42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 allows civil damages claims against officials for violations of clearly established constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Alston v. Read · filed 2011-12-14

We conclude that there is no clearly established duty on a prison official to review a prisoner’s original court records beyond those in his institutional file on the facts of this case. Thus, Read and Simmons are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the official could reasonably have believed the arrest was lawful under clearly established law and the information available at the time.

Haley v. Elsmere Police Department · filed 2011-12-15

Regarding claims of false arrest, “[A]n arresting agent is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she could reasonably (even if erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed at the time by the arresting agent.”

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities may be barred by qualified immunity.

Maffeo v. Nevada Ex Rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education · filed 2011-12-15

Dean West was manifestly protected in her individual capacity by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Feis v. KING COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT. · filed 2011-12-19

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have been aware.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue a personal-capacity claim despite a qualified immunity defense.

Jones v. Quintana · filed 2011-12-19

Currently before the Court is Quintana’s [58] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”), through which Quintana seeks the dismissal of Jones’ claim against her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), contending that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall DENY Quintana’s [58] Motion to Dismiss.

Section 1983 claims against individual correctional officers may be barred by qualified immunity.

Estate of Gaither v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-12-19

Relying upon the doctrine of qualified immunity, the Defendant Correctional Officers now seek judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them in their personal capacities. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT the Defendant Correctional Officers’ [232/233] Motion for Summary Judgment.

Section 1983 allows damages claims for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Feis v. King County Sheriff's Department · filed 2011-12-19

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have been aware. ... Determining entitlement to qualified immunity requires a two-part inquiry, asking (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the complaining party, show that an official’s conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. ... If either question can be answered in the negative, then qualified immunity applies to shield government officials from liability.

Section 1983 authorizes damages claims against state actors who deprive others of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Kerns v. Bader · filed 2011-12-20

A plaintiff can overcome this presumption of immunity only by carrying the heavy burden of showing both that (1) the defendant-officer in question violated one of his constitutional rights, and (2) the infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that “every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing” violated the law.

Qualified immunity protects a government official from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wysocki v. Crump · filed 2011-12-20

Because Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws by persons acting under color of state law.

Freels v. County of Tipton, Tennessee · filed 2011-12-21

Upon hearing oral argument and carefully considering the arguments and record on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officials from money damages in § 1983 claims unless the plaintiff shows a statutory or constitutional violation and a clearly established right.

Ochser v. Gerard funk/anthony Cruz · filed 2011-12-21

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is governed by federal law. See Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State, 206 Ariz. 529, 532 ¶ 8, 81 P.3d 320, 323 (2003). The doctrine “shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Section 1983 permits civil claims for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law and subjects those claims to qualified-immunity limits.

Johnson v. Phillips · filed 2011-12-22

Phillips is not entitled to qualified immunity for the search of the passenger compartment, however, because he acted outside the clearly established boundaries of his authority as an Auxiliary Reserve Police Officer. ... We therefore conclude that Phillips is not entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s claim for unlawful search of her vehicle.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity unless the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Miles v. Baker · filed 2011-12-28

We now turn to the question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. “Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... First Amendment protection for Miles’s speech is clearly established. ... At this stage of the proceedings, factual issues remain which preclude the granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to qualified immunity when the defendant's conduct was not prohibited by clearly established law.

Ricciuti v. Gyzenis · filed 2011-12-28

On the record currently before it, the Court finds that Ms. Ricciuti’s speech was protected under the First Amendment, that the law clearly established this in 2009, and that the Defendants’ affirmative defenses hinge on questions of material fact that remain in dispute.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Scozzari v. City of Clare · filed 2012-01-04

In this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants Dwayne Miedzianowski and Jeremy McGraw (collectively, “Defendants” or “the Officers”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. We AFFIRM. ... Government officials may invoke qualified immunity as a defense only “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional rights violations under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Cantrell v. City of Murphy · filed 2012-01-04

Even with this favorable assumption, however, the Cantrells are unable to show that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on what remains of their Fourth Amendment claim. Put simply, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to detain Ave.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity unless officials violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights while performing discretionary functions.

Shirk v. Forsmark · filed 2012-01-05

Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability. ... To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must plead a constitutional violation, and the constitutional right allegedly violated must have been "clearly established" at the time of the action in question.

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for a prisoner's excessive force claim against a corrections officer, subject to qualified immunity.

Dobbins v. J.C. Giles · filed 2012-01-09

Thus, when a plaintiff making an excessive force claim “has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment” demonstrating that the officer used force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, he has necessarily established the two prongs required to defeat a defense of qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Hulett qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Howard v. Nunley · filed 2012-01-09

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Nunley on Howard’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding the use of pepper spray on the basis of qualified immunity, because it is uncontested that Howard disobeyed an order to stop pounding on his cell door after he also received a warning that failure to comply would result in the use of pepper spray.

Section 1983 claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Olson v. Ak State Trooper G. Ken Zabala · filed 2012-01-10

We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Zabala on the basis of qualified immunity because any potential constitutional violation resulting from Zabala’s use of a taser against Olson, where Olson was actively resisting arrest and threatening officers, was not clearly established when the incident occurred in 2005.

Section 1983 provides the action in which the court rejects qualified immunity where a triable dispute remains over violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Delgado v. Barnes · filed 2012-01-10

California state prisoner Kenneth R. Delgado appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging, inter alia, that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety. ... Contrary to defendants’ contention, Barnes is not entitled to qualified immunity because there remains a triable dispute as to whether he violated ... Delgado’s clearly established constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 damages claim, an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a right that was clearly established at the time.

Guttman v. Khalsa · filed 2012-01-11

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate on the facts alleged that (1) the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity. ... Since the individual defendants in this case did not employ Guttman in the first place, much less defame him in the context of terminating his employment, their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an officer who permits a prolonged police dog attack on a compliant suspect attempting to surrender.

Edwards v. Shanley · filed 2012-01-12

In sum, we hold that clearly established federal law prohibits the police from subjecting a compliant subject who is attempting to surrender to a lengthy dog attack. As a result, we reverse the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Shanley.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing the alleged violation was not clearly established at the time.

Johannes v. Hernandez · filed 2012-01-12

Even if Johannes could show that he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights when he was placed in wrist restraints for thirty minutes after he refused to obey orders, the district court properly concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding detention of individuals awaiting SVP proceedings was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation in 2003.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot claim qualified immunity for conduct that could not reasonably be thought constitutional.

Grayson v. Schuler · filed 2012-01-13

He seems just to have been applying the Rastafarian exception, which could not reasonably be thought constitutional. So neither on substantive nor immunity grounds can the grant of summary judgment be upheld.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about probable cause and concealed or fabricated evidence remain disputed.

Gutierrez v. Solano · filed 2012-01-17

In support of qualified immunity for Detective Solano and Deputy Velasco, Defendants simply repeat that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and that the Detective and Deputy did not fabricate or conceal any evidence. As discussed, there are genuine disputes as to these material facts. The court therefore denies Defendants’ Motion as to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when the officer had arguable probable cause and reasonably believed the request to move was lawful.

Zalaski v. City of Hartford · filed 2012-01-18

As discussed above, since it was objectively reasonable for a police officer to believe a request that struck a balance between the speaker’s right to expression and the government’s interest in safety, pedestrian traffic and ensuring the rights of permit-holders was lawful, Defendant Albert had arguable probable cause and would also be entitled to qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of their arrest.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate a constitutional right.

Cicchiello v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2012-01-20

We conclude that because defendants did not violate a constitutional right, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim when the official’s policy for investigating protective-custody requests is not deliberately indifferent.

Ronnie Morgan, Jr. v. Marlin Gusman · filed 2012-01-20

Therefore, we find that Hubert was entitled to qualified immunity and REVERSE the district court’s denial of Hubert’s motion for summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent the court from determining whether the officer reasonably believed his conduct was lawful.

Hodge v. Village of Southampton · filed 2012-01-20

Here, the Court examines qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs surviving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of excessive force. The Court concludes that defendant Hun-sucker has failed to set forth undisputed evidence that establishes that he is entitled to qualified immunity; rather there are disputed issues of fact in this case that must be resolved in order to determine whether qualified immunity would be warranted.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could believe that entering a home was necessary to prevent imminent violence.

Ryburn v. Huff · filed 2012-01-23

Judge Rawlinson’s analysis of the qualified immunity issue was correct.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary public duties are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law would not have made the unlawfulness of their conduct clear to a reasonable official.

Sherrod v. Johnson · filed 2012-01-23

Plaintiff failed to present any precedent, and the Court is aware of none, to suggest that a reasonable principal and superintendent armed with the knowledge they possessed, to include the unsatisfactory performance reviews, would know they could not recommend and/or adopt a recommendation to terminate Sherrod. Accordingly, Johnson and Crutchfield are entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff must present facts showing a violation of clearly established law to overcome an officer’s qualified immunity.

Hernandez v. City of Las Cruces, New Mexico · filed 2012-01-25

Qualified immunity, however, may be abrogated only if the plaintiff presents facts suggesting a violation of clearly established law. Because that much hasn’t happened in this case, we are obliged to reverse.

An official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Porter v. Jewell · filed 2012-01-27

Because Porter failed to establish that Officer Jewell’s conduct resulted in a constitutional violation, Officer Jewell was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the use of deadly force was reasonable and no clearly established law gave fair notice that the conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

Terrell v. Smith · filed 2012-01-30

After thorough review, we conclude that Officer Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. The use of deadly force was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case; what’s more, there was no clearly established law at the time of the incident that would have given Smith fair notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

A defendant cannot obtain qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at dismissal when the pleaded facts prevent the court from finding that the conduct complied with clearly established law or was objectively reasonable.

Peters v. City of Buffalo · filed 2012-01-30

However, assuming the facts stated in Peters’ second amended complaint are true, this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Clark and Marusak’s actions did not violate clearly established law. Furthermore, this Court cannot find as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for those Defendants to believe their conduct did not violate the law. Accordingly, neither is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Peters’ § 1983 claim at this time.

Qualified immunity for a child-services caseworker must be assessed against the particular § 1983 claims asserted.

Southerland v. City of New York · filed 2012-02-02

The plaintiffs -- a father and his children -- bring various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that Woo, a children's services caseworker employed by the defendant City of New York, entered their home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of the children into state ... custody. The district court concluded that Woo was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed with respect to the father's substantive due process claim, but vacated and remanded with respect to the father's and children's Fourth Amendment unlawful-search and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims, and the children's Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Martin v. Hilkey · filed 2012-02-02

We agree with the district court that when Deputy Henderson submitted his search-warrant affidavit, the law was not clearly established that Mr. Martin was exempt from Colorado’s current felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a warrant and indictment establish probable cause and the plaintiff identifies no false statement by the officer.

Shine v. Tyler Banister · filed 2012-02-02

Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting Mars’ Motion for Summary Judgment in the issue of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on an officer who relies on a later-invalidated warrant unless the application’s lack of probable cause made that reliance unreasonable.

Cannaday v. Sandoval · filed 2012-02-02

An officer who relies on a warrant later declared invalid will not be liable for damages under § 1983 unless the warrant application was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” ... Nothing in the record suggests that any of the officers had reason to question the warrant at the time of the search.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated clearly established law.

Sama v. Hannigan · filed 2012-02-03

Given the dearth of case law and the existence of at least some case law supporting the position that Hannigan’s and Benoit’s conduct was not contrary to clearly established law, Sama has failed to rebut the defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim, and summary judgment was appropriate.

An official claiming qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit must first show that he performed a discretionary function; the plaintiff must then show a violation of a clearly established right.

Barnes v. Zaccari · filed 2012-02-07

To claim qualified immunity, a defendant must first show he was performing a discretionary function. ... The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. ... Here, it is undisputed that Zaccari was performing a discretionary function.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether the officer violated a clearly established right and acted reasonably.

Kinzer v. Schuckmann · filed 2012-02-07

Rather, accepting Plaintiffs version of events, we must decide whether grabbing and twisting the wrist of middle-aged woman about to enter flash flood water, without first ordering her to stop, constitutes excessive force during the course of a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Reluctantly, we cannot answer this question with a definitive “no,” and, under the totality of circumstances, whether the right was clearly established and whether the officer acted reasonably depends on questions of fact which only a jury is privileged to resolve. Accordingly, summary judgment is improper.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a section 1983 claim when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time.

DeNucci v. Henningsen · filed 2012-02-08

Accordingly, Henningsen was entitled to qualified immunity, and the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict on plaintiffs section 1983 claim.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 may be protected by qualified immunity.

Sharp v. Johnson · filed 2012-02-09

We will affirm the judgment for Defendants on the First Amendment Action because the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by qualified immunity (discussed in greater detail infra Section II.B.2).

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence supports a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Paden v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-02-09

In the case at bar, the Court finds that qualified immunity is not applicable. First, in light of the Court’s findings in Part III.A and B plaintiff has presented evidence to support a violation of his constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of association. Second, the cases cited in Part III.A and B, demonstrate that the right to free speech and freedom of association were clearly established at the time of Keeling’s alleged misconduct. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Keeling is not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Officials who violate a clearly established free exercise right are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Colvin v. Caruso · filed 2012-02-09

Neither Riley nor Burnett are entitled to qualified immunity on the 1983 claim. They violated Colvin’s clearly established free exercise right.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, which can shield individuals from the suit itself.

Golembiewski v. Logie · filed 2012-02-09

Section 1983 claims are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, which, if applicable, shields individuals not just against liability, but against the suit itself.

Section 1983 does not provide wrongful arrest damages against an officer when the identification procedure used was not clearly established as unconstitutional at the time.

Phillips v. Allen · filed 2012-02-10

A rule of law devised after the events does not support an award of damages; officer Allen would be entitled to qualified immunity. ... But Phillips does not have a damages remedy for wrongful arrest under §1983 and the fourth amendment.

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages under § 1983 when the official could reasonably but mistakenly believe a retaliatory demotion was constitutional.

Hunt v. County of Orange · filed 2012-02-13

We agree with the district court, however, that although Carona’s demotion of Hunt in retaliation for campaign speech violated the First Amendment, Carona is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield officers through qualified immunity when the evidence viewed in the plaintiff’s favor shows that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Gatling v. Roland · filed 2012-02-14

Roland and Mincey now appeal the district court’s qualified immunity ruling. We affirm. The court correctly held that the evidence considered in the light most favorable to Gatling2 demonstrated that Roland and Mincey’s conduct violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

In a Section 1983 claim, once an official establishes that the challenged conduct was within the scope of discretionary authority, the plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity.

Lelieve v. Oroso · filed 2012-02-14

Here it is undisputed that Belfort was a government official performing discretionary functions at the time of the condüct at issue. Therefore, the burden shifts to Lelieve to demonstrate that Belfort violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right to overcome the qualified-immunity defense.

A qualified immunity defense to a Section 1983 claim raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must appear on the face of the complaint.

King v. Barton · filed 2012-02-15

When presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a qualified immunity defense must appear on the complaint’s face.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would know the alleged use of deadly force was unlawful.

Johnson v. Rankin · filed 2012-02-16

The Defendant is alleged to have shot an apparently unarmed man who had his hands up, or at least visible, and was, at most, stumbling in the officer’s direction. A reasonable officer in these circumstances could not have believed that such conduct was lawful, and, as a result, the Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 gives officers qualified immunity from personal liability for a search under a magistrate-approved warrant when its alleged defect would not have been obvious to a reasonable officer.

Messerschmidt v. Millender · filed 2012-02-22

The Court of ... Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the warrant was invalid, and that the officers were not entitled to immu- nity from personal liability because this invalidity was so obvious that any reasonable officer would have recognized it, despite the magistrate’s approval. We disagree and reverse.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity if the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time, even if their conduct was unconstitutional.

Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2012-02-23

Because neither case law, nor external sources, nor “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent” in taser use, Hope, 536 U.S. at 745, 122 S.Ct. 2508, would have put every reasonable officer on notice that Hall’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment in July 2008, we hold that Hall is entitled to qualified immunity, even if he did use excessive force.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Kowolonek v. Moore · filed 2012-02-23

Therefore, we find that even if the officers violated Kowolonek’s constitutional rights, those rights were not clearly established, and thus the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show a violation of a clearly established right.

Montoya v. City of Flandreau · filed 2012-02-23

We further conclude the constitutional right Officer Hooper allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the misconduct, as required by the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

Physicians are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim when the evidence does not show deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

Sama v. Hannigan · filed 2012-02-23

There is no evidence that Benoit and Hannigan were deliberately indifferent to Sama’s serious medical needs, and they are entitled to qualified immunity on Sama’s Eighth Amendment claim.

Officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Dixon v. Bannister · filed 2012-02-25

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable official would know that offering to extract Plaintiffs teeth and place a partial denture rather than allowing the prisoner to visit an outside dentist to provide veneers or crowns would amount to a violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff therefore has failed to demonstrate a clearly established right and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Hoyt v. Cooks · filed 2012-02-27

Accordingly, Cooks and Harkleroad are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim.

In a § 1983 claim against officials performing discretionary functions, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Finn v. Haddock · filed 2012-02-29

In this case, it is undisputed that Deputies Rackard and Stone were performing discretionary functions. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for using body pressure to restrain a prone, handcuffed person who poses no serious safety threat because existing law clearly established that this violates the Fourth Amendment.

Tucker v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2012-03-02

Turning to the clearly established law inquiry, we conclude that existing law recognized a Fourth Amendment violation where two officers use their body pressure to restrain a delirious, prone, and handcuffed individual who poses no serious safety threat.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Martin v. Conner · filed 2012-03-02

Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages under § 1983 when their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts show no violation of a constitutional right.

Fisher Sand & Gravel, Co. v. Girón · filed 2012-03-06

Because FSG-NM did not have a protected property interest in the Project Contract, there could be no deprivation of due process. Mr. Girón and Mr. Valerio are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on FSG’s procedural due process claim.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a Section 1983 action when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Deligiannis v. City of Anaheim · filed 2012-03-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Deligiannis’s Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims on the basis of qualified immunity because, at the time of the incident, it was not clearly established whether Deligiannis was entitled to a warrant or a pre-seizure hearing before defendants seized his vehicle under California statute for failure to pay multiple parking tickets.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional prohibition was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

King v. Cuomo · filed 2012-03-07

Thus, because neither clearly established principles of double jeopardy nor due process prohibited defendants from administratively imposing legislatively mandated PRS terms before 2006, or from obtaining judicial resentencing of offenders already released from their determinate prison terms before 2010, the district court correctly granted dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity.

A government official has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Leavey v. Detroit, City of · filed 2012-03-09

Because Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation consisting of a violation of her First Amendment rights, the defense of qualified immunity applies in the instant action.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims, including conspiracy claims, against officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Conner v. Heiman · filed 2012-03-09

Because Neil and Heiman did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity protects them from Conner’s claims under § 1983, and they are entitled to summary judgment on those claims. The finding that Neil and Heiman have qualified immunity also bars Conner’s § 1983 conspiracy claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim merely because the plaintiff suffered no injury when the law clearly established that injury was unnecessary.

Velius v. Township of Hamilton · filed 2012-03-09

Thus, the broad rule that non-injurious force can rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation forecloses any claim to qualified immunity in this case.

An official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, even if a constitutional right is assumed.

Waganfeald v. Gusman · filed 2012-03-12

Rather, we hold only that in light of the security risks and unique emergency conditions he faced, Hunter did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner under clearly established law. The district court therefore erred by not granting Hunter qualified immunity as a matter of law.

An officer is protected from Section 1983 false-arrest liability if there was arguable probable cause for any one of the arrest charges.

McComas v. Brickley · filed 2012-03-13

The existence of arguable probable cause for either charge is enough to bar liability for false arrest under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, which can shield officials from liability and from the suit itself.

Jones v. Sandusky County · filed 2012-03-13

Section 1983 claims are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity which, if applicable, shields individuals not just against liability, but against the suit itself.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity.

Trendle v. Campbell · filed 2012-03-14

Upon careful review, we conclude that Campbell was entitled to qualified immunity.

A sheriff sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the evidence does not show that he acted unreasonably in delegating an investigation.

Dowling v. Arpaio · filed 2012-03-14

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Arpaio acted unreasonably in his delegation of the investigation to Hendershott, Arpaio is entitled to qualified immunity on the Section 1983 Retaliatory Prosecution claim and Maricopa County is entitled to Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiffs’ claim of retaliatory prosecution based on actions taken by Arpaio.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a prison official when clearly established law required the official to respond to a serious risk of inmate assault without certainty that an attack would occur.

Billups v. Lomeli · filed 2012-03-15

Moreover, Lomeli is not entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the events at issue, the law was clearly established that the deliberate indifference standard “does not require that the guard or official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault.” Berg, 794 F.2d at 459 (citations ... and internal quotation marks omitted).

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing law clearly established that their specific conduct violated a federal right.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Braddy · filed 2012-03-16

In this case, because the preexisting law at the time did not already clearly establish that what the social workers did violated the Victim’s federal rights, we must reverse the District Court’s denial of summary judgment. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when existing law did not give fair notice that their conduct was unlawful.

Sisney v. Reisch · filed 2012-03-19

As a result, the SDSP Officials did not have fair notice it was unlawful to deny Sisney’s project applications. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting these Officials qualified immunity on Sisney’s claims for denial of his 2004, 2005, and 2006 project applications.

Individual officials may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the complaint fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation.

Manza v. Newhard · filed 2012-03-20

In sum, because the complaint fails to state a plausible substantive due process claim, much less one that any reasonable official would have recognized was violated by the conduct at issue, we identify no error in the district court’s dismissal of this claim either outright or, with respect to the individual defendants, on grounds of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim facing qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show facts constituting a constitutional violation; the court decides whether the law was clearly established.

Sims v. Leonard · filed 2012-03-20

By entering judgment here, the district court imposed a requirement that Sims establish a “legal fact,” that the defendants’ conduct violated “clearly established” constitutional principles; but Sims needed only to show facts constituting a constitutional violation.

Broad, conclusory allegations against defendants as a group do not overcome an individual official’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Pearce v. LaBella · filed 2012-03-22

But in the present case, the plaintiffs’ broad and conclusory allegations against “the defendants” as a group do not suffice to overcome Roefaro’s individual qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under Section 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Charles Choyce, Jr. v. Velez · filed 2012-03-22

The district court similarly did not err in finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity insofar as Choyce was suing them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity generally shields government officials performing discretionary functions, such as the administration of medical care, from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated a constitutional right.

Crumbley v. Dawson · filed 2012-03-22

Crumbley failed to show that the Officer Helem’s alleged conduct violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir. 1989). Thus, the district court did not err in providing Helem qualified immunity from this claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established under the circumstances.

Patrick v. Moorman · filed 2012-03-23

Even if we did not conclude that Moorman’s apprehension of Patrick satisfied the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, Moorman would still be entitled to qualified immunity and a grant of summary judgment on Patrick’s claim.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officers who actively participate in force against a handcuffed person who is not resisting.

Hilger v. Velazquez · filed 2012-03-26

Thus, taking the facts in a light most favorable to Hilger, both officers, including the intervening officer, were active participants from the beginning and not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they do not violate clearly established rights or reasonably believe their conduct does not violate those rights.

Hall v. State of New York · filed 2012-03-27

In this case, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellee, we conclude that defendants-appellants Stevens and Weinstock are entitled to summary judgment because they did not violate Hall’s clearly established constitutional rights and, at the very least, it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate such rights.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Pendleton v. Goord · filed 2012-03-27

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any conduct with respect to the plaintiff’s September 2007 arrest and incarceration for violation of the terms of his PRS. It was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe, given the murky legal landscape that followed Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2006), that they were not violating plaintiffs rights in September 2007 by continuing to enforce his term of PRS.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, even if that belief was mistaken.

Fleming v. Livingston County, Ill. · filed 2012-03-28

In this case there was certainly arguable probable cause.

In a Section 1983 suit, an official who asserts qualified immunity shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct violated clearly established law.

Crumbley v. Dawson · filed 2012-03-28

While the defendant official must initially assert the defense, “[o]nce the defendant has done so the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut this defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.”

In a § 1983 suit, a court denying summary judgment on qualified immunity must explain whether it applied both steps of the immunity inquiry to the claims.

Jones v. McNeese · filed 2012-03-29

Rather, we remand because the analysis is so scant that we are unable to discern if the district court even applied both steps of the qualified immunity inquiry to all of the summary judgment claims.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute determines whether the official violated clearly established rights.

Paige v. Coyner · filed 2012-03-29

After careful consideration of the arguments presented by both parties, the Court finds that summary judgment is improper because resolution of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity hinges on a determination of fact.

A local officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Gomez v. Fiessner · filed 2012-03-30

From our review, we conclude that this account does make out a violation of the Gomezes’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Feissner therefore does not have qualified immunity from this claim.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence shows that he knowingly initiated criminal proceedings without probable cause.

Henderson v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-03-30

If the facts are taken in the light most favorable to Henderson, Gress knowingly arrested Henderson and initiated criminal proceedings against her without any cause, let alone probable cause. Clearly, his actions were not objectively reasonable and were not done in good faith. ... Thus, Gress is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the facts do not show a constitutional rights violation.

Bean v. Indiana University · filed 2012-03-30

The facts do not demonstrate that University Defendants violated Ms. Hilder’s constitutional rights; therefore, we need not proceed with the analysis. University Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

Prison officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the requirements for meaningful segregation reviews were not clearly established at the time.

Toevs v. Reid · filed 2012-04-02

Nevertheless, because at the time it was not clearly established that the review process should apply throughout each level of the QLLP and that the perfunctory reviews given to Mr. Toevs at Levels 1-3 and the failure to provide any reviews whatsoever at Levels 4-6 would not be considered meaningful given the rehabilitative justification for this segregation program, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer with at least arguable probable cause is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Gaston v. City of New York · filed 2012-04-02

Accordingly, since Det. George had actual probable cause but only need to have had arguable probable cause to be entitled to qualified immunity, Det. George is entitled to summary judgment on Gaston’s false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims on qualified immunity grounds.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Ainsworth v. Norris · filed 2012-04-04

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for money damages unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the official violated a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time the challenged conduct occurred. ... In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court properly found that Norris was entitled to qualified immunity on Michael’s excessive force claim.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Ahlers v. Rabinowitz · filed 2012-04-06

Accordingly, we construe the complaint as a claim for money damages and conclude that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Barrett v. Belleque · filed 2012-04-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Barrett’s claim for damages because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Stevenson v. Carroll · filed 2012-04-06

We also agree with the District Court that qualified immunity shields Carroll in his individual capacity from monetary damages.

In a § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim, qualified immunity requires the plaintiff to show a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Cobbs v. Pramstaller · filed 2012-04-10

We apply a two-step test to qualified immunity claims in deliberate-indifference cases, determining (1) whether, based upon the applicable law, a constitutional violation has occurred; and (2) whether that violation involved a clearly established constitutional right. ... While Cobbs’s need for the second operation seems evident in hindsight, we cannot conclude that Pramstaller’s decisions to delay surgery constituted deliberate indifference in light of his limited knowledge.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the law is clearly established and no reasonable officer would believe the force was lawful in the circumstances.

Weather v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2012-04-11

The law protecting a person against excessive force in this situation is clearly established. Weather was breaking no law, was not resisting arrest, and was not placing himself or others in danger. No reasonable officer would believe that “twisting Mr. Weather’s arm behind his back and pushing or shoving him into the brick wall outside the school” was a lawful use of force in this circumstance, and appellants point us to no cases that indicate otherwise.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the unlawfulness of the force would not have been clear to every reasonable officer under the circumstances.

Borquez v. City of Tucson · filed 2012-04-11

Given the jury’s finding that Borquez grabbed Pacheco’s arm, we conclude that it would not have been sufficiently clear to every reasonable officer whether Pacheco’s shove was unlawful under these conditions. ... Therefore, Pacheco is entitled to qualified immunity.

A factual dispute that determines whether officers violated a constitutional right and are entitled to qualified immunity can preclude summary judgment in a § 1983 action.

Sloan v. Dulak · filed 2012-04-11

The Court finds that the factual issue of how long Sloan was stopped prior to being tackled is dispositive of whether Sloan’s constitutional rights were violated and whether the Officers are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when material facts about arguable probable cause for an arrest remain disputed.

Salazar v. Walters · filed 2012-04-16

The district court did not err when it ruled that Walters was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A private individual retained by the government to perform its work may seek qualified immunity in a §1983 suit even if the individual is not a permanent, full-time government employee.

Filarsky v. Delia · filed 2012-04-17

The Court of Appeals rejected Filarsky’s claim to the protection accorded Wells, Bekker, and Peel solely because he was not a permanent, full-time employee of the City. The common law, however, did not draw such distinctions, and we see no justification for doing so under §1983.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Youngbey v. March · filed 2012-04-17

We agree that appellants are entitled to qualified immunity because neither their no-knock entry of appellees’ home nor their nighttime search violated “clearly established law.”

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 claim when reasonable officers could conclude there was probable cause for the arrest.

Radocchia v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2012-04-17

McPartland is entitled to qualified immunity because reasonable police officers could conclude there was probable cause for Radocchia’s arrest by McPartland.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when his conduct does not violate a plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Calton v. Livingston · filed 2012-04-19

The summary judgment evidence here supports the district court’s conclusions that Hallman’s actions did not rise to this level and that Hallman was entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials sued under § 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable official would know.

Whitney v. City of Milan · filed 2012-04-24

Government officials are immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing discretionary duties, provided “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). ... Here, Whitney’s right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in the City’s government was clearly established. Therefore, Crider is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Under § 1983, consulting a prosecutor and obtaining an arrest warrant do not establish qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed.

Merchant v. Bauer · filed 2012-04-26

As a result, the district court did not err in ruling that Officer Bauer is not, at this stage of the litigation, entitled to qualified immunity on Merchant’s § 1983 claim.

Bail bondsmen acting under color of state law are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims.

Gregg v. Ham · filed 2012-04-30

In sum, neither history nor policy support extending the qualified immunity defense to bail bondsmen.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from § 1983 liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Molina-Gomes v. Welinski · filed 2012-04-30

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa · filed 2012-04-30

Officials being sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for actions that did not violate a clearly established constitutional right at the time of the alleged violation such that reasonable officials acting in the officials’ position would not have understood they were violating that right. ... Assuming a Fourth Amendment right against malicious prosecution exists, such a right was not clearly established when the appellees were prosecuted in 1977 and 1978.

A police officer may be entitled to qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Cornell v. Kapral · filed 2012-05-01

Upon a review of the record and the arguments of counsel, we reject Cornell’s remaining arguments, including his argument in the alternative that Kapral is not entitled to qualified immunity, as lacking in merit.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

McAllister v. DeSoto County, Mississippi, e · filed 2012-05-01

Because McAllister has not alleged a constitutional violation, Coleman and Davis are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, officers can receive qualified immunity when they reasonably could believe their conduct was lawful, without a decision on whether it violated the Constitution.

Burke v. Sullivan · filed 2012-05-03

Because the instant matter concerns a claim of qualified immunity, not a motion to suppress evidence, we need not reach the issue of whether the officers violated the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim when clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer on notice that his use of force was unlawful.

Shekleton v. Eichenberger · filed 2012-05-03

Qualified immunity protects officers from liability in a section 1983 case “unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... As in Brown, we agree that the general constitutional principles against excessive force that were clearly established at the time of the incident between Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were such as to put a reasonable officer on notice that tasering Shekleton under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton was excessive force in violation of the clearly established law.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Morris v. Cross · filed 2012-05-03

Because Morris failed to show a constitutional violation, the district court properly concluded that Cross, Agapiou, and Milligan were entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when officers of reasonable competence could disagree about the legality of their actions.

Griffin v. Hannaford · filed 2012-05-04

In this case, officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether Appellees’ initial entry into and search of Appellant’s hotel room was justified by exigent circumstances. ... Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment on the ground that Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim for using force to coerce consent to a home search when that conduct violated clearly established law.

Hemphill v. Hale · filed 2012-05-10

The law regarding forced consent was clearly established in August 2009 such that a reasonable person in Hale’s position would have known that his actions were unreasonable.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional violations, but qualified immunity protects them when the violated right was not clearly established.

Clemente v. VASLO · filed 2012-05-15

Plaintiffs then filed suit against Frank Vaslo (mayor of Lincoln Park), Duchane, Bartok, and the City for violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Short of threatening termination, what public employers could do to obtain an employee’s consent to conduct an inspection was not clearly established. Duchane and Bartok are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may assert qualified immunity; the court asks whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Edwards v. Eastland County Jail · filed 2012-05-16

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, this court must address the following questions in any order: “(1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Qualified immunity does not apply to official-capacity claims under Section 1983.

Hunter v. Town of Edwards · filed 2012-05-16

Thus, because the defense of qualified immunity is not applicable to official capacity claims under Section 1983, Wilkerson’s Motion to Dismiss, to the extent it seeks the dismissal of such claims, is denied.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Reyes-Reyes v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2012-05-17

Under these circumstances, no reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, Benitez is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in securing the search warrant for the House.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 suit when he reasonably relies on information used to obtain a search warrant, even if that information proves partly incorrect.

Sharpe v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-05-18

The court finds that Detective Clingerman is entitled to qualified immunity. His reliance on the information provided by the suspect’s relative was reasonable and, indeed, the type of information customarily relied on by law enforcement officers.

Section 1983 permits a qualified-immunity defense, but an officer is not entitled to summary judgment when clearly established law prohibits the alleged force and material facts remain disputed.

Hermiz Ex Rel. Estate of Hermiz v. City of Southfield · filed 2012-05-21

Because we decide the legal question—whether “clearly established” Fourth Amendment law prohibited shooting at the driver of a fleeing car from the side, absent indications of an ongoing threat—in the estate’s favor, we affirm the denial of summary judgment against Matatall.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

DeMont v. Bebber · filed 2012-05-22

In sum, however arguable it may be that a person’s pre-application eligibility for VA survivor benefits should be considered a constitutionally protected property right, no such right was “clearly established” at the time Bebber allegedly misinformed DeMont about her eligibility for benefits. Bebber is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court grants summary judgment in his favor on Count II.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they show that they did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right.

Brown v. Fogle · filed 2012-05-17

Therefore, ... the court finds that defendants, having shown that they did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional right, are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the pleaded facts show deliberate indifference to an inmate’s suicide risk, a clearly established right.

Estate of Miller, Ex Rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz · filed 2012-05-24

For example, in Cavalieri v. Shepard, we stated that the right that Cavalieri was asserting is “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to suicide.” 321 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 406 (7th Cir.1992)). Here, plaintiff asserts the same right. We therefore conclude that that right was clearly established in 2009 as it was in 1998.

Qualified immunity can shield an individual defendant in a § 1983 claim from the suit itself.

Reilly v. Vadlamudi · filed 2012-05-25

Section 1983 claims, however, are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity which, if applicable, shields individuals not just against liability, but against the suit itself.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Rhoden v. Mayberg · filed 2012-05-25

The district court properly dismissed Rhoden’s action after concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding the right of civil detainees to regular smoke-free outdoor exercise was not clearly established.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, qualified immunity is assessed using the force officers actually used, even if they intended to use less force.

Kanda v. Longo · filed 2012-05-25

Given that the officers used substantially more force than was intended, for purposes of this inquiry, we ask whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the force that was actually used was lawful under the circumstances. ... We therefore reverse the district court’s determination that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and remand for further proceedings.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established.

R I Inc v. McCarthy · filed 2012-05-29

Assuming arguendo that the NLRA or LMRA preempts the PWA as applied to the facts of this case, thereby providing Plaintiffs with a federal right, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit because that right is not clearly established.

Section 1983 shields officials from damages under qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

M.O.C.H.A. Society, Inc. v. City of Buffalo · filed 2012-05-30

To the extent plaintiffs seek to impose liability under Sections 1981 and 1983 against defendants Sixt and Keane in their individual capacities, those defendants are protected from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are barred by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established right.

Khan v. Newell Normand, Sheriff, et a · filed 2012-06-01

Abdul and Hajera Khan filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claims arising out of their son’s death. ... Qualified immunity protects government officials from money damages unless a plaintiff shows: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. ... Consequently, the defendants are protected by qualified immunity even if their conduct constituted excessive force.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Twiggs v. Selig · filed 2012-06-04

Because Twiggs has failed to offer evidence that could convince a reasonable jury that Angel's and DYS's stated reason for firing her was pretext for intentional discrimination, her claim fails as a matter of law, and both Angel and Selig are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Clark v. Ware · filed 2012-06-04

Assuming arguendo that Johnson’s repeated use of the taser on Clark was excessive, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that it violated clearly established law as of November 2009. Therefore, the Court finds Johnson and Ware are entitled to qualified immunity on Clark’s claims of excessive force and failure to intervene.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated clearly established law.

Brown v. Cwynar · filed 2012-06-07

Even assuming prong one is satisfied and Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, qualified immunity would attach because not “every ‘reasonable official’” in Officer Cuscino’s shoes would have understood “beyond debate” that tasering Brown constituted excessive force.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable fact-finder could find that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Kita v. City of Seattle · filed 2012-06-07

Because a rational fact-finder could conclude that Clay violated Kita’s clearly established constitutional rights, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 state-created danger claim when it was not clearly established that the doctrine covered an official who did not know the specific victim was at risk.

Doe v. Round Valley Unified School District · filed 2012-06-07

Assuming for purposes of argument that (i) John Allen knew Ranee had committed two rapes, (ii) he actively concealed that information, and (iii) but for the concealment Jane Doe would have learned about Ranee’s behavior before she became involved with him, John Allen did not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right because it is not clearly established in the Ninth Circuit whether the state-created danger doctrine applies in situations where the government official creating the danger is not aware of the danger to the specific victim.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer through qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges an unjustified delay in treating serious, visibly bleeding injuries and the unlawfulness of that delay was clearly established.

Alsobrook v. Sergeant E. Medina · filed 2012-06-12

The district court did not err in finding that the law was clearly established at the time of the incident that allegations of an unjustifiable delay of one hour and forty minutes in treating a continuously bleeding “gash to the back of [Alsobrook’s] head, a cut under his right eye, a bloody nose, [and] a cut high on his forehead by the hairline” while his clothes were covered in blood and his face was swelling and bruising, were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying Medina’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about the officer’s conduct are disputed.

Catrena Green v. Throckmorton · filed 2012-06-13

We further conclude that the question of qualified immunity turns on disputed facts—namely, on Green’s ambiguous performance on the field sobriety tests and on whether Throckmorton was being truthful when he claimed that Green could not follow the pen—and thus “the jury, not the judge, must determine liability.” See McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that whether two police officers were entitled to qualified immunity was a question for the jury).

A correction officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates the clearly established duty to protect prisoners from violence and the officer could not reasonably believe the conduct was lawful.

Dennis v. Westchester County Jail Correctional Department · filed 2012-06-13

Hopkins is not entitled to qualified immunity: Correction officers have a clearly established “duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), and we cannot conclude that it was objectively reasonable for Hopkins to believe that his actions (as they are alleged by Dennis) did not violate this duty.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity must be considered for each defendant and each constitutional claim asserted against that defendant.

Handt v. Koffron · filed 2012-06-14

These defendants are entitled to consideration by the district court of their claims to qualified immunity as to each of the constitutional claims asserted against them.

An official sued individually under § 1983 may obtain dismissal on qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

Chiles v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2012-06-15

We review “de novo the district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity.” ... Applying this standard and upon careful consideration of the parties’ appellate briefs, the district court record, and relevant case law, we conclude the district court judge appropriately granted Mr. Jones’s motion to dismiss.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff’s account of the facts defeats that defense.

Anderson v. McCaleb · filed 2012-06-15

The defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when accepting Anderson’s recitation of the facts.

Government officials performing discretionary duties have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights.

Simmonds v. Genesee County · filed 2012-06-19

Government officials are immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing discretionary duties, provided “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). ... The district court properly granted Comstock and Dirkse qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to officials whose conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established rights.

Haiyan v. Hamden Public Schools · filed 2012-06-19

Here the Defendant’s conduct in terminating Haiyan as a Guest Teacher pursuant to the terms of the MOU without a Loudennill hearing was objectively reasonable as a matter of law as a reasonable official would reasonably believe such conduct did not violate a clearly established right. ... Consequently, the individual defendants would also be entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer had fair warning that the alleged force was excessive and material facts remain disputed.

Monetti v. City of Seattle · filed 2012-06-21

Both individual officers here have asserted the defense of qualified immunity from plaintiffs § 1983 claims. ... Because we must assume at this point all facts presented by the non-moving party are true, a reasonable officer would have had fair warning that causing unnecessary pain to restrain a suspect’s hands and legs is excessive force. ... For the above reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim is DENIED as to both individual defendants.