42 U.S.C. § 1983

When a § 1983 defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the constitutional right was clearly established.

Rodeman v. Foster · filed 2011-03-16

Where a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that “(1) that the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute exists over whether an officer was deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s serious medical needs.

Border v. Trumbull County Board of Commissioners · filed 2011-03-17

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Palumbo acted with deliberate indifference to Border’s serious medical needs, we conclude that the district court properly denied summary judgment to Palumbo on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Noble v. Adams · filed 2011-03-17

In summary, in 2002 it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that his or her conduct vis á vis the declaration of an emergency, the lockdown, or the curtailment of use of the exercise yard was unlawful in the situation he or she confronted.

Individual officials sued under § 1983 can be denied qualified immunity on an equal protection claim at summary judgment.

Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont. · filed 2011-03-18

As to that claim, we con- clude that on the basis of the summary judgment record, a rea- sonable trier of fact could find that the Commissioners violated Gerhart’s equal protection rights and that the Com- missioners are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, they use gratuitous force after a suspect has surrendered and submitted to arrest.

Wheeler v. City of Cleveland · filed 2011-03-21

Here, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to Ellis and Lane. Under Wheeler’s version of the facts, Ellis and Lane used gratuitous force after Wheeler had surrendered and submitted to arrest, thus violating a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when they use unnecessary, disproportionate force against a secured, unarmed person.

Wolfe v. Footen · filed 2011-03-21

We evaluate the officers’ conduct under this deferential standard and find that neither officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the officer’s conduct violates clearly established law.

Wernert v. Washington · filed 2011-03-22

Similarly here, Deputy Greene’s use of force against Wernert, who was already restrained and posed little possibility of harm to the officers, was not objectively reasonable and contravened clearly established law. Therefore, Deputy Greene is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for continuing to use deadly force against an incapacitated suspect when a reasonable officer would know the force was no longer needed.

Brockington v. Boykins · filed 2011-03-22

Because a reasonable officer would have recognized that deadly force was no longer needed after Brockington was injured and help- less with his back on the ground, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an official sued in her individual capacity.

Decotiis v. Whittemore · filed 2011-03-24

We affirm the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint against Whittemore, because she is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual capacity and the suit against Whittemore in her official capacity is redundant of the suit against CDS-Cumberland.

In a § 1983 action, an officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when entitlement to immunity depends on disputed facts for a jury to decide.

Rodriguez v. Passinault · filed 2011-03-25

If the legal question of immunity is completely dependent on which view of the facts the jury accepts, the district court should not grant summary judgment on the issue.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Ansell v. Twp · filed 2011-03-25

Accepting these allegations as true and construing all facts in Ansell‟s favor – as we must at this stage of the litigation – we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that Ansell adequately alleged a violation of his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force and thus in denying the Deputy Sheriffs‟ motion to dismiss.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a jury could find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wray v. Painter · filed 2011-03-28

Since there exists sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury may find that Defendant violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right and that the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation, Defendant is not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless the facts establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

McKenney v. Harrison · filed 2011-03-28

An official is entitled to qualified immunity against a § 1983 action unless (1) the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the party seeking damages, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. ... We conclude that the entry into the home did not violate Barnes’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a constitutional right.

Frazier v. Ortiz · filed 2011-03-28

Frazier has not presented a material issue of fact demonstrating the CDOC defendants violated his First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment in their favor was warranted.

In a Section 1983 political retaliation suit, an official’s qualified immunity depends on whether the employee held a policymaking position when the alleged retaliation occurred.

Bardzik v. County of Orange · filed 2011-03-28

We hold that Carona is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions retaliating against Bardzik while Bardzik was Reserve Division Commander because Bardzik was a policymaker in that position. Carona is not entitled to qualified immunity, however, for any further retaliatory action against Bardzik once Bardzik was transferred to Court Operations. Under clearly established law, Bardzik was not a policymaker at Court Operations.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim for using pepper spray on an arrestee who is not accused of a serious crime, poses no immediate threat, and is not actively resisting or fleeing; that prohibition was clearly established by 2006.

Howard v. Wayne County Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-03-29

Thus, by the time of Howard’s encounter with Wood in August 2006, the principle of law was already clearly established that use of pepper spray on an arrestee who was not accused of a serious crime, was not posing an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and was not actively resisting arrest or seeking to flee is constitutionally unreasonable.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when the alleged conduct violated a clearly established equal protection right.

Pratt ex rel. Petranchuk v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2011-03-29

The Court rejects Defendants' argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, contrary to Defendants' belief, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was clearly established that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when significant force against a person offering only passive resistance violates clearly established law.

Meirthew v. Amore · filed 2011-03-30

Because it was clearly established that the use of significant force in response to passive resistance may constitute excessive force, and because Meirthew posed no safety threat, Amore is not entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against government employees are subject to qualified immunity when their actions are objectively reasonable and do not violate clearly established rights.

Wion v. Janie Cockrell, Ann Byrom, J. Missildine, A.R. Massingil, and Kelli Ward · filed 2011-03-30

Thus, the trial court did not err in finding Wion did not state material facts that would overcome the TDCJ employees’ defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent the court from deciding whether the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights and acted objectively reasonably.

Robinson v. Jordan · filed 2011-03-30

Because disputed facts exist to preclude the Court’s determination as to whether defendant violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, and as to whether defendant acted objectively reasonably even if plaintiff's rights were violated, the qualified immunity analysis cannot be conducted at this time.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages for administratively imposed post-release supervision while its unlawfulness was not clearly established.

Locantore v. Hunt · filed 2011-03-31

Here, there cannot be a claim that any Defendant committed a wrong after April 2008, when they arguably would lose the shield of qualified immunity, as Plaintiff prevailed in his habeas petition in March 2008. Thus, all Defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

Anderson v. Kent State University · filed 2011-03-31

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was engaged in protected conduct, and therefore cannot show that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected right. ... Therefore, Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit may be decided by whether the asserted right was clearly established, without deciding whether the conduct violated the Constitution.

Lopera v. Town of Coventry · filed 2011-04-01

In this case, these considerations counsel that we consider the second prong of the analysis and go no further.

In a § 1983 action, genuine disputes of material fact can preclude summary judgment on officers’ qualified immunity defense.

Huckaby v. Priest · filed 2011-04-05

Furthermore, the fundamental factual disputes identified in the record which prevent summary judgment also require this court to reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Defendants on interlocutory appeal.

An officer who knowingly, deliberately, or recklessly makes a false statement in an affidavit is not protected by immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Stevens v. Delaware County · filed 2011-04-05

The District Court correctly identified the controlling legal principle — that when an officer knowingly, deliberately, or recklessly makes a false statement in an affidavit, that officer is not protected by any immunity doctrine.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give fair notice that his conduct violated a constitutional right.

A.D. v. Markgraf · filed 2011-04-06

For these reasons we conclude that Markgraf is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was clearly established and a reasonable person in their position should have known it was protected.

Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington · filed 2011-04-06

As such, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the proper course is to remand Adams’ claims for further consideration under the second and third prongs of the McVey test.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when disputed facts leave the officer’s use of excessive force for a jury to decide.

Holland v. Bramble · filed 2011-04-06

In the case at bar, there remain genuine issues of disputed material fact as to whether defendant used excessive force during the November 26, 2004 incident with plaintiff and, thus, violated his constitutional rights. The court concludes that a determination of whether defendant violated plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights remains a question for a jury trial. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when it was not clearly established that he had to leave a home while assisting a social worker investigating child neglect.

Coates v. Powell · filed 2011-04-08

We believe that a reasonable police officer could act in good faith and remain in the house still assisting Clevenger. ... For the above reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Officer Glandon on the basis of his receiving qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when a jury could find that the officer fabricated a statement material to probable cause for an arrest warrant.

Kuslick v. Roszczewski · filed 2011-04-11

Telling lies to a magistrate in order to concoct probable cause is no technical violation of the law, and qualified immunity surely does not require us to countenance such behavior, if indeed a jury concludes that is what occurred here.

A teacher sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable teacher would recognize.

Mathers Ex Rel. J.S.J. v. Wright · filed 2011-04-11

Wright is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.

Section 1983 permits an unlawful arrest claim to proceed when the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the summary judgment record.

Merchant v. Fairfax County, Va. · filed 2011-04-11

Although Officer Bauer is entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Merchant, does not entitle Officer Bauer to qualified immunity. Therefore, it is appropriate to deny summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and proceed to a jury trial.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the evidence could permit a reasonable juror to find a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Jennings v. Bradley · filed 2011-04-12

Thus, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutional.

Alford v. Humboldt County · filed 2011-04-12

On the other hand, no pre-existing authority established that it was unreasonable for law enforcement officers to fail to deploy a throw phone as part of their efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to a standoff. Accordingly, Lt. Cavinta is entitled to qualified immunity based on this sole surviving claim against him.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim calls for examining whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Schmidt v. Creedon · filed 2011-04-18

Under the rule in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), we consider first whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and then, “if a violation could be made out . . . the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim depends on whether the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show a violation of a clearly established right.

Asher v. McClure · filed 2011-04-20

Thus, to determine whether they are protected by qualified immunity, we must consider whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Asher, supports a conclusion that Defendants violated Asher’s Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers facing a Section 1983 excessive force claim may obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiffs lack evidence of injury.

Shaw v. Hardberger · filed 2011-04-21

However, the defendants demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning their qualified immunity defense to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 First Amendment claims when the asserted rights were not clearly established.

Doninger v. Niehoff · filed 2011-04-25

Because we conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on both First Amendment claims, and because we agree with the district court with regard to Plaintiff’s other claims, the district court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer tases a nonthreatening, nonresisting suspect in violation of clearly established law.

Cherry v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 2011-04-25

The force applied by Officer Hanes was disproportionate to the actions of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, qualified immunity is denied.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 damages claim when the officer reasonably believes a detention is lawful.

Tindle v. Enochs · filed 2011-04-26

This Court finds that Enochs is entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably believed she could detain Tindle.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if he had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Garcia v. Killingsworth · filed 2011-04-28

Killingsworth is entitled to qualified immunity from suit if he had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of the claimed constitutional right.

Bates v. Orozco · filed 2011-04-29

Because Bates did not show a violation of the claimed constitutional right, the district court properly granted summary judgment on ruling that Officer Orozco was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Gutierrez v. Toledo · filed 2011-05-02

Therefore, under this prong, a defendant “is entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” ... Therefore, we find that a reasonable police officer would have understood that he had probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when disputed facts could show they used excessive force against a restrained, cooperative prisoner.

Bailey v. Golladay · filed 2011-05-03

As there is a factual dispute as to whether such force was used against Bailey after he was restrained and had become cooperative, the district court erred in determining that Defendants Duvall, Story, Forrest and the unnamed officer were due qualified immunity for the actions taken while transporting Bailey to the segregation unit.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officials would know that the alleged discriminatory discipline and termination were unlawful.

Rick Eaton v. Siemens · filed 2011-05-04

But reasonable officials would surely know that they are acting unlawfully by subjecting employees perceived as being uncooperative with department misconduct to discriminatory discipline and termination.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed and the asserted right was not clearly established.

Buzayan v. City of Davis Police Departmen · filed 2011-05-04

Instead, we hold that the right was not clearly established; even if the officers were mistaken in their conclusion that probable cause existed, a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Buzayan for misdemeanor hit-and-run.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Hudson v. Harrison · filed 2011-05-04

The district court properly dismissed Hudson’s First Amendment claim without leave to amend after concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding a prisoner’s right to receive publications from non-approved vendors was not clearly established.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when his use of force was reasonable and violated no constitutional right.

Hayden v. Green · filed 2011-05-05

His actions were reasonable, and he did not violate Hayden’s constitutional rights. We reverse the district court’s order denying qualified immunity, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A § 1983 false-arrest plaintiff can overcome an officer’s qualified immunity by showing that the officer deliberately or recklessly gave false information material to the finding of probable cause for an arrest warrant.

Richardson v. Nasser · filed 2011-05-05

Therefore, to overcome qualified immunity in this context, Richardson must establish “(1) a substantial showing that [Nasser] stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth and (2) that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause.” Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when they reasonably could not have known their conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Garcia v. County of Merced · filed 2011-05-05

In the alternative, we conclude that reasonable officers in possession of this information under these circumstances could not have known that to act as they did would violate the constitutional rights upon which Garcia predicates his consti- ... tutional claims.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against government officials when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a clearly established right.

Gerald v. Locksley · filed 2011-05-06

Gerald has not shown that the Defendants violated his rights, and thus not his clearly established Firsb-Amendment rights. The Defendants are therefore immune from his Firsb-Amendment retaliation claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Blosser v. Gilbert · filed 2011-05-10

Because the border between pulling a suspect from his car and pulling him from his car through the window is “hazy” enough that the contours of any right to be free from the latter could not have been “sufficiently clear,” cf. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 206, Gilbert and Carpentier are entitled to qualified immunity.

In § 1983 individual-capacity claims, qualified immunity may be denied for plausibly alleged violations of clearly established rights and granted when the complaint fails to plead a plausible constitutional violation.

Porter v. Valdez · filed 2011-05-11

For the reasons that follow, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the retaliation and due-process claims; they are entitled to it for the equal-protection claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 false-arrest claim at summary judgment when disputed facts prevent a determination that the arrest was objectively reasonable.

McComas v. Brickley · filed 2011-05-13

For the reasons explained above, we find that genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to Mr. McComas’s § 1983 claim and that qualified immunity cannot shield Detective Brickley from possible liability.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established when the officer acted.

Lewis Floyd, Jr., vs Corder · filed 2011-05-13

In conclusion, even if Deputy Sheriff Corder’s use of his taser constituted excessive force, he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions did not violate Floyd’s “clearly established rights.”

An official sued individually under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2011-05-16

Williams filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit as a putative class action against the Department and Commissioner Richard Allen in his individual and official capacity. ... Williams presents the following arguments on appeal: ... (2) Commissioner Allen (in his individual capacity) is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the takings claim because he was not acting in his discretionary authority when he implemented regulations governing the deductions from the earnings of inmates who participate in the Department work-release program. ... Williams’s second argument lacks merit for the reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned opinion.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to identify clearly established law that would have alerted a reasonable officer that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Aragon v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2011-05-17

It remains the plaintiff’s additional burden in a qualified immunity appeal like this to identify clearly established law at the time ... of his arrest capable of alerting a reasonable officer that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional. This burden, we hold, the plaintiff hasn’t carried.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time.

Miller v. IDAHO STATE PATROL · filed 2011-05-18

Given the foregoing legal uncertainty as to whether a forced warrantless catheterization is constitutional, the district court should have dismissed Miller’s § 1983 claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is not an issue in a Section 1983 suit seeking only injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities.

Battista v. Clarke · filed 2011-05-20

Because the individual defendants are sued only in their official capacity for injunctive relief and no damages are sought, qualified immunity is not an issue nor need the separate roles of individual defendants be sorted out.

A court may resolve qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim by deciding whether the right was clearly established without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Lopera v. Town of Coventry · filed 2011-05-20

In this case, these considerations counsel that we consider the second prong of the analysis and go no further.

In a § 1983 suit, asserting qualified immunity alone does not justify summary judgment before the plaintiff has an opportunity for discovery.

Alspaugh v. McConnell · filed 2011-05-23

We also note that it is not proper to grant summary judgment without giving Alspaugh an opportunity to engage in discovery merely because the state defendants asserted qualified immunity as a defense.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to rebut the defense.

Chiles v. Hempstead · filed 2011-05-23

We are convinced, though, that the defense of qualified immunity was validly raised and was not rebutted.

An official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe the challenged hearing was lawful.

Livingston v. Kelly · filed 2011-05-24

In light of this ruling, it was objectively reasonable for Selsky to think that a fair hearing could be conducted on the 1996 charge even without the videotape.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Warner v. McVey · filed 2011-05-27

Even if we assume that our reasoning recognizes a clearly established right for a probationer such as Warner, this right was not clearly established when Warner‟s designation was applied. ... Lightner and Williams are therefore entitled to immunity from suit.

A Section 1983 claim against government officials may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the pleading stage when the complaint does not plausibly allege a violation of clearly established law.

Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Township of Richmond · filed 2011-06-01

As such, plaintiffs’ “insubstantial” equal protection claim was ripe for dismissal under the doctrine of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 arrest claim based solely on a radio call when the complaint does not establish arguable probable cause.

Craft v. Olszewski · filed 2011-06-02

Therefore, under the facts presented in the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant Genao cannot claim immunity based solely on the radio call.

Qualified immunity protects officers from liability under § 1983 when the right they violated was not clearly established.

Coffin v. Brandau · filed 2011-06-03

We hold that although the Deputies’ entrance into the garage did violate the Coffins’ Fourth Amendment rights, the boundaries of the right violated here were not clearly established and, thus, the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from § 1983 damages liability unless the official violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Chambers v. Pennycook · filed 2011-06-06

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action for damages unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known. ... We reject in this decision a constitutional rule that turns on the arrestee’s degree of injury, but given the law prevailing at the time of the incident, we conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Hannemann v. Southern Door County School District · filed 2011-06-07

Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from lawsuits insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

White, Jr. v. Martin · filed 2011-06-08

Once these inferences are made, and taking into account the other evidence, the violation of Mr. White’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force is clearly established for purposes of denying the summary judgment motion.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when his belief that he had probable cause was reasonable under the circumstances.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2011-06-09

Based on these findings, Schaffer’s belief that he had probable cause to arrest Leventhal for disorderly conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 may receive qualified immunity when their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

Glair v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2011-06-09

Officers Roditis and Gomez were entitled to summary judgment on Glair’s Fourth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity because even if they mistakenly concluded that probable cause was present, their mistake was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the law did not give him reasonable notice that his conduct could lead to damages liability.

Gardner v. Board of Police Commissioners · filed 2011-06-09

Given this legal landscape, we think it was not clearly established as of September 2007 that an officer in Missouri could effect a seizure under the Fourth Amendment without subjectively intending to do so. Ritchie was therefore not on clear notice that he must conform his conduct— including conduct that was a foreseeable consequence of his medical condition — to a rule that might result in liability under the Fourth Amendment for actions that he did not subjectively intend. He is entitled to qualified immunity if the state of the law did not allow him reasonably to anticipate that his conduct may give rise to liability for damages.

Qualified immunity does not necessarily shield a children's services caseworker from § 1983 claims arising from a home entry and removal of children.

Southerland v. City of New York · filed 2011-06-10

The plaintiffs -- a father and his children -- bring various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that Woo, a children's services caseworker employed by the defendant City of New York, entered their home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of the children into state custody. The district court concluded that Woo was entitled to qualified ... immunity with respect to all of the claims against him. We disagree.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest.

Whitson v. Gilberg · filed 2011-06-13

In addition to holding that probable cause bars the claim of false arrest, the court holds further that even if probable cause did not exist, there can be no question but that arguable probable cause sufficient to support qualified immunity, exists.

Qualified immunity protects defendants from § 1983 claims when their official conduct was objectively reasonable.

Stepien v. Schaubert · filed 2011-06-13

Even assuming arguendo that the Board member defendants here did not act in a legislative capacity in bringing misconduct charges against Stepien and voting to remove him from office, they are entitled at the very least to qualified immunity from Stepien’s § 1983 claims, since they acted at all relevant times in their official capacities and in a manner that was not objectively unreasonable.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted statutory right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Roth v. Guzman · filed 2011-06-13

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity with respect to claims under ... either the DPPA or § 1983, and REMAND for entry of judgment in favor of defendants Guzman and Rankin.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct violates no constitutional right.

Ball v. Township of Silver Spring · filed 2011-06-13

Since there was no constitutional violation, defendants Bassler, Burger, and Grunden are entitled to qualified immunity on this aspect of the unlawful arrest claim.

Individual defendants have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no clearly established law required pre- or post-termination hearings during a bona fide reduction in force.

Abreu v. NEW MEXICO CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES · filed 2011-06-16

The Court finds that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, because there is no clearly established law requiring pre-termination or post-termination hearings in the context of a bona fide RIF.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly warn them that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

San Gerónimo Caribe Project, Inc. v. Acevedo-Vilá · filed 2011-06-17

In view of this, it cannot fairly be said that the defendants were on clear notice that their failure to provide predeprivation process violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and defendants thus are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an official from a warrant-based claim when the official did not prepare or bear full responsibility for the warrant application and did not taint the independent intermediary’s decision.

Jennings v. Patton · filed 2011-06-17

We have been “unwilling . . . to extend [§ 1983] liability . . . beyond the affiant and person who actually prepared, or was fully responsible for the preparation of, the warrant application.” ... In light of these circumstances, Judge Patton is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established under the circumstances.

Hodge v. City of Long Beach · filed 2011-06-20

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Appellants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging excessive force.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful at the time.

Toevs v. Reid · filed 2011-06-20

Because the standards for meaningful periodic reviews during extended placement in a stratified incentive program involving confinement to administrative segregation were not previously clearly established in this circuit, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the use of deadly force was lawful.

Littleton v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD. · filed 2011-06-21

Accordingly, the Court finds that, even if Swonger’s conduct violated a constitutional right, this is a case where a reasonable officer could have believed that Boggs posed a serious deadly threat. Swonger, then, as a matter of law, is also entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a statutory or constitutional right.

Elizondo v. Fletcher Parks · filed 2011-06-27

We find that Garcetti precludes Elizondo’s claim and therefore Parks is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no violation of a statutory or constitutional right.

Section 1983 damages claims against state actors are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Lee v. Johnson · filed 2011-06-28

Nevertheless, the court concludes that an award of monetary damages under § 1983 — the only form of relief left to Lee on this claim — would without doubt be stymied by Chaplain Richardson’s assertion of qualified immunity with respect to it.

Section 1983 shields officers from liability under qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Thornton v. Jeff Fray · filed 2011-06-28

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims—except for those arising out of KT’s detention in the van and the officers’ refusal to allow Thornton to cover herself—because the length of the search, use of handcuffs, and display of weapons did not violate clearly established law.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Beckinger v. Township of Elizabeth · filed 2011-06-29

Thus, it cannot be said that the right asserted in this case was clearly established when Memorandum No. 07-17 was issued.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officials sued in their individual capacities when their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Diaz-Bigio v. Santini · filed 2011-06-29

We reverse and direct entry of judgment for defendants in their individual capacities on grounds of qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful seizure claim when they prolong a naked detention without justification in violation of clearly established law.

Hutchinson v. Lemmon · filed 2011-06-30

For these reasons, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the individual officers were not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Ms. Hutchinson’s unlawful seizure claim.

Discovery in a Section 1983 action may be stayed pending resolution of a defendant’s qualified immunity claim.

Packnett v. Petrakis · filed 2011-06-30

The district court did not err in staying discovery pending resolution of defendants’ qualified immunity claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 political dismissal claim when unresolved facts prevent the court from determining whether the position permits a patronage dismissal.

O'Connor v. Township of Redford · filed 2011-07-01

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying summary judgment to Defendant on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against officers for constitutional violations, but qualified immunity protects officers who reasonably believe their conduct is lawful.

Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill. · filed 2011-07-06

Police officers sued under § 1983 often may claim qualified immunity “when they act in a manner that they reasonably believe to be lawful.” ... As such, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the excessive force claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Sanchez v. Bratton · filed 2011-07-07

Plaintiffs, the parents, grandmother and aunt of then-probationer Oscar Sanchez (“Oscar”), appeal the district court’s grant, on summary judgment, of qualified immunity to law enforcement defendants on the illegal search branch of their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of a constitutional right, subject to applicable immunities.

Muhammad v. Close · filed 2011-07-08

The defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity as a ground for summary judgment comes too late.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Lobozzo v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2011-07-08

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to qualified immunity.

McCaster v. County of Ramsey · filed 2011-07-11

The Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on McCaster’s claims. In analyzing that assertion, the Court must conduct a two-part inquiry. First, it must assess whether the facts alleged, when viewed in the light most favorable to McCaster, show that the challenged conduct violated a constitutional right. If a violation could be established based on those facts, the Court must then determine whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established on the date in question.

Qualified immunity is a defense to a § 1983 claim, but it did not protect these defendants at summary judgment.

Bellamy v. Alyssa Wells · filed 2011-07-12

We conclude that the district court did not err when it denied Defendants qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional rights violations by persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Jackson v. Johnson · filed 2011-07-18

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Jackson, Deputy Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because tasering Jackson to effectuate a false arrest constituted a use of force where none was necessary, and no reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity.

Wells v. Krebs · filed 2011-07-18

We have reviewed the record, and agree with the magistrate judge and for substantially the same reasons she identified in her detailed recommendation filed September 1, 2010– Wells failed to show an Eighth Amendment violation. The defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit and entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to qualified immunity for officials who did not violate clearly established rights.

Borgman v. Kedley · filed 2011-07-19

Borgman filed this action against agent Kedley and the Wild Rose Clinton, alleging that they both had violated her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they acted in concert to have her arrested without probable cause. ... Since the record evidence supports the conclusion that Kedley arrested Borgman for trespassing on casino property, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Kedley was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when officials’ actions are objectively reasonable.

Thurston v. Celli · filed 2011-07-19

Anderson P. Thurston appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants, Santa Rosa police officers, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they shot and killed his son, Haki Thurston. ... Defendants’ actions were therefore reasonable, and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a private action against someone acting under color of state law who deprives them of constitutional or federal statutory rights.

King v. Taylor · filed 2011-07-19

“Under § 1983, an individual may bring a private right of action against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statutes.”

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established.

Charles Warner, Jr. v. Wright · filed 2011-07-20

Nor does the record reveal a genuine dispute as to a material fact regarding the defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. When a defendant pleads qualified immunity as a defense, the court must determine whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff set forth a violation of a constitutional right and whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009). ... Thus, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from liability arising from Warner’s claims regarding his religious freedom. Ontiveros, 564 F.3d at 382.

Section 1983 claims against public officials may be subject to qualified immunity when the official's conduct is objectively reasonable.

Chacon v. York · filed 2011-07-20

Because it is not possible to conclude as a matter of law, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Chacon, that York acted in an objectively reasonable manner—which would entitle him to qualified immunity—the district court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment for York on the excessive force claim.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Tommy Sanchez, Jr. v. Edwards · filed 2011-07-20

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... On the basis of the record in this case, no reasonable juror could find that Banquer and Schwebel acted unreasonably under the circumstances, and therefore we conclude that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity.

Stanton v. McIntosh County, Georgia · filed 2011-07-21

Appellant brought an action against McIntosh County, Georgia, Stephen Jessup, as Sheriff of McIntosh County, and Captain James Lyons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Based upon the uncontradicted facts surrounding the obtaining of the arrest warrant, Captain James Lyons is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers may be barred by qualified immunity when their mistaken belief in probable cause was reasonable.

Barrientos v. Haritos · filed 2011-07-25

This is sufficient to entitle the officers to qualified immunity, even if probable cause was lacking. ... Accordingly, the officers are entitled to summary, judgment of plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Government employees sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity.

TURNER v. MOORE · filed 2011-07-29

As explained in Watkins, supra, the immunity applicable to governmental officials and governmental employees sued in their individual capacities is qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields defendants from suit under § 1983 when their conduct did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Dean v. Smith · filed 2011-08-03

Nor do I approve or disapprove of the acts or omissions of the defendants — I conclude only that plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated and that each of the defendants has qualified immunity from suit.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Gonzalez v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2011-08-03

Accordingly, the district court erred in denying summary judgment to Officer Cragin on his defense of qualified immunity for the warrant arrest of Gonzalez.

Officials sued under § 1983 may have qualified immunity depending on whether the evidence shows a constitutional violation, a clearly established right, and objectively unreasonable conduct.

Gaspers v. Ohio Department of Youth Services · filed 2011-08-05

We follow a three-step analysis when reviewing a district court’s decision concerning qualified immunity. See Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003). First, we evaluate whether the facts demonstrate that a constitutional violation has occurred. Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 519 (6th Cir. 2010). Second, we determine whether the violation involved a clearly-established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. Third, we consider “whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence ‘to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.’” Id. (citations omitted).

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim is available only to natural persons sued in their individual capacities.

Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District · filed 2011-08-05

As only natural persons who are sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity, however, we address such immunity with regard to those defendants only.

A state correctional institution cannot claim qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Barker v. Goodrich · filed 2011-08-10

First and foremost, the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to London Correctional Institute, which is not eligible for such immunity.

State officials sued in their personal capacities under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity.

MSI Regency Ltd. v. Jackson · filed 2011-08-12

For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and hold that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Tracy v. State of Washington · filed 2011-08-16

Summary judgment was also appropriate with respect to M.T.’s § 1983 claim because even if the panel assumes that defendants were state actors they were entitled to qualified immunity since they did not violate a clearly-established federal right.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed.

Dixon v. Chief William Lansdowne · filed 2011-08-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Dixon’s excessive force claim based on qualified immunity because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers used an unreasonable amount of force in subduing him, and “a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed[.]” Luchtel, 623 F.3d at 982-83.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a Section 1983 claim when the right to protection from dangerously low cell temperatures was clearly established.

SKANDHA v. Savoie · filed 2011-08-18

The Court concludes that defendants are not shielded by qualified immunity. The law regarding whether a low cell temperature can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation is clearly established.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer with qualified immunity when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Walker v. Davis · filed 2011-08-22

But the facts, as we must view them, make out a violation of Germany’s clearly established constitutional rights. The district court’s denial of qualified immunity is affirmed.

Section 1983 permits suits for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not violated or was not clearly established.

Torres v. City of Madera · filed 2011-08-22

An officer will be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an officer whose alleged failure to disclose evidence did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights.

Brown v. Chiappetta · filed 2011-08-23

In short, Brown fails to show that Chiappetta violated her due process right to disclosure because she never stood trial. Moreover, Chiappetta’s acts were not in bad faith and Brown does not show that the disputed evidence is favorable or material under Brady. Therefore, for each of these reasons, Chiappetta is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants sued individually may receive qualified immunity from a special-relationship claim even when the claim against a school is plausible.

Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District · filed 2011-08-23

The Does have pleaded a facially plausible claim that the School violated Jane’s substantive due-process rights by virtue of its special relationship with her and its deliberate indifference to known threats to her safety. Accordingly, we (1) reverse the district court’s grant of the Education Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, (2) affirm that court’s qualified-immunity dismissal of the Does’ special-relationship claims against those Education Defendants sued in their individual capacities, and (3) remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In a § 1983 judicial deception claim, an officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity once the plaintiff has made out the claim.

Chism v. Washington State · filed 2011-08-25

We have consistently applied the rule that summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is not appropriate once a plaintiff has made out a judicial deception claim.

In a § 1983 action, officials are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts could show that they should have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Hernandez Ex Rel. Hernandez v. Foster · filed 2011-08-26

Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Jaymz’s Fourth Amendment continued withholding claim and the parents’ substantive due process con- tinued withholding claims.

Police officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts show that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Glik v. Cunniffe · filed 2011-08-26

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the appellants on Glik's First Amendment claim.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right clearly established at the time.

Vincent v. Yelich · filed 2011-08-29

Because the defendants’ actions did not violate any constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting a defendant’s qualified-immunity defense.

Modrell v. Hayden · filed 2011-08-30

Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden to rebut the defense.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the officer’s conduct violated clearly established law.

Rubio v. Lopez · filed 2011-08-30

Because Rubio has failed to show that Lopez’s force violated clearly established law, we conclude that Lopez is entitled to qualified immunity on Rubio’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Fields v. Abbott · filed 2011-08-30

Because we conclude that the Miller County individual defendants did not violate Fields’s substantive due process rights, we need not address the other prong of the qualified-immunity analysis; namely, whether the substantive due process right that Fields asserts was clearly established when the events in this case took place. ... The Miller County individual defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Fields’s substantive due process claim.

State officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they act with objective reasonableness.

Muir v. Andre Thibault, Matthew Gonyo and Dept of Liquor Control · filed 2011-08-31

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they act with objective reasonableness.

Officers facing a § 1983 false arrest claim are not entitled to qualified immunity when they lacked arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Jessup v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2011-09-01

Given that, under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Jessup, the officers had absolutely no basis for prolonging the Terry stop once they learned that no basketball had been stolen, it is not “arguable” that they possessed probable cause to believe that the first element of § 843.02 had been satisfied, and thus they lacked “arguable probable cause” to arrest Jessup and were not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 due process claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Collazo v. Pagano · filed 2011-09-01

Finally, Pagano was entitled to qualified immunity on Collazo’s due process challenge. Even assuming for the argument that Collazo had a protected property interest in receiving a special diet—a matter upon which we intimate no view—Collazo fails to draw to our attention any case of our Court or of the Supreme Court establishing such a right. Accordingly, we conclude that Collazo’s purported right to due process in this context was not so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known of it.

Officers who actively assist a private seizure may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law prohibits their conduct.

Cochran v. Gilliam · filed 2011-09-02

Accordingly, we reject the Gilliams’ argument that their active involvement in assisting the Landlords in seizing Cochran’s property was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity merely because they followed a superior’s orders.

Dirks v. Grasso · filed 2011-09-02

Baker and Inana cite no binding authority holding that following a superior’s orders entitles officers to qualified immunity, and none exists.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 false arrest liability when probable cause supports the arrest.

Martinsky v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2011-09-02

Qualified immunity “shield[s] executive employees from civil liability under § 1983 if either (1) their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable [for them] to believe that their acts did not violate these clearly established rights.” ... As the Court has determined, Defendants had probable cause to issue Plaintiff a summons. Defendants’ conduct was therefore consistent with Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unlawful or false arrest, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 claims when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Reardon v. Midland Community Schools · filed 2011-09-02

Moreover, both Faust and Stevens are entitled to qualified immunity, and there is no evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom by the school district.

Qualified immunity shields individual defendants from § 1983 liability when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Lockard v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, IND. · filed 2011-09-06

In light of this somewhat diverging patchwork of well-reasoned cases, the Court cannot help but find that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity shielding them from liability.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Williams v. McCallin · filed 2011-09-07

We are unaware of any authority from any court that recognizes such a right. The lack of any such decision means, perforce, that the law is not clearly established. As such, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Mr. Williams’ § 1983 claim.

An official is immune from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish the constitutional violation required by the qualified immunity test.

Estate of Wilbert Lee Henson v. Cou · filed 2011-09-07

Thus, the first element of the qualified immunity test is not met, and Nurse Kraj-ca is immune from suit. We REVERSE the denial of qualified immunity and REMAND in order for the district court to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Nurse Krajca.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim or the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Jackson v. Harris · filed 2011-09-14

“If the plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim or if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law, then the government official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. ... Jackson’s allegations are insufficient to overcome Harris’s qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 suit when material facts about the alleged violation remain disputed.

Eldrick Brown v. Passmore · filed 2011-09-19

Because there is no objective evidence that “blatantly” contradicts Brown’s version, the district court was correct in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, the non-moving party. The district court did not err in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact, and appropriately denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit can sometimes be decided on a motion to dismiss.

Haley v. City of Boston · filed 2011-09-19

To this end, the defense sometimes can be raised and evaluated on a motion to dismiss.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer would have understood that the arrest was unlawful.

Patrizi v. Huff · filed 2011-09-26

The Court finds that Ms. Patrizi has carried her burden to show that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A state official sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity when the alleged right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor · filed 2011-09-26

The “qualified immunity analysis is identical” whether brought against a state official, such as Bailey-Jones, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a federal official, such as Zachem, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the moving defendants are protected by qualified immunity and, thus, will grant their respective motions to dismiss.

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Brims v. Barlow · filed 2011-09-27

Because Brims failed to establish a constitutional violation, Barlow was entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison supervisor sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for alleged failures to adopt policies or train staff when the evidence does not show that those failures were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

Porter v. Epps · filed 2011-09-28

Accordingly, we must consider whether Epps’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law that a prison official must ensure an inmate’s timely release from prison and that such an official may be liable for failure to promulgate policy or failure to train/supervise if he acted with deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. ... Because Epps is entitled to qualified immunity on Porter’s claims, we reverse the district court.

Qualified immunity can shield a prison officer from a Section 1983 claim when the undisputed circumstances of the incident warrant it.

Dixon v. Laboriel · filed 2011-09-29

Under the circumstances depicted, we agree with the district court that Laboriel was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when reasonable officers could disagree about whether their conduct was lawful.

White v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES · filed 2011-09-30

Because reasonable officers could have believed that there was no reasonable alternative other than the gender-based hiring policy to protect the privacy interests of inmates and that gender was therefore a BFOQ for the OIC position, defendants Broceo and Williams are entitled to qualified immunity.

An individual defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Been v. New Mexico Department of Information Technology · filed 2011-09-30

Because Plaintiff thus has satisfied both prongs of the test necessary to overcome summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, Defendants’ motion to dismiss that portion of Count III that alleges that Rudolph, Storie and Martinez violated her right to equal protection must be denied.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Lucas v. Henrico County School Board · filed 2011-09-30

Because the contours of the right at issue were not sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official in Defendants’ position would have understood that what they were doing violated that right, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.