42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the Constitution.

Schulte v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2010-01-05

We agree with the district court that, under the circumstances, Mejia and Holtz could have reasonably believed in light of all the circumstances that they confronted that their conduct did not violate the Constitution. ... The officers are thus entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not address whether Schulte has alleged sufficient facts to make out a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

An official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the official was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Strinni v. Mehlville Fire Protection Dist. · filed 2010-01-06

Therefore, Chief Silvernail, in his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity as he was not personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.

A jailer who knows of a detainee’s serious medical risk and fails to obtain prompt care may face a personal-participation claim under § 1983 despite a qualified immunity defense.

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala. · filed 2010-01-06

Thus, Plaintiff properly stated “personal participation” section 1983 claims for deliberate indifference against Reed and Robinson, and the district court was right to deny those Defendants qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Hammonds v. Martel · filed 2010-01-07

Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the established facts show no constitutional violation.

Brown v. Acting Director of Metro Dade Correctional · filed 2010-01-07

Accordingly, no constitutional violation occurred, and Weston is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability unless they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Dagdagan v. City of Vallejo · filed 2010-01-07

Further, each Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing the defense of qualified immunity precludes liability for Plaintiffs claims under the Fourth Amendment. ... For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and DENIED in part and Defendants’ motions are DENIED. ... However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established and their conduct was reasonable.

Chism v. Washington Ex Rel. Washington State Patrol · filed 2010-01-08

Assuming, without deciding, there was a constitutional violation, Defendants Gardner and Sager are entitled to qualified immunity because the parameters of the particular constitutional right at issue (Fourth Amendment in the context of an Internet child pornography investigation) were not “clearly established” at the time of their alleged misconduct, and therefore, they reasonably believed they had probable cause to seek and obtain the warrants at issue.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for a state official when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Barragan v. Landry · filed 2010-01-08

After a careful de novo review of the record, the briefs, and arguments of the parties, we conclude that Landry is entitled to qualified immunity because the contours of the rights at issue in this case were not clearly established at the time of the actions.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have only qualified immunity, which does not shield them when they had fair warning that racially discriminatory policing violated equal protection.

Elliot-Park v. Manglona · filed 2010-01-12

Unlike prosecutors, who enjoy absolute immunity, police officers are entitled only to qualified immunity in section 1983 cases. ... The three officers thus had a more than fair warning that failure to investigate and arrest Babauta because of race violated equal protection.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Mattos v. Agarano · filed 2010-01-12

Even if we thought that the officers used excessive force, it would not have been clear to any reasonable officer on August 23, 2006, that use of a Taser in the situation they confronted was constitutionally impermissible.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Gosline v. New Mexico Finance Authority · filed 2010-01-12

Because Mr. Gosline “failed to make a showing that [he] had a protected property interest in continued employment, [he] failed to meet [his] burden to show defendants violated a clearly established right.” Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 578 (10th Cir. 1996). Consequently, defendants Sisneros and Duff are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

When an official asserts qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the court examines a required Rule 7(a) reply along with the complaint.

Rhodes v. Prince · filed 2010-01-12

Where, as here, a defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity and the district court requires the plaintiff to submit a particularized reply under Rule 7(a), we examine both the complaint and the Rule 7(a) reply.

Section 1983 does not protect a government official from a damages claim when qualified immunity is unavailable.

Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez · filed 2010-01-13

Because binding Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that a citizen’s constitutional right to be free from “deadly force in a situation that clearly would not justify its use” is clearly established, see id., and because Defendant violated that right by maliciously firing ten-plus rounds at the incapacitated and non-resisting Plaintiff who no longer posed a realistic threat or flight risk, I agree with Magistrate Judge Wfliite that the Defendant is not entitled to avail himself of the protections of qualified immunity in this particular case.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state actors, subject to qualified immunity for discretionary functions performed within their authority reasonably under then-existing law.

HOOTSTEIN v. Collins · filed 2010-01-14

As noted above, all Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Rome, moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff Grandparents’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity. State actors are protected from damages under § 1983 if “they have performed discretionary functions falling within the scope of their authority and have done so in an objectively reasonable manner, measured by the state of the law at the time the conduct occurred.” Brennan, 888 F.2d at 192 (citations omitted). The qualified immunity doctrine provides defendant public officials an immunity from suit and not a mere defense to liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Therefore, whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991).

Section 1983 permits a civil claim against a state actor who violates a clearly established constitutional right, subject to qualified immunity.

Wilson v. Wilkins · filed 2010-01-19

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we agree. A reasonable officer would have known that he was not free to make sexual overtures and repeatedly touch a citizen in his control in a moving vehicle.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the record could support a finding that their use of force violated clearly established law.

Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2010-01-20

We agree with the district court that this record is insufficient for us to hold as a matter of law, at this stage in the case, that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a prison hearing officer when a reasonable officer could have believed the evidence satisfied the requirements for discipline.

Creech v. SCHOELLKOPH · filed 2010-01-20

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, since at the time of his decision a reasonable hearing officer could have considered the “some evidence” requirement to be satisfied by Plaintiffs testimony and the detailed written incident reports.

An officer sued under § 1983 for wrongful arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Moran v. Cameron · filed 2010-01-21

We choose to first address the second prong of the Saucier test’s two-prong inquiry and ask whether the officers’ arrest of Moran was clearly established as unconstitutional because it lacked arguable probable cause. We hold that the officers had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Moran.

A defendant may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a genuine factual dispute over whether the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Trois v. Long · filed 2010-01-21

For the claim pursuant to § 1983, Deputy Long asserts qualified immunity. ... Because Trois has not presented any evidence that the Deputy maliciously withheld ... information from the grand jury, his claim fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Deputy Long’s actions violated Trois’ constitutional rights. Therefore, for that claim, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the undisputed facts show no Fourth Amendment violation.

Wallingford v. Olson · filed 2010-01-25

We reverse the judgment of the district court and grant Deputy Olson qualified immunity from Wallingford’s excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity protects a school official from § 1983 liability when the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Mardis v. HANNIBAL PUBLIC SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2010-01-25

The Court finds the Janes is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. As discussed above, Janes's conduct did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established First Amendment rights.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff's evidence fails to establish a constitutional violation.

J.R. v. Gloria · filed 2010-01-27

We reject plaintiffs' argument and affirm the district court's holding that Gloria and Terry were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to establish on the facts that there was a substantive due process violation.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be dismissed when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

O'Donnell v. Simon · filed 2010-01-28

In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court mandated a two-step qualified immunity analysis — first, whether “the facts alleged show that the [official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right,” and, second, whether the right, if violated, “was clearly established.” 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). In Pearson, the Court backed away from that sequence, stating, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” 129 S.Ct. at 818. We nonetheless begin by determining whether O’Donnell can establish a constitutional violation. Because she cannot, we need not proceed further.

Section 1983 permits a civil claim against a state official for violating federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Melgar Ex Rel. Melgar v. Greene · filed 2010-01-29

The boy’s father, Appellee Jose Melgar, sued the canine officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued the officer and the police department under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Officer Greene is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s federal claim, and we remand the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice to plaintiff’s ability to proceed with his state claim in state court.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Jefferson v. Lewis · filed 2010-02-04

Government officials, including police officers, are immune from civil liability unless, in the course of performing their discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 authorizes claims against government actors who violate federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Bolmer v. Oliveira · filed 2010-02-08

Government actors have qualified immunity to § 1983 claims “‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” ... As a state actor, Oliveira is immune to Bolmer’s § 1983 substantive due process claim if (1) the reviewable facts do not make out a violation of Bolmer’s right to substantive due process, or (2) the right was not clearly established at the time of Bolmer’s commitment.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations by officials acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity unless the right was clearly established.

Bull v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-02-09

Moreover, we have explicitly held several times that it was clearly established that strip search policies similar to San Francisco's are unconstitutional. In Ward, we concluded that "the law was sufficiently clear in early 1981 so as to expose a public official who unreasonably authorized blanket strip searches of minor offense arrestees to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Ward, 791 F.2d at 1332 (emphasis added). Although San Francisco's policy included arrestees charged with more serious offenses than those at issue in Ward, San Francisco's policy also applied to minor offense arrestees, such as those at issue in Ward. See also Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that by 1989, it was clearly established that it was unconstitutional to strip search a detainee arrested for a minor offense without reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee was carrying or concealing contraband; reasonable suspicion was based on factors such as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record). Defendants argue that the large amount of documentary evidence they have produced distinguishes this case from other strip search cases. Because no other case confronted such a well-documented problem, Defendants contend, the law was not clearly established. However, the specific facts of previous cases need not be materially or fundamentally similar to the situation in question; rather, the salient question is whether the state of the law at the time gives officials fair warning that their conduct is unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). The fact that San Francisco documented a contraband smuggling problem does not muddy the clarity of the law. The evidence Defendants produced to the district court shows only that contraband was a significant problem in San Francisco jails generally; it does not demonstrate that persons eligible for inclusion in this class of plaintiffs contributed significantly, or even at all, to that problem. Therefore, San Francisco's policy is not different enough from policies that we have held unconstitutional to suggest that the rights violated by the policy were not clearly established. [8] Sheriff Hennessey is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Sharee Butler v. City of Sacramento · filed 2010-02-11

Perez is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Butler, demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s misconduct.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief for a constitutional deprivation caused by someone acting under state authority.

Evans v. Bayer · filed 2010-02-12

An official who is sued in his personal capacity may be shielded from damages by qualified immunity. ... To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the right in question was clearly established. Accordingly, Bayer’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Evans’s demand for nominal damages.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, but officials may be liable for violating clearly established constitutional rights.

Timothy Council v. Sutton · filed 2010-02-12

The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields public officials from suits against them in their individual capacities for torts committed while performing discretionary duties unless the tortious act violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” ... Therefore, the Deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for challenging unconstitutional conduct by state actors.

Day v. ROBINWOOD WEST COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DIST. · filed 2010-02-16

Defendant claims that it has qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' claims for nominal damages because the District's actions "did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The defense of qualified immunity, however, is not available to municipalities. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). Thus, the Court finds that qualified immunity is not applicable and therefore turns to the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who violates clearly established constitutional rights while acting under state authority.

Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2010-02-16

Regardless of the authority Hudepohl possessed, Zucker was not “relieve[d] . . . of his responsibility to decide for himself whether to violate clearly established constitutional rights.” ... Thus, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Kennedy, we conclude that Zucker violated Kennedy’s constitutional rights by banning him from all City recreational property without due process of law.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to qualified immunity, and a claim for arrest without probable cause may proceed when qualified immunity is rejected because a triable issue exists.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2010-02-17

This appeal arises from an action brought pro se by William Eugene Leventhal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), against employees of the Iowa State Patrol, Sergeant Daniel Schaffer and Lieutenant Jeff Ritzman, arising out of Leventhal’s arrest and handcuffing for the crime of disorderly conduct during the Register’s Annual Great Bicycle Ride Across Iowa (RAGBRAI). ... Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s thorough opinion.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe · filed 2010-02-18

As a result, this speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection and the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Wallace v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-02-22

The officers’ stronger argument is that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The officers’ qualified immunity defense is evaluated under the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). ... Because Officers Modlin and Vogel are entitled to qualified immunity, the § 1983 claim against them (Count V) will be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims for damages against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the official's conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Haugen v. Molly Fields · filed 2010-02-22

Qualified immunity shields a government official from suits for damages unless her official conduct violates a constitutional right that is “clearly established,” meaning it is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she] is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, and the claimant bears the burden of showing a constitutional violation and a clearly established right.

Roska v. Sneddon · filed 2010-02-23

Once the Social Workers raised the qualified immunity defense, the Roskas “carried the burden of showing both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Green, 574 F.3d at 1300 (quotations omitted). ... The district court did not err in concluding the Roskas failed to meet their burden to show the children’s procedural due process rights were clearly established, a prerequisite to the denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2010-02-24

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects the officers from personal liability under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to qualified immunity.

Whitlock v. Brown · filed 2010-02-24

The Whitlocks sued Brown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against governmental officials may be subject to qualified immunity protecting officials performing discretionary functions from insubstantial claims.

Westerfield v. United States · filed 2010-02-24

We stress that on remand the district court may fashion a discovery order that is limited to the issue of qualified immunity, recognizing that the case law concerning qualified immunity makes clear that the doctrine exists to make certain that governmental officials who perform discretionary functions are protected from insubstantial claims; hence, the trial courts are instructed to rule on such motions at the earliest opportunity.

In a § 1983 suit, denying summary judgment because material facts are disputed does not resolve qualified immunity before trial.

Bell v. Herod · filed 2010-03-04

The qualified immunity issue was not resolved before trial. Bell’s contention to the contrary is inaccurate and therefore does not provide a basis for relief.

Qualified immunity shields a social worker from § 1983 damages for a foster care placement when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time.

Doe Ex Rel. Johnson v. South Carolina Department of Social Services · filed 2010-03-05

We affirm the grant of summary judgment, however, under the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. Although our precedents do not foreclose a foster child’s claim that her substantive due process right to personal safety and security ... is violated by a foster care placement made in deliberate indif- ference to a known danger, such a right was not clearly estab- lished in this circuit at the time Thompson made her placement decisions regarding Jane.

A defendant has qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim when the record indicates probable cause for the search warrant and arrest.

Murray v. Newman · filed 2010-03-05

The district court properly concluded that Newman had qualified immunity from Murray’s claim of malicious prosecution because the record indicates that there was probable cause to issue a search warrant and arrest Murray.

An officer sued under § 1983 for excessive force is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known the shooting violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. Kendall · filed 2010-03-08

A government official such as Kendall is not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages if a reasonable officer in his position would have known that his shooting of Smith would violate Smith’s constitutional right to be free from an excessive application of force. ... For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s determination that the right in question was clearly established and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts bear on whether officers violated a constitutional right and reasonably believed their actions were lawful.

Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-03-09

In this case, the district court properly denied the summary judgment motion because there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers violated Asa Sullivan’s Fourth Amendment rights. Those unresolved issues of fact are also material to a proper determination of the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the legality of their actions.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Harris v. Ford · filed 2010-03-10

Accordingly, we hold that there was no clearly established right which Officer Ford violated in the conduct of the search of Mr. Harris’s home on October 5.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Redd v. Wright · filed 2010-03-10

The task of framing the right at issue with some precision is critical in determining whether that particular right was clearly established at the time of the defendants’ alleged violation. ... For those reasons, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Redd’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims.

Qualified immunity on a Section 1983 First Amendment claim requires determining whether the plaintiff’s speech was constitutionally protected.

Kindle v. City of Jeffersontown, Kentucky · filed 2010-03-15

Because the finding as to whether Plaintiffs’ speech was protected under the First Amendment is a necessary component of step one of the qualified immunity analysis, we must remand on the qualified immunity question in light of the remand on the Pickering analysis.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe the challenged conduct was lawful, even if the asserted right was clearly established.

Taravella v. Town of Wolcott · filed 2010-03-16

We conclude that Dunn’s conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. ... Because a reasonable mayor could understand the Agreement to provide that Taravella could be fired without a hearing, it cannot be said that Dunn acted unreasonably in doing so.

Officers facing a Section 1983 false-arrest claim are protected by qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Rushing v. Estate of Ernest R. Mincey · filed 2010-03-16

A defendant need only demonstrate that arguable probable cause existed in order to be protected by qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, we find that Mincey had, at minimum, arguable probable cause to issue the arrest affidavit of the Plaintiff.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Armenta v. Chatman · filed 2010-03-16

Because Armenta failed to show that Defendants violated his constitutional rights regarding his retaliation claim, he failed to show that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officials when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Beckinger v. TOWNSHIP OF ELIZABETH · filed 2010-03-17

Under these circumstances, the actions taken by McNeilly and Black with respect to plaintiffs were not objectively unreasonable at the time. Consequently, McNeilly and Black are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ claims under the First Amendment and summary judgment must be granted in their favor with respect to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent the court from deciding whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable.

Jones v. Price · filed 2010-03-17

Here, Price has failed to establish that he is shielded by qualified immunity. ... Whether Price acted reasonably under the circumstances is disputed, and to determine whether Price did act reasonably as to the place and manner in which he searched Jones will require factual findings, as well as a jury’s evaluation of the credibility of both Price and Jones. Judgment as a matter of law, therefore, is inappropriate and the Court DENIES Price’s motion for summary judgment.

A defendant in a Section 1983 excessive force claim is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known the force would cause lasting harm and reasonably believed the force was lawful.

Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2010-03-17

Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that a reasonable officer in Rader’s position would have known that the manner in which he used the taser would contribute to Lomax’s death or otherwise cause lasting harm. Because his “use of force was premised on a reasonable belief that such force was lawful,” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1285 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original), especially as it was employed for Lomax’s benefit and resulted from the paramedics’ request, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when an official did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Garcia v. Selsky · filed 2010-03-22

In addition, regardless of whether plaintiff could state a facially valid claim with respect to the original hearing itself, Selsky would be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause for the arrest.

Shroff v. Spellman · filed 2010-03-23

We are persuaded that under these undisputed circumstances, no reasonable officer would determine that he or she had probable cause to arrest Ms. Shroff after reading the restraining order and being informed that Ms. Shroff was not a restrained person. Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Spellman did not have arguable probable cause to arrest Ms. Shroff for a violation of the restraining order.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim when established law gave fair warning that the alleged conduct violated constitutional rights.

Reno v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 2010-03-23

The court concludes that United Teachers clearly establishes the applicable law for purposes of qualified immunity, and that the plaintiff has met her burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity does not apply in this case.

An officer who knowingly secures a false identification by fabricating evidence or unlawfully influencing witnesses is not entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit.

Good v. Curtis · filed 2010-03-23

As directed by our decision in Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989) (Geter II), we conclude that a police officer’s knowing efforts to secure a false identification by fabricating evidence or otherwise unlawfully influencing witnesses is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts could show that an officer used deadly force against a suspect who posed no immediate threat.

Porter v. MASSARELLI · filed 2010-03-24

Given the genuine issues of material fact presented by Porter’s testimony concerning whether Massarelli was entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment claim, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the evidence could show they used gratuitous force against a restrained inmate, a prohibition clearly established at the time.

McDowell v. Sheerer · filed 2010-03-24

Additionally, by 2004, “it was established that an officer may not ... use gratuitous force against an inmate who has been subdued.” See id. at 326.

Section 1983 shields officers from facial challenges through qualified immunity when the statute’s unconstitutionality was not clearly established, but does not shield their alleged enforcement of it in violation of clearly established rights.

Lowden v. County of Clare · filed 2010-03-25

In any event, Deputies Kahsin and Woodcock are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ facial challenges because it was not clearly established that the Michigan statute is unconstitutional and entirely unenforceable. In contrast, Deputies Kahsin and Woodcock are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ as applied claims because viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it was clearly established that enforcing the Michigan statute in the factual circumstances that are alleged violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 liability is barred by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Mullins v. Marshall · filed 2010-03-26

Thus, even if a constitutional violation occurred, Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity because viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to him, Mullins has not shown either that a constitutional right was violated or that the right was clearly established.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if their conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Brooks v. City of Seattle · filed 2010-03-26

Qualified immunity entitles the Officers “not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” on the § 1983 claim, provided their conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Montanez v. City of Milford · filed 2010-03-29

Government officials are immune from liability for civil damages when their conduct “ ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the need for force was clearly established as a limit on its use.

Cooley v. McNabb · filed 2010-03-30

Further, Officer Embrey is not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time that “force is only justified when there is a need for force.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim for enforcing an administratively imposed post-release supervision term in 2007 when the law did not clearly establish that enforcement violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Ruffins v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES · filed 2010-03-31

Given this critical ambiguity regarding the implications of the Earley decision on those currently under PRS supervision and the disagreement among state courts about Earley’s application to interpretations of state law, this Court concludes that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any conduct with respect to the arrest and incarceration of plaintiff in 2007 for violation of the terms of his PRS.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 medical care claim when no reasonable officer could believe that misrepresenting requested medical information was lawful under clearly established law.

Scarbro v. New Hanover County · filed 2010-04-01

No reasonable officer could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that such a misrepresentation was lawful under these circumstances. Therefore, Hudson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Richards v. Gasparino · filed 2010-04-01

Here, Gasparino’s knowledge of Richards’s past behavior, based on a prior December 2003 arrest, along with his observations at Richards’s apartment on the date of the January 2004 arrest, provided sufficient information to lead Gasparino reasonably to believe that Richards had arguably committed the crime of risk of injury to a minor. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Gasparino was entitled to qualified immunity and granted him summary judgment.

Officers sued under § 1983 for failure to protect may be denied qualified immunity.

Portee v. Washington · filed 2010-04-02

The portion of the district court’s order finding that Appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); however, we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim arising from their use of tear gas and flash bang grenades under the circumstances presented.

Estate of Escobedo v. Bender · filed 2010-04-05

The district court denied the motion, in part, finding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the entry with the tear gas and flash bang devices. The officers then filed this interlocutory appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

For a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983, a plaintiff who establishes a constitutional violation need not separately show that the right was clearly established to defeat qualified immunity.

Nasseri v. City of Athens Alabama · filed 2010-04-08

Nasseri stated a constitutional violation, and, as the Court reiterated in Danley, Nasseri is not required also to show violation of a clearly established right for his Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint plausibly alleges a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Children First Foundation, Inc. v. Legreide · filed 2010-04-09

As already noted, engaging in viewpoint discrimination when not necessary to further a compelling governmental purpose is a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Granting Defendants qualified immunity is therefore patently inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to a public entity or an official sued only in her official capacity under Section 1983.

Paeth v. Worth Township · filed 2010-04-09

Because qualified immunity protects a public official sued in her individual capacity from civil damages, qualified immunity is not available to the public entity itself or to an official acting in her official capacity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when common sense and general precedent made the alleged conduct’s unconstitutionality obvious, even without a factually identical case.

Morris v. ZEFFERI · filed 2010-04-13

The district court did not err in finding the unconstitutionality of Zefferi’s alleged conduct should have been obvious to Zefferi based both on common sense and prior general case law.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official could not have known that the alleged property right existed.

Pettit v. Glick · filed 2010-04-14

Glick, as a reasonable official, could not have known that Pettit might have a property right in the CRI Director position or thereby in the Dalton Chair which, by contract, was simply derivative of whoever held the CRI Director position. Therefore, the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Glick.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the plaintiff’s version of the facts provides no actual or arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Bradley v. Jusino · filed 2010-04-14

Accordingly, like the district court, we conclude that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Bradley do not support judgment as a matter of law in favor of Jusino on the ground of qualified immunity.

A plaintiff alleging excessive force under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment can overcome qualified immunity by showing a constitutional violation without separately showing that the right was clearly established.

Smith v. P . Vavoulis · filed 2010-04-19

“For claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, however, a plaintiff can overcome a defense of qualified immunity by showing only the first prong, that his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.” ... Because Smith’s version of the facts satisfies both the subjective and objective requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation, the district court did not err in denying the defendants motion for summary judgment.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the facts viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor show that they personally participated in violating a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Binay v. Bettendorf · filed 2010-04-20

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by finding that Defendants Pongracz and Bettendorf were not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.

An official has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 equal protection claim if the right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Perrea v. Cincinnati Public Schools · filed 2010-04-20

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Hahn did not violate a clearly established right and she is entitled to qualified immunity on Perrea’s equal protection claim.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established and reasonable officers could disagree.

Glenn v. City of Columbus, Georgia · filed 2010-04-20

This is a close case, and where the officers’ actions were not clearly established to be unconstitutional, and reasonable officers could disagree, the officers are afforded qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if there was arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Crenshaw v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2010-04-21

Even when probable cause for arrest did not exist, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he can show that there was “arguable probable cause” for the arrest.

A prison official sued under Section 1983 for overdetention is entitled to qualified immunity when established law would not have made the unlawfulness of her conduct clear.

Montanez v. Thompson · filed 2010-04-22

Accordingly, we do not believe the established law in this case would have put Thompson on notice that her conduct was clearly unlawful; summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.

Section 1983 claims against public officials may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Livingston v. Kelly · filed 2010-04-26

Thus, even if plaintiff could show that the destruction of the videotape led to a violation of his due process rights — and again, I do not find that it did — Selsky would still be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims for civil damages are subject to qualified immunity when officials’ conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Schneyder v. Smith · filed 2010-04-26

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials, including prosecutors, are immune from suits for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Fettes v. Hendershot · filed 2010-04-27

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability in the performance of discretionary functions so long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... It is not clear to us why a government official would submit himself to depositions and other discovery methods, rather than assert his entitlement to qualified immunity immediately after being served with a § 1983 complaint. ... We conclude that the district court erred when it denied Milburn, Delaney, and' Schick’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s judgment as to Milburn, Delaney, and Schick, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a constitutional violation caused by a state actor, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Solovy v. Morabito · filed 2010-04-27

At the present stage of this case, Sergeant Carroll is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims for damages against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their actions did not violate clearly established rights.

Steele v. City of Cleveland · filed 2010-04-28

Defendants have invoked qualified immunity, which “shields government officials from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, as the district court concluded, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact prevent deciding the defense at summary judgment.

Desantis v. City of Santa Rosa · filed 2010-04-28

Review is limited to whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. ... we conclude that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the City of Santa Rosa and the individual police officers.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages for deprivation of constitutional rights, with qualified immunity limiting liability for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Williams v. Wood · filed 2010-04-29

The doctrine of qualified immunity holds that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” ... Because the facts in the light most favorable to Williams fail, under clearly established law, to provide Wood reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Williams, much less arresting him, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain and summary judgment should not have been granted on the claim of unconstitutional seizure of Williams.

In a Section 1983 excessive force claim, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law forbids deadly force against a suspect who poses no immediate threat.

Sanchez v. City of Midland, Texas, et · filed 2010-04-30

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Sanchez, shows that Sanchez did not pose an “immediate” threat to the officers or to others, and we agree with the district court that the officers are not entitled to ... qualified immunity under the second Saucier inquiry.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to an individual defendant when the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established under the circumstances.

Dixon v. Board of Regents of the University System · filed 2010-04-30

Furthermore, even if there had been a constitutional violation of Dixon’s First Amendment rights, Vance, the individual defendant, would have been entitled to qualified immunity since it was not clearly established that his termination of Dixon under the circumstances of this case would have constituted a First Amendment violation.

Qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material factual disputes must first be decided by a jury.

BLUE RIDGE PUBLIC SAFETY, INC. v. Ashe · filed 2010-04-30

Lest there be any confusion as to this issue, the Court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate on the § 1983 claim because there are genuine issues of material fact as to what actually occurred and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is for the jury in this case to make that determination and only thereafter may there be a determination as a matter of law whether those facts violated a clearly established constitutional right.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for an unlawful stop when a reasonable officer could believe the stop was lawful.

Solis v. Oules · filed 2010-05-03

Oules should have therefore enjoyed qualified immunity for the wrongful stop.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Plofsky v. Giuliano · filed 2010-05-03

Instead, we determine that, even if defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiff violated his First Amendment rights, those rights were not “clearly established” at the time that he was terminated. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an officer who makes an arrest without probable cause and conducts an unconstitutional strip search when the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Shroff v. Spellman · filed 2010-05-04

Frank Spellman, a Denver Police Officer, has appealed from the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on his defense of qualified immunity in this civil rights action filed against him by Amy Shroff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We affirm because we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that Officer Spellman arrested Ms. Shroff without probable cause, and subjected her to a strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established.

Mashburn Ex Rel. CM v. Yamhill County · filed 2010-05-04

I find Mr. Loewen and Mr. Vesper are granted qualified immunity from suit because it was not clearly established that the strip searches at YCJDC were unconstitutional.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on an unlawful-search claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Lockett v. New Orleans City · filed 2010-05-05

We find it unnecessary to address the first prong because we agree with the district court that it is not clearly established that the defendants’ searches of Lockett’s person were objectively unreasonable.

Public officials sued individually under Section 1983 are shielded from monetary damages by qualified immunity unless they violate clearly established law that a reasonable official would have known.

JC Ex Rel. RC v. BEVERLY HILLS UNIFIED SCHOOL · filed 2010-05-06

For the reasons stated below, the individual Defendants' motion is GRANTED. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials sued in their individual capacity from monetary damages, unless their conduct is violates "clearly established" law of which a reasonable public officer would have known.

Qualified immunity shields public officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 from monetary damages unless they violate clearly established law a reasonable official would have known.

J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District · filed 2010-05-06

The individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for money damages.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless their conduct violates clearly established law.

Nelson v. Shuffman · filed 2010-05-07

Government officials are generally afforded qualified immunity under section 1983 when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established law.

An officer cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force suit when gratuitous force against a subdued suspect violates a clearly established right.

Robert A. Mills v. Sheriff J. R. Jack Parker · filed 2010-05-13

This Court has held that where a plaintiff alleges that the defendants used excessive force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, the defense of qualified immunity is unavailable because the right to be free from gratuitous force after a suspect has been subdued is a clearly established constitutional right. ... Accordingly, Mills is entitled to a trial on his § 1983 claim against Deputy Kent and the district court is instructed to appoint counsel to represent Mills in further proceedings.

An officer who acts beyond the scope of his official authority cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Woods v. Town of Danville, WV · filed 2010-05-14

Taking this law and procedure into consideration, the court concludes that when Jarrett drove outside of the Danville city limits, he was performing an act beyond the scope of his authority, and as such, he is not entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity does not shield a police officer from a § 1983 claim when the evidence permits a finding that he misrepresented his relationship with a witness to prosecutors and failed to preserve exculpatory evidence in bad faith.

White v. McKinley · filed 2010-05-17

We agree with White that McKinley is essentially attempting to relitigate the issue of qualified immunity. In light of our prior holding, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a reasonable jury could have concluded that McKinley's misrepresentation of his relationship with Tina to the prosecutors and failure to preserve the diary was done in bad faith.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Lester Carpenter Reed v. Allen · filed 2010-05-18

Even assuming Reed’s complaint states a constitutional violation, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the right Reed asserts was not clearly established.

A government official generally cannot claim qualified immunity under § 1983 when the evidence is sufficient to support intentional race or gender discrimination.

Piatt v. City of Austin · filed 2010-05-18

Thus, generally, where the evidence is sufficient ... to support a claim of intentional gender or race discrimination, any immunity defense will be foreclosed.

Qualified immunity shields an official from § 1983 monetary damages when the official's conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Rendelman v. Scott · filed 2010-05-19

Alternatively, to the extent that Rendelman ... seeks monetary damages from him, Captain Scott is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful stop claim when no reasonable officer could believe the stop was supported by probable cause.

Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill. · filed 2010-05-21

Our discussion up to this point should make abundantly clear that Officer Sharkey is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the stop.

Officials sued under § 1983 for malicious prosecution have qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe there was probable cause to prosecute.

Norton v. Town of Islip · filed 2010-05-25

In sum, based on undisputed facts in the record, the remaining individual defendants—that is, those individual defendants who were not granted immunity by the District Court—are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s federal-law claims.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established under the circumstances of their conduct.

Lockett v. New Orleans City · filed 2010-05-27

We find it unnecessary to address the first prong because we agree with the district court that it is not clearly established that the defendants’ searches of Lockett’s person were objectively unreasonable.

A state actor has qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when existing law would not have put a reasonable person on notice that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Wilson v. Zielke · filed 2010-05-28

Thus, the law as it existed at the time of this incident would not have put a reasonable person in Zielke’s position on notice that she was violating a clearly established right. Accordingly, Zielke is entitled to qualified immunity on Wilson’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an official subject to qualified immunity only when the constitutional right at issue was clearly established.

Wong v. Beebe · filed 2010-06-04

We need not decide whether the searches were unconstitutional, however, because even assuming a constitutional violation, Beebe is entitled to summary judgment because the right to be free from strip searches under those circumstances was not “clearly established” in 1999. ... Beebe is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when the defendant reasonably concluded that probable cause existed.

Tompkins v. Spokane County · filed 2010-06-09

Tompkins brought a claim in the Eastern District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that North-Jones arrested him without probable cause. ... North-Jones is entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably concluded that she had probable cause to arrest Tompkins for the crime of stalking.

An officer who prepares and executes facially invalid search warrants is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful seizure claim.

Signature Pharmacy, Inc. v. Soares · filed 2010-06-10

Upon review, Wright’s Motion will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ claims that Wright illegally prepared and executed the search warrants. The warrants were invalid on their face and Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an official who reasonably believed a public employee made deliberately or recklessly false statements.

Westmoreland v. Sutherland · filed 2010-06-11

Therefore, it was reasonable for defendant Sutherland to conclude that plaintiffs speech was made with a reckless, if not intentional, disregard for the truth. Accordingly, defendant Sutherland is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonably competent officer could have believed that probable cause supported the arrest warrant.

Pair v. City of Parker FL Police · filed 2010-06-16

Even with the date discrepancy Pair highlights, a reasonably competent officer, in Officer’s Wilson’s shoes, in light of the information Officer Wilson possessed, could conclude that probable cause existed and that the arrest warrant should issue.

Section 1983 claimants bear the burden of showing that qualified immunity does not apply once defendants establish that they acted within their discretionary authority.

Fleming v. Deputy Tama Barber · filed 2010-06-17

Because Defendants were engaged in a discretionary function, the burden shifts to the Plaintiffs -- the section 1983 claimants -- to show that no entitlement to qualified immunity exists.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the constitutional right violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Bryan v. MacPherson · filed 2010-06-18

Early one morning in the summer of 2005, Officer Brian MacPherson deployed his taser against Carl Bryan during a traffic stop for a seatbelt infraction. Bryan filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Officer MacPherson appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We affirm the district court in part because, viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to Bryan, Officer MacPherson’s use of the taser was unconstitutionally excessive. However, we reverse in part because the violation of Bryan’s constitutional rights was not clearly established at the time that Officer MacPherson fired his taser at Bryan on July 24, 2005.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a due process claim when the asserted property right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cortes-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana · filed 2010-06-17

Qualified immunity, therefore, shielded the defendants from the due process claims of the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 permits a qualified immunity defense for an officer who obtains a search warrant if the officer could reasonably believe the warrant application established probable cause.

JUNKERT v. Massey · filed 2010-06-21

Massey therefore has a qualified immunity defense against Junkert’s § 1983 action, and for that reason, we find no reason to over- turn the judgment in favor of Massey.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Harmon v. Anderson · filed 2010-06-21

Therefore, because a reasonable officer would not have understood that he was violating Harmon’s constitutional rights by housing him in protective custody along with sentenced prisoners and treating him the same as those prisoners, Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to rely on a statute still published and enforced, despite an earlier ruling that the statute was unconstitutional.

Amore v. Novarro · filed 2010-06-22

We conclude that Novarro is entitled to qualified immunity under these circumstances. It was unreasonable to expect this police officer to know that a statute that was, and is, still on the books and being enforced had been ... held to be unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the asserted Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Coffin v. Brandau · filed 2010-06-22

Finding that the Deputies did not violate a right of the Coffins’ that was “clearly established,” we are able to conclude the inquiry there.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe the arrest statute remained valid.

Amore v. Novarro · filed 2010-06-22

If it was objectively reasonable for Novarro to believe that the statute in question was valid, then arrest under this particular unconstitutional statute in the circumstances presented here was not a clearly established constitutional violation for purposes of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows that a reasonable officer would have understood the challenged conduct to be unlawful under clearly established law.

Painter v. The City of Albuquerque · filed 2010-06-23

Even if Officers Kelly and Porlas lacked probable cause to effect an arrest, Mr. Painter has not shown that they violated “clearly established” law when they did so, and thus the officers would still be entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Painter’s Fourth Amendment claim.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established to a reasonable official at the time.

James Terry, Jr. v. City of New Orleans · filed 2010-06-24

In light of the state of the law and the surrounding circumstances at the time of Terry’s incarceration, a due process violation would not have been sufficiently clear to a reasonable public officer, and thus the Warden is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim for discriminatory promotion practices when a reasonable official would have known those practices violated clearly established rights.

Shockley v. Minner · filed 2010-06-25

The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... Although Plaintiff has not pointed to any precedents with precisely similar facts to the present action, in the Court’s view, an objectively reasonable person in Defendant’s position should have had notice that engaging in promotion practices based on gender discrimination would violate Plaintiffs rights.

A Section 1983 complaint that sufficiently pleads facts defeating arguable reasonable suspicion can overcome an officer’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage.

T.J. Edward Wilson, Jr. v. Correa · filed 2010-06-25

Correa appeals, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court found that, “[a]t the motion to dismiss stage, Wilson has sufficiently pled facts to defeat the officers’ arguable reasonable suspicion . . . .” This Court agrees.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have understood that delaying a response to a credible, imminent threat to an inmate’s safety violated clearly established rights.

Leach v. T Drew · filed 2010-06-28

Our review of the district court’s order is limited to a single question: whether Leach’s Eight Amendment rights were clearly established at the time he was assaulted. We review this question of law de novo, Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is not entitled to qualified immunity when, on the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Brown v. City of Waterbury Board of Education · filed 2010-06-28

Under Brown’s version of the facts, Frost’s conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights, of which a reasonable person would have known at the time. Therefore, the court concludes ... that Frost is not entitled to qualified immunity on Brown’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Ward v. County of Cuyahoga · filed 2010-06-29

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability for damages if the official’s conduct in performing a discretionary function does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 damages claims against state employees are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Piccone v. McClain · filed 2010-07-02

With respect to Defendants Reber and Mazzeo, the federal counts (Counts 21, 23, 25, and 27) will be dismissed. Their participation in the events at hand was limited to making, filing, and reviewing an arguably flawed intake report. The court cannot find that they infringed any “clearly established” constitutional right by doing so.

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 claims arising from officials’ child custody decisions after a juvenile court order.

Barnes v. County of Placer · filed 2010-07-06

The district court also correctly decided that qualified immunity bars the § 1983 claims for custody decisions subsequent to the Juvenile Court’s order.

Officials defending § 1983 claims are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when, viewing the evidence favorably to the plaintiffs, no reasonable official could have believed the challenged procedures complied with due process.

Bailey v. Pataki · filed 2010-07-06

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby confirms its determination, in the form of this Opinion and Order from which an interlocutory appeal may be taken, that the defendant officials are not entitled to summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar a monetary claim against a prison officer under Section 1983.

Sweeper v. Taylor · filed 2010-07-07

With respect to Sweeper’s claim against Officer McCoy, having conducted an independent de novo review, we hold, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion, Sweeper v. Taylor, No. 906-CV-379, 2009 WL 815911 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009), that McCoy was entitled to qualified immunity when he issued Sweeper a misbehavior report for disobeying an order to desist from praying.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when their objectively reasonable conduct violates no constitutional right.

Estate of Turnbow v. Ogden City · filed 2010-07-12

Since the officers were acting in an objectively reasonable manner there was no constitutional violation and thus they are shielded by qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for warrantless entry when clearly established law would have made the entry’s unlawfulness apparent to a reasonable officer.

Richardson v. City of Antioch · filed 2010-07-13

Accordingly, the Court finds as a matter of law that Defendant Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for their illegal entry on June 7, 2007 and DENIES their motion for partial summary judgment on this ground.

Government actors have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Carnell v. Paterson · filed 2010-07-14

“Government actors have qualified immunity [from] § 1983 claims insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Accordingly, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

In a § 1983 race discrimination claim, an official claiming qualified immunity based on mixed motives must show that the record indisputably establishes a lawful reason for the challenged action.

Ham v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 2010-07-14

Rubin is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity if the record indisputably shows that his failure to promote Davidson to the Deputy Chief position was based, at least in part, on a factor other than race. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Rubin qualified immunity on Davidson’s claims.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when reasonable officers would not have believed their conduct consistent with a clearly established right to be free from excessive force.

Mlodzinski, et al. v. Lewis, et al. · filed 2010-07-16

Also taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Mlodzinskis, the court cannot conclude that reasonable officers in the defendants' position would have believed their actions were consistent with the Mlodzinskis' clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, so the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of gualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Nuovo v. the Ohio State University · filed 2010-07-16

The consequent conclusion is that, even assuming arguendo that Bornstein and Whitacre should have performed a preliminary assessment or screening, their purportedly mistaken belief that they could not and their failure to do so thus constitute at most reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions. These defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court accordingly also GRANTS the motion to dismiss the individual capacity components of claim eight.

Officers sued under § 1983 for wrongful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when their mistaken belief that they had probable cause was objectively reasonable.

Cronan v. Fowler · filed 2010-07-19

Based on their knowledge of the law and their understanding of what had occurred at the time of the arrest, the officers had a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that they had probable cause to arrest Cronan for the theft of the gasoline.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Finley v. Neven · filed 2010-07-20

The district court properly concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because prisoners do not have a clearly established right to sleep on a comfortable mattress.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek damages from an official who, acting under color of law, deprives them of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Coffin v. Brandau · filed 2010-02-24

Therefore, we conclude that their “conduct was not so clearly established as to justify stripping [them] of qualified immunity.” ... For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment for Deputies Lutz and Brandau on the basis of qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 action, disputed facts underlying probable cause can prevent summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Engineering & Manufacturing Services, LLC v. Ashton · filed 2010-07-21

Because disputed factual issues underlying ... probable cause are present in this case, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Officers with probable cause to make an arrest have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from that arrest.

Lomax v. City of Miami Mayor · filed 2010-07-21

Although the conduct of which Lomax complains is, if true, unfortunate, her alleged victimization at the hands of the police cannot surmount the officers’ ... qualified immunity defense because, under the aforementioned Florida statute, they had probable cause to arrest her.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest when no clearly established law would have alerted a reasonable officer that the officer lacked probable cause.

Deskins v. City of Bremerton · filed 2010-07-21

We also agree with the district court that Hedstrom is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Deskins’s arrest. No clearly established law would have alerted a reasonable officer that she lacked probable cause to arrest Deskins for ... obstruction under RCW 9A.76.020 when he ignored several commands and was slow in responding to others.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim applies when the officials did not violate a constitutional right.

CICCHIELLO v. Beard · filed 2010-07-21

Therefore, the court must examine: (1) whether the officials violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and that the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established.

Muhammad v. McNeil · filed 2010-07-21

We must grant qualified immunity to the government official unless the plaintiff can show “that the facts when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation” and “that the illegality of the [government official’s] actions was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the incident.”

To defeat qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim challenging a warrant petition, a plaintiff must substantially show deliberate or reckless falsehoods or omissions that were material to probable cause.

Beltran v. Santa Clara County · filed 2010-07-26

To prevail on summary judgment and defeat Tjhin’s and Suarez’s assertions of qualified immunity the Beltrans must (1) make a substantial showing that the challenged warrant petition contained misrepresentations or omissions that were deliberate falsehoods or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth and (2) the misrepresentations or omissions were material because probable cause could not be established without them.

Section 1983 permits a civil damages claim against government officials whose conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Stephens v. City of Akron · filed 2010-07-27

The individual defendants maintain that qualified immunity shields them from liability for Plaintiffs § 1983 claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Because Plaintiff presents a conflicting versions of the facts that, if proven, would establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, the Court concludes that the officers are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.