28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district with no connection to claims about conditions at detention facilities elsewhere.

Enloe v. Henke · filed 2022-10-05(b)

In those motions, petitioner also appears to demand his transfer to another state facility, but it is well settled that an inmate generally has no liberty interest in his designation to a particular correctional facility, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983), and insofar as he challenges the conditions of the state facilities where he is, and has been, detained, this venue is improper, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Section 1391(b) does not provide venue in a district where none of the defendants reside and none of the alleged events occurred.

Silva v. Auld · filed 2023-01-12(b)

At the outset, the Court observes that none of these Defendants live or reside in Kentucky and that Plaintiff’s allegations against them do not pertain to events that occurred in the Western District of Kentucky. Thus, this Court is not the proper venue for these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district with no connection to the defendant or the events giving rise to the claim when another proper district is available.

Sifuentes III v. Adobe · filed 2023-01-26(b)

Based on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations have no relationship to this District and venue is improper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and no event giving rise to the claim occurred when another district provides a proper venue.

Gilmer v. Zahnd · filed 2023-01-26(b)

None of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where personal jurisdiction is lacking and no other basis for venue exists.

RIVERS v. AMERICA CENTURY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2023-04-12(b)

Insofar as personal jurisdiction is lacking and there is no other foundation for venue, venue also does not lie in this district and the motion to dismiss on this ground is likewise granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the action occurred when another district is available.

McKay v. Prison Medical Providers · filed 2023-05-22(b)

The Court therefore finds that venue is improper in this District under Section 1391(b), and that transfer of this action to the Western District is warranted under Section 1406(a).

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides or is subject to personal jurisdiction and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Macias v. 176 Judicial Dist., Ct. · filed 2023-07-21(b)

Here, it is apparent that this district is the wrong venue for this action insofar as none of the Defendants are alleged to reside in or are located in the District of Connecticut and none of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims are alleged to have occurred in the District of Connecticut.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on the defendants’ residence or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim, with a personal-jurisdiction fallback when no other district qualifies.

Sweigert v. Multimedia System Design, Inc. · filed 2023-08-02(b)

However, venue for Plaintiff's lawsuit is not proper in the Eastern District of Michigan because it is not clear that the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Michigan or that either Defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court, let alone both, as required by the statute.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, when another district is available.

Fisi v. Extra Space Storage Inc. · filed 2023-08-09(b)

Venue in a civil action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... All of the events at issue are alleged to have occurred in Fort Worth, Texas. No action or injury is alleged to have occurred in this District. ... Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, this Court still concludes that it properly dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for lack of venue.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the alleged events occurred when another district is available.

Johnson (PS) v. Chapin · filed 2023-12-15(b)

Subsection (1) is not met. The parties appear to reside in Colorado, and it is not clear this Court has personal jurisdiction over any Defendant. ... Accepting the allegations as true, none of the alleged wrongdoing occurred in New Mexico. The claims stem from events in a Colorado prison. Subsection (3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state, where a substantial part of the events or property is located, or, if no other district qualifies, where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Porter Jr v. Roy · filed 2024-03-06(b)

The District of Massachusetts is not the proper venue for Porter’s claim concerning an alleged interest in real property located in New Hampshire, a person residing on that property, and the conduct of employees of a town in New Hampshire. Subsection of the above statute (1) is inapplicable because there is no suggestion that all the defendants are residents of Massachusetts. Subsection (2) does not support venue in this Court because the events giving rise to Porter’s claims did not occur in Massachusetts. Because venue exists in the District of New Hampshire, subsection (3) is irrelevant; further, nothing in the complaint suggests that this Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants.

Section 1391(b) does not establish venue in a district where the defendants are not all residents of the state and neither the relevant events nor the property are located, when venue is available in another district.

Porter Jr. v. Candia Police Department · filed 2024-03-06(b)

The District of Massachusetts is not the proper venue for Porter’s claim concerning an alleged interest in real property located in New Hampshire and the conduct of the municipality in which the property is located. Subsection of the above statute (1) is inapplicable because there is no suggestion that all the defendants are residents of Massachusetts. Subsection (2) does not support venue in this Court because the events giving rise to Porter’s claims did not occur in Massachusetts. Because venue exists in the District of New Hampshire, subsection (3) is irrelevant; further, nothing in the complaint suggests that this Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper where no party resides and none of the alleged events occurred, when venue is proper elsewhere.

Emrit v. Combs · filed 2024-03-20(b)

The Court finds that venue is clearly inappropriate in the Northern District of Oklahoma because no party resides in this district and no events are alleged to have occurred in this district, and plaintiff himself agrees that venue is proper elsewhere. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in the Eastern District of California for the claims against San Bernardino County prison officials.

(PC) Howard v. Parks · filed 2024-03-22(b)

Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against prison officials from San Bernardino County. Venue is improper in this district for any such defendants.

Venue under § 1391(b) is improper when the district has no connection to the dispute or either defendant.

Frederick v. Vendor Resource Management, Inc. · filed 2024-04-06(b)

Plaintiff does not challenge Judge Russo’s analysis of venue or her conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... The Court agrees. As Judge Russo noted in the Findings and Recommendation, the Complaint does not allege any connection to Oregon. The allegedly wrongfully converted property is located in Alabama, the underlying events occurred in Alabama, and neither Defendant is incorporated or doing business in Oregon.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district when the complaint alleges no qualifying connection between that district and the defendants or the claims.

Emrit v. Combs · filed 2024-05-03(b)

The complaint contains no allegation that any party has a presence in, or connection to, the Middle District of Tennessee or is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. Neither does Plaintiff allege that any events relevant to his claims occurred in this district. Id. Venue in this district is therefore improper.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district with no connection to the parties or the claim.

Piens v. Reckard · filed 2024-07-08(b)

In any event, this matter cannot be venued in the District of South Dakota. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b): ... It is clear from the complaint that plaintiff's malpractice claim did not arise in the District of South Dakota. Plaintiff's complaint contains no facts that would justify the bringing of this action in a jurisdiction with no contacts to the parties or the cause of action.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in Hawaiʻi for claims against a Texas city arising from events in Dallas when a Texas district is available.

Roberts v. City of Dallas · filed 2024-07-26(b)

As such, Roberts has failed to establish that venue is proper in the District of Hawaiʻi.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the claim arose when another district is available.

Harvey v. Gande · filed 2025-01-17(b)

Plaintiff’s claim is more properly brought in Arizona, and thus it does not fall within one of the three categories set out in section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred when another district is available.

Reeves v. Stanislaus County Superior Court · filed 2025-01-21(b)

The court concluded venue was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and the RICO venue statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), because all defendants are California residents, all acts forming the basis of Reeves’s claims occurred in California, none of the defendants is located in Oklahoma, and none transacts business in the Northern District of Oklahoma. ... We have nonetheless reviewed the district court’s determination that venue was improper and see no error in the court’s analysis or conclusion.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue where the complaint alleges no defendant residence, relevant event or omission, or other statutory basis in the district.

Greene v. LA Care Health Plan · filed 2025-04-10(b)

Plaintiff makes no allegation of an act or omission occurring within the jurisdictional boundaries of this Court, nor does plaintiff allege that he or the defendant resides within this district. None of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper when none of its grounds for bringing a civil action in the district applies.

Greene v. United States · filed 2025-05-15(b)

None of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) are present in this case.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides, no substantial part of the events occurred, and the defendants cannot be found.

ALLEN v. ROCKVIEW · filed 2025-06-05(b)

In sum, this district is an improper venue under § 1391(b) for the claims brought in this lawsuit.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district when the alleged conduct occurred elsewhere and the defendants are located elsewhere.

Beltran-Medina v. Lake County · filed 2025-06-10(b)

To begin, Beltran-Medina complains of actions that appear to have occurred exclusively in Illinois, largely by Illinois officials, making venue improper in this district.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides, no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, and no defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Fitzgerald v. Little · filed 2025-06-17(b)

Under subsection (1) of the statute, the District of Vermont is not the proper venue for this case because none of the Defendants reside here, nor are they subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Turning to subsection (2), Vermont is not where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred,” as the Agreement was formed and allegedly violated in New Jersey. Subsection (3) does not authorize venue in this Court, since even if there were “no district in which an action may otherwise be brought” under subsections (1) or (2) (although, as explained below, the District of New Jersey is an appropriate venue), Defendants are not subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. The Court therefore finds no basis for venue in the District of Vermont.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no alleged events occurred when the action could be brought in another district.

Johnson v. Melara · filed 2025-07-31(b)

Regardless, even if Plaintiff intended to allege federal question jurisdiction, the Court finds dismissal is still appropriate as venue is improper in this Court. There are no allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, let alone any allegations of events occurring within this district. It further appears that none of the defendants reside in this district, and there are other districts where this action could be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) requires plaintiffs to show that venue is proper in the chosen district; failure to do so can result in dismissal without prejudice.

Lowes v. Fitness AI, Inc. · filed 2025-08-19(b)

On August 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a response but has failed to address how venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Because Plaintiffs have failed to show venue is proper in this district, the Court DISMISSES the case without prejudice for lack of venue.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the action occurred when the action could have been brought elsewhere.

Lyall v. Carnegie Mellon University · filed 2025-08-21(b)

None of the Defendants resides in Kentucky, and none of the events alleged in the action occurred in the Western District of Kentucky. It is evident that these claims, whether they are meritorious or not, could have been brought in a United States district court in the state of Washington. Therefore, the Court finds that the Western District of Kentucky is not the proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Emrit v. Musk · filed 2025-08-28(b)

The Court has reviewed the Complaint and finds that there is no basis for venue in the Eastern District of Missouri. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: ... Emrit does not allege that any of the defendants reside in the Eastern District of Missouri, or that any part of the events or omissions giving rise to his alleged claims occurred here.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district with no alleged connection to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claim when another district is available.

GU v. ABADI · filed 2025-09-24(b)

Under a Section 1391 analysis, Venue is not proper in this Court.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue where the defendants do not reside in the forum state, no substantial part of the events occurred in the district, and no defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction there.

Lewis · filed 2025-10-23(b)

Similarly, under the venue statute, the allegations cannot establish all defendants are residents of Washington under § 1391(b)(1), that a substantial part of events giving rise to the claims took place in this district under § 1391(b)(2), or that any defendant is subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction under § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district with no facts connecting it to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claim.

Lietzke · filed 2026-02-04(b)

No facts support a conclusion that venue in Idaho is appropriate for the same reasons personal jurisdiction does not lie.

In a diversity action, an amendment can cure improper venue when an assignment makes a plaintiff who resides in the district the sole real party in interest.

Dixie Portland Flour Mills, Inc. v. Dixie Feed & Seed Co. · filed 1967-09-12(a)

“Defendants do not seriously contend that improper venue cannot be cured at this stage of the proceedings by an amendment, and we conclude that it may be. ... “We therefore conclude that Dixie Portland is now the only real party in interest and therefore venue is properly laid in this district.”

Section 1391 governs whether venue is proper in the district where a civil action is filed.

Griffin v. Passport Center · filed 2020-01-30

Accordingly, because “service is complete upon mailing,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), for the same reasons as stated in the Recommended Ruling, ECF No. 12, this case must be dismissed for both improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).

Section 1391(a) does not treat a plaintiff’s claim against a third-party defendant as a separate civil action for venue purposes when the original and third-party actions are already properly before the court.

Thompson v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. · filed 1967-10-23(a)

The court agrees with Judge Palmieri that the term “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) should not be construed, for venue purposes, as including the claim of the plaintiff against the third-party defendant, which is part and parcel of the actions already pending in this court.

Section 1391’s venue limits do not apply to third-party claims brought under Rule 14.

United Van Lines, LLC v. Marks · filed 2005-04-18

The parties disagree over whether venue is governed by the general principles found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, or by the more specific provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 14706. The Court need not determine whether venue is proper under either statute because the motion to dismiss/transfer due to improper venue was filed by a third-party defendant. ... Following this logic, this Court is a proper venue for the Marks’ third-party claim against IEI.

Section 1391(b) supplies the general venue rules for claims against private contractors.

Krick v. Raytheon Company · filed 2023-09-29(b)

Accordingly, the current venue is proper under Section 1391 for the claims against the Contractor Defendants.

Section 1391(c) does not apply when jurisdiction rests on the District of Columbia's local jurisdiction statute.

Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Company · filed 1967-12-01(c)

Section 1391(c) has no application where jurisdiction is alleged under D.C.Code Ann. § 11-521.

Section 1391(e) permits joinder of non-federal defendants only when venue would be proper for them without a federal party.

Lozano v. Civiletti · filed 1980-09-11(e)

Section 1391(e) only allows additional, non-federal defendants to be joined if the plaintiffs satisfy the “other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.”

Section 1391(e)'s venue and service provisions apply only when every defendant is a federal official or agency.

Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. · filed 1968-01-31(e)

Although plaintiffs assert that this Court has jurisdiction with respect to their complaint against the Administrator pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, they do not claim, nor can they claim, the benefits of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), because this latter section only applies in civil actions in which each defendant is a federal official or agency.

Section 1391(e) permits venue to apply when joined nonfederal defendants are within the forum’s territorial limits, so long as the federal defendants are beyond those limits.

Green v. Laird · filed 1973-04-06(e)

Defendants Laird and Warner were sued in this district and served in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They claim that the presence of the City of North Chicago and its police chief as party defendants in this suit renders venue improper as to them because § 1391(e) applies only to civil actions “in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States” (emphasis added). ... However, those decisions are not binding upon this court, which in the absence of a ruling by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is free to adopt what it considers the better rule in these cases. ... Hence, venue is proper in this district as to defendants Laird and Warner.

Section 1391(e) does not bar personal jurisdiction over a federal officer in the district where the claim arose when a nonfederal defendant is joined.

Glodgett v. Betit · filed 1973-12-28(e)

First, the Stinson court took the view that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) barred the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Secretary by the court in the district where the claim arose, if a non-federal party were joined as a party defendant. The law in this circuit is to the contrary.

Section 1391(e) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a federal officer when the non-federal defendants were outside the court’s territorial limits when the action was filed; dismissing them later does not cure that defect.

Blum v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York · filed 1976-10-12(e)

In the instant case, Blum’s resort to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 fails because the non-federal defendants were not within the territorial limits of the court. And though the district court has dismissed the suit as to the non-federal defendants, this statute still does not avail Blum since these provisions may not be used to create personal jurisdiction where it did not exist at the time of filing the action.

Section 1391(e) does not establish venue based on the plaintiff’s residence when nonfederal defendants are joined; if the defendants do not all reside in one district, § 1391(b)’s claim-arose alternative applies.

Cleveland v. Andress · filed 1978-01-18(e)

It is undisputed on this record that all the individual defendants do not reside in one judicial district — some are in Utah and some Nevada. Also, because some defendants are not federal officials or agencies, the venue provision of section 1391(e)(3), (4) permitting suit where the plaintiff resides is inapplicable. The alternative venue provision of section 1391(b) (supra) applies, that is, the place where the claim arose.

Section 1391(e)(1) does not permit venue against a federal defendant based on the residence of a nonfederal defendant joined in the same action.

National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke · filed 1991-03-25(e)(1)

The statute itself appears to provide that the venue determinations for federal and non-federal defendants are separate, even though they may be joined in the same suit. The Court is persuaded, therefore, that venue in this case is not proper in the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Bey v. Charles · filed 2025-01-22(b)(2)

Venue does lie in the Northern District of Georgia, where Plaintiff resides and his claims arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; injury there alone is insufficient when the defendant’s relevant conduct occurred elsewhere.

American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 International Importing Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1991-02-07(b)(2)

Without something more concrete in the way of intra-forum activities, I cannot find that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s] occurred” here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arose.

Mintz v. Barthelemy · filed 1989-10-03(b)

Because Mintz’ claims arose in this district, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) supports venue in a district where the plaintiffs have substantial operations and the defendants’ threatened acts will occur.

Long Island Rail Road v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers · filed 1989-03-14(b)

Venue lies in the Southern District of New York, as plaintiffs have each presented evidence establishing that they have substantial operations in this district and that the threatened acts of defendants will occur in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for civil rights claims in the district where the claims arose.

Wilson v. Lane · filed 1988-04-19(b)

Venue over such civil rights claims is properly in this Court, because the claims arose in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) and (c) permits venue where the claim arose or where the corporate defendant resides, including a district where it does sufficient business.

Saturn Systems, Inc. v. Saturn Corp. · filed 1987-05-08(b), (c)

Thus venue in Minnesota is proper only if this district may be considered the district in which the defendant resides or in which the claim arose. ... Therefore, venue in Minnesota would be improper under § 1391(b). ... Therefore, venue is not proper in Minnesota as the district in which the defendant resides.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the cause of action arose.

Discount Muffler Shop, Inc. v. Meineke Realty Corp. · filed 1982-02-19(b)

Venue is properly laid in this district because this is the district in which the cause of action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the impact of the challenged conduct and the resulting injury will be felt.

ABC LEAGUE v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n · filed 1982-01-25(a)

Since the impact of the MSHSAA regulation and of the injury complained of will be felt in St. Louis and St. Louis County, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where all construction for the challenged projects will take place.

Delaware Water Emergency Group v. Hansler · filed 1981-08-17

The § 3.8 projects approved by the Commission all involve construction to be performed wholly within this federal judicial district— making venue proper in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue where the cause of action arose, including a district with a substantial relationship to the claim or where the alleged injury is felt.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin · filed 1980-01-03(e)(2)

We reject the Section’s contention that venue was improperly laid in this District. First, Allis-Chalmers is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) to bring the action in the judicial district in which “the cause of action arose.” Under this section, venue is proper in the district that bears a substantial relationship to the cause of action, ... or where the injury resulting from the alleged wrongdoing is felt.

As amended in 1966, § 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Swanson Painting Company v. Painters Local Union No. 260 · filed 1968-03-20(b)

In any event, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) was amended on November 2, 1966, which was prior to the commencement of this action, so that venue exists not only in the judicial district where all the defendants reside, but also “in which the claim arose. * * * ” (Supp. II, 1965-66). It is not disputed that this claim arose in Montana.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for an indemnity claim in a district where injuries underlying the claim occurred.

Kroger Company v. Adkins Transfer Company · filed 1968-05-01(a)

Dornbos also urges that, assuming jurisdiction under T.C.A. § 20-235 et seq., this action is nonetheless subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) on the ground that venue is improperly laid in the Middle District of Tennessee because the instant action for indemnity did not arise in this District within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a). This assertion is not well taken. Upon consideration, it is the opinion of the court that, inasmuch as the claim for indemnity is predicated, in part, upon injuries allegedly sustained by certain of Kroger’s customers, in the Middle District of Tennessee, venue in this District is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for transitory federal claims in the district where the claim arose when jurisdiction does not depend wholly on diversity of citizenship.

Adams Dairy Company v. National Dairy Products Corp. · filed 1968-10-24(b)

There can be no doubt that the civil antitrust actions here involved were filed in the judicial district “in which the claim arose,” within the meaning of the 1966 amendment to Section 1391(b) of Title 28, United States Code. Nor can there be any doubt that “Section 1391(b) is the general venue statute governing transitory causes of action in the federal courts where jurisdiction does not depend wholly on diversity of citizenship.”

Section 1391(a) makes venue proper where the claim arose, and this claim arose where the contract was made.

M. Dean Kaufman, Inc. v. Warnaco, Inc. · filed 1969-01-03(a)

Plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of the merger, nor out of the preliminary negotiations which led to it. It arose out of his contract; and, since this contract was not entered into in this district, and concededly no other basis of venue under § 1391 is applicable, venue is improper.

Under the claim-arose provision of § 1391(b), venue can be proper where the trust funds have their principal offices and managers meet, even if some challenged transactions occurred elsewhere.

Giordani v. Hoffmann · filed 1969-01-10(b)

Although certain of the specific transactions which the plaintiffs challenge occurred outside of this District, the Court believes that the plaintiffs’ allegations generally satisfy the requirement of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) that the “claim arose” here, and thus that venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Dr. Harold D. Kletschka v. William J. Driver, Individually and as Administrator of the Veterans Administration · filed 1969-04-22(b)

As a preliminary matter we note that venue is properly laid in the Northern District of New York, contrary to the alternative holding of the district court. It was in this district that “the claim arose,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose, but the claims here did not arise in the forum district.

State of Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. · filed 1969-10-10(b)

This court finds it unnecessary to determine whether § 1391(b) applies in antitrust cases, for even assuming that it does, the plaintiffs’ claims did not arise in the forum district. A holding to the contrary would, in effect, be an adoption of the “co-conspirator” theory of 15 U.S.C. § 22, which states that presence of one alleged co-conspirator in the district establishes venue as to all, for it would grant venue as to all defendants merely because sales by some occurred in the district. Just as the “co-conspirator” theory has been widely rejected as an attempt to evade the legislative limitations on venue in antitrust actions, so also must the suggested application of § 1391(b) to the facts in these cases be rejected.

Section 1391 permits venue discovery about where the claim arose when general venue rules supplement special antitrust venue statutes.

ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co. · filed 1969-10-16

Thus, this court is of the opinion that Section 1391 is applicable in the present case, and under its terms venue discovery as to where the claim arose is proper.

Section 1391(b) places venue where the most significant conspiratorial acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Company · filed 1970-03-24(b)

Since the defendants and the plaintiffs are farflung and the conspiracy is alleged to have been nation-wide, significant sales causing substantial injury cannot be said to be the key consideration here. Rather, since the heart of the complaint against the individual defendants is that, in their capacities as high-ranking officers of their respective ticket companies, they conspired with one another to violate the antitrust laws, the most significant conspiratorial acts of the defendants would be the key to venue under Section 1391 in this case.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose and supplements specific venue statutes.

Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti · filed 1970-06-16(b)

In addition, the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)) provides that venue may be laid in the district “in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” ... It has been held that this section is supplementary to the specific sections of the Clayton Act. ... This seems a proper interpretation in view of the generally accepted thesis in this district that the specific venue provisions of the antitrust statutes were intended to facilitate the prosecution of these actions and not to make unavailable the general venue provisions. ... Consequently, the refusal to sell damaged plaintiff in New York and that is where the claim arose.

Section 1391(a) makes venue proper in the district where the claim arose when the parties do not all reside in the district.

Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp. · filed 1970-06-22(a)

Furthermore, since neither the plaintiff nor all of the defendants reside in this judicial district venue is proper only if the action has been brought in the district where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits an antitrust action to be brought where the claim arose, measured by the weight of the contacts.

California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n · filed 1970-07-02(b)

In light of the above and, although the matter is not free from doubt, we conclude that the “weight of the contacts” favors laying venue against NASL in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless another law provides otherwise.

Jimenez v. Pierce · filed 1970-07-14(b)

First, no other law is here applicable with regard to venue under the foregoing sections of the United States Code. ... In the absence of any affirmative showing by plaintiff that the N.A.C.C. has itself mandated the acts and practices complained of, and in view of the plain wording of the Mental Hygiene Law, this court, with all due appreciation for the gravity of plaintiff’s charges, is not at all persuaded that the claim arose in this district. But even conceding arguendo the substance of plaintiff’s argument, the issue of whether the claim arose in this district would still be in doubt. All of the numerous activities of which plaintiff complains occurred in the Northern District of New York, and, upon the facts here, the weight of contacts appears to exist there. ... Given the fact that the action is being prosecuted without the assistance of counsel, and that the alleged misconduct is of an extremely serious nature, this court declines to impose the severe penalty of dismissing the action, but rather directs that the case be transferred to the Northern District of New York, where it might originally have been brought.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited · filed 1971-06-24(b), (d)

Under subdivision (b) of the general venue provisions, venue is only proper in two judicial districts, where all defendants reside and, as provided by a 1966 amendment, where the claim arose. None of the defendants reside in this district. This Court is of the opinion that the claim did not arise in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Gerber v. Canfield · filed 1970-09-03(a)

The 1966 amendment to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(a) authorizes a civil action to be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arises (South Carolina is one judicial district) and provides: A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. [Emphasis added.] The wording of the statute projects neither confusion nor ambiguity.

Section 1391(b) permits plaintiffs to rely on it as an independent alternative basis for venue where the claim arose.

Blau v. Tool Research & Engineering Corp. · filed 1971-08-31(b)

Moreover, given the hybrid jurisdictional nature of this action, I would also agree with plaintiffs that § 1391(b) provides an independent' alternative basis for venue in this district. In this respect, I am constrained to disagree with Judge Wyatt’s disposition in his memorandum on reargument in Pittsburgh Forgings, supra, wherein he concluded that the “except as otherwise provided” clause in § 1391(b) disqualifies plaintiff from reliance on that section.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a federal claim arose, even when a special antitrust venue provision also applies.

Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc. · filed 1971-10-15(b)

The allegations of the complaint leave little room to find that the alleged acts resulting in unfair competition and monopolization occurred in any other state than Nebraska, and therefore venue is proper under § 1391(b) and is not obviated by 15 U.S.C. § 15.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Ryan v. Glenn · filed 1971-12-30

These ultimate facts are amply supported by evidence and justify our prior conclusion that the “claim arose” within this judicial district so as to confer venue upon this court.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where the claim arose.

Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corporation · filed 1972-03-17(a)

The defendant’s motion to dismiss also raises a question of venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides: “(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” Since we have determined that the cause of action arose from the transaction of business by Deltona within the State of Colorado, the action arose within the State of Colorado, and the District of Colorado is a proper venue.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action not founded solely on diversity to be brought where the claim arose.

Ellison v. ROCK HILL PRINTING AND FINISHING COMPANY · filed 1972-08-17(b)

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina is, as demonstrated by the pleadings, the district “in which the claim arose” in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and is the district “in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed” and where the defendant can be “found” in the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). Therefore, venue is properly placed.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where the cause of action arose, including where substantial material events occurred.

United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee · filed 1971-07-19(e)

Venue is properly laid, among other places, in the judicial district where the “cause of action arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). The “cause of action” in this case may, as defendant asserts, have arisen in Washington, D. C., the district where the Board for the Correction of Naval Records refused to grant plaintiff’s petition; but it also had its roots in this district where the court-martial proceeding was held. The cause of action for venue purposes can be said to arise wherever substantial material events took place.

Section 1391(b) permits an action not founded solely on diversity to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Iaquinta v. Sloan · filed 1972-10-26(b)

Of course, the general venue statute governing federal actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and not West Virginia law, would control. In particular, § 1391(b), providing for the bringing of actions “not founded solely on diversity of citizenship .... only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose” (emphasis added), would seem broad enough to permit this case to be brought in this judicial district.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the claim arose when jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship.

Paragon International, N. v. v. Standard Plastics, Inc. · filed 1973-01-08

Although the venue statute provides for venue in the district in which the claim arose, a federal district court sitting in New York cannot decide under some federal common law where the claim arose. It must rely on the state law of the forum. ... Accordingly, I find that the claim arose in the Southern District of New York, and that venue lies here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside and where the claim arose.

Sanborn v. Wagner · filed 1973-02-15(b)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) by reason of the fact that both defendants reside in the District of Maryland and the claim arose here.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action only where the parties reside or the claim arose, and the court determines where the claim arose from the operative facts.

Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U. S. Silver & Mining Corp. · filed 1973-03-23

The Defendant Silver’s motion to dismiss further urges that the claim sued upon did not arise within this district. 28 U.S.C., § 1391, provides that a civil diversity action “may ... be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.’’ (Emphasis added.) Although the Defendant was doing business in Texas, it did not reside in the Southern District of Texas. Its home office and it principal place of business were in the states of Utah and Illinois. So, venue can be maintained in the Southern District of Texas only if the “claim arose” here. Ryan v. Glenn, D.C., 52 F.R.D. 185, 192, says that the word “claim” as it is used in the quoted statute providing for venue in a United States judicial district means “the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable in the courts”; thus, where the claim arose is a matter of substantive law. This being the case, we must look, under Erie, to the law of Texas to determine venue in this diversity case.

Section 1391(b) supplements Clayton Act venue in antitrust actions; the court used the weight of contacts to determine where the claim arose.

Redmond v. Atlantic Coast Football League · filed 1973-05-03(b)

The general venue provisions of 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b) are applicable to antitrust actions and are designed to supplement Section 4 of the Clayton Act. ... Consequently, in accordance with the aforementioned “weight of contacts” test, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that his cause of action arose in this judicial district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a contract claim at the place where performance was to occur, even when the claim arises from anticipatory repudiation elsewhere.

Gardner Engineering Corporation v. Page Engineering Company · filed 1973-08-01(a)

It clearly appears to be the purpose of the 1966 amendment to § 1391(a) to further the convenience of the parties, the primary purpose of the venue statutes, and to allow a suit to be brought at the place where the claim arose, which could include the place where the performance was to have taken place. The place of performance here was at the jobsite in Arkansas, and it clearly meets both the spirit and intent of the amended venue statute to hold that venue was proper in Arkansas.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless otherwise provided by law.

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg · filed 1973-11-21(b)

Since the defendant Sperberg does not reside in this judicial district, venue is proper in the Southern District of New York only if the claim arose here. ... For this reason, I find that the claim arose in this district and, therefore, venue is clearly proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Chance v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Company, Inc. · filed 1974-01-23(a)

In the present actions, venue is appropriately laid in the respective states of accidents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a nondiversity conspiracy claim in a district where alleged operative acts occurred.

United States ex rel. Thomas v. Rundle · filed 1974-02-20(b)

Plaintiff has alleged a conspiracy between the defendants, operative acts of which are alleged to have occurred within the eastern as well as the western district of Pennsylvania. Accordingly we conclude that venue is properly laid in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose; a crash and alleged negligent acts in that district suffice.

Miller v. Cousins Properties, Incorporated · filed 1974-03-22(b)

The facts demonstrated in the record make it appear that the crash of the aircraft and the alleged negligent acts assigned to Cousins occurred in Vermont. This is adequate to establish that the claim, upon which the action is founded, arose in this District within 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a trademark infringement claim where confusion injures the mark holder, even if the defendant sells the goods elsewhere.

Scott Paper Company v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc. · filed 1974-04-16(b)

Injury to the holder of a mark occurs when its name is confused with that of the alleged infringer. Such confusion, if it exists in this case, clearly occurred in the State of Delaware. That it may have occurred elsewhere does not change this fact. ... Defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue will be denied.

Section 1391(b) does not permit suit wherever any part of a claim arose, however small that part may be.

Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc. · filed 1974-04-16(b)

In other words, to return to the question as originally posed, I am deciding that the right given by Section 1391(b) to sue in any district “in which the claim arose” is not the right to sue where any part of the claim, however small, arose.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where an antitrust claim arose when allegedly wrongful acts outside the district targeted the plaintiff within it, even if the conspirators never met there.

Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites · filed 1974-06-13(b)

Though the ratifications in New York may not have been enough, standing alone, the performance of allegedly illegal and ill-motivated acts which found their target in New York should be enough in these circumstances. It is not necessary that the conspirators meet in the district to support a venue which is based on the ground that the claim “arose” here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim for relief arose.

McCrory Corporation v. Cloth World, Inc. · filed 1974-06-24(b)

In any event, the general venue statute — 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) — would support the venue herein, since, as noted a claim for relief based on alleged tortious interference “arose” in New York.

Section 1391 permits a contract action to be brought in the district where the claim arose.

Allied International Products Ltd. v. Textron Industries, Inc. · filed 1974-10-15

All performance under the contract was undertaken either in Rhode Island or India, and all decisions by Textron relating to the contract were made in its Providence offices; it was there that the decision to terminate was made and from there that the notice to plaintiff to terminate the contract was sent. Rhode Island is thus a District in which the action might have been brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where a diversity contract claim arose, determined under the forum state's grouping of contacts rule.

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller · filed 1974-10-16(a)

The issue of where the claim arose is to be resolved in accordance with the state law of the forum, that is, New York law. ... New York relies upon the “grouping of contacts” as the criterion in contract litigation. ... In view of the aforementioned contacts with the Southern District of New York, venue properly lies in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where substantial contacts with the district show that the claim arose there.

Arnold v. SMITH MOTOR CO., BROOKFIELD, MO. · filed 1974-12-19(b)

In the instant action, the court finds substantial contacts with this district to render venue appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The injury, the sale to plaintiff which precipitated it, and the alleged consequential damages which flowed therefrom all occurred here and will require proof by plaintiff.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the incident giving rise to the suit occurred.

Taylor v. Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 1974-07-01

The amount of damages sought against each defendant exceeds the statutory prerequisite of $10,000 and venue is properly laid in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the incident triggering this litigation occurred in Maryland.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Leinberger v. Webster · filed 1975-02-06(a)

Since both causes of action arose in Vermont, venue could originally have been laid there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action to be brought in the district where the claim arose, even if not all defendants reside there.

Harley v. Oliver · filed 1975-05-20(b)

All the events upon which the claim is based occurred in the Western District of Arkansas. There is no diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and any of the defendants. ... Title 28, U.S.C.A., § 1391, provides: ... “(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” ... Thus, contention No. 1 of plaintiffs is without merit.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, determined in an antitrust case by weighing the contacts with the district.

United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists · filed 1975-06-06(b)

Applying the test to the facts of this case, I find that the “claim arose” here, for purposes of § 1391(b), and that venue is therefore properly established in this district as to the individual defendants.

Section 1391(b) places venue where the claim arose; for a challenge to layoff decisions, the court considers where the decisions and alleged violation occurred.

Weil v. New York State Department of Transportation · filed 1975-06-30(b)

The purpose of the venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391) is to provide a convenient forum for trial balancing the equities and fairness to each party. ... In the case at bar the clear weight of the contacts is in Albany, which is located in the Northern District of New York. There the determination was made as to the number and identity of those to be laid off. If there was any violation of plaintiff’s rights it occurred there. ... It is clear to me that venue lies properly in this matter in the Northern District of New York.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

White v. Smith · filed 1975-07-21

Plaintiffs properly brought this suit in New Jersey, the district “in which the claim arose”, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the principal tort claims arose.

Wahl v. Foreman · filed 1975-07-25(a)

It is clear that in this case venue is proper only if the claim arose here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Accordingly, the principal tort claims arose in New York, and venue as to them is proper here.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where the claim arose, determined by the district with the most significant contacts.

Ghazoul v. International Management Services, Inc. · filed 1975-07-25(a)

In the present ease, the facts, as developed in the pleadings and affidavits at bar make it manifest that the “weight of contacts” for venue purposes lies in this district. ... Venue in the Southern District of New York is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Action Alliance for Senior Citizens v. Shapp · filed 1975-07-30(b)

We once more reject this contention, finding that venue is proper both under 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (b) in that the claim arose here and under section 1392(a) in that one of the defendants, Paul Standeven, resides here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal question case where all defendants reside or where the claim arises.

Mad Hatter, Inc. v. Mad Hatters Night Club Co. · filed 1975-08-13(b)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which permits venue in federal question cases wherever all the defendants reside or wherever the claim arises. Here the entire claim — that defendants were threatening court action because of plaintiff’s use of the name of “Mad Hatter” — did arise in Michigan.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a civil rights claim where operative facts, including the injury, occurred; distinct claims must be assessed separately.

Maney v. Ratcliff · filed 1975-09-03(b)

Venue for the first two claims is properly laid in this district, since many of the operative facts giving rise to the claims occurred here. ... The third claim, relating to events in New York in late December and early January, did not arise in this district and venue is therefore improper.

Under § 1391(a), courts determine where a diversity claim arose by weighing the contacts with each district; an insignificant connection does not establish venue.

British-American Insurance Company Ltd. v. Lee · filed 1975-10-03(a)

The best method for making such a determination appears to be by the adoption of a “weight of contacts test.” ... Hence, the transmittal of the voting instructions through the Delaware Trustee was but an insignificant part of the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to the rights sought to be enforced in this lawsuit. ... For the above reasons, the Court concludes that venue is not properly laid in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) or under § 27 of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal claim to be brought in the district where it arose; courts determine that district by weighing the contacts and giving substantial weight to the place of injury.

Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc. · filed 1975-11-12(b)

I also believe that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which allows for a federal claim to be brought in the judicial district “in which the claim arose.” ... I agree that, in determining where the claim arose, courts should use the weight of the contacts test, but I also feel that the place of injury should be given great weight and consideration by the court; a failure to give “heavy” weight to the place of injury would enable a foreign corporation to make policy decisions in a distant state which violate the antitrust laws, and yet force the aggrieved party to travel to the wrongdoer’s home district to litigate the suit.

Section 1391(b) does not establish venue where a claim arose based on meeting attendance without a showing that the cause of action arose from those meetings.

In Re Chicken Antitrust Litigation · filed 1975-12-24(b)

As noted in the discussion with respect to Tyson Foods, Inc.’s motion above, absent some affirmative showing that the cause of action arose out of the conventions and meetings attended by Mr. DeWitt, the attendance of such meetings would not subject DeWitt to suit here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a trademark infringement claim in a district where the defendants made substantial sales of the allegedly infringing products.

Tefal, S.A. And Royal Chambord, Inc. v. Products International Company, a Partnership Also Known as Picam Products and a · filed 1976-01-26(b)

Furthermore, keeping in mind the purposes of the venue requirement — the convenience of the parties — we do not deem it unfair on this record to require the defendants to stand trial in a district where they did substantial business in products which allegedly infringe plaintiff Tefal’s products and in which it is fair to infer substantial dollar sales of defendants’ products took place.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

ACTION ALLIANCE, SR. CIT. OF GR. PHILA., INC. v. Shapp · filed 1976-01-30(b)

We once more reject this contention, finding that venue is proper both under 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (b) in that the claim arose here and under section 1392(a) in that one of the defendants, Paul Standeven, resides here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the alleged injury occurs, even if the challenged government decisions were made elsewhere.

Sheffield v. State of Texas · filed 1976-04-19(b)

Alternatively, we conclude that the claim arose in this district, and therefore venue is proper here notwithstanding the residence of the Defendants.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the transactions giving rise to the claim occurred.

EF Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Burkholder · filed 1976-05-19(a)

1. No challenge having been presented to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court finds that jurisdiction over this action is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship) and that venue is properly laid in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because the transactions in question occurred in the Washington, D. C. office of Hutton.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose even if a defendant resides elsewhere.

Far-Mar-Co, Inc. v. Schultz Cattle Co. · filed 1976-06-15(a)

A determination of proper venue in this action would be based on consideration of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) which states: ... Since Junior has established he is not a resident of Oklahoma, it must be determined if the claim arose in Oklahoma. ... The Motion to Dismiss asserted by Defendant George Schultz, Jr., based on an allegation that venue is improper is overruled and thus said Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is overruled in its entirety.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial portion of the claim arose, including where the challenged statements were made or circulated.

Goggi Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp. · filed 1976-06-18(b)

Turning to that portion of defendant’s motion which is addressed to venue, I find that venue in this case is properly laid in this district. The parties are in apparent agreement that if venue is proper in this case it must be under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... However, even under such a test a substantial portion of plaintiffs’ claim could well be said to have arisen in this district. ... Not only are plaintiffs New York corporations, but this district is alleged to be a major outboard motor market and defendant’s challenged statements were allegedly made in or circulated in New York.

Under § 1391(a), a claim arises in a district where a substantial part of the acts, events, or omissions giving rise to it occurred.

Commercial Lighting Products, Inc. v. United States District Court · filed 1976-06-30(a)

We thus find venue in this type of case in any district in which a substantial part of the acts, events, or omissions occurred that gave rise to the claim for relief.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim on a guaranty arose, even if the guarantors later moved away.

United States v. Casey · filed 1976-09-16(b)

Section 1391(b) establishes venue in the judicial district “in which the claim arose”. The Government’s claim against the defendant on his guaranty had its provenance in Puerto Rico. It was executed there. So was National’s note and its chattel mortgage. The lending agency, EDA, handled the loan out of its San Juan office. The claim against Mr. Casey did not leave Puerto Rico when he left. Venue remained there.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the claim arose; minimal contacts with a district do not suffice.

Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc. · filed 1976-09-27(b)

We conclude that the defendant’s contact with New York has indeed been miniscule and that the claim cannot reasonably be found to have arisen here for purposes of § 1391(b).

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue in the district where the transactions giving rise to the claim originated.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Graves · filed 1976-11-18(a)

Venue also properly is laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 since the transactions concerning the Bank originated in Concordia Parish within the Monroe Division of this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose; in an antitrust case, substantial conspiratorial meetings and votes can establish that location.

Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan · filed 1977-01-10(b)

In antitrust cases, venue may be established under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22 or under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In the present case, Ronald and Joseph Haas attended numerous meetings with other defendants in this district. Ohio-Sealy alleges that during these meetings, the defendants conspired to harm it and implemented that conspiracy by, among other actions, voting to adopt alleged restraints of trade. Applying the weight of the contacts test, these meetings appear to be the most significant part of the alleged offense. Since Ronald and Joseph Haas attended these meetings and participated in the voting, we find that the claim against them arose here and that venue in this judicial district is proper as to them.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Flintkote Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. · filed 1977-01-26(a)

There is no question that these actions “might have been brought” in the proposed transferee districts since that is ... where the acts complained of took place and where the claims arose.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where the claim arose, including where the alleged wrongful conduct originated.

ITT Thorp Corp. v. Firemen's Insurance · filed 1977-01-28(a)

It therefore appears that the claims forming the basis of this suit arose in Marshalltown, Iowa, where Mr. Halverson’s allegedly fraudulent or dishonest activities originated. Under § 1391(a), the southern district of Iowa, where the “claim arose” is one proper venue for this action.

In a diversity action, the claim arises for venue purposes in the district with the most significant contacts underlying the cause of action.

B. J. McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs · filed 1977-02-14(a)

Of these three possible forums, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the site of the most significant contacts since the operative events which gave rise to plaintiff’s cause of action took place here. This is the district where the claim arose, and venue therefore is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the cause of action arose.

Gonzalez v. Texas Employment Commission · filed 1977-01-24(b)

The second claim is that venue in the Southern District of Texas is improper. This claim is without merit: This cause of action arose when Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was denied in Hidalgo County, which is within the Southern District of Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the claim arose; venue is proper when the alleged contacts with that district outweigh those elsewhere.

Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson · filed 1977-06-17(a)

But these Florida contacts are far outweighed by the alleged contacts with this district. Accepting these allegations as true — which, as pointed out above, is the Court’s duty— there is no doubt that defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue must be denied.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity claim in any district with which the claim has significant contacts.

Data Disc, Incorporated v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc. · filed 1977-07-13(a)

In this circuit, we have determined that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), a claim arises in any district with which it has “significant contacts.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the alleged injury occurred, even when the cause originated in another district.

Johnson v. Mississippi · filed 1977-08-25(b)

The cause originated in the Southern District, but the injury has been inflicted in the Northern District. Under the statute the venue is properly laid in either district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case where the claim arose, including a district with more than miniscule contacts related to the alleged wrongdoing.

Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. · filed 1977-10-12(a)

The facts in this case clearly show “more than miniscule contact” with this district. ... The Court is satisfied that on the facts presented venue is fairly laid in this district.

Federal law governs where a claim arose for purposes of venue under § 1391(a).

Schreiber v. Blankfort · filed 1977-11-01(a)

The task of determining “where a claim arose” under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970) is, therefore, one of federal statutory interpretation.

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper where only a trivial part of a trademark infringement claim arose.

Hindu Incense v. Meadows · filed 1977-11-10(b)

The display of the invoice form with the “Genie” logo in Chicago may constitute some part of the claim of trademark infringement, but it surely cannot be regarded as either a substantial part or the largest part of such claim; it is at the most a scintilla of substance, which is more than nothing, but does not amount to anything.

Section 1391(b) does not provide venue for an antitrust claim in a district where the defendant made no substantial sales and engaged in no alleged conspiratorial acts or transactions giving rise to the claim.

Athletes Foot of Delaware, Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co. · filed 1977-11-28(b)

There is no allegation that conspiratorial meetings, nor any overt act by AFMA in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, occurred in this district. AFMA does not make substantial sales here ... and the claim against it did not arise or grow out of transactions within Delaware. ... Venue with respect to AFMA cannot be predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, including the district where the alleged violations caused their principal effects and injury.

Township of Long Beach v. City of New York · filed 1978-01-24(b)

This argument is rejected. It seems patently obvious that the claim upon which this action is based can be considered to have arisen in New Jersey as that certainly is the place where the effect of the alleged violations have weighed most heavily and it is the situs at which the injury occurred.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for an age discrimination claim in the district where the employment injury occurred.

Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co. · filed 1978-01-25(b)

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that an action not founded solely upon diversity may be brought only in the judicial district in which all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. ... In the case before this Court, the alleged injury occurred only in Maryland, where the plaintiff lives and worked. The basic test is therefore appropriate: the cause of action arises and venue lies in the district in which the injury occurs.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. UOP, Inc. · filed 1978-03-20(a)

Because the claim in this case arose in the Virgin Islands, venue would clearly be proper in that judicial district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the claim arose.

Great American Insurance v. Raque · filed 1978-05-01(a)

The occurrence from which this claim arises had its genesis in this district and venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant’s contacts giving rise to a transitory claim are more than miniscule under the weight of the contacts approach.

McDonald's Corp. v. Congdon Die Casting Co. · filed 1978-06-12(b)

And applying it, the court concludes that defendant’s contacts with this forum are a sufficient basis on which to place venue in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

For a conspiracy claim to arise in a district under § 1391(b), a defendant whose venue is challenged must have substantial or significant contacts with that district.

Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mtg. Corp. · filed 1978-06-12(b)

Since the venue provisions at issue here are modeled after the antitrust venue provisions, I conclude that it must be shown that there is venue over Pennington, under Section 1391(b), due to his own contacts with this district. ... Accordingly, it has not been alleged that the claim against Pennington arose in this district and proper venue has not been asserted as to him under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Under § 1391(b), a trademark claim may arise in a district where the defendant’s contacts support personal jurisdiction; substantial local sales also support venue under a weight of contacts test.

Battle Creek Equipment Co. v. Roberts Manufacturing Co. · filed 1978-06-26(b)

In my view the latter of the two approaches set forth above is preferable, largely for the reasons cited by Moore. Defendants do not contend that personal jurisdiction over Roberts Manufacturing is lacking, and for that reason the second approach would dictate that venue is proper. Even under the “weight of contacts” test, however, it appears that sufficient reasons exist for recognizing venue in this district.

Under § 1391(b), a claim does not arise in a district where the defendant’s contact is minuscule, even if that contact supports personal jurisdiction.

Metropa Co., Ltd. v. Choi · filed 1978-09-19(b)

Its only contact with this district has been the mail-order sale of two wigs, at a combined price of $28.99, to a wig dealer in Manhattan. Such a miniscule contact, while sufficient to ground personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute, is inadequate to establish venue in the Southern District of New York.

Under § 1391(a), venue in a diversity case is proper in a district where the claim arose.

Cochrane v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. · filed 1979-01-05(a)

In view of the citizenship of the parties which has been described, it is evident that venue in the Southern District of Iowa was proper only if plaintiffs’ claim “arose” in that district within the meaning of § 1391(a).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the claim arose, based on the claim’s significant contacts with that district.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Alexander · filed 1979-01-11(a)

The claim against the Contractor in respect to the Hunter Field and Fort Stewart jobs clearly arose in the Southern District of Georgia within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where the claim arose.

National Surety Corp. v. Robert M. Barton Corp. · filed 1979-03-21(a)

As Defendants assert in their Motion that this action involves transactions occurring within the transferee district, and Plaintiff has not disputed this, the Court will assume that the Plaintiff’s claim arose in the transferee district so that this action could have been brought in that district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the claim arose.

Kruse v. Zenith Radio Corp. · filed 1979-03-21

With venue bestowed upon this district as the situs in which the claim arose, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391, intervenor American States Insurance Company’s subrogation claim may proceed in the absence of plaintiff Walter Kruse.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where a diversity claim arose only if a substantial part of the claim arose in that district.

Lámar v. American Basketball Ass'n · filed 1979-04-12(a)

The “substantiality” test applied to the language of § 1391(b) by the Transamerican and Honda courts is even more appropriate in a case such as this where plaintiff’s venue choices are broader under § 1391(a) and where only a single defendant is involved.

Sections 1391(b) and (e) use a preponderance of the contacts test to determine where a claim arose for venue purposes.

Thornwell v. United States · filed 1979-05-30

Accordingly, in reviewing venue objections under sections 1391(e) and 1402(b), the Court must apply the same “preponderance of the contacts” test that it employed under section 1391(b), and under this test, it concludes that venue is proper for the United States and the four defendants named in their official capacity.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal common law nuisance action against a municipal corporation in the district where the claim arose, including where the injury was suffered, regardless of state venue rules.

People Of The State Of Illinois v. City Of Milwaukee · filed 1979-06-14(b)

Whatever may be the significance of state law in determining whether an action is "transitory" or "local" in other contexts, 4 we agree with the district court, Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, 4 E.R.C. at 1850, that the language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, 406 U.S. at 108 n.10, 92 S.Ct. 1385, indicates that an action against a municipal corporation and based on the federal common law of nuisance may be filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), in either the district where all the defendants reside or the district where the claim arose, without regard to any otherwise applicable state venue statutes or common law rules. In this case, the claim arose in the Northern District of Illinois, where the injury was suffered, and therefore venue was proper.

Section 1391(b) places venue where the claim arose; the effect of state officials’ actions at the plaintiff’s location does not itself make that location a proper venue.

Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. · filed 1979-06-26(b)

In short, the District of Idaho is the only one in which “the claim arose” within the meaning of § 1391 (b).

A claim arises in a district for venue purposes when the defendant’s transaction of business there supports long arm jurisdiction over the claim.

Bastille Properties, Inc. v. Hometels of America, Inc. · filed 1979-08-22(a)

I therefore hold that the existence of long arm jurisdiction based on defendants’ transaction of business within New York is, without more, sufficient to support a finding that the claim arose in New York.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the most significant contacts underlying the claim occurred.

Randolph Engineering Co. v. Kommandit-Gesellschaft · filed 1979-09-28(a)

A claim arises in a judicial district when, in comparison with other possible fora, the most significant contacts underlying the cause of action occur in that district. ... In comparison to the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Michigan has very few contacts with this cause of action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a claim arose, which the court determined by weighing the parties’ contacts and identifying where the plaintiff felt the injury.

Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fox · filed 1979-10-17(b)

The two principal tests employed to determine where a cause of action “arose” under Section 1391(b) are the “weight of the contacts” test and the “place of injury” test. ... The court therefore concludes that venue is proper in the Central District of California.