42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Mangieri v. Clifton · filed 1994-08-24

"Probable cause is a defense to a § 1983 claim based on an alleged false arrest."

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Defore v. Premore · filed 1994-10-06

Thus, the court holds as a matter of law that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law is hereby granted.

Section 1983 claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Giano v. Kelly · filed 1994-11-16

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from liability where they did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Wright, 21 F.3d at 500 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). ... Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Giano’s tenth cause of action based on collateral estoppel and qualified immunity is denied.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for government officials.

Cofield v. Randolph County Commission · filed 1994-12-30

Applying the fact specific test of Horsley to the matter before it, the court finds that Deputy Sheriff Ricky Hancock is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a damages action against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights.

Feasel v. Willis · filed 1995-03-09

It is, further Ordered Lubbock County is not as a matter of law under the present record entitled to Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, and the lawsuit for damages as stated by the Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is permitted to proceed against Lubbock County the political entity, and its named officials only in their official governmental capacity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities can be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

D'aguanno v. Gallagher · filed 1995-03-29

Government actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil trials for money damages and may not be held liable in their individual capacity "if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' "

Section 1983 claims against government employees may be subject to qualified immunity for discretionary conduct that violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Walden v. City of Seattle · filed 1995-04-03

In an action under § 1983, government employees, including police officers, are afforded qualified immunity under federal law unless, in the performance of discretionary duties, their conduct violated " 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 does not immunize county supervisors from suit when they act in bad faith intending to deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 1981-09-23

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity as enunciated in Scheuer and Woods, the Supervisors are not entitled to immunity from suit if their actions were taken in bad faith with the intention of depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 affords state officials qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law.

Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley · filed 1995-11-30

Because we concluded above that Doody’s and the other DSOD officials’ actions were reasonable, the officials are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on another officer’s information in continuing a detention.

Irvin Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Kaczmaryn · filed 1996-01-23

Thus, qualified immunity protects Kaczmaryn and Van Dien from liability for their continuation of the plaintiffs’ seizure.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact remain about that defense.

Hoffman v. Lehman · filed 1996-01-23

The court cannot conclude based upon the record so far developed that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when controlling law did not clearly establish that the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.

Arrington v. Dickerson · filed 1996-01-31

Because neither the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of the United States, nor the Supreme Court of Alabama have considered facts and circumstances which are closely analogous to those in the case at bar, the court finds that it is not clearly established that Gilmore’s conduct constituted a First Amendment violation. Accordingly, the court finds that Gilmore is entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claim asserted against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 right-of-access claims based on 23 days of segregated confinement are barred by qualified immunity under the applicable circuit precedent.

Walker v. Mahoney · filed 1996-02-09

Further, in light of the Second Circuit’s decision in Jones, any alleged right-of-access claim stemming from the plaintiffs segregated confinement would be overcome by a qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a prison official for denying yard access during a seventy-day segregation when the right was not clearly established at the time.

Thomas v. Ramos · filed 1996-02-21

Even if the conditions of segregation were sufficiently serious, and Ramos acted with the requisite intent to implicate the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), we hold that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

School officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim merely because they were confused about disciplinary procedures when they knew or should have known their actions violated students’ due process rights.

Darby v. Schoo · filed 1982-07-07

Such confusion, however, is insufficient to allow an entitlement to qualified immunity to these Defendants.

Individual township supervisors and a township solicitor are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims; the township and its board are not.

Glassman v. Township of Falls · filed 1982-07-13

In addition, the individual defendants, the Solicitor and the Supervisors, are entitled to a qualified immunity which is not enjoyed by the Board or the Township.

State officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Calloway v. Fauver · filed 1982-08-02

Applying the Harlow rule, it is apparent that each of the defendants is entitled to rely upon the defense of a qualified immunity. The conduct of none of them violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

State officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to the same qualified immunity accorded to presidential aides under Harlow v. Fitzgerald.

Wolfel v. Nick Sanborn · filed 1982-10-20

We construe the remand order of the Supreme Court to mean that State officials are entitled to the same qualified immunity in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as was accorded to aides of the President in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law they violated was not clearly established at the time they acted.

Hixon v. Durbin · filed 1983-03-31

Under the circumstances presented, I am unable to conclude that the defendants violated “clearly established” law. ... The qualified immunity defense should be applied so as to protect an official’s freedom to exercise his independent judgment on a question of this sort unless and until his views are rejected by a court.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from § 1983 damages when the law governing their conduct was clearly established and they could be expected to know it.

Fujiwara v. Charles G. Clark, Etc. · filed 1983-04-01

The law governing the conduct of Appellees was then clearly established by Mt. Healthy, and Appellees could have been expected to be familiar with it. Under the standards laid down in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2739, knowledge of the law is attributable to Appellees, and qualified immunity as matter of law does not exist under the facts of this case.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 damages claim when unsettled due process law gave officials no reason to know their conduct violated constitutional rights and they lacked malicious intent.

Harper v. Kemp · filed 1988-01-25

As recognized by the Magistrate, since the law governing the requirements of due process in cases such as this one is unsettled, it cannot be said that Defendants knew or should have known that their action, taken within the sphere of their official responsibility, would have been violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover, since the evidence showed that Defendants did not maliciously intend to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the defense of qualified immunity was available to them.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the facts supporting the search warrant establish probable cause.

Harden v. Peck · filed 1988-04-11

Applying the standard set forth in Malley to this case, we have no doubt that Peck is entitled to qualified immunity. The factual allegations in Peck’s Affidavit clearly are sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Harden had sold and was still in the possession of cocaine.

A public official acting within the scope of discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the plaintiff fails to show a material factual dispute about conduct violating clearly established law.

Ed Rich v. Dollar · filed 1988-04-15

Consequently, we are compelled under Harlow, Mitchell, and our precedent to hold as a matter of law that appellant Dollar is shielded from appellee Rich’s § 1983 claim for damages by the qualified immunity to which he is entitled as a public official acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Maine v. Oklahoma Department · filed 1997-09-30

Moreover, we agree with the district court that, even if we assume for the purpose of argument that plaintiff had proven a cognizable § 1983 claim, she failed to demonstrate that the due process rights at issue were so clearly established in June 1993 that reasonable officials in defendants’ situation would have understood their conduct violated those rights. See Liebson, 73 F.3d at 277-78. Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Wagner v. Bay City Texas · filed 2000-09-27

But our qualified-immunity inquiry requires us to determine whether the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable, in light of clearly-established law at the time, and in light of the information the officers possessed. ... Thus, those actions were objectively reasonable in the context of this dangerous situation that Gutierrez created, and we therefore reverse the denial of summary judgment on the excessive-force claim.

For a § 1983 claim, conflicting decisions from other circuits alone do not establish a qualified immunity defense when the right is clearly established in the Fifth Circuit.

Desormeaux v. Savoie · filed 2002-08-02

Savoie is incorrect; the divergent views of the other courts of appeals do not affect established law in this circuit, and a public official cannot use them, standing alone, to establish the qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a public official’s qualified immunity defense must plead specific conduct supporting a constitutional violation, rather than rely on conclusory allegations.

Burge v. Stalder · filed 2002-12-09

In the face of the assertion by a defendant public official of the defense of qualified im- munity, a § 1983 plaintiff must comply with a heightened pleading standard.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim involving a warrant if a reasonable officer could conclude that the warrant should issue.

Smith v. Brock · filed 2003-03-18

Where there is a warrant for an arrestee, an officer enjoys immunity from suit ... for false arrest so long as a reasonable officer could conclude that a warrant should issue.

Police officers are immune from damages under § 1983 when probable cause to arrest is at least arguable.

Kauch v. City of Cranston · filed 2003-03-25

On the contrary, the “[p]olice are afforded immunity [from § 1983 actions for damages] ‘so long as the presence of probable cause [to arrest] is at least arguable.’” Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

In a § 1983 claim, an officer receives qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation, without reaching whether the right was clearly established.

Weaver v. Shadoan · filed 2003-08-13

Because Plaintiff did not satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we need not address whether the right was clearly established. The district court is thereby reversed on the issue of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity can shield prison officials from liability on some § 1983 legal-mail claims.

Sallier v. Brooks · filed 2003-09-18

For the reasons set out below, we further conclude that the correspondence in 11 of the 20 claims did not implicate constitutionally-protected legal mail rights, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on six of the remaining nine claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the final three claims.

In a § 1983 action, an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances is entitled to qualified immunity.

Davis v. McLennan County Jail · filed 2006-05-15

Davis has not shown that the district court erred in determining that Wollard’s actions were objectively reasonable under the ... circumstances and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Herbert Lee Hathcock, Jr. v. Cohen · filed 2008-07-23

If no constitutional right has been violated, our inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords an officer qualified immunity when a warrant application contains enough indicia of probable cause for a reasonable officer to believe the warrant is valid.

Johnson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-03-13

Furthermore, the Leon standard guides the determination of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity from § ... 1983 liability. Officers lose their shield of qualified immu- nity “[o]nly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of non-federal law, and an officer does not lose qualified immunity by violating department protocol.

Pasco Ex Rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch · filed 2009-04-28

Violations of non-federal laws cannot form a basis for liability under § 1983, and qualified immunity is not lost because an officer violates department protocol.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officers when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo · filed 1996-03-06

We therefore conclude that the defendant officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Town officials may invoke qualified immunity against individual-capacity § 1983 claims.

Landry v. Mier · filed 1996-04-11

This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Swartwood’s conclusion that the individual defendants are entitled to invoke the protection afforded by the qualified immunity doctrine and that, therefore, summary judgment should enter in their favor on all civil rights claims against them in their individual capacities.

A municipality cannot claim qualified immunity under § 1983 based on its officials’ good faith.

Forsch v. City of Kent · filed 1996-04-15

We reverse Judge McCutcheon’s ruling on reconsideration that the City enjoyed qualified immunity based on the good faith of the individual officials who made the decision to proceed with the seizures here at issue.

An officer enforcing a statute is protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity when the statute’s unconstitutionality was not clearly established at the time.

Putnam v. Davies · filed 1996-09-26

Accordingly, the Court holds that Defendant Turner is immune from liability for damages resulting from the due process violations to which he subjected Plaintiff. Defendant Turner was acting in accordance with a statute that not only had never been held unconstitutional, but in fact had been upheld by an Ohio court.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that probable cause exists.

Clark v. Palmer · filed 1996-10-03

The defense of qualified immunity shields law enforcement officials "who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present." Anderson v . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).

Qualified immunity can shield an official from § 1983 damages when the complaint alleges neither malice nor action contrary to clearly established law.

Mandelstam v. City of South Miami · filed 1996-10-23

The two-count complaint sought damages for inverse condemnation and violation of the Mandelstams' due process rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, a review of the Mandelstams' complaint demonstrates they did not allege either malice or action contrary to the law. ... In sum, McCann's conduct, as alleged by the Mandelstams, was conduct for which qualified immunity generally applies.

Officers are shielded from liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when their use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Wicker v. City of Galveston · filed 1996-10-24

Thus, because there are no genuine issues of fact material to the Court’s qualified immunity determination, the Court concludes that the Officers are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity as a defense to liability under § 1983.

Kirley v. Williams · filed 2009-05-05

Moreover, the doctrine of qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities such as Appellee City of Erie.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when they reasonably believe the evidence establishes probable cause.

Collins v. City of Sacramento · filed 2009-05-05

Regardless, summary judgment was appropriate on the basis that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity, acting on the reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Collins on the basis of all the evidence recovered in the search.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for an overbroad warrant when they reasonably rely on its approval by a prosecutor and judge.

Millender v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-05-06

We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity because we conclude that the officers were entitled to immunity under the second prong of the test set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), as they reasonably relied on the approval of the warrant by a deputy district attorney and a judge.

In a § 1983 wrongful-arrest suit, officers have qualified immunity if a reasonable officer would not have known the arrest was unconstitutional, even if the protective order had been vacated.

Martin v. Russell · filed 2009-05-06

Furthermore, and in the alternative, even if there had been an order vacating the order of protection and it had been filed, we think that a reasonable officer would not have known that arresting Mr. Martin was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton · filed 2009-05-06

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages from defendants in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for an overbroad search warrant when they reasonably rely on its approval by a prosecutor and judge.

Millender v. County of L.A. · filed 2009-05-06

Accordingly, Detective Messersch- midt and Sergeant Lawrence are entitled to qualified immu- nity for the overbreadth of the warrant under the second prong of the Saucier test.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Kennedy v. Lehman · filed 2009-05-06

Thus, Kennedy’s First Amendment claim arising from alleged retaliation was plainly not “clearly established” at the time the Individual Defendants committed their alleged wrongdoing.

A supervisor found liable under § 1983 for intentional gender discrimination or for condoning it is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Olsen v. County of Nassau · filed 2009-05-07

Applying the standards discussed above to the within action, the Court concludes that Atchison is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... The jury herein found Atchison liable for intentional discrimination as well as condoning or permitting intentional discrimination to occur.

A § 1983 plaintiff can defeat a motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds by sufficiently alleging that the individual defendants intended to harm him.

Coletta v. the City of North Bay Village · filed 1997-04-11

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff can meet this burden by alleging that the individual defendants’ actions violated clearly established constitutional law, or that the individual defendants’ objective intent was to harm the plaintiff, regardless of the state of the law at the time of the conduct. ... Accordingly, as to the issue of qualified immunity, the Court denies the motion to dismiss Counts II and III without prejudice to the filing of a proper summary judgment motion on this issue.

Qualified immunity may be denied to a police officer sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional stop and arrest.

Lyons v. Newsome · filed 1997-04-29

Having reviewed the parties’ submissions on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity on the facts of this case.

Disputed material facts can prevent summary judgment on a § 1983 claim and its qualified immunity defense.

Holland v. O'BRYANT · filed 1997-05-01

It would be premature to grant summary judgment for either party at this time with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is a fact driven case and a number of significant facts remain in dispute. ... Defendants Gibson and O’Bryant have stated that they might exercise their right to appeal this court’s denial of their right to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their actions in seeking a search warrant are objectively reasonable.

Robertson v. City of Beckley · filed 1997-05-07

Here, the officers interviewed a confidential informant, with whom they had worked and who had provided credible information in the past, corroborated the information the informant through surveillance, and then obtained a search warrant from a magistrate. The Court holds these actions satisfy the requirements of objective reasonableness on which qualified immunity rests.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages when their actions are objectively reasonable, even if the information they relied on proves wrong.

Mcpherson v. Kelsey · filed 1997-10-01

Under the circumstances, a reasonable official in Sowle's position would have entertained sufficient suspicion to justify a search. The fact that the officer's information turned out to be erroneous is not a reason for holding Sowle liable; the question, to repeat, is the reasonableness of his actions. We conclude that his actions were reasonable and that Sowle was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 damages claim when the officers’ lack of authority to enter the plaintiff’s apartment was clearly established.

Guzman v. Bonnstetter · filed 2009-05-13

In the present case, we think there is no question that the search was illegal and there is no issue of qualified immu- nity—that is, no issue that somehow the fact that the officers did not have a right to enter Guzman’s apartment was not clearly established.

In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming an official’s qualified immunity defense.

Wyatt v. Smith · filed 2009-05-13

“Once a public official raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden rests on the plaintiff to rebut it.” ... He has failed to show that he met his burden to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual school board members when a reasonable member could have believed the challenged action lawful because the asserted right was not clearly established.

Cole v. Buchanan County School Board · filed 2009-05-14

Because the conduct complained of did not violate a clearly established right, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for dismissal of the action against the individual Board members.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Bellamy v. Wells · filed 2009-05-15

Because, in the light most favorable to Bellamy, a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue violated Bellamy’s Sixth Amendment rights and the intended introduction of his statements would violate his Fifth Amendment rights, Defendants do not have qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by showing a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Hindbaugh v. Washita County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-05-18

Regarding the district court’s Fourth Amendment ruling, to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the actions. ... Accordingly, Mr. Hindbaugh cannot overcome defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Tobin v. Washington · filed 2009-05-18

Instead, exercising the discretion the Supreme Court permitted in Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818-21, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), we uphold the district court’s determination that any asserted due process violation was not a “clearly established” constitutional right, see id. at 816.

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating a properly raised qualified immunity defense.

Collier v. Montgomery · filed 2009-05-20

Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Decoria v. County of Jefferson · filed 2009-05-20

We conclude that the alleged constitutional right at issue here was not “clearly established” in 2005, and that Titland is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Fields v. Prater · filed 2009-05-21

Because, however, it was not clearly established under existing law at the time of the hiring decision that the action taken was unconstitutional, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law permits force only when needed.

Seals v. Mitchell · filed 2009-05-26

Further, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time that “force is only justified when there is a need for force.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481.

An official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Tibbetts v. Kulongoski · filed 2009-05-29

Because the relevant parameters of a Fourteenth Amendment right to a name-clearing hearing were not clear at the time of the allegedly stigmatizing statements, we conclude that a reasonable official in the Governor’s position would not have been aware of his alleged obligation to provide Plaintiffs name-clearing hearings. We therefore reverse the district court and hold that Governor Kulongoski is entitled to qualified immunity in this suit.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials from damages when their sentence calculation reflects an objectively reasonable mistake under unsettled law.

Arthurs v. Beard · filed 2009-05-29

Given the plain language of the Parole Act, their mistake in this regard does not appear to have been an unreasonable one and therefore should not serve to strip them of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Hardesty v. City of Ecorse · filed 2009-06-01

Under the circumstances present in this case, a reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for fleeing and eluding and that his actions were lawful. Therefore, even if Plaintiff could show an absence of probable cause, Officer Barkman is still entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established right and material facts remain disputed.

Montgomery v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-06-05

Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the heavy two-part burden to avoid summary judgment based on qualified immunity. I further find that the Defendants have failed to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit if reasonable officials could differ on whether the officer’s actions were lawful.

Wren v. Towe · filed 1997-12-30

If reasonable public officials could differ on the legality of a defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to immunity from suit.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted procedural due process right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Parrish v. Mallenger · filed 1998-01-07

In our view, the subsequent actions of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa Legislature to clarify state law, and our subsequent decision in Mahers v. Halford, make it clear that the extent to which Parrish was entitled to predeprivation notice and hearing was far from clearly established in April 1991. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Nix and Mallinger are entitled to qualified immunity from Henry Parrish’s damage claims.

Section 1983 does not shield an official through qualified immunity when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right and no special circumstances excuse the official’s failure to follow the law.

Buckley v. Loeffelholz · filed 1998-01-21

In sum, we agree with the district court that Loeffelholz was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Buckley’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the official’s disputed motive is essential to the claim.

Rich v. Montpelier Supervisory District · filed 1998-01-23

Under these circumstances, we cannot accept defendant’s version of the facts at face value and dismiss plaintiff’s claim on immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action does not require a prior decision involving the identical conduct; courts assess whether the right was clearly established.

LaBounty v. Coughlin · filed 1998-02-13

With these warnings in mind, we find- that the district court erred in describing the right at issue as “the right to be free from crumbling asbestos.”

Officers retain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is not sufficiently egregious to strip that immunity.

Ahlers v. Schebil · filed 1998-02-18

Therefore, although the Court holds that Defendants failed to turn over some Brady material before the probable cause determination, their conduct was not so egregious as to deeloak them of their qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under Section 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

McGarvey v. Biswell · filed 1998-02-20

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are shielded from Plaintiffs’ fourth amendment claims by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a public official from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct lawful.

Stanley v. Cooper · filed 1998-03-10

For all of these reasons, defendant Linda Cooper is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

A school official who knowingly fails to provide required pretermination process may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Samuel v. Morris Holmes, Maudelle Davis-Cade, J. Berengher Brechtel, Gail Moore Glapion, Carolyn Green Ford and C · filed 1998-03-31

Given these facts, we cannot say that the court erred in refusing to grant Holmes qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of clearly established rights and the factual record is incomplete.

Prager v. LaFAVER · filed 1998-04-10

The court finds that the complaint in this case properly states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of plaintiff’s free speech interest, and that it is premature, in the absence of a more complete factual record, to grant qualified immunity to this claim on the basis of the' pleadings.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 due process claim when evidence permits a jury to infer that officers intended to help a private actor harm the plaintiff.

Hemphill v. Harold Schott, Nyc Police Officer Thomas Dimuro, Nyc Police Officer · filed 1998-04-10

We hold, however, that Hemphill’s claim against the Officers under the Due Process Clause should survive a claim of qualified immunity.

A private contractor performing a government administrative task for profit under limited direct supervision cannot assert qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Ace Beverage Co. v. Lockheed Information Management Services · filed 1998-05-20

This interlocutory appeal raises the question whether a private contractor acting under color of state law is entitled to qualified immunity from an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We answer in the negative on the authority of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Richardson v. McKnight, — U.S. --, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Texas Ex Rel. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Walker · filed 1998-05-28

Consequently, the Regents’ and Low’s actions in terminating Walker either were not unconstitutional or were not objectively unreasonable in light of the law as it existed at the time of ... Walker’s firing. The district court properly granted qualified immunity.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages if they acted in good faith and did not violate clearly established rights.

State Dept. of Public Safety v. Sexton · filed 1998-06-12

In their individual capacities, Sgt. Luther and Ms. McGinty were entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 if their actions were undertaken in good faith and did not violate clearly established rights.

Section 1983 affords state officials qualified immunity when a reasonable official in their position would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

MD Minority Contract v. Kassoff · filed 1998-06-15

The specific rights allegedly violated--those to be free from pur- poseful racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts (42 U.S.C. § 1981) and from intentional violation, under color of state law, of the right to equal protection under the law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) --are clearly established. ... We conclude that reasonable persons in the state Defendants' posi- tion would not have known that their actions violated any clearly established constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the state Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Arresting officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest liability when a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed.

Marrs v. Boles · filed 1998-07-15

Because the court finds probable cause existed to arrest Marrs on the driving under the influence charge and on the disorderly conduct charge, it is unnecessary to discuss the evidence relating to child endangerment. The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates defendants from liability. Summary judgment must be granted in their favor.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct violated no clearly established procedural right.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1998-07-27

All the time Horne served in the SHU was pursuant to a disciplinary sentence that did not violate any clearly established procedural right. Defendants accordingly are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm the dismissal of Horne’s claim.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity.

Club Retro LLC v. Hilton · filed 2009-06-08

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages from defendants in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when no controlling circuit or Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that their conduct is unconstitutional.

Belanger v. Blum · filed 2009-06-10

In the absence of any controlling circuit or Supreme Court decision establishing the unconstitutionality of the state defendants’ actions, they are immune from suit in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity warrants judgment for a defendant on a Section 1983 claim when the facts do not show a violation of the asserted constitutional right.

Estate of Omayra Sob v. City of Jersey City · filed 2009-06-16

The District Court erred in denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Nalbach, Wolleon, and Younger. Accordingly, we will vacate the portion of the order of the District Court denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment and remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in their favor on the Estate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state officials who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity when the rights were not clearly established.

Walker v. King County · filed 2009-06-18

Qualified immunity protects state governmental officials from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 affords a social worker qualified immunity when she reasonably believes her conduct is lawful under clearly established law, even if it violates constitutional rights.

Springer v. Placer County · filed 2009-06-18

Because it was reasonable for Morris to believe in the circumstances presented in this case that her decision to take Christian into protective custody without a warrant was lawful, she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Friedman v. Boucher · filed 2009-06-23

Because Friedman’s rights were clearly established at the time that Defendants took the sample, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief from officials who, under color of state law, deprive the person of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Barnes v. Henderson · filed 2009-06-23

In addition, Henderson would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability on this claim, as it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not violate plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against public officials for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Gidley et al. v. Oliveri · filed 2009-06-25

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the booking-and-summons of Gidley did not implicate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right such that a reasonable police officer would have understood that the procedure violated i t .

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Rome v. Guillory · filed 2009-06-25

To overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity defense 2 to Rome’s § 1983 claim that he was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Rome must make a showing of no probable cause. ... Because the record raises no genuine issue concerning the conclusion that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Rome, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Rome’s § 1983 and state law claims.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue someone acting under color of state law for violating the person's constitutional rights.

Lockett v. NEW ORLEANS CITY · filed 2009-06-26

In sum, the Court finds that Lockett has failed to show a constitutional violation in his allegations of excessive force, and thus has failed to meet the first prong of the Saucier/Pearson test. As such, the MP Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Lockett’s excessive force claims.

Section 1983 permits money damages claims for federal-rights violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Hunsberger v. Wood · filed 2009-06-29

Because plaintiffs seek money damages, they must overcome defendant’s qualified immunity. ... Because we conclude that defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we need not proceed to ask whether the alleged right was clearly established. ... Wood’s actions were reasonable and he therefore deserves immunity from money damages.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law.

Garcia-Rubiera v. Calderon · filed 2009-06-30

Plaintiffs additionally claim that the district court erred in finding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages against the Defendants in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To determine qualified immunity, we have "typically applied . . . a three part test in which we inquire:" ... We identify no error in the district court's analysis, and see no reason to revisit anything we previously determined in Flores Galarza. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court with respect to its grant of qualified immunity to Defendants.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for damages when a state official, acting under color of state law, violates federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Barnes v. County of Placer · filed 2009-06-30

Turning to the conduct of Defendants Emily Hill and Deputy Rick Harroun in this case, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because their decision to place M.X. and R.X. in protective custody without first obtaining a warrant and keep them in custody until the Placer County Juvenile Court ordered their release did not violate clearly established law.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Seamons v. Snow · filed 1998-09-09

Accordingly, pursuant to U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 applies to damages claims but is unavailable against claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Dorwart v. Caraway · filed 1998-11-12

Qualified immunity is a defense to damages liability; it is not available in actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, factual disputes about whether an officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Leghart Ex Rel. Leghart v. Hauk · filed 1998-11-23

Although Hauk maintains that he was in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or death as a result of Leghart’s actions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and resolving any factual disputes in their favor, the Court finds that outstanding issues of material fact exist as to the Mazda’s movement and whether Hauk had alternative means of safe escape available to him. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Hauk’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim against him must be denied.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unreasonable detention claim when the pleadings allege a violation of a clearly established right and conduct that was not objectively reasonable.

Heitschmidt v. City of Houston · filed 1998-11-23

We conclude the officers are not entitled, on the basis of the pleadings, to qualified immunity with respect to Heitschmidt's unreasonable detention claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings when the alleged detention violates a clearly established right and their conduct is objectively unreasonable.

Heitschmidt v. The City of Houston · filed 1998-12-16

We conclude the officers are not entitled, on the basis of the pleadings, to qualified immunity with respect to Heitschmidt’s unreasonable detention claim.

A § 1983 claim can survive dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint alleges that officials denied a clearly established right to meaningful procedures before depriving a person of a protected job interest.

Levenstein v. Bernard Salafsky, Patricia A. Gill, and David C. Broski, in Their Individual Capacities · filed 1998-12-16

At this stage, therefore, Levenstein has alleged enough to survive dismissal of his procedural due process claims on qualified immunity grounds.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they could not reasonably have known that their specific conduct violated a clearly established right.

Lewis v. Bruce D. Cowen, Roland H. Lange, and William v. Hickey, Individually · filed 1999-01-15

We conclude that the plaintiff did not engage in protected speech under the Pickering test and that, in any event, the defendants enjoy qualified immunity from plaintiffs' § 1983 action based on the First Amendment.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Lee v. Waters · filed 1999-02-04

The record therefore supports the grant of dismissal to the defendants on Mr. Lee’s due process claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence could establish a violation of clearly established rights against unreasonable seizures or excessive force.

Johnston v. City of Bloomington · filed 1999-03-12

Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's finding that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on those claims.

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence permits a finding of excessive force and the right was clearly established.

No. 97-4396 · filed 1999-03-12

We also agree that, at the time of the incident, it was clearly established law that a person had the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force. ... Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's finding that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on those claims.

In a § 1983 improper-arrest claim, qualified immunity can rest on arguable probable cause even when actual probable cause is absent.

Guidry v. Harp's Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-03-24

Therefore, an officers’ acts may be viewed as reasonable so long as the officer is not plainly incompetent or knowingly violating the law, and probable cause need only be arguable, not probable cause in fact. Appellant’s state law claims would not be subject to the same analysis used by the federal court in determining Jones’s entidement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects prison guards from a Section 1983 claim when their response to an altercation is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Bennett v. Collins · filed 1999-04-21

Accordingly, the determination that the defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit on Bennett’s claim was not erroneous.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a mistaken-identity arrest made under a facially valid warrant.

Joye v. Richland County · filed 1999-04-22

In light of these cases, the Court can only conclude, as a matter of law, that Clemens and Davis are not liable to plaintiff under § 1983 because his claim fails on the merits and, alternatively, because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official under the circumstances.

Henderson v. Simms · filed 1999-05-14

For the reasons stated, an Order will be entered separately, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, as the present case is barred by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield government officials who coerce entry into a home without a warrant or an established exception, because the prohibition was clearly established.

Calabretta v. Floyd · filed 1999-08-26

The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Stevens v. Trumbull County Sheriffs' Department · filed 1999-09-01

Summary judgment on the equal protection claim in Count One is GRANTED in part with respect to Defendant Norman Olson in his individual capacity based on qualified immunity, and DENIED in part with respect to Defendants Trumbull County Sheriffs Department and Trumbull County 911.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may allow discovery limited to qualified immunity when facts needed to decide that defense are unknown and within the defendant’s possession.

Morgan v. Gusman · filed 2009-07-01

At this stage in the litigation, crucial facts necessary to resolve the issue of qualified immunity are unknown. Therefore, consistent with Schultea, we VACATE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and REMAND for discovery limited to that issue.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Howard v. Kansas City Police Department · filed 2009-07-02

Because none of the mitigating factors present in Price were involved in this case, the Officers had fair warning that their use of force was not objectively reasonable. As such, the Officers’ conduct violated a clearly established right.

Factual disputes over a defendant’s allegedly retaliatory motive can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

Kantamanto v. King · filed 2009-07-02

The factual disputes in the record preclude any decision with respect to qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to C.O. North.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the officials had objectively reasonable grounds to believe their conduct was lawful.

Pratt v. Hogan · filed 2009-07-06

However questionable the facts demonstrate a violation of plaintiffs constitutional right from being subject to adverse consequences should he decline to consent to the challenged portions of his treatment program, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and are immune from civil damages liability because defendants had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that their conduct was lawful.

Public school teachers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they maliciously restrain a child for hours in violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

H.H. Ex Rel. H.F. v. Moffett · filed 2009-07-07

Because we have found that, on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Appellees, the Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, and because Appellants have raised no other question of error on the part of the district court, we affirm and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity when the right they violated was sufficiently clear at the time of their conduct.

Narducci v. Moore · filed 2009-07-09

We agree with those circuits that at the time of the recording in this case, it was sufficiently clear that government employees enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace to preclude qualified immunity.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their objectively unreasonable actions create the risk that leads to deadly force.

Bletz Ex Rel. Estate of Bletz v. Gribble · filed 2009-07-10

Defendants cannot claim the protection of qualified immunity when their own objectively unreasonable actions created the very risk that generated the eventual use of deadly force.

In a § 1983 suit, asserting qualified immunity at summary judgment shifts to the plaintiff the burden to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Riggins v. Goodman · filed 2009-07-10

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff must demonstrate on the facts alleged both that the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was not unreasonable under clearly established law.

Barnes v. Pierce · filed 2009-07-10

Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their probable-cause determination was objectively reasonable at the time.

Noy v. Travis · filed 2009-07-13

Because such a determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable at the time it was made, we hold that the district court did not err in ruling that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a genuine factual dispute remains about the officers’ use of force.

Goffney v. Sauceda · filed 2009-07-13

Goffney has raised a genuine issue of fact that excessive force was used following his arrest. Summary judgment on this question and the related issue of qualified immunity was improper.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when no clearly established constitutional right was violated.

Morgan v. Bubar · filed 2009-07-14

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a constitutionally protected property interest or a constitutionally cognizable equal protection right has been clearly violated, we conclude that Carini and Castronova are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 equal protection suit is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show that he kept an employee on medical leave because she was pregnant.

Dimino v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1999-09-14

Accordingly, Long is not entitled to qualified immunity from Dimino’s equal protection claim and defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim with regard to Long is denied.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from § 1983 damages when no reasonable official would have considered their conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Palmer v. Johnson · filed 1999-10-19

We therefore hold that no error of law has been demonstrated in the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and in that respect the denial of defendants’ motion is AFFIRMED.

Officers sued under § 1983 for an arrest without probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity if they reasonably believed they had probable cause, even if they were mistaken.

Womack v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors · filed 1999-10-19

Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity only if they arrested Womack with the objectively reasonable belief that they had probable cause to do so – even if they were mistaken.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they violate clearly established rights and their conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Jackson v. Mann · filed 1999-11-05

The prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity. When the prison officials denied Jackson’s requests for a kosher diet, it was clearly established that: (1) “prison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples,” Bass, 976 F.2d at 99; and (2) the Free Exercise Clause affords protection to religious beliefs which are “sincerely held,” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. ... Because these rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, ... and because the prison officials offer no reason to conclude that their acts were “objectively reasonable,” the prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give officers qualified immunity for intentionally violating clearly established rights protected by Miranda, even if their training endorsed the conduct.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts · filed 1999-11-08

Accepting the facts as presented by McNally and Bey, as we must on summary judgment, see Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage when disputed facts prevent a finding that their alleged exposure of inmates to dangerous levels of second-hand smoke was objectively reasonable.

Warren v. Keane · filed 1999-11-16

However, at this stage of the litigation defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from these claims, and plaintiffs may proceed with their action.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable, even if they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Rexford Kipps, Carol Kipps and Kyle Kipps v. James Caillier, Ray Authement, Nelson J. Schexnayder, Jr., and Nelson Stokl · filed 1999-12-06

Because we find that defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Kipps’s 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the controlling precedent covers their use of force.

Richards v. Ferrebee · filed 1999-12-08

The district court determined that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. ... We agree with the district court that Elliott controls here, the appel- lant having failed to sufficiently distinguish its applicability to the facts of this case.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields · filed 1999-12-13

The court finds that Keith has qualified immunity against Sparing’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers who intentionally misstate facts to obtain a search warrant cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when they could not reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Sythe v. City of Eureka · filed 2000-01-28

The officers could not have objectively believed the warrant was issued upon probable cause. Reasonable law enforcement officers would not decide to seek a warrant based on the evidence in the videotape. They could not have reasonably believed their conduct to be lawful. Qualified immunity is not available to these officers as a defense to Plaintiffs suit.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when reasonably competent officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Martinez v. Simonetti · filed 2000-02-04

We therefore find that the district court erred in concluding that a rational jury could fail to find their behavior objectively reasonable; accordingly, Sergeant McCauley, Captain Rosa and Assistant Chief Simonetti are entitled to immunity from suit in this action.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the law governing the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Kaspar v. City of Hobbs · filed 2000-03-28

Given the holding of Thomas, and the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has directly addressed the authority of a non-resident caretaker under circumstances similar to those of the instant case, there is a question, however slight, regarding whether the law is clearly established on this issue. Therefore, only under the facts as presented by Defendants, I will extend the benefit of the doubt to Defendants Durham and Lamb and grant qualified immunity to the officers as to their search of the common areas of Plaintiffs premises, to include the living room and kitchen.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a person they reasonably perceive to be armed and an imminent threat.

Bertha BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew BAEPPLER; David Wilsman, Defendants-Appellants · filed 2000-06-06

Therefore, we REVERSE the denial of summary judgment for both officers Baep-pler and Wilsman and find as fact that Boyd, as perceived by reasonable police officers in the circumstances presented here, was armed and remained an imminent threat and a danger until he finally dropped his weapon after officer Baeppler fired his last shots.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, shows that they acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Corder v. Denver, City & Co. · filed 2000-08-31

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Corder, leads this court to conclude that the officers acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. We therefore affirm the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for obtaining a search warrant when they reasonably could have believed probable cause supported it.

Mena v. City of Simi Valley · filed 2000-09-22

Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the claim that the search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue was overbroad.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could show that officers struck an inmate after he was subdued and stopped resisting.

Giles v. Kearney · filed 2009-07-15

Because Giles testified that he was kicked and punched while fully restrained on the ground, after he ceased to resist, Giles alleges conduct in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights that a reasonable officer would have known was a violation under the circumstances, and we will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the three correctional officers in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Gause v. Diguglielmo · filed 2009-07-15

Therefore, the District Court properly held that qualified immunity shielded the Commonwealth Defendants from this claim.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to qualified immunity for reasonable officials.

Koch v. Lockyer · filed 2009-07-15

While the compulsory DNA collection violated Koch’s Fourth Amendment rights, Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity against damages.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Myers v. James · filed 2009-07-16

Loretta James and Travis Saulsberry appeal from the district court’s order denying them qualified immunity with regard to Lorri Myers’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging she was strip searched at the LeFlore County Detention Center (LCDC). Because this circuit’s law concerning strip searches was clearly established at the time of the search, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the officials’ conduct.

Parkhurst v. Lampert · filed 2009-07-16

As we have distinguished Cook on a number of bases, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden to show that any constitutional right to the delivery of his newsletters in the manner that he sent them was clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct.

Qualified immunity protects prison officers from a § 1983 safety claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the cell placement exposed the prisoner to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Ruiz v. Sotelo · filed 2009-07-20

Under the recently decided case of Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), we need not address Ruiz’s first claim if we uphold the district court’s qualified immunity ruling, and we do so here. ... Considering this context, we conclude that a reasonable prison official would not have known that he was subjecting Ruiz to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Booth v. State of Maryland · filed 2009-07-21

Accordingly, this Court concludes that Warden Peguese was entitled to qualified immunity because Booth has not alleged conduct that constitutes a violation of any clearly established right.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Waeschle v. Dragovic · filed 2009-07-22

For that reason, Dragovic is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.