42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is reasonable under the circumstances, even if its constitutionality is uncertain.

Duarte v. Begrin · filed 2008-11-06

Even if there were some doubt about the constitutionality of the entry and arrest, the officers’ conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim protects an officer who reasonably relies on another officer’s account and reasonably believes there is probable cause to arrest.

Torres v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-11-12

Based on this conclusion, we further conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable officer in Rains’ position would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Torres. Accordingly, Detective Rains was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cross v. Mokwa · filed 2008-11-14

At a minimum, it was not clearly established in 2003 that a police officer could be liable on a “prior restraint” theory for making arrests that were supported by probable cause and then conducting a reasonable search and seizure of a condemned building. For these reasons, the district court’s denial of qualified immunity from these First Amendment claims is reversed.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Trinity Cross v. Joseph J. Mokwa, etc · filed 2008-11-14

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 & n.30 (1982).

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges facts that could establish a violation of clearly established rights and the defense requires a factual record.

Alfaro v. Labador · filed 2008-11-14

We agree with the District Court that, based on the allegations of the complaint, the ZBA defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Defendants in a Section 1983 procedural due process claim are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established law.

Handte v. Hosmer · filed 2008-11-14

Even if the process afforded fell below the constitutionally required minimum, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable to believe the arrest occurred within the officer’s jurisdiction.

Engleman v. Deputy Murray · filed 2008-11-17

Notwithstanding the historical prohibition on executing an arrest warrant outside of the arresting officer’s jurisdiction, we conclude that Deputy Murray is entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for an officer in Deputy Murray’s position to have believed that he was executing the arrest in Arkansas.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim based on the officer’s actions in placing a person in a police vehicle under the circumstances presented.

Vance v. Wade · filed 2008-11-17

Although we agree that Vance’s allegations are insufficient to support an excessive-force claim for handcuffing, we disagree that Wade is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim relating to Wade’s actions in placing Vance in the back of a police vehicle.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to public officials for intentional race discrimination in public employment when the right was clearly established.

Sprinkle v. CITY OF DOUGLAS, GA · filed 2008-11-21

In this case, the rights allegedly violated by Defendants were “clearly established” at the time of their actions and, therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when clearly established law gave fair warning that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

Shepard v. Hallandale Beach Police Dept. · filed 2008-11-25

Accordingly, because Officer Budnick violated Shepard’s clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights by arresting Shepard in his home without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, we find that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on Shepard’s unlawful arrest claim.

An investigator facing a Section 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when a corrected warrant affidavit still establishes probable cause.

Barton v. Curtis · filed 2008-11-25

Accordingly, making every reasonable inference in Barton’s favor, no reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the conclusion that even a “corrected” version of the 2003 Affidavit lacked probable cause. Curtis is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials performing discretionary functions are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Whitten v. Wooten · filed 2008-12-01

Qualified immunity gives government officials performing discretionary functions complete protection from individual claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when the record lacks facts establishing the defense as a matter of law.

Patterson v. Fuller · filed 1987-02-17

There being no facts in the record which will support a defense of qualified immunity or justification or self-defense as a matter of law, the Court cannot grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this issue.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt · filed 1987-03-10

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a public official from liability for civil damages in a section 1983 action if, at the time of the challenged action, the statutory or constitutional right allegedly violated was not "clearly established."

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action does not apply to a claim for injunctive relief.

Jorge E. Cancel Lugo v. Carlos Alvarado, Etc. · filed 1987-05-26

Those cases were suits for damages only, unlike this case, where the plaintiff also requested injunctive relief, as to which a defense of qualified immunity is totally immaterial.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 claim when their alleged conduct violated clearly established rights.

Vaughn v. Ricketts · filed 1987-05-29

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of clearly established laws prohibiting the Defendants' alleged conduct. Consequently, the Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity fails and their Motion for Summary Judgment on that ground is denied.

A defendant facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the defendant’s conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Watts v. Runnels · filed 2008-12-02

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Watts’ equal protection claim because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when disputed facts could establish that they used malicious force in violation of clearly established law.

Adams v. Bouchard · filed 2008-12-04

Having fully reviewed the record and the governing law, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 23]. ... With respect to the second part of the inquiry, it was clearly established in June 2007 that prison officials cannot inflict injury where they act, not in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. ... Therefore, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity be denied as to Defendants Bouchard and Schmidt.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know.

Burkes v. Waggoner · filed 2008-12-09

That is, they are immune unless their actions “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 excessive force claims against public officials may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.

Price v. Engert · filed 2008-12-10

Furthermore, even if Price’s grievance had been timely filed and his administrative remedies properly exhausted, I find that his claims of excessive force must nonetheless be dismissed on the basis of the defendants’ qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a chief judge sued individually under § 1983 for a reassignment within his discretionary authority when the complaint alleges no constitutional violation.

Spechler v. Tobin · filed 2008-12-10

Because the Court agrees that Chief Judge Tobin was acting within his discretion as the Chief Judge in reassigning former Judge Spechler to a separate division, the Court grants him qualified immunity.

A state employee who causes a constitutional violation by intentionally providing false information to police without probable cause is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Buckner v. SHETTERLEY · filed 2008-12-15

Rather, the Court’s ruling simply prevents a state employee from escaping § 1983 liability when the employee causes a constitutional violation by intentionally providing false information to police without probable cause. The jury found that Defendant Shetterley engaged in such conduct; thus, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

James v. Mellen · filed 2008-12-15

Accordingly, Mellen is entitled to qualified immunity and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Qualified immunity does not shield foster-care officials from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show that clearly established law gave them fair warning that their failure to protect children from a known, substantial risk of harm was unconstitutional.

H.A.L. Ex Rel. Lewis v. Foltz · filed 2008-12-15

Although the injury sustained in Taylor was a beating-induced coma and the injury here is sexual abuse and although other unimportant differences exist, we accept that Taylor clearly established decisional law that applied, at the pertinent time, with obvious clarity to Defendants in this case -- assuming that the true facts are the same as those alleged -- and that Defendants had fair warning that their conduct (doing nothing to protect the children, given the circumstances) violated clear federal law. Defendants can therefore be held personally liable for the childrens’ injuries.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is assessed from the point of view of an objectively reasonable officer.

LaFrenier v. Kinirey · filed 2008-12-16

While the court did not reach the qualified immunity defense asserted by the defendants, we note that qualified immunity turns on assessing the situation from the point of view of an objectively reasonable officer and that defendants would be entitled to immunity in any event.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from Section 1983 damages when they violate a civil detainee’s clearly established substantive due process rights.

Meyers v. Pope · filed 2008-12-16

The district court’s qualified immunity analysis was equally flawed. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Here, Meyers’s substantive due process rights were clearly established in 2002.

A defendant sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Brooks v. Stringer · filed 2008-12-18

Without making such a showing, Brooks cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, see id. at 834, and Payne, in her individual capacity, was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who uses significant force against a fully secured arrestee after all danger has passed is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Galvez v. Bruce · filed 2008-12-18

The lesson of Slicker and Lee is that qualified immunity is not available to officers who subject arrestees to significant force after “the arrest ha[s] been fully effected, the arrestee completely secured, and all danger vitiated.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199-1200; see also Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1233.

In a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, the general rule against arrest without probable cause is too broad, by itself, to defeat qualified immunity.

Herrera v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-12-19

While it is clearly established that arrest without probable cause is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court cannot deny qualified immunity to Officer O’Brien by applying the “clearly established law” test at this level of generality.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim must be reconsidered when the reasonableness finding supporting it is vacated.

Santiago v. Stamp · filed 2008-12-23

We therefore also vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to its conclusion that defendants have established that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they reasonably believe they are conducting a search with valid consent.

Morales v. Boyd · filed 2008-12-23

Thus, the Officers reasonably believed that they were executing the search pursuant to valid consent and are protected by qualified immunity.

Officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the right to a name-clearing hearing after legally required disclosure of stigmatizing allegations was not clearly established.

Hemmah v. City of Red Wing · filed 2008-12-30

First, the Court holds that it was not clearly established that a public employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing when the defendant employer is legally required to disclose the stigmatizing allegations against the employee.

In a § 1983 suit involving qualified immunity at summary judgment, the court first identifies the facts supported under the summary judgment standard, then asks whether a reasonable officer should have known the conduct was unlawful.

Morelli v. Webster · filed 2009-01-07

In order to ease this inherent tension, we think it wise for courts to cabin these standards and keep them logically distinct, first identifying the version of events that best comports with the summary judgment standard and then asking whether, given that set of facts, a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were unlawful.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established, but does not bar injunctive relief.

Gunasekera v. Irwin · filed 2009-01-08

Our holding that a name-clearing hearing may require publicity in some circumstances was not clearly established law at the time that Irwin and Krendl acted. However, because qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief, Gunasekera may proceed with respect to his request for a public name-clearing hearing as indicated above.

A factual dispute over whether an officer knowingly made a false identification can prevent qualified immunity on Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Pizarro v. Kasperzyk · filed 2009-01-08

If White knew that Pizarro was not the driver of the second quad, there was no probable cause to identify him as such, nor could any reasonable officer do so. As their testimony on this issue is divergent, Pizarro and White’s credibility cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, White’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Pizarro’s constitutional claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and GRANTED in all other respects.

Qualified immunity does not shield a Section 1983 defendant from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violated clearly established protection for public employee speech.

Robinson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-08

Therefore, at the time defendants acted in 2005 and 2006, both the constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were clearly established and potentially applicable to defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 does not protect an officer through qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show objectively unreasonable force that violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Valladares v. Cordero · filed 2009-01-12

Based on the standard for summary judgment, the district court correctly determined that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to James indicate that Officer Cordero’s actions were not objectively reasonable and violated James’ clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Thus, the officer was precluded from protec- tion under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when facts known to them establish an affirmative defense that leaves them without arguable probable cause.

Williams v. Sirmons · filed 2009-01-13

A reasonable officer would have known, given this particular set of circumstances, that Williams’ flight from the traffic stop was justified by the affirmative defense of necessity or duress. For this reason, the deputies lacked arguable – much less actual – probable cause to arrest, even though the circumstances established that Williams met all elements of the offense of fleeing or eluding a police officer. The deputies, therefore, are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law for Williams’ claim that the arrest was unsupported by probable cause and the district court properly denied summary judgment on this ground.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the undisputed facts establish arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Brienza v. Gee · filed 2009-01-13

But, the undisputed facts show that Bridwell had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Brienza on the DUI charge. Bridwell is entitled to qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment for Bridwell was appropriate.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action focuses on the legality of the official’s conduct rather than the official’s liability to the particular plaintiff.

Eng v. Cooley · filed 2009-01-14

We therefore agree with the Seventh Circuit that “the appropriate focus in a qualified immunity analysis is the legality of the conduct of the public official, not ... his liability to the ultimate plaintiff.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities and officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Eng v. County of La · filed 2009-01-14

Qualified immu- nity is not available, however, to municipalities or individuals in their official capacities.

Government officials are shielded from § 1983 damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Guzzi v. Dennehy · filed 2009-01-14

Nevertheless, in regard to a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against a government official for money damages, such an official is shielded from liability insofar as his conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity solely because no case addresses their precise conduct when existing law made its unlawfulness apparent.

Ostlund v. Robert C. Bobb, Edward J. Cooper, City of Santa Ana · filed 1987-08-21

Therefore, Bobb and Cooper cannot use the absence of case law directly on point to shield them from liability. The unlawfulness of their conduct should have been apparent to them in light of preexisting case law.

Law enforcement defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when warrants and probable cause provide reasonable grounds for their actions.

Bemis v. Kelley · filed 1987-09-29

While the above conclusions dispose of this matter, I believe the defendants are entitled to that protection under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The facts here, especially the presence of both a state and federal search warrant and the presence of probable cause to arrest and the attendant right to seize weapons and evidence, show reasonable grounds for the belief that the defendants’ actions were necessary and taken in good faith.

In a § 1983 damages action, factual disputes can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Eva Garrett, Individually and as Administratrix for the Estate of Linda Kay Johnson, Deceased v. Lloyd Rader and Norman · filed 1987-10-13

Because we agree with the district court that there are factual issues which preclude a determination of the question of qualified immunity as a matter of law, the Order denying the motions for summary judgment will be affirmed.

In a § 1983 suit, a court must consider all undisputed record facts when deciding a public official’s qualified immunity claim.

Whitt v. Smith · filed 1987-11-02

Therefore, a district court must carefully consider “all the undisputed facts in the record,” to determine a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity to “shield public officials ... from the burdens of trial.”

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer whose warrant application was objectively reasonable, even if omitted facts would have negated probable cause.

Ogden v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-11-25

The Court concludes that defendant Manjoras enjoys qualified immunity, whether or not the arrest affidavit supports a finding of probable cause.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for property damage during a warrant search when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct was unnecessarily destructive.

Cook v. Gibbons · filed 2009-01-20

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to grant summary judgment to appellants based on qualified immunity.

Officers sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Pearson v. Callahan · filed 2009-01-21

Because the unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct in this case was not clearly established, petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint does not allege a constitutional violation.

Davis v. Carter · filed 2009-01-23

In this school setting case, the complaint’s allegations of deliberate indifference, without more, do not rise to the conscience-shocking level required for a constitutional violation. ... The defendant coaches are entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the evidence shows conduct that violated clearly established law.

Bertl v. City of Westland · filed 2009-02-02

Bertl has provided enough evidence to show that Thomas’ conduct violated clearly established law, and the unlawfulness of those actions would be apparent to a reasonable official.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when enforcing a statute without fair warning that their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Cowart v. Deputy Armando Enrique · filed 2009-02-04

We find that the district court erred in failing to grant the Deputies’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. ... The Deputies enforced a statute as it was enacted and therefore had no “fair warning” that strict adherence to the Florida statutes would have them run afoul of the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not shield a prison officer through qualified immunity when the officer unreasonably withholds meals in violation of a clearly established right.

Foster v. Runnels · filed 2009-02-05

Furthermore, Cole’s conduct was not reasonable because she took no other action to ensure that her obligation to provide Foster with meals was met. Consequently, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 claims against individual state officers.

O'Dwyer v. Department of Transportation & Development · filed 2009-02-05

The district court dismissed O’Dwyer’s § 1983 claims against individual state officers, on qualified immunity grounds, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ... This court rejected O’Dwyer’s § 1983 arguments, in connection with the present case, in Appeal No. 06-30840. ... We do so again.

A prison official who repeatedly denies an inmate meals without a safety justification is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the right to adequate food is clearly established.

Foster v. Runnels · filed 2009-02-05

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Cole is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity § 1983 claims against officers whose conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

CLOANINGER EX REL. EST. OF CLOANINGER v. McDevitt · filed 2009-02-09

Thus, qualified immunity bars Cloaninger’s suit against Parlier and Lo individually and summary judgment was properly awarded.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims may proceed against an officer when disputed facts prevent a determination that qualified immunity applies.

Sulfridge v. Huff · filed 2009-02-09

Because genuine issues of material fact as to Officer Huff’s qualified immunity claim exist, we affirm the district court’s decision.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Butler v. City of Sacramento · filed 2009-02-11

Assuming, without deciding, that Perez violated Butler’s Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain her after completing the search of her vehicle, this right was not clearly established in 2005, and Perez is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was objectively reasonable.

Reid v. City of Beverly Hills · filed 2009-02-13

Accordingly, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on their objectively reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that there was probable cause.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages when a reasonable officer could have believed the use of force was lawful.

Arrington v. Ramsey · filed 2009-02-16

Norris’ decision to use force under the circumstances is shielded by his qualified immunity defense because the Court finds that based on the facts as outlined below, a reasonable officer confronting the same circumstances could have reasonably believed that the use of force, including deadly force, was necessary.

A § 1983 plaintiff overcomes qualified immunity at summary judgment by showing facts supporting a constitutional violation of a right clearly established at the time.

Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-02-17

As applied to this case, Dominguez’s right to adequate medical care has long been clearly established. Therefore, we conclude that Dominguez has satisfied both requirements for overcoming Fletcher’s qualified immunity defense.

A prison nurse is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 medical-care claim when the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Dominguez v. Corr Medical Servs · filed 2009-02-17

As applied to this case, Dominguez’s right to adequate medical care has long been clearly established. Therefore, we conclude that Dominguez has satisfied both requirements for overcoming Fletcher’s qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer joins an arrest already underway and reasonably believes the first officer had probable cause.

Hogue v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 2009-02-23

A reasonable police officer who witnessed Officer Rarey assert physical control over Hogue while escorting him toward the exit of the store (Trial Tr. 138), and then saw Officer Rarey fall to the ground twice and Hogue also go down, could believe that Officer Rarey was acting on probable cause and therefore step in to assist him to effectuate the arrest. ... In sum, qualified immunity protects Officer Harrison from liability, and therefore summary judgment will be GRANTED in his favor with respect to the § 1983 claim of false imprisonment or false arrest.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim at summary judgment when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of a clearly established right.

Evans v. City of Etowah, Tennessee · filed 2009-02-23

Under these facts, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the plaintiff shows no constitutional violation.

BHGDN, LLC v. Minnesota · filed 2009-02-24

As noted above, BHGDN has not shown that any constitutional violations occurred. Therefore, Hugoson and Ernest are entitled to qualified immunity on BHGDN’s § 1983 claims and the court grants their motion to dismiss.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Drogosch v. Metcalf · filed 2009-02-25

A law enforcement officer’s key defense to a § 1983 action is encapsulated in the concept of qualified immunity. ... In sum, Drogosch has carried his burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Agent Metcalf violated Drogoseh’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following his warrantless arrest. The district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Metcalf was therefore free of error.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an official in her personal capacity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2009-02-27

Second, we also affirm the district court's dismissal of Poirier's claim against Commissioner Dennehy for damages under § 1983. Even if we had concluded that Poirier had stated a claim for violation of her right to intimate association, she would not be entitled to seek damages against Dennehy in her personal capacity because such a right was not "clearly established" at the time of the purported violation.

In a § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity by showing a constitutional violation without separately showing that the right was clearly established.

Fennell v. Gilstrap · filed 2009-02-27

For claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, however, a plaintiff can overcome a defense of qualified immunity by showing only the first prong, that his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Hanson v. Dane County · filed 2009-03-03

However, I conclude that defendant Wittmann is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because the law was not clearly established that plaintiff was “in custody” during questioning.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff provides no admissible evidence of the alleged constitutional violation.

Burgest v. United States · filed 2009-03-03

Burgest has failed to provide any admissible evidence of the constitutional violation he alleges. West is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment was appropriate.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established right and acts objectively unreasonably.

Doucet v. City of Bunkie · filed 2009-03-04

It could have reached that conclusion notwithstanding defendants’ qualified immunity defense because it determined, on the basis of the facts before it, both that Sanders’ conduct deprived Doucet of rights that were clearly established, and that his conduct was objectively unreasonable. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). That determination was correct.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Robertson v. Elliott · filed 2009-03-06

The district court erred by failing to grant summary judgment to Pennington and Elliott on those claims for which qualified immunity is an available defense, namely, the § 1983 claims asserted against them in their individual capacities.

In a § 1983 claim, once defendants properly support a qualified immunity motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce evidence that their actions violated clearly established federal law.

Retzlaff v. De La VINA · filed 2009-03-04

As defendants have asserted their entitlement to qualified immunity in a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden was on Retzlaff to come forward with summary judgment evidence sufficient to sustain a determination that defendants’ actions violated clearly established federal law.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights.

Cooper v. Petray · filed 1988-08-16

“[Ojfficials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suit as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was reasonable and the arrest was not clearly established as unlawful.

Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2009-03-09

Although the arrest was unfortunate, we cannot say that the Defendants’ belief that it was fake was plainly incompetent. The arrest, therefore, was not clearly established as unlawful.

Section 1983 permits claims against public officials, subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Bergeron v. Cabral · filed 2009-03-09

Qualified immunity is a judge-made construct that broadly protects public officials from the threat of litigation arising out of their performance of discretionary functions.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim when, taking the employee’s facts as true, officials could not reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Bardzik v. County of Orange · filed 2009-03-11

Likewise, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, this Court must presume that Bardzik was not a policymaker and that the Orange County Defendants were aware of this. Therefore, it would not be reasonable for the Defendants to believe their conduct was lawful.

Section 1983 claims against municipal officers are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla. · filed 2009-03-11

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Government officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Panozzo v. Rhoads · filed 1989-05-10

Nonetheless, regardless of whether such conduct constitutes a due process violation, qualified immunity shields defendants from liability.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability when no reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Fonte v. Collins · filed 1989-05-16

Accordingly, under the objective test established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Defendants may not avail themselves of qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officers from an unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed under the law at the time.

Gorra v. Floyd Hanson, Patrick Chase, Minnesota State Highway Patrol, an Agency or Division of the State of M · filed 1989-07-24

Because the law had not been construed at the time of the arrest, and because the troopers’ interpretation was not inconsistent with common understanding, we cannot say that the troopers’ interpretation of the statute was unreasonable. Accordingly, Hanson and Chase are entitled to be shielded from liability under the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields police officers from damages for an arrest when officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Simkunas v. Tardi · filed 1989-08-31

Accordingly, this court finds that Hickory Hills Police officers Michael Tardi and Robert Troy are to be afforded qualified immunity from liability with regards Count I of this Complaint.

A police officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when reliance on a search warrant was objectively reasonable after consulting a prosecutor and obtaining a judge’s approval.

Ortiz v. Robert C. Van Auken, and Wayne C. Spencer · filed 1989-10-27

Therefore, Spencer is entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to this action.

In a § 1983 action, once officials show they acted within their discretionary authority, the plaintiff must show that their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law to overcome qualified immunity.

Hudgins v. City of Ashburn · filed 1989-12-13

Once defendants-appellants have shown that their alleged unlawful action was within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to plaintiff Hudgins to demonstrate lack of good faith or that defendants-appellants’ action violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law.

An officer sued under § 1983 for obtaining a search warrant has qualified immunity unless the application so lacks indications of probable cause that belief in it would be unreasonable.

Johnson v. Walton · filed 2009-03-13

Here, the Leon exception therefore applies and Officer Walton is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim may require a fuller factual record to determine whether a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Newell v. Runnels · filed 2009-03-13

Whether a reasonable State’s Attorney should have known that firing Plaintiffs would violate their First Amendment rights to free speech needs to be considered on a more developed record. Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals have provided particularized guidance concerning the alleged specific conduct at issue here or its potential impact on an office like Newell’s with only 10 employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the intermediate appellate court reversing summary judgment in favor of Newell on the § 1983 claim in Count I is affirmed.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects foster care workers who reasonably carry out a Family Court placement order.

Orlik Ex Rel. Orlik v. Dutchess County · filed 2009-03-16

We find that Tilton and Woolsey are entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to oversee Jared’s foster care placement.

A school official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the prohibition on the alleged conduct was clearly established and no reasonable official could believe the conduct was lawful.

Putaro v. Carlynton School District · filed 2009-03-16

Panza is not entitled to qualified immunity. The law has been clearly established for a lengthy period of time that school officials may not retaliate against the filing of a grievance and no reasonable person in Panza’s position could believe that retaliating against Putaro by refusing to hire him was appropriate conduct.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Ashfaq v. Anderson · filed 2009-03-16

Because Dr. Ashfaq has failed to allege a deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right, Dr. Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Dr. Ashfaq’s § 1983 claim should be and hereby is DISMISSED.

Section 1983 permits damages suits against government officials unless qualified immunity applies because the official did not violate clearly established rights.

Faghri v. University of Connecticut · filed 2009-03-20

“[Qualified immunity ... shields a government official acting in an official capacity from suit for damages under § 1983 unless the official violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officer acted objectively reasonably.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2009-03-24

Because the court finds that the evidence shows a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Schaffer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court finds that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied as to the qualified immunity issue.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a Section 1983 claim when the facts alleged do not permit the court to decide the defense at that stage.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-25

Nor may the Court conclude that Officer Ha is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment unless they establish that the defense applies as a matter of law.

Fonte v. Collins · filed 1990-03-15

The defendants, Portland, Maine, police officers, were sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating the fourth amendment rights of the plaintiff by arresting him without probable cause. Because the officers have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, we affirm.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a government official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Allen v. Higgins · filed 1990-06-13

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed to the extent that it finds that Groose is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law for depriving them of a federal right, subject to applicable defenses such as qualified immunity.

Young v. Michael C. Barrett, John Rosson, City of Clarksville, Tennessee, and Montgomery County, Tennessee · filed 1990-08-27

Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that Barrett forfeited any claim to the defense of qualified immunity on Young's search and seizure claim.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors who deprive people of federal constitutional or statutory rights, subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

Keller v. Frink · filed 1990-09-28

Police officers are shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the right they are alleged to have violated was not clearly established at the time of the incident.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Nunez-Soto v. Carlos Alvarado, Etc. · filed 1990-12-26

Consequently, defendants enjoy qualified immunity and are entitled to judgment on plaintiffs claim for damages.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead, and failing to plead it may waive the defense.

Moore v. Morgan · filed 1991-02-07

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to personal liability that the defendant has the burden of pleading. ... In this case, because Morgan and the commissioners never raised this affirmative defense, we hold that it was waived.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about probable cause.

Simkunas v. Michael Tardi and Robert Troy · filed 1991-05-03

Having uncovered sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, Officers Tardi and Troy had “no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.” ... They were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and summary judgment on this basis was therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 allows suits for constitutional deprivations by persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct was objectively reasonable.

O. George Specht, Jr. And June B. Specht v. Roger Jensen, Doug Martin, and Don Owens · filed 1991-06-13

Furthermore, after carefully evaluating the undisputed facts of the case, the Specht I panel concluded that defendants' claim of objective reasonableness was not supported by the undisputed facts in the record. 832 F.2d at 1525. Such a finding clearly defeated any assertion of qualified immunity, be it on a motion j.n.o.v. or a pretrial motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable.

Torchinsky v. Siwinski · filed 1991-08-09

Under these circumstances, Siwinski acted with objective reasonableness and is thus entitled to immunity from appellants’ § 1983 claim against him.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability and permits municipal officers to invoke qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Van Dunk v. St. Lawrence · filed 2009-03-26

Additionally, the Defendants have asserted a defense of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, municipal officers are free from liability if they show either that their actions “did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or that it was objectively reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate these clearly established rights.” ... As a result, qualified immunity applies to each of the individual Defendants. Since the individual Defendants would not have been on notice that their actions would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate, and is granted.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state or District of Columbia law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-26

Nor may the Court conclude that Officer Ha is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 claims for civil damages may be barred by qualified immunity when governmental actors do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Chaklos v. Stevens · filed 2009-03-30

Governmental actors performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue someone acting under color of state law for depriving them of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity.

Chaklos, Richard v. Stevens, Kathleen · filed 2009-03-30

Without deciding whether this amounts to a constitutional violation, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the law does not make clear that their action was unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the officer creates probable cause by rendering a person unable to leave.

Goddard v. Kelley · filed 2009-03-31

Similarly, no reasonable police officer would believe that he could create the probable cause that led to plaintiffs arrest for trespassing. Accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to the circumstances of this case.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from an individual-capacity section 1983 claim when the official could reasonably believe the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Williams v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. · filed 2009-03-31

Accordingly, we further conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Maturi has qualified immunity in regard to appellant’s section 1983 counts against Maturi in his individual capacity.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established under pre-existing law.

Hill v. Washington State Department of Corrections · filed 2009-03-31

The Court concludes that Defendants Vail, Pacholke, and Roberts are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to all of Plaintiffs’ claims for damages, fees, and costs for Defendants’ enforcement of both the pre-revised DOC Policy and the current DOC Policy. Although Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable person would know that enforcing the DOC Policy violates a clearly established constitutional right, they fail to show that the DOC Policy, in light of pre-existing law, violates any right guaranteed by the Constitution.

In a § 1983 claim against an official acting within discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Ogletree v. City of Auburn · filed 2009-03-31

As the burden is on Plaintiffs to show that the individual Defendants are not entitled to the defense, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to defeat Defendants’ properly-supported motion seeking summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Summary judgment, therefore, is due to be entered in the individual Defendants’ favor on the § 1983 equal protection claims on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim may be denied at summary judgment when the plaintiff-favorable record does not establish an objectively reasonable mistake by the officers.

Ruiz v. Lebanon County · filed 2009-03-31

It follows that we are unable to hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law in denying qualified immunity to the officers at this stage of the proceedings. Nothing that we hold will preclude, however, the factfinder from deciding that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable based on facts shown at a later point in this matter.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity for actions taken in good faith.

Anderson v. Stevas · filed 1985-12-05

If, on the other hand, the state defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, they are entitled to a qualified immunity for actions taken in good faith.

A police officer loses qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the warrant application is so lacking in indications of probable cause that believing probable cause exists is unreasonable.

Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. · filed 1995-05-19

Under Malley, the shield of qualified immunity is lost where the warrant application is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that it is unreasonable to believe that probable cause exists.

A public officer is protected by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless the allegedly violated right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand the conduct violated it.

Hamilton Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Cannon · filed 1996-04-19

To overcome the qualified immunity defense, the contours of the right allegedly violated must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates that right.

In a § 1983 claim, qualified immunity does not protect an official when the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct was apparent, even without a prior case addressing the specific conduct.

Jones v. Hunt · filed 2005-06-14

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, plaintiffs need not point to a prior holding that the specific conduct at issue is unlawful; rather, the unlawfulness of the alleged action must have been apparent.

A supervisor who acquiesces in an unconstitutional arrest and prolongs the detention for an improper purpose may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Pompano v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 2008-04-17

Based upon those determinations, qualified immunity would not be available to Jones.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable investigation establishes probable cause for the arrest.

Barfield v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Louisiana Department of Justice · filed 2009-04-03

Because Widmer’s reasonable investigation of Barfield established probable cause to arrest her, Widmer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity when the alleged right was not clearly established.

Radillo v. Fugioka · filed 2009-04-03

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Radillo’s First Amendment claim because the right that Radillo alleges was violated was not clearly established at the time of the incident in 2003.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established law.

Hostetler v. Green · filed 2009-04-15

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a violation of clearly established law.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law would not have made the unlawfulness of their conduct clear to a reasonable official.

McSpadden v. Wolfe · filed 2009-04-21

Thus, because “it would not have been clear to a reasonable [official] what the law required under the facts alleged [by Appellant], [Appellees are] entitled to qualified immunity.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (2004).

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff shows neither a constitutional violation nor conduct that was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Ratcliff v. Moore · filed 2009-04-24

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because Plaintiff has not shown either a constitutional violation nor that what Defendants did was “objectively unreasonable” in light of clearly established law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim when the employee’s right was clearly established at the time, assuming disputed facts are resolved in the employee’s favor.

Robinson v. York · filed 2009-04-27

Therefore, at the time defendants acted in 2005 and 2006, both the constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were clearly established and potentially applicable to Defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 claims against school officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right to protection from private actors was not clearly established at the time.

Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District Ex Rel. Board of Education · filed 2009-04-27

Accordingly, even if a constitutional right to governmental protection inhered in the public school context, that right was not clearly established during the time period in which Doe was victimized. As a result, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the federal and constitutional claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when they neither knew nor reasonably should have known their actions would violate constitutional rights.

Peterson v. Davis · filed 1982-11-26

In view of all the surrounding circumstances of this case, the defendants did not know, nor should they reasonably have known, that the actions they took would violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity is decided by the court and must be raised by the final opportunity for a directed verdict.

Lewis v. Kendrick · filed 1991-04-26

Possibly the officers intended this to be a request for an instruction on qualified immunity. The question of immunity is for the court. ... It is not silently reserved. The last opportunity to raise it is by motion for directed verdict.

Section 1983 claims against prison disciplinary hearing officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer could reasonably believe the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Zavaro v. Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, C.R. Homrighouse · filed 1992-07-31

“The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield public officials ... from liability in § 1983 actions ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ... In sum, Captain Homrighouse could not have reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate Zavaro’s constitutional rights, and Homrighouse’s defense of qualified immunity was properly rejected by the district court.”

An officer sued under Section 1983 is protected by qualified immunity when seeking an arrest warrant was objectively reasonable.

Hoffman v. Reali · filed 1992-08-27

Essentially for the same reasons set forth in the district court, we conclude that Reali’s conduct was objectively reasonable and that he was protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Knight v. Davies · filed 1992-09-17

Further, given the above discussion regarding plaintiffs failure to establish any deliberate disregard of plaintiff’s medical condition, to any extent plaintiff seeks to recover damages against the remaining state defendants in their individual capacities, the court finds these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity.

Reynolds v. Condie · filed 1992-12-14

These actions of defendant were stated to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Therefore plaintiffs sought an injunction enjoining defendant from changing their duties or salaries. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that defendant has qualified immunity under Thulen v. Bausman, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1991), certiorari denied, 112 S.Ct. 1262. We agree and therefore affirm.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local official for violating constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Valencia v. Wiggins · filed 1993-01-18

Concluding that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, we find the jail official not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits damages actions for rights violations, subject to qualified immunity when an officer reasonably believes the arrest was lawful.

James M. O'Neill and the Store at Oak Beach, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, Ronald Tolkin and James Hassan · filed 1993-02-16

Where, as here, in a § 1983 action for damages based on malicious prosecution, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if “(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable to officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Leaf v. Freeman · filed 1993-04-27

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of qualified immunity because that defense is unavailable to officials in an official-capacity suit.

To overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a clearly established right and that a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated that right.

Bonilla v. City of San Diego · filed 1993-04-29

To overcome the qualified immunity defense, plaintiff must establish first that the defendants' actions violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable officer would have been aware, and second, that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions violated that clearly established right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established under the circumstances they faced.

Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1993-11-23

If, in the face of all the information the state actors had, Joshua De-Shaney enjoyed no constitutional right to protection, I cannot conclude that it is clearly established that Sinthasomphone had such a right. The officers are entitled to a qualified immunity. Summary judgment dismissing the due process claim against them is GRANTED.

Law enforcement officers have qualified immunity from suit in Section 1983 actions.

Davis v. DiPino · filed 1994-02-23

Law enforcement officers have a judicially created qualified “immunity from suit” in 1983 actions.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when it was not clearly established that the official’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Shadburne v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1994-05-19

The Court has carefully reviewed the recommendation concerning qualified immunity and concludes that it is proper. ... Under the facts of this case, defendant is clearly entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity supported by defendants’ good-faith affidavits can warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim.

Schoone v. Olsen · filed 1977-02-11

The second count of the complaint alleges a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants claim a qualified immunity under this claim of a civil rights violation. Upon the “good faith” affidavits of the defendants, I am required to grant summary judgment as to this count pursuant to Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Parole officers sued for damages under § 1983 may present a good faith immunity defense to the jury when the evidence supports it.

Dennis M. Wolfel, Cross-Appellant v. Nick Sanborn, Cross-Appellees · filed 1977-05-02

We conclude that defendants were entitled to have their good faith defense submitted to the jury and that the district court erred in finding that defendants’ reliance on the unwritten policy of the Parole Authority was unreasonable.

Qualified immunity can shield prison officials from § 1983 damages liability.

Wycoff v. Brewer · filed 1978-03-23

We think, however, that the defendants in this case are shielded from liability for damages by the qualified executive privilege recognized in Procunier v. Navarette, supra.

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 damages against prison officials.

McAlister v. Robinson · filed 1978-03-30

The plaintiffs also claim they are entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Procunier et al. v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) this court holds that they are not so entitled.

An official’s subjective good faith alone does not establish qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Perez v. Dr. Ismael Rodriguez Bou, Miguel Perez v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1978-05-05

Subjective good faith in one’s conduct is not sufficient to protect an official from civil rights liability.

In § 1983 damages actions, police officers have a good faith defense when they believe the force was necessary and lawful and have reasonable grounds for both beliefs.

Leslie Landrum, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Roy Lee Landrum, Deceased v. John Moats and Robert J. Rockwell · filed 1978-05-30

If police officers (1) believe that a certain amount of force is necessary to make an arrest, (2) believe that use of that amount of force is lawful under the circumstances, and (3) have reasonable grounds for each of the foregoing beliefs, then they are entitled to the defense of good faith even if the use of force turns out, ex post, to have been illegal or excessive.

Officials who fail to establish qualified immunity from § 1983 damages may be liable for compensatory damages.

Wren v. Jones · filed 1978-08-21

They have been unable to establish any basis for qualified immunity. They must be held liable for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.

Private defendants who use a state distraint procedure repeatedly declared unconstitutional do not receive qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Allen · filed 1979-04-12

Keeping in mind that the relevant standard here is “knew or reasonably should have known," (emphasis added), this Court deems that when a provision of a state statute has been repeatedly declared unconstitutional it is reasonable for a private individual to believe that if he engages in procedures set up by said provisions, his actions are in all likelihood going to violate another’s constitutional rights. ... For these reasons, the Court holds that defendants in the action do not fall within the category of qualified immunity to damages in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions.

School officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted rights were not clearly established and there is no evidence of malicious intent.

Valadez v. Graham · filed 1979-06-18

In the present case, even if it were found that defendants’ actions have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights, defendants could not be held liable in damages because first, the constitutional and statutory rights were not so clearly established at the time in the context of special educational programs that defendants can be held to a knowledge of the violation, and secondly, there is absolutely no evidence, or even the allegation, that defendants’ actions were taken with any malicious intent.

State officials may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 damages when they could not reasonably have predicted that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Fujiwara v. Clark · filed 1979-08-10

In light of the various applications of the Mt. Healthy standard, defendants could not be expected to have predicted with any certainty whether their conduct would violate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Thus, under Procunier, the immunity defense is available to defendants under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule and defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of objective good faith.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a law enforcement officer for excessive force, subject to qualified immunity when the officer could reasonably have believed the conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Mendoza v. Sherman Block, Los Angeles County · filed 1994-05-31

We therefore hold that the deputies’ use of the police dog is subject to excessive force analysis, and that this law is clearly established for purposes of determining whether the officers have qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against persons who, under color of state law, deprive another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Reynolds v. Hale · filed 1994-06-16

The first issue is whether Defendants Hale and Hunter enjoy qualified immunity from the Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that she was arrested without probable cause. “[Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Applying the Harlow analysis, the Court must first determine whether Defendants Hale and Hunter violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights belonging to Mary Reynolds. ... The Court concludes Defendants Hale and Hunter are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that she was arrested without probable cause, and on the related claim Defendants caused a criminal “warrant” to issue against her on the basis of a false statement.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by qualified immunity.

Van Deusen v. Parker Evatt Sammie D. Brown Martha Wannamaker Ronnie A. Grate · filed 1994-06-20

The district court properly awarded summary judgment to appellees on this claim because the prison officials are protected against such damages here by their qualified immunity from suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Greiner v. City of Champlin · filed 1994-07-05

The district court correctly held the officers were protected from the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims by the doctrine of qualified immunity.