 1983 claim may be denied, and the court may reaffirm that denial on a renewed motion.

Warrington v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-11-05

The Court considered Sheriff Hosselkus’ argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity in its order on defendants’ motion to dismiss [#33]. It concluded that the Sheriff is n o t entitled to qualified immunity. ... I remain satisfied that the ruling was correct and therefore reaffirm the Court’s previous order.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim based on how officers conducted a search depends on the facts of that search.

Olson v. Gilley CA3 · filed 2013-11-06

Whether deputies were entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 regarding the manner of their search, however, is primarily a factual question.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for using deadly force against a person posing no threat when that right was clearly established.

George Cooper, Sr. v. Sheehan · filed 2013-11-07

With respect to the second part of the Saucier analysis, the precedent discussed herein amply demonstrates that the contours of the constitutional right at issue — that is, the right to be free from deadly force when posing no threat — were clearly established at the time the Officers shot Cooper. Accordingly, the district court properly denied, at the summary judgment stage, the Officers’ invocation of qualified immunity from Cooper’s § 1983 excessive force claims.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the facts viewed favorably to the plaintiff could show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Stoner v. Watlingten · filed 2013-11-07

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Stoner, a fact-finder could determine that Watlingten (1) violated a constitutional right belonging to Stoner that was (2) clearly established at the time of the violation. Accordingly, the district court properly denied summary judgment of dismissal to appellant Watlingten on the false arrest claim.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for extending a prison mail watch when the governing law is not clearly established.

Ford v. Fischer · filed 2013-11-08

Similarly, we conclude here that appellees are entitled to qualified immunity. Given the dearth of case law analyzing what factors warrant the continuation of a mail watch and the extent to which the reasons for continuing mail watch must be documented, we conclude that the law is not clearly established.

In a § 1983 suit, public officials receive qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot identify a clearly established right they violated.

Blackmon v. Sutton · filed 2013-11-08

Now an adult, Mr. Blackmon has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various members of the juvenile detention center’s staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. ... The motion to dismiss is denied and the decision of the district court denying qualified immunity is affirmed, except with respect to Mr. Blackmon’s “failure to transfer” claim against Ms. Sutton. On that claim, we direct the district court to grant qualified immunity to Ms. Sutton.

Qualified immunity protects officials from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Foster v. Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services · filed 2013-11-13

Because Hansen and Watkins were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims brought by the Fosters, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated clearly established federal law.

Beattie v. Smith · filed 2013-11-13

We affirm the dismissal because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. To survive a motion to dismiss for qualified immunity, a plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants plausibly violated his federal rights, and that those rights were clearly established at the time.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability at the first step of the analysis when no constitutional violation occurred.

JONES v. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2013-11-14

Because there was no violation of Jones’ constitutional rights, Officer Crossman was entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability at the first step of the required analysis.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim can survive a motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds when the allegations plausibly show a violation of a clearly established right.

Long v. Fulmer · filed 2013-11-15

In short, the district court carefully and thoroughly analyzed the qualified immunity question and concluded that Mr. Long had plausibly alleged a violation of his constitutional right to be free from excessive force and had plausibly stated a basis for denying Officer Fulmer qualified immunity at this stage. We agree with that analysis and adopt it here.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Trizuto v. Bellevue Police Department · filed 2013-11-18

Even if Officer Trizuto’s complaint of retaliation were speech on a matter of public concern, Lieutenant Young would be entitled to qualified immunity. ... No clearly established authority would have advised Lieutenant Young that the First Amendment protected Officer Trizuto’s retaliation complaint against him.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who relies in good faith and objectively reasonably on a prosecutor’s advice before making an arrest.

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle · filed 2013-11-19

Because Rogers’s reliance on Birbeck’s advice was in good faith and objectively reasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Kelly’s arrest.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense without showing that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right.

Gibson v. Kilpatrick · filed 2013-11-19

In the absence of such a showing, Gibson cannot overcome Kilpatrick’s qualified immunity defense. Thus, the district court erred in denying Kilpatrick’s motion for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity, and we reverse.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Estate of C.A. v. Grier · filed 2013-11-25

We hold that, even assuming a constitutional violation, the individual defendants were not on notice that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right because no case has found a violation under similar facts.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 unlawful entry and arrest claims when the plaintiffs offer no evidence that the unlawfulness would have been clear to those officers.

Saad v. City of Dearborn Heights · filed 2013-11-25

As with the junior Officers, the Saads neither argue nor cite record evidence to support that it would have been clear to Sergeant Skelton that entry into the Saad home and Saad’s arrest were unlawful. ... Under these circumstances, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity on the Saads’ unlawful entry and arrest claims as to Officer Cates, Officer Gondek, Reserve Officer Nason, and Sergeant Skelton.

State actors sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Estate of C.A. v. Castro · filed 2013-11-25

State actors sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... We hold that, even assuming a constitutional violation, the individual defendants were not on notice that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right because no case has found a violation under similar facts.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs fail to show a genuine dispute of material fact that the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly-established law.

Clayton v. Columbia Casualty Company · filed 2013-11-26

Because Appellants have not shown a genuine dispute of material fact for whether the Deputy’s shooting Clayton was objectively unreasonable under clearly-established law, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a § 1983 damages claim when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Kvech v. New Mexico Department of Public Safety · filed 2013-11-30

The undisputed evidence shows that, while Chacon violated Kvech’s constitutional rights, Chacon is entitled to qualified immunity and judgment as a matter of law, because the law was not clearly established what process, if any, was due a person who had been convicted of a sex offense in state A, was required to register as a sex offender in state A, and moved to state B with different sex offender registration requirements.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Volkman v. Ryker · filed 2013-12-02

We find no error in the district court’s procedural approach, and we conclude that Volkman has not carried his burden of showing that the defendants’ conduct violated a “clearly established” constitutional right. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim depends on whether the law governing the officer’s use of force was clearly established at the time.

Werner v. City of Poulsbo · filed 2013-12-03

Officer Moore is therefore entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), as to the taser usage.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant in a Section 1983 suit when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the injury.

Hinterberger v. Iroquios School District · filed 2013-12-05

As Hinterberger’s alleged right was not clearly established at the time of her injury, Loftus is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed material facts prevent the court from deciding whether the official acted reasonably.

Kregler v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-09

Dismissal on the basis of a qualified immunity defense is not appropriate where there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness. ... Without a fuller factual record to be developed at trial, the Court is not in a position to determine whether Defendants have satisfied their burden of proving that Garcia’s actions were objectively reasonable. Therefore, at this time the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment predicated on Garcia’s claim of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Atterbury v. Daly · filed 2013-12-10

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Atterbury’s unreasonable search and seizure claim on the basis of qualified immunity because California state law requires those found not guilty by reason of insanity of a felony to provide a DNA sample, and Atterbury’s right to be free of this requirement under the Fourth Amendment is not clearly established.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause to prosecute existed.

Hoyos v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-11

Here, for the reasons stated above, reasonable officers could at least disagree about whether probable cause to prosecute Hoyos existed, and defendants Harrison and Avron are entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official cannot claim qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for an arrest based on a warrant lacking adequate evidentiary support when the right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established.

McAfee v. Boczar · filed 2013-12-12

Therefore, Boczar cannot shield herself from damages liability by invoking qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Marvin Waddleton, III v. Jackson · filed 2013-12-12

Because there was no constitutional violation, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Waddleton’s claims against them in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts could show that officers gratuitously beat a restrained, compliant inmate in violation of clearly established law.

Kargbo v. Brown, et al. · filed 2013-12-13

Nor can it conclude that they are entitled to the protections afforded by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from Section 1983 damages when the complaint alleges that they violated a clearly established right by arresting peaceful protesters without a valid time, place, and manner restriction.

Occupy Columbia v. Haley · filed 2013-12-16

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields government officials performing discretionary functions from personal-capacity liability for civil damages under § 1983, insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... Accordingly, at this stage, Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity for damages arising out of Occupy Columbia’s arrest on November 16, 2011.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep't · filed 2013-12-17

Unless the officers’ conduct violated Hocker’s constitutional rights, and unless Supreme Court or Sixth ... Circuit case law clearly established those constitutional rights at the time of the incident, the court must grant immunity to the officers. Hocker fails the first prong because he cannot show a constitutional violation.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 race discrimination claim when the evidence permits a finding that the official violated a clearly established right.

Burton v. Arkansas Secretary of State · filed 2013-12-17

We thus hold that the district court correctly concluded that Chief Hedden was not entitled to qualified immunity on Burton's § 1983 race discrimination claim.

An officer sued personally under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when her admitted use of force violated a clearly established right.

Jenkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-12-18

As for Ms. Coley’s arguments for qualified immunity, they will be denied. Her argument that she is entitled to qualified immunity for the assault at the police cruiser will be denied.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no clearly established law required her to release a person after a lawful arrest.

Panagoulakos v. Yazzie · filed 2013-12-20

In short, Officer Yazzie is entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law imposed on her a duty to release Panagoulakos following his lawful arrest after the traffic stop.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the law at the time did not give fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Gilmore v. Hodges · filed 2013-12-20

Thus, because the state of the law did not provide the officers with “fair warning” that their alleged conduct was unlawful, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when genuine factual disputes remain over whether officials violated clearly established rights.

Spencer v. Jackson County Missouri · filed 2013-12-26

Since Spencer has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants violated his First Amendment rights, the district court's grant of qualified immunity to the defendants was premature and must be reversed.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when qualified immunity bars them.

Cord Bowers v. Yeoman · filed 2013-12-31

Upon careful de novo review of the record below, and the submissions before us on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint as failing to state a claim and as raising claims that were barred by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an individual defendant from a § 1983 claim when the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Cillo v. City of Greenwood Village · filed 2013-12-31

We also hold that the individual defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on the second requirement for § 1983 qualified immunity because Sgt. Cillo’s First Amendment right to associate with a Union was a clearly established right at the time of ... his termination.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim alleging that a public official retaliated against someone for exercising First Amendment rights.

Thompson v. Ohio State University · filed 2014-01-06

For purposes of assessing Dr. Salimbene’s claim of qualified immunity, it is clearly established that a public official’s retaliation against an individual for exercising First Amendment rights violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim unless they violate clearly established rights.

Han v. City of Folsom · filed 2014-01-08

Even if Barber and Peterson violated Joseph’s Fourth Amendment rights, we conclude that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the Hans’ excessive force claims.

A defendant cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when a jury could find he knew detainees were regularly served sickening meals and had authority to intervene.

Smego v. Aramark Food Services Corp. · filed 2014-01-10

If a rational juror concluded that the meals were intolerable on a regular basis, that juror could also rationally conclude that Defendant Ashby was subjectively aware of the problem through Plaintiffs’ many complaints and Ashby’s ability to try the food for himself. A rational juror could also conclude that Ashby had the authority to do something about it by demanding that Aramark fix the situation. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment is not appropriate for Defendant Ashby, nor is a finding of qualified immunity.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rebirth Christian Academy Daycare, Inc. v. Minott · filed 2014-01-13

Accordingly, Mr. Gargano and Ms. Brizzi are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the individual capacity claims brought against them.

When an officer asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

White v. Sanchez · filed 2014-01-14

“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For the following reasons, we agree with the district court that Mr. White failed to show that Mr. Sanchez violated his constitutional rights. Summary judgment in favor of Mr. Sanchez was therefore appropriate.

Officials sued individually under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs fail to show that the asserted federal right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Comprehensive Addiction Treatment Center, Inc. v. Leslea · filed 2014-01-15

Because we hold that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we do not decide whether the defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from an arrest warrant when the plaintiff fails to show a material deliberate or reckless falsehood.

Sussman v. Dalton · filed 2014-01-16

Dalton was accordingly entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims.

Public officials have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Phillips v. Wright · filed 2014-01-17

“Public officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts undertaken in their official capacity, unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.” ... Brock and Johnson would not have put defendants on clear notice that denying Phillips surgery, on the basis of the referrals in front of them, constituted deliberate indifference to medical need under the Eighth Amendment.

Defendants sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Marvin Waddleton, III v. Jackson · filed 2014-01-20

Because there was no constitutional violation, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Waddleton’s claims against them in their individual capacities.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 may be protected by qualified immunity.

Simmons v. Hernandez · filed 2014-01-20

Our review of the summary judgment record confirms that the district court was correct in concluding that the defendants named in Simmons’s second civil rights suit were qualifiedly immune from the punitive damages claims against them.

State actors sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Estate of C.A. v. Grier · filed 2014-01-20

We hold that, even assuming a constitutional violation, the individual defendants were not on notice that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right because no case has found a violation under similar facts.

An official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a genuine factual dispute that the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Clayton v. Columbia Casualty Company · filed 2014-01-20

Because Appellants have not shown a genuine dispute of material fact for whether the Deputy’s shooting Clayton was objectively unreasonable under clearly-established law, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts show they had fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Kramer v. Southern Oregon University · filed 2014-01-22

Therefore, on the basis of the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint, I conclude that Defendants had “fair warning” that their conduct was unconstitutional. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and Defendants’ motion to dismiss on that basis is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer with qualified immunity when she secures an arrest warrant without adequate evidence and violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

McAfee v. Boczar · filed 2014-01-23

By securing a warrant that lacked adequate evidentiary support, Boczar infringed McAfee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from capricious arrest. And this constitutional right is clearly established. ... Therefore, Boczar cannot shield herself from damages liability by invoking qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim if the officer had arguable probable cause.

Polk v. Nugent · filed 2014-01-24

To be entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, an officer need only have arguable probable cause.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Mack v. Mazzarella · filed 2014-01-28

Under the totality of the circumstances, Mazzarella had arguable probable cause to arrest Mack. Because arguable probable cause existed for Mack’s arrest, the district judge did not err by granting summary judgment to Mazzarella, based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity from damages when the governing constitutional law is uncertain.

Demers v. Austin · filed 2014-01-29

Finally, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti.

Officers sued under Section 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity on the pleadings when the alleged facts show a violation of clearly established limits on deadly force.

Zion v. Nassan · filed 2014-01-30

While it is entirely possible that discovery will show that Haniotakis’s actions put the officers or the public in significant danger, the facts contained in the pleadings do not demonstrate danger that would justify the use of deadly force. Thus, it would be premature to grant the defendants qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliatory arrest claim when the arrest had objective probable cause and the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Moral v. Hagen · filed 2014-01-31

Because this scenario (retaliatory animus but objective probable cause) does not offend clearly established law, the Supreme Court granted qualified immunity to the officers in Reichle. Id. We see no lawful way the district court could have reached a different result in this case.

Qualified immunity bars discovery on a Section 1983 claim against public officials unless the plaintiff pleads facts that, if true, would overcome the defense.

Williams-Boldware v. Denton County Texas · filed 2014-01-31

Before allowing discovery in a matter where qualified immunity is alleged, the district court must first find “that the plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome” a qualified immunity defense. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Williams-Boldware’s failure to promote claim did not plead facts that would overcome a qualified immunity defense because her allegations are conclusory statements based almost wholly upon speculation.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when existing precedent put a reasonable supervisor on notice that the alleged conduct violated constitutional rights.

Ellis v. Houston · filed 2014-02-03

We conclude that existing precedent put the supervisors on notice that such actions would violate constitutional rights. A reasonable prison supervisor would have understood that permitting and participating in racially derisive remarks and assigning inferior work assignments would violate the black officers' rights under §§ 1981 and 1983. Based on the record evidence, Sergeant Miles has not shown that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the black officers' harassment claims, nor have Lieutenants Stoner and Haney shown they are entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claims of Officer Ellis.

Qualified immunity limits damages claims against state officials under Section 1983, but it did not support summary judgment on this First Amendment claim.

Wall v. Wade · filed 2014-02-03

We vacate the district court’s summary judgment order granting the defendants qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time.

Rooni v. Biser · filed 2014-02-04

Here, we conclude that there was nothing that would have alerted Biser to the fact that a constitutional violation was looming. We therefore conclude that Biser was entitled to qualified immunity on Rooni’s complaint of excessive force in connection with the hand-cuffing, and thus that summary judgment in Biser’s favor was proper on this part of the case.

Officers who lack arguable probable cause to arrest a person are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from that arrest.

Childress v. L. P. Walker · filed 2014-02-05

Accordingly, based upon the record at this time, the district court held that the officers did not have arguable probable ... cause to arrest Childress and denied their request for qualified immunity as to his Fourth and First Amendment claims. ... However, our review of the record and the district court’s thoughtful opinion leads us to conclude that the judgment of the district court is due to be ... AFFIRMED.

Officials sued under § 1983 may rely on a later Supreme Court ruling to support qualified immunity for earlier conduct.

T.S. Ex Rel. J.S. v. Doe · filed 2014-02-05

It is thus wholly consistent with the principles of qualified immunity to give the defendants the benefit of the Court’s ruling. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ federal claims.

Section 1983 does not shield an official with qualified immunity for firing a public employee with a protected property interest without a pretermination hearing when that hearing right was clearly established.

Gross v. Village of Minerva Park Village Council · filed 2014-02-05

The right to “some kind of hearing” was clearly established by July 2011. ... Eisentrout is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity at summary judgment shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Garcia v. Escalante · filed 2014-02-06

“When a [§ 1983] defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”

For qualified immunity under § 1983, the law governing social workers’ home searches is assessed separately from the law governing child seizures.

Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. · filed 2014-02-06

We must ... now decide whether Andrews or Kovacic governs the search of a home in 2010. Because Brent’s Fourth Amendment allegations relate to the search of his home, and not to the seizure of his children, we hold that Andrews controls.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on an official protected by qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Thomas v. East Orange Board of Education · filed 2014-02-06

Accordingly, Superintendent Scott has qualified immunity and is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the arrest was objectively reasonable.

Branch v. Officer Timothy Gorman · filed 2014-02-12

The officer's conduct did not show plain incompetence or a knowing violation of the law. Officer Garbisch is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the assumed facts show conduct that violated clearly established law.

Nazareth Brown v. Weber · filed 2014-02-13

Under this account, cabined by the incontrovertible facts shown by the video, Weber’s use of the taser amounted to force that was excessive under clearly established law in December 2010. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment denying Weber qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits public officials sued in their individual capacity to claim qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Carney v. Miller · filed 2014-02-14

Qualified immunity provides a shield from liabil- ity for public officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacity, so long as an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the right asserted against them was not clearly established.

Pittman-Bey v. Celum · filed 2014-02-14

As there is neither controlling authority nor a robust consensus of persuasive authority showing that a Muslim inmate who did not participate in Jumu’ah services was entitled to participate in Ramadan activities and after sunset meals, the right asserted by Pittman-Bey was not clearly established law, and the district court correctly concluded that Celum and Shakir were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a Section 1983 suit when material facts about prison officers’ deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs remain disputed.

Stewart v. Guzman · filed 2014-02-20

An issue of material fact exists in regards to whether Appellees were deliberately indifferent to Stewart’s health and safety. ... Accordingly, the ... district court erred when it granted Appellees summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in a § 1983 suit when a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Flaherty v. Knapik · filed 2014-02-21

On the undisputed facts of record, the court is obliged to find that a reasonable person should have known that the order to remove the political signs did infringe upon the guarantees of free expression set forth in the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Moreover, in failing even to consider alternatives to outright removal, (Dkt. No. 50 at 16), Defendant demonstrated indifference to what he should have known were Plaintiffs’ rights. Under these circumstances, Defendant is not entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when clearly established law would not have warned a reasonable officer that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Villegas v. City of Anaheim · filed 2014-02-24

Officer Bennallack is also entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the analysis because clearly established law in January 2012‘ would not have put a reasonable officer in his position on notice that using deadly force to protect himself and his fellow officers against a subject armed with a gun, who disobeyed repeated commands to drop the weapon and instead began to raise it, would violate the Fourth Amendment.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, an officer’s subjective state of mind does not defeat qualified immunity when he acted as an objectively reasonable officer would.

Flythe v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-02-25

At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff argued zealously that Officer Eagan’s drug use did not entitle him to qualified immunity. ... That evidence does not change the Court’s legal conclusion because Officer Eagan’s subjective state of mind does not change the fact that he acted as an objectively reasonable officer would have in the same situation.

Individual defendants sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Matusick v. Erie County Water Authority · filed 2014-02-25

We conclude that because his constitutional right to intimate association in the context of the First Amendment was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, the individual defendants held liable for these claims were entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials sued individually under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when they knowingly ignore a prisoner’s serious medical needs in violation of clearly established rights.

Rodrigue v. Morehouse Detention Center, et · filed 2014-02-27

Based on the district court’s factual findings that Grayson and Fife knew of Rodrigue’s serious medical condition but ignored his requests for medical attention despite this knowledge, we hold that appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an officer when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established.

Estate of James Garcia III v. City of Sacramento · filed 2014-02-28

Under the circumstances, it was not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment required Dahl to provide an additional warning before deploying his canine again.

Qualified immunity protects a state mental health evaluator from a § 1983 damages claim when the evaluator’s conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate a clearly established right.

Raub v. Campbell · filed 2014-02-28

Given the collective information presented to Campbell, and the results of his interview with Raub, Campbell’s decision as a mental health evaluator to seek a temporary detention order was objectively reasonable, irrespective of Raub’s political beliefs.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for searching an arrestee’s cell phone and seizing photos without a warrant when no clearly established law forbade that conduct at the time.

Britt v. Anderson · filed 2014-02-28

In this case, a reasonable police officer in Anderson’s position in Chicago in June of 2013 could have believed the search of Britt’s phone did not require a warrant, because there was no clearly established law excluding cell phone photos from seizure following a search incident to an arrest of the phone’s owner. Accordingly, Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity under the law as it exists, and Count I must be dismissed on that basis.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe the plaintiff was not similarly situated to others for equal protection purposes.

Kulkin v. Town of Pahrump · filed 2014-03-04

A reasonable official in their position could have reasonably believed that Kulkin was not similarly situated to the other vendors with respect to the documentation policy. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). Campbell and Glidden are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity defeats a Section 1983 claim against an officer when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Willie Clark, Et Ux. v. Jennings Police Department · filed 2014-03-05

If a court finds that the officer‟s alleged conduct violated no constitutional right, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity and the court need not inquire further.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from damages under § 1983 when the officer has not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Ross v. Early · filed 2014-03-05

The qualified immunity defense “‘protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” ... Officer Early thus did not violate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the district court correctly found him entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 may be denied summary judgment on qualified immunity when the record, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, does not require it.

Iris Weekley v. Nick Embry · filed 2014-03-05

Drawing all inferences and viewing this record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 1 we accept that summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not demanded at this stage in the proceedings.

Qualified immunity is a defense to a Section 1983 claim against a public official.

Crum v. Compton Unif. School Dist. CA2/2 · filed 2014-03-05

Qualified immunity is a defense to a claim under section 1983.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, shows a violation of clearly established law.

Flythe v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-03-07

Moreover, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts regarding the constitutional violation prong of the qualified immunity analysis suggest that Officer Vazquez’s conduct violated clearly established law at the time—because it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to use deadly force against an unarmed individual with his hands in the air, who otherwise posed no threat to the officer or others. Thus, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for Officer Vazquez must be denied.

Prison officials cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim on the ground that the duty to provide care for serious medical needs was unclear in 2009.

Consonery v. Pelzer · filed 2014-03-07

This standard was clearly established in 2009, when Consonery was incarcerated at WCCF.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the circumstances provide no arguable probable cause.

Huff v. Reichert · filed 2014-03-10

Under these circumstances, we do not see even arguable probable cause. Even if two arrests from a decade ago were moderately relevant, it is hard to see how those arrests in conjunction with driving through a high-crime area would lead a prudent, reasonable officer to conclude that Huff was committing a crime. Therefore, Reichert is not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ claims of false arrest.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 unreasonable-seizure claim when no reasonable officer could believe the warrantless arrest was lawful on the information available.

Bechman v. Magill · filed 2014-03-11

The district court correctly determined that no reasonable police officer could actually believe Bechman’s warrantless arrest was lawful, given the information supplied to the officers and the circumstances surrounding Bechman’s arrest.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer from an unlawful arrest claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful.

Tibbett v. McPherson · filed 2014-03-11

In addition, the court finds that under the facts most favorable to Tibbett, a reasonable officer could not have believed it was lawful to arrest Tibbett. Therefore, the court declines to grant qualified immunity, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 19) is DENIED.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law did not put them on notice that their conduct was unlawful.

MacDonald v. Town of Eastham · filed 2014-03-12

Given the nature of the qualified immunity inquiry, it is sufficient to hold — as we do in this opinion — that because these questions are not resolved by clearly established law, the officers who entered and searched the plaintiff's dwelling are entitled to the shield of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 wrongful arrest claim survives dismissal when the alleged facts show that the officer could not reasonably conclude there was probable cause.

Karunyan v. United States · filed 2014-03-13

The district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Defendant Special Agent Lauren Hanover on the wrongful arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In these circumstances, it was unreasonable for Hanover to conclude that there was probable cause that Karunyan specifically intended to engage in fraudulent criminal behavior.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Beckstrand v. Read · filed 2014-03-14

Beckstrand has failed to show he had a clearly established Fourth Amendment right against overdetention. Accordingly, we reverse the district court on the Fourth Amendment claim and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment to Read and Simmons.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliatory regulatory action when the plaintiff’s rights were clearly established, even if the officials had grounds to act.

Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene · filed 2014-03-19

Properly assuming on this interlocutory appeal that defendants retaliated against Royal Crown for speech protected by the First Amendment, defendants’ action was not objectively reasonable. Royal Crown’s First Amendment and substantive due process rights to be free from retaliation and irrational government action in response to its letter to Senator Golden were clearly established at the time that defendants closed down plaintiffs day care facility. ... Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim at summary judgment when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, any reasonable officer would have believed the force was excessive.

Hawkins v. Carmean · filed 2014-03-20

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Hawkins, we conclude that any reasonable officer in Carmean’s situation would have believed her use of force to be excessive. Carmean is, therefore, not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.