42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against an official in his individual capacity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

SAYED v. Profitt · filed 2010-09-27

Because Mr. Sayed has not established a constitutional violation, his claim against Mr. Profitt in his individual capacity is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Olseth v. SLC Corp. · filed 2010-09-30

In this case, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that even if Ms. Olseth demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether her constitutional rights were violated, Officer Larson was entitled to qualified immunity because his actions did not violated clearly-established law.

An assisting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer reasonably follows a primary officer and has no reason to know the conduct might violate constitutional rights, even if the primary officer is not immune.

Shepard v. Hallandale Beach Police Department · filed 2010-09-30

This Court has concluded that assisting officers during a search are entitled to qualified immunity when there is no indication that they acted unreasonably in following the lead of a primary officer or that they knew or should have known that their conduct might result in a Fourth Amendment violation, even when the primary officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... For these reasons, we cannot say the district court erred in concluding that Officer Budnick was entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Honeycutt v. Ringgold · filed 2010-10-01

“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing immunity from suit from the outset.” ... On the undisputed facts, Mr. Honeycutt has failed to carry his burden to show that Ms. Ringgold was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety, thereby violating a constitutional right. Consequently, the district court erred in denying Ms. Ringgold’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted basis for liability was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Saenz v. City of McAllen · filed 2010-10-04

Because the state created danger theory as a basis of liability was not clearly established at the time the incident occurred, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the claimed constitutional right was not clearly established in the situation they faced.

Gruenberg v. Gempeler · filed 2010-09-30

there was simply no constitutional benchmark here to which prison staff could measure their response. Qualified immunity is designed to shield officials from liability when they exercise their judgment, particularly in gray areas where the contours of the Eighth Amendment are not clear.

Officers who made an arrest supported by probable cause were entitled to qualified immunity from this § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

El v. Crain · filed 2010-10-05

The district court properly determined that even if Ankhenaten Ra El has a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, defendants Smith and Medina are entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Ankhenaten Ra El was supported by probable cause.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity cannot rest on a finding that the Eighth Amendment rights at issue were not clearly established when those rights were clearly established.

Jones v. Neven · filed 2010-10-06

The Eighth Amendment rights Jones claims defendants violated, however, were clearly established.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Faghri v. Univ. of Conn. · filed 2010-10-07

Even accepting as true Faghri’s contentions as to all disputed issues of fact, we conclude that Defendants did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable officer could believe the force used was necessary.

Luchtel v. Hagemann · filed 2010-10-07

Alternatively, even if some degree of force used in subduing Luchtel was excessive, a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed, entitling the officers to qualified immunity.

An officer may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim for enforcing a statute previously held unconstitutional when the officer’s reliance on it was objectively reasonable and the officer had arguable probable cause.

Amore v. Novarro · filed 2010-10-12

In the case at bar, where the defendant acted deliberately and rationally in seeking to determine the then-valid, applicable and enforceable law before taking the actions for which the plaintiff now seeks to hold him accountable, we cannot say that Novarro's arrest of Amore was objectively unreasonable. His immunity stands.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when they had probable cause or reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Burdett v. Reynoso · filed 2010-10-12

Accordingly, the district court properly found that the Arresting Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Gregory Rideau, Jr. v. Woodford · filed 2010-10-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Rideau’s remaining claim as to the denial of outdoor exercise during the seventh prison lockdown because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rideau as the nonmoving party, he failed to raise a triable issue that denying him outdoor exercise under the circumstances violated his constitutional rights.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate a student's clearly established rights.

DeFabio v. East Hampton Union Free School District · filed 2010-10-13

In light of the record in this case, we hold that the Individual Defendants have qualified immunity with respect to Appellants’ First Amendment claims.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged violation was not clearly established.

Hall v. Ekpe · filed 2010-10-13

To the extent Hall sues defendants in their individual capacities, defendants would, in any event, be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity because, although it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that prison officials may not substantially burden the right of free exercise “without some justification,” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 276, it was not clearly established that security and financial concerns could not provide that justification for prisoners who had not demonstrated observance of their professed religion in a manner identified by the prison chaplain for that religion, see Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d at 536.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires consideration of whether the evidence shows a violation of a statutory or constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Tracy v. Freshwater · filed 2010-10-14

Accordingly, when a defendant official invokes qualified immunity as a defense in order to support a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider two questions: (1) whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, makes out a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when their judgment about the force needed to overcome resistance is reasonable.

Statchen v. Palmer · filed 2010-10-15

The qualified immunity defense accepted by the district court disposes of this appeal, and the legal framework for it is straightforward. An arrest is a form of fourth amendment seizure and the use of force to effect it must be reasonable under all the circumstances, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); but under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are themselves entitled to reasonable latitude in making judgments about how much force is necessary to overcome resistance.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Van Lee Brewer v. Simental · filed 2010-10-15

Those governmental officials are entitled to qualified immunity “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

In a § 1983 damages suit, a court may deny officers’ request for qualified immunity before discovery when the complaint plausibly alleges a clearly established constitutional violation.

Swagler v. Neighoff · filed 2010-10-18

As to the First and Fourth Amendment claims, however, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the troopers’ request for qualified immunity in advance of discovery.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by showing a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Dodd v. Jones · filed 2010-10-18

Because the law enforcement officers are entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity in this § 1983 action, Dodd must show both that the facts construed most favorably to him establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the incident, such that a reasonable official would have known his actions were unlawful.

An officer with arguable probable cause to arrest and detain a person is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful detention claim.

Jacobson v. Mott · filed 2010-10-18

This finding entitled Mott to qualified immunity on Jacobson’s § 1983 claim that Mott unlawfully detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and it is of no moment whether Mott also had arguable probable cause to arrest for a different offense.

In a § 1983 public employee speech claim, qualified immunity can protect officials from damages even when retaliation violated the First Amendment; the balance of interests must conclusively favor the employee to defeat immunity.

Camp v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2010-10-18

Even after the Hope decision, there will be cases in which retaliation for speech violates the First Amendment rights of the plaintiff but qualified immunity protects the defendants from a monetary judgment against them. There is a difference between the Pickering balance merely tilting in favor of the plaintiff and it tilting conclusively in his favor; it is the difference between the interests furthered by the plaintiff’s speech merely outweighing the defendant’s interests in restricting it and his interests far outweighing them.

Public school officials sued under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity on substantive due process claims even when they are not entitled to it on equal protection claims.

DiStiso Ex Rel. DiStiso v. Town of Wolcott · filed 2010-10-19

Based upon the above reasoning, the Court holds that Cook, Uccello, and Couture are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiffs equal protection claims. However, the Court further holds that Cook, Uccello, and Couture are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiffs substantive due process claims, and therefore the substantive due process claims are dismissed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Hernandez v. The City of El Paso · filed 2010-10-20

Plaintiff has not established the violation of any clearly established constitutional rights on his individual capacity § 1983 claims as the law existed in 1994. Defendants Jesus Terrones, Guillermo Martinez, Arturo Ruiz, Jr., Antonio Tabullo, Joe Zimmerly, and Pedro Ocegueda, are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s remaining individual capacity § 1983 claims against them.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established Eighth Amendment right.

Campbell v. Smith · filed 2010-10-21

Although we have jurisdiction to consider Smith and McClinen’s claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity because a prison officer’s singular attack on an inmate does not qualify as punishment, we nonetheless conclude it fails because, in June 2008, it was clearly established that the Eighth Amendment forbade the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” against inmates.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an officer when an objectively reasonable officer would have known that the force used violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Raiche v. Pietroski · filed 2010-10-25

Therefore, Pietroski is not entitled to qualified immunity against Raiche's excessive force claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right underlying the claim was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Vendouri v. Gaylord, et al. · filed 2010-10-26

Because Vendouri has identified no other basis for determining that the right on which she bases her claim was clearly established, the school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not require summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, under the plaintiff’s alleged facts, the officer’s conduct is not clearly objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Schmidt v. Gray · filed 2010-10-26

As it is not clear as a matter of law that, under Schmidt’s version of the facts, Gray’s conduct was objectively reasonable, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Gray.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when material facts remain disputed and denial of relevant discovery prejudices the plaintiff.

McMillian v. Wake County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-10-28

Because we conclude the denial of McMillian’s discovery requests substantially prejudiced him, we hold the district court abused its discretion in denying these requests. For these reasons, we conclude the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was premature, particularly in light of the erroneous evidentiary ruling.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Harris v. Alvarado · filed 2010-10-28

In these circumstances, any right that Plaintiff had was not "clearly established," Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009), so Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

A municipal employee sued in an individual capacity under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity unless the claimant shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and objectively unreasonable conduct.

Carter v. Sid J. Champion · filed 2010-10-29

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, a petitioner must state a claim for a violation of a constitutional right, show that the constitutional right was established at the time of the actions at issue, and demonstrate that defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the legal rules clearly established when the defendant acted.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Perkins v. Schwappach · filed 2010-10-29

For the reasons outlined above, the facts that Perkins alleged fail to make out a violation of a constitutional right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Accordingly, the District Court also properly granted Schwappach’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue that they violated a constitutional right.

Hentz v. Ceniga · filed 2010-10-29

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hentz’s claims on qualified immunity grounds because he failed to raise a triable issue that defendants violated any of his constitutional rights.

An official sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

West v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department · filed 2010-10-31

As a result, even if Salazar retaliated against West based on her EEOC complaints, such retaliation does not violate clearly established First Amendment rights, and qualified immunity protects Salazar from West’s First-Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Gilbert v. French · filed 2010-11-01

Thus, because Gilbert did not show that Berndt and Fry’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, the district court did not err in granting them summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Officials facing a Section 1983 claim may receive qualified immunity when the evidence leaves no triable issue that they knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to an inmate’s safety.

Earl Rose , Jr. v. B. Bonnet · filed 2010-11-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because defendants’ moving papers and evidence alone established that there was no triable issue as to whether they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Rose’s safety.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against officers when the law governing their alleged conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Porter v. Hill · filed 2010-11-02

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because the law concerning the opening of prisoners’ legal mail outside their presence was not clearly established at the time the alleged violations occurred.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

LeSUEUR-RICHMOND SLATE CORP. v. FEHRER · filed 2010-11-03

Because the constitutional issue is a close question, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless they transgress rights that are “clearly established.”

A private attorney retained by a city to conduct an internal affairs investigation is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Delia v. City of Rialto · filed 2010-11-08

Accordingly, Filarsky is not entitled to qualified immunity as a private attorney and we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in his favor and remand for trial, or further proceedings as determined by the district court.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity on this record when they could not reasonably believe the employee’s job required political affiliation.

Morin v. Tormey · filed 2010-11-15

The Defendants have also failed to establish that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that Morin was a policymaker such that they would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for excessive force are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct violates no constitutional right or the asserted right was not clearly established.

Crowell v. Kirkpatrick · filed 2010-11-15

In any event, since the facts alleged, even taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, do not amount to a constitutional violation, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. It certainly was not clearly established that the use of force here violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the case law of the Supreme Court or this Circuit.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against an officer when it was reasonable for the officer to believe a warrant affidavit established probable cause.

Payne v. City of Laurel, Maryland · filed 2010-11-15

Further, the district court determined that, in any event, qualified immunity barred Payne’s claims against Officer Proctor because “it was reasonable for Proctor to believe, under the circumstances, that his warrant affidavit exhibited probable cause.” ... Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the controlling authorities, we conclude that the district court’s analysis was correct. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s well reasoned opinion.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the alleged facts show no constitutional violation or the right was not clearly established at the time.

Bolbol v. City of Daly City · filed 2010-11-17

The court must determine whether the facts alleged, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show the violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s evidence could establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

McCoy v. Burns · filed 2010-11-18

For the reasons stated above, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to either of Plaintiffs two claims.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit if the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established when the official acted.

Clark v. Wilson · filed 2010-11-22

In sum, because neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals had applied Sandin’s “atypical and significant hardship” test to the freezing of a prison trust account by 2007, Wilson did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and hence is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was unsettled and reasonable officials could not have known their conduct violated it.

DEL VALLE GROUP v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2010-11-22

In light of the unsettled status of this question of law, reasonable officers in the Individual Defendants’ positions could not have known they were violating Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court GRANTS the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiffs First Amendment claims against Morales and Rodriguez in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when officers reasonably believe their conduct is lawful under the law as it stood at the time.

Ray v. Township of Warren · filed 2010-11-23

Under the circumstances, the officers were not on notice that their conduct was a clear violation of the law, and they acted reasonably in their belief that they could enter Ray’s home for the purpose of checking on his daughter. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Eklund v. City of Seattle Municipal Court · filed 2010-11-24

Bruce E. Eklund (Eklund) brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Seattle Municipal Court (the Municipal Court), the chief judge of the court, Fred Bonner (Bonner), and others. ... Holding that Bonner was entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Bonner.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the constitutional right violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Bryan v. MacPherson · filed 2010-11-30

However, we reverse in part because the violation of Bryan’s constitutional rights was not clearly established at the time that Officer MacPherson fired his taser at Bryan on July 24, 2005.

Qualified immunity protects officers sued under Section 1983 when the law did not clearly warn them that their use of force was unconstitutional.

Barnett v. Florence, Alabama, City of · filed 2010-12-01

In this case, we need not address the first inquiry because, even if we were to assume that the use of force violated the Constitution, Barnett cannot demonstrate ... that the law was so clearly established as to give the officers fair warning that the force used under these circumstances would have violated the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from a § 1983 damages claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Gentilello v. Rege · filed 2010-12-01

The district court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Gentilello had not alleged sufficient facts to state a constitutional violation. We agree.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that their conduct was unlawful.

Meléndez-García v. Sánchez · filed 2010-12-10

We conclude that it would not have been clear to a reasonable official that the conduct about which Meléndez complains was unlawful.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 selective enforcement claim when the plaintiff fails to show that she and her proposed comparator were similarly situated.

Brooks v. Sweeney · filed 2010-12-14

In the absence of such evidence establishing that she and Mathews were similarly situated — in other words, in the absence of a showing that the circumstances pertaining to the septic system problems that the plaintiff and Matthews encountered were substantially similar in all material respects — the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential predicate of her equal protection claim, and, consequently, Sweeney and Huleatt both are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for her § 1983 claims.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

R.K. Ex Rel. J.K. v. Board of Education · filed 2010-12-15

“Government officials who perform discretionary functions are generally protected from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” ... In this case the remaining two prongs of the analysis need not be addressed because Defendants have not violated the Constitution. ... Accordingly, this Court shall dismiss the claims against Defendant Putty in her individual capacity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the evidence does not establish that the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Hartry v. County of Suffolk · filed 2010-12-15

Making all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court cannot conclude that based on the facts and evidence in the record, the Defendants actions were “objectively reasonable” as a matter of law. ... Therefore the Court must deny the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski · filed 2010-12-16

Although the district court erred by holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact whether the defendants regulated their speech based on its content, the defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation.

Cruz v. Palacios · filed 2010-12-16

Whatever the status and scope of a property interest in the immediate possession of the body of a close relative, in the context of a lawful ongoing investigation, no such right was clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. Having failed to establish a necessary element of her § 1983 case, Dela Cruz’s claim necessarily fails, and summary judgment for Palacios on qualified immunity grounds was proper.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless the law was clear enough that a reasonable officer would understand their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Kovacic v. Villarreal · filed 2010-12-17

We hold that defendants Villarreal and Rubio are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. A constitutional right is clearly established for the purposes of section 1983 only if the law is clear enough such that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when clearly established law gave notice that denying a prisoner out-of-cell exercise for almost a year could violate the Eighth Amendment.

Young v. Ericksen · filed 2010-12-20

Qualified immunity fails to defeat Young’s Eighth Amendment out-of-cell exercise claim. ... Under these circumstances, I cannot find as a matter of law that the defendants could have reasonably believed that denying Young out-of-cell exercise for almost an entire year would not constitute a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the officials did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Castle v. Appalachian Technical College · filed 2010-12-21

Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

A public official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a constitutional violation.

Gentilello v. Rege · filed 2010-12-21

The district court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Gentilello had not alleged sufficient facts to state a constitutional violation. We agree.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment based on qualified immunity when disputed facts determine whether they reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest.

McCADD v. Murphy · filed 2010-12-21

Determining whether officers reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest would require the resolution of disputed questions of fact, such as where the vial was located, what it looked like, and whether a police dog alerted to the area where it was found. Accordingly, the defendants cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage on the basis of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity case, a plaintiff who meets the initial burden must still respond with evidence when the defendant’s summary-judgment evidence contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations.

Johnson v. Roberts · filed 2010-12-22

Buchwald is merely addressing the first hurdle that a plaintiff must surmount in responding to a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. If the plaintiff does not make the showing required by Buchwald, the claim must be dismissed. But if the plaintiff makes the showing, the usual rules of summary-judgment practice still apply; and if the defendant presents evidence that contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations, the plaintiff must overcome a second hurdle—namely, responding with evidence, not just allegations.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law when a factual dispute remains over whether they reasonably believed they had authority to exclude someone permanently from public property.

Thomas v. Carroll · filed 2010-12-22

The ODOT defendants have asserted that ODOT has a broad, inherent right as a property owner to exclude persons from the rest area, but they have not demonstrated that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on that basis.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Fredenburg v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2010-12-22

Pete Prolo (“Officer Prolo”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment order denying him qualified immunity with respect to the Fredenburgs’ false imprisonment and Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The facts alleged by the Fredenburgs show that Officer Prolo’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Mauwee v. Donat · filed 2010-12-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against the state officials in their individual capacities because these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a person who poses no immediate threat when doing so violates clearly established law.

Zulock v. Shures · filed 2010-12-22

We now turn to the question of whether Shures is protected by qualified immunity from Zulock’s claim for excessive force. As Shures violated a clearly established constitutional right of Zulock’s of which any reasonable person would have known, we find that the district court appropriately denied Shures’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s account could establish that an officer’s response to a known risk was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Burling v. Simon · filed 2010-12-29

Burling’s version of events, which we must accept as true, demonstrates that Simon’s failure to take further action in light of the substantial risk of harm to Burling might be viewed as objectively unreasonable under the parameters set forth in Johnson. See id. at 526-27. Therefore, the district court erroneously granted Simon summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the judgment is VACATED as to Burling’s claim against Simon.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the facts would not permit a finding that they were deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s suicidal tendencies.

Jerauld Ex Rel. Robinson v. Carl · filed 2010-12-30

Jerauld does not allege facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Kroger, Parker, or Sams acted with deliberate indifference to Jerauld’s suicidal tendencies. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to Kroger, Parker, and Sams on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when arguable probable cause existed at the time of arrest.

Seitz v. DeQuarto · filed 2011-01-06

This Court grants summary judgment with respect to DeQuarto and Andryshak in their individual capacities on Mr. Seitz’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Investigators are entitled to qualified immunity because arguable probable cause existed at the time of the arrest.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could establish that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Couden v. City of Wilmington · filed 2011-01-07

It is important to note that our decision denying qualified immunity is a limited one: qualified immunity is not warranted at the summary judgment stage in this case as to the flashlight claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when material factual disputes remain about whether defendants violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Doe v. Cape Henlopen School District · filed 2011-01-07

The court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether defendants are protected by qualified immunity. As previously discussed, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendants violated Nancy’s well established constitutional rights. Therefore, the court shall deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the issue of qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional rights violation.

Bell v. Township of Concord · filed 2011-01-10

As the Court first found that Plaintiff fails to show that his due process rights were violated, Defendant Kavadias would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their no-knock entry violates clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Bellotte v. Edwards · filed 2011-01-11

Though the officers claim that exigent circumstances justified their conduct, we agree with the district court that the remarkably scanty rationale offered for the no-knock invasion makes an award of qualified immu- ... nity inappropriate.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Griffin, Jr. v. Garrison · filed 2011-01-13

But, even if Garrison could be said to have violated Griffin’s asserted right to unemployment benefits, she would plainly be entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Eddie Ira Sanders, Sr. v. City of Dothan · filed 2011-01-19

Because the right that Plaintiff alleged that Eggleston violated is not clearly established, Eggleston is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of excessive force.

A doctor under contract to provide care to state prisoners is a state actor who may receive qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Bishop v. Karney · filed 2011-01-19

Accordingly, Karney was a state actor entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when an unreasonable mistake of fact leads to a traffic stop that violates clearly established law.

Liberal v. Estrada · filed 2011-01-19

Because we hold that Officer Estrada’s mistake of fact was not reasonable, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established First Amendment right.

Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health · filed 2011-01-19

We conclude, however, that Clairmont’s First Amendment interests outweigh the administrative interests of the Seattle Municipal Court and that his rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. We therefore reverse and remand.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Payton v. City of Florence, AL · filed 2011-01-21

We also find that on January 8, 2007, the law was clearly established that Officer McCreless’s conduct, as Payton describes it, violated her constitutional right to be free from excessive force. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Payton’s § 1983 excessive force claim against Officer McCreless.

An official’s qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action remains available at trial and must then be evaluated on the trial evidence.

Ortiz v. Jordan · filed 2011-01-24

The plea remains available to the defending officials at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be evaluated in light of the character and quality of the evidence received in court.

Section 1983 defendants are protected from damages by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right presents a novel question.

Atkins v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-01-25

The question is novel, and the defendants therefore protected from liability for damages for possibly answering it incorrectly by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established federal right.

Castle v. Appalachian Technical College · filed 2011-01-27

Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if he knowingly or recklessly makes material false statements in a warrant request, because that conduct violates clearly established law.

Lawson v. Veruchi · filed 2011-01-28

And if Veruchi had knowingly included this false informa- tion, then he also would not be entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established “that a warrant request violates the Fourth Amendment if the requesting officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, makes false statements in requesting the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the determination that a warrant should issue.” Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003).

An officer sued under Section 1983 for false arrest has qualified immunity if the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about it.

Caceres v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NJ · filed 2011-01-31

On the federal false arrest claim, Sangiorgi enjoys qualified immunity if “it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed” or if “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” ... Accordingly, Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity must be assessed separately for each official based on that official’s conduct; a denial based on disputed facts must identify the material disputes.

Griffin-El v. Beard · filed 2011-02-03

We will therefore vacate the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and remand for the District Court to specify, in compliance with Forbes, which material facts, if any, preclude qualified immunity as to each Appellant.

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Lillo v. Bruhn · filed 2011-02-04

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the court improperly rejects the plaintiff’s account of the events.

Coble v. City of White House, Tenn. · filed 2011-02-11

The district court held that Officer Carney was entitled to qualified immunity because Coble failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. The district court based this finding, like its summary judgment finding, on the audio recording. Because we have determined that it was improper to rely on this audio recording over Coble’s version of events, this finding is also subject to reversal.

A defendant facing a Section 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Kirk v. City of Kokomo · filed 2011-02-17

Plaintiffs however, completely failed to respond to Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to show that their right to be free of such office searches was clearly established at the time of the searches, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield correctional officers with qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have understood that failing to address unsanitary cell conditions was unlawful.

Meneweather v. Powell · filed 2011-03-01

Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because, again viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Meneweather, it would have been clear to reasonable correctional officers in defendants’ positions that their failure to address the unsanitary conditions of Meneweather’s cell were unlawful.

A public official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when acting within discretionary authority and the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Allen v. School Board of Broward County · filed 2011-03-02

As such, using the analysis provided in Neal, R.R.S.’s allegations do not show that Davis’s acts were unconstitutional, and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when arguable probable cause supported the arrest.

Lewis v. Blue · filed 2011-03-02

Because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct, Deputy Blue is due qualified immunity on Plaintiffs unlawful arrest claim.

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Ault v. Speicher · filed 2011-03-03

We find Plaintiff’s argument unavailing because we find qualified immunity shields Defendant from liability for civil damages in this case.

An officer who fails to show that the law governing probable cause was unclear is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Halcomb v. Woods · filed 2011-03-03

Mr. Woods has not argued, much less established, that the constitutional law governing the existence of probable cause in such a situation is unclear. He consequently has failed to show that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer fails to show that an objectively reasonable officer would have believed the conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Halcomb v. Wmata · filed 2011-03-03

Qualified immunity is relevant only to those constitutional claims that were decided against Mr. Woods: unreasonable search and unreasonable arrest. ... Mr. Woods has not argued, much less established, that the constitutional law governing the existence of probable cause in such a situation is unclear. He consequently has failed to show that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when no objectively reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

NUON v. City of Lowell · filed 2011-03-04

Accordingly, Kinney lacked probable cause to arrest Nuon and the arrest is not protected by qualified immunity. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor on Counts I and III, as to liability.

An officer is immune from civil damages under § 1983 when the conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable officer would have understood.

McInnis v. Maine · filed 2011-03-07

The judgments in favor of the government officers on the ground of qualified immunity rest on the rule that an official is not subject to civil damages under § 1983 if the action complained of did not violate a clearly established right to which a reasonable officer would have understood that the plaintiff was entitled.

A plaintiff who does not contest an individual defendant’s qualified immunity defense may abandon her § 1983 claim against that defendant.

Jaber v. Wayne State University Board of Governors · filed 2011-03-07

Finally, Dean Wood is entitled to summary judgment for another reason based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff does not address or dispute this contention made by Defendants. Therefore, she waived or abandoned her claim against Dean Wood.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 suits when their conduct does not violate clearly established law that a reasonable person would have known.

Graniczny v. City of El Paso, Tex. · filed 2011-03-07

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity from suit under § 1983 to government officials provided that “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Given the record, the Court finds that the Officers’ actions did not violate Graniczny’s constitutional rights. As such, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim turns on whether an objective person in the defendant’s position would have believed the conduct violated established law.

Chase v. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2011-03-08

In determining whether defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the question is whether an objective person in defendant’s situation would have believed that his conduct violated established law.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege the deprivation of an actual constitutional right.

Jennings v. Patton · filed 2011-03-09

Because Jennings has failed to allege the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, Judge Patton is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable officer would have known.

El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume · filed 2011-03-15

Because the prior case law provided fair warning to Berthiaume at the time of the incident, we conclude Berthiaume violated El-Ghazzawy’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Berthiaume.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff’s evidence could show a violation of a clearly established right.

Howard v. Wayne County Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-03-16

In such a situation, a jury could reach the conclusion that use of pepper spray against the plaintiff constituted excessive force. The district court thus erred in granting summary judgment to defendants Wood and Hardie1 based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity.

When a § 1983 defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the constitutional right was clearly established.

Rodeman v. Foster · filed 2011-03-16

Where a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that “(1) that the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute exists over whether an officer was deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s serious medical needs.

Border v. Trumbull County Board of Commissioners · filed 2011-03-17

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Palumbo acted with deliberate indifference to Border’s serious medical needs, we conclude that the district court properly denied summary judgment to Palumbo on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Noble v. Adams · filed 2011-03-17

In summary, in 2002 it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that his or her conduct vis á vis the declaration of an emergency, the lockdown, or the curtailment of use of the exercise yard was unlawful in the situation he or she confronted.

Individual officials sued under § 1983 can be denied qualified immunity on an equal protection claim at summary judgment.

Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont. · filed 2011-03-18

As to that claim, we con- clude that on the basis of the summary judgment record, a rea- sonable trier of fact could find that the Commissioners violated Gerhart’s equal protection rights and that the Com- missioners are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, they use gratuitous force after a suspect has surrendered and submitted to arrest.

Wheeler v. City of Cleveland · filed 2011-03-21

Here, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to Ellis and Lane. Under Wheeler’s version of the facts, Ellis and Lane used gratuitous force after Wheeler had surrendered and submitted to arrest, thus violating a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when they use unnecessary, disproportionate force against a secured, unarmed person.

Wolfe v. Footen · filed 2011-03-21

We evaluate the officers’ conduct under this deferential standard and find that neither officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the officer’s conduct violates clearly established law.

Wernert v. Washington · filed 2011-03-22

Similarly here, Deputy Greene’s use of force against Wernert, who was already restrained and posed little possibility of harm to the officers, was not objectively reasonable and contravened clearly established law. Therefore, Deputy Greene is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for continuing to use deadly force against an incapacitated suspect when a reasonable officer would know the force was no longer needed.

Brockington v. Boykins · filed 2011-03-22

Because a reasonable officer would have recognized that deadly force was no longer needed after Brockington was injured and help- less with his back on the ground, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an official sued in her individual capacity.

Decotiis v. Whittemore · filed 2011-03-24

We affirm the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint against Whittemore, because she is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual capacity and the suit against Whittemore in her official capacity is redundant of the suit against CDS-Cumberland.

In a § 1983 action, an officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when entitlement to immunity depends on disputed facts for a jury to decide.

Rodriguez v. Passinault · filed 2011-03-25

If the legal question of immunity is completely dependent on which view of the facts the jury accepts, the district court should not grant summary judgment on the issue.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Ansell v. Twp · filed 2011-03-25

Accepting these allegations as true and construing all facts in Ansell‟s favor – as we must at this stage of the litigation – we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that Ansell adequately alleged a violation of his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force and thus in denying the Deputy Sheriffs‟ motion to dismiss.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a jury could find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wray v. Painter · filed 2011-03-28

Since there exists sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury may find that Defendant violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right and that the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation, Defendant is not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless the facts establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

McKenney v. Harrison · filed 2011-03-28

An official is entitled to qualified immunity against a § 1983 action unless (1) the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the party seeking damages, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. ... We conclude that the entry into the home did not violate Barnes’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a constitutional right.

Frazier v. Ortiz · filed 2011-03-28

Frazier has not presented a material issue of fact demonstrating the CDOC defendants violated his First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment in their favor was warranted.

In a Section 1983 political retaliation suit, an official’s qualified immunity depends on whether the employee held a policymaking position when the alleged retaliation occurred.

Bardzik v. County of Orange · filed 2011-03-28

We hold that Carona is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions retaliating against Bardzik while Bardzik was Reserve Division Commander because Bardzik was a policymaker in that position. Carona is not entitled to qualified immunity, however, for any further retaliatory action against Bardzik once Bardzik was transferred to Court Operations. Under clearly established law, Bardzik was not a policymaker at Court Operations.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim for using pepper spray on an arrestee who is not accused of a serious crime, poses no immediate threat, and is not actively resisting or fleeing; that prohibition was clearly established by 2006.

Howard v. Wayne County Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-03-29

Thus, by the time of Howard’s encounter with Wood in August 2006, the principle of law was already clearly established that use of pepper spray on an arrestee who was not accused of a serious crime, was not posing an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and was not actively resisting arrest or seeking to flee is constitutionally unreasonable.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when the alleged conduct violated a clearly established equal protection right.

Pratt ex rel. Petranchuk v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2011-03-29

The Court rejects Defendants' argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, contrary to Defendants' belief, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was clearly established that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when significant force against a person offering only passive resistance violates clearly established law.

Meirthew v. Amore · filed 2011-03-30

Because it was clearly established that the use of significant force in response to passive resistance may constitute excessive force, and because Meirthew posed no safety threat, Amore is not entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against government employees are subject to qualified immunity when their actions are objectively reasonable and do not violate clearly established rights.

Wion v. Janie Cockrell, Ann Byrom, J. Missildine, A.R. Massingil, and Kelli Ward · filed 2011-03-30

Thus, the trial court did not err in finding Wion did not state material facts that would overcome the TDCJ employees’ defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent the court from deciding whether the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights and acted objectively reasonably.

Robinson v. Jordan · filed 2011-03-30

Because disputed facts exist to preclude the Court’s determination as to whether defendant violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, and as to whether defendant acted objectively reasonably even if plaintiff's rights were violated, the qualified immunity analysis cannot be conducted at this time.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages for administratively imposed post-release supervision while its unlawfulness was not clearly established.

Locantore v. Hunt · filed 2011-03-31

Here, there cannot be a claim that any Defendant committed a wrong after April 2008, when they arguably would lose the shield of qualified immunity, as Plaintiff prevailed in his habeas petition in March 2008. Thus, all Defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Anderson v. Kent State University · filed 2011-03-31

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was engaged in protected conduct, and therefore cannot show that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected right. ... Therefore, Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit may be decided by whether the asserted right was clearly established, without deciding whether the conduct violated the Constitution.

Lopera v. Town of Coventry · filed 2011-04-01

In this case, these considerations counsel that we consider the second prong of the analysis and go no further.

In a § 1983 action, genuine disputes of material fact can preclude summary judgment on officers’ qualified immunity defense.

Huckaby v. Priest · filed 2011-04-05

Furthermore, the fundamental factual disputes identified in the record which prevent summary judgment also require this court to reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Defendants on interlocutory appeal.

An officer who knowingly, deliberately, or recklessly makes a false statement in an affidavit is not protected by immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Stevens v. Delaware County · filed 2011-04-05

The District Court correctly identified the controlling legal principle — that when an officer knowingly, deliberately, or recklessly makes a false statement in an affidavit, that officer is not protected by any immunity doctrine.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give fair notice that his conduct violated a constitutional right.

A.D. v. Markgraf · filed 2011-04-06

For these reasons we conclude that Markgraf is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was clearly established and a reasonable person in their position should have known it was protected.

Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington · filed 2011-04-06

As such, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the proper course is to remand Adams’ claims for further consideration under the second and third prongs of the McVey test.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when disputed facts leave the officer’s use of excessive force for a jury to decide.

Holland v. Bramble · filed 2011-04-06

In the case at bar, there remain genuine issues of disputed material fact as to whether defendant used excessive force during the November 26, 2004 incident with plaintiff and, thus, violated his constitutional rights. The court concludes that a determination of whether defendant violated plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights remains a question for a jury trial. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when it was not clearly established that he had to leave a home while assisting a social worker investigating child neglect.

Coates v. Powell · filed 2011-04-08

We believe that a reasonable police officer could act in good faith and remain in the house still assisting Clevenger. ... For the above reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Officer Glandon on the basis of his receiving qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when a jury could find that the officer fabricated a statement material to probable cause for an arrest warrant.

Kuslick v. Roszczewski · filed 2011-04-11

Telling lies to a magistrate in order to concoct probable cause is no technical violation of the law, and qualified immunity surely does not require us to countenance such behavior, if indeed a jury concludes that is what occurred here.

A teacher sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable teacher would recognize.

Mathers Ex Rel. J.S.J. v. Wright · filed 2011-04-11

Wright is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.

Section 1983 permits an unlawful arrest claim to proceed when the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the summary judgment record.

Merchant v. Fairfax County, Va. · filed 2011-04-11

Although Officer Bauer is entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Merchant, does not entitle Officer Bauer to qualified immunity. Therefore, it is appropriate to deny summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and proceed to a jury trial.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the evidence could permit a reasonable juror to find a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Jennings v. Bradley · filed 2011-04-12

Thus, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutional.

Alford v. Humboldt County · filed 2011-04-12

On the other hand, no pre-existing authority established that it was unreasonable for law enforcement officers to fail to deploy a throw phone as part of their efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to a standoff. Accordingly, Lt. Cavinta is entitled to qualified immunity based on this sole surviving claim against him.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim calls for examining whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Schmidt v. Creedon · filed 2011-04-18

Under the rule in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), we consider first whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and then, “if a violation could be made out . . . the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim depends on whether the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show a violation of a clearly established right.

Asher v. McClure · filed 2011-04-20

Thus, to determine whether they are protected by qualified immunity, we must consider whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Asher, supports a conclusion that Defendants violated Asher’s Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers facing a Section 1983 excessive force claim may obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiffs lack evidence of injury.

Shaw v. Hardberger · filed 2011-04-21

However, the defendants demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning their qualified immunity defense to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 First Amendment claims when the asserted rights were not clearly established.

Doninger v. Niehoff · filed 2011-04-25

Because we conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on both First Amendment claims, and because we agree with the district court with regard to Plaintiff’s other claims, the district court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer tases a nonthreatening, nonresisting suspect in violation of clearly established law.

Cherry v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 2011-04-25

The force applied by Officer Hanes was disproportionate to the actions of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, qualified immunity is denied.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 damages claim when the officer reasonably believes a detention is lawful.

Tindle v. Enochs · filed 2011-04-26

This Court finds that Enochs is entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably believed she could detain Tindle.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if he had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Garcia v. Killingsworth · filed 2011-04-28

Killingsworth is entitled to qualified immunity from suit if he had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of the claimed constitutional right.

Bates v. Orozco · filed 2011-04-29

Because Bates did not show a violation of the claimed constitutional right, the district court properly granted summary judgment on ruling that Officer Orozco was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Gutierrez v. Toledo · filed 2011-05-02

Therefore, under this prong, a defendant “is entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” ... Therefore, we find that a reasonable police officer would have understood that he had probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when disputed facts could show they used excessive force against a restrained, cooperative prisoner.

Bailey v. Golladay · filed 2011-05-03

As there is a factual dispute as to whether such force was used against Bailey after he was restrained and had become cooperative, the district court erred in determining that Defendants Duvall, Story, Forrest and the unnamed officer were due qualified immunity for the actions taken while transporting Bailey to the segregation unit.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officials would know that the alleged discriminatory discipline and termination were unlawful.

Rick Eaton v. Siemens · filed 2011-05-04

But reasonable officials would surely know that they are acting unlawfully by subjecting employees perceived as being uncooperative with department misconduct to discriminatory discipline and termination.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed and the asserted right was not clearly established.

Buzayan v. City of Davis Police Departmen · filed 2011-05-04

Instead, we hold that the right was not clearly established; even if the officers were mistaken in their conclusion that probable cause existed, a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Buzayan for misdemeanor hit-and-run.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Hudson v. Harrison · filed 2011-05-04

The district court properly dismissed Hudson’s First Amendment claim without leave to amend after concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding a prisoner’s right to receive publications from non-approved vendors was not clearly established.