42 U.S.C. § 1983

Public officials sued for damages under Section 1983 may assert qualified immunity, but officers cannot obtain summary judgment on that defense when they should have known their use of deadly force was unconstitutional.

Mumm v. Mornson · filed 2006-01-10

Qualified immunity is a defense available to public officials sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because the officers should have known that the prerequisites for the constitutional use of deadly force had not been met, we hold that they are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds as to Mornson’s Fourth Amendment claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for revoking a license without a prior hearing when they fail to show an emergency or a reasonable belief that one existed.

GINORIO v. Contreras · filed 2006-01-10

Furthermore, defendants have been unable to establish by any evidence now on the record that an emergency situation existed, or that at least they reasonably believed it existed, at the time of the order that could justify a pre-hearing deprivation. Without such a showing, the Court must find that, at this stage in the proceedings, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual officials may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Maldonado v. City of Altus, OK. · filed 2006-01-11

Plaintiffs have not called to our attention, nor have we found, any cases from either the Supreme Court or this circuit establishing the right to speak a foreign language in the workplace. ... Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct lawful.

Olmeda v. Ortiz-Quinones · filed 2006-01-12

Qualified immunity doctrine protects government officers and employees from suit on federal claims for damages where, in the circumstances, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful. ... On such a spectrum, Olmeda's case is not close: she is not federally protected against political discrimination and the federal damage claims are barred by qualified immunity.

Police officers are immune from damages under Section 1983 when their objectively reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Keane v. Artz · filed 2006-01-12

Police officers are entitled to immunity from civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, Artz’s conduct was objectively reasonable, and he is immune from section 1983 liability.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute remains about whether the officer acted objectively reasonably.

Purtell v. Mason · filed 2006-01-17

When determining whether qualified immunity shields a police officer from a Section 1983 action, the Court undertakes a two-part inquiry. ... Based on this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Mason acted in an objectively reasonable manner when he asked Jeffrey Purtell to take down the tombstones based on the circumstances he confronted on November 6, 2002. As such, the Court denies Officer Mason’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Purtell’s First Amendment claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for disrupting familial integrity when their action rests on a reasonable suspicion of danger to a child.

K.D., a Minor v. County of Crow Wing · filed 2006-01-18

We have repeatedly held that when a state official takes an action that would otherwise disrupt familial integrity he or she is entitled to qualified immunity if the action is properly founded upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse. ... However, the government’s ability to immediately intervene in the interest of minor children cannot be so constrained. In cases in which continued parental custody poses an imminent threat to the child’s health or welfare, emergency removal of children without a court order is constitutionally permitted.

In a § 1983 claim involving a child’s removal from parental custody, qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable officer could believe the removal was lawful based on the information available, regardless of the officer’s subjective intent.

K.D., a Minor, Through His Mother, Michelle Deason Michelle Deason, Individually v. County of Crow Wing Andy Galles City · filed 2006-01-18

However, the question facing us is not the officers’ subjective intent, but rather whether a reasonable officer could believe the removal of K.D. to be lawful in light of the information they possessed.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Wright v. Dixon · filed 2006-01-19

That is far from what occurred here, and defendants’ actions therefore did not violate clearly established law, nor should they have believed that they had done so.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer with arguable probable cause for the arrest is entitled to qualified immunity.

Carroll v. Henry County, Ga. · filed 2006-01-23

However, in the context of qualified immunity from a section 1983 claim, the police officer need not have actual probable cause but need only to have “arguable probable cause.” ... In the instant case, Officer Reid had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Carroll because Mr. Carroll failed to obey his direction to pull over.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.

Tallman v. Elizabethtown Police Department · filed 2006-01-23

Furthermore, even if Bland’s actions had violated Lee’s Fourth Amendment rights, the right in question was not clearly established so as to preclude the application of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against public officers are barred by qualified immunity when discretionary acts do not violate clearly established rights.

Morris v. Jackson · filed 2006-01-25

Therefore, Morris’s decision to retain the books and CDs is protected by qualified immunity and cannot serve as the basis for Morris’s lawsuit.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the record presents a triable issue that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.

Turner v. Dammon · filed 1988-05-03

We hold that on this record Dammon and Edwards are not entitled to qualified immunity and that an issue of triable fact as to these defendants’ violation of settled Fourth Amendment principles appears to have been presented.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless they personally acted in a manner that clearly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

ESTATE OF · filed 1988-05-17

And unless the individual defendants personally acted in a manner that clearly violated the murder victim's constitutional rights, these defendants are clothed with qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2735-38, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 damages action when the plaintiffs present sufficient evidence of a violation of clearly established rights.

Estate of Conners ex rel. Meredith v. O'Connor · filed 1988-05-17

We find that the plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

A court granting qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim must identify which defendants are immune and explain why.

Blankenship v. Kerr County, Texas, Carl E. Biermann and Cliff Greeson · filed 1989-09-15

Blankenship correctly contends that the district court should not have held the defendants to be qualifiedly immune. The court did not specify which defendants were immune or why they were immune, and instead merely reaffirmed a prior unexplained ruling. We therefore reverse the court’s holding with respect to this issue.

Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Hinshaw v. LOPFI · filed 2006-01-30

Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability under § 1983 when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal marks omitted).

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Hinshaw v. Smith · filed 2006-01-30

Because there was no First Amendment violation, the individual Board member defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and LOPFI is entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against it premised on the First Amendment.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity case, the jury determines objective reasonableness when that question depends on disputed facts.

Trujillo v. Large · filed 2006-02-01

The issue before us is whether Detective Large was entitled to a jury instruction on qualified immunity which directed the jury to decide the objective reasonableness of Detective Large’s conduct. Here, as in Maestas, the qualified immunity analysis “hinges upon whose version of the facts are believed.” Maestas, 351 F.3d at 1009. Consequently, the district court correctly had the jury determine the disputed material facts on the reasonableness element of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 1009-10. The court did not err in giving the challenged jury instruction.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Murphy v. Gardner · filed 2006-02-01

In an action under § 1983, individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

Lafavors v. Ken Jenne · filed 2006-02-02

We agree with the district court that, even if a constitutional violation did occur, Olarte is entitled to qualified immunity. ... Assuming that being bitten by a police dog while resisting arrest violates a constitutional right, Lafavors cannot show that this right was clearly established at the time of his arrest.

Section 1983 claims against officers sued individually are subject to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly warn that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Walker v. Prieto · filed 2006-02-03

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant Prieto is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation.

Clark-Murphy Ex Rel. Estate of Clark v. Foreback · filed 2006-02-06

At issue in this § 1983 action is whether the district court properly denied qualified immunity to 15 Michigan corrections officers on duty at various points during the isolation, dehydration and eventual death of inmate Jeffrey Clark. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Clark-Murphy (the representative of Clark’s estate), we affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to 11 of the employees and reverse it as to 4 of them (Andy Dyer, Kristine Wakefield, Rina Becher and JoAnn Friedt).

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Dias v. Elique · filed 2006-02-06

Therefore, the district court did not err in holding that the Supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established.

Brian Dias William Mason, Sr. v. Jose Elique Michael Murray University and Community College System of Nevada University · filed 2006-02-06

In any event, even if we were to assume that the Supervisors violated Appellants’ due process rights, they would still be entitled to qualified immunity because Appellants have not demonstrated that such a right was clearly established.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Farrell Ex Rel. Farrell v. Transylvania County Board of Education · filed 2006-02-07

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs properly pled its claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs’ allegations, nonetheless, fail to establish any conduct by Haehnel that violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Haehnel’s motion to dismiss the claims asserted against her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her individual capacity.

In a § 1983 claim, the court decides qualified immunity as a question of law, but the jury decides disputed facts on which immunity depends.

Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth · filed 2006-02-08

Although qualified immunity is a question of law determined by the Court, when qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.

Section 1983 defendants cannot establish qualified immunity through reliance on a state statute they failed to follow.

Roska v. Sneddon · filed 2006-02-09

Because Defendants failed to comply with the statute on which they base their qualified immunity claim, Defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct was objectively reasonable, even if the rights they violated were clearly established.

Sueiro Vázquez v. De La Rosa · filed 2006-02-10

Therefore, whether or not the Court deems plaintiffs’ rights to be clearly established in the specific context of this case, the outcome of the immunity inquiry would still be the same because defendants inexorably meet the third requirement for qualified immunity to apply, that is, objectively reasonable conduct by defendant officers resulting in plaintiffs’ termination of employment. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when, on the plaintiff's version of the facts, he had fair notice that shooting a fleeing suspect who posed no immediate threat was unlawful.

Sigley v. City of Parma Heights · filed 2006-02-10

Accepting these facts as true, Mockler would have fair notice that shooting Davis in the back when he did not pose an immediate threat to other officers was unlawful. ... Accordingly, based- upon the facts taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Mockler is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

In a § 1983 action challenging a warrantless arrest or seizure, an officer has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Cortez v. Mccauley · filed 2006-02-10

Therefore, when a warrantless arrest or a seizure is the subject of a § 1983 action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest or detain the plaintiff.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of constitutional rights.

in Re: Stacy K. Boone, P.A. and Cardiologists of Lubbock, P.A. · filed 2006-02-14

Therefore, the defendants were entitled to claim qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.

Moore v. Guthrie · filed 2006-02-22

Therefore, we cannot say that it was clearly established that Chief Guthrie and the City of Evans violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to bodily integrity by requiring him to wear his riot helmet during training.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably could have believed their conduct was constitutional under the law at the time.

Murray v. Arizona Department of Corrections · filed 2006-02-22

In granting summary judgment to defendants Stewart and Marshall, the district court properly concluded that, prior to the district court’s decision in Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty v. Ryan, 269 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1203 (D.Ariz. 2003), defendants reasonably could have believed that the prison’s internet policy was constitutional. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two of Murray’s amended complaint.

Officials acting within their discretionary authority have qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific context.

Avalon Carriage Service Inc. v. City of St. Augustine · filed 2006-02-23

Even assuming the existence of a constitutional violation, the Court does not find the right to be clearly established when it is viewed in light of the specific context of this case. ... As a result, the Court therefore finds that qualified immunity applies.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for discharging an employee from a non-trust position because of political affiliation when that prohibition was clearly established.

Lopez-Sanchez v. Vergara-Agostini · filed 2006-02-24

The defendants are not entitled to prevail on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity since it was clearly established in 2002 that discharging someone based upon political affiliation from a position other than trust violated plaintiffs constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 suit, a court cannot resolve genuine factual disputes when deciding qualified immunity on summary judgment.

Mcclellan v. Smith · filed 2006-02-24

The District Court generally failed to heed the rule that resolution of genuine factual issues is inappropriate on motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to file the criminal charge.

Jaegly v. Couch · filed 2006-02-24

Couch thus had arguable probable cause to file a felony complaint charging Jaegly with first degree criminal contempt, and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who knowingly falsifies evidence to support an arrest is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Cook v. Hill · filed 2006-02-27

We noted that “the prohibition on falsification or omission of evidence, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, was firmly established as of 1986, in the context of information supplied to support a warrant for arrest.” Id. at 1298. Thus, an officer who has engaged in such behavior is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 equal protection claim when the conduct violates a clearly established right.

Patterson v. Balsamico · filed 2006-02-27

Balsamico would not have been entitled to qualified immunity in any event, because Patterson's equal protection claim arising out of that incident involved "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 liability unless the official violated a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Henderson v. Munn · filed 2006-02-28

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a section 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

An officer who intentionally retaliates against protected speech is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no objectively reasonable officer would think the conduct lawful.

Russo v. City of Hartford · filed 2006-03-02

In light of the jury’s liability finding on the section 1983 claims against Croughwell, the jury had to have found that Croughwell acted with intent to discriminate against Russo for his exercise of his First Amendment Rights. No objectively reasonable officer would think that such motivated action was lawful. The court therefore finds Croughwell is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Clark-Murphy v. Foreback · filed 2006-03-02

At issue in this § 1983 action is whether the district court properly denied qualified immunity to 15 Michigan corrections officers on duty at various points during the isolation, dehydration and eventual death of inmate Jeffrey Clark. ... Second, qualified immunity prevents the officers from being held liable for constitutional violations if the right at issue was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable official could have believed the alleged conduct was lawful.

Rick Plemmons v. Roberts · filed 2006-03-03

We further hold, given the facts as we must take them, that no reasonable official could have thought the failure to summon immediate medical help for Plemmons was lawful.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that delaying necessary emergency medical care violated an inmate’s clearly established rights.

Rick Plemmons v. J.T. Roberts, Pulaski County Sheriff the County of Pulaski, Missouri Ronald Jones Michael Gibbens · filed 2006-03-03

Given the facts as we must take them, we conclude any reasonable officer would have known that a delay in providing prompt, appropriate medical care to Plemmons constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect municipalities or municipal employees, according to this court.

Caraballo v. Roman Hernandez · filed 1990-09-07

The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, protects only state or local government officials: its protection does not extend to municipalities or municipal employees. ... Defendants all being employees of the Municipality of San Sebastián, the doctrine of qualified immunity can afford them no solace.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 for interference with a prisoner’s outgoing mail when the claim is based only on negligence.

McBride v. Zant · filed 1992-05-06

In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (98 SC 855, 55 LE2d 24) (1978), another case brought under 42 USC § 1983, it was held that officials who had interfered with a prisoner’s outgoing mail in violation of his constitutional rights were entitled to qualified immunity from liability under which they could not be held liable for damages where the claim for relief is, as here, based only on negligence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint in Case No. A92A0041.

Defendants in a § 1983 damages action are entitled to qualified immunity when the rights allegedly violated were not clearly established at the time.

Crosetto v. Heffernan · filed 1992-10-22

The Magistrate is of the opinion that Defendants violated no clearly established First Amendment rights. The alleged constitutional rights that Plaintiffs allege were violated were not clearly established prior to the State Bar’s suspension of the mandatory bar rule on July 1, 1988. ... Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity be granted.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to public officials whose conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Brown v. Ashton · filed 1992-11-17

This is so because, as the Supreme Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), public officials are shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any alleged violations of federal constitutional or statutory law “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer may be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action on the facts alleged.

Kennedy Ex Rel. Gorton v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2006-03-06

We disagree, and affirm the district court’s determination that, on the facts alleged, Shields is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for an alleged home search and seizure when the need for a warrant was clearly established at the time.

Sabin v. Miller · filed 2006-03-07

It was clearly established on October 2, 2002, that Sabin had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her home entitling her to Fourth Amendment protection, and that Defendants needed a warrant to intrude on her privacy interest in her home as they allegedly did on October 2. ... Accordingly, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Sabin, the Court holds that Defendants Chavez and Miller are not entitled to qualified immunity on Sabin’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action on the facts alleged.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2006-03-07

Defendant Noel Shields appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on his assertion of qualified immunity against Plaintiff Kimberly Kennedy's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. He argues that his conduct did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. We disagree, and affirm the district court's determination that, on the facts alleged, Shields is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In § 1983 First Amendment claims, qualified immunity protects officers when the asserted right was not clearly established by obviously applicable principles or closely analogous precedent.

Egolf v. Witmer · filed 2006-03-09

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were violated, I nonetheless conclude that the Troopers are protected by qualified immunity. In First Amendment claims brought under § 1983, courts have generally found the law to be “clearly established” only in those circumstances: 1) where the “relevant principles” of First Amendment law “apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question”; or 2) where a “closely analogous case” holds the conduct unconstitutional and no “reasonable official could have distinguished” it.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the violated right was clearly established and a reasonable official would understand that the conduct was unlawful.

Frederick v. Morse · filed 2006-03-09

Thus, having determined that the “facts alleged show [Morse’s] conduct violated a constitutional right,” that “the right was clearly established,” and that “it would be clear to a reasonable [principal] that [her] conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted,” we hold that defendant Morse is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts show an arrest without probable cause under an invalid warrant and objectively unreasonable conduct.

McCutchen v. Tipton County · filed 2006-03-10

As explained above, Plaintiffs allegations, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that the officers arrested Plaintiff without probable cause pursuant to an invalid warrant. ... Accordingly, the defendant officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, supports denying the defense.

Rigdon v. The State of Georgia Board · filed 2006-03-10

In its July 25 order, the court, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Rigdon (as it was required to do), explained at length (at pages 20-25) why Ford is not entitled to qualified immunity. We find no error in the court’s explanation and therefore affirm its ruling.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established or it was objectively reasonable to think their conduct was lawful.

Svitlik v. O'LEARY · filed 2006-03-11

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating a person’s constitutional right if the particular right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, or it was objectively reasonable for the officer to think the conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when facts could establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and that conduct violates clearly established law.

Kimbell v. Clayton County, Georgia · filed 2006-03-14

In this case, we agree with the district court’s finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Kassandra Kimbell’s serious medical needs.1 McDaniel, 886 F.2d at 313. Additionally, we agree with the district court’s finding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a violation of clearly established law. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313, 116 S. Ct. at 842. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on qualified and official immunity.

Section 1983 claims against individual state officers are subject to qualified immunity.

Aaron C. v. New Mexico Human Services Department · filed 2006-03-17

The district court dismissed Appellant’s claims against individual state officers on grounds of qualified immunity. ... For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its orders of May 5, 2004, and December 29, 2004, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims.

An official of a nonprofit athletic association treated as a state actor may claim qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2006-03-17

We find that qualified immunity is available to officials such as Carter.

Qualified immunity may shield doctors in a § 1983 action when they followed state law and could reasonably believe their actions lawful.

Wilson v. Dravis · filed 2006-03-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds because the doctors, who followed Oregon state law before administering Wilson’s medication, could have reasonably believed that their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims against individual defendants when plaintiffs fail to show a violation of clearly established law.

Baumeister v. New Mexico Commission for the Blind · filed 2006-03-20

Third, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs did not address Defendants’ arguments regarding two bases for the § 1983 claims, and have wholly failed to state a claim of violation of clearly established law which shocks the conscience for their remaining cause of action.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from § 1983 damages when the conduct did not violate clearly established federal rights.

Bradley v. James · filed 2006-03-20

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Chief James is thus entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this claim and on grounds of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when an objectively reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Paullin v. City of Loxley, AL · filed 2006-03-20

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity where the officer had “arguable probable cause”: where an objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Mitchum could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Paullin. ... Mitchum is entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim.

An official’s claim that local law gave them no authority to take the alleged unconstitutional action is not a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim.

Torres v. Zegarelli · filed 2006-03-22

As such, Zegarelli and DeFeo’s lack of authority argument does not invoke the qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law would not make the alleged constitutional violation clear to an objectively reasonable official.

Rodriguez v. Lamarque · filed 2006-03-23

However, there is no question that LaMarque is entitled to qualified immunity because Allen, Lopez, and May do not clearly establish that a deprivation of outdoor exercise for the period endured by Rodriguez, without adverse medical effects, is substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim.

Woodlen v. Jimenez · filed 2006-03-28

Thus, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, a prior appellate ruling denying qualified immunity controls on remand when defendants present no new evidence relevant to immunity.

Bollinger v. Oregon · filed 2006-03-28

Since, in the posture presented to us, this qualified immunity question is a purely legal one, and Bollinger I held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, that holding controls this appeal as law of the case. Although on remand, defendants produced evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment, no evidence relevant to qualified immunity was presented, so that the law of the case is still applicable.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when exigent circumstances make their warrantless entry constitutionally reasonable.

Causey v. Bay City · filed 2006-03-29

The officers in this case reasonably suspected that immediate police action was necessary to ascertain whether someone inside the house was in peril, and therefore the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for warrantless entries justified by exigent circumstances.

Choice L. Causey Henretta Denise Bradley v. City of Bay City John May Thomas Pletzke, Joseph E. Doyle Eric Sporman Ken S · filed 2006-03-29

Because exigent circumstances justified the entries, we reverse the order of the district court denying the officers qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, the court decides whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity under a given set of facts.

Helsabeck v. Fabyanic · filed 2006-03-30

In Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that the question of a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity under a particular set of facts must be decided by the court, not by the jury. The district court in the present case therefore committed error when it submitted the qualified immunity interrogatory to the jury.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact remain.

Chasse v. Opal McCraney · filed 2006-03-30

Summary judgment is properly denied if there are genuine issues of material fact as to an asserted qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 suit, defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment through unfocused arguments that fail to establish the remaining elements of the defense.

Doherty v. Delaware · filed 2006-03-31

However, the next two elements of the qualified immunity analysis cannot be met by defendants’ unfocused arguments. Thus, the court must deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when their alleged conduct violated a clearly established right.

ESTATE OF KOULTA v. City of Centerline · filed 2006-03-31

The facts presented do not merely allege a constitutional violation, but pursuant to Saucier and Higgason, supra, indicate that Koulta’s rights were clearly established at the time of his death.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from a prisoner retaliation claim when the prohibition against retaliatory punishment is clearly established.

Remeidio v. Woodford · filed 2006-04-05

The defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for this claim, because “the prohibition against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law1 in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when existing law did not give a reasonable officer fair notice that the force was unlawful.

Jimenez v. City of Costa Mesa · filed 2006-04-05

However, Officer Le is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim. In light of Tony Maae’s initial resistance, his lack of serious injury, and the fact he was not yet handcuffed when punched and thus posed at least a minimal threat, we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would have had “fair notice” under existing caselaw that “the force employed was unlawful, and that any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.”

Governmental actors performing discretionary acts are qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Van Emrik v. Chemung County Department of Social Services · filed 1993-07-08

In the Federal realm, governmental actors who engage in discretionary actions are qualifiedly immune from liability in a suit based on 42 USC § 1983 if it can be established that their actions did not " 'violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’ ” (Robison v Via, 821 F2d 913, 920, quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818; see, Defore v Premore, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 5833, 1992 WL 88043, ND NY, Apr. 27, 1992, Munson, J.).

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive-force claim is assessed under the law in effect when the officers acted.

Murphy v. Johnson · filed 1996-02-15

The conduct of the officers must therefore be evaluated under the standard for excessive force existing at the time of the incident.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against prison officials who reasonably believed their restrictions on religious meals were lawful at the time.

Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2006-04-07

In Ahmad v. Department of Correction, post 479 (2006), we determined that qualified immunity was proper where prison officials acted to limit the alternative meals available to Muslim inmates (pork-free and vegetarian) on the reasonable belief that such limitations were lawful at the time. The issues and the time period in question in that case and this, are sufficiently similar for us to conclude that entry of summary judgment for the defendants here would have been proper on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Ahmad v. Department of Correction · filed 2006-04-07

For a right to be clearly established, the unlawfulness of the defendants’ conduct must be “apparent” based on then existing law. ... Consequently, the defendants are entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Nance v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots' Ass'n · filed 2006-04-10

For the reasons that follow, the Board has qualified immunity; therefore, we need not address the other claimed immunity. ... For the two-step qualified-immunity analysis, we must first determine whether, under current law, “‘a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged’”. ... Pursuant to our review of such evidence, the § 1983 due-process and equal-protection claims fail for the following reasons.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe there is probable cause for an arrest.

Olagues v. Kousharian · filed 2006-04-10

The district court properly concluded that these appellees were entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that they reasonably believed there was probable cause for Olagues’ arrest.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against jail officials whose response to inmate safety risks was arguably reasonable.

Moore v. Cullman County Commission · filed 2006-04-13

But we need not determine the reasonableness of Roden’s and Buegler’s actions because, if their response to the risks was even arguably reasonable, they are entitled to qualified immunity barring the § 1983 claim against them.

In a § 1983 claim, a State court considering qualified immunity may decide whether the asserted right was clearly established before resolving a difficult, unsettled constitutional question.

Nelson v. Salem State College · filed 2006-04-13

In this case, we conclude that the judge appropriately exercised her discretion by first deciding that, at the time of the defendants’ conduct, any constitutional right the plaintiff could claim had been violated was not clearly established.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the circumstances do not support finding that a reasonable officer would recognize a disputed eviction as unlawful.

Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriff's Department · filed 2006-04-14

In these circumstances, Tibbetts' decision to disbelieve Higgins and to defuse the situation by asking him to leave under threat of citation for trespass was neither plainly incompetent nor involved a deliberate violation of the law.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers who make a warrantless home arrest without consent or exigent circumstances when clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer the entry was unlawful.

Bashir v. Rockdale County, Georgia · filed 2006-04-14

We conclude that, under the law existing at the time, it was clearly established the deputies’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable law enforcement officer faced with these circumstances would have known he could not enter the home and arrest Bashir without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent. ... Accordingly, Deputy Davis and the unnamed deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment in their favor on Bashir’s unlawful arrest claim.

An official sued under Section 1983 may be denied qualified immunity even without a prior case involving materially similar facts if the right was clearly established.

Miller, James E. v. Jones, Arthur L. · filed 2006-04-17

For a right to be clearly established, however, we need not have a prior case that is founded on materially similar facts; officials may still be on notice in “novel factual circumstances.”

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for a retaliatory transfer when prior precedent gave him clear notice that the transfer was unlawful.

James E. Miller, Jr. v. Arthur L. Jones, Police Chief · filed 2006-04-17

Finally, should former Chief of Police Jones have needed personal notice that the retaliatory transfer of public employees for speech protected by the First Amendment is subject to suit under § 1983, he need only look to our holding in Octavio Delgado v. Police Chief Arthur Jones and Deputy Chief Monica Ray, 282 F.3d 511, Mar. 8, 2002, decided against the appellant himself in the same month during which the merger was first proposed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when the officer reasonably believes probable cause exists.

Georgeon v. City of San Diego · filed 2006-04-17

Because Adams reasonably believed that she had probable cause to arrest Georgeon under these circumstances, the district court properly concluded that she was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Way v. County of Venture · filed 2006-04-19

This said, a reasonable official in the position of Brooks and Hanson would not have understood that following the jail’s policy violated Way’s rights because the unconstitutionality of the search they conducted was not clearly established at the time.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that their conduct violated clearly established rights at the time.

Way v. County of Ventura Robert Brooks Karen Hanson, and Robert Ortiez, Ventura Police Officer · filed 2006-04-20

This said, a reasonable official in the position of Brooks and Hanson would not have understood that following the jail’s policy violated Way’s rights because the unconstitutionality of the search they conducted was not clearly established at the time.

School board officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official should have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Brannan v. Amato · filed 2006-04-24

It seems fair to conclude that objectively reasonable school board officials should have known that they were acting in disregard of clearly established law and the public schools regulations. Moreover, the objective unreasonableness of the school board officials is supported by the record.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the defendants’ claimed lack of retaliatory intent remains disputed.

Carr v. Whittenburg · filed 2006-04-28

Because the Court declines to grant sum-maiy judgment for the Defendants on the grounds that they acted without retaliatory intent, the Court also declines to grant the Defendants summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 damages claim may survive a qualified-immunity motion to dismiss when the record is too undeveloped to resolve the defense.

Torisky Ex Rel. Torisky v. Schweiker · filed 2006-04-28

We will affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, however, so that the matter of immunity can be determined on the basis of a more fully developed record.

Section 1983 officers may receive qualified immunity for a reasonable mistaken entry, but factual disputes about a continued search and detention can preclude summary judgment on immunity.

Harman v. Pollock · filed 2006-05-02

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendants as to the plaintiffs’ claim of an unreasonable entry into 44 ½ West 2700 South. Because we conclude that there are material factual disputes about when the officers should have realized they were at a separate residence not encompassed by the warrant, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims of an unlawful search and seizure.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed that no further hearing was necessary.

Anderson v. Recore · filed 2006-05-04

Hence, we conclude that an officer could reasonably have believed that the TRC lacked discretion and that no further hearing was necessary. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

A state official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the statutory right at issue was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services v. Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 2006-05-10

Relying on PAMII’s plain language and then-Judge, now-Associate Justice, Alito’s decision for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2000), we affirm the district court1 and hold (1) PAMII preempts Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.035.4, and (2) given the legal uncertainty before Schuffman at the time he concluded Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.035.4 was not preempted, Schuffman is entitled to qualified immunity from Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services’s (MOPAS) suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity protects a state official from a Section 1983 claim unless the official violated a clearly established federal right that a reasonable person in the official's position would have known.

Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services v. Missouri Department Of Mental Health · filed 2006-05-10

A state official like Schuffman is protected by qualified immunity from a section 1983 claim "unless [his] alleged conduct violated clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person in [his] position[ ] would have known." ... In sum, we hold MOPAS's PAMII-based statutory right to the requested peer review report was not clearly established such that a reasonable person in Schuffman's position at the time would have known following Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.035(4) and not disclosing the report violated 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(A).

Qualified immunity is available to officials sued personally under § 1983, but unavailable to government entities or officials sued in their official capacities.

Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshall University · filed 2006-05-11

Qualified immunity may be invoked by a government official sued in his personal, or individual, capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. 159 at 165-67. This defense is not available in an official-capacity suit brought against a government entity or a government officer as that entity’s agent.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Borello, Ronald T. v. Allison, Richard · filed 2006-05-11

Defendants therefore are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 prisoner safety claim, a prison official’s response to a known risk must be reasonable to support qualified immunity; taking some action alone is insufficient.

Borello v. Richard Allison, Lisa Gales, John Liefer, and John Inman · filed 2006-05-11

We emphasize that a prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity simply because 'he or she takes any action in response to a risk of harm to an inmate— that response must be reasonable.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a prisoner’s retaliation claim when the alleged job transfers do not amount to a constitutional violation.

Morris v. Powell · filed 2006-05-15

These defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the job transfer claim because there is no cognizable constitutional violation.

State officials sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity, and a plaintiff must identify a clearly established right and allege facts showing its violation to proceed.

Francisco v. Long · filed 1997-12-31

Federal courts have recognized a qualified immunity defense for federal officials sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and for state officials sued under § 1983. ... In other words, once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of identifying a clearly established right, of which a reasonable person would have known, and alleging facts showing the defendant violated that right. ... Because Appellants could not come forward with sufficient facts or allegations to show violations of clearly established law, they are not entitled to subject Defendants to the burdens of an evidentiary hearing, discovery, or trial.

Government officials performing discretionary functions, including police officers, may assert qualified immunity in § 1983 suits.

Shibley v. Begin · filed 1998-03-26

Although § 1983 on its face provides for no defenses or immunities, the United States Supreme Court has held that government officials, including law enforcement officers, who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in civil rights actions under § 1983.

Individuals sued under § 1983 for prison conduct in 1994 are immune from an ADA-based claim because whether prisoners could bring ADA claims was then unsettled.

Grant v. Schuman · filed 1998-07-16

We have also noted the possible theory that the right to be free from discrimination may be the type of right, privilege, or immunity secured by law so that Grant may sue Cearlock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving him of that right, privilege or immunity. See Mallett v. Wis.Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1251 (7th Cir.1997). We pursue this no further because the district court correctly noted the judicial uncertainty then existing whether a prisoner could have a cause of action against the prison or state under ADA. Because that question was not settled for this circuit until Crawford, supra, in 1997 and Yeskey, supra, in 1998, individual defendants would be immune from suit for conduct in 1994.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff's version of the facts supports retaliation for protected speech in violation of clearly established law.

Merkle v. Upper Dublin Schl. Dist. · filed 2000-05-09

In view of our analysis that Merkle's version of the facts supports the proposition that Brown, and through him the District, maliciously prosecuted Merkle in retaliation for her protected First Amendment activities, it follows that Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Mitchell v. Wagner · filed 2001-01-29

After de novo review, see Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1998), we agree with the District Court that defendants were ... entitled to qualified immunity on the unsanitary-conditions claim, see id. at 1128 (explaining that government officials have qualified immunity from suit unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known); Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1994).

When a § 1983 plaintiff fails to show unconstitutional conduct, the court need not reach the second step of the qualified immunity analysis.

Thacker v. Lawrence County · filed 2006-05-17

In light of the fact that Thacker has failed to prove that the deputies engaged in unconstitutional conduct, there is no need for us to perform the second step of the qualified immunity analysis—that being “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

A § 1983 plaintiff waives an appellate challenge to qualified immunity by failing to argue that the right was clearly established.

Ruffin v. Nicely · filed 2006-05-18

Ruffin waives this argument by failing to provide any argument or to refer to any cases. See Buziashvili v. Inman, 106 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore, we have no reason to disturb the district court’s holding that the defendants in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual officials when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated a constitutional right.

S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky University · filed 2006-05-19

For the reasons cited above, the Court has found that Plaintiff has not produced any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that his rights were violated, and that is in itself sufficient to end the inquiry and determine that Vance and Rini are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 due process claim when a reasonable official, relying on consistent advice that an employee lacked tenure, would not have known that termination without a hearing was unlawful.

Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts · filed 2006-05-23

Given this information, a reasonable officer would not have clearly known that terminating Miller without the procedures required only for tenured employees was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the violated right was clearly established, even without a case involving similar facts.

Burchett v. Kiefer · filed 2002-11-19

We also conclude that, under the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Hope v. Pelzer, this right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. In Hope, the Court made clear that a right can be clearly established even if there is no case involving "fundamentally similar" or "materially similar" facts.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a search warrant affidavit establishes probable cause even without allegedly false information.

Williams v. Ramsey · filed 2006-05-30

As the April affidavit established probable cause to conduct the searches at issue in this case even without the allegedly false information in that affidavit, the officers are entitled qualified immunity.

Police officers may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim regardless of whether the seizure is characterized as an arrest or an investigative stop.

Barton v. City and County of Denver · filed 2006-06-02

The Court also accepts the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the alleged use of excessive force with'respect to the second seizúre, regardless of whether it is characterized as an arrest or investigative stop, and GRANTS that portion of the defendants’ motion.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when undisputed facts establish probable cause for the arrest.

Bochove v. Village of Corrales · filed 2006-06-06

These undisputed facts establish probable cause for her arrest for interference with a police officer and attempted assault on a police officer. Thus, the arrest was legal and qualified immunity was also proper.

Officials sued under § 1983 for involuntary commitment have qualified immunity when they had at least arguable probable cause to believe the person was dangerous and needed involuntary care.

Vallen v. Connelly · filed 2006-06-06

We do not reach the District Court’s second, alternative holding, because we agree with the District Court that the undisputed circumstances leading up to Vallen’s re-commitment gave defendants at least arguable probable cause to conclude that he was dangerous and needed involuntary care.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity requires the court to ask first whether the plaintiffs asserted a constitutional violation and, only if they did, whether the right was clearly established.

Pett v. Dudzinski · filed 2006-06-07

The initial inquiry is whether plaintiffs have asserted the violation of a constitutional right at all. Id. Only if plaintiffs have done so does it become necessary for the court to determine whether that identified right was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. Here, plaintiffs fail to establish a constitutional violation.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when there was no arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Davis v. Williams · filed 2006-06-07

In the context of a claim for false arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where that officer had “arguable probable cause,” that is, where “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest” the plaintiff. ... Under the facts as alleged by Davis, we find that there was no arguable probable cause to arrest Davis, and, therefore, we reverse.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when they reasonably believe probable cause exists, even if it does not.

Richards v. CITY OF NEW YORK 405 · filed 2006-06-15

Thus, under the circumstances, McCann and Paul had a reasonable basis for believing there was probable cause, even if such probable cause did not actually exist, and are entitled to qualified immunity in the arrest of Richards.

Prison guards are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Anthony v. Martinez · filed 2006-06-16

Prison guards like J. Martinez cannot be held liable for civil damages unless their conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a government official protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Jennifer Y. Ex Rel. Harris v. Velazquez · filed 2006-06-20

Assuming, arguendo, that Velazquez did violate Jennifer’s constitutional rights, those rights were not clearly established when the relevant events in this case took place. Velazquez is thus entitled to qualified immunity from this suit.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims alleging retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause because no clearly established equal protection right to be free from retaliation exists.

Gardner v. City of Camilla, Georgia · filed 2006-06-21

Because we have held that no clearly established right exists under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from retaliation, even when we take the facts in the light most favorable to Gardner and Clayton, they cannot demonstrate that the actions of either Scott or Irwin violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, Scott and Irwin are entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 retaliation claims.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Brittain v. William Hansen Rebecca Scott County of San Bernardino, and Brian Campbell, C0191 · filed 2006-06-22

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable jury could find the force unreasonable and that unreasonableness was clearly established.

Ross v. Buck · filed 2006-06-23

Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Jess’s use of the pepper foam and other conduct was gratuitous and therefore unreasonable, see Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2006) (use of mace on prostrate, restrained arrestee who posed little or no threat to safety of officers or others was not objectively reasonable), and because the unreasonableness of the alleged conduct was clearly established at the time of the incident, Ross is entitled to proceed on these claims against Officer Jess.

Qualified immunity protects a state official from a § 1983 claim when no clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Washington v. Harris · filed 2006-06-23

Moreover, even assuming that Deas’s behavior was sufficiently repugnant to give rise to a constitutional claim, no case law clearly establishes that such conduct violates the Constitution, and thus we cannot say that any reasonable officer would have known of it.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Gomes v. Wood · filed 2006-06-27

W e disagree with the district court’s application of Carey to these facts, but we affirm its decision for a different reason: we hold that because M s. Annes did not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable official would have known, she and the other defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers are protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on an arrest supported by probable cause.

Lyles v. Micenko · filed 2006-06-29

Since probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Lyles for assault, the Officers are protected by qualified immunity and ’ the Court grants D;C. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who arrests someone without probable cause in violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights; qualified immunity does not shield that officer.

David v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-06-30

Further, Davis is not protected by qualified immunity. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing plaintiffs, Davis arrested David without probable cause and therefore unreasonably violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their compliance measures give them an objectively reasonable belief that their program does not violate clearly established rights.

Gray v. Johnson · filed 2006-06-30

The prison officials are also entitled to qualified immunity so long as "reasonable person[s]” in their positions would have concluded that coerced participation in the TCP, as it existed, did not violate Martin's "clearly established” rights under the Establishment Clause. ... The court finds that those steps, taken as a direct response to an opinion examining the interplay of TCP programs and the Establishment Clause, created an objectively reasonable belief on the part of program staff and prison officials that the program as it existed during Martin’s stay did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Smith · filed 2006-06-30

Accordingly, denial of Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was proper, and we affirm the decision of the district court.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Salsbury v. City of Berkeley · filed 2006-07-03

The district court erred in denying summary judgment on Payne’s Fourth Amendment claim because Officer Meredith is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. ... However, the right at issue here is not clearly established.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Hughlett v. Romer-Sensky · filed 2006-07-06

Here, the inquiry is limited to the first step, because the district court properly found that defendants did not violate any of plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights and that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when evidence supports an officer’s use of gratuitous force in violation of a clearly established right.

Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court · filed 2006-07-07

Moreover, because Sixth Circuit case law supports Shreve’s right not to be struck and jumped on gratuitously, qualified immunity is not available for lack of a “clearly established” right.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against a public official unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and a right that was clearly established at the time.

Atterberry, Jeffrey v. Sherman, Leonard · filed 2006-07-07

In order to proceed against the state actors, Atterberry must (1) adequately allege the violation of a constitu- tional right, and (2) show the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable public official would have known that his conduct was unlawful.

In a § 1983 action, officers may be denied qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known that exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless home entry.

Shotland v. City of Torrance · filed 2006-07-11

Based on the record before it, including all the evidence introduced by appellants, the experienced district court judge determined that a reasonable officer would have known that the intrusion was not excused by exigent circumstances. ... Based on the record in the district court and now before us, we affirm the court’s denial of appellants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, unresolved material facts about prison officials’ qualified immunity can make summary judgment premature.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-07-14

Further, there remain genuine issues of material fact relevant to the Individual Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. For example, there is an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Williams was exposed to levels of ETS sufficient to pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, whether the Individual Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the ETS problem at the D.C. Jail, and whether the Individual Defendants’ conduct rose to the level of deliberate indifference. In sum, the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is premature and will be denied without prejudice.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no statute or case law clearly establishes the asserted duty.

Moss v. Mamalis · filed 2006-07-14

Furthermore, even if Jones owed some obligation to investigate the plaintiff s allegations that plaintiff was improperly placed on postrelease supervision, there is no statute or case law which clearly establishes this duty. As a result, Jones is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 false arrest claim when probable cause made the arrest objectively reasonable.

Martin v. City of Alexandria · filed 2006-07-17

Because the arrest was not objectively unreasonable, Officer Gleason is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could show that officers used unreasonable force against a person who did not resist.

Samuelson v. City of New Ulm · filed 2006-07-20

Based on this evidence, we hold the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the record indisputably shows that lawful considerations partly motivated their conduct and the law did not clearly establish liability.

Fry v. Hillsborough Co. School Board · filed 2006-07-20

Here, even assuming, as the district court did, that Alexander and Miles’s conduct violated Fry’s First Amendment rights, there is undisputed evidence in the record that establishes that Alexander and Miles had lawful reasons for deciding not to renew Fry’s employment contract, namely that the defendants were motivated, at least in part, by Fry’s deficient work performance and interpersonal behavior. Thus, the district court correctly determined that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers who unreasonably ignore an inmate’s serious symptoms despite an earlier medical assessment.

Gordon v. Frantsi · filed 2006-07-21

In this case, it was unreasonable for Arends, Deschene and Frantsi to ignore Gordon's shortness of breath and chest pain because they were responsible for responding to medical emergencies and knew Gordon was on high observation. A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity when officers ignore it.

A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when officers ignore it.

Gordon v. Frank · filed 2006-07-21

In this case, it was unreasonable for Arends, Deschene and Frantsi to ignore Gordon's shortness of breath and chest pain because they were responsible for responding to medical emergencies and knew Gordon was on high observation. A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity when officers ignore it.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 claim if the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation or the right was not clearly established at the time of injury.

Hernandez v. Conde · filed 2006-07-24

To determine whether qualified immunity serves as a defense to a § 1983 action, the court undertakes a two-step analysis. ... First, the court must determine whether the facts alleged state the violation of a constitutional right. ... And if so, the court must determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of injury. ... If the answer to either of these questions is “no,” then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action for a reasonable mistake when there is no evidence of recklessness.

Hernandez v. Conde · filed 2006-07-24

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Agent Conde may have mistaken the house. However, there is no evidence of improper motive or recklessness. There is also no evidence that Agent Conde entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations. An officer’s reasonable but mistaken belief is entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials who review prisoner complaints are entitled only to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the review process lacks judicial safeguards.

Koutnik, Joseph D. v. Brown, Lebbeus · filed 2006-07-24

For the reasons outlined in Cleavinger, Ray, Huibregtse, and Raemisch were entitled only to qualified immunity for their role in evaluating Koutnik’s complaint.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts bearing on the defense are disputed.

Freece v. Clackamas County · filed 2006-07-25

Disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when existing law gave them fair warning that forcing a Muslim inmate to handle pork contrary to his sincere religious beliefs was unconstitutional.

Williams v. Bitner · filed 2006-07-25

In sum, we hold that the Prison Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from Williams’s First Amendment claim. ... We therefore conclude that the state of the law at the time the violation occurred gave the Prison Officials “fair warning” that their alleged treatment of Williams was unconstitutional.

A government official sued under § 1983 may obtain qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Warden Stephen Benton v. Hopkins · filed 2006-07-25

A government official who is sued under § 1983 may seek summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity. ... We agree with the district court’s analysis of the first Saucier prong and its conclusion that, on this record, Benton did not satisfy his burden to show that the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim must show that the official violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Johnson Ex Rel. Estate of Cano v. Holmes · filed 2006-07-26

In order to defeat a qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.” M imics, Inc. v. Village of A ngel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 political firing claim when the record lacks enough detail to determine whether the defendants are entitled to it.

Kenney v. Charnock · filed 2006-07-26

Accordingly, as the issue of qualified immunity is before this Court on a motion to dismiss and discovery has just begun, the Court finds for the foregoing reasons that there is simply not enough clarity at this point in the litigation for the Court to determine whether Defendants are entitled to such immunity. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss and will permit the parties to proceed with discovery.