42 U.S.C. § 1983

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Shipman v. Hamilton · filed 2008-04-01

The district court did not err in denying Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Under the facts as they are presented to us, no reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Shipman for obstructing service of process after she affirmatively assisted the officers by pointing out the location of Handsbury, the person to be served.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an officer when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful under the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor.

Shipman, Karen Y. v. Hamilton, Eric · filed 2008-04-01

In sum, the district court did not err in denying Hamil- ton’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Under these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed that he had grounds to arrest Shipman, the only registered nurse on duty that night.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment based on qualified immunity by offering particularized evidence of an improper motive.

Huth v. Haslun · filed 2008-04-03

Thus, to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must proffer particularized evidence supporting a claim that Defendants acted with an improper motive. Plaintiff has done so by demonstrating “circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion that [she] has been singled out.” ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is thus denied.

A public employee sued under § 1983 for failing to intervene is entitled to qualified immunity when the underlying constitutional violation was not clearly established and the employee lacked fair warning.

Strong v. Wisconsin · filed 2008-04-04

Because plaintiffs due process claim against defendant Vítense is legally uncertain, I cannot conclude that defendant Valley had fair warning that her failure to intervene to stop Vítense would violate the Constitution. Accordingly, I conclude that defendant Valley is entitled to qualified immunity and I will grant her motion for summary judgment.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest.

Amrine v. Brooks · filed 2008-04-08

Because Amrine’s arrest was supported by arguable probable cause, Brooks and Hemeyer are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity on this claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause.

Amrine v. Hemeyer · filed 2008-04-08

Because Amrine's arrest was supported by arguable probable cause, Brooks and Hemeyer are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish a constitutional violation.

Murray v. Earle · filed 2008-04-11

Because Murray fails to allege conduct establishing a violation of a constitutional right, we proceed no further than the first step. ... Therefore, Defendants-Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, qualified immunity does not protect an officer when clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer that the use of deadly force was unlawful.

Tubar v. Clift · filed 2008-04-11

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Clift’s argument that the law was not clearly established at the time of the shooting such that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions were unlawful. We agree with the district court that our decision in Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.1996), clearly established Tubar’s right not to be shot in a car that posed no immediate danger to the police officer or others.

Section 1983 claims against police officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Jewett, Terrance v. Anders, Dale · filed 2008-04-11

Officer Anders therefore is entitled to qualified immunity as to ... Mr. Jewett’s claims of unlawful arrest and deprivation of liberty.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Cameron v. TN · filed 2008-04-16

Moreover, we apply a “two-step test for determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Sowards, 203 F.3d at 438. The plaintiff must establish, first, that a state official violated a constitutionally-protected right and, second, that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation such that the defendant official should reasonably have known that the conduct in question was unconstitutional. See id.

Section 1983 claims for money damages against state prison officials are subject to a limited immunity.

Hurley v. Ward · filed 1978-06-09

As state prison officials, the defendants enjoy a limited immunity from liability for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against officials for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified good-faith immunity for non-malicious official actions.

Sherer v. Waier · filed 1978-06-12

Second, defendants possess a qualified good-faith immunity from liability for damages under § 1983, based upon common law tradition and strong public policy that such officers should be protected from tort liability arising under state law for all good-faith, non-malicious actions taken in order to fulfill their official duties.

Section 1983 creates a federal civil action for damages against public officials who, under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Smith v. Robinson · filed 1978-09-06

Defendants, by reason of their status as public officials, already enjoy the very substantial benefits of qualified immunity from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the general federal civil rights statute.

A § 1983 complaint against a public official acting in an official capacity must allege specific facts showing bad faith or why qualified immunity does not apply.

Gomez v. Toledo · filed 1979-08-07

Where, as here, a public official is being sued for action taken in his official capacity, it is assumed that he wears a cloak of qualified immunity and the complaint must allege and specify facts that show bad faith or state why in this particular case the cloak was shed.

Qualified immunity can shield an official from personal damages liability under § 1983 when the official acted in good faith without violating rights clearly established at the time.

Atcherson v. Siebenmann · filed 1979-09-13

Assuming without deciding that Judge Siebenmann acted as an administrator and not in his judicial capacity, we hold that he established a qualified immunity defense to damages liability.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials, subject to qualified immunity for official actions taken in good faith.

Ross v. Meagan · filed 1981-01-16

The two remaining appellees, Detective Meagan and former Governor Shapp, are entitled to a qualified immunity for official actions taken in good faith.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil rights remedy, subject to qualified public officials’ good faith defense to damages liability.

Jaworski v. Schmidt · filed 1982-07-19

Public officials who enjoy qualified immunity may assert their good faith as a complete defense to damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damage claims against public officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the officials acted within discretionary authority and did not violate clearly established law.

Saldana v. Antonio Garza and Ricardo Olvera · filed 1982-09-07

It is axiomatic that public officials whose positions entail the exercise of discretion enjoy the special protections of a qualified immunity from personal liability in § 1983 damage actions.

Section 1983 allows a government official sued under it to assert qualified or good faith immunity.

Green v. White · filed 1982-11-17

A government official such as White who is subject to a section 1983 suit may plead as an affirmative defense a qualified or good faith immunity from suit.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights and permits damages claims against state officials, subject to qualified immunity.

Trejo v. Perez · filed 1982-12-13

In Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir.1980), we stated that a police officer may defend a § 1983 action with proof that “he acted with a good faith belief that his actions were within his lawful authority,” and “reasonable grounds existed for this belief.” ... Questions regarding the legal uncertainty of the underlying offense are to be decided by the trial judge. If the trial judge decides that the legality of the underlying offense at the time of the arrest was not settled, as it should have here, the only jury issue would be framed as the objective immunity standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald. It would not differ in application from the objective probable cause test for validity of a warrantless arrest.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to immunity when the officials act within the scope of their duties and in good faith.

Wentz v. Klecker · filed 1983-11-16

We hold only that state officials acting within the scope of their duties and in good faith are immune from damage actions against them personally.

Section 1983 permits suits against officials acting under color of state law in their individual capacities, subject to qualified immunity.

Steve Rollins, a Minor, by Kathleen Agosta, His Mother and Next Friend v. John R. Farmer and the City of Omaha, a Munici · filed 1984-04-02

Thus, § 1983 suits against individual officials acting under the color of state law may be brought against the officials in their individual capacities subject, of course, to the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for money damages against a state official whose conduct under color of state law deprives a person of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McCall-Bey v. Franzen · filed 1984-05-14

Therefore, Lane is not entitled to qualified immunity and may be liable for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity when an official's conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Ogden Ex Rel. Estate of Ogden v. Coutny of Maui · filed 2008-04-21

Looking at both these factors, the court finds that Officer Pacheco is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state actor for depriving the person of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity.

York v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2008-04-22

When a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to make the arrest.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be subject to qualified immunity.

Artiga v. Officer Richard Garcia · filed 2008-04-22

A government official who is sued under § 1983 may seek summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued for constitutional violations do not lose qualified immunity merely because their conduct violated a separate statute or administrative rule.

Davis v. Scherer · filed 1984-08-16

Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.

Police officers may assert qualified immunity in suits under § 1983.

Garmon v. Robert Foust, (Two Cases) · filed 1984-08-20

Police officers are afforded a qualified immunity from liability in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Tubbesing v. John Fox Arnold · filed 1984-08-22

The objective standard now permits summary judgment for the official if the law was not “clearly established” at the time the challenged action occurred.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established right.

Galloway v. Hadl · filed 2008-04-28

Because plaintiff has alleged the violation of his clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest, Hadl, Hofer and Riggs are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim and the motion to dismiss on that ground is overruled.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 liability when the alleged constitutional rights were clearly established and a reasonable officer should have known of them.

Linares v. Jones · filed 2008-04-28

Thus, Plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of actual constitutional rights which, as shown by the foregoing precedent, were clearly established long before the events giving rise to this action and about which a reasonable officer performing his duties in 2002 should have known. The Court therefore concludes that qualified immunity does not shield Rembish from liability under § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a strip search violates clearly established law.

Archuleta v. Wagner · filed 2008-04-29

Deputy Mandelko violated this law by strip searching Ms. Archule-ta and is not entitled to qualified immunity on these facts.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, qualified immunity does not require a prior case with identical facts when an officer shoots a compliant suspect or fires again after the suspect is objectively incapacitated.

Graves v. Shrf · filed 2008-04-30

Under general precedents such as Garner, Zachary should have known that his use of force was excessive. It does not take a specific case for an officer to know that he cannot shoot a compliant suspect and that he cannot fire again at someone who is objec- tively “downed or incapacitated.”

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on an officer protected by qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Anderson v. City of Tampa · filed 2008-05-01

Officer Bucher is protected by qualified immunity and entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not afford an officer qualified immunity for assisting a private party’s unlawful seizure of property when clearly established law gave the officer notice that the assistance was unlawful.

Price-Cornelison v. Brooks · filed 2008-05-02

Brooks was thus on notice on October 16, 2003, that he could be liable for assisting a private party’s unlawful seizure of property at the time he threatened to arrest Price-Cornelison if she returned to her home to prevent Rogers from taking Price-Cornelison’s property.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Fox v. Graff · filed 2008-05-06

Thus, Fox has not shown that his constitutional rights have been violated, and, therefore, the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could make the same mistake about whether the conduct was lawful.

Purtell v. Mason · filed 2008-05-14

But the officer’s mistake about the scope of the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to ridicule their neighbors was one a reasonable officer might make in this situation. He was therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for a mistaken restriction of speech if a reasonable officer could have made the same mistake.

Purtell, Jeffrey v. Mason, Bruce · filed 2008-05-14

Officer Mason’s on-the-street judgment, though mistaken, is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against an officer are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct violates no constitutional right.

Njang v. Montgomery County MD · filed 2008-05-14

We therefore agree with the district court that Officer Marchone is entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ claim of excessive force, and that summary judgment was appropriate.

A child welfare worker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for searching a child under clothing at a private school without consent or another warrant exception when clearly established law gave fair warning.

Michael C. v. Gresbach · filed 2008-05-19

Considering the facts above in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, we find that a reasonable child welfare worker would have known that conducting a search of a child’s body under his clothes, on private property, without consent or the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is in direct violation of the child’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches.

A child welfare worker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law warned that consent to interview a child did not permit a search of the child’s body.

C., Michael v. Gresbach, Dana · filed 2008-05-19

In this case, it was clearly estab- lished that the scope of consent to interview does not extend to a search of an individual’s body under Jimeno and its progeny.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity must show both a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Cordova v. Aragon · filed 2008-05-20

Plaintiff Tracey Cordova brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), which provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed by individuals acting under color of state law. ... Under Tenth Circuit law, a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds must satisfy a “heavy” two-part burden of showing that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 qualified immunity bars personal-capacity damages when a reasonable official could have believed the employee’s position was subject to political dismissal.

López-Quiñones v. Puerto Rico National Guard · filed 2008-05-21

Given past precedent, we cannot say it was clearly established that Lopez, a director of a significant unit within the Puerto Rico National Guard, was insulated from political dismissal. Accordingly, while Lopez may seek injunctive relief for his termination, he may not obtain monetary relief from the individual defendants in their personal capacities.

Officers facing § 1983 claims are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances they faced.

Egolf v. Witmer · filed 2008-05-22

In this instance, we agree with the District Court that, regardless of whether the police violated the protesters’ First and Fourth Amendment rights, these rights were not “clearly established” in this circumstance.

An officer does not lose qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim merely because a person advancing toward her may have begun to turn as she fired.

Lehman v. Leichliter · filed 2008-05-27

The mere fact that Matthew may have changed his direction, changed his course, or simply changed his mind about advancing on Leichliter as she fired does not deprive the officer of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when no objectively reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful under clearly established law.

Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-02

Accordingly, Officers Adams and Baxter are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs claim under Section 1983.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity against an excessive force claim.

Marshall v. West · filed 2008-06-02

A law enforcement officer may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a § 1983 individual-capacity lawsuit. ... Accordingly, West is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that he used excessive force when he discharged his weapon.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Trammell v. Thomason · filed 2008-06-03

Therefore, based on the facts of the instant case, the Court finds that Officer Dorough is entitled to qualified immunity on Trammell’s Section 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity protects prison officials from damages under § 1983 when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Gilliam v. Quinlan · filed 1985-02-25

WHEREAS the defense of qualified immunity is “available to prison officials as a defense from liability for damages for actions taken in their official capacities,” ... provided the prison officials can show that “their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” ... WHEREAS the court hereby adopts the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations, ... IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

A private party sued under § 1983 for using state attachment procedures has qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time.

Woodring v. Jennings State Bank · filed 1985-03-01

Therefore, under Buller, the bank is entitled to qualified immunity from liability because it reasonably could not have known it was violating Mrs. Woodring’s constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim when the right they allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rubacha Ex Rel. Rubacha v. Coler · filed 1985-04-15

But defendants cannot really argue — given the June 1982 Youngberg decision and a number of earlier similar decisions at other levels— the right of a juvenile in state custody to bodily security had not been clearly established by October 1983.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Carver v. Lehman · filed 2008-06-09

We conclude, however, that this right was not clearly established at the time of the facts giving rise to this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity.

A plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

Leary v. Cnty · filed 2008-06-10

To overcome a qualified-immunity defense in the setting of a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant violated a “constitutional right” and (2) that the right “was clearly established.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could show that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Belanger v. City of Hartford · filed 2008-06-19

A reasonable police officer should know that swinging a baton at an individual’s face while they are facing away from the officer without prior warning would constitute a violation of that individual’s right to be free from excessive force. In light of the aforementioned issues of material fact, Perri’s motion for summary judgment as to the section 1983 excessive force claim based on qualified immunity is DENIED.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts are material to both the claim and the immunity defense.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-20

Bruce was not entitled to qualified immunity against Johnson’s § 1983 claim at the summary judgment stage because their conflicting deposition testimony gives rise to genuine issues of fact material to both the § 1983 claim and the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment in a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether deadly force was reasonable.

Carlson v. Lunsford · filed 2008-06-20

The district court denied Lunsford’s motion for summary judgment, holding that ... Lunsford was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, based upon the reasoning set out by that court in its opinion and order filed on February 8, 2007.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued under § 1983 unless their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Senu-Oke v. Jackson State University · filed 2008-06-20

Even if a constitutional right may have been violated, the official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the court finds that the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the state actions at issue.

Officers defending a § 1983 false arrest claim bear the burden of showing that their arrest was objectively reasonable to obtain qualified immunity.

Parsons v. City of Pontiac · filed 2008-06-24

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Detectives Martin and McKinney bear the burden of showing that their arrest of Parsons was objectively reasonable.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when no objectively reasonable officer with the same knowledge could believe arguable probable cause existed.

Ellis v. Chief of Police · filed 2008-06-24

Quite simply, we do not believe any objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Chief Wright could have believed that even arguable probable cause existed for arresting Ellis for violating Florida Statute Section 810.09 or 877.03. Having determined Chief Wright is not entitled to qualified immunity against Ellis’s claim of unlawful arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we, therefore, also conclude he is not entitled to qualified immunity against Ellis’s claim of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers who are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established.

Castillo v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2008-06-24

Further, even if Castillo’s rights were violated, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established. Thus, the individual defendants are not liable under § 1983.

Qualified immunity bars money damages against officials under § 1983 but does not bar a claim for injunctive relief.

Frazier v. DiGuglielmo · filed 2008-06-25

The court therefore finds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs First Amendment claim. His claim for money damages will be dismissed, leaving only his claim for injunctive relief.

Individual officers are protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Fogel v. Collins · filed 2008-06-27

We therefore hold that despite their violation of Fogel’s First Amendment rights, qualified immunity protects the individual officers from an award of damages.

In a § 1983 action, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the officer’s failure to read readily available information before a stop was objectively unreasonable.

Phelan v. Village of Lyons · filed 2008-06-27

In sum, we cannot conclude that Officer Dyas’s failure to read the third line was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. ... On this record, we conclude that Officer Dyas was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material factual disputes bear on whether the official reasonably believed the search was permitted.

Stancuna v. Sherman · filed 2008-06-27

Here, the court finds that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate. ... These issues of fact are critical to determining whether Sherman was operating under a reasonable belief as to what kind of search he was permitted to conduct.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when his mistaken belief in probable cause was unreasonable because he overlooked readily available information.

Phelan, Laura v. Village Lyons IL · filed 2008-06-27

On this record, we conclude that Officer Dyas was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when isolated reports of misconduct do not give sufficient notice of serious harm and the supervisor’s conduct is at most negligent.

A.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Reaves · filed 2008-06-27

Like the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Roseville, we conclude that Nash’s actions were at most negligent and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Nash presented substantial evidence indicating that the previous incidents of misconduct by Reaves were not “obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration,” but were 5 isolated occurrences over a 16-year period that did not provide a basis for terminating Reaves’s employment or provide him with sufficient notice that Reaves would seriously harm A.S.

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, the reasonableness of the force and the officer’s qualified immunity are separate questions.

Rocha v. City of Austin · filed 2008-06-27

Thus, in any § 1983 case alleging a police officer’s use of excessive or lethal force, the objective reasonableness of the force used is a separate question from the immunity question whether no reasonable officer could have believed that she was not using excessive force.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

El Bey v. Roop · filed 2008-07-01

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages stemming from their performance of discretionary functions so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against an official whose warrantless criminal search of a home’s curtilage violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Jacob v. Township of West Bloomfield · filed 2008-07-03

Having determined that Defendant’s intrusion upon Plaintiffs property violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, we agree with the district court that Widgren provides Defendant with no valid claim of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established rights.

Sarpy v. Town of Homer · filed 2008-07-07

Similarly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellees in their individual capacities because Appellees did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if they could reasonably believe probable cause existed.

Daniels v. D'AURIZO · filed 2008-07-09

With respect to claims relating to false arrest, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if: (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met. ... For the foregoing reasons, I find that there are no material issues of fact, that defendants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs on February 14, 2002 and further are entitled to qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ claims, and that defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit has qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the defendant’s conduct violated federal rights under the circumstances.

Burnette v. Taylor · filed 2008-07-10

If we are mistaken on this point, we also readily conclude that, given the circumstances, the law was not already clearly established that what any of the individuals did would violate federal law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim cannot be granted as a matter of law when genuine disputes of material fact remain.

Reed v. City of Cleveland · filed 2008-07-14

Indeed, our independent review of the record demonstrates that the district court properly found that genuine issues of material fact preclude the conclusion that Officer Clark is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A deputy sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when he reasonably could have believed probable cause existed based on the information he had at the time of arrest.

Newton v. Ray · filed 2008-07-14

The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion. In a well reasoned Memorandum Opinion, the court held that the defendant “reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed in light of the information he possessed at the time he arrested the plaintiff.” The plaintiff now appeals. We find no error in the district court’s reasoning, and therefore affirm.

In a § 1983 claim against an officer, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment based on qualified immunity must initially show that the officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Amundsen v. Jones · filed 2008-07-15

When the defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, however, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that: (1) the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

Qualified immunity protects defendants from § 1983 damages liability when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Aruanno v. Spagnuolo · filed 2008-07-15

In any case, we agree with the District Court that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ... In this case, even if we were to conclude that Aruanno had a right to refrain from disclosing his past sexual history and we have not so concluded, we could not hold that the right is clearly established under the First Amendment, and that it was one of which defendants should have been aware.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against government officials who deprive people of rights secured by the Constitution.

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2008-07-18

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against government officials who deprive persons of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government officials are entitled to a dismissal “if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... “Qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability, it constitutes immunity from suit.”

Section 1983 permits damages claims against government actors, but qualified immunity protects an officer when the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Rheingold v. Harrison Town Police Department · filed 2008-07-18

Because we determined that it was objectively reasonable for Parrello to believe that probable cause existed, he is immune from liability under § 1983 on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local official for violating federal rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

Childs v. Dekalb County, Georgia · filed 2008-07-18

The district court correctly concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against state actors who violate federally protected rights.

Buck v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-07-28

The defendants-appellants in this appeal are five individual officers (“the Officers”) who assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 First Amendment deprivation claim. ... Because the Officers failed to raise their arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to causation before the district court, we must AFFIRM the district court’s denial of summary judgment and denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Bias v. Woods · filed 2008-07-29

Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a government official for a constitutional violation, but qualified immunity can entitle the official to summary judgment.

Peach State Recovery, Inc. v. Goodwin · filed 2008-07-30

Peach State and Miner thereafter filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Goodwin, alleging false arrest in violation of Miner’s Fourth Amendment rights. ... On appeal, Peach State and Miner argue that the district court erred in finding that Goodwin was acting within his discretionary authority, that Goodwin had probable cause to arrest Miner, that there were no disputed issues of material fact to preclude an entry of summary judgment, and that Goodwin conducted a reasonable search given the circumstances. Appellants’ arguments, presented in Sections I–IV of Appellants’ initial brief, fail for the reasons clearly set forth in the district court’s well-reasoned order dated January 8, 2008. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that Deputy Goodwin is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 claims for damages may be barred by qualified immunity when officials act under prison policies that are not patently unconstitutional.

Brown v. Mason · filed 2008-08-01

We affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity from Brown’s claims for damages. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they confiscated Brown’s photographs pursuant to official prison policies, which policies were not “patently violative of constitutional princi- pies.”

Section 1983 claims against officers in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the officers could not reasonably have known their conduct violated established rights.

Schneider v. OH · filed 2008-08-04

In effect, this requires that in order to hold the officers liable in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Schneider must show not only that the officers’ actions were unconstitutional, but also that they should have known at that time that they were violating Schneider’s rights.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Keylon v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-08-05

Second, the district court should have granted Ms. Keylon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against Officer Barnard because his defense of qualified immunity fails.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional violations by officials acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2008-08-05

In the context of a § 1983 action, moreover, the officer “is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that [reasonable suspicion] existed to ... detain the plaintiff’—i.e., if the officer had “arguable reasonable suspicion.”

Section 1983 permits a damages action against a state actor for a constitutional violation, but qualified immunity can shield an official unless the right was clearly established.

Dahl v. Weber · filed 2008-08-05

For these reasons Defendant Weber is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state actor for violating a federal right, but qualified immunity can protect the officer from damages unless the right was clearly established.

Cabrera v. LeVierge, et al. · filed 2008-08-06

Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity test, and applying that test to plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts, see Groh, 540 U.S. at 5 6 2 , it is plain that a prisoner’s constitutional right not to be kicked and punched while shackled was clearly established at the time. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (holding that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was kicked and punched while shackled, even though his injuries required no medical attention). And, regarding the third prong of the test, an objectively reasonable correctional officer, in LeVierge’s position, would have understood that repeatedly punching and kicking a shackled inmate who posed no physical threat would violate the inmate’s clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 claims against governmental officials may be subject to qualified immunity when their discretionary actions could reasonably have been consistent with the rights allegedly violated.

Newman v. Kock · filed 2008-08-06

Qualified immunity is a defense to federal law claims that shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability as long as their actions could reasonably be thought to have been consistent with the rights those actions are alleged to violate.

Section 1983 permits claims against governmental officials for violating federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

William A. Newman, Ph.D. v. Nereu F. Kock, Jr., Jacky Yuk-Chow So, Dan R. Jones, and Ray M. Keck, III · filed 2008-08-06

“Qualified immunity against section 1983 claims requires proof of effectively the same elements as official immunity under Texas law.”

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional-rights violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Iko v. Shreve · filed 2008-08-06

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ... The district court therefore properly denied the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity as to this claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Couture Ex Rel. M.C. v. Board of Education of the Albuquerque Public Schools · filed 2008-08-07

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must, we hold that the individual defendants did not violate M.C.’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures or his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Smith v. Stafford · filed 2008-08-08

A two-step process is used to determine whether qualified immunity bars a § 1983 action. Courts first ask, "[tJaken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" If the allegations show a constitutional violation, courts then must determine whether the right allegedly violated was "clearly established," which occurs where "the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Where either of these requirements is not met, the § 1983 claim will be barred by the official's qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims may proceed past the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a clearly established constitutional violation despite a qualified-immunity defense.

Back v. Hall · filed 2008-08-11

Just as we gauge other pleading-stage dismissals to determine only whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), so we review an assertion of qualified immunity to determine only whether the complaint “adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); see also Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.2002).

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief against officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Back v. Schrader · filed 2008-08-11

Just as we gauge other pleading-stage dismissals to determine only whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), so we review an assertion of qualified immunity to determine only whether the complaint “adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2002). ... Measured by this yardstick, Back’s political-affiliation allegations suffice, and neither Hall nor Schrader is entitled to qualified immunity at this early stage of the case.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities may be subject to qualified immunity.

McIntosh v. Partridge · filed 2008-08-11

To the extent McIntosh’s claim is against Partridge in his individual capacity for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Partridge is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials for constitutional deprivations, subject to qualified immunity.

Autery v. Davis · filed 2008-08-13

In constitutional tort cases where evidence of wrongful intent is an element of liability, a state official is entitled to qualified immunity if the record indisputably establishes that the official was in fact motivated, at least in part, by lawful considerations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for a malicious prosecution claim when he only supplies truthful information to a prosecutor and does not make the charging decision.

Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville · filed 2008-08-13

Since Popp supplied only truthful information to Prosecutor Thomas, he cannot be subject to a malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Caviness v. Johnson · filed 2008-08-14

Generally, government employees are immune from personal liability if their conduct is reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information that the employee possessed at the time of their actions. ... With regard to the claim for the destruction of his property, Caviness has cited to clearly established law which finds a violation of the Fourth Amendment can occur if property is unnecessarily and excessively destroyed during the execution of a search warrant. ... This Court concludes a jury could conclude from the facts presented that the damage to Caviness’ property during the execution of the search warrant in this case was not necessary, measured, or reasonable to effectuate the search. As a result, this Court must deny Johnson qualified immunity on this particular claim.

Section 1983 claims against social workers may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Franet v. County of Alameda Social Services Agency · filed 2008-08-14

Hintzen is entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for her pre-hearing conduct.

Section 1983 provides relief for deprivation of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity for public officials.

Flinn v. Elaine Gordon, Dexter Lehtinen · filed 1985-11-15

After an examination of the complaint and applicable law, we find that none of these injuries constitute the loss of a federal right and, consequently, that no relief is available under § 1983. Since Flinn cannot show the loss of any federal right, much less the loss of a “clearly established” right, he has failed to overcome Gordon’s qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when the officer reasonably but mistakenly believes probable cause exists.

Wheeler, Michelle v. Lawson, Ronald · filed 2008-08-21

We believe that the probable cause determination here was sufficiently close that an officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, even if that belief ultimately was mistaken.

Qualified immunity does not shield a sheriff from a § 1983 claim for a blanket policy of strip searching pretrial arrestees solely because they will be housed in the general jail population when that policy violates clearly established rights.

Bull v. City & County Sf · filed 2008-08-21

However, a policy of strip searching arrestees based solely on their clas- sification for housing in the general population violates the arrestees’ clearly established constitutional rights, and we thus affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a sheriff for a policy of strip searching pre-arraignment arrestees solely because they will be housed in the general jail population when that policy violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Bull v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2008-08-22

However, a policy of strip searching arrestees based solely on their classification for housing in the general population violates the arrestees’ clearly established constitutional rights, and we thus affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

An officer facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable reliance on another officer’s information would lead an officer in the same position to believe probable cause existed.

Torres v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-08-25

In light of what Detective Roberts told Detective Rains after showing the six-pack to Hernandez, and in light of the undisputed fact that, of the four detectives, Detective Rains was the least involved in the investigation, we conclude as a matter of law that Detectives Rains reasonably relied on the (allegedly false) statement by Detective Roberts that Hernandez had identified Torres. Based on this conclusion, we further conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable officer in Rains’ position would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Torres. Accordingly, Detective Rains was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim based on continuous cell lighting when no clearly established law prohibited comparable lighting absent evidence that they knew it caused serious harm.

Walker v. Woodford · filed 2008-08-28

These cases suffice to show that during the time Plaintiff was held at Calipatria there was no clearly established law forbidding them from keeping the equivalent of a 30 or 40 watt incandescent bulb on 24 hours daily in inmates’ cells, absence a showing they knew Plaintiff was being severely harmed.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of a constitutional right.

Vicari v. Ysleta Independent School District · filed 2008-08-28

Because Vicari has not shown a violation of any constitutional right, Miller is entitled to qualified immunity from her suit.

A public official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Sanchez v. Dubois · filed 2008-09-02

Because the defendants established that “no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when it was not objectively reasonable for him to believe his conduct was lawful.

Davis v. Stratton · filed 2008-09-09

In addition, because D’Annibale knew the falsity of his claim that the Quad was private property, it was not objectively reasonable for him to believe that his action did not violate Plaintiffs rights. D’Annibale is thus not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim must allege that they were performing discretionary functions.

Gary v. DeKalb County Government · filed 2008-09-09

The officials argue on appeal that they were engaged in their respective discretionary functions for DeKalb County, but the officials did not allege in their motion to dismiss that they were performing discretionary functions. ... No matter how fanciful Gary’s complaint appears to be, the record does not support a finding of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from § 1983 liability when plaintiffs fail to identify record evidence supporting their allegations of misconduct.

Spinks v. Township of Clinton · filed 2008-09-11

While bad faith is normally a jury question, plaintiffs offer no citations to the record that might support their characterization of Clancy's conduct, as required by Rule 4:46-5(a). Plaintiffs' general references to the disks and CD is insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we agree with the trial judge's ruling that Clancy enjoyed a qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 liability.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable jury could find that probable cause was objectively lacking.

Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2008-09-15

Qualified immunity, then, is not available to Ramirez from the § 1983 claim premised on a jury finding that there was an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity in a § 1983 action bears the burden of showing both a constitutional violation and that the law was clearly established.

Sparks v. Rittenhouse · filed 2008-09-16

The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the law was clearly established.

In a § 1983 suit, officers’ qualified immunity turns on whether the facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Henderson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2008-09-19

To determine whether peace officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we apply a two-pronged test. ... First, we consider whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officers violated a constitutional right. ... Second, we consider whether the right was clearly established. ... We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Officers in them individual capacities.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when settled law would have put reasonable officers on notice that their conduct was unlawful.

Arce v. Blackwell · filed 2008-09-19

We have had similar cases in the past that would have put reasonable police officers on notice that their response to Arce — keeping an individual who is in a state of excited delirium restrained with his chest to the ground while applying pressure to his back and ignoring pleas that he cannot breathe — constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials protected by qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Roman Catholic Foundation, UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2008-09-24

Thus, while I conclude that the University may fund RCF’s unique sectarian activities when it also funds the unique activities of a wide range of secular student groups, my conclusion nudges the boundaries of clearly established law. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and I will deny plaintiffs’ demand for monetary relief pursuant to § 1983.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the asserted right was not clearly established when the official acted.

Carepartners LLC, Et v. Lashway · filed 2008-09-24

If the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages on a Section 1983 Free Exercise claim when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Campbell v. Alameida · filed 2008-09-24

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Campbell’s Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims for damages, because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the right was not clearly established when they acted.

CAREPARTNERS, LLC v. Lashway · filed 2008-09-25

If the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged conduct that violates the clearly established prohibition on irrational or arbitrary government classifications.

Lazy Y Ranch Ltd v. Behrens · filed 2008-09-25

We view the complaint as relying on the principle that government actors may not draw irrational or arbitrary classifications. This principle is clearly established, see, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2007), so Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers have qualified immunity from Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Harris v. County of Nassau · filed 2008-09-29

In addition to holding that probable cause bars the false arrest and false imprisonment claims, the court further holds that even if probable cause did not exist, there can be no question but that arguable probable cause sufficient to support qualified immunity, exists. Specifically, even if the defendant police officers were somehow mistaken as to their belief regarding probable cause, it was certainly reasonable to believe that probable cause existed. In light of the foregoing, the officers are entitled to dismissal of the Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Warren v. Goord · filed 2008-09-30

In light of the Court's finding that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing a state-created danger claim was not sufficiently clear to warn them that their conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Estate of Oliva v. New Jersey · filed 2008-09-30

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that in 2002 the law with regard to culpability of state actors in a state-created danger case was not sufficiently clear to put Defendants on notice that their actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is appropriate.

Individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, shows that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

COREY AIRPORT SERVICES, INC. v. City of Atlanta · filed 2008-09-30

In summary, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Corey, the court holds that, though they were acting within their discretionary authority, the individual City defendants each violated Corey’s clearly established constitutional right to be treated fairly and equally during the 2002 RFP process. Accordingly, the individual City defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Genuine disputes of material fact can preclude summary judgment on a police officer’s qualified-immunity defense to a § 1983 claim.

Chappell v. City of Cleveland · filed 2008-09-30

It is this reservoir of disputed facts which, at least under current, binding Sixth Circuit precedent, counsels against a judgment granting qualified immunity to the Detectives at this stage of the proceedings. ... Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Detectives’ joint motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Chappell’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983 is DENIED.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Farah v. Wellington · filed 2008-09-30

As explained in the district court’s opinion, Farah has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants’ qualified immunity defense because he has not shown that he suffered a constitutional violation. ... Therefore, the lower court correctly granted White qualified immunity on Farah’s claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity for government officials.

Miller v. Clinton · filed 2008-10-01

Since Miller’s speech is unprotected, she cannot establish a First Amendment retaliation claim. That cause of action should therefore have been dismissed because Judge Saxton is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Sosa v. Hames · filed 2008-10-07

Even if the facts demonstrate a violation, the plaintiff still has the burden to show that the constitutional rights were “clearly established” at the time of the violation in order to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time.

Gargiul v. Tompkins · filed 1986-05-14

However, a remand for trial against the Board members in their individual capacities is not required because they are entitled, as a matter of law, to a good-faith immunity defense. ... Nevertheless, we cannot say that the right to refuse examination by a physician of the opposite sex was sufficiently established in 1975 to defeat a defense of qualified immunity.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim that states a violation of clearly established law.

O'QUINN v. Chambers County, Tex. · filed 1986-06-04

Plaintiffs claims of retaliation and intimidation under § 1983 and § 1985 state violations of clearly established law; therefore, defendant Morris is not immune from suit.

Prison officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable officer would have known the inmate’s due process rights were clearly established.

Sourbeer v. Robinson · filed 1986-06-19

We conclude that Sourbeer's due process rights were clearly established within the meaning of Harlow and People of Three Mile Island, and that the appellant officers are liable to him for damages.

Section 1983 officials have qualified immunity from personal damages when they could reasonably believe the law did not clearly forbid their conduct.

De Abadia v. Hon. Luis Izquierdo Mora · filed 1986-06-27

For now we merely hold, finding appellants to be at least reasonable in believing the law was not clearly established, that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity from damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

White v. Pierce County · filed 1986-08-20

Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Having complied with the statute, the deputies are immune.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from restraining a detainee for medically necessary treatment when the officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Meyer v. Woodward · filed 2008-10-09

In light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Sullivan, and the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of Rudy, it cannot be said that Defendant Woodward’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, Defendant Woodward is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 that arise out of the circumstances surrounding the catheterization procedure.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for a prison physician when disputed facts could show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a clearly established constitutional violation.

Hayes, Floyd K. v. Snyder, Donald N. · filed 2008-10-09

It has been established for decades that prison physicians violate inmates’ constitutional rights when they deliberately disregard an inmate’s serious medical condition, and only a trial can resolve the facts that are in dispute.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is an objective defense that cannot be supported by reliance on advice of counsel.

Pritchard v. County of Erie · filed 2008-10-14

This is an objective, not a subjective, test, and reliance upon advice of counsel therefore cannot be used to support the defense of qualified immunity.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Swift v. Tweddell · filed 2008-10-17

Even if a violation of plaintiffs rights could be found, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their actions. ... For the reasons given, I find that plaintiffs constitutional rights were not violated at all; it was therefore objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that their actions did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights.

A sheriff seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 detention claim must show good faith and that the detention fell within his discretionary authority.

McGee v. Carrillo · filed 2008-10-20

In the present case, the district court was correct in denying Carrillo’s Motion to Dismiss because Carrillo has failed to demonstrate that he acted in good faith and within his discretion when he incarcerated McGee after the charges against McGee were dropped.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show that officers used force against a restrained person in violation of clearly established law.

Weigel v. Broad · filed 2008-10-21

If, however, the facts plaintiffs proffered are true and the jury draws the inferences most supportive of plaintiffs’ position, then the law was clearly established that applying pressure to Mr. Weigel’s upper back, once he was handcuffed and his legs restrained, was constitutionally unreasonable due to the significant risk of positional asphyxiation associated with such actions. ... In these circumstances, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action must raise qualified immunity before the district court in a timely fashion to preserve the defense for appeal.

Noel v. Artson · filed 2008-10-22

Our cases have been consistent on one thing: that to be preserved for appeal, the defense of qualified immunity must be raised in a timely fashion before the district court.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity requires an inquiry into whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established.

Sullivan v. Allred · filed 2008-10-22

A qualified immunity defense requires a two step analysis. ... If a constitutional violation is found, the qualified immunity inquiry continues and examines whether the constitutional rights violated were clearly established to the extent that a reasonable person would be aware of those rights.

When a § 1983 defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and that the defendant’s conduct violated clearly established law at the time.

Gaston v. Ploeger · filed 2008-10-23

When a defendant in a § 1983 case has asserted qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) at the time of the incident, it was clearly established that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation.

Qualified immunity can support summary judgment for defendants facing Section 1983 prison conditions claims.

Lucero v. Mesa County Sheriff's Department · filed 2008-10-27

Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants on Mr. Lucero’s first and third claims, based on qualified immunity, for substantially the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge and the district court.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 excessive force claim when the pleaded facts show objectively unreasonable force causing injury.

Holguin v. Lopez · filed 2008-10-28

Taking Holguin’s allegations as true, the Court concludes Hol-guin states a cognizable excessive force claim since he alleges injuries resulting from force that was seemingly excessive and objectively unreasonable in light of the circumstances. The Court, therefore, declines to dismiss the excessive force claim against Officer Robles on the basis of qualified immunity.

To avoid dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had fair notice that the conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Frank Battle, Sr. v. Webb · filed 2008-10-31

Thus, to avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, Battle has the burden of demonstrating that Webb-at the pertinent time and given the specific circumstances of this case-had fair notice that his conduct would violate clear federal law.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an official when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Kloch v. Kohl · filed 2008-11-03

Even if we were to conclude that Dr. Kloch properly alleged a constitutional violation, we are satisfied that Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of our analysis: whether the right at issue was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint shows their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Bailey v. United States Marshal Service · filed 2008-11-03

Because it is clear from the face of the amended complaints that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the complaints will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Kloch v. Jon C. Bruning, etc. · filed 2008-11-03

Even if we were to conclude that Dr. Kloch properly alleged a constitutional violation, we are satisfied that Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of our analysis: whether the right at issue was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.

In a § 1983 action, officers are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Grimes v. Yoos · filed 2008-11-03

Thus, because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right in using canine force to apprehend Grimes, the defendants are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Arresting officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when prosecutors control the decision to continue the case.

Gil v. County of Suffolk · filed 2008-11-06

Moreover, the arresting police officers are also entitled to qualified immunity as to the malicious prosecution claim because the matter was in the hands of the prosecutorial authorities making the decision to continue with the prosecution.