42 U.S.C. § 1983

An officer with arguable probable cause to arrest is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Ruiz v. Town of Indian Shores · filed 2010-07-30

The record clearly demonstrates that, at the very least, Wiseman had arguable probable cause to arrest Ruiz for a violation of the Town of Indian Shores’ public consumption ordinance. ... That is the situation we have here and the district court erred in not granting qualified immunity to Wiseman on this claim.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity for conduct that occurred before the asserted right was clearly established.

Scott v. Superintendent · filed 2010-08-02

We agree that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for all actions they took prior to our decision in Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006), and further conclude that the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for any actions the defendants took thereafter.

Defendants in a Section 1983 political patronage suit are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when it was not clearly established that firing an employee in that position was unlawful.

Moss v. Martin · filed 2010-08-02

Given the uncertainty that litigants encounter in this somewhat murky area of the law, it is difficult for a plaintiff to avoid a qualified ... immunity defense in a case of first impression unless she occupies a low rung on the bureaucratic ladder. We conclude, therefore, that the defendants Moss has sued were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 arrest claim when, viewing the evidence in the plaintiff’s favor, no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.

Reedy v. Evanson · filed 2010-08-02

Our decision on qualified immunity as to those claims is solely that it is not warranted at the summary judgment stage in this case.

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Blickley v. Ford · filed 2010-08-03

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Moreover, and to say the least, the pre- existing law did not clearly establish that, given the circumstances, Ford had violated Blickley’s rights; Ford is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers with arguable probable cause to arrest are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Lomax v. Diaz · filed 2010-08-03

Because we conclude from the record that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Lomax for battery under Florida law, she is barred from pursuing § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The officers are thus entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities.

Section 1983’s qualified immunity protects officers from an arrest claim when a reasonable officer would believe probable cause supported the arrest.

Russell v. Devereaux · filed 2010-08-05

We review de novo the question of qualified immunity; as the parties have framed it, that question is whether the officers violated Russell’s “clearly established” right not to be arrested without probable cause. ... Based on the record before us, it is clear that a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause supported Russell’s arrest in June of 2006.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit asks whether an officer reasonably misunderstood the legal limits on the officer’s conduct.

Southerland v. Commonwealth of PA · filed 2010-08-06

The qualified immunity question, on the other hand, answers whether an officer made a reasonable mistake of law.

A prison nurse who knowingly denies prescribed pain medication after surgery is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the denial violates clearly established rights.

Williams v. Certain Individual Employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division · filed 2010-08-06

Under these alleged facts, Defendant #2 would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 due process claim when the prisoner was not denied the procedural protections required at a disciplinary hearing.

Young v. Rios · filed 2010-08-06

First, the district court did not err in granting Rios qualified immunity on Young’s due process claim because, even if we presume without deciding that Young’s segregation created a protected liberty interest, we cannot say that he was denied the procedural due process protections that he was entitled to pursuant to Wolff.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Fernandez v. Metro Dade Police Dept. · filed 2010-08-06

Plaintiff Juan B. Fernandez brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Sergeant Robert Perez of the Metro Dade Police Department, among others. ... Once Defendant asserted the defense of qualified immunity in his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff took on the burden of satisfying a two-part test: (1) Defendant’s conduct violated a federally protected right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. ... For this reason, we REVERSE the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Flores Ex Rel. Flores v. Jaramillo · filed 2010-08-09

Flores has not shown a violation of a clearly established right, and our qualified immunity analysis ends there. The officers are immune from suit.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they violate a clearly established due process right by withholding apparently exculpatory evidence.

Elkins v. Summit County, Ohio · filed 2010-08-10

Thus, Elkins’ right to have the Mann memorandum disclosed was clearly established on January 5, 1999. ... Therefore, the Mann memorandum was apparently exculpatory in light of the whole case at the time, and the officers’ failure to disclose it violated Elkins’ right to due process. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the officers’ liability on Elkins’ section 1983 claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for obtaining search warrants when the plaintiff cannot show deliberate or reckless falsehoods or omissions and corrected affidavits support probable cause.

Whalen v. LANGFELLOW · filed 2010-08-10

In summary, Whalen’s Franks claims fail because he has not shown that the affidavits supporting the searches contained deliberate falsehoods or omissions or a reckless disregard for the truth and because there was probable cause to search 949 and 951 Iglehart for boxes containing weapons based on the reconstructed affidavits. Langfellow is therefore entitled to qualified immunity for his procurement of the search warrants for 949 and 951 Iglehart.

A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim under Section 1983.

Zahn v. City of Trenton · filed 2010-08-11

A municipality, however, is not entitled to qualified immunity for claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as are Plaintiff’s federal claims.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Scott v. Fischer · filed 2010-08-11

For the reasons we have already rehearsed, because any conduct on the defendants’ part that led to the imposition of Scott’s PRS occurred some four years before Earley, the law as to the unconstitutionality of such acts was not clearly established when they took place and the defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

A jury’s finding of no excessive force makes an officer’s qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim moot.

Youa Vang Lee v. Andersen · filed 2010-08-12

The finding of no excessive force mooted Andersen’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity and rendered harmless any error in failing to define “objectively reasonable.”

An officer assisting with an arrest may rely on the requesting officer’s probable-cause determination when that reliance is objectively reasonable.

Stearns v. Clarkson · filed 2010-08-13

When one officer requests that another officer assist in executing an arrest, the assisting officer is not required to second-guess the requesting officer’s probable cause ... determination, nor is he required to independently determine that probable cause exists.

An officer facing a § 1983 false arrest claim is entitled to qualified immunity only if the officer’s own observations or information from another officer would support a reasonable belief that the person arrested committed a crime.

Ciardiello v. Sexton · filed 2010-08-13

He will only be entitled to qualified immunity if he perceived events himself, or received information from Sexton, that would have been construed by a reasonable officer to show that Ciardiello had engaged in a crime.

In a § 1983 suit arising from a medical emergency, police officers’ qualified immunity depends on whether their actions objectively show that they acted as medical responders or as law enforcement officers.

McKenna v. Edgell · filed 2010-08-17

We conclude that whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity depends on whether they acted in a law-enforcement capacity or in an emergency- medical-response capacity when engaging in the conduct that McKenna claimed violated the Fourth Amendment.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law would have made the unlawfulness of the force apparent to a reasonable officer.

Shannon v. Koehler · filed 2010-08-17

We are convinced that the right Officer Koehler allegedly violated was clearly established as of September 13, 2006, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful, see Krout, 583 F.3d at 564; that is to say, the excessiveness of Officer Koehler’s use of force was apparent, see Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Koehler.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Lundstrom v. Romero · filed 2010-08-17

We conclude Lundstrom and Hibner have alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate the officers violated their clearly established constitutional rights. ... Accordingly, we hold the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when probable cause was at least arguable.

Soukup v. Garvin · filed 2010-08-25

Even if probable cause were lacking, moreover, neither Garvin nor the Town would be liable on the § 1983 claim: he would be entitled to qualified immunity because the existence of probable cause was at least arguable, and he was not carrying out any municipal policy or custom in arresting Soukup despite any lack of probable cause.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim must be revisited after necessary discovery when the record does not yet permit a decision on whether the plaintiff has evidence of a constitutional violation.

Fennell v. Quintela · filed 2010-08-25

However, at this juncture in the litigation, we cannot definitively decide whether Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez are entitled to qualified immunity because further discovery is necessary to determine whether Fennell has produced sufficient ... evidence of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the district court should revisit the issue of qualified immunity after discovery is complete.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court must apply the qualified immunity inquiry to the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor before ruling on immunity.

Katosang v. Wasson-Hunt · filed 2010-08-26

We pass no judgment on whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as we can neither affirm nor deny qualified immunity where the district court failed to undertake the necessary analysis, i.e. applying the qualified immunity inquiry to the facts in the light most favorable to Katosang.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Bailey v. Maxwell · filed 2010-08-26

The district court properly concluded that Defendants are entitled qualified immunity because Bailey’s right to due process before assignment to the Security Maximum Unit was not clearly established at the time he was in the Unit.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Vendouri v. Gaylord, et al. · filed 2010-08-27

Because Vendouri has identified no other basis for determining that the right on which she bases her claim was clearly established, the school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer acting within discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Charlton H. Forrester, Jr. v. Stanley · filed 2010-08-30

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Stanley is entitled to qualified immunity and Forrester’s § 1983 claim was due to be dismissed upon Stanley’s motion.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Gillman v. Schlagetter · filed 2010-08-30

Considering the contours of the qualified immunity defense and the foregoing analysis of Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, the Court concludes that even if Plaintiff could prove the elements of § 1983 free speech claim, Defendants would still prevail on a defense of qualified immunity.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they violate a clearly established due process right.

Tri-State Contractors, Inc. v. Fagnant · filed 2010-09-01

Therefore, we agree with the district court that Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated Tri-State’s clearly established due process rights.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable.

Labensky v. Cornwell · filed 2010-09-01

Plaintiff has not produced any direct evidence which directly contradicts Defendant’s set of material facts, and has therefore not offered direct evidence that Defendant may have been unreasonable to the extent that his actions would both destroy qualified immunity from suit and subject him to liability under Plaintiffs alleged claim.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to arrest for an offense.

Burnett v. Unified Government of Athens'Clarke County, GA · filed 2010-09-03

Because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Burnett for that offense, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from damages under Section 1983 when the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Hodge v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office · filed 2010-09-03

Lieutenant Moore’s actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he is entitled to qualified immunity from Hodge’s Fourth Amendment-based claim.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material facts remain disputed about whether an officer violated clearly established rights.

Besson v. Webre · filed 2010-09-03

Because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Macomber violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable officer would have known, the Court DENIES Macomber’s motion.

Section 1983 damages claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when an objectively reasonable mistake gives the officer arguable probable cause to arrest.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2010-09-09

Because Schaffer’s actions constitute arguable probable cause, and were not plainly incompetent, or a knowing violation of the law in his arrest of Leventhal, I find in this non-jury trial that Schaffer is entitled to qualified immunity. THEREFORE, Leventhal’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Schaffer for unlawful arrest is denied.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for race-based promotions when the consent decree they invoke did not require those promotions.

Finch v. Peterson · filed 2010-09-10

Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate judge that the consent decree did not require the use of race as a factor in making promotion decisions. The individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

In a § 1983 claim against an official acting within discretionary authority, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity.

Manseau v. City of Miramar · filed 2010-09-10

So, Plaintiffs bore the burden of showing that (1) the facts, as alleged and viewed in the light most favorable to them, established a constitutional violation and -- if so, (2) the constitutional right violated clearly was established.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts are material to whether their conduct was reasonable.

Alster v. Goord · filed 2010-09-10

Here, “issues of fact exist concerning the severity of [Alster’s] condition and the state of mind of the individual Defendants that are material to a determination of reasonableness.” ... Accordingly, this Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect a city official who retaliates against someone for orally seeking help from an elected official when a reasonable official would know that retaliation is unlawful.

Holzemer v. City of Memphis · filed 2010-09-15

Because we find no constitutional distinction between an oral and written petition for redress, we also find that a reasonable city official would have known that retaliation for seeking such assistance from a local, elected official is unlawful.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the arrest was objectively reasonable.

Donald Hodge, Jr. v. East Baton Rouge Parish · filed 2010-09-16

Hodge’s refusal after multiple requests gave Lieutenant Moore probable cause. Lieutenant Moore’s actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he is entitled to qualified immunity from Hodge’s Fourth Amendment-based claim.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when no clearly established law bars removing a policymaking employee for publicly opposing the employer’s policies.

Faghri v. University of Connecticut · filed 2010-09-17

If the facts are as he alleges them to be, then Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had no obligation to retain in a management position, especially a high-ranking executive position, one who publicly opposed the university management’s policies. We conclude that at the very least, there was no clearly established law which prohibited Defendants from removing Faghri from his deanship.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Dunn v. Castro · filed 2010-09-14

As a result, the district court erred in holding Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 judicial deception claim when the plaintiff fails to show deliberate or reckless statements or omissions material to probable cause.

Littlefair v. Gonser · filed 2010-09-15

Littlefair failed to show that Sergeant Gosner deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omissions in his affidavit that were material to the finding of probable cause for the search warrant of Littlefair’s property. ... Sergeant Gosner’s conduct does not rise to this level, and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A sheriff sued individually under Section 1983 may be denied qualified immunity when, accepting the plaintiff’s version of the facts on interlocutory appeal, he shows no reversible error in that denial.

McDaniel v. Smith · filed 2010-09-20

After review and oral argument, and accepting Plaintiff-Appellee’s version of the facts at this interlocutory stage, we conclude Defendant-Appellant Sheriff Robert Smith, sued individually, has not shown reversible error in the district court’s order (dated October 29, 2009) which (1) denied qualified immunity as to Plaintiff-Appellee’s federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in Counts 4, 5, and 7, and (2) denied official immunity as to Plaintiff-Appellee’s state law claims in Counts 10, 11, 12, and 14.

A defendant must preserve a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim in the trial court to obtain appellate review.

Jimenez v. Wood County, Tex. · filed 2010-09-22

The County argues next that Sheriff Daugherty was entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability because he did not violate a clearly established right. ... We agree with the Jimenezes that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal and that, therefore, it is inappropriate for our consideration.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive force claim when no clearly established law gave an officer fair warning that mistaking a firearm for a taser violated the Fourth Amendment.

Henry v. Purnell · filed 2010-09-24

Deputy Purnell could not have been on notice because no case gave him fair warning that such weapon confusion violated the Fourth Amendment as a use of excessive force. ... Consequently, Deputy Purnell is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on Henry’s § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against an official in his individual capacity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

SAYED v. Profitt · filed 2010-09-27

Because Mr. Sayed has not established a constitutional violation, his claim against Mr. Profitt in his individual capacity is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Olseth v. SLC Corp. · filed 2010-09-30

In this case, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that even if Ms. Olseth demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether her constitutional rights were violated, Officer Larson was entitled to qualified immunity because his actions did not violated clearly-established law.

An assisting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer reasonably follows a primary officer and has no reason to know the conduct might violate constitutional rights, even if the primary officer is not immune.

Shepard v. Hallandale Beach Police Department · filed 2010-09-30

This Court has concluded that assisting officers during a search are entitled to qualified immunity when there is no indication that they acted unreasonably in following the lead of a primary officer or that they knew or should have known that their conduct might result in a Fourth Amendment violation, even when the primary officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... For these reasons, we cannot say the district court erred in concluding that Officer Budnick was entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Honeycutt v. Ringgold · filed 2010-10-01

“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing immunity from suit from the outset.” ... On the undisputed facts, Mr. Honeycutt has failed to carry his burden to show that Ms. Ringgold was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety, thereby violating a constitutional right. Consequently, the district court erred in denying Ms. Ringgold’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted basis for liability was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Saenz v. City of McAllen · filed 2010-10-04

Because the state created danger theory as a basis of liability was not clearly established at the time the incident occurred, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the claimed constitutional right was not clearly established in the situation they faced.

Gruenberg v. Gempeler · filed 2010-09-30

there was simply no constitutional benchmark here to which prison staff could measure their response. Qualified immunity is designed to shield officials from liability when they exercise their judgment, particularly in gray areas where the contours of the Eighth Amendment are not clear.

Officers who made an arrest supported by probable cause were entitled to qualified immunity from this § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

El v. Crain · filed 2010-10-05

The district court properly determined that even if Ankhenaten Ra El has a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, defendants Smith and Medina are entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Ankhenaten Ra El was supported by probable cause.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity cannot rest on a finding that the Eighth Amendment rights at issue were not clearly established when those rights were clearly established.

Jones v. Neven · filed 2010-10-06

The Eighth Amendment rights Jones claims defendants violated, however, were clearly established.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Faghri v. Univ. of Conn. · filed 2010-10-07

Even accepting as true Faghri’s contentions as to all disputed issues of fact, we conclude that Defendants did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable officer could believe the force used was necessary.

Luchtel v. Hagemann · filed 2010-10-07

Alternatively, even if some degree of force used in subduing Luchtel was excessive, a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed, entitling the officers to qualified immunity.

An officer may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim for enforcing a statute previously held unconstitutional when the officer’s reliance on it was objectively reasonable and the officer had arguable probable cause.

Amore v. Novarro · filed 2010-10-12

In the case at bar, where the defendant acted deliberately and rationally in seeking to determine the then-valid, applicable and enforceable law before taking the actions for which the plaintiff now seeks to hold him accountable, we cannot say that Novarro's arrest of Amore was objectively unreasonable. His immunity stands.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when they had probable cause or reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Burdett v. Reynoso · filed 2010-10-12

Accordingly, the district court properly found that the Arresting Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Gregory Rideau, Jr. v. Woodford · filed 2010-10-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Rideau’s remaining claim as to the denial of outdoor exercise during the seventh prison lockdown because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rideau as the nonmoving party, he failed to raise a triable issue that denying him outdoor exercise under the circumstances violated his constitutional rights.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate a student's clearly established rights.

DeFabio v. East Hampton Union Free School District · filed 2010-10-13

In light of the record in this case, we hold that the Individual Defendants have qualified immunity with respect to Appellants’ First Amendment claims.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged violation was not clearly established.

Hall v. Ekpe · filed 2010-10-13

To the extent Hall sues defendants in their individual capacities, defendants would, in any event, be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity because, although it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that prison officials may not substantially burden the right of free exercise “without some justification,” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 276, it was not clearly established that security and financial concerns could not provide that justification for prisoners who had not demonstrated observance of their professed religion in a manner identified by the prison chaplain for that religion, see Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d at 536.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires consideration of whether the evidence shows a violation of a statutory or constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Tracy v. Freshwater · filed 2010-10-14

Accordingly, when a defendant official invokes qualified immunity as a defense in order to support a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider two questions: (1) whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, makes out a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when their judgment about the force needed to overcome resistance is reasonable.

Statchen v. Palmer · filed 2010-10-15

The qualified immunity defense accepted by the district court disposes of this appeal, and the legal framework for it is straightforward. An arrest is a form of fourth amendment seizure and the use of force to effect it must be reasonable under all the circumstances, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); but under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are themselves entitled to reasonable latitude in making judgments about how much force is necessary to overcome resistance.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Van Lee Brewer v. Simental · filed 2010-10-15

Those governmental officials are entitled to qualified immunity “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

In a § 1983 damages suit, a court may deny officers’ request for qualified immunity before discovery when the complaint plausibly alleges a clearly established constitutional violation.

Swagler v. Neighoff · filed 2010-10-18

As to the First and Fourth Amendment claims, however, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the troopers’ request for qualified immunity in advance of discovery.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by showing a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Dodd v. Jones · filed 2010-10-18

Because the law enforcement officers are entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity in this § 1983 action, Dodd must show both that the facts construed most favorably to him establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the incident, such that a reasonable official would have known his actions were unlawful.

An officer with arguable probable cause to arrest and detain a person is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful detention claim.

Jacobson v. Mott · filed 2010-10-18

This finding entitled Mott to qualified immunity on Jacobson’s § 1983 claim that Mott unlawfully detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and it is of no moment whether Mott also had arguable probable cause to arrest for a different offense.

In a § 1983 public employee speech claim, qualified immunity can protect officials from damages even when retaliation violated the First Amendment; the balance of interests must conclusively favor the employee to defeat immunity.

Camp v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2010-10-18

Even after the Hope decision, there will be cases in which retaliation for speech violates the First Amendment rights of the plaintiff but qualified immunity protects the defendants from a monetary judgment against them. There is a difference between the Pickering balance merely tilting in favor of the plaintiff and it tilting conclusively in his favor; it is the difference between the interests furthered by the plaintiff’s speech merely outweighing the defendant’s interests in restricting it and his interests far outweighing them.

Public school officials sued under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity on substantive due process claims even when they are not entitled to it on equal protection claims.

DiStiso Ex Rel. DiStiso v. Town of Wolcott · filed 2010-10-19

Based upon the above reasoning, the Court holds that Cook, Uccello, and Couture are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiffs equal protection claims. However, the Court further holds that Cook, Uccello, and Couture are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiffs substantive due process claims, and therefore the substantive due process claims are dismissed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Hernandez v. The City of El Paso · filed 2010-10-20

Plaintiff has not established the violation of any clearly established constitutional rights on his individual capacity § 1983 claims as the law existed in 1994. Defendants Jesus Terrones, Guillermo Martinez, Arturo Ruiz, Jr., Antonio Tabullo, Joe Zimmerly, and Pedro Ocegueda, are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s remaining individual capacity § 1983 claims against them.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established Eighth Amendment right.

Campbell v. Smith · filed 2010-10-21

Although we have jurisdiction to consider Smith and McClinen’s claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity because a prison officer’s singular attack on an inmate does not qualify as punishment, we nonetheless conclude it fails because, in June 2008, it was clearly established that the Eighth Amendment forbade the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” against inmates.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an officer when an objectively reasonable officer would have known that the force used violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Raiche v. Pietroski · filed 2010-10-25

Therefore, Pietroski is not entitled to qualified immunity against Raiche's excessive force claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right underlying the claim was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Vendouri v. Gaylord, et al. · filed 2010-10-26

Because Vendouri has identified no other basis for determining that the right on which she bases her claim was clearly established, the school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not require summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, under the plaintiff’s alleged facts, the officer’s conduct is not clearly objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Schmidt v. Gray · filed 2010-10-26

As it is not clear as a matter of law that, under Schmidt’s version of the facts, Gray’s conduct was objectively reasonable, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Gray.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when material facts remain disputed and denial of relevant discovery prejudices the plaintiff.

McMillian v. Wake County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-10-28

Because we conclude the denial of McMillian’s discovery requests substantially prejudiced him, we hold the district court abused its discretion in denying these requests. For these reasons, we conclude the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was premature, particularly in light of the erroneous evidentiary ruling.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Harris v. Alvarado · filed 2010-10-28

In these circumstances, any right that Plaintiff had was not "clearly established," Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009), so Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

A municipal employee sued in an individual capacity under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity unless the claimant shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and objectively unreasonable conduct.

Carter v. Sid J. Champion · filed 2010-10-29

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, a petitioner must state a claim for a violation of a constitutional right, show that the constitutional right was established at the time of the actions at issue, and demonstrate that defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the legal rules clearly established when the defendant acted.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Perkins v. Schwappach · filed 2010-10-29

For the reasons outlined above, the facts that Perkins alleged fail to make out a violation of a constitutional right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Accordingly, the District Court also properly granted Schwappach’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue that they violated a constitutional right.

Hentz v. Ceniga · filed 2010-10-29

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hentz’s claims on qualified immunity grounds because he failed to raise a triable issue that defendants violated any of his constitutional rights.

An official sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

West v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department · filed 2010-10-31

As a result, even if Salazar retaliated against West based on her EEOC complaints, such retaliation does not violate clearly established First Amendment rights, and qualified immunity protects Salazar from West’s First-Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Gilbert v. French · filed 2010-11-01

Thus, because Gilbert did not show that Berndt and Fry’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, the district court did not err in granting them summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Officials facing a Section 1983 claim may receive qualified immunity when the evidence leaves no triable issue that they knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to an inmate’s safety.

Earl Rose , Jr. v. B. Bonnet · filed 2010-11-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because defendants’ moving papers and evidence alone established that there was no triable issue as to whether they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Rose’s safety.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against officers when the law governing their alleged conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Porter v. Hill · filed 2010-11-02

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because the law concerning the opening of prisoners’ legal mail outside their presence was not clearly established at the time the alleged violations occurred.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

LeSUEUR-RICHMOND SLATE CORP. v. FEHRER · filed 2010-11-03

Because the constitutional issue is a close question, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless they transgress rights that are “clearly established.”

A private attorney retained by a city to conduct an internal affairs investigation is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Delia v. City of Rialto · filed 2010-11-08

Accordingly, Filarsky is not entitled to qualified immunity as a private attorney and we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in his favor and remand for trial, or further proceedings as determined by the district court.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity on this record when they could not reasonably believe the employee’s job required political affiliation.

Morin v. Tormey · filed 2010-11-15

The Defendants have also failed to establish that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that Morin was a policymaker such that they would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for excessive force are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct violates no constitutional right or the asserted right was not clearly established.

Crowell v. Kirkpatrick · filed 2010-11-15

In any event, since the facts alleged, even taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, do not amount to a constitutional violation, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. It certainly was not clearly established that the use of force here violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the case law of the Supreme Court or this Circuit.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against an officer when it was reasonable for the officer to believe a warrant affidavit established probable cause.

Payne v. City of Laurel, Maryland · filed 2010-11-15

Further, the district court determined that, in any event, qualified immunity barred Payne’s claims against Officer Proctor because “it was reasonable for Proctor to believe, under the circumstances, that his warrant affidavit exhibited probable cause.” ... Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the controlling authorities, we conclude that the district court’s analysis was correct. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s well reasoned opinion.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the alleged facts show no constitutional violation or the right was not clearly established at the time.

Bolbol v. City of Daly City · filed 2010-11-17

The court must determine whether the facts alleged, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show the violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s evidence could establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

McCoy v. Burns · filed 2010-11-18

For the reasons stated above, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to either of Plaintiffs two claims.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit if the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established when the official acted.

Clark v. Wilson · filed 2010-11-22

In sum, because neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals had applied Sandin’s “atypical and significant hardship” test to the freezing of a prison trust account by 2007, Wilson did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and hence is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was unsettled and reasonable officials could not have known their conduct violated it.

DEL VALLE GROUP v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2010-11-22

In light of the unsettled status of this question of law, reasonable officers in the Individual Defendants’ positions could not have known they were violating Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court GRANTS the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiffs First Amendment claims against Morales and Rodriguez in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when officers reasonably believe their conduct is lawful under the law as it stood at the time.

Ray v. Township of Warren · filed 2010-11-23

Under the circumstances, the officers were not on notice that their conduct was a clear violation of the law, and they acted reasonably in their belief that they could enter Ray’s home for the purpose of checking on his daughter. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Eklund v. City of Seattle Municipal Court · filed 2010-11-24

Bruce E. Eklund (Eklund) brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Seattle Municipal Court (the Municipal Court), the chief judge of the court, Fred Bonner (Bonner), and others. ... Holding that Bonner was entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Bonner.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the constitutional right violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Bryan v. MacPherson · filed 2010-11-30

However, we reverse in part because the violation of Bryan’s constitutional rights was not clearly established at the time that Officer MacPherson fired his taser at Bryan on July 24, 2005.

Qualified immunity protects officers sued under Section 1983 when the law did not clearly warn them that their use of force was unconstitutional.

Barnett v. Florence, Alabama, City of · filed 2010-12-01

In this case, we need not address the first inquiry because, even if we were to assume that the use of force violated the Constitution, Barnett cannot demonstrate ... that the law was so clearly established as to give the officers fair warning that the force used under these circumstances would have violated the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from a § 1983 damages claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Gentilello v. Rege · filed 2010-12-01

The district court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Gentilello had not alleged sufficient facts to state a constitutional violation. We agree.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that their conduct was unlawful.

Meléndez-García v. Sánchez · filed 2010-12-10

We conclude that it would not have been clear to a reasonable official that the conduct about which Meléndez complains was unlawful.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 selective enforcement claim when the plaintiff fails to show that she and her proposed comparator were similarly situated.

Brooks v. Sweeney · filed 2010-12-14

In the absence of such evidence establishing that she and Mathews were similarly situated — in other words, in the absence of a showing that the circumstances pertaining to the septic system problems that the plaintiff and Matthews encountered were substantially similar in all material respects — the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential predicate of her equal protection claim, and, consequently, Sweeney and Huleatt both are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for her § 1983 claims.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

R.K. Ex Rel. J.K. v. Board of Education · filed 2010-12-15

“Government officials who perform discretionary functions are generally protected from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” ... In this case the remaining two prongs of the analysis need not be addressed because Defendants have not violated the Constitution. ... Accordingly, this Court shall dismiss the claims against Defendant Putty in her individual capacity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the evidence does not establish that the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Hartry v. County of Suffolk · filed 2010-12-15

Making all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court cannot conclude that based on the facts and evidence in the record, the Defendants actions were “objectively reasonable” as a matter of law. ... Therefore the Court must deny the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski · filed 2010-12-16

Although the district court erred by holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact whether the defendants regulated their speech based on its content, the defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation.

Cruz v. Palacios · filed 2010-12-16

Whatever the status and scope of a property interest in the immediate possession of the body of a close relative, in the context of a lawful ongoing investigation, no such right was clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. Having failed to establish a necessary element of her § 1983 case, Dela Cruz’s claim necessarily fails, and summary judgment for Palacios on qualified immunity grounds was proper.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless the law was clear enough that a reasonable officer would understand their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Kovacic v. Villarreal · filed 2010-12-17

We hold that defendants Villarreal and Rubio are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. A constitutional right is clearly established for the purposes of section 1983 only if the law is clear enough such that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when clearly established law gave notice that denying a prisoner out-of-cell exercise for almost a year could violate the Eighth Amendment.

Young v. Ericksen · filed 2010-12-20

Qualified immunity fails to defeat Young’s Eighth Amendment out-of-cell exercise claim. ... Under these circumstances, I cannot find as a matter of law that the defendants could have reasonably believed that denying Young out-of-cell exercise for almost an entire year would not constitute a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the officials did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Castle v. Appalachian Technical College · filed 2010-12-21

Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

A public official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a constitutional violation.

Gentilello v. Rege · filed 2010-12-21

The district court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Gentilello had not alleged sufficient facts to state a constitutional violation. We agree.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment based on qualified immunity when disputed facts determine whether they reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest.

McCADD v. Murphy · filed 2010-12-21

Determining whether officers reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest would require the resolution of disputed questions of fact, such as where the vial was located, what it looked like, and whether a police dog alerted to the area where it was found. Accordingly, the defendants cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage on the basis of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity case, a plaintiff who meets the initial burden must still respond with evidence when the defendant’s summary-judgment evidence contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations.

Johnson v. Roberts · filed 2010-12-22

Buchwald is merely addressing the first hurdle that a plaintiff must surmount in responding to a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. If the plaintiff does not make the showing required by Buchwald, the claim must be dismissed. But if the plaintiff makes the showing, the usual rules of summary-judgment practice still apply; and if the defendant presents evidence that contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations, the plaintiff must overcome a second hurdle—namely, responding with evidence, not just allegations.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law when a factual dispute remains over whether they reasonably believed they had authority to exclude someone permanently from public property.

Thomas v. Carroll · filed 2010-12-22

The ODOT defendants have asserted that ODOT has a broad, inherent right as a property owner to exclude persons from the rest area, but they have not demonstrated that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on that basis.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Fredenburg v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2010-12-22

Pete Prolo (“Officer Prolo”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment order denying him qualified immunity with respect to the Fredenburgs’ false imprisonment and Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The facts alleged by the Fredenburgs show that Officer Prolo’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Mauwee v. Donat · filed 2010-12-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against the state officials in their individual capacities because these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a person who poses no immediate threat when doing so violates clearly established law.

Zulock v. Shures · filed 2010-12-22

We now turn to the question of whether Shures is protected by qualified immunity from Zulock’s claim for excessive force. As Shures violated a clearly established constitutional right of Zulock’s of which any reasonable person would have known, we find that the district court appropriately denied Shures’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s account could establish that an officer’s response to a known risk was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Burling v. Simon · filed 2010-12-29

Burling’s version of events, which we must accept as true, demonstrates that Simon’s failure to take further action in light of the substantial risk of harm to Burling might be viewed as objectively unreasonable under the parameters set forth in Johnson. See id. at 526-27. Therefore, the district court erroneously granted Simon summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the judgment is VACATED as to Burling’s claim against Simon.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the facts would not permit a finding that they were deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s suicidal tendencies.

Jerauld Ex Rel. Robinson v. Carl · filed 2010-12-30

Jerauld does not allege facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Kroger, Parker, or Sams acted with deliberate indifference to Jerauld’s suicidal tendencies. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to Kroger, Parker, and Sams on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when arguable probable cause existed at the time of arrest.

Seitz v. DeQuarto · filed 2011-01-06

This Court grants summary judgment with respect to DeQuarto and Andryshak in their individual capacities on Mr. Seitz’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Investigators are entitled to qualified immunity because arguable probable cause existed at the time of the arrest.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could establish that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Couden v. City of Wilmington · filed 2011-01-07

It is important to note that our decision denying qualified immunity is a limited one: qualified immunity is not warranted at the summary judgment stage in this case as to the flashlight claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when material factual disputes remain about whether defendants violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Doe v. Cape Henlopen School District · filed 2011-01-07

The court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether defendants are protected by qualified immunity. As previously discussed, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendants violated Nancy’s well established constitutional rights. Therefore, the court shall deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the issue of qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional rights violation.

Bell v. Township of Concord · filed 2011-01-10

As the Court first found that Plaintiff fails to show that his due process rights were violated, Defendant Kavadias would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their no-knock entry violates clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Bellotte v. Edwards · filed 2011-01-11

Though the officers claim that exigent circumstances justified their conduct, we agree with the district court that the remarkably scanty rationale offered for the no-knock invasion makes an award of qualified immu- ... nity inappropriate.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Griffin, Jr. v. Garrison · filed 2011-01-13

But, even if Garrison could be said to have violated Griffin’s asserted right to unemployment benefits, she would plainly be entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Eddie Ira Sanders, Sr. v. City of Dothan · filed 2011-01-19

Because the right that Plaintiff alleged that Eggleston violated is not clearly established, Eggleston is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of excessive force.

A doctor under contract to provide care to state prisoners is a state actor who may receive qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Bishop v. Karney · filed 2011-01-19

Accordingly, Karney was a state actor entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when an unreasonable mistake of fact leads to a traffic stop that violates clearly established law.

Liberal v. Estrada · filed 2011-01-19

Because we hold that Officer Estrada’s mistake of fact was not reasonable, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established First Amendment right.

Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health · filed 2011-01-19

We conclude, however, that Clairmont’s First Amendment interests outweigh the administrative interests of the Seattle Municipal Court and that his rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. We therefore reverse and remand.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Payton v. City of Florence, AL · filed 2011-01-21

We also find that on January 8, 2007, the law was clearly established that Officer McCreless’s conduct, as Payton describes it, violated her constitutional right to be free from excessive force. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Payton’s § 1983 excessive force claim against Officer McCreless.

An official’s qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action remains available at trial and must then be evaluated on the trial evidence.

Ortiz v. Jordan · filed 2011-01-24

The plea remains available to the defending officials at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be evaluated in light of the character and quality of the evidence received in court.

Section 1983 defendants are protected from damages by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right presents a novel question.

Atkins v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-01-25

The question is novel, and the defendants therefore protected from liability for damages for possibly answering it incorrectly by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established federal right.

Castle v. Appalachian Technical College · filed 2011-01-27

Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if he knowingly or recklessly makes material false statements in a warrant request, because that conduct violates clearly established law.

Lawson v. Veruchi · filed 2011-01-28

And if Veruchi had knowingly included this false informa- tion, then he also would not be entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established “that a warrant request violates the Fourth Amendment if the requesting officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, makes false statements in requesting the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the determination that a warrant should issue.” Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003).

An officer sued under Section 1983 for false arrest has qualified immunity if the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about it.

Caceres v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NJ · filed 2011-01-31

On the federal false arrest claim, Sangiorgi enjoys qualified immunity if “it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed” or if “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” ... Accordingly, Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity must be assessed separately for each official based on that official’s conduct; a denial based on disputed facts must identify the material disputes.

Griffin-El v. Beard · filed 2011-02-03

We will therefore vacate the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and remand for the District Court to specify, in compliance with Forbes, which material facts, if any, preclude qualified immunity as to each Appellant.

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Lillo v. Bruhn · filed 2011-02-04

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the court improperly rejects the plaintiff’s account of the events.

Coble v. City of White House, Tenn. · filed 2011-02-11

The district court held that Officer Carney was entitled to qualified immunity because Coble failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. The district court based this finding, like its summary judgment finding, on the audio recording. Because we have determined that it was improper to rely on this audio recording over Coble’s version of events, this finding is also subject to reversal.

A defendant facing a Section 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Kirk v. City of Kokomo · filed 2011-02-17

Plaintiffs however, completely failed to respond to Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to show that their right to be free of such office searches was clearly established at the time of the searches, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield correctional officers with qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have understood that failing to address unsanitary cell conditions was unlawful.

Meneweather v. Powell · filed 2011-03-01

Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because, again viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Meneweather, it would have been clear to reasonable correctional officers in defendants’ positions that their failure to address the unsanitary conditions of Meneweather’s cell were unlawful.

A public official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when acting within discretionary authority and the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Allen v. School Board of Broward County · filed 2011-03-02

As such, using the analysis provided in Neal, R.R.S.’s allegations do not show that Davis’s acts were unconstitutional, and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when arguable probable cause supported the arrest.

Lewis v. Blue · filed 2011-03-02

Because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct, Deputy Blue is due qualified immunity on Plaintiffs unlawful arrest claim.

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Ault v. Speicher · filed 2011-03-03

We find Plaintiff’s argument unavailing because we find qualified immunity shields Defendant from liability for civil damages in this case.

An officer who fails to show that the law governing probable cause was unclear is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Halcomb v. Woods · filed 2011-03-03

Mr. Woods has not argued, much less established, that the constitutional law governing the existence of probable cause in such a situation is unclear. He consequently has failed to show that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer fails to show that an objectively reasonable officer would have believed the conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Halcomb v. Wmata · filed 2011-03-03

Qualified immunity is relevant only to those constitutional claims that were decided against Mr. Woods: unreasonable search and unreasonable arrest. ... Mr. Woods has not argued, much less established, that the constitutional law governing the existence of probable cause in such a situation is unclear. He consequently has failed to show that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when no objectively reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

NUON v. City of Lowell · filed 2011-03-04

Accordingly, Kinney lacked probable cause to arrest Nuon and the arrest is not protected by qualified immunity. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor on Counts I and III, as to liability.

An officer is immune from civil damages under § 1983 when the conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable officer would have understood.

McInnis v. Maine · filed 2011-03-07

The judgments in favor of the government officers on the ground of qualified immunity rest on the rule that an official is not subject to civil damages under § 1983 if the action complained of did not violate a clearly established right to which a reasonable officer would have understood that the plaintiff was entitled.

A plaintiff who does not contest an individual defendant’s qualified immunity defense may abandon her § 1983 claim against that defendant.

Jaber v. Wayne State University Board of Governors · filed 2011-03-07

Finally, Dean Wood is entitled to summary judgment for another reason based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff does not address or dispute this contention made by Defendants. Therefore, she waived or abandoned her claim against Dean Wood.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 suits when their conduct does not violate clearly established law that a reasonable person would have known.

Graniczny v. City of El Paso, Tex. · filed 2011-03-07

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity from suit under § 1983 to government officials provided that “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Given the record, the Court finds that the Officers’ actions did not violate Graniczny’s constitutional rights. As such, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim turns on whether an objective person in the defendant’s position would have believed the conduct violated established law.

Chase v. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2011-03-08

In determining whether defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the question is whether an objective person in defendant’s situation would have believed that his conduct violated established law.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege the deprivation of an actual constitutional right.

Jennings v. Patton · filed 2011-03-09

Because Jennings has failed to allege the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, Judge Patton is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable officer would have known.

El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume · filed 2011-03-15

Because the prior case law provided fair warning to Berthiaume at the time of the incident, we conclude Berthiaume violated El-Ghazzawy’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Berthiaume.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff’s evidence could show a violation of a clearly established right.

Howard v. Wayne County Sheriff's Office · filed 2011-03-16

In such a situation, a jury could reach the conclusion that use of pepper spray against the plaintiff constituted excessive force. The district court thus erred in granting summary judgment to defendants Wood and Hardie1 based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity.