42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity does not entitle an officer to summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts prevent the court from finding the officer's conduct objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Nelson v. Suraci, No. 403034 (May 28, 1999) · filed 1999-05-28

For the same reasons, and even considering the affidavit of Reginald Allard, Jr., an instructor at the Connecticut Police Training Academy, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when there is no evidence beyond the plaintiff’s bare assertions that the official lied and a reasonable officer would have believed the person was dangerous.

No. 98-3389 · filed 1999-06-03

Accordingly, because there is no evidence, other than Hedges' own bare assertions, that Poletis lied and since a reasonable officer in Poletis' position would have believed Hedges to be dangerous, Poletis is entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim.

When qualified immunity is raised on a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim, the complaint must allege facts showing a violation of a clearly established right that a reasonable public official would have known.

Flores v. Danfelser · filed 1999-06-04

When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss a claim alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an appellate court, like the trial court, reviews the plaintiffs’ pleadings to determine whether they have pleaded facts which, if true, set forth a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable public official, viewed under an objective standard, would or should have known.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when resolving it requires weighing disputed evidence.

Rosales v. Coughlin · filed 1999-06-04

I also reject defendants’ contention that the they are entitled to summary judgment based upon their qualified immunity. The Second Circuit has held that where factual disputes exist, a court cannot resolve the question of qualified immunity without engaging in some weighing of the evidence, a function that falls within the province of the jury.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges facts showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Jandro v. Foster · filed 1999-06-07

Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 claim at this stage of the proceedings.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about whether it existed.

Posr v. Court Officer Shield 207 · filed 1999-06-09

Even when there is no probable cause to arrest, a police officer is nonetheless immune from a claim of false arrest “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim, qualified immunity cannot support dismissal at the pleading stage when the alleged facts do not establish that officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

No. 98-9205 · filed 1999-06-09

On grounds similar to those underlying our analysis of the probable cause question, we hold that it was improper for the district court to conclude, at this stage of the litigation, that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that probable cause existed. Accordingly, dismissing Posr's complaint on qualified immunity grounds was inappropriate.

Government officials facing a § 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity when their challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.

Umar v. Scott · filed 1999-06-10

Appellant also argues that the policy of not allowing “close custody” inmates to attend Muslim services known as Jumu'ah and religious study known as Taleem violates his rights to free exercise and equal protection, invoking 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and section 501.001 of the Texas Government Code. ... Furthermore, we hold that Appellees’ actions in complying with the policy were objectively reasonable, and Appellees’ have established, as a matter of law, their entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim applies to officials sued in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-06-14

The defense of qualified immunity applies only to the extent that the Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law put the defendant on notice that the alleged conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Prager v. LaFaver · filed 1999-06-15

We therefore hold the law was clearly established in Mr. Prager’s favor at the time Mr. LaFaver suspended and terminated him.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law was insufficiently clear for a reasonable official to know the conduct violated established rights.

Blake v. Wright · filed 1999-06-15

In sum, we hold that Wright is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 because the law regarding the administrative monitoring of police phone lines was sufficiently unclear at the time of the alleged violations that a “reasonable” officer in Wright’s position would not have known he was violating clearly established law.

Qualified immunity protects officials from damages under Section 1983 when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their official acts complied with constitutional and statutory limits.

Thomas Wilkinson, Benjamin Wilkinson, by Next Friend Thomas Wilkinson and Jonathan Wiegand v. Caroline S. Russell, James · filed 1999-06-17

Under this formulation, all government officials are protected from liability in connection with their official acts provided that “it is objectively reasonable for [them] to believe that [they are] acting within constitutional and statutory bounds.” Zahra, 48 F.3d at 686 (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1991)).

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that an objectively reasonable officer would have known.

Driscoll v. Townsend · filed 1999-06-18

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers acting in their official capacity from suits for damages under § 1983, unless their actions violate clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.

Qualified immunity does not warrant judgment for a § 1983 defendant when the jury’s verdict may rest on other supported conduct to which the defendant has not applied the defense.

Harris v. Huston · filed 1999-06-21

The defendant does not argue that qualified immunity applies to this other conduct. Thus, despite my conclusion that at the time of his discharge Mr. Harris’ right to advance notice was not clearly established, it does not justify the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Parent Ex Rel. Student v. OSCEOLA COUNTY SCHOOL · filed 1999-06-21

The defense of qualified immunity further insulates Paradiso and Collins from the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. ... The plaintiffs cannot point to any cases or statutes that would show that Paradiso's or Collins' actions violated any established law, and thus Collins and Paradiso are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant violated a clearly established right and acted objectively unreasonably.

Daviston v. LA St Bd of Nursing · filed 1999-06-22

To succeed in making out a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Daviston must demonstrate that the board members’ conduct (1) violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right and (2) is objectively unreasonable.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for alleged acts outside the scope of his discretionary authority.

Woodley v. City of Jemison · filed 1999-06-25

Clearly, making obscene telephone calls is not within the scope of a police officer's discretionary authority. Because Northcutt's alleged acts are outside the scope of his authority, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, disputed material facts about officers’ knowledge and the reasonableness of their actions can preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Lyles v. City Of Barling · filed 1999-06-28

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that material issues of fact exist concerning the officers' knowledge and the reasonableness of their actions in light of the facts, thus precluding a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when material facts about the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ actions remain disputed.

Randall v. Reeves · filed 1999-06-29

When these items are considered, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ actions against Randall and the cause of his injuries. ... The magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment on Randall’s excessive-force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the decision should be reversed.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials are barred by qualified immunity when their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Mentzel v. Gilmore · filed 1999-06-29

This defense bars § 1983 suits against individual officials if their actions did not violate clearly established law.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known the conduct exceeded clearly established limits on his authority.

Showers v. Spangler · filed 1999-06-29

Because the boundaries of his inspection authority were, in fact, clearly established -- and did not include the use of administrative inspection to randomly and extensively search for evidence of crimes -- Spangler is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material facts bearing on an officer’s objective reasonableness remain disputed.

Archuleta v. LaCuesta · filed 1999-07-02

A person acting under color of state law who violates the rights of a plaintiff established by the United States Constitution or federal statutes may be held personally liable for his or her action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Such a person is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, however, if his or her action was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. ... We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer LaCuesta because there are genuine issues of material fact.

Qualified immunity is available to officers sued under Section 1983 in their personal capacity, but not in their official capacity.

Butera v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-07-07

The qualified immunity defense is only available to the Defendant officers for those counts in which they are sued in their personal capacity (Counts XII-XIV).

An officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when disputed material facts prevent the court from assessing whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable.

McCaslin v. Wilkins · filed 1999-07-07

We conclude, however, that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the basis of the alleged reasonableness of Officer Wilkins' actions.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their alleged conduct.

Lytle v. Wondrash · filed 1999-07-07

Accordingly, the constitutional right Lytle asserts was not clearly established at the time the Appellants allegedly retaliated against her, and as a result they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.

Bessman v. Powell · filed 1999-07-09

Under these circumstances – where both the protected nature of the speech and the viability of retaliation allegations are doubtful – the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities may claim qualified immunity when their conduct was reasonable under the law established at the time.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 1999-07-13

Although Thompson and Tyndzik erred in failing to provide Brown with a hearing regarding the impoundment of vessel 7430, they are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was reasonable.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officials when the evidence does not support knowing or reckless material falsehoods in a warrant application and the applicable probable cause requirements were not clearly established.

Balsa U.S.A., Inc. v. Austin · filed 1999-07-16

Based upon this Court’s determination that the evidence does not support a finding that Defendants made material false statements in the warrant application either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth, and because the probable cause requirements for an administrative search warrant were not clearly established at the time the affidavit was prepared, the § 1983 claim against the Defendants is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued individually under § 1983 when probable cause for an arrest defeats the claimed constitutional violation.

Cline v. Binder · filed 1999-07-19

The district court properly concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Cline and Hagler and that they thus failed to establish a con- stitutional violation -- a necessary predicate for§ 1983 liability. Accordingly, Binder and the other defendants were entitled to quali- fied immunity in their individual capacities against Cline and Hagler's § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages if an objectively reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Painter v. Bill Robertson Robert Tush · filed 1999-07-20

Thus, even if a public officer has deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, qualified immunity will apply if an objective reasonable official would not have understood, by referencing clearly established law, that his conduct was unlawful.

A prior appellate decision denying qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim bars reconsideration of that defense under the law of the case doctrine when no exception applies.

Dicks Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Jenne · filed 1999-07-21

Here, in affirming the trial court's initial denial of qualified immunity, we decided the issue by necessary implication. Further, none of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply to warrant reconsideration of the qualified immunity issue by either the trial court or this court, i.e., the record does not reflect any substantially different evidence produced in support of Deputy Biernacki's motion for reconsideration; there were no intervening changes in the law applicable to the qualified immunity issue which would overrule this court's prior decision on the qualified immunity issue; and the record before this court does not support a finding that the prior rulings were clearly erroneous. As in Riley, therefore, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine governs the qualified immunity issue in this case.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim need not be considered further when the court finds no constitutional violation.

Benjamin v. Washington State Bar Ass'n · filed 1999-07-22

The doctrine of qualified immunity limits the exposure of public officials to liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [107] ... The first step in this analysis is to determine whether a violation of a constitutional right has occurred. [110] ... Qualified immunity is not invoked because there is no constitutional violation.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity turns on whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the official’s actions were objectively reasonable.

Williams v. Bramer · filed 1999-07-22

In a § 1983 suit, we must make two separate inquiries. We must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991); Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1993). If we find that a constitutional right has been violated, our second inquiry is whether the governmental official’s actions were objectively reasonable.

Qualified immunity does not shield an individual-capacity defendant from injunctive relief under § 1983.

Smith v. Plati · filed 1999-07-22

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in his individual capacity from a claim for injunctive relief.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from § 1983 liability when it was unclear whether the asserted right applied to the defendant’s conduct.

O'Hagan v. Soto · filed 1984-01-16

Though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is well established, the uncertainty as to whether it had attached at the time Soto questioned O’Hagan entitles Soto to resist liability on the basis of qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right or was objectively reasonable.

Lukan v. North Forest ISD · filed 1999-07-28

In determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, we apply a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity. See Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998). Second, even if the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable. See id.

A § 1983 claim against a state official fails, and qualified immunity shields the official, when the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional deprivation.

Saenz v. Heldenfels Bros. · filed 1999-07-30

Because the appellants have failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, their § 1983 claim fails and Gonzalez is shielded by his qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims if their conduct did not violate clearly established rights or they reasonably believed it did not.

McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free School District · filed 1999-07-30

A government agent enjoys qualified immunity when he or she performs discretionary functions if either (1) the conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable to believe that the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when a government employee reasonably believed that their actions were lawful.

Wayne Thomas Ahlers and Nina Ahlers v. Schebil · filed 1999-07-30

Section 1983 claims are limited by the qualified immunity exception, such that a government employee will be shielded from liability so long as the employee acted under the objectively reasonable belief that his or her actions were lawful.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a material factual dispute remains about the force used.

Lambert v. City of Dumas · filed 1999-08-09

Such a factual dispute, however, establishes a genuine issue of material fact for trial precluding summary judgment for the Appellants on their claim of qualified immunity with respect to the Appellee’s claim of excessive force.

For a § 1983 qualified immunity defense, the court first asks whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a protected right.

Brenda Mattox and Dona Holly v. City of Forest Park Stephen Vollmar, Police Chief Ray Hodges and Kenneth Hughes · filed 1999-08-11

The qualified immunity inquiry entails a determination of whether the law allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. However, courts must answer a threshold inquiry first: Did the plaintiffs sufficiently allege violation of a constitutionally or statutorily protected right?

Qualified immunity bars monetary damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established, but it does not bar equitable relief.

Nicholas v. Miller · filed 1999-08-13

Without Second Circuit or Supreme Court authority defining with reasonable specificity Nicholas’s right to form an inmate legal services organization, appellees are entitled to qualified immunity. However, since qualified immunity only shields appellees from monetary damages, Nicholas’s claims for equitable relief may proceed.

A defendant asserting qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Sugg v. Albuquerque Public School District · filed 1999-08-16

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a required element of qualified immunity, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A § 1983 defendant’s qualified immunity defense can be denied without prejudice at the motion to dismiss stage when the complaint lacks enough facts to resolve it.

De Rinaldis v. Llavona · filed 1999-08-16

After a close inspection of the pleadings, and further recognizing the need to focus on specific facts, the Court finds that the complaint discloses insufficient facts to adequately resolve the qualified immunity issue at this motion to dismiss stage. The qualified immunity of codefendant, Ms. Morales, is denied without prejudice of the same being requested under a summary judgment standard enabling the court to focus on specific facts.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their actions could reasonably be thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.

Burda Bros., Inc. v. Walsh · filed 1999-08-16

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil suits for damages arising out of the performance of their official duties as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 seizure claim when existing precedent clearly established the governing law at the time of the conduct.

Donald Hawkins etc. v. City of Farmington · filed 1999-08-16

Walters finally argues that even if he seized Hawkins and even if the seizure were unreasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established in September 1994 that his actions in creation of a partial roadblock with means of escape would violate any constitutional right. We disagree. Brower was decided in 1989, five years before this incident occurred, and as we have held, that case established the law to be applied here.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when it was not clearly established that the challenged conduct was an actionable employment decision.

Bevill v. UAB Walker College · filed 1999-08-17

However, it was by no means clear at the time of Watkins’s ratification of the Plaintiffs termination that the ratification of her termination would constitute an “employment decision” actionable in the First Amendment context. Therefore, as to Watkins, qualified immunity will be GRANTED.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutionally protected right.

Pindell v. Wilson-McKee · filed 1999-08-17

Under Siegert, this court holds that even viewing the facts most favorable to plaintiff, he has failed to show a claim for violation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest and therefore defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on plaintiffs liberty interest claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 child-removal claim when disputed facts could show that officials lacked sufficient investigation, credible information, and reasonable suspicion of abuse.

Strail v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES · filed 1999-08-23

Although the outer limits of the right may be abstract, within the context of these facts, its meaning is straightforward: a state agency may not separate parent and child without sufficient investigation, credible information, and a reasonable suspicion of abuse, past or imminent. Though rights within the familial context may not always be clear enough to destroy the formidable qualified immunity defense, the facts of this case not only pierce the narrow gap in the armor, they find the flesh.

An official whose actions did not contribute to an alleged rights violation is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim.

Schaffrath v. Thomas · filed 1999-08-25

Here, even assuming a violation of a clearly established right occurred, we hold that McNeil is entitled to qualified immunity because her actions did not contribute to the violation.

A court deciding a § 1983 claim may dismiss on qualified immunity without first deciding the constitutional question when that question can readily be reviewed in a suit for injunctive relief.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1999-08-25

We do not understand Wilson and Conn, to have, intentionally but without explanation, abandoned the carefully modulated position taken in Sacramento and adopted instead a rigid rule requiring federal courts to express advisory constitutional opinions in every case governed by qualified immunity. ... Because the constitutional question in this case is easily amenable to adjudication in a suit for injunctive relief by any adversely affected prisoner, and because this does not represent an instance of egregious, outrageous conduct, we reaffirm our decision to rely on the lack of clearly established law to dismiss Horne's action on grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is evaluated separately for each defendant based solely on that defendant’s conduct.

Davis v. Carey · filed 1999-08-27

With respect to each defendant, the qualified immunity claim is to be evaluated, of course, solely on the basis of that defendant’s conduct.

Disputed facts material to an officer’s reasonableness preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim.

McKelvie v. Cooper · filed 1999-08-27

Where, as here, there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a claim against state child welfare officials who remove a child without sufficient investigation and reasonable suspicion of abuse; qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment when the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, show no reason to think the child needed protection.

Strail v. Department of Children, Youth, & Families · filed 1999-08-28

Though rights within the familial context may not always be clear enough to destroy the formidable qualified immunity defense, the facts of this case not only pierce the narrow gap in the armor, they find the flesh. As a result, this is not even a case where the issue of qualified immunity becomes entangled in a complex balancing test. If the record is read in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, then no facts exist to suggest that Sarah might have needed protection.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the claimant holds a confidential policymaking position and the officials violate no clearly established right.

Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger · filed 1999-08-30

The council defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Julie Biggs’ First Amendment retaliation claim because Julie Biggs held a confidential, policymaking position with respect to the City of Redlands.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim as a matter of law when disputed facts permit the jury to reject it.

District of Columbia v. Minor · filed 1999-09-09

On the record here, we are quite unable to conclude that the jury was compelled to find that qualified immunity protected Kelsey from liability under § 1983,- or that we could do so as a matter of law on the disputed facts of this case.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit uses an objective standard; an official’s intent and motivation do not determine immunity.

Crosby v. Paulk · filed 1999-09-10

Because "we have 'rejected the inquiry into [an official's] state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard,' " the government actor's intent and motivation are insignificant in determining qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is assessed objectively, without considering officials’ alleged ill will.

Crosby v. Paulk · filed 1999-09-10

Thus, we need not address the alleged ill will between Sheriff Paulk and his agents and the Crosbys for qualified immunity analysis.

Qualified immunity protects officials from individual liability under Section 1983 for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Malik v. Arapahoe County Department of Social Services · filed 1999-09-14

The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Government physicians are qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 liability when they act objectively reasonably in deciding to commit a person involuntarily.

Katzman v. Khan · filed 1999-09-17

The undisputed facts show that both the state and city defendant doctors acted in an objectively reasonable manner in finding plaintiff to be a danger to others and deciding to commit him involuntarily to the CPC; therefore, they are qualifiedly immune from liability under Section 1983.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

B.C. ex rel. B.C. v. Plumas Unified School District · filed 1999-09-20

When the dog sniff in this case occurred, it was not clearly established that the use of dogs to sniff students in a school setting constituted a search. ... Accordingly, we conclude that all defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from B.C.’s claims for money damages.

A government official may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff presents no evidence of a constitutional violation and the official acted reasonably.

Christian v. City of Dallas · filed 1999-09-22

In this case, viewing the facts and drawing inferences most favorably for Plaintiff, Defendant Bennie Click is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence supporting his constitutional claims, and Defendants’ evidence establishes that Chief Click was reasonable in his actions since Plaintiff was given a full and fair hearing by Chief Click.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff offers no evidence supporting an allegation that the defendant knowingly presented false information to a court.

Niemet v. The County of Cole · filed 1999-09-22

As the district court acknowledged, Niemet failed to provide any evidentiary support for his claim that Hemeyer knowingly presented false information to the juvenile court, and, accordingly, Hemeyer is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity turns on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct; the official’s motivation alone does not defeat the defense.

Sound Aircraft Services, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton · filed 1999-09-22

Because the focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is on the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, motivation does not come into play.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe the seized items were within the warrant’s scope or evidence of a crime.

Brindley v. Best · filed 1999-09-22

No reasonable officer in the defendants’ position could have believed that certain seized items were within the scope of the warrant or evidence of a crime. Thus, the officers are not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct was lawful.

Brown v. Selwin · filed 1999-09-24

Based on the record presented to the Court, it is clear that it was objectively reasonable for the State Defendants to believe that their actions were appropriate and lawful.

Individual officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Furfaro v. City of Seattle · filed 1999-09-27

The contours of the right to perform a nude stage dance without fear of warrantless arrest are not clearly established. The lower courts from other states where the issue has been confronted have reached inconsistent results. The trial court properly dismissed the claims against the individual police defendants based on qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Lukan v. North Forest Isd, Gloria S. Scott, L v. Brisco · filed 1999-09-27

In determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, we apply a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, show conduct that was objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law.

Shelton v. La Dept Corrctns · filed 1999-09-28

When Shelton’s allegations are taken as true, the facts do not show that McGovern’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established federal law.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s action.

Marcum v. Catron · filed 1999-09-28

The court further holds, however, that it was not clearly established as of September 17,1997 that such a relationship was constitutionally protected. Hence, the plaintiff may proceed with his claim against the defendant in his official capacity, but the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, barring suit against him in his individual capacity.

A defendant may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim even when information underlying an objectively reasonable decision later proves inaccurate.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 1999-09-29

Even if Greg’s and Greer’s allegations about Lee were not wholly accurate in retrospect, that is not enough to defeat Thompson’s entitlement to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established right and show no extraordinary reason they could not have known the governing law.

Truelove v. Hunt · filed 1999-09-29

In this case, Defendants have not offered any extraordinary circumstances that would explain why the deputies did not know and could not have known of the applicable legal standard. As a result, this court will not grant summary judgment based upon the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants who neither knew nor should have known that enforcing a prison publications policy violated clearly established rights.

Lepine, et al. v. NH Dept, of Correct · filed 1999-09-30

But more to the point for purposes of analyzing defendants' entitlement to gualified immunity, defendants neither knew nor should they have known that their decision to enforce the provisions of that policy and prohibit plaintiffs from obtaining specific materials which plainly fall within the scope of the PPD likely violated plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Warren v. Swanson · filed 1999-10-04

In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to present any authority to suggest a clearly established right to a more invasive search than a pat-down, or that any reasonable police officer would know that handcuffing a loud, abusive arrestee to a wall violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and II.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when no informed official could reasonably believe that firing an employee to punish another person’s protected speech was constitutional.

Camacho v. Brandon · filed 1999-10-15

To summarize, defendants have argued that even if plaintiffs allegations are true, it was objectively reasonable for them to punitively fire plaintiff in retaliation for Fuentes’ speech. We hold that no informed person in 1998 could reasonably believe that such conduct is constitutionally permissible.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim that proceeds to trial need not be evaluated under a purely objective good-faith standard.

Mcelveen v. County Of Prince William · filed 1984-01-26

Thus, the County's argument that the standard for good-faith immunity must be purely objective, is untenable, and its claim that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict or granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, must fail.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not justify summary judgment when the evidence could show that officials violated a clearly established property right of which a reasonable person would have known.

McGEE v. HESTER · filed 1984-02-01

The district court disposed of the section 1983 claim against Hester and Gammon by employing the doctrine of good faith immunity. ... When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to McGee, we do not feel that this is the "insubstantial claim" contemplated by Harlow to be disposed of on summary judgment. We feel that the district court erred in focusing solely on the purpose of the surveillance. At some point, the methods of surveillance become so intrusive as to violate the clearly established property right of McGee of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, the objective test of Harlow has been met in this case.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that the particular defendant must plead and does not support a motion to dismiss.

LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake · filed 1984-02-06

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the particular defendant and thus is not an appropriate ground to support a motion to dismiss.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a public official personally liable under § 1983 must overcome qualified immunity by proving bad faith or malicious conduct.

Tobin v. Goggins · filed 1984-02-06

The judge's charge to the jury adequately stated the law, placing the burden on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants acted towards her with malicious intent or bad faith, and that the transfer was “in retaliation for her filing the grievance.”

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a claim under § 1983.

Harris v. Morales · filed 1999-10-19

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A privately employed prison physician cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Hinson v. DeKalb County · filed 1999-10-20

For the same reasons that the Richardson Court declined to extend the doctrine of qualified immunity to privately employed prison guards, we decline to extend qualified immunity to this privately employed prison physician.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Powers v. Plumas Unified School District · filed 1999-10-21

When the dog sniff in this case occurred, it was not clearly established that the use of dogs to sniff students in a school setting constituted a search. ... Accordingly, we conclude that all defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from B.C.'s claims for money damages.

In a Section 1983 claim where the legality of an official’s conduct depends on motive or intent, the qualified immunity analysis must consider that intent.

Carrera v. Yepez · filed 1999-10-28

Thus, in motive-based cases such as this one, where the legality of a defendant’s actions depends on the defendant’s motive or intent, the qualified immunity analysis necessarily encompasses a consideration of the defendant’s intent.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a constitutionally protected right.

Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben · filed 1999-11-02

As discussed above, plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a constitutionally protected right. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity permits dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki · filed 1999-11-02

For the reasons stated in parts II.B. and C. below, we conclude that the complaint does not state a constitutional claim against King or Polonetsky and that their motions to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds should have been granted.

Qualified immunity does not shield correction officers from § 1983 liability for retaliating against an inmate’s exercise of the clearly established right to petition for redress of grievances.

Gaston v. Coughlin · filed 1999-11-03

The Court holds that the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity to liability in this action. The crucial issue is whether the right or rights that Plaintiff claims Defendants violated was clearly established. It cannot be seriously disputed that the First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances is clearly established.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Campbell v. Sletten · filed 1999-11-04

We conclude Sletten and Nibbe had arguable probable cause to arrest Campbell for criminal trespass. ... We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Sletten and Nibbe are entitled to qualified immunity in this action.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from a Section 1983 claim when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Martinez v. Smith · filed 1999-11-05

Second, the defense of qualified immunity will succeed if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light of clearly established law.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity turns on whether the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Hill v. Hathaway · filed 1999-11-05

We have jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, whether Wright and Boyd are entitled to qualified immunity, after accepting all of Hill’s factual allegations as true, by determining whether Hill has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Qualified immunity may shield a prison official from a § 1983 claim arising from efforts to accommodate an inmate’s medical need for food while maintaining discipline.

Payne v. Revell · filed 1999-11-17

Furthermore, defendant Harrell is entitled to qualified immunity in connection with his efforts to accommodate Payne’s medical need for food while still maintaining discipline.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Dotson v. City of Youngstown, Ohio · filed 1999-11-17

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Dotson has failed to show that any clearly established constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, Defendant Chaibi is entitled to assert qualified immunity regarding plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 suit, an official seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity must show that no genuine issue of material fact defeats immunity, while the plaintiff must allege and prove a violation of a clearly established right.

Hoard v. Sizemore · filed 1999-11-17

The defendant, as the movant in a motion for summary judgment, must show that no genuine issues of material fact remain that would defeat his claim of qualified immunity, and the plaintiff carries the burden to allege and prove that the defendant official violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved at the pleading stage when the defense requires factual development.

Jackson v. City of Columbus, Gregory Lashutka, Thomas W. Rice, Sr. · filed 1999-11-17

Whether a reasonable official should have known that imposing a gag order on a high-ranking public official would violate this right in connection with an investigation about issues relating to public corruption by that official is not obvious as a matter of law. Because no discovery has yet taken place and the defense of qualified immunity is not clear cut, we find it inappropriate to resolve this issue at the present stage of the case.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer lacked grounds to reasonably but mistakenly believe probable cause existed.

Overstreet v. Myers · filed 1999-11-22

I find that they did not provide her with grounds for a reasonable but mistaken belief that probable cause existed. Sergeant Myers is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

An official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when using supervisory authority to demand sexual favors was plainly unlawful.

Kelly v. City of Oakland · filed 1999-11-23

In short, McNab had fair warning from the statute that to use his position as a supervisor to attempt to extract sexual compliance from Kelly was a breach of federal law for which he has no immunity.

An error in a qualified-immunity instruction in a § 1983 action is harmless when the jury does not reach immunity.

Wilson v. Hinds · filed 1999-11-30

Officer Hinds’s testimony was also sufficient to support the instruction on qualified immunity; however, any error in the instruction would be harmless because the jury did not reach the issue of qualified immunity.

A public official may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 sexual harassment claim when established law gave sufficient notice that the alleged conduct could create liability.

Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, Kansas Water Department · filed 1999-11-30

We believe that these cases provided sufficient notice to Masters that he could be held liable for sexual harassment under § 1983 for the type of conduct he allegedly engaged in here. Accordingly, the court shall not grant summary judgment on this basis either.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official in that position would have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Lee v. Arapahoe County · filed 1999-12-01

We hold an employer in Mr. Gibbs’ position could reasonably have been expected to know employee speech concerning public safety is protected by the First Amendment. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Gibbs’ claim of qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Rainey v. Hartness · filed 1999-12-02

Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, Hartness was entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ federal civil-rights claims.

In a § 1983 claim, whether a right was clearly established for qualified immunity is a legal question for the court.

Dubuc v. Isaac · filed 1999-12-03

Whether the law was clearly established is a legal question, not appropriate for jury review.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for a prison officer whose use of force was reasonable to restore discipline.

Rios v. Holbrook · filed 1999-12-03

Reviewing the record de novo, and not considering the facts Rios submits are contested and the affidavit relied upon by the district court, we conclude that Holbrook’s use of force against Rios was not unreasonable in light of the circumstances, that Holbrook’s actions were reasonable to restore discipline, and that Holbrook was thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when reasonable officers could believe their use of force was lawful, even if that belief was mistaken.

McGruder v. Heagwood · filed 1999-12-07

Accepting as true McGruder’s version of the facts, we conclude that objectively reasonable police officers could have believed that they were not using excessive force, though this belief may have been erroneous.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe no clearly established law requires them to investigate a suspect’s mistaken-identity claim before arresting him on a matching warrant.

Waldon v. Borough of Upper Darby · filed 1999-12-09

Thus, given the confidence that the officers likely had in the warrant, and the unique circumstances presented to the officers, the officers were reasonable in believing that no clearly established law required them to investigate plaintiffs claims before arresting him. ... The officers are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and summary judgment will therefore be entered in their favor on the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is available only to defendants sued in their personal capacities.

Walker v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, REGIONAL TRANSP. · filed 1999-12-13

The defense is only available to those defendants sued in their personal capacities.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in a § 1983 action when the constitutional violation is obvious, even without a prior case on matching facts.

Skurstenis v. Jones · filed 1999-12-20

When a violation of a fundamental right is so obvious that no half-way intelligent public official could conclude in good faith that his proposed action is constitutional, a public official who does it anyway cannot claim qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from damages under § 1983 for violating a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. RECTOR & VISITORS OF UNIV. OF VIRGINIA · filed 1999-12-22

Here, what plaintiffs are alleging involves a deprivation of an actual constitutional right that was clearly established at the time; thus, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions surrounding the November UJC hearing.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on false statements or omissions in an arrest warrant application if the corrected application still establishes probable cause.

John G.Hulse v. Hall · filed 1999-12-23

If Hall's verified complaint contained deliberate falsehoods or omitted certain information as Hulse and DeMars allege, Hall is only entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability "if all the false and reckless portions of [the verified complaint] are corrected and the corrected [complaint] still supports a finding of probable cause." ... We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties' arguments and conclude a corrected version of Hall's verified complaint, which includes the test results and specifically references the information provided by the custom combiners, still presents evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Hulse and DeMars. Hall was thus entitled to qualified immunity, see Bagby, 98 F.3d at 1099-1100, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hall.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable, even if those actions violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kipps v. Caillier · filed 1999-12-30

Even if defendants violated Kipps's clearly established constitutional right, they are still entitled to qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable.

Government agents are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Rigle v. County of Onondaga · filed 1999-12-30

Moreover, the 42 USC § 1983 causes of action against defendants James R. Miller and Nicholas J. Pirro were properly dismissed on the ground of qualified immunity. Government agents are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818).

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established in a particularized sense relevant to the case.

Franklin v. AR Police Dept. · filed 2000-01-04

We conclude that Franklin has not demonstrated a right which is “clearly established in a particularized sense relevant to the case at hand.” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Hadaway on this claim.

An officer does not gain immunity from a Section 1983 claim merely by acting on an alleged crime victim’s tip.

B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine · filed 1984-02-08

Fontaine may have been acting on a tip of an alleged crime victim. However, this no more immunized him from liability under section 1983 than it automatically established probable cause for the warrants he sought and obtained.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead.

Gavrilles v. O'CONNOR · filed 1984-02-14

Defendants’ claims of qualified immunity are premature. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant.

A separate good-faith immunity instruction is unnecessary in a § 1983 action when the jury must find purposeful sex discrimination that clearly established law prohibited and defendants identify no extraordinary circumstances.

Stella STATHOS, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Russell E. BOWDEN, Et Al., Defendants, Appellants · filed 1984-02-22

Under the court’s instructions, to find liability under § 1983 the jury had to find that the defendants “purposefully” discriminated against plaintiffs “because they [were] women.” ... The law was clear throughout this period that public officials, acting in their official capacities, could not purposely discriminate (in this sense) on the basis of sex. ... Thus, a special Harlow instruction was unnecessary.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim depends on whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act.

Staats v. Brown · filed 2000-01-06

Claims of qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 must fail if the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act.

Officers cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by relying on training that endorses conduct a reasonable officer would know violates clearly established rights.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts · filed 2000-01-08

The fact that Los Angeles and Santa Monica may have trained their police to violate the rights of individuals does not provide any defense for these officers.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official who dismissed a volunteer in retaliation for protected speech when the volunteer’s asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Ziskend v. O'LEARY · filed 2000-01-10

Because no other pertinent case law appeared between August of 1994 and October of 1997 when Ziskend was dismissed, the qualified immunity that exists for public officials who discharge volunteers in retaliation for exercising free speech rights is applicable to O’Leary in the instant action.

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

Kelly v. City of Oakland · filed 2000-01-12

The City is not entitled to claim qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim alleging an arrest without probable cause, an officer has qualified immunity unless the warrant application was so deficient that belief in probable cause was unreasonable.

Pace v. Danner · filed 2000-01-13

When the plaintiff in an action under § 1983 contends that an officer acted without probable cause, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless the "warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." George v. City of St. Louis, 26 F.3d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1994).

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable officer would recognize that the alleged force was unlawful.

Papp v. Snyder · filed 2000-01-20

The Court finds that no reasonable officer would use a choke hold and a carotid sleeper hold on a suspect who is both handcuffed and restrained by four other individuals. ... For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Snyder is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity if the challenged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right.

Jordan v. Weddle · filed 2000-01-21

Weddle is entitled to qualified immunity if he did not violate Jordan's constitutional right to equal protection. ... We thus reverse the district court's denial of Weddle's motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 false arrest claim when the asserted Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of arrest.

Staats v. Brown · filed 2000-01-24

However, Staats' arrest under this state statute under these circumstances is not a heretofore clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the trial court, and reverse the Court of Appeals, and hold that Officer Brown is entitled to qualified immunity from Staats' § 1983 claim for false arrest.

A social worker sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity for withholding a child’s whereabouts from a custodial parent when the worker did not help take or hide the child and no clearly established right required disclosure.

Dunlap v. Hilgenkamp · filed 2000-01-25

In summary, I find and conclude that there was no clearly established constitutional right that required a social worker to notify the custodial father of the whereabouts of his daughter when the social worker had done nothing to assist the noncustodial parent in taking or hiding the child. That being the case, Shippen’s silence is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment in a § 1983 claim when disputed material facts prevent the court from deciding whether the officers acted objectively reasonably.

Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi · filed 2000-01-26

We therefore hold that, because of the disputed facts, Gaines and Perez are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Nominal damages in a § 1983 action are legal relief barred by qualified immunity.

Hopkins v. Saunders · filed 2000-01-26

Hopkins' claim has much in common with the claim in White: it is based on section 1983 and is being challenged, at least in part, on qualified immunity grounds. ... In summary, then, we conclude that because the award of nominal damages to Hopkins constitutes legal rather than equitable relief, it runs counter to our remand instructions and our immunity holdings in Hopkins I and therefore must be reversed.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts permit different conclusions about whether officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Cerrone v. Cahill · filed 2000-01-28

In this case, for the reasons previously stated, the question of whether Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable in the absence of probable cause requires resolution of genuine issues of material fact and, thus, a reasonable finder of fact could reach more than one conclusion. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official whose conduct violated no clearly established right.

Mercure v. Van Buren Township · filed 2000-01-31

Having already concluded that Defendants acted on a legitimate concern that Plaintiffs conduct had implications to the operation of the Township police force, the Court finds that Defendant Brooks violated no clearly established rights in his investigation of Plaintiffs relationship with Ms. Yono, and that Brooks is entitled to qualified immunity from the constitutional claims against him.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw · filed 2000-02-02

A court "`must first deter- mine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all.'" Id. at 1697 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999)). If so, the court then proceeds to "`deter- mine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Id. (quoting Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1295).

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, sufficiently show a violation of clearly established law.

Stewart v. City/County Denver · filed 2000-02-04

Stewart has alleged facts which are sufficient to preclude summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer making a warrantless arrest if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Walker v. City of Oklahoma · filed 2000-02-07

Under the qualified immunity standard, an officer effecting a warrantless arrest is “‘entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest’ the plaintiff.” ... However, upon review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the district court that “‘a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [Ms. Walker].’”

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted right was clearly established.

Wallace v. Wellborn · filed 2000-02-08

To establish that the agents are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, Wallace must satisfy a three-part test. ... Therefore, Appellant has not shown a clearly established right to a pre-seizure hearing.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an official when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a constitutional right; the court need not then decide whether the right was clearly established.

Pryor v. Coats · filed 2000-02-09

Plaintiff has not persuaded us that defendant’s bulletin board policy violated his First Amendment right of free speech or that the policy unconstitutionally respects an establishment of religion, and therefore, the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendant was correct. Having determined that plaintiff failed to assert a violation of a constitutional right, we need not determine whether the law was clearly established.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities may receive qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Thornhill v. Breazeale · filed 2000-02-10

Accordingly, Sheriff Breazeale and Deputy Perry are immune from Section 1983 liability in their individual capacities under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not support summary judgment when the governing law was clearly established and material facts remain disputed about the officer’s conduct.

Hill v. Martinez · filed 2000-02-11

Because the law regarding excessive force was “clearly established when the alleged violation occurred,” Losavio, 847 F.2d at 645-46, and because I concluded above that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of Defendant Martinez’s seizure of Preston Hill, summary judgment is inappropriate on Defendant Martinez’s defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a state official from personal-capacity § 1983 damages when the violated constitutional rule was clearly established and the official knew or should have known of it.

Starlight Sugar Inc. v. Soto · filed 2000-02-14

The Court holds that the law was clearly established at the time the conduct occurred and that Soto knew or should have known that such conduct violated the Commerce Clause. ... Defendant is not entitled to either a blanket or qualified immunity under the facts of this case as Soto knew or should have known that Market Regulation No. 13 violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when no reasonable fact finder could find that every officer in the defendant’s position would have recognized deadly force as unjustified.

Wood v. City of Lakeland, FL · filed 2000-02-16

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a fact finder could not find that no reasonable person in the defendant's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant's acts. ... Defendant Thompson is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, if qualified immunity remains undecided until trial, the jury determines the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ conduct.

McCoy v. Hernandez · filed 2000-02-17

However, we have previously held that while qualified immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial, if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury which must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ conduct. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, McCoy’s argument regarding the submission of the qualified immunity issue to the jury is without merit.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of the asserted constitutional right.

Resendiz v. Miller · filed 2000-02-25

Accordingly, appellants have failed to establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable officer would have known their conduct was unlawful under clearly established law.

Lalonde v. County of Riverside, Robert Moquin, and Jason Horton, Opinion · filed 2000-02-25

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, unless a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue was unlawful under clearly established law.

A municipality sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity and may be subject to discovery on claims against it.

Estate of Sorrells v. City of Dallas · filed 2000-02-25

A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... Therefore, plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct discovery in order to pursue their claims against this defendant.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages only if the official’s conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Amaechi v. West · filed 2000-02-28

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the challenged search crossed evident Fourth Amendment lines and, therefore, precludes Officer West from invoking the protection of qualified immunity.

An official performing discretionary functions has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim if a reasonable official, considering the law and facts available at the time, could have believed the conduct lawful.

Paff v. Kaltenbach · filed 2000-02-28

The ultimate issue will then be whether, given the established law and the information available to Kaltenbach, a reasonable law enforcement officer in Kaltenbach’s position could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action depends on whether the plaintiff asserts a violation of a clearly established right and whether a reasonable official would have known the alleged conduct violated that right.

Trammell v. Norris · filed 2000-02-28

In evaluating claims of qualified immunity, we must determine whether appellee asserted a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right and whether, given the facts most favorable to appellee, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable officials in appellants’ positions would have known that their alleged actions violated that right.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who could reasonably believe, under the established law and facts available at the time, that his conduct was lawful.

Paff v. Kaltenbach · filed 2000-02-28

Because we believe a reasonable officer would, and in fact should, consider the views of the postmaster in this situation, we have no difficulty concluding that Kaltenbach could have believed the restriction imposed here was reasonable, and that his own conduct was therefore lawful. Thus, Kaltenbach is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' claimed violation of their First Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends in part on whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the law clearly established at the time.

Jones v. City of Jackson · filed 2000-02-29

The second step is to “decide whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable” in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity dispute, the official must first show that he acted within his discretionary authority; the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of showing that the official is not entitled to immunity.

Katherine Gardenhire and Walter Gardenhire v. Donald Schubert, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Chief of Polic · filed 2000-03-02

The ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Wegener v. Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991). The defendant bears the initial burden of coming forward with facts to suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority during the incident in question.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Mervin v. Furlong · filed 2000-03-06

When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff must make the following two-part showing: (1) demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) show that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. ... Accordingly, we do not find that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give state officials qualified immunity when clearly established law made it unreasonable to believe their conduct was lawful.

LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh · filed 2000-03-06

We conclude that in 1997 no reasonable official could have believed that Section 143.4 could constitutionally be employed to impede LSO’s right to display non-obscene art on the premises of an ABC licensee. Thus, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Officials on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not established when they acted.

Chambers v. Colorado Department of Corrections Margaret Heil, in Her Individual and Official Capacity · filed 2000-03-07

Because the state of the law was not established when these actions were taken, the prison officials named in this lawsuit are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, Mr. Chambers’ claim for damages cannot be sustained.

Public officials sued under § 1983 for discretionary acts are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

C.A. v. Lowndes County Department of Family & Children Services · filed 2000-03-13

Public officials are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit for discretionary acts occurring in the course of their official duties. ... As such, Defendants Hannah, Reeves and Stockman are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit requires the court to ask whether the plaintiff alleged a constitutional deprivation and, if so, whether the right was clearly established when the defendants acted.

Howard v. Henderson · filed 2000-03-10

In determining defendants’ entitlement to immunity, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional magnitude, and, if so, whether that right was so clearly established that defendants would have known their conduct violated the Constitution at the time of their acts.